CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-35/2: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001000040006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 25, 1952
• Content Type: NIE

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M Y9i].~ /
ZGUFtCTY MMd1r'I
.. Ogt,lS?h1TE
25X1A9a Surly 259 1952
Political as well as military developmenta within the Associated
States of bidoobina eve highlighted by events in Vietnam, espeo1atly by
the course of the war against the Oosmmmtst.4.ed Viet Aiinha In the political
mphere, and to a lesser degree eoonomi 2ly, French and Chinese G ist
policies toward Cambodia and Laos, particu2arlly as they affect the inter-
national posture of Indochina, will be conditioned by the situation exist-
lug in Vietnr set cry particular moment? In the discussion'. which follows,
therefore, attention has keen focused on Vietnamo This concentration
reflects the belief that developments in the States of Cambodia and I8os
will not affect the conclusions reached, exit in Instances which are
apecifi cally noted.
G SITUATION IN INAOCFIIIT,
A. 2. t&bat is the current political situation in Vietnam, Taos, and
Cambodia, particularly those developments influencing adminiata
Live efficiency, national morals, mobilisation capabilities, and
relations with the Fnueh?
j a The current political situation in Vietnam reflects the
g eaUanntal instability and widespread public apathy in the face of for-
midabla probl;aaa which has characterized the non-Conviunist Vietnamese areas
in r e c e n t hears, The G o v e r i m e n t of Ngt Van Tam, irstc l.ed in Sune, is
still in the process of reorganizing the administration, and. actions to
date have been limited largely to promisee of constructive steps which
remmin to be fulfinede
c`.ts:i''i>9 I is S C
Ar".:alityl NS 1s?2
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Tam?c program for iztensiiying Vietnamese contributions to the
defenses of Indochina, pa^omotirg agrarian reforana, preparing for creation
of a National Assombly, and increasing attention to social welfare has a
potential appeal to wide sections of the population who, nsvertheleas, seem
uazsiU.ing to commit themselves to avowed support of the Goverment in the
absence of demonstrated progress.
The new leadeoabip may reveal greater euez= and decisiveness than
the formes, 4aves gat of Tran Van Huu, due largely to Tames personal dy-
namism. Sane ministries are now in more capable hands though others have
been entrusted to less talented individuals who reputedly lack ability or
whose previous service boa been tainted bir personal corruption. Appoolnt..
manta of subordinate officials made thus far bear out the general iuprasaian
that the zeta Government, while about equal in ability, is no more represents-
tine of Vietnamese nationalism than its predecessor. Several outstanding
Vietnamese leaders continue to abstain from participation in the Governanent,
and a few of those now serving under Tam appear to be restless and unhapff,
The dissident Cao Dni elem uts led by Gon 1. Trish Ztah The have shown no
disposition to abandon their "third force" activities, and the represents.
lion in the Govwmxmt of Important political groups, each as the loyal
Coo Dal faction, the Doi Viet, and the Vietnam Nationalist Party (VNQDD)o
is nominal at best. The impact of the obange in Government on national
morale is difficult to estimate, The initial reaction to the sudden an-
nom nt of the replacement of Tvan Van Huu with Tam was one of shock
and dismay, particularly in the North. Tam roast overcome a popular tear
and dislike resulting from the ruthlessness he displ ad as former head
of the &wete. At the present time, the Government seems to have no
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greater degree of public support than did its predecessor; however, if
Tarn is successful in his initial efforts to Cary' out affirmative programs
and to promote reforms, it is possible that the Government will seciree ever.
widening support. The dominant mood at present continues to be one of
detacb,ment, born either of unconcern or of a feeling of helplessness in a
situation in which the only alternatives appear to the Vietnamese to be a
continuance of hated French domination or a now Cw,amist-led despotism,
the manpower potential of the Vietnam Government is higher than the
present rate of mobilization suggests. Future progress win depend largely
on changes in the popular conviction that the new rational Army, even under
a Vietnamese Chief of Staff, is subject to French control and is, there.
fore, a"foreign" force,. Although the French have not had great difficulty
recruiting enlisted personnel, the problem of securing officer cadres
tisanes to block the rapid expansion of the armed forces. Recent reports suggest
that educated youths are more attracted to the regional pacification teems
(GUO) being established in Tc kin, presumably because their leadership and
control is considered to be in Vietnamese rather than in French hand >
Official relations with the French seem to have improved since the
change of Government in June. It is clear that friction between Tran Van
Mat and the French, perhaps ootnplicated by difficulties between Bao # i
and Sun, led to the fall of the third Huu cabinet. Tam has thus far had
the support of the French, even though some resident officials expressed
regret over the sudden nature of his appointment. As long as the French
are satisfied with the programs and progress of the now Government, the
prospects for close cooperation are Improved. Although the political
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situation remains unstable, there is no firm evidence to suggest that
the present Government will be short-lived, or that future changes in
th leadership, if they occur, will radically alter the present picture.
Ofifta. There is considerable political Instability in Cambodia
also. Mounting political tension marked by the defection of wartime
Premier Son hoc hank, and by stixient downstrations in the spring of
1952 culminated in the dismissal of the aorvtrammt of Huy Kanthoul in
June, when King Norodom Sihanouk personally assumed direction of the
Government, The Singes request for a three-year mandate for personal
rule was turned aside by the elected National Assembly, which declared
that it lacked competence to ratify the Singes action but which agreed
to continue to serve him loyaliy? The cabinet installed by the ling is
kaimposed primarily of msanbars of his personal entourage, including several
manbers of the royal family, and includes no outstanding political figures.
in addition to Viet Minh guerrilla activities, the Government is
plagued by continuing rebel-lion of vationaltst.Issarek groups and_by 3a-
ability to establish complete rapport with hap Chhtnn, the virtually
autonmvm pnavlatcial leader of Sim Beep. Aalations between Dap Chhuon
scud the Goverment are presently stalemated) Dap Qbhi n demards greater
watetence from the Goverment In the form of supplies and equipeatt? a
condition the Goverimmt is unlikely to meet es long as the provincial
tormas retain their separate identity as a semi-autonomous unit.
