PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KASHMIR DISPUTE TO THE END OF 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020013-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: August 27, 1951
• Content Type: STUDY

'Approved For Rase 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79RO 12AO01200020013-1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
C +ICE C&" NATI0i1L ESTIMATES
27 August 1951
SUBJECT s NME ,: PROBABLE DEVELOPZ VTS III THE KASIll1IR DISPUTE TO
THE EtJD CF 1951
(For Board consideration)
THE FR0J3LF2Q
To estimate Indian and Pakistani capabilities and intentions
concerning Kashanir, and to indicate probable developments in the dispute
during 19510 with particular reference to the possible use of armed
force.
CWCLUSICcIS
1, India and Pakistan have reached a critical state of tension
over Kashmir a chiefly because of the Indian plan to hold Constituent
Assembly elections between 10 and 30 September in most of Kashmir,
including the Vale area, If held, these elections will produce an
Assembly that will vote in favor of final affiliation of Kashmir with
India.
2, The military forces of both countries are deployed in
readiness for wars and very few additional measures would be required
for either to go to war,
DECLASS
CLASS. CHANGED Td'
Approved For Release 2000/ IA-RDP7 hT4 T612uD6
DATE: _ KAM( 0 REVIEWER: 0
 'Approved For RqJ ase 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79RQ 12A001200020013-1
3, The Iz7dian Government is extremely unlikely to precipitate
war, but is fully prepared to.accept war and will not call off the
elections 'or.otherwise act to reduce the tension,,
4, While the Pakistan Government is unlikely to precipitate war,,
.there is a chance that it will do so to thwart India*s Assembly plans.
The danger. of such action will be greatest during the period from
September 15 to November 1. Thereafter, it may decline if the UN takes
effective action toward an impartial plebiscite.
5. Apart from the govermnentsf intentions there is a substantial
change that hostilities will be brought on by unauthorized action by
the Pakistan fix, renewed communal rioting, or political pressures
especially in Pakistan. This likelihood will diminish only if there is
a substantial lessening of tension, which we regard as unlikely in the
period of this estimate,
6. In the event,of war, fighting will almost certainly not be
confined to Kashmir brat will spread to the Punjab and to.East Pakistan,
It is unlikely that the UN could effect a Cease-fire unless a stalemate
was reached.
7. In any extended conflict India would probably be victorious, but
its victory would not be quick or easy. Such conflict would almost
certainly produce serious economic and political dislocation in both
countries, regardless of the victor, and might open the way for a Commmu:ist
coup in India. It would also probably deprive the US of vital raw materials
now obtained from India and of potential air bases.. in Pakistan,
Approved For Release 2000/08/292 - CIA-RDP79RO1012A001200020013-1
 'Approved For Rae se 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R0` 012A001200020013-1
DISCUSSIc1
-o~N 7Tif3 ATLra %i 1Y E319'~: 'f^'~us
e
1, The Kashmir dispute originated in 1947, when the Mahara3ah+s
accession to India led to an undeclared war between India and Pakistan.
In 1949, a UN cease-fire left Indian forces occupying an area including
the gale of Kashmir and containing about 7 of the. population. There-
after, despite repeated UN efforts, the parties were unable to agree to
terns for demilitarization and administration of a plebiscite to determine
the permanent affiliation of the state.
2. In October 1950 the ruler of the Indian-controlled area of
Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah,, announced plans for election of a Kashmiri
Constituent Assembly. Pakisten denounced this plan vigorously, its
leaders threatening war if it were erth'ied out, and appealed first to
the British Coamnonweaith nations and then to the UN0 On 30 March 1951
the UN Security Council passed a resolution, sponsored by the US and UK9
under which ex-Senator Frank Graham of the US was designated as UN
representative to seek a solution to the demilitarization problem, India,
rejected the resolution (which Pakistan supported), but agreed to receive
Graham, who arrived in the subcontinent on 29 June 1951. He is due to
report to the Security Council by 29 September 19518 though he may seek
delay.
3. Despite the Graham mission, Abduliah declared In June that the
Constituent Assembly elections would be hold as planned, between 10 and
r 3 -
Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO01200020013-1
 'Approved For R lepse 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020013-1
30 September, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan then re petted that Pakistan
would not permit such elections, and renewed the threat of war.
