TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-35/1: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA THROUGH MID-1952

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001000030033-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 18, 1999
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: January 9, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

SECURITY INFORTATION
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
9 January 1952
SUBJECT: TZWS OF REFERENCE: NIE-35/1: PROBABLE DEVELOFtENTS
IN INDOCHINA THROUGH "ID-1952
To estimate Irobable developments in Indochina through
mid-1952 with particular emlhasis on probable Chinese Oo't'm nist
courses of action in that areas
A. What. is the current military situation in Indochina?
10 What is the relative nilitary strength, combat effec-
tiveness and tactical disposition of the French-
Vietnamese and Viet "inh forces?
ao How has the fighting in Tonkin during the past
six .months affected French-Vietnamese capabilities?
bo How has the fighting in Tonkin during the past
six months affected Viet 'tinh capabilities?
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2, What is the present nature and level of Chinese
Communist technical and materiel assistance to the
Viet Minh?
Be What are the capabilities of the Chinese Comnanists to
commit an increasing volume of assistance to the Viet
Minh in the form of advisers, instructors, manpower
incorporated in Viet Minh units, and materiel?
to Assuming present situation or an intensification of
the fighting in Korea?
20 Assuming an armistice in Korea?
What are the capabilities of the Chinese Communists to
commit major elements of their regular forces in Indochina?
1. Assuming present situation or an intensification of
the fighting in Korea?
ao What ground forces do the Chinese Communists have
available for commitment to an invasion of Inds-
china? What is the level of training and equip.
ment of these troops? Bow many troops can the
Chinese Communists now support logistically in
Indochina in sustained military operations?
 b. What air strength could the Chinese Communists
commit to such an invasion? Shat airfields are
available or could be made available for operational
use?
so What naval strength scold the Chinese Communists
commit to such an invasion?
2. Assuming an ar.nietice in Koreas
a. How margr troops could the Chinese Communists support
logistically in Indochina in sustained military
operations?
b. What air strength could the Chinese Cou aniste ooudt
to such an invasion?
cq What naval strength could the Chinese Commuunist$
commit to such an invasion?
D. How mould the capabilities of the list Minh forces be
affected in the next six months ifs
1. Chinese Communist technical and material assistance
were maintained at approximately present levels?
Chinese Communists increase their present assistance
programs over the next few months to the levels
envisioned in B 1 and B 2 above.
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3o Chinese Caannnists increase their present assistance
to the levels contemplated in 0 1 and C 2 above,
E. What are the present FrenchaVietnamess capabilities to
withstand attacks bys
to The Viet Minh alone, assuming a continuance of the
present scale of Chinese Communist assistance?
2a The Viet Minh alone, assuming a substantial increase
in the scale of Chinese Communist assistance, including
3volunteers" with the Viet Minh?
3o The Viet Minh, assisted by major Chinese Commud.at
regular forces?
F. What trends in French-Vietnamese capabilities to resist
Viet Minh-Chinese Communist pressure are probable through
n3dt4952?
to In manpower and materiel supi.xy (including scheduled
US aid)?
20 In political strength and stability within Vietnam?
3o In the nfl to resists
ao Political and economic developments within Frames?
bo Political and economic developments within Indochina?
AL
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scan
do What would be the influence on Chinese Communist coursers
of action with respect to Indochina oft
to The situation in Korea?
2? The requirements of internal consolidation in
Conmmuiat China?
3o A possible Chinese Communist belief that a more
forward course in Indochina might incite UN or US
oounterraction in Indochina?
?o Substantially increased assistance to the Viet
Minhs possible including "volunteers" in Viet
Minh unite?
bo Commitment of regular Chinese Communist forces
in organized units?
4o A Possible Chinese Communist belief that a more
forward Course in Indochina might bring UN or US
retaliations including strategic bombings against
the China mainyand?
ao Substantially increased assistance to the Viet
Mints possible including "volunteers" in Viet
Minh unite?
bo Commitment of regular Chinese Communist forces in
organised units?
 II? INDICATIONS OF CURRENT CHINESE CCMRUNIST INTENTIONS WITH
A significant improvement in the French-Vietnamese
military and kolitical position in Indochina?
6, Indications of French weakening of will to resist
because of the economic and military strains on
metropolitan France involved in a long-term and
indecisive war in Indochina?
70 Developments elsewhere in Southeast Asia (for example,
Burma) favorable to the Conmunists?
A, What indications may be derived from Communist military
activity in Cotmmtnist China and within Indochina?
Be What indications may be derived from non-military events
such as Cosmnuniet (Soviet, Chinese Comawniet, Viet Minh)
propaganda, the movement of Communist leaders, and the
formation of point Viet Minh.Chinese Communist cultural
and/or military organizations?
I110 PROBABLE CHINESE 06NddUNIST COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT
(To be prepared by o?NE based on I and II above)