TENTATIVE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR PROPOSED NIE (FORMERLY STAFF PLANNING PROJECT NO.7 STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF A SOVIET CONQUEST OF WESTERN EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST* BEFORE 1953 (FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE BOARD)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001200010049-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: May 26, 1951
• Content Type: STUDY

Appro For Release 2005/O CIA-RDP7 1012AO01200010049-3
26 May 1951
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
SUBJECT: Tentative Terms of Reference for Proposed NIE
(Formerly Staff Planning Project No. 7)3 '
STRATEGIC IE,IPLICATIONS OF A SOVIET CONQUEST OF
WESTERN EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST* BEFORE 1953
(for consideration of the Board)
THE PROBLEM
To examine the effect on the EastuWest power position of
a Soviet conquest of Western Europe and the Near East before
19530
el~
The study would esent a deeoription or sxmation of the
,V'I potential military and economic accretions to the Soviet bloc
resulting from conquest of the area under optimum condition,
European con inentai countries West of the Iron Curtain
(including Yugoslavia),, Greece,, Turkey, Iran,, the Levant,, the
Arabian peninsula, and Egypt
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DOCUMENT NO. --"
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
X DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
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i0e.1 no US counteraction' negligible resistance and destruc-
tion by Western armed forces, eta. The study would then examine
the numerous known or possible internal and external factors
which might deter or prevent full Soviet realization of the
LAW*
areas ential kCV04UL-0L&-on.ahan # Soviet
r,,
[ thoug no attempt si be
made to reach conclusions regarding a Soviet intent to overrun
Western Europe and the Near East, certain limited conclusions
may emerge which would shed light on Soviet intentions,cparti-
oularly with respect to the optimum time for a conquest of
Western Europe and the Near East and the most advantageous
method of achieving itol
QUESTIONS BLARING ON THE PROBLEM l (U "
G l ,` I Lam` - i f~
V r H A T PNMM MILITARY AND GNOMIC ADV ?ETA Q ES COULD MEEL
THE-
USSR
EAR EAT?
N
(Disregarding such factors as US counteraction, destruction
by retreating western forces, and interdiction of the con-
quered area*s normal trade with non-Soviet areas.)
A. Military..
p o7ext~
1. Removal of a lsmd threat to the USSR?
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2, Increased capability for lunching attacks
against the US, the UK eerr other non-Soviet
countries?
Ec Ononx c ef E, GI Pr ~7
1. What would be the gross Western Europe and , ,
tpC(51 Y'e S cJ" 1'rC-'l~~,c - frv GGk~ to k GtTg
Near Eastern oduction of resources and pro3$
which Gould contribute to the Soviet potential for
war against the US and UK?
2. In what particular lines would the economic poten
tial of Western Europe and the Near East make the
greatest contribution to Soviet economic strength?
TO WHAT EXTENT AIM FOR HOW LONG WOULD VARIOUS INTERNAL
FACTORS DE IT OR . UNT FULL SOVIET UTILIZATION OF
WESTERN EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST?
(As in I above, external factors such as US counter-
action,, etc.,, would be 'disregarded.)
A. Military.
1. Overextension of Soviet military force`s?
2. Difficulties of organizing and controlling non-
Soviet armed forces?
3, Necessity for providing large occupation forces?
B, Economic. //s
1. Integration of the economics- of the two areas?
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