The apparent satisfaction of the French over the Sings recent
actions, and the presence of French troops in the streets of Th,nz Fla
at the tine the government was disbanded, have created the popular
 impression that the Kiang acted in order to please the Frew? Although
the personal popularity of the King realm high, the strong nationalist
aspirations of the people prevent roal enthusiasm over the now regime,
but in relations with the French brought about by the
Ring?a assumption of personal rule may prove to be of abort duration,
The French have tended to identify an dissident elements in Cambodia as
affiliated with or dominated by the Viet Minh, and have pressed the Govern.
ment for more vigorous action to restore internal order, If such action
is not forthcoming, rtinlatioirehipa with the French may grow more strained,
Moreavers, the 11ng?s seizure of direct governing authority may produce
greater sympathy with the nationalist defectors led by Son Ngoo Tharb,
T{iaarh has been demanding c fete Independence for Cambodia] so far, reports
of his association with the Viet Minh have not been confirmed,
IM. Conditions in Laos are more stable than in the other two
Associated States, despite continuing harassing attacks by local guerrilla
units controlled by the Viet Minh, In the absence of externally caused
a, no significant tangos are foresees In the period covered
by this eatimte,
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3a What is the current economic situation in Vietnam,
Combodia9 and Laos as it affects national morale and
mobilisation potential?
Economic conditions in the Associated States are sufficiently
stable and prosperous to prevent any serious adverse effect on
national morale. Such dissatisfaction an does stem from economic
conditions derives from problems of distribution, from the impact
of military demands, and from the continuing belief that the
economies of the Assooiated States are organized to benefit French
investors rather than the local populations.
Despite a sharp decline from prewar export levels of such
oemmodities as rice and coal, the Associated States presently
enjoy a favorable balance of payments positions, as a result of
French military procurement and the export of rubber and some rice
and coal. The Cambodian Governmentes ban on exports of rice
through Saigon and the continuing blockade of the Transbaesae rep.ion
in South Vietnam have reduced both the domestic supply of rice and
the foreign exchange earnings usually derived from rice exports.
Despite the fairly favorable eoonomio situation the financial
position of the Government of Vietnam is precarious. The Government
to now operating at a deficit, even with French subsidies. The
absence of a published budget makes determination of its exact
position impossible, and the lack of competent technicians impedes
the solution of existing financial problems.
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Economic conditions do not impose limitations on the
ourrent rate of mobilization, except that difficulties experienced
in recruiting officer candidates and specialists such as medical
personnel may be partially attributable to the econcmio deprivations
which military service entails for educated individualeo
4, What is the current situation in Viet Minh held territory?
including morale, food supply, armaments production., rela.
tions with the Chinese Communists, manpower reseureesP and
extent and effectiveness of controls?
The Communist regime of No Chi Minh is currently in the
process of consolidating its control over areas which include about
half the population of Vietnam, and is continuing to nourish and
support guerrilla groups operating in Cambodia and Laos,. Although
the land hold by the Viet Minh is generally less productive than
the rioemrioh deltas of the Red River and the Mekong, the regime
has organized production, transportation, and oomamioation within
and between its various zones with sufficient success to enable the
Communist military forces to maintain their guerrilla type pressure
on rrenoh..Vietnsmese held areas and, for limited periods, to launch
coordinated offensives in division strength.
Recurrent campaigns to increase production, to "intensify
support for the front," and, most recently, to eliminate waste and
"bureauoratism" suggest that the regime continues to meet with serious
problems of administration and organization of its war effort, There
are no firm indications, however, that the economic condition of
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Viet Minh zones is currently' deteriorating.
Food production in areas firmly held by Oacsmaist forces is
inadequate to support the population, and the shortage must be
overcome by seizure of rice supplies in more productive regians.
Oarrsnt Viet Minh military operations seem designed primarily to
facilitate accumulation of food stooks prior to the end of the
summer rainy, season and the return of conditions more favorable
for large-scale military operations. Despite repeated exhortations
to increase produotion, to.proteot harvested crops, and to combat
drought and floods, there is no evidence of critical food shortages,
if one takes into account the Viet Minh ability to commandeer
supplies in areas nominally held by Franeo-Vietnamese forces.
Arms production within the Viet Minh areas is probably still
increasing. Reported claims by Communist leaders that self-sufficiency
in arms production will be achieved by 2965 appear to be exoessively
optimistic, however, and continued dependence an China seems likely,
particularly for supplies of modern weapons.
Viet Minh relations with the Chinese Communists are characterised
by frequent acknowledgment of the importance of the Chinese "example"
as a prototype of revolution in "oolonial" lands and of Chinese "support
and assistance" for the struggle in Vietnam. The "assistance" received
from Mina is referred to only in general terms, horsevsr. Reports of
disagreemsnt within the Viet Minh leadership over an inorease in
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Chinese assistance are unconfirmed, but the traditional Vietnamese
fear of the Chinese may well restrain the leadership from solioiting
direct military intervention. The Communists undoubtedly desire to
give the impression of being able to complete their revolutionary
program unaided, and efforts are apparently being made to disguise.