40 Early in July, allegedly to counter Pakistani military moves,
India hastily reinforced her Kashmir garrison to 65,000 men, and moved the
bulk of her striking forses to the Pakistan border in the East Punjab
oppoeae Lahore, where she now has over 75,000 man including an armored
division and'brigade. Pakistan also straightened her forces, and now has
about 180000 men, with another 15,000 in reserme0 deployed for use in
Kashmir, and about 57,000 men in the Punjab border area, with another
7500 in reserve, 010 the distant East Pakistan front, India has 20,000
men against about 108000 Pakistani,
5, Militarily, the Indian forces are now fully deployed in position
for attack or defense. The present deployment of the Pakistani forces
appears to be defensive in nature, but the further naves necessary for
attack are not m j or in character,
iri KaabmTr,
6o The dominant motdva ii force of both India and Pakistan on the
Kashmir issue is nationalism tinged with religion, The Kashmir Isom
focuses the deepest passions of both countries, and since 1947 public
opinions, particularly in Pakistan, has made the issue one of national
prestige going well beyond its original foundations. To Pakistan, founded
on the principle of a 2!oslem nation, it scam intolerable that the largest
of the subcontinent's princely states, containing a predominantly (78%)
Approved For Release 2000/0812k CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020013-1
 'Approved For Rpiease 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01 112A001200020013-1
Moslem population, should be handed over to India. To the Indians, who
have waged a vigorous campaign to take over the princely states left
uncommitted by Partition, it appears all but unthinkable to give up a
state whose ruler has formally acceded to India, Nehruls feelings about
Kashmir are intensified by his long association with Sheikh Abdullah, by
the fact that he himself is a Kashmiri by birth, and by his strong belief
in the concept of a secular state under which Moslems may have full
equality,
7. Strategically, the Pakistani view Kashmir as an Important military
gateway which would enable India to threaten Pakistan's principal military
headquarters and also major agricultural areas, Indian strategic interest
is less marked; a Pakistani Kashmir would outflank much of the Last Pun jab,
but the intervening terrain is difficult,
8, Economically, Kashmir's trade is with Pakistan rather than India.
Possession of Kashmir would slightly improve Pakistan's control over the
vital water supply obtained from the Indus River and its tributaries,
though it would not prevent India from otxrying out a present threat to
impair the flow of two major Indus tributaries that rise in India,
90 Eventually, both India and Pakistan might be satisfied with
less than the whole of Kashmir, However, both are adamant in demanding
control of the central Vale area,, the heart of the state, which has a
Moslem majority but is on the Indian side of the cease-fire line,
5-
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A001200020013-1
JXQW
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79ROl 01 2AO01 200020013-1
,$t' 2aa otg the A' ence o War
10. India's trump card is her present .control. of the Vale. It is
generally geed that a plebiscite conducted under impartial auspices
in the near future would produce a substantial majority in the Vale for
accession to Pakistan, Howeverg, Indian control,, with the inevitable
intimidation and. ban on pro-Pakistan religious campaigningq would with
equal certainty produce a rc-sult, favorable to India in any Constituent
Assembly elections.
11. Therefore,, it is extremely unlikely that Indict would postpone
or cancel the.elections. Although the Security Council wrote to India
in June stating that the elections were contrary to the spirit.of the
March 30 resolution, there is no indication of any UN action to block the
elections and almost no chance that India would heed the 731 if it did acct,
12? If the elections are hold,, the resetting Constituent Assembly
will establish a constitutional government and will undoubtedly pass
some form of resolution in favor of final affiliation with India; Although
Indian spokesmen now concede that such a resolution will not be binding
on the U.N. India will certainly mako maximcnQ propaganda use of its
Moreover, the? creation of a stable and "independent" goverment (in
contrast to the puppet government of the Pakistan-occupied part of
Eashmir) may enlist growing loyalty and support amok the Ka,shmiriq
Through this process the Indians undoubtedly hope eventually to present
the world with a aq i9 at least as to the areas now under
Indian control?
