COMMENTS ON NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE CONCERNING KASHMIR DISPUTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020002-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 3, 1951
• Content Type: MEMO

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691029 XR-357-AB
FROM: AP4EiBASSY, KARACHI 556 November 3, 1951
TO: TIDE DEIARTI?::T OF STATE, WAS?IIiIGTON AIR POUCH
REF: NIE-41: Department's instruction no. 26, October 1, 1951
SUBS~'~CT: Comments on National Intelligence Estimate Concerning
Kashmir Dispute
In general, the Embassy concurs with the Nstional Intelligence
Estimate on "Probable Developments in the Kashmir Dispute to the
End of 1951", although it believes that undue emphasis is placed
on the issue of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly. The Assembly
is only one of the factors which contribute to the frustration of
Pakistani leaders regarding Kashmir and is not likely of itself
to become a cause of war.. The GOP does, however, make great use
of the Assembly for purposes of both internal and external propa-
ganda.
The Embassy has the following specific comments regarding
the Estimate. Where no comment is made the Embassy concurs with
the Estimate's statements.
Par , The Embassy does not believe that the GOP will, during
the period under consideration, precipitate, deliberately launch,
or sponsor local action in Kashmir, the possibility of which is
suggested in the Estimate.
Par 6, The Estimate states that in an extended conflict India
would probably be victorious. The Embassy concurs if Pakistan
does not get extensive outside aid. If the GOP, however, gets
aid in the form of artillery and all types of amunition, Paiistan
could win in a long war.
Par The Estimate's information regarding the status of the
Graham mission is now out of date.
Par 11, Liaquat Ali Khan did not threaten war to prevent the
Constituent Assembly elections as stated in the Estimate,
Par 19. The Estimate says that Pakistan might welcome reference
of the Kashmir question to the General Assembly. The GOP has,
in fact, vigorously opposed referral of the question to the
General Assembly. (See Embassy's telegram No. 321, September 24,
1951 and the Department's telegram No. 325, September 21, 1951).
Par 20. The Embassy does not possess information adequate for
checking the figures on Indian Army strength given. in this para-
graph.
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SECRET Vfw 2 Karachi 556
Par 21, The Embassy agrees with the estimate of the numerical
strength of Pakistan's Army forces. Of the 57,000 men said to be in
the Wazirabad area, however, a considerable number are probably civil
armed forces (Scouts, Police and National Guard). There are approxi-
mately 35,000 regulars in that area.
Par 23. While the Embassy does not disagree with the conclusion of
the Estimate that in an all-out war with Pakistan.. India would proba-
bly be victorious, it is believed that if neither gets from the out-
side any augmentation of armor or air, it is likely that within a
few weeks both sides will have neither. This would benefit Pakistan.
Par 25-. In the event of war, support of Pakistan by the Pathan tribes-
men might be a mixed blessing. The tribesmen, often more interested
in loot than principle, are likely-to be quite difficult to control
in a planned military campaign.
Par 32. The Embassy does not believe that Pakistan will deliberately
launch or sponsor local action in Kashmir, the possibility of which
is suggested in the Estimate.
Par 33. As'already indicated, the Embassy does not feel that the
onstituent Assembly plays such an important part in the decisions
of the Government of Pakistan. The statement that "GOP leaders
might believe that...hostilities in Kashmir would bring about im-
mediate UN action favorable to Paldstan" represents in the Embassy's
opinion the most valid reason why Pakistan might eventually encourage
the tribesmen and Azad Kashmir forces to attack in Kashmir.
APPENDIX: In the table of Comparative Strengths of Indian and
Pakistani Armed Forces, Pakistan Army strength should be revised
to show seven Infantry Divisions instead of one. Pakistan's strength
in aircraft should be revised to. show sixty-seven Hawker Furies in-
stead of sixty-eight and five Halifaxes instead of six.
(signed) Avra N. Warren
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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH
FR.Ct4 : New Delhi 1258 12/6/51
TO : The Department of State, Washington- AIR POUCH
Department's Instruction #38 of October 1, 1951, RE NIE-,41
REF 3 "Probable Developments in the Kashmir Dispute to the End of
1951"
SUBJECT:
The receipt is acknowledged of National Intelligence Estimate -41
with respect to probable developments in the Kashmir dispute to the end
of 1951.
