THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ALBANIA WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GREEK, YUGOSLAV AND ITALIAN INTERESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001200030008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2000
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: November 9, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

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SECURITY INFORMATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
9 November 1951
SUBJECT: NIF4i2: THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ALBANIA WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GREEKS, YUGOSLAV
AND ITALIAN INTERESTS
To assess the strategic importance of Albania; to examine
the stability of the existing regime; and to analyze Greek,
Italian and Yugoslav interests in Albania.
1. Politically9 Albania is of importance for the USSR as
an outpost of Communism. The USSR would regard its loss as a
blow to Soviet prestige, particularly since the defection of
Yugoslavia and the failure of the Communist effort in Greece.
Economically, Albania is a liability to the USSR9, and militarily
it is of minor importance to the USSR.
20 The present regime in Albania is under direct Soviet
control,
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3, Resistance activity constitutes a troublesome problem
for the Hoxha regime but is not an immediate threat. As long
as the resistance effort is divided and does not receive sub-
stantial external aid, the Albanian security forces will probably
succeed in containing ito
!t. The interests-of Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia in
Albania conflict, and each of these three countries probably
prefers continuance of the status 9uo_ to a change which would be
favorable to the others,
5o Italy and Yugoslavia have officially accepted the
principle of the creation of a sovereign and independent Albania
with its present boundaries and-free from Soviet control, However,.
Greece, because of its claims to northern Epirus, has so far not
accepted this principle. Whether or not all three of Albania's
neighbors could actually be brought to accept an independent
Albania with its present boundaries would probably depend upon
the support given the new government by the Western Powers,
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6. Politically, Albania is of importance to the USSR
primarily as an outpost of Communism, The USSR would regard
its loss as a blow to Soviet prestige, particularly since the
defection of Yugoslavia and the failure of the Communist effort
in Greece0 Economically, Albania is, if anything, a liability
to the USSR, 1411i.tarily.,, Albania is of minor importance to
the USSR. Although it occupies a strategic location at the
entrance to the Adriatic, un.->or modern conditions its capabili-
ties for development are limited. Saseno Island and the port of.
Valona have potential value as bases for mine craft, small naval
attack craft.. and submarines, Yhich might for a short period
cause annoyance to naval operations in the Adriatic and Ionian
Seas. Saseno Island was a minor Italian submarine base and
there have been recurrent but unconfirmed rumors in the postwar
years of Soviet efforts to reconstruct these facilities. There
is no confirmed evidence of extensive Soviet efforts to build
up Albanian air facilities and, although Albania might be of
value as an outpost in an early warning system for air defense
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of the Soviet orbit, there is no evidence of Soviet radar
installations. Since the defection of Yugoslavia, Albania has
lost most of its strategic importance to the USSR because of
the lack of overland comninication with the Soviet orbit. How
ever, Albania would be of some significance to a land campaign
in the Balkans, since operations in conjunction with Bulgaria,
if successful, could separate Greece from Yugoslavia.
The Stabilit of the R ime and Extent of Soviet Control
7. Prior to the Cominform-Yugoalav rift in June 1948,
Albania was closely tied, both politically and economically, to
Yugoslavia. Rather than follow Marshal Tito's.heresy, however,
Hoxha chose the Moscow camp and launched a vigorous campaign for.
the elimination of "nationalist" elements in Albania. Hoxha not
only extricated Albania from its ties with Yugoslavia, but also
succeeded in eliminating serious competition for leadership with-
in Albanian Reported rivalry between Hoxha and the Minister of
Interiors Lt. Gen. Mehmet Shehu is likely to be of little impor-
tance as both men are apparently firmly controlled by the Kremlin.
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Albania is totally dependent upon Soviet support. With-
out its the country's econongr would be severely shaken within
a few months. Soviet control is reinforced by from 1000 to 1500
Soviet "experts" in key positions in the polices military, and
civilian administrations as well as in the party hierarchy.
9. With Soviet support Hoxha and Shehu have thus far succeeded
in ruling the country through the usual Communist methods of police
terror and rigid economic controls. Despite evidence of oppor-
tunism and disloyalty in the security forces and particularly in
the arr , these forces constitute effective instruments for the.
suppression of opposition.
10. Soviet support to Albania, however, has not included a
mutual assistance pacts probably because the USSR desires to leave
the situation fluid and to avoid a commitment which might prove
embarrassing.' Albania has such a pace only with Bulgaria
(16 December 19)7).
The only other Satellites which have not concluded mutual
assistance pacts with the USSR are Eastern Germany and North
Korea.