.M 6
Approved For Release 2000/ : CIA-RDP79RO1012A001200020013-1
 Approved For -eaease 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79RO1012AO01200020013-1
13. Confronted by this sequence of events, Pakistan -- if she did
not go to war - would certainly seek further UN action. Because of
her willingness to accept an impartial plebiscites Pakistan undoubtedly
believes that she has a superior moral case at this stage of the dispute
and that further UN resolutions will be favorable to hero At the =7
least she can count on firm support from Arab and tslem nations and to
a large extent from the British Commonwealth nations. Present reportc
indicate that the graham mission has little chance of reaching an agreed
solution. It may propose the appointment of,an arbitrator (already
rejected by India) or perhaps formulate its on plan for demilitarizati+ a
and these ree u rdativns would go to the Security Council. At the
same time Pakistan would almost certainly propose a new resolution
specifically denouncing and rei'asing to recognize the Constitutent
Assembly elections, Reference to-the General. Assembly in 'November is
also a possibility (and need not mean witbdrauai of Security Council
jurisdiction); Pakistan might welcome this as a more effective means of
bringing world opinion pressure to bear on India.
14, Indian land forces heavily outnumber those of Pakistan, and the
Indian Air Faroe and Navy, though smalls, are likewise superior. Moreover,
India has scene industrial capacity for munitions production, while Pakistan
has virtually none and would be heavily dependent on outside supplies,
4nother major Pakistani weakness is the fact that its transportation and
gommmieations network in West Pakistan parellels the Indian frontier and
~s ex-tremely vulnerable to attack.
I Approved For Release 2000/0a/".; CIA-RDP79RO1012AO01200020013-1
 Approved For ease 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79RW 01 2AO01 200020013-1
15a, In an all-out war with Pakistan, India probably would be victorious,
provided Pakistan received no outside help. Initially, probably neither
country, would be likely to gain a decisive victory, and in the first
stages Pakistan might even win somb battles. But in time the balance
would be tipped in India's favor by her advantages in troop strength,
trained reserves, m?npaurer resources, and industrial capacity. The Indian
Navy could blockade Karachi,, Pakistan's only major port, and the Indian.
Air Force could neutralize the Pakistani Air Force, though its own bombing
.capabilities are meager..
16. In a limited action designed by either country to take all or
part of Kashmir, India would probably also be vietorious, but its sucoess
would not be quick or easy. India's present troop superiority in the
area would be partially-offset by the mountanovs terrain and by the
difficulty of bringing up suppliae and reinforcements over the single
road between India and Kashmir. Indian forces would also be handicapped
by cold weather in any winter fighting, from Deoember on.
17. Important elements in any conflict would be the attitude of
Afghanistan and of the Northwest Frontier tribesmen, particularly the
Pathans. Afghanistan itself,, which has been diligently courted by India
in recent months, would probably make border raids on Pakistan, and the
possibility of such raids is already tying down most of two Pakistani
divisions. On the other hand, in spite of continuing Afghan propaganda,
?ome of the Pathan tribesmen would probably fight again on the Pakistani
1~ide, as in 1947, and if so their warlike qualities would substantially
ugment initial Pakistani strength in Kashmir,
Approved For Release 2000/08/89- CIA-RDP79ROl 01 2AO01 200020013-1
 Approved For Re$l ase 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79 12AO01200020013-1
18. Weather conditions would seriously hamper military operations
in Kashmir and the Punjab until after the monsoon ends, generally about
15 September. For a short tin thereafter, major rivers near the Punjab
border would be deep and unfordable, and it has been reported that
flood conditions now exist in the Lahore area and will prevent military
operations there until at least 1 October. Thus, there may be a period
of weeks when operations will be possible in the crucial areas of Kashmir
but not on the Punjab border,,
.kel i bond _of, Wa' of 1 951
A. Dglibr ar b
19, We estimte that the Indian Government (001) is extremely
unlikely to precipitate a war during this period, Its reasons against war
are formidablep (a) war would disrupt the Conatitueit Assembly elections
and subsequent plans; (b) time is all an India's side -? even if the elections
were postponed,, her possession of most of the disputed areas would still leave
her in a strong position gradually to win over the Ksshmiri; (o) any extended
war would be a serious threat to Indian economic and political stability
and would almost oertainiy lead. to widespread oom pal rioting between
Hindus and t3oslema, The only contrary arguments of any possible weight are
that (a) a war that led to quick victories in the West Punjab and East Pakistan
would help Nehru's wavering prestige; (b) at of Inaba, including Nebrue
opposed Partition and would welcome the reintegration of Paki.atan. However,,
Noru is almost certainly too well arare of the risks to be swayed by these
copsiderations.
