C-2 CONTRIBUTION TO NIE 35/2 : ' PRORABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001000040005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

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0 2 COINTRIIIUTION TO NIB," 34/2: "PROBABLE DEVELOr 1ENTS
w INDOCHINA
IN TDOCHINA
TI- 1, SITUATION
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[spoor ng:
'.. The s-;;atue of comb-at apocationra in Vietnams Laos and Cambodia?
The rainy season has great7.y reduced combat activity in the
Tonkin area. Both the Viet Minh Md. French Union forces have been resting
and aea:zti:ing during this period. In central arwd south Vietn sa, Cambod:Inp
a3""?cl Laos., the Viet Minh have mainti:ined sufficient pressure against French
Union Force, to prevent the transfer of troops from tlaoso areas to Tonkin.
Guerilla warfare continues throughout Tndochina.
What isrenrls have there been in the past six months in
a.
rczle.tive Yilitar j, sFcronr h, combat e:efert:iveneses arad tactical 2 iS20 13ition
of French-Indochinese and Viet }1:inh forces?
(].) Strer. h - '!'ho relative staength of the French
Associated States and Viet Minh forcos has not !:hanged substantially since
1 Jenuary 1952. It is estinna?tsd that the losses suffered by the Viot Micah
durt?Yng the Iioa Binh caanpai 5An mid subsequent operations in. the Red Eiver
Dolts, have been largely a^eplaeed The a cpansioa of the Associated Stator
Axraed Forces sires 1 Jamtuazy 1952 has not appreciably affected the ba1unoo
of n i].itaxy strengthth in Indochina.
(2) CouLxat E: notivone s - Siros 1 J n'as1' 1952, the
n ench Associated States forges have made a slight gain over the Viet Minya
in over-al.l combat effoctivenass.
(a) Although the Viet Unca first-line units displa ad
a considerable increase in eoarbc.t of#ectivenew dvxin ; tho Iloe Binh campaign,
E.hisz increased ci'fectivenoss was not evident in subsequent operattogns by
the seondnlina Viet Plinth units (316th and 320th.Divisaons) within the Red
River Delta. Ncrcaale reportedly is low in sass diet Minh unite in Tnnldn.
The sick rate in many unite is high, and the loss of ntny experienced
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In Coohin-Chinas a ms4or decrease in Viet Minh
capabilities was indicated when the Cormmnists dissolved, at least tBmporarilys
nore than half of their regular units and utili2ed these in the training of
depleted regional forces.
(b) The now of Chinese Communist materiel to the Viet Minh
has been more than offset by the continued arrival of large quantities of
FU]@P equipment. The mobility and effectiveness of French Union reserves in
the Tonkin area have greatly increased as a result of receiving large
numbers of motor vehicles during early 1952.
(c) In unit firepower and in materiel, the forces of the
trench Associated States are superior to the Viet Minh. The resultant re-
duction in relative combat effectiveness of Viet Minh forces in this are.
enabled the Fronch Vietnamese forces to make definite gains in pacifying
certain regions of Cochin-China.
(3) Dis sition - No major changes have occurred in the tactical
dispositions of opposing forces in Indochina since the withdrawal of French
forces from the Hoa Binh salient on 23 February. Of the nine Viet Minh
regiments which bad infiltrated into the French perimeter in Tonkin at the
class of the Hoa Binh campaign, four still remained on 1 Julg. .
b. What are present French-Indochinese capabilities to:
(1) Expand their area of control and inflict heavy losses on
the Viet Minh, assuming the present nature and degree of Chinese Coemauniat
assistance to the Viet Minh?
(a) Control - While the French union forces have sufficient
firepower and mobility to permit limited offensive operations against the
Viet Minh, these forces are not now considered capable of gaining and main-
teining control over significant areas of 'Viet Minh-held territory
1. The continued arrival of French replacements and
the continued strengthening of French Union forces should permit further
reduction of Viet Minh activity within the delta by about October.
2
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2. By the latter part of 1952, the French Union
forces should have the capability of expanding slightly their area of
control in Cochin-Cbina, but the areas of control in Annam, Cambodia, or
Laos are likely to remain substantially unchanged.
3. In general, the expansion of areas of control,
on other than a temporary basis, is not in itself a profitable objective
for the French so long as the Viet Minh forces continue to avoid engaging
in close and decisive combat, and so long as the French and Vietnamese are
incapable of consolidating effectively and defending their gains.
