D/I-USAF CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-41: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KASHMIR DISPUTE TO THE END OF 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 20, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

as 20'991,08M : CIA-RDP79 V01012AO01200020006-9
DI-USAF CONTRIBUTION TO NIE=41^ PROBABLE MWELOPMENT
. IN THE KASHMIR DISPUTE TO THE END 514 25X1 A98
*USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File*
III. A. Cagabilities of the Indian Air Force.
The Indian Air Force (IAF) has available approximately 177 combat type
aircraft which are operational or could readily be made operationalo These ccusist
of 22 British type jet fighters, 128 British type conventional fighters and 27
light bombers (B=-249s). In addition, the IAF possesses 57 twin-engine transports
(C?471s). The IAF is commanded and guided by British RAF officers. Its over-all
personnel strength consists of approximately 1108 officers, of which 410 are pilots,
and 16,875 enlisted men. Because of the dependence on loaned RAF personnel, the
operations of the IAF would be seriously impaired without continued British assistance,,
The IAF has accepted delivery of 22 of the 39 Vampire jet fighters it has
on order from the British but renorted],y only 3 of these aircraft have as yet been
assigned to a tactical fighter squadron. Currently the mainstay of the IAF is the
British Tempest conventional fighter on which maintenance is good and ,serviceability
over 60 per cent?
The present combat value and size of the IAF give it a relatively high
combat capability in relation to the Royal Pakistan Air Force (RPAF). Defensively,
the IAF has sufficient, fighters to meet any aerial attack that could be launched by
the RPAF. However, due to lack of adequate radar or visual early warning stations,
poor communications, insufficient and widely dispersed anti-aircraft units, and the
concentration of fighter aircraft on a few -airfieldsc India is extremely vulnerable
to a surprise attack. Offensively, the capabilities of the IAF are extremely limited
at this time. Due to lack of qualified crews, maintenance inefficiency and lack of
technical knowledge on the part of ground personnel, the B'24 light bombers could not
~...
.
f
i
J-c. re
CIA h
t b
e
o
th
s
n
as
y
r l F, .: ` 20 Au tst 1951
SEGREH- deco that
~ C no objection to declass
^ It coma formation of CIA
Interest tha t remain
classified at $ 0
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R010'31On 2AM nd
DsH q~?.. . 1. B vIswa
 F.
Approved For Reeleasi' @ g : CIA-RDP79 1012AO01200020006-9
be employed in offensive operations on a sustained basis. The fighter aircraft, how-
ever, could be used for limited tactical ground support, strafing and low level bombing
missions.
Any offensive effort by the IAF might be limited by a lack of aviation fuel
as all such fuel is imported. The shut-down of the Abadan Refinery has closed the
normal source of supply for high-octane avgas. Reportedly the government is maintaining
a six-months stored reserve of POL. Since no combat type aircraft are manufactured
within India, the IAF is dependent on foreign sources for the procurement of such
aircraft and also their essential spare parts,
Without substantial assistance from foreign sources it is believed that
India is incapable of waging an offensive aerial war for a sustained period of
operations. However, it is believed that the IAF is capable of providing limited
support for localized operations of a short duration.
During World War II numerous airfields were constructed throughout India
in every section of the country. Many of these facilities were constructed by the
USAAF and later were declared surplus to American needs and turned over intact, to
the Indian Government. Approximately 300 were fields with permanent type runways.
only. from 10 to 15 per cent of these airfields have been maintained by the Indian
Government and nothing has been added of permanent-type construction. Nearly all
the air facilities existing in India could be made serviceable with a minimum amount
of expense and effort. However, with the lack of maintenance effort on the part of
the Indian Government, a greater number of these fields will become progressively
more unserviceable.
India would neither be aided nor hindered to any appreciable extent by
Afghan intervention in any conflict insofar as the role of the Afghan Air Force is
BEGn-1 P1111IL"T
2
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012AO01200020006-9
 Approved For Release '% L CIA-RDP79l 01 2AO01 200020006-9
concerned. The Afghan Air Force only has 25 aircraft in tactical units (13 ettack
fighters and 12 bomber-transports). The combat value of the Afghan Air Force is
extremely low in all aspects of warfare; it is merely a token force with no a.ppre '
ciable offensive or defensive capabilities against the air forces of neighboring
states.
III. C. at Intentions Are Indicated by Recent Indian Activities?
It is believed that recent Indian military moves do not indicate a desire
to provoke war but do indicate a willingness to accept war and evidence that mili-
tary pressure is being employed to attain political objectives*
During July the complement of an IAF fighter squadron was increased from
12 to 15 Tempests and the'squadron was transferred from Palam Field, New Delhi to
Halwara (approximately 60 miles west of Ambala in Punjab Province). Subsequently
this squadron was returned to its New Delhi base due to inability to maintain it in
the forward area. This squadron arrived at Halwara at approximately the same time
the Government of India was concentrating troops in the Punjab area.
No other forward deployment of air units by the IAF or other moves have
been reported to data which would indicate the immimence of hostilities insofar as
the IAF was concerned. However} it is believed that the lack of other indications
of probable combat air activity in the near future are not too significant in this
situation since hostilities between Pakistan and India probably would consist
primarily of infantry actions due to the inability of either country to sustain.,
without substantial outside assistance, large scale air operations,
A limiting factor on both air operations and the serviceability of airfields
in the Kashmir area are the monsoon rains which are expected to end about the first
of October. A period of good flying weather should then ensue.
