TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-40: POTENTIAL MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND SCIENTIFIC ACCRETIONS TO THE USSR RESULTING FROM THE ACQUISITION OF WESTERN EUROPE BEFORE MID-1952

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001200010043-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: July 7, 1951
• Content Type: MF

A
Appr a For Release CIA-RDPA b1012AO 1200010043-9
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL ESTIMATES BOARD
7 Ju3y 1951
MEMORANTRJM FOR: M 0 Allan Evans, 0IR
General John Weckerling, G-2
Captain Ray Malpass, ONI
Colonel Edward Ho Porter, AFUIN
Captidn R. G. McCook,, JIG
SUBJECT : TM(S OF REFERENCE: NIE : POTE24TIAL
MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC ACCRE-
TIONS TO THE USSR RESULTII FRal TIE
ACQUISITION OF WESTERN E(JROPE FORE
MID-1952
la The attached draft terms of reference a for-
warded for review.
~2o It is requested that your representative meet with
us - at 2:30 on Wedneadaar, 11 July, in Room 31 'i, South
Building.
25X1A9A
Distribution "B"
Approved For Release 2005/0
Execut ves re
DOCUMENT NO.
CHANGE IN CLASS. t~r~
DECLASSIFIED 4
CLASS. CHANGED T0. TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE.
AUTH: HA 70-2
DATE: 1-'ZI? D REVIEWER:
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
7 July 1951
SUBJECTS TERMS OF REFERENCES NIE-4408 POTENTIAL MILITARX=
ECONOMIC Alm SCIENTIFIC ACCRETIONS TO THE USSR
RESULTIIiG FROiT THE ACQUISITION OF WESTERN EUROPE
BEFORE M11Wi952
(For Consideration by IAC representatives)
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the potential miitary, economic and cien'
tific ar^etions to the USSR resulting from the acquisition
of western Europe before mid4952o
SCOPE
The study would first (Section I) evaluate the mil.itaxy,
economic and scientific potential of Western Europe in terms
of its usefulness to the USSR. The study would then (Section
II) examine, under the assumption of general. war between the
s Fin-
Continental. Europe west of the iron Curtain, t including ng Fin-
].and., Sweden, Norway, Denmark, West Germany, Snc
Italy, yugoslavia, France, Spain, Portugal, The Netherlands,
Belgium, Luxembourg, but e=luding the UK and all colonial
possessions of the Western European countrieso
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US and the USSR, the factors which would retard or prevent
full Soviet utilisation of the area's war potential* No
attempt will be made to reach conclusions regarding a Soviet
intent to overrun Western Europe, but certain limited con-
clusions may emerge which might shed light on the role of
Western Europe in the Kremlinoa over-all strategic pl lingo
QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
T. WHAT RUE TO T THE q USSR NFRO'i ACQUISITION OF THE TERRITORY AND
TOTAL RESOURCES OF WESTERN EUROPE?
(This section is intended to examine the Western European
situation "as is", disregarding such factors as US counter'-
action, destruction by '?'eatern forces, or interdiction of
the conqaered areas' normal trade with non-.Soviet areas.)
A. MITNRY
3?0. Defensive advantages, or reduction of potential
military threat to the USSR (denial to the US
of manpower,, air bases, land approaches to the
USSR, etc.).
Offensive advantages, or increased facilities for
military action against the US, the UK and other
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non-Soviet countries resulting from acquisi-
tion of bases, trained manpower, munitions,
etco
Bo ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC
3, What would be the overall accretion to the
Soviet military potential from :debtern European
stocks, resources and productive aapacitS?
2, In what particular lines would the economic
and scientific potential of Western Europe
make the greatest contribution to Soviet
strength?
I1C. UNDER THE ASSUMPTIO11 OF GENERAL WAR BETWEEN THE US AND THE
USSR, WHAT FACTORS WOULD TEflD TO RETARD OR PREVENT SOVIET
UTILIZATION OF WESTERN EUROPES POTENTIAL?
(A precise estimate of the damage which could be inflicted
by the various military and economic courses of action
available to the US is not expected?)
MILITARY AND POLITICAL FACTORS
lA Overextension of Soviet military foreeso
20 Necessity for providing large occupation forces.
3. Administrative problems.
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Difficulties of organizing and controlling
non-Soviet armed forceso
Bo ECONOMIC FACTORS
1. What basic problems would confront the USSR
in integrating the economies of the newly
occupied area with that of the present
Soviet orbit and in exploiting Western
European resources?
(a) Conversion and standardization problems..
(b) Transportation problems.
(a) Specific fields in which the USSR might
befforced to rely on Western European
military, scientific,, and technical per-
aonneelo
(d) Problem of non-cooperation and obstruction
by Western European labor forcpeso
20 To what degree is the Western European economy
dependent on imports from non-Soviet areas?
To what extent could these imports be supplied
by the USSR?
3, To what extent could Western European resources
and productive capacity supplement those of the
USSR?
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