(b) Losses - The French Union advantage in mobility and
firepower (an advantage which probably will be increased by the arrival of
additional MDAP.equipment during the next 12 months) gives them the capa-
bility of inflicting heavy losses on the Viet Minh when the Viet Minh can
be engaged in close combat. However, the employment of "hit and run" and/or
guerrilla tactics by the Viet Minh does not now permit the French Union
forces to effectively exploit their capability.
(2) Hold presently occupied territory in Indochina
against the Viet Minh operating with theeaent nature and degree of
Chinese Communist assistance?
French Union forces in Cambodia, Laos, South and
Central Vietnam should be able to hold their presently held territories
through mid-1953. In Tonkin the French should be able to hold the wed
River Delta. Although it is expected that the Viet Minh will re-infiltrate
the Red River Delta in some force during 1952, it is estimated that French
Union forces will control this area more firmly by the end of 1953 than at
present.
(3) Resist attacks by the Viet Minh operating with sub-
atas'UaV increased Chinese Communist assistance?
(a) It is estimated that the French Union forces
could hold the ares4s that they presently control in Cambodia, Laos and
Cochin China, at least through mid-1953. In Central Vietnam, the Punch
Approved dlamoUtO }12 I/a{ RA,1Q12A0 3.04 ~ 0 ,0=,y-Hus-Tourana area.'
Mme Ehb' ea held and evacuate their
ecurlty Informs Ikon
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(b) Barring the introduction' of Chinese
Communist troops into Indochina, the French Union forces probably could
hold the strategic areas of the Red River Delta,
(4) Resist attacks by combined Vint Minh-Chinese
The capability of the French Union to resist
attacks by combined Viet Minb-Chinese Communist forces is dependent upon
the number of Chinese Comrauniat troops employed and the effectiveness Ot,
their commitment and the amount of air support provided. The commitment
of 150,000 Chinese Communist troops in IndochinA.-the maxima force which
they are logistioafy capable of supporting--and particularly if this force
were supported by air, would probably result in a French evacuation of
Tonkin before outside assistance could be brought to bear. Such an evacua-
tion would be extrewe4, difficult. In this circumstance, the French pry
.ably would be forced to initiate a general withdrazal.from Indochina
w3less Western counteraction promised some hope of restoring the position
of the French Union in Indochina.
2. No contribution.
3. No contribution.
L.. The situation in Viet Minh-held territory, including morale,
fOOdsupplies.
(1) As of April 1952, French cadres provided for the
Associated States armies were as follows:
Vietnam
Cambodia
Laos
Total
Officers
6141
64
69
7714
NCOss
3,653
257
224
4,134
4
198
--
--
198
Total
1.4,b,92
321
293
5x106
(2) Through 1953, the arnd.es of the Associated States
Lri11 be entirely dependent on the French for air and armored (other than
reconnaissance) support and largely dependent on the French for artillery
support., especially in heavy artillery (See paragraph II, A,2,a, page 1 ) .
2. No contribution.
3. No contribution..
D. What is the current nature and level of U.S. suppo to the
French and Indochlxt t
1. PNil-it,
The United States provides the follorod.ng types of arnt
,to
arid for Indochina:
(1) The replaceiuenb of obsolete and worn-out, equu xu;rt in.
;t c hands of French Unicn forces;
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(2) The initial a
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(3) A large share of the continuing logistical requrre?
=at:'s of the French. in the .form of ammunition, spare parts, and the
^ai].sacotreSS: of combat losses.
b. A United St Sates Mi itary Assistance Advisory Group (R?A..+1G)
Is ma .m ained in Saipan to supervise the distribution of U.S. materiel
delivered in Indochina.
c. Existing United States programs provide approximately
30 percent of the total financial burden of the Indochinese ear. As of
30 April 1952, a total of about, $347,000,000 has been accpendcd by the
United States for aid to Indochina. As of this date, oquilmont shippc:i? to
Tndcciaina totalled 94,800 tons, including 6,000 tons delivered In April
191,2. Among the items sh .p;:)nd ate 657 combat vehicles, 5,9565 trucke, 1,728
trai .ers, 78,713 small arms and automatic weapons (including 1,161 rocket
7.ar'anchers), 1,400 mortars and artillery pieces, 18,000,000 rounds of
carluaaition of all types, 260,000 mines and rockets, and 3,869 radio sets.
