SUMMARY OF ORAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO NIE-45: 'PROBABLE FREE WORLD ATTITUDES IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT, THROUGH MID-1954, UNDER CERTAIN ASSUMED CONDITIONS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001300050031-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 1999
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: January 13, 1953
• Content Type: MF

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Security Information
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
map OF NNT/ONAL ESTIMATES
13 January 1951
MENORAMOIFORI Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)
Colonel Gerald F. Lillords, USA (G-2)
Captain Allan L Reed p USN (ONI)
Colonel Jack E. Thome% USAF (AFOIN40
Captain John A, Holbrook, USN (JIG)
SUBJEDT Summary of Oral Contributions to NIE415:
"Probable Free World Attitudes in the East-
)est Conflicts, through mid-1954p under
Certain Assumed Conditions"
I. Attached is cur working summary Of the oral oontribu-
tions to the Latin American section of subject paper. In
accordance with the understandings accompanying this procedures,
these are circulated for your comment, arbich may be by informal
memorandemp marginal notation, or any other method you deem
suitableo It is requested that comment be received in this
office by the close of businees on Thursdey, 22 January,
Please note that this summary is not the final papero which
will be cast in usual estimate leh and will be circulated
in the usual manner following initial Board review,
25X1A9a
Executive Secretary
LV17IVM.)
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. i
XDECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE. 11( MAR_ ( REVIEV,VER. 0 ( 557
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*
Latin America
14 With the exception of Argentina and Onatema1a9 the coun-
tries of Latin Amerioa will probab4 continue generally pro,
Western and cooperative with the West during the period of this
estimate,. Eventually the trend toward exaggerated nat4onallem9
if it continues) will seriously affect Hemisphere solidarity
and US security intereets in Latin America. For the next several
years9 however, change la not likely to be so far reaching as to
reduse substantially the present degree and soope of Latin
American cooperation4
2,, There is unlikely to
American military cooperation
ane agreements entered into
ably be ratified and an nt will probably be concluded
ie. There is no likelihood that any
other nation now haIing a US Military Mission would follow
Argentinaos example and allow the Mission contract to lappet,
However Llhe Latin American countries will genera14 continue
to a limited view of the importance of Hemisphere defense9
and their cooperation will be affected hy self-seeking and by
* See NIE-709 "Conditions and Trends in Latin America Affect-
ing US Security," 12 December 19520 especially paragraphs
69 36-489 and 53-62?
be any great change in Latin
c ill. bilateral military assist-
Brasil and Uruguay will prob-
with the Dessinican R
**Mak
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(A,
some apprehension toward their neighborsLleading to demands for
national foreit rather than the types of forces best suited to
*moral.). pleasing,,
3* No Latin American country is likely to change its policy
an granting bases in time of peace, at least without a substan-
tial .WA gm se. This applies particularly to Veneauele,
Nicaraguap Ecuador (faith respect to the Galapagos Islands), and
Brasil,, Although the Latio American countries will remain gen-
erally willing to ship strategic materials to the US, difficulties
are likely to cont!nue, especially over price*
4. Although Latin American countries will probably continue
generally to eoeperate in Bast-West trade restrictionk any de-
cline in the price of mw materials could lead to Worsened
pressure for violating ttle Battle Act. Chile, with copper? and
Bolivia, with tin, would be particularly likely to increase
Soviet Bloc trade in this eventc,
5? Latin American support for the Korean War is almost
certain to aoatinue passive, and there mar be a total withdrawal
of Colombian forefeet, parttly for internal reasons) so that there
would remain no Latin American forces there, Within the UN,
however, the Latin American countries will probably continue to
support the US