BECRE C.-
Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020006-9
 Approved For ele "PJ29 : CIA-RDP79F~,01012AO01200020006-9
ceL
IV. A. capabilities of the Royal Pakistan Air For
The Royal Pakistan Air Force (RPAF) has available approximately 92 combat
type aircraft which are operationtl or could readily be made operational. These
consist of 1 British type jet fighter, 84 British type conventional fighters and
7 British type light bombers (Halifax). In addition, the RPAF has approximately 24
twin-engined transports. The RPAF, like the IAF, is guided by British RAF officers.
Its over-all personnel 'strength consists of approximately 531 officers, of which 124
are pilots, and 7204 enlisted men. In addition thereto, there ate 6 pilot officers,
33 ground officers and 252 enlisted men of the RAF operating under contract as tech-
nical and administrative advisors to the RPAF. Because of the dependence on senior
RAF officers, the RPAF, like the IAF, would be severely handicapped it it attempted
to carry on operations without the assistance of the British.
The RPAF has received delivery of only one of the 36 Vickers "Attacker" jet
aircraft it ordered from the British.* This jet fighter is not assigned to any
tactical unit. The operational fighter squadrons of the RPAF are equipped with the
postwar British 'Hawker "Fury" aircraft on which serviceability is very high.
Pakistan is'almost entirely dependent on outside sources of supply for
all aircraft, aircraft spares, munitions and armament, and.aviation fuel. Unless
Pakistan has stockpiled avgae, the shut-down of the Abadan Refinery has closed
completely the normal source of supply for high-octane avgae. Although there is no
*-Reports have been received stating that six of these Vickers "Attacker" jet aircraft
have been received by the RPAF from the UK; however, receipt of only one "Attacker"
has been confirmed4
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A001200020006-9
 Approved For teJease
CIA-RDP79R 01 2AO01 200020006-9
aircraft factory in Pakistan, there is one facility capable of assembly, repair
and modification of airframes and engines. Supply organization and administration
appears to be reasonably efficient, and maintenance of aircraft in tactical units
is good.
The combat value of the RPAF is relatively low in comparison with that of
the IAF0 In initial operations the RPAF might be fairly effective in a conflict
with India but its combat value would decrease rapidly in actual combat because of
its lack of reserves and the comparatively greater size of the IAF. Both???Pakistan
and India are in the process of developing jet fighter forces, but, to date, the
IAF has received by far the larger number and has had a greater opportunity for
operational training,
Defensively,, the RPAF probably could, at the outset of hostilities', meet
any aerial attack that could be launched by the IAF at least until such time as the
IAF is able to utilize In combat operations additional numbers of the jet fighters
which already have been,delivered by the British. However, the defensive capabilities
of the RPAF, for the reasons mentioned above, would fade after a short period, Offer
lively, the capabilities of the RPAF are extremely limited. The RPAF could provide
limited tactical ground support and conduct strafing and low level bombing missions
for a short period, In addition, the RPAF has 7 light bombers (Halifax) which con-
ceivably could be used for sporadic strikesfl although currently there is no organized
light bomber squadron and these aircraft are not assigned to any tactical unit.
For the reasons stated in paragraph III A above, Pakistan, as India, would
neither be aided nor hindered to any appreciable extent by Afghan intervention in
any conflict insofar as the role of the Afghan Air Force is concerned since the combat
capabilities of that force are negligible.
I-ECRET
5
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A001200020006-9
 Approved For Release 20
~ w(IA-1\/r / JI\V IV ILAVV ILVVVLVVVV-J
IV. C. What are the dications from the Pakistan Response to Indigos Acti ties?
It is believed that Pakistan does not desire to provoke a war, but is
willing to accept war or to pursue political objectives through military pressures
Reportedly the Pakistan Arnr during July ordered units to defensive
positions in the direction of Lahore (to the northwest of the area reported as the
site of Indian troop movements). No movement of RPAF units has been reported,
however, all leaves in the Pakistan Armed Forces reportedly were cancelled. It is
believed that currently the RPAF is as ready for combat as its limited equipment and
size will, permit. Reports indicate that probably the RAF advisors will withdraw from
the respective air forces in the event of hostilities between India and Pakistan with
a consequent decrease in the combat effectiveness of both forces.
VI. What Are The Probable Developments In The Near Future?
aaaar~is~a~s .~+r -
(No contribution has been made to this section which. has been allotted to
"OIR and Defense" since the questions posed involve political considerations primarily),
VII. at Effect Could These Probable Develo is Have On U.S. Securit Interests?
From, the standpoint of aerial warfare, Pakistan is strategically important
because of its geographical position which affords potential sites for air bases which
could be used for bomber strikes against any part of the USSR., In the event that India
ultimately acquired all or a portion of Pakistan, the areas so acquired would probably
be denied to the U.S. and her allies as sites for air'bases in flew of the Indian
Government?s'apparent determination to maintain an independent position in the East-
West conflict and to avoid a commitment to the West. The security interests of the
U.S. thereby would-.be prejudiced to this extent if the occupant of this strategic area
becomes India instead of Pakistan which, as a more firmly aligned member of the British
Commonwealth of Nations, currently is more favorably oriented toward the West.
E I L~
0, R E T
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020006-9