-9-
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A001200020013-1
 Approved ForZlease 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79Qf+9012A001200020013-1
20. Indian actions are consistent with this view of her intentions,
Her July troop movements could well have been designed to forestall
Pakistani interference with the Constituent Assembly elections while further
deterring Pakistan by the threat of a Punjab counterattack, There have
been plausible but unconfirmed reports that before these. movements India
obtained a copy of Pakistani plans for initiating war in Kashmir irhile
conducting a delaying action in the Punjab,
21, Nonetheless, India is clearly willing to accept war and is
extremely unlikely freely to withdraw her forces in ouch a tray as to relax
the tension. In the event of war, India would certainly not pzit
hostilities to be confined to Kashmir, whero Pakistan right gain some
quick successes,, but would take advantage of her superiority on the Punjab
front and perhaps in East Pakistan,
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A001200020013-1
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A001200020013-1
N
B. Deliberate War by Paki~,,tan
22. We estimate that while the Pakistan G vernment (GOP) is un-
likely to precipitate war, there is a chance that it will do so through
a local attack in Kashmir before the end of 1951. This possibility
will be greatest during and immediately after the Constituent Asmbly
elections (roughly 15 September to 1 Noiveaber). Thereafter it may
decline, depending chiefly on UN developments.
23. Rationally, the arguments against a deliberate resort to
war by Pakistan appear overwhelming. In a long war Pakistan would
almost certainly lose East Pakistan (containing 60; of her population)
and major Punjab areas, and her economic and political stability -.-
even her very existence --- would be threatened. However, the extre!e
statements of Liaquat and other Pakistani leaders indicate that they
may have reached a dangerous mood of frustration in which these con-
siderations would be outweighed by the desire to'thwart the Constituent
Assembly elections. Floreovor, there is evidence that the Pakistani
leaders, who tend to be contemptuous of Indian fighting qualities,
believe that their forces might be able to rake quick gains in Kashmir
(even to capturing Srinagar) and conduct a holding action in the Punjab
(possibly aided by the reported floods), after which Pb]cistan would
appeal for a now UN cease-fire. Pakistani statements have used every
possible argument to put India in the wrong and encourage support for
a contention in the UN that military action in Kashmir is Justified
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A001200020013-1
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200020013-1
because of Indian obduracy and the illegality of the Constituent Assembly
elections. There is also :tee possibility that Pakistan would encourage
the tribesmen to cane in and would then argue that the hostilities
vere a local revolution; hoer, the presence of UN observers makes
this unlikely.
24. If the Constituent Assanbly is elected and convenes# the
GOPOs position will depend on whether the UN offers real hope of a
solution that would offset the effect of the elections and permit an
impartial plebiscite. The actions of the Constituent Assembly.. plus
Indian "crowing", will undoubtedly tend to increase army and popular
pressure for war, and if the Security Council failed to take even the
steps of dens mciation and arbitration, the GOP might give way and start
a war. however, so long as the UN appears to offer hope of effective
action, the GOP will probably not resort to war after the Constituent
Assembly elections if it has declined to do so before.
C. VX8F1S C7Rlii3di JCL Leo i
25. Apart from the possibility of deliberate war we estimate
that there Is a 'substantial ebance that war will be brought on during
this period by a chain reaction of explosive factors. These includes
a. Unauthorized r litany action by the Pakistan army.
For some time a definite militant group in Pakistan has
agitated for aggressive action. An anti-goverment plot
from this source was nipped in the bud by the GOP In
.. 12 a.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A001200020013-1
 Approved For Release 200010-RDP7911012A001200020013-1
the spring of 1951. while a recurrence of actual revolt
appears improbable,, members of this group might turn
a border incident into large-scale conflict at any time.
