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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 21, 2005
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Publication Date: 
December 10, 1951
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79R01012A001200010026-8.pdf207.24 KB
I.. Cgxsplslc~~a> 'she; Sc-71et Union through the acquisition of Continental Western Europa oy4S.. under ttana conditions acquire. Approve/or Relea e.2005 05 .2 : CIA-RDP79W012AO01200010026-80eo, ? S CMU INFOPM&TIC' (Sector Summary) /~ 1 -rte/{/ ~ 79jt TI) ''IvTIAIJ ECONOMIC CAIRNS OF T U.S,: S,B, RESUIJING FROM THE ACc,UISITIO OF COg s 84771 PAL W ES'l` i I;UltCPB CfRDITANCE ' CONFIDENTIAL Ar oxe:i ;tai r1,-9m (Table 9-A) An estimated production capaoit7 by mid-1952 of some 8,700 armored vehicles per an mm. In &4ition the Soviet Union would acquire some of the 15,5001 armored hides now inventoried as jr el in Western Europe, b. & , 7$ mm and above (Tab] o 9--S) In addition, the Soviet Union would acquire an estimated production capacity by raid.-4952 of batter titan 9,%00 artillery pieces per annum. Also the Soviet Union would acquiro some of the 20,500 artillery places now inventoried as L- 1t e ; ine W~, ,eatern EuTopci p, C. , (Table 9-C) The Soviet Union would also acquire an estimated production-capacity by mid-1952 of 334,400 metric tons of explosives per anr=. While it is im- possible to estimate the mate .,.c tonnage of explosives in Western Europe which might be acquired. by the Soviets, it would unquestionably be a substantial J~ ou.nt o tl. h i a. ' at e , (Table 13_B) As no OW agent stockpiles are j n in Western Europe. and as production installations for their manufacture are neglk-;t "n, there would be no potential economic gain for the Soviet Union through the acquisition of It is estimated that the Soviet Union is current]. DATE: 3.~'I,.~f.t . L a. ds.Y'rutclM -01ii9i", AUTH: HR 70.2 Ct,m Tie & tk .aJjk CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS C NEXT REVIEW DATE: Qq.I t Western Europe in the field of CW agents. DOCUMENTNO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. I CJ DECLASSIFIED 6,000 armored vehicles anmally within the U.S.S.R. (a margin of error is recognized, in this estimate; maximum probable production may be 7,500) and is Approved For Rel 9 1(Nth*Ifr P79R01012A001200010026-8 25X1 CONFIDENTIAL Approv For F '111 P N1 1MA-RDP79 1012AO01200010026-8 SEIGU MY INF0BJWI IOR capable of increasing this production within two years, from already available facilities, to 30,000 per annunn. In addition, the Soviet Satellites of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany rroduce component parts for Soviet- model armored vehicles, i.e., transmissions. differentials, tracks, turrets and armor plate most of which is shipped to the U.S.S.R. for assembly. chile it is estimated that Continental. Western Europe will attain a production capacity of approximately 8, ?00 armored vehicles per annum by mid-1952, it is doubtful that the Soviet Union would utilize this pradnetion capacity, at least initially, for other than repair andaaaintenanoe purposes as it is currently esti,j-.meted that the U.S.S.R. now has some 60,000;rmored vehicles .n-being. b. Argil. As in the case of armored vehicles, the U.S.S.R. is also estimated to have an impressive inventory of artillery pieces, namely, 110,000 pieces of 76 mm and above. Also, by mid-1952 it is estimated that the U.S.S.R. will have a production capacity of 100,000 pieces of artillery per annum. it is estimated that Continental Western Europe will attain a production capacity' of 10,000 pieces of artillery per annum by mid-1952. It seems doubtful, In view of the Soviets apparent policy to limit the production of ordnance# even among their Satellites, that they would implement a vast production program in newly acquired.territory. However, in view of their anticipation of a sea-borne invasion, it seems probable that they might direct at least a portion of this capacity to the production of coastal and anti-aircraft guns. C, E loaiyes The estimated production of explosives for Continental Western Europe for 1951 is just short of 200,000 metric tons for all types. It is estimated that by mid-1952 this annual rate of production could be increased to some 205,000 metric tons, while the total production capacity is estimated at 334,400 metric tons. By comparison. it to estimated that the U.S.S.R. alone produced some 200,000 metric tons of explosives during 1951 and will produce at an annual rate of 300,000 metric tons by mid-1952. It is further Approved For Relea ?- -M1 'q' fDF Y 1 AV10026-8 Approve.,d F.orQQda[ RDP79P 12AO01200010026-8 EOTIPTIl 0BAIO estimated that by mid.-1952 the U.S.S.R. will have a production capacity of 750,000 metric tons of explosives. On the basis of the foregoing estimates, the Soviet Union could increase her potential production capacity for explosives by nearly 50 porrcent through the acquisition of the production capacity of Continental Western Europe. Ate Ap 91 Cheimicajjfhr~ The Soviet Union is estimated an of the and of 1951 to hare an lflVeat0Z7 of 580,000 metric tone of OW agents. By mid-1952 it is estimated they will have a production capacity of 150,000 metric tons per annum of CW agents. There are no CW Plants in Continental Western 1iurope known to be in production of OW agents except for experimental purposes and the output of these, if placed in fVt1 operation, would be almost neg1ige.ble. 3. Sts I A The following tables are attached hereto: Table 9-A, Armored Vehicles Table 9-B, Artillery Table 9-0, Explosives Table 13-B, Gtr Agents CONFIDENTIAL 3 Approved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200010026-8 S URITTY IB 0RM&TIOR 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200010026-8 Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200010026-8