The Embassy is in general agreement with those sections of this
report which analyze the attitudes of Pakistan and India. It is noted,
however, that the estimate was prepared in September 1951 and that since
that date developments regarding Kashmir have taken a decided turn for
the better with the result that some of the conclusions of the estimate
require revision.
Among the factors which have led to this changed situation are the
following: (1) Publication on October 15, 1951 of a balanced constructive
renort by Dr. Graham on his demilitarization talks with India and Pakistan;
(2) Conciliatory statements by Nehru and other Indian officials following
Prime Minister Liaquat's assassination on October 16, 1951; (3) Equally
conciliatory statements by the new Pakistan Prime Minister Nasinuddin
regarding Indo-Pakistan relations; (4) Prime Minister Nehru's statement
to a press conference on November 3 that the Government of India would
be prepared to have a non-aggression pact with Pakistan and would also
be prepared substantially to reduce Its forces in Kashmir and would wel-
come a plebiscite as early as possible; (5) Adjournment of the Kashmir
Constituent Assembly s e die on November 7, possibly until next April,
without taking action on the question of accession although statements
were made by Prime Minister Abdullah and other Kashmiri officials which
indicated they favored accession to India; and (6) Action by the Security
Council on November 10 authorizing Dr. Graham to continue his conversations
with India and Pakistan regarding demilitarization in Kashmir for another
six weeks.
Two of the most important consequences of the foregoing developments
are the present relaxation in the critical state of tension which existed
between India and Pakistan earlier this year, as indicated in the first
conclusion of NIB-441; and the fact that Pakistan has not launched or. sponsored
local action in Kashmir, as appeared possible when NIE-41 was written.
At the present moment, it seems likely that the Government of India
will continue its present conciliatory approach toward Pakistan respecting
Kashmir and will avoid any action of a controversial character which might
precipitate public debate regarding the issue. Reasons for this attitude
may be found in the preoccupation of Indian government officials, who are
also members of the Indian National Congress, with India's forthcning
general elections and in the undesirability of making the Kashmir dispute
an election campaign issue. Another important reason is the confidence
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a New Delhi 1 %40
December b, 1951
Indians government officials have in Dr. Graham and their hope that his
current conversations with representatives of India and Pakistan in Paris
regarding demilitarization will bear fruit.
Basically, progress is long overdue and, providing none of India's
political principles is compromised, a solution of the Kashmir question
would be welcomed on economic and financial grounds. Since the outbreak
of hostilities in Kashmir in October 1947, that state's normal economic
relationships with Pakistan have been disrupted. Furthermore, the possi-
bility of renewed warfare with Pakistan ties down the greater part of the
Indian Army in or near Kashmir and prevents any reduction in size :rhieh
might otherwise be instituted. Dr. Ambedkar, former Law Minister in Prime
Minister Nehru's cabinet and the head of the Scheduled Castes Federation,
has already drawn attention to the question of the financial cost to India
of the Kashmir dispute in the election manifesto of the Federation (Embassy
Despatch 871, October 22nd). Although Dr. Ambedkar'a view did not sub-
sequently provoke extended comment in the Indian press, many thinking Indians
including government planners certainly realize that a solution for the
Kashmir question would be economically as well as politically advantageous.
In view of the foregoing, it is believed that relations between India
and Pakistan will continue on their present even keel until at least the and
of February 1952', when India's general elections are scheduled to be com-
pleted. Progress thereafter will depend on the results of the general
elections and the success which Dr. Graham achieves in Paris in his demil-
itarization talks with representatives of India and Pakistan. Regarding
the former, it is generally anticipated that Prime Minister Nehru's Indian
National Congress will be returned to power and it may, therefore, be ex-
pected that India's present policy on Kashmir will be continued, Regarding
the latter, if Dr. Graham should be able to report agreement on demilitariza-
tion following the conclusion of his talks in Paris about December 22, and
if the Security Council should subsequently hold out hope of an early pleb-
iscite in Kashmir by extending Dr. Graham's responsibilities in this respect,
definite progress in Indo-Pakistan relations regarding Kashmir and with
respect to other problems may well be anticipated.
For the Ambassador:
(signed) Everett F. Drumright
Everett F. Drumright
cc. Karachi, Paris Gadel, London Counselor of Embassy (Political)
SECURITY INFORMATION SECRET
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