Popular feeling in Pakistan. The GOP has been able sub-
stantially to limit incendiary press and radio statements
in the past, and US E basa9' Karachi believes that it
can continue to do so. But the possibility of a dangerous
surge of feeling exists, especially in the event oft
o. Renewal of the widespread communal rioting that took
place in Bengal, in the spring of 1951.
d. Indian internal politics. Popular aentinent in India
is notably calmer than in Pakistan, and Nehru appears
to enjoy virtually unanimous support on this issue.
however,, there is now a struggle between Nehru and the
right wing of the Congress Party,, some elements of which
are sympathetic to the strongly anti-Moslem and anti-
Pakistan Hindu t'fahasabha, though others are conservative
businesemen generally opposed to military adventures.
Apart from actual beliefs, there is some possibility
of $nf tory statements for political advantaged
26. The chance of unproaediated war arising from the abovo factors
is likely to diminish only if there is a substantial relaxation of
tension. Such a relaxation is unlikely to be brought about by any
conciliatorystatement on either aides although there is a bare possibility
Approved For Release 2000/08/29': k IA-RDP79R01012A001200020013-1
 Approved For Release 2000/
%Wl
RDP79R,W 01 2AO01 200020013-1
that Nehru and Liaquat would calm the waters by meeting to settle sub-
sidiary issues$ such as the water dispute- But so long as India pursues
the Constituent Aesenb1y plan,, the only real hope for relaxation appears
to lie in UN action that would not merely satisfy the leaders of the
Pakistan Governnant but also enable them to all ai mnd popular
feeling.
D. Conc].vsion as to Likelihood of War
27. In may, we believe that while the chancey are generally
against an outbreak of war before the end of 1951, a substantial risk
of such an outbreak nevertheless exists and will continua unless general
tensions between India and Pakistan are reduced. The chief factors
in the situation are whether and to xftt degree India pursues her
Constituent Assembly pig and the extent to which the UN is able to
achieve a plan that has general world backing and affords at least
plebiscite.
the hope of an impart
iAl
PEW
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : C 4-RDP79R01012A001200020013-1
14 ~
 Approved For ,Release 2000/0 ' A-RDP79FR.QA 01 2AO01 200020013-1
Co segue es of I-lax fraor us Se
w
28. It is extrmely unlikely that a war could be confined to
Kaetmir, or thrt 01 cease-fire efforts would be successful in
the early stages of conflict, at least so long as either aide
had a hope of major imeediate gains. It is particularly ual kels-
that India would accept a cease-fire that left Pakistan in con-
trol of the Vale.
29. War on a broad scale would have a very serious effect on
US security interests. Its I mediate effect would be to subject
the US to heavy pressures# as in the Palestine war. UUhether or
not the US took an active role in atteairoit3ng to settle the eon-
flict, it would run a serious rilh of alienating one or both of
the parties and affecting their positidn$ in the East-West con-
flict? Pakistan, if it survived, would be unlikely to take an
active part in Wastcrn plans. India might be driven further to-
ward neutralian, and it is possible that the Indiana might even
enter into some sort of working partnership with the Soviet blocs
Shortage of military supplies might drive both sides to seek aid
from arxr outside source, including the t1SSR and, is the case of
India, Uo riunist China,
30, Specifically, the, a ment of strategic materiels from India
to the US would probably be impeded or blocked if the war spread
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CI ROP79RO1012AO01200020013-1
 Approved For ease 2000/08729"--CIA-RDP79 1012AO01200020013-1
to Bengal The most important material'thus affected would
be manganese, of which the US gets 30i of its Supply from
India. In Pakistan# the U5 would lose important potential air
bases if the Government turned away fron the west or lost in-
ternal control, or if important areas were overrun by India.
31. Perhaps most important would be the internal consequences
in India and Pakistan. Although the outbreak of hostilities
might initially strengthen the respective goverments' control,
any extended fighting would so weaken both, countries as to make
the maintenance of orderly goverment a matter of question.
There would alnost certainly be vast cor unal disturbances and
a resulting increase in the severity of the refugee problem.
Such conditions might permit the Indian Co=mist Party to take
over various local areas, and there its a slight possibility that
it would be able, conceivably frith Chinese help, to asp con.
e
trot. of the goverment. Outright Co runiat control is extreme31
unU ly in Pakistan, but a state of internal chaos and immobiliza-
tion would be probable.
The consequences of Comr=ist control of India to US security
interest vis-a-vis the USSR, especially in Southeast Asia and
the Near Last, are consider, d in detail in NIE',23, "Position
of India in the East-Wet Conflict."
-? 16
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A001200020013-1