the presence of Chinese instructors, advisors, and technicians who
may be operating with the Viet Ylnh, The meant positive evidence
of Chinese participation in military operations with the Viet Minh
suggests the probability that their activities are confined to main
aenters,and that their contacts with the Vietnamese are deliberately
limitedo
The Viet Minh may be experiencing some difficulty in replacing
combat losses for the first tire, Recent reports suggest that
increasing numbers of teen-age youths are being taken for military
service, and there are unconfirmed reports of low morale and large=
scale desertions among newly formed units, So far, however, there
are no indications of a signifioant reduction in manpower available
for mobilization, in order to meet production goals efforts are
apparently being made to train women to replace men who have been
mobilized. The moat acute shortage of civilian manpower lies in the
need for skilled teo)mloians and speoialietsj considerable empha}is is
being; put on the necocaity for improving teobnioal training, and it
seems likely that China is providing training; facilities for sans
categories of specialiets,
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It is difficult to assess the relative importance of coercion
and persuasion in the control mechanisms of the Viet Minh. It seems
evident, however, that controls are effective, for there have been
no substantial uprisings in areas of Ommmmist control. The
existence of discontent is revealed by continuing defections., but
grievances are apt to relate to specific hardships suffered, such
as shortages of medical supplies, rather than to disillusionment
with Viet )m.nh objectives. At the present time there are no indications
that the Communists are losing control over the population in areas
which are effectively dominated by the rebel forceso Reports of
low morale among military units may reflect merely a need for rest,.
re-training, and re-equipment, for which the summer rainy season
provides an opportunity. It will not be possible to evaluate these
reports prior to the end of the rainy season, when the Viet Minh
capabilities for renewed large=soalo military action will probably
be tested,
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I. B. What is the current nature and level of Chinese Communist assistance
to the Viet Minh?
Chinese Communist military assistance to the Viet Minh seems to
have been given on an expanding scale. Reported shipments have ooritaineds
a wide variety of arms$ including artillery, mina, and ammunition; food
stuff a and olothing.,i fuel and some communications equipment; medical
supplies= and some industrial equipment and machinery necessary to maintsin
arms production in the Viet Minh areas.
The Chinese are probably providing facilities and cadres for
military instruction in South Ohina, at least for specialized personnel,
and some Vietnmoae Communist students and technicians apparently are
receiving training in Chinese institutions.
Chinese Communist support of the Viet Minh provides reasauranoe
and increases the prospects for viotory. The existence of a strong
Communist state extending north from the Viet Minh areas in Tonkin provides
a source of supplies and a sanctuary for training p~raonnsl and may also
contribute importantly to Viet 4inh morale.
Chinese assistance within Vietnam appears to be limited, at present,
to technicians, political and military advisors, and perhaps some manpower
used to maintain the supply routes to Chinao No Chinese Communist combat
units have been identified in the major areas of conflict.
The current level of Chinese assistance cannot be determined
quantitatively from presently available information, Tonnage figures
rhioh have been reported are irreconcilable. It seems probable, however,
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that supplies actually furnished are selected because of their direct
contribution to the Viet 21nh military effort rather than for the purpose
of sustaining the civilian populationa Chinese aid is vital to the Viet
Minh, chiefly because the types of material furnished fill gaps in local
production capabilities,
Estimates of the number of Chinese advisors and technicians
operating with the Viet ,dinh vary from a few thousand to 268000* The
lower estimates are more plausible, The fact that no Chinese military
personnel are known to have been killed or captured (except in skirmishes
with guerrilla units in the northern border region) suggests that military
advisors do not operate below higher com4tisnd levels, The net Minh
capacity to utilize technical specialists and political advisors in
limited, as long as current efforts to isolate Chinese from the Vietnamese
population are maintained, The number of Chinese Communist agents
operating within the Chinese community in Indochina, which is heavily
concentrated in the South Vietnam city of Chalon cad its environs, cannot
be estimatedo
1o Co What is the current nature and level of French support to the
Associated Stites of Indochina?
Within Indochina, French efforts are directed toward fostering the
belief that the existing governments have achieved indepondenoe within the
French Union, and that future relationships will be negotiated following
the restoration of peace; The recent changes of government in Vietnam
and Cambodia seem to hav e satisfied the French, who had manifested
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misgivings about the determination of former cabinets to struggle against
the Viet Minh and the Issarak guerrillas.
Overt approval of the existing administrations may, however, have
the not effect of reducing popular support for the local governments. Any
government which cooperates with the French is viewed with distruwt by
many Vietnamese, who share the conviction that policies are formulated by,
or at least submitted for approval to the French. French efforts to
reinforce the existing governments may, therefore, subvert their own
objectives of stimulating broader public support for the defense of
Indochina.
Furthermore, French objectives are to some extent sabotaged by the
persistence of rumors that the French contemplate or have actually under-
taken negotiat+cue with the Viet Minh with a view to settling the conflict
on terms 'rthioh would permit reducing the French commitment. Despite
repeated French denials, the rumors continue to circulate in Indoohinai
as a result, maw Vietnamese are reluctant to commit themselves
irrevocably to the non-Communist side, fearing retaliation if a French
withdrawal led to Communist victory.
Successive .'rench governments have defended the need for continuing
the war in Indochina before the French people and in the Uational Assembly.
The assignment of troops needed for European defense and the voti$g of
large military budgets to support the war represent political as well as
military support for the governments of the Associated States, The
now Vietnamese oabinot or Nguyen Van Tam has been welcomed by French
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officials because of a belief that anti-Communist efforts would be more
vigorously pursued.
Internationally, the French Government has supported the Associated
States' aspirations for foreign recognition, has sanctioned the exchange
of diplomatic missions with leading countries outside the Soviet bloc, and
has supported their membership in international organisations. France has
sponsored applications for UN membership, although there is little prospect
for favorable action in the face of an expected Soviet veto.
I. D. 2, what is the current nature and level of US economic support to
the French and Indochinese?
The current trend in the allocation of US assisti oe is away from
projects which are predominantly relief operations toward greater emphasis
on construction and developuont programs which will have a lasting impact
on the national economies and the wall-being of the populationo In
addition to supplies and equipment, the US furnishes technicians in a
variety of fields, to supplo:;xant French efforts. Although US programs
are compatible with stated French objectives, somo projects have not been
enthusiastically welcomed by the French, who sometimes give the appearance
of apprehension lost US activities in the economic field result in reduction
or replacement of the dominant French position in the economies of the
Associated States.
