NIE-40: POTENTIAL MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND SCIENTIFIC ACCRETIONS TO THE USSR RESULTING FROM THE ACQUISITION OF WESTERN EUROPE BEFORE MID-1952

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001200010042-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: July 13, 1951
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEIICY
NATIONAL ESTLIATES BOARD
13 Ju' 1951
III1I?I(RAIff)1JLI FOR: N. Allan Evnna, OIR
General John WeckerlinC, G-2
Captain Ray I Ia1.pas s, OUT
Colonel Edward It. Porter, AFOIII
Captain R. G. IlcCool, JIG
SUM,= : IM !,-/+O: Potential Military, economic and
Scientific Accretions to the USSR Resulting
from the Acquisition of Western europe
before I?Iid-1952
1, The enclosed terns of reference, indicating the
allocations of production responsibility, were agreed on by
the IAC representatives neeting on 12 July.
2. It is requested that contributions be received in
this office by the close of business on Nedneaday, 17 October.
25X1A9A
Lecutive Secretary
Distribution tt13a
25X1
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MOW&
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCT
12 . July 1951
SUBJECT: TERM OF RI MCE: M.40: POTEtaTIAL MILITARY,
ECONCJ111C AND SCIENTIFIC ACCRETIONS TO THE USSR
FMULTII FItOI THE ACQ ITION OF WESTERN EUROPE
BEFORE X1952
To estimate the potential rd ttcry, economic, and scien-
tific accretions to the tMSA resulting, from the acquisition
of Western Europe* before mid-1952.
SCOPE
The study would first (Section 1) evaluate the military,
economic, and scientific potential of Western Europe in terms
of its usefulness to the USSR. The study would then (Section
II) ezsmine under the assumption of wartime conditions, the
* n urope west of the Iron Curtain, including Finn
lands -Sweden., Norway, Dem ark, Austria, West Gem, Switzerland,
Italy, Yugoslavia, France, Spain, Portugal, The Netherlands,
Belgium, L bourg, but excluding the UK and all colonial
possessions of the Western European countries.
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factors, emcluding destruction by military action, which
would retard or prevent full Soviet utilization of the area's
war potential. No attempt will be made to reach conclusions
regarding a Soviet intent to overrun Western Europe, but
certain limited conclusions nay,ege which might shed light
on the role of Western Earope In the Kremlin's over-all
strategic planning6
QUESTIONS BEARING ON'THE PROBLP 1
IQ WHAT UMM=0 ECOD QC, AND SCIENTIFIC ADVANTAGES IPOUID
ACCRUE TO THE USSR FROM ACQUISITION OF THE TERRITORI AND
TOTAL RESOURCES OF WESTERN EUROPE?
(This section is intended to eaceoaine the Western Daropean
situation "as is,, a disregarding such factors as TS counter-
action, destruction by Western forces, or interdiction of
the conquered areas' normal trade with non-Soviet areas.)
G?.2 A? Iii
(coordinating
Defense)
1. Defensive advantages, or reduction of potential
military threat to the USSR (denial to the US
.rm
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20
OM
(coordinating)
O0/si
of manpower, air bases, land approaches to the
USSR, etea)0
Offensive advantages, or increased facilities
far military action against the US,, the Us and
other non.Soviet countries resulting from acquiei..
tion of bases? trained manpower, munitions, etc,
Be ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIF])C
1, '/hat would be the gross accretion to the Soviet
military potential from Western European stocks,
resources, and productive capacity?
2. In what particular lines would the econc*mdc and
scientific potential of T7estern Europe make the
greatest contribution to Soviet strength?
IIv UNDEt THE ASSULtPTION OF WARTM CONDITIONS, 1VHAT FACTORS,
EXCLUDING DESTRUCTION Br MILITAIM ACTION, WOULD TEND TO
RETARD OR PREVENT SOVIET UTILIZATION OF WESTERN EUROPEIS
POTENTIAL?
(A precise estimate of the damage which could be inflicted
tV the various military and econanic courses of action
available to the US is not expected. It is assumed that
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the Soviet Union has control of the oil of the
Middle Last and overland access to all of cox.
tinental Asia.)
G.-2
A.
MUITARY AND POLITICAL FACTORS
(coordinating
Defense)
1o
Effects of the required deployment of Soviet
3.
military forces in Western Europe.
Necessity for providing large occupation forces.
Administrative Problems-
4.
Difficulties of organizing and controlling
(coordinating
)
non-Soviet armed forces.
OIR
(coordinating)
6; 61
B. ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC FACTORS
1. 'What basic problems would confront the LFSR
in Integrating the econa?ates and scientific
potential of the newly occupied area with that
of the present Soviet orbit and in exploiting
Western ]ropean resources?
(a) problems of economic administration and manage.
meat, including conversion and standardization
problems, etc.
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(b) Transportation probl.e s0
(c) Specific fields in vdiich the USSR might
be forced to rely, on Western European
scientific and technical persoinel o
(d) Problem of nort-cooperation and obstruction
by Western European labor forces o
24 To ghat degree is the Western European econmq
dependent on Imports from non-Soviet areas?
To that extent could these Imports be supplied
by the USSR?
3, To what extent could Western European resources
and productive capacity supplement those of the
T SR?
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