NIE-36/1: PROSPECTS FOR THE SURVIVAL OF A NON-COMMUNIST REGIME IN BURMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001100020004-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 20, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

Approved For Release 1999/09/08: CIA-RDP79R01,rp1 A001100020004-2
SECURITY I ION
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
20 November 1951
SUBJECTI NIE-36A: PROSPECTS FOR THE SURVIVAL OF A
NON-COMMUNIST REGIME IN BURMA
To review the conclusions of NIEP36, "Prospects for
Survival of a NontComnini.st Regime in Burma,," dated 1 August
19510 with reference to the timing of possible control over
part or all of Burma 1r the Burmese Communists o
to In NIF,c36 it was estimated that the Communists "will
probably be able within the next year or two to achieve do facto
control over a considerable area of northern Burma" and that if
covert Chinese Communist aid to the Burmese Communists continues
"the Burmese Government Is not likely to survive in the long
run unless it greatly increases its political and military
strength,"
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A001100020004-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP79ROI00112A001100020004-2
2. Recent reports indicate that the situation may be
deteriorating more rapidly than had been estimated in NIE-36?
As anticipated, the Chinese Communists have continued their
support of the Burmese Communists, In addition there is evidence
that the Burmese Communists are making progress toward collaboration
with the Karens, thus increasing the over-all capabilities of the
insurgents, The pro?-Commumist Burma Workers and Peasants Party
has become increasingly effective in unifying overt left-wing
opposition to the Burmese Government and in hampering the
government's operations against the insurgents, Within the
government itself, friction between certain ArnV leaders (par-
ticularly lie Win) and the Socialist leaders has not abated, and
there are indications of rising tension between the moderate
Socialists and leftists led by Da Sw,
3, We conclude, therefore, that internal tensions are likel;-?
to weaken the regime more rapidly than anticipated in NIE..36 and
that there is a greater possibility that the present government my
be replaced by a leftist regime or even, though less likely, by
a pro-Communist regime, We conclude also that the Burmese CommunA.its
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A001100020004-2
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will probably extend their military control in Northern Burma du:-ing
the current fair weather season (six to eight months) and thatf
even without direct participation by Chinese Communist Forces, they
will be able to achieve effective control over considerable area t;
Northern Burma in a year to eighteen months,
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A001100020004-2