In the fiscal years 1961 and 1962& US economic assistance to the
Associated States arountod to +46 million. For FY 1968, a total of 026
million has been budgeted, in addition to $80.6 million in military-
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support expenditures. Of the 425 million in economic assistance, about
half will be used for supplies and equipment for local industry, and the
remainder for special projects. These projects will emphasize measures
to increase agricultural production and public health programs, with
public works (port development, hi; wsya, water supply, etc.,) having
third priority,
All US projects are calculated to improve the resistance-potential
of the Associated States by creating butter living conditions and promoting
local production as moans of increasing popular readiness to support the
government and its war effort.
I. D. 8. What is the current nature and level of US political support to
the French and Indochinese?
Official 'US statements have recognized the crucial importance of
Indochina in the Asian sector of the world struggle against Communism,
and, as a corollary, the significance of the French oamtribution to the
collective defense effort of the free world, The expanding scale of US
military and economic assistance to Indochina is predicated on the principle
that the democratic nations must support the French and the governments
of the Associated States.
Early recognition of the Associated States, and the welcome
extended to their representatives at the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference
in San Frsncisoo, have highlighted the diplomatic support -,Ivan by the
US to the established Governments. -levation of the status of the US
mission to Vietnam from Legation to ..mbaasy in June 1952 is the latest
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stop in the process of demonstrating support for the Associated States,
The US has approached other gowrnnents to encourage their recognition of
the established governments, and is currently emphasizing the importance
of recognition by other Asian states which, except for Thailand and
South Korea, have thus far been reluctant to acknowledge the independence
and sovereignty of the Associated states. US efforts may, however, be
partly responsible for the fact that no non-Communist Asian government has
recognized the Ho Chi Minh regime, despite widespread feelings that the
Viet Minh represents the true "nationalist" force in Indochina,
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A. French Capabilities and Probable Course of Action.
1o a. How will French and Indoohinese will and intention to resist
be affected by political economic and military developments
in Western Europe and within metropolitan FranoR and the
French Union?
In spite of manifest strain on their financial resources and on
their reservoir of available manpower? the French are likely to proseoutc
the Indochina war for the foreseeable future.
Within the metropolea irreducible political factors would appear
to compel the Frenoh to pursue their current effort. The present French
Government would find it politically difficult0 if not impossible0 to
repudiate a war policy for which it has assumed fall responsibility.
Coalition governments which instituted a policy consistently followed
since the outbreak of the Indochina war have included every political
formation in the National Assembly exclusive of the Gaullists0 Future
non-Communist coalitions of parties bearing equal responsibility for
waging the conflict could ill afford to pall a halt to a war which has
cost France an estimated 10200 billion francs and 300000 man without
either a decisive military victory over the Viet Minh or a negotiated
settlement which would protect remaining French interests in the area.
Since the negotiated settlement would be virtually impossible prior to
the military victory0 no alternative to continued military action in yet
in sight. A Gaullist-led Government, of course, would merely prams the
Indochina campaign with equal or accentuated vigor while it clamored for
more US aid.
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Political events on the European Continent also demand the cohesion
of the French Union. The French regard the sovereign states of Viet-Nam.
Laos, and Combodis as important associates of that French Comcmxnity which
opposes a possible German hegemony in Western Europe. French control of
North African nationalism would also be jeopardized by any further loosening
of French Union ties between the metropole and Indochina, Furthermore, it
is improbable that the Fronoh would withdraw from Indochina in order to
bolster their defenses in Western Europe* In addition to the necessity of
guarding the French Union intact in order to maintain a world power status,
the absence of imminent military danger on the continent removes French
compulsion to make what would be an almost intolerable decision.
Factors outside the metropole affecting French will to continue
the fight include the present unreadiness of the Vietnamese national armies.
Although the four divisions totaling approximately 170,000 men will be
increased by six divisions by the end of 1952, insufficient trained non-
commissioned officers and field grade native officers make it impossible
for the French to turn over the defense of Indochina to these armies
within the next several years.
Barring massive Chinese military intervention and the withdrawal
of the high level of US aid to French, therefore, the French armies will
carry on the fight over the period covered in this estimate.
II. A. 1o ba Row will Wench and Indochinese will and intention to resist
be affected by political and economic trends within Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia?
In the absence of a significant shift in the military balance,
French will and intention to resist are likely to be determined more by
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events outside Indochina than by political and economic trends within the
Annooiated States. The determination to preserve Iretoohina as. an Asian
bastion of the free worlds frequently reiterated in official statements,
Sc more likely to be shaken by domestic conditions in France or by
Communist moves olsewhere than by predictable political and economic
developments within: the Associated States. Governments in Vietnam which
gave tacit support to the French but which failed to achieve notable
progress in domestic political reforms have been supported in the past,
and the present administration appears to offer more nearly coaaplete
collaboration with French officials than its predecessor. Future changes
in govornment would not, in themselves,, result in a dilution of French
will to resist,
Soricus economic detorioration might affect French attitudes
adversely, particularly if the interests of leading French commercial and
financial enterprises, which have prospered during the ear, were drastically
affooted, Given caxiotinG US assistance end the continuation of Fronch
military expenditureu in Indochina - which have been made at a steadily
expanding rate oo there is little prospcot of eoonomnio collapse, despite
a precarious internal financial position and the absence of prospects for
rapid eoononto devalopmont.
The continuing reatriotions on rice marketing and exports represent
the most serious element in the present situation. If the embargo Is
rotaeiued through the yeelr, it will produce an important drain on normal
#oreign excheuge oarn+nge, requiring as a consoquence a compensatory
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increase in French subsidies or further resort to deficit financing.