2. No contribution.
3. No contribution.
A. French-Zxattochine:>e 0apabilitlos and Pxobablo Lotuses of Action
1, How will French and Indochinese trill and intention to resist
be affooted by-,the,brien
a. Pol1tlcal,.vcooncmdc, and militar dolrolo ntsmmin Wect,:rn
E ,taro ae~ aid ari thin mote qpq- :.ten Franca, Wand the French Union?
(1) In the long term, political, econozzLc, and r:i.l?+tasy
dcvelopuents in Western Europe, France, and French North Africa probably
will be the determining factors in French will and intention to resist in
t:ndoch:im. At present quad for the foreseeable future, France t i3J. be
unable, simultaneously, to proceed with domestic r covert', to meet French
ATO ecsmnitrnonts, to stabi7.i.2o the North African situation, and to torwi.r.,ato
successfully the wasr in Indochina.
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(2) The French anparont]y have given the following
priority to the above ccmmitraonts:
(a) Domestic recovery
(b) NATO
(c) French North Africa
(d) Indochina
(3) The French effort in Indochina is one of necessity,
not one of choice. Further." Franca probably would like to withdraw frog
Indochina as soon as pr;ad cable if she could avoid
I. .?bandorsnent of her extensive Ooonomlc intex,sts
20 Leaving the country at the moray of the Viet
U.nh and Chinese ConImuniats, and
3o Jeopardt2ing the entire Western position in
ba Politi~arl and 3concrui a ronda Itl7dn Vietnam, Lao: , earl
miaocU including attitudes tocra ds French imperial control and toward
goo Chinese Cotmnun3 ets? "~
extant are the Chiuesa Cosamuntets
`arded ass conquerors and io what extent as 13berators fran white co rls?)
(1) The French will and Intent to resist In Indochina are not
likely to he greatly influenced by political or ecomnic trends within
(2) The agrutaption of Premiership by the King of Cambodia,
and the replacement in Vietnam of Than Van Huu by by Nguyen Van Tam will probably
result in closer cooperation between the French and the goverment officials of
those two States. However, such cooperation will not be popular with the
general populace of any of the three Associated States. Indochinese m3Yori.es
of French colonial rule, and the desire to achieve complete independence
will continue to be a constant and unavoidable source of difficulty In
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the fight against Communism. However, this difficulty is lessened to some
:jxtent by the general Indochinese antipathy for the Chinese, and by the
unwillingness on the part of politically conscious Indochinese to allow
the newly granted national independence to'be overcome by Communism,
epecially Chinese Communism.
(3) Although dissidence constitutes a potential internal
danger, it is unlikely to constitute a serious threat to the French Union.
c. Possible tripartite warninaa to the Chinese Communists to
keep their troops out of Indochina?
Such public warnings would considerably improve the morale
and peace of mind of both the French and Indochinese, particularly if it
committed the United States and the United Kingdom to the defense of
Indochina in the event of direct Chinese Communist intervention.
d. Change in the level of United States economic and milit
assistance and in the nature of the United States commitment for the defense
of Indochina?
A reduction in the level of United States economic and
military assistance would adversely affect both Indochinese and French will
to resist the Communists in Indochina. Greater United States commitments
are likely to increase the will of the French and Indochinese and the
capability of the Indochinese to resist.
e. A cease-fire in,Koreal
(1) A cease-fire in Korea probably would cause the French
to demand a Western guarantee of assistance in the event of Chinese Cotn unist
aggression in Indochina.
(2) Such a guarantee, together with a tripartite warning,
probably would offset a French tendency toward withdrawal from Indochina
in the face of the increased threat of possible Chinese Communist Invasion
of Indochina that would follow a cease-fire in Korea.
(3) The French probably hope for a settlement of the
Indochinese problem in the event of a cease-fire in Korea.
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T. An expansion of the Korean war?
The 7rcneh probably view with alarm any possibility
that the Korean war might be extended onto the China mainland as inviting
Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina, and voiding any hopes for an
over-all political settlement in the Far East. This eventuality, without
strong additional Western nnupport, probably would adversely affect the
French will to resist in Indochina unless substantial Western assistance
were assured.
Fblit:9.