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ll. Nevertheless, any change in the Albanian situation which
might threaten Soviet control would automatically involve a question
of Soviet prestige in an area in which one Satellite has already
defied'the Kremlin. Under present circumstances, such a change
probably could occur only with the support of one or more of the
neighboring states. Such a development would necessarily lead
to a deterioration of the international situation, Soviet action
to counteract a change of this nature would depend upon broader
considerations of global strategy,
Resistance to the Present Regime
~wanr r ..wv.m.m~ann -
12. Dissatisfaction among the Albanian people continues to
be widespread and there has been some overt resistance within the
past few years, The regime itself has admitted the existence of
"diversionistn elements and attacks upon military and civilian
supply convoys. The most dramatic incident of resistance activity
was the bombing of the Soviet Legation in February 1951, but
local assassination and limited economic sabotage have probably
been more effective challenges to Communist authority, Thus far,
the Hoxha regime has been able to deal with opposition movements
by instituting further repressive measures. For example, Shehu
has organized special pursuit battalions which operate in the
mountainous areas against individual resistance groups.
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13. Refugees have reported the existence of various local
resistance groups, such as the "National League of the Mountains,"
"Liberty," "Skanderbeg,"* "Call" and "National Unity," but
specific information regarding these gaups is lacking. There does
not appear to be any established cooperation among the various
dissident groups despite their common desire to rid Albania of
the Hoxha regime.
lt. Among the Albanian emigre resistance movements the
Committee for a Free Albania, an affiliate of the National Committee
for a Free.Euiope, with operational headquarters in Rome is perhaps
the most influential. The Committee comprises three groups:
(1) the National Agrarian Democratic Party/Balls Kombetar (National
Front) whose following is strongest in southern Albania, (2) the
Legality Party (pro-King tog) which is strongest in central Albania,
and (3) the League of Peasants and Villagers (Agrarian Party)
which has its strongest following in the extreme north and in the
neighboring Yugoslav provinces inhabited largely by Albanians.
Although these groups have the common objective of establishing
an independent and sovereign Albania, they differ among themselves
The name of an Albanian hero of the 15th Century.
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as to the type of government to be created, The Committeets
activities within Albania have been limited to propaganda work
and some subversive efforts by agents. Its most effective
operation thus far has been the dropping of propaganda leaflets,
These leaflets have caused considerable excitement within the
country, prompting periodic official notes of protest to the
Italian Government and encouraging Albanians to flee Albania.
l5. In addition to the internal organizations and the
Committee for a Free Albania, there are operating within Albania
representatives of pro.Italian, pro=Yugoslav, and pro-Greek
Albanian emigre groups. Despite their common opposition to the
present regime, their ultimate objectives reflect the divergent
interests of the three countries. Their activities have been
limited because of fear on the part of each country that a charge
in the Albanian regime might benefit one of the other neighbors
and possible for fear of precipitating an international crisis.
16. The efforts of both the internal resistance groups and
the emigre organizations are uncoordinated and their objectives
frequently conflict. These factors have simplified the task of
Albanian. security forces in isolating and destroying individual
groups.
17. Under present circumstances, while resistance activity
constitutes a troublesome problem for the Hoxha regime, it is not
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an immediate threat, As long as the resistance effort is divided
and does not receive substantial external aid, the Albanian
security forces will probably succeed in containing it.
CONFLICTING INTERESTS OF ITALY, YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE
18, Albania has long been a bone of contention among its
neighbors, Their interests conflict to such an extent that, even
under present circumstances, the problem of Albania complicates
the development of good relations and cooperation among Italy,
Yugoslavia and Greece, Other problems, such as Trieste and Macedonia,
are of greater immediate importance in creating dissension among
these powers, but Albania would probably become a critical issue
If the present regime were overthrown,
Italian Interests
19. Italy's objective in Albania has always been to establish
Albania as an Italian sphere of influence and to prevent any other
power from gaining a foothold from which Italian influence in the
Adriatic could be challenged. In pursuit of this objective, Italy
supported the creation of an independent Albania in 1912 and later,
in 191), occupied the island of Saseno and the port of Valona.
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Italian troops remained in occupation until 1920, Italy was then
forced to evacuate the main and$ but retained Saseno which was con-
verted into a minor naval and submarine base. By a pact of friend-
ship and security with albania in 1926, Italy established a legal
basis for including Albania in Italy's sphere of influence. Italian
influence was manifested by loans, management of nearly all important
economic enterprises, and training and equipping of the armed forces.
In 1939, Mussolini occupied Albania and united it with Italy; in
19140, he launched his invasion of Greece from there? Under the
Italian Peace Treaty(1947), Italy recognized the independence of
Albania, ceded Saseno Island, and renounced all public and private
property rights, concessions, claims, etc, in Albania4
20, Italy has not given up, however, its basic objectives
toward Albania: the denial of the area to other powers and the
restoration of Italian economic and political influence in Albania.
In its official statements, the Italian Foreign Office has empha-
sized that continued Albanian independence and territorial integrity
correspond with Italian interests. Italian efforts to improve
relations with the present Communist regime have made no progress..
Formal diplomatic relations were established in 1949 and., despite
Communist restrictions on the Italian Legation in Tirana, Italy
undoubtedly intends to retain such relations as long as possible,
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21. Italy evidently aims eventually to reestablish its
influence through the pro-Italian exile group., the National
Independent Bloc. The leadership of this group cooperated with
Italy before and chxring the war and enjoys the support of the
present Italian government;
22. Italy is particularly apprehensive of possible Yugoslav
pre-eminence in Albania in the event the Hoxha regime should be
overthrown. The Italian desire to avoid the establishment of a
foothold by any other power in Albania is so strong that Italy
probably prefers continuation of-the status Do to the creation of
a power vacuum which Yugoslavia and, possibly Greece, would be in
a better position to fill.