Baoause of internal trade barriers, the maintenance of the export ban
has not yet had the desired effect of inducing domestic price reductionso
Vietnamese will and intention to resist seems unlikely to be
significantly increased by any developments now in prospect, The govern.
ment of Nguyen Van Tam has demonstrated greater energy than its predecessor
in presenting a Sform program, It remains to be seen whether political
and economic reforms will actually be implemented in such a way as to
create the conviction among Vietnamese nationalists that the government
In truly representative and truly Independent, The announced intention
to form an appointed Provisional National Council to advise the cabinet
on matters submitted to it for discussion has been declared a preliminary
stop toward formation of an elected National Assembly, a project long
discussed but one on which no significant progress has been made to date,
Even if the plan comes to fruition within the period of this estimate,
it is uncertain whether the Assembly will be endowed with legislative
powers sufficient to attract the participation of leading nationalist
political figures who have consistently abstained from participation in
successive Vietnamese cabinots,
In the economic field, Tam has promised agrarian reforms, and a
new labor cods has recently been promulgated by decree of Bao Del*
Agrarian problems? most pressing in the South, concern establishing the
rights of small farmers to land which they have occupied in the absence
of larger landowners who fled to the greater security of the cities,
recompensing former owners either by government grant or establishment
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of procedures for gradual payment by now owners, and drastically reducing
land roots in some areas -e all Of which will require direct government
intervention, In the absence of a published budget, long awaited but
still apparently unavailable, it is impossible to judge whether the
governments has resources adequate to finance these programs. The govern-
ments ability to supplement its resources by increased tax revenue is
questionable, on the basis of a poor record in the paste
Hatred for the remnants of French colonial rule is the basic
conditioner of relations between French and Vietnamese. This manifestation
of widespread nationalist aspirations seems to be the dominant political
attitude in Vietnam. Repeated French assurances of the existing independence
of the Associated Status within the French Union have not satisfied most
Vietnamese that, in the absence of the Communist military threat, the
French would permit establishment of the conditions necessary for complete
independence. While many Vietnamese leaders accept the necessity for French
protection from the threat of the Viet Minh supported by Communist China,
it has thus far proved impossible to secure the whole-hearted support of
the Vietnamese population for measures required to intensify local oontri-
butions to the joint military effort,
The presence of the French -- a constant irritant to Vietnamese
nationalists - balanced against an uncertain future, prevents complete
collaboration with the present administration, Although there in an
increasing Vietnamese awareness of the menace of Communism, Ho Chi Minh
is still regarded by many as a nationalist first and a Communist second,
and the existence of the Communist "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" as a
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visible alternative to the present situation contributes to the prevailing
spirit of "attentisme."
Present political instability -- marked by competition among the
small elite for directive authority and by apathy or disgust by the mass --
seems likely to continue during the coming year. The reluctance of many
potential leaders to support the preamt regime actively deprives the
government of badly needed administrative talent.
The economic situation seems unlikely to deteriorate sufficiently
to produce drastic effects on Vietnamese intention and will to resist,
It is possible, however, that there may be increasing hardships and
accompanying disaffection, if the present trend toward inflation and
financial instability should be intensified or ignored, The long-term
consequences of the present rice-blockade may be expected to increase the
resentment of producers, who are not receiving the benefits of current
high prices, and of consumers, who are paying the bill for the high profits
of speculators and middlemen, There is little internal stimulus for
increased national productivity since French enterprises at present tend
to withdraw earnings rather than to reinvest in Indochina and much of
the capital accumulated by wealthy Vietnamese remains unused for productive
purposes. It the current military impasse should be protracted,. discontent
may increase among those who are hit hardest by existing inflationary
pressures, since the government shows no signs of ability or determination
to adopt the firm measures necessary. to reduce the gap between available
goods and currency in circulation.
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Cambodian will to resist the incursions of Columnist-directed
rebel bands seems unlikely to increase in the foreseeable future, unless
political changes restore the prestigeful Democratic Party to its leading
role in the government. On the other hand. there is no conclusive evidence
of potential deterioration, despite the mounting agitation of Son Ngoc Thanh
and his followers. It is reported that Thanh, who is considered a nationalist
hero, is seeking outside assistance for his campaign for independence. If
the government fails to take affirmative action against Thanh, relations
with Franco will be strained; yet an attempt to suppress Thanh9s activities
might well give the movement greater prestigeo
Except for the qualifications noted in the preceding paragraph,
conditions in Cambodia and Laos are most likely to be affected by develop-
ments in Vietnam or elsewhere in Southeast Asia. rather than by factors
inherent in the existing political and economic situation in these less
developed States.
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II A 1 c How will French and Indochinese will and intention to resist
be affected by possible tripartite warnings to the CC to
keep their troops out of Indochina?
Preventing overt Chinese Communist intervention in the Indochina
war is a basin French objective. Extreme sensitivity to any stop which
might be viewed as provocative is reflected in the great concern shown
over the problem of repatriation of Chinese Nationalist internees now
in North Vietnam and in French reluctance to admit, until rooentlyo
that Chinese Communist advisors and technicians were assisting the
Viet Minh. French attitudes toward the desirability of a tripartite
warning would be heavily influenced by these oonaiderations0 If the
stop were not considered dangerously provocative, it is probable that
issuance of a joint warning would enhance French will to resist, by
indicating more positively a US commitment to participate in defense
of the peninsula.
A tripartite declaration, provided the terms of the warning were
sufficiently precise to indicate US intentions to support the warning
with action if necessary, could gain the support of non-Communist
Vietnamese. There are, however, modifying factors. Some Vietnamese
leaders appear to feel that current US policy plays into the hands of
the French, by contributing to the preservation of "imperial" control.
And there are fears of antagonizing the Chinese Communists, thus pro-
pelling them to more direct intervention in Indochina. Should a tri-
partite declaration indicate a multilateral guarantee of independence,,
non-Communist Vietnamese support would be assured, However, issuance
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II A 1 d How will French and Indochinese will and intention to resist
be affected by-'hanges in the level of US economic and
military assistance and in the nature of the US commitment
for the defense of Indochina?
Both the French and Vietnamese could be expected to welcome any
increase in the level of US military assistance. The Vietnamese seem
,to be more Interested in economic assistance than the French, who
sometimes give the appearance of tolerating economic aid programs
chiefly because they are judged to be a necessary concomitant of
badly needed military assistance.
