NIE-35/1: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA THROUGH MID-1952

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001000030024-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 18, 1999
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: February 21, 1952
• Content Type: NIE

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SECURITY 11 ORATION
SUBJECT. AIIE-35f1a PROBABLE DE?VSLQPUENTS IN INDOCHINA THROUGH
:-1952
To estimate probable developments in Indochina through
mid-1952 with particular emphasis on probable Chinese Communist
courses of action in that area.
CONCLUSIONS
1. We believe that the Franco-Vietnamese forces will continue
to hold substantially their present military position in Indochina during
the period of this estimate.
2. We believe that the French will continue their war
effort in Indochina, but at the same time, while insisting upon
the protection of French interests,, win attempt to limit their
commitments there by demanding; additional US financial assistance and
by seeking commitments for US-UK military support in the defense of
Indochina.
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3. The present critical financial situation of Prince
is causing the French Government increasing concern over France's
ability to maintain its position in Indochina and to support
simultaneously its presently projected military effort in Europe,
We believe that the reflections of this concern in Vietnam will
give rise to misgivings concerning France's intentions toward
Indochina and will accordingly have an adverse effect upon Vietnamese
morale, We believe that this concern will not affect French
determination to defend Indochina during the period of this
estimate, but may at a later date influence France's will to
continue resistance in Indochina,
it, Independent of present or possible future operations
in Korea, the Chinese Communists have the capability to commit and
logistically support approximately 150,000 troops in Indochina.
This force coula probably cause the *aneooVietnamese forces to
evacuate Tonkin before effective resistance could be brought to
bear,
5. We believe, however, that the Chinese Communists will
not intervene in force in Indochina during the period of this estimate,
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CONFIDE*I'AL'
 6,. We believe that the Chinese Communists w.sLl-1 expand the scale
and nature of their present assistance to the Vi.ot Minh and may in
addition introduce Chinese "volunteer" troops in small numbers,
In pursuit of this policy they will stop short of any degree of
assistance which they estimate might provoke major Western
retaliatory action against the main lane of China.
11 3--
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THE CURR>i T SITUATION
6, [The-eurrent military situation err-indochid-rj,0
ens-of st lmlmatea] since the publication of NI -35s "Probable
Developments in Indochina During the Remainder of 1951" dated
7 August 1951, the French[Ie7extended their Red River delta
perimeter around Hanoi and Haiphong westward to Hoe Binh, but
the Viet Minh[have been vigorously counterattacking at various
points since early December] (See Map fit) In the Hanoi.,
Haiphong delta area, 115,000 Franco-Vietnamese regular troops
currently confront an estimated 90,000 Viet Minh regular troops.
Elsewhere in Indochina, guerrilla type warfare continues and
the Viet Minh still control northern Tonkin, major portions
of the Annam coast and parts of Cochinchina, Cambodia, and
Laos. (see Map #2)
7e There has been a .great improvement in the vigor,
coordination, and effectiveness of recent Viet Minh attacks
along the French Perimeter in Tonkin, The Viet Minh have
mounted a sustained frontal attack in the western delta area,
 ~Ww
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and elsewhere in the delta have infiltrated one division and
major elements of another behind the Franco-Vietnamese positions
in the central and southern parts the delta where they are
c~d. " a, AA L ,fie, r1- t/ ti C .
now conducting harassing operations, There has been a noticeable
increase in Viet Minh antiaircraft capability in recent months, AlthouEI
the Viet Minh have, suffered heavy casualties
tit C .y ia-4'or*#nJ they continue to attack and have
forced the French to commit almost all of their Tonkin reserves to
the operations along the western edge of the delta and against Viet
Minh unite which have infiltrated elsewhere,
80 'This increased capability reflects a considerable
increase in Chinese Commmi.at advisory, training, and logistic
assistance to the Viet Iinh, ,.hile there is no conclusive
evidence that Chimes personnel,9 either in units or as individuals,
are serving with Viet Minh combat units, there are an estimated
159000 Communist Chinese with the Viet Minh serving in technical,
advisory and garrison capacities. There has been considerable a~4
improvement of transportation routes and f:n:.tlitiea from South
China into Indochina, Chinese Conurnnlat logistic assistance
to the Viet Minh via these routes is at an all time high, while
stockpiles on both sides of the border are believed to be in
excess of Viet Minh requirements for present operations,
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9a A though Fres=h losses have been heavy, to combat
effectiveness of the French forces remains highs The combat
effectiveness of the Associated States' forces is for the most
part not yet adequate to fit them #cr Independent combat operations,
Cav .hepse forces are primarily performing static defense roles Atr 4q
- Laura cvc u ~.TQ_d IRAQ. c n rTD~ &, yn -h ..< ? e ?1J?"`~
US SAP aid has been of critical importance to the regular
French forces during recent oporations. Although the attrition
rate in French equipment is high, LDAP logistic assistance is
compensating for these losses,
10, There has been little significant change in the
political situation within Vietnam, the most important of the
Associated States, since the publication of NIE-35, asd the
factors discussed In NIEa35 which limit the development of a
strong Vietnamese government still apply, The death of
General de Lattre has had an adverse effect upon Vietnamese
morale as have the suspicions of the Vietnamese that the French
may be wea,taning in their determination and ability to defend
Indochina.