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Greek Interests
23Q Greek interests in Albania center upon Greek claims to
southern Albania (northern Epirus),, an area which the Greeks occupied
from 1912 to 1916 and which they have consistently claimed on
historical, ethnic., strategic and economic grounds. The Greeks also
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recall that Albania served as a base for the Italian attack on
Greece in 1940 and, in the postwar years, for Communist guerrilla
operations against Greece. Ewen at present, Albania is a base
from which Communist agents are infiltrated into Greece.
214. Greece$ like Italy and Yugoslavia, is attempting to
further its policy through the use of Albanian refugees. Those
in Greece are primarily from southern Albania and are apparently
concentrated in camps along the Albanian'bordero To date, their
efforts have been largely in the field of espionage, propaganda
and the encouragement of additional emigration. Some of those
in the camp at Yannina are reported to be formed into military
units, intended for eventual use in southern Albania.
25. The Greeks probably look on partition of Albania between
Greece and Yugoslavia,as the ideal solution to the problem. They
are. apprehensive of possible Yugoslav or Italian domination of the
entire country, and would probably attempt to occupy northern
Epirus in the event of military action in the areas such as a
Yugoslav invasion of Albania. For the presents in the absence of
Allied assurances against possible Italian or Yugoslav domination
of Albania,, Greece probably prefers continuation of the status quo
at least so long as the Hoxha regime does not resume full scale
support to the Greek guerrillas.
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Yugoslav Interests
260 Serbia opposed the principle of an independent Albania
in the period from 1912 to 1918. Following World War I, the
Yugoslavs occupied northern Albania until 1921. In 1926,
Yugoslavia finally accepted the Albanian frontier as delineated
in 1913. Until the outbreak of World War II, Italian domination
of Albania prevented Yugoslavia from exercising any influence.
27. This situation changed. radically during World War II
when Tito, through Albanian Communists, managed to obtain control
of the Albanian National Liberation Movement. Tito's control was
exercised largely through emissaries attached to the headquarters
of the Albanian Army of National Liberation, and, from 19144 to
19148, Albania was a puppet of Yugoslavian In 19148, Hoxha was able
to extricate Albania from its ties with Yugoslavia following the
Tito-Cominform rift,
280 Since 19148, Tito has ostensibly championed the principle
of an independent, sovereign Albania and has condemned both Greek
territorial claims and the alleged Greek proposals for the partition
of Albania between Greece and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is particularly
apprehensive of the restoration of Italian influence or domination.
In the past several months, Yugoslav propaganda has charged Italy
with encouraging the plans of Albanian exiles for an "ethnic"
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Albania which would include the Yugoslav provinces of Kosovo and
Metohiya, both populated chiefly by Albanians. Tito's actual
objective appears to be the eventual creation of an anti-Soviet,
pro-Tito regime in Albania and areturn to the status of 19W-1916.
It was apparently to this end that the "League of Albanian Political
Refugees in Yugoslavia" was formed in May 1951. The League, which
claims to represent some 5,000 Albanian refugees, is controlled by
Albanian Communists who have fled from Albania since 1948? It
was created by Belgrade as an instrument of Yugoslav policy, despite
its proclaimed objective of "an independent, free., indivisible,
democratic and republican" Albania, The League has alreacr engaged
in some espionage, sabotage and propaganda activity, and it possesses
a considerable potential for more extensive operations. Yugoslavia's
exposed position, however, has probably deterred Tito from using
the League to the full. Yugoslav spokesmen have expressed the fear
that any substantial efforts to overthrow the Hoxha regime might be
taken by the USSR as a pretext for military action against Yugoslavia.
THE POSSIBILITY OF A SET'TLE`-TENT
29. The existence of an Albanian state has in the past always
depended upon the attitude of stronger powers. Although all three
of Albania's neighbors would presumably wish to see the eventual
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liquidation of the present regime in Albania, their interests in
the ultimate status of Albania are incompatible. Since Albania's
isolation from the Soviet orbit in 19118, the policy of each of its
neighbors has been directed at establishing a position from which
it could profit in the event of the overthrow of the Hoxha regime.
As a result, each country as sought to counter the moves of the
others. This has led to a diffusion of resistance efforts within
Albania. Rivalry among the three countries over Albania is also
one of the factors limiting the cooperation of these nations in
the development of coordinated defense plans in Southeastern
Barope4
30. Italy and Yugoslavia have officially accepted the
principle of the creation of a sovereign and independent Albania
within its present boundaries and free from Soviet control. How-
ever, Greece, because of its claims to northern Epirus' has so far
not accepted this principle. Whether or not all three of Albania's
neighbors could be brought to accept Albanian independence would
probably depend upon the support given the new government by the
Western Powers?
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