The French have consistently advocated procedures which will
permit allocation of military supplies by the French command. However,
the positive impact of US aid on Vietnamese will and intention to
resist depends largely on the strength of their impression that US
assistance is being used to develop indigenous forces rather than to
strengthen the French military position, The French have recently
shown greater willingness to publicize US aid, and there is some prospect
that increasing numbers of Vietnamese will become aware of the nature
and scope of US support for their struggle.
Extension of a.unilateral US commitment for the defense of Indo-
china would have much the same effect as a tripartite declaration. The
Vietnamese would undoubtedly approve the assignment of US military
specialists for purposes of training and technical instruction.
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II A 1 e Now will French and Indochinese will and intention to resist
be affected by a cease-fire in Korea?
A cease-firs in Korea would be apt to create some initial
apprehension among both French and Vietnamese lost the Chinese Com-
munists, freed from their commitment in the North, turn their attention
southward and step up their direct support of the Viet Minh efforto
There would also be some wishful thinking that a settlement in Korea
indicated the possibility of a peaceful solution in Indochina. Both
these reactions could be exploited by Chinese Communist and Viet Minh
propagandists*
11 A 1 f How will French and Indochinese will and intention to resist
be affected by an expansion of the Noreen war?
The French probably believe that the threat of direct Chinese
Communist intervention in Indochina can best be reduced by continuation
of the stalemate in Korea. While there might be some initial relief
that peace had not been concluded and that, consequently, an immediate
southward Chinese thrust was less likely, it is probable that local
opinion would react unfavorably to intensification of the Korean ward
An extension which involved attacks on the Chinese mainland would be
viewed as the beginning of a general Asian war, and there would be fears
of a sudden Chinese effort to consolidate the southern front by aiding
a Viet Minh effort to seize complete control of Tonkin. The French, in
addition, would probably fear a reduction in US aid as a result of
greater concentration on the north Asian theater, which would affect
adversely both the war in Indochina and French preparations for defense
in Europe.
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II A 1 g How will French and Indoohineee will and intention to resist
be affected by political, military, and economic developments
elsewhere in Southeast Asia?
Direct Communist aggression elsewhere in Southeast Asia would
have a moat serious impact on attitudes in Indochina, If Communist
control of Burma or Thailand appeared imminent, the French position in
Indochina might be rendered untenable, with immediate adverse effects
on French and Vietnamese will to resists The first signs of retrench-
ment would be apt to cause a sudden eruption of pro-Viet Minh sentiment
and activitly*
Other developments in Southeast Asia are likely to have little
impact on the course of the struggle in Indoohinae Increased recognition
of the Associated States by other Asian governments would certainly be
weloomed, but such a trend would not in itself contribute to solution
of the Indochina war mm the criterion against which all events are apt
to be judged,
II A 2 b What trends in Frenoh-Indochinese capabilities to resist or
reduce Viet Minh-Chinese pressure are probable, in political
strength, stability, and national morale in the Associated
States?
Greater political support for the struggle against Communism could
'be expected to result if concrete measures were taken to broaden the
base of the Vietnamese government and to demonstrate its sincerity in
promoting Vietnamese nationalist objectives. Measures by the French
to persuade the Vietnamese public of the genuineness of Letourneauls
recent Washington statement that the Associated States will be free to
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remain in or to leave the French Union, following the end of hostilities,
would be the most effective way of increasing the political potentialities
of the present government.
For the period of this estimate, it appears likely that political
fragmentation,, public apathy or resentment, and incomplete collaboration
with the government and with the French will continue to form the
dominant pattern in Vietnam.
II D 3 b Row will Viet Minh courses of action be affected by the
economic and political situation within their area of control?
The present situation in Viet Minh areas is characterized, by
the Communists, as a period of preparation for the long-promised
"general counteroffensive." Efforts are being made to marshal economic
and manpower resources, to perfect organization, and to consolidate
control over territory and population. The leadership looks forward to
A time when (1) intensified military operations will be possible to
wrest additional territory from French control, or (E) war-weariness,
political disintegration, and the impact of Communist propaganda will
sap the will to resist of Franco-Vietnamese forces and the civilian
population.
The constant agitation for increased production efforts would
seam to indicate that some economic difficulties are being encountered,
and it seems clear that the civilian sector of the eooncosy is being
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If the situation becomes progressively tighter, either of two courses
of action is possibles
1, The Viet Minh command might be led to undertake more desperate,
perhaps ill-advised, military operations in a final effort to
seize control of more productive regions in the great river
deltas, Desperation moves might give the French increased
opportunity to destroy major Communist forces, if the Viet
Minh deviates from the present policy of caution, which has
meant avoiding large-scale engagements tenever the outcome
seems unoertaino
2, The Communist leadership might resort to appeals for greater
and more direct Chinese Communist assistance, perhaps including
troops as well as augmented supplieso Such a stop would require
overcoming what seems to be the present reluctance to accept
aid in forma which will make the Chinese role obvious to the
Vietnamese people,
Presently available evidence doom not suggest a degree of
deterioration sufficient to cause the Viet Minh to choose as a course
of action a final desperate effort to seize the productive delta region,
reversion to strictly guerrilla warfare, or an appeal for overt Chinese
Communist intervention, Rather, continuation of the present tactics of
combined open and guerrilla warfare is indicated,
The political situation in Viet Minh areas is unlikely to
deteriorate in the absence of a severe military setback or of the
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development of economic difficulties much more severe then now seems
probable. Meanwhile,, the Viet Minh continues the extensive process of
education and indoctrination, designed to Inculcate general acceptance
of Communist goals and of the hardships which are necessary for their
achievement. That this campaign in being conducted with diligence
and considerable skill is evident from the scattered testimony of
former prisoners of war and of occasional defectors.
There are no indications that potential disputes within the
leadership between "nationalist" and "Stalinist" Communists or the
problem of succession will break the monolithic front presented by
the Party leadership In the near future.