no We believe that the spirits of the Viet Minh leaders have
been raised by the recent death of General do Lattre, the ewe
panded scale of Chinese Communist assistance, the debilitating
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effect which the sustained Viet LU.nhl offensive has had upon
r,L cc t H f3 1
the French,, and their discernment of a makening Franco-
Ca.u-+/+. ).1 .cQ.~ ~~ c.. o-L
Vietnamese will to resist, The trond-of_the-Viet L1nh away from
I V. A-I ~ co- ~
a revolutionary national movement and towards the pattern of a
Communist regime continues with a consequent strengthening of
internal controls The food shortage is being alleviated by rice gained
from within the French porimeter0 There is no evidence of serious
friction between the Viet ?idsh and the Chinese CoDmxnists.
12, We believe that the Viet Minh will, probably be able
to retake Hoa Binh and to continue to infiltrate the French lines
in Tonkin,y but will be unable further to reduce the French defense
perimeter during the period of this estimate. Within the period
the Viet Minh will probably find it r cessary to slacken tempo
racily their current offensive effort,, although the overall com-
bat effectiveness of the Viet Minh will almost certainly continue
to improve. Elsewhere in Indochinag the Viet Minh will centime
and will increase their terrorist and guerrilla tactics.
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l3, The French government is increasingly concerned over
France's ability to maintain its position in Indochina. There
is a growing official feeling in France that it cannot simultaneously
support presently projected military efforts in both Europe aid
Asia without greater US aid. The French now estimate that, with
present i15 aid, the maximum 1952 military budget that is .politically
and economically possible will fall Several hundred million dollars
short of their projected requirements for NATO and Indochina togethsr4
The French, if eventually forced to choose between Europe and Indo-
China, would view their Indochina conatLt mnt, as of lesser importance0
?.oreover, there has been a growing feeling that the distant and
costly Indochinese war offers few rewards even if wono This feeling
is increasing political pressure for same alleviation of the French
burden in Irdoehina0 The various approaches by which France is seeking
to achieve this reduction of its ronthtrentS area (a) by insisting
that much of the financial burden f r the defense of Indochina be
shifted to the TTS,g (b) by seeking a US-,1JK commitment to participate
in the defense of Indochina in the event of more active Chinese
Communist interventions or possibly (c) by including the issue of
Indochina within the context of any general. Far East settlement which
might arise out of Korean negotiations. Should. these approaches prove
nlsuccessful, the French would seriously consider withdraaaal from Indochina?
 14. Within the period under review, however, we believe
that a French military withdrawal from Indochina is unlikely
despite the increasingly difficult financial situation which has
caused isolated demands in Parliament for a withdrawal, Strong
factors still, hold the French to their present commitxnants.
These includes (a) the intangible but powerful factor of prestige;
(b) the knowledge that withdrawal from Indochina would have reper-
cussions elsewhere in the French Union; (c) the concern over the
fate of French nationals and investments in Indochina; (d) the
official feeling that no settlemcnst with the Viet Linn or with
Communist China could be achieved that would preserve ary French
interests in Indochina; and (e) the practical difficulties of achieving
any military evacuation.
