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December 12, 2016
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January 28, 2002
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Approved ForBelease 2002/08/12 CIA-RDP79R0101U013000400Q2-0 Latin America * 1. /With the exception of Argentina and Guatemala, the? Most coun- tries of Latin America will probably continue generally pro-Western and cooperative with the West during the period of this estimate. The two principal exceptions are Argentina and Guatemala whose cooperation is severely circumscribed by the strong influence of ultra-nationalism in the former and Communism in the latter country. Eventually the trend toward exaggerated nationalism, particularly when exploited by Communism /if it continuesL7 will if it continues seriously affect Hemisphere solidarity and US security interests in Latin America. For the next several years, however, change is not likely to be so far reaching as to reduce substantially the present degree and scope of Latin American cooperation. 2. There is unlikely to be any great change in Latin American military cooperation. The bilateral military assistance agreements entered into with Brazil and Uruguay similar to those already in force with five other Latin American countries will probably be ratified /, and anl. A military assistance agreement will probably be concluded with the Dominican Republic. There is /no7 little likelihood that any other nation now having a US Military Mission would follow Argentina's example and allow the Mission contract to lapse. However, the Latin See NIE-70, "Conditions and Trends in Latin America Affecting US Security," 12 December 1952, especially paragraphs 6, 36-!t3, and 53-62. State Dept. review completed SECRET Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300040002-0 Approved For $please 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R0101 24PO1300040002-0 SECRET 2. American countries will generally continue to take a limited view of the importance of Hemisphere defense, and their cooperation will be affected by self-seeking and by some apprehension /toward7 concerning their neighbors, leading to demands for /national7 forces designed to serve national interests rather than the types of forces best suited to overall planning. for Hemisphere defense. 3. No Latin American country is likely to change its policy on granting bases in time of peace, at least without a substantial quid fro quo. /fihis applies particularly to Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador (with respect to the Galapagos Islands), and Brazil-7 Although the Latin American countries will remain generally willing to ship strategic materials to the US, difficulties are likely to continue, especially over price. 1. Although Latin American countries will probably continue generally to cooperate in East-West trade restrictions, any decline in the price of raw materials could lead to increased unwillingness to comply with /pressure for violatin7 the Battle Act. in the absence of adequate US compensation. Chile, with copper, and Bolivia, with tin, would be in this event particularly likely to /increase7 seek outlets for their exports in the Soviet /]Tloc trade7orbit /in this event-7 5. Latin American support for the Korean War is almost certain to continue passive/, and there' may be a total withdrawal of Colombian forces, partly for internal reasons, so that there would remain no Latin American forces there-7 Colombia, the one Latin American country Approved For Release 2002/08/1 RDP79R01012A001300040002-0 Approved For;,, please 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R0101; 001300040002-0 3. with troops in Korea, has recently raised the issue of withdrawing its forces. Within the UN, however, the Latin American countries will probably continue to support the US on the POW issue. 6. In the UN generally, while Latin American cooperation on basic East-West issues such as Korea will probably continue strong, Latin American countries may tend to attempt an independent line especially if there is division between the/ITS and UK-7 Western Powers. On colonial issues, the Latin American countries may support the Arab- Asian bloc to some degree, but such support would /not extend to cases of doubtful legality, such as Tunisia, and the Latin American attitude would also be affected by the identity of the colonial power involved, being friendly to France but hostile to the UK or Belgium.7 be tempered y(l) fear of warms (2) unwillingness to aid the Soviet Bloc in the attainment of its objectives and (3) attitude toward the colonial power involved. /There is little chance of log-rolling by the Latin American and Arab-Asian groups, each for the other, since the Latin American countries have no major issues that can be used for trading purposes.T 7. Latin American diplomatic relations with the Soviet Bloc are likely to center around simple questions of diplomatic recognition. There is some possibility that Brazil may eject the two satellite missions now accredited there. Overall, it is unlikely that the Soviet Bloc will be able to add to its diplomatic representation, and it may lose additional posts. SECRET Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300040002-0 Approved For$elease 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79RO101 001300040002-0 SECRET 8. With respect to internal Communism, /ar 7 most Latin American governments are likely to /take firmer measuresL7 continue their anti- Communist policies and there may be joint action in such limited fields as restriction of travel. However, such measures7 anti-Communist controls are likely to be balanced by increased Communist opportunities in some countries. Thus, Brazil has recently /enacted an/ tightened its anti-Communist lair/7s . /T;ut7 However the close identification of Communists with Nationalists makes it difficult to take effective measures/j-7in Brazil as well as in other countries. /end the Prestes "Army of Liberation" may be an increasing threat.? In Argentina, the official Communist Party has recently /$aken a position less hostile to7 announced support of Peron, and the Peron government /may avoid any action whatever against Communists.7 will probably continue its policy of relative toleration of Communist activities. In Guatemala, the situation of Communist penetration of government is likely to continue as at present, with some possibility of further Communist gains from the dislocation /of7/the7 caused by radical implementation of the new agrarian laws. Despite possible Communist gains, the Bolivian government is /not taking/ for the present, at least, unable to take effective anti-Communist measures /and is unlikely to do so-7 In other countries such as Venezuela and Cuba, the governing /military men7 groups will act strongly against overt Communist activity, but the Communists could nonetheless gain in influence through present instability or an overthrow of the government. by extremists. Approved For Release 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300040002-0 Approved For Fi@lease 2002/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012}1300040002-0 SECRET 5. 9. In general, Latin American attitudes on the East-West conflict are unlikely to be more affected than at present by Soviet Bloc propaganda and tactics within the range of the assumed courses of action. Local Communist efforts to merge their efforts with extreme Nationalist groups will tend to /increase7 inflate Communist strength, as in Brazil, and Communists will probably continue to contribute significantly to anti-American sentiment. Should Soviet Bloc tactics succeed in creating serious divisions between the US and Western Europe, on the issue of immediacy of Soviet threat, Latin America might tend to take the European point of view, which would probably mean a relaxation of defense efforts and cooperation. Latin American popular groups will continue moderately susceptible. to Soviet peace propaganda. Approved For Release 2002/08/TZ~ I k-RDP79R01012A001300040002-0