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II. Bo S. so How will Viet Minh course of action be affected by political,
economic, and military developments elsewhere In Southeast
Asia?
Predictable developmwnts elsewhere in Southeast Asia seem unlikely
to affect Viet Minh courses of action, except for the possibility of overt
Chinese Communist aggrosaion. The extension of Communist control to other
parts of Southeast Asia would rive a tremendous boost to Viet Mink morale,
and it is possible that the military campaign would be suddenly intensified
to take advantage of the expected French retrenobmsnto The Viet Mich appears
interested at present in expanding its activities in Cambodia and Laos,
and this trend would undoubtedly be stepped up if there were prospects
of consolidating Communist control of the Southeast Asian mainland.
It now seems unlikely that the Viet Minh will receive greater
support from other Southeast Asian states, since the Stalinist orienta-
tion of the Viet tiinh has become more obvious to them. On the other hand,
even if greater recognition were accorded to the governments of the
Associated States, it is unlikely that Viet :dish actions or morale would
be directly affected. ('lost of the independent governments have already
been stigmatized in Viet Minh propaganda as "tools" of the Western
"impcrialista." As long as the situation in Indochina remains basically
unchanged, economic developments elsewhere in southeast Asia will have
no impact on Viet Minh courses of aoti al.
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II B-4a HOW WILL CHINESE AND WORLD COL21UNIST COURSES OF ACTION IN
INDOCHINA BE INFLUENCED BY THE FOLLOWINGS
so Overall Communist Interests and Policies in the Far Easts
la Importance of Indochina to Communist Policies in Asia,
(a) Potential importance* Indochina is of potential importance
to the Communist bloc and particularly to Communist China, because in
Communist hands it would become (1) a potential stepping atone to
further Communist conquests in South east Asia; (2) a major prestige
factor for the Kremlin and Peiping--the conquest of Indochina would
seriously weaken the determination of Thailand, Burma, and other areas
to resist Communist aggression; (3) an important "buffer" area,
preventing the "encirclement" of south China by non-Communist states
and safeguarding other possible Communist conquests in Southeast Asia;
and (4) an important source for rice, rubber, opal, and other products0
(b) Present Importance. Within the time context of the present
estimate, however, the Communist leadership will probably consider not
the long-range importance of Indochina, but the present importance of
(to areas now under DRV control, and in particular the fact that
(1.) the existence of the DRV armed forces has compelled Frame to main-
tain a considerable military investment in Indochina, seriously reducing
French capabilities for contributions to NATO and the Korean warj
(2) the DRV, as the only Communist regime in southeast Asia recognised
by the Communist states, represents a considerable prestige investment
in Asia which has so far prevented the Associated States from assuming
full international status in the eyes of many "neutralists" or prop
Communists; (3) the DRV, while not consituting a firm "buffer" for south
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China, has helped'to prevent the eatablidunent of stable non-Ocumoniet
Throes on Chinass border.
(o) MoffLtaM in Cho of World War? A further Caamtmiat con..
aidea"stion is the importance of Indochina to the Communist bloc in arse of
a general or world war. It is probable that under these airotsstancess
Indochinsas relative Importance would be less than at prresent$ tmless a
determined drive into Southeast Asia is dictated by the Soviet need for
raw materials, If it should become necessary for the Cmonmiste to re-
trench their power in the Far Bast during a general mart Southeast Asia
would prrobably be surrendered ahead of other areas, not only because of
its remote Location from the center of Communist military and economic
strength, but also because of the teat that not only Southeast Asia but
also the southern part of China is of comparatively little military and
econcaoio importance to the Soviet bloc, It is probable that in the avert
of a world marl Cotat strength in the Far Zest would be concentrated in
Korea, Manchuria, and north China and that the main Jr a8astern offensive
effort would probably be directed against Japan. Fiadhormore, there are
indications that if an invasion of the Chinese mainland seriously threatened
Communist control, Peiping would withdraw its strength to north and northeast
China and would not attempt to make a flat stand in the south, thus further
reducing the strategic importance of Indochina In case of war.
2, Ido?ohiua and overall, World Communist P924cies in Asia
Since Indochina sass to have no ovenahalming a eurity importance to
the Cnammist bloc, it is probable that Communist policies toward Indochina
will be determined not only by their bearing on the ultimate C twist o1)r
ieotive of seizing power In Indochina, but also by their estimated effect
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on O=mm at policies and objectives elsewhere. This would be true par.
tieularly so long as there appears to be no danger that the ciao-Vietnamese
,border may fall smdar a strong and stable anti-Con mist regime,
Comumist policies tamazd Indochina will depend therefore to a large
extent upon the degree to which the Communnist leadership regards preomnt
policies as successful in maintaining a viable Ccaaamist base in Indochina,
the degree to which the Coaammist leadership will hope to exploit "nutrelist"
sestin nt in Asia and elsewhere, the degree to which it will attempt to
ecaerbate existing differences in Far BRatern policy among the A9, UK9 and
France, and upon the Ca mmist estivate of the risks of general war. The
world and Chinese Cozzaun st leaders could decide on a policy of peace in
Indochina, they could continue their present policy of supporting the W
asailitery operations and of building up the MV military potential through
Chinese material aid and advice, or they could shift to a policy calculated
to achieve a dramatic victory in Indochina through the intervention of Chinese
"volrmteers." In view, however, of the strategic and prestige Isportanoe to
the Cm=mists of the present MV positions it is ualikkely that the Commmiat
leadership would decide on a serious peace policy not conditional upon so?
ceptanco of Comumist terms, similarly, in view of the estimated probability
that the gremlin does not desire to launch a general Asian or world war during
the period of this estimate, it in unlikely that the Cnxunist leaders would
decide on full-scale Chinese intervention it it believed such a policy to
entail a severe danger of world war, particularly since Indochina may play
only a minor role in Communist plans for a possible war;
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It. B. $.?b. An increa e in rej&
A principal vatmosm in world Cnnmtst policy toward Irdoobina is the
Importance to the Cammunist leadership of the territory controlled by the
DRY as a "buffer" for south China. However, an indicated above, the eon.
tinned existence of a mintmsl Coma ist bass in Indoobine is probably of
great importance to the Cammamists for both strategic and prestige reasons.