15. Within Indochina, we believe that there will be no im-
provement during the period of this estimate in the morale or the
political strength of the Vietnamese. The efforts of the - nch
and the Bao Dai regime to resist Communist pressure will
continue to be viewed apathetically by a people to do not recognize
much of a personal stake in the war effort and apparently mistrust
French motives more than they recognize any danger from the
Communists. This mistrust of French motives would be further heightened
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In the event that the French attempt by military force to
subdue growing anti.Viet I'inh, anti-French "third force" movements,
CHINESE COi Cftf1P1I8'T CAPABILITIES ,M!A PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTI
16p The Communist Bloc continues to view Indochina as a key
to its desired goal, that of eventual Communist control over all
Southeast Asia. The it mediate importance of Indochina to Lioscow
and Peiping, lies in the fact that the existence of a Covmnuiist~
sponsored Viot Ltinh has compelled France to divert much of its
financial and military resources to Indochina, prevented the
Associated States from gaining generally recognised international
status, and hindered the estahlishmert of a stable non-Communist
state on CMnals border? The potential importance of Indochina
to rloseow and Peiping In great; the fall of Indochina would be a
psychological victory for the Cormnuxdst Bloc of the first magnitude p
would undermine the determination of the governments and peoples
of Burma and '4zailand to resist Cocwdat aggressions would
facilitate farther conquests in Southeast Asia, would hinder the
"encirclement of Communist China by nonnCammunist states, would
provide the Communist Bloc with control of additional sources of food
and strategic materials, and would. deny to the West the strategic
position and the resources of Indochina,
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170 Transportation facilities from South China into Indochina
have been improved, and there have been numerous indications of
Chinese Communist troop buildup and stockpiling along the Indochina
borders Those developments increase the capabilities of the Chinese
Communists either to invade Indochina in force or to give military
assistance to the Viet Minh0
18, If the Chinese Communists should decide to intervene
directly in Indochina, they have an estimated 300,000 troops
available in South China upon vdxich they could draw for such an invasion,
We believe that of this number they could actually commit and support
logistically 10,000 troops independent of present or possible future
operations In Korea. Logistic and transportation difficulties would
limit the operations of these troops to a series of local offensives,
each of about one weekas duration. Between these offensives time amuld
be needed for replenishment of supplies and repair of transportation
facilities,, An armistice in Korea would increase the number of
troops and the logistic support that could be made availzblo for
operations in Indochina; transportation deficiencies would still be a
limiting factor, however, although the level of logistic support
could be raised somewhat by use of the facilities of the Chinese
Communist Air Forces The combat efficiency of the above troops is
 S #T
probably equal to that of the Chinese Commnmist troops now In
Korea, with due allowance for a disparity in supporting weapons,
So long as the Korean war ccntinuen, the Chinese Communists would
not be capable of committing any significant mount of artillery
for an invasion of Indochina, The infantry forces, however, are
probably adequately equipped with normal light weapons, These
Chinese Couunnist troops, added to those of the Viet Minh, would
probably be able to force the French and the Vietnamese troops
to evacuate Tonkin before any effective assistance would be brought
to bear, Although the Chinese Conanunists would probably not
con?nit any jet aircraft so long an hovUlities in Korea continue,,
the CCAF, employing only piston-type aircraft, would probably
have the capability to neutralize the French Aix Forces in Tonkin,
An armistice in Korea vould of course vastly increase this capability,
19, The Chinese Cowaur3sts may invado Indochina if world
Ca nunist leadership should decide that a shift in western policies
had created a serious threat to Comm ist China that could not be
oowite ed through present Com!!nuaist strategy, A Communist belief that
the West intends to attack China regard-lose of Chinese policies in
Southeast Asia, would destroy the deterrent effect of the estimated
Comm unist belief that the US may react to an invasion of Indochina with
a possible counterattack against the Chinese mainland,
 20, Vie believe, hover, that the Chinese Communists will
not invade Indochina during the period of this estimate. Although
the increased Chinese Communist capabilities in South China suggest
preparations for an invasion of Indochina, present evidence does
not necessarily indicate that such an invasion is imminent. Other
considerations, flrthermore, militate against a direct intervention
by the Chinese Gommunistsa
a,. Present Communist strategy is bringing considerable
success in Indochina, may weaken the determination
and ability of both the Vietnamese and the French
to continue resistance, and may provide the Com..
monists with a potential tool for aggravating
differences among the Vies tern Povmrs,
b, Recent western moves have probably made world
Communist leadership aware that the Test, and
in particular the US, may expand the war in
Asia to the Chinese mainland should Communist
China invade Indochina. Any such awareness is
probably somewhat offset by Communist recognition
of divided opinions in the West as to the merits
and timing of such retaliation. On balance, however,
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 concern that the war in Asia might be expanded and
that drastic retaliatory action might be taken aga&ret
tho mainland of China is probably sufficient to be a
major factor dissuading the Chinese Communists from
openly intervening in force in Indochina
co Despite the importance of Indochina discussed above,
it is of relatively secondary value to the Communist
Bloc when compared to other areas of greater strategic
and economic importance, It is unlikely that its
value to Peiping and t;oscow is great enough to
dictate a large-scale Chinese Communist invasion
with a possible risk of initiating general varo
21o We believe that the Chinese -Communists will, short
of open intervention, gradually expand the scale and nature of
their present assistance to the Viet Minho Even assuming continuing
heavy commitments in Korea, the Chinese Communists will face no
forbidding difficulty in increasing the present level of technical
and logistic assistance to the Viet Minh. Logistical support will
probably consist primarily of such items as light arms and ammunition,
vehicles, some field and antiaircraft artill?rvy and communication
and medical equipment.
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22. The Chinese Communists will also continue to commit
technical and advisory porsonnel to the Viet Thlnh and may introduce
Chinese "volsmteer" troops, We do not believe, however, that
significant numbers of such "volunteers" will be introduced into
the Viet Mitt during the period of this estimate.
23. Consequently, the probrble outlook through mid-1952 in
Indochina is one of continued military stalemate, We foresee
scorn small territorial gains by the Viet Minh, but no major victory
an either side during the period of this estimate,
CONFIDENTIAL`