An increase in the relative strength and effectiveness of P`Cench-Indothins
forms that seriously threatened the DRIP?s continued existence would there-
fore can for s reeammination of Coummni t policies.tound Indochina, which
might lead to a greater willingness to accept increased risks of genera] war?
However, an Improvement in French Vietnamese prospects sufficient to seriously
threaten the aurvivai of the DRV is unlikely within the present time-context?
A substantial improvement in the tiN military potential, tether caused
by Chinese aid or by a reduction In French-Vietnamese capabilities, would
probably be interpreted by the Cmist leadership as proof of the probable
success of their present strategy. It would be un7Akely, under such oircwa-
stances, that the CoM mists should shift to the more dangerous and costly
policy of inoressiug the degree of Chinese Communist intervention?
do A ter iggti_ tewardnrt to keep their troops out of Indochina
It is probable that in any Communist decision to increase Chinese
Commmist participation in the Indochinese fighting, the danger of re-
tatiatory action against Mina, itself and the consequently increased risk
of general war will be part factors. Western 4ovelopments during the
past year have probably treated an atareness among the Communist leaders of
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the denger that that vest may react with vigor and determination to Chinese
aggression in Indochina, However, Other developments, particularly the
dcrosntic political situation in France, the U'S, the Great Britain, met have
tempered this realization somevbat. Inaothr as a tripartite waning some
to ecraate a greater awareness among the Cnrrunist leaders of the dangers of
intervention in Indochina, it would serve as a deterrent to further aggression,
=less other developments should convince the Ox=mists that arpended war
and military action against China we inevitable in MW aase,
s. `e?a in the %rean war
Developments in Korea will affect Communist policy toward Indochina,
not only insofar as Indochinm and Korea may compete for materiel and troops
(see M2 above . Defense pria+ary-s) but psrticolar]y since the two theaters
are izfortant aspects of Asian Ccmmzwlot policy,, It does not seem likely that
the strategic importance of Indochina is great enough to lead the Communists
Into precipitating a general war in order to conquer Indochina, but it is pos-
sible that an extention or threatened extension of the war in Korea may lead
the Coammmista into att meting to create a diversionaxp attack in Indochina?
Conversely, If the Korean war ends in a oease-41" and the Comm fists desire
oontbued hostilities, they may shift their effort at military expansion to
Southeast Asia, However, it should be noted that increased Chinese Communist
intervention would increase the risk of regional, if not global, war and
would therefore appear to undercut the estimated Communist policy* in Korea of
attempting to"confine and possibly and the Korean war0
f, ' Other COntinaeaeies
The release of Nationalist internees in Ibdochina would probably not
be considered by the Caste as materially affecting the strategic balance
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in Southeast Asia, and would probably not be sufficient reason for increased
Chinese Comarunist intervention, although it could be utilized as a pretext if
such intervention is decided upon for other reasons,
Qai*st operations by MC troops in Southeast Asia or against Mina
itself would raise a aura difficult problem for the Comiutsts0 If operations
against Cosaaunist Claim were based on Indochina, the possibility of Increased
Chinese inisregntion would be increased, Operations against Conamist Mina
based on Fonsosa or Southeast Asian areas other than Indocbina, would probably
affect Chinese Cosuwmist policies toward Indochina only if the operations
v of a scale sufficient to lead Peiping or the Sremila to conclude that
the likelihood of a general Asian war had increased greatly. In that cease,
the problem that arises would be whether increased operations by Cassmmist
China in IMoohina would be of sufficient military value to warrant the risks
=A costs involved, or whether reneged full-scale operations in Korea or a
direct assault on Taiw m would not be militarily more rewarding,
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6o That trends are likely in Viet 11inh-Chinese Communist
relations?
Relations between the DRV and Casammist China are an expression
not only of Communist ChinsQS interest in the DRVQa continued existanee
and expansions but also of Communist (nine's prominent role in the
Asian Communist movement and of its seeming status as a "Junior
partmr" of the DSSR in the vorld Communist bloc, The DRV seems to
regard Communist Mina not only as a source of materiel and technical
assistance, but also as the interpreter of Communist policy end methods
and as a model to be followed in revolutionary praotioeo At the same
time the DRV leadership is careful to male its obeisances to Moscow
as the ultimate source of revolutionary theory and as the leader of
the world "poses" camp,
The present trend in Viet Minh-Chinese Cwmmnist relations
will probably continue. Prom the Viet Minh side, this process will
involve continuing, but gradual, efforts to overawe through "education"
and propaganda the historic Vietnamese animosity toward the Chinese,
to ornate confidence in Chinese leadership, and to foster recognition
of the "important aid" being rendered by the "alder brother" to the
North*
Communist China will probably continue to provide increasing
assistance in the farm of supplies and equipment to counterbalance
stepped-up US aid to the Frenoo..Vietnamese forces, The system of
supplying teohnioal, military, and political advisors to the Viet Minh
will likewwi.ae probably be continued. The oomadtment of Chinese ground
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or air forms viii remain imlikeiy as long as the Viet Ihnh is able to
z.Sntsia app'ozbnat&,y its present position.
There an no inAieatioms that friction between the %inese and
Viet Mtmh leadership is likely to develop in the period covered by this
elotimte or in the abeenoo of a oonyplmte Ccrnimist victory In Indoctbim.
Total victory - involving the enrtension of Communist control trhrotocQt
Indoehima - remiaine the ultimate Viet Minh goal, but both-the Chinese
Ocnmtmists and the Viet Minh isedership probably prefer, for different
reasons, to mdaimtae direct Chin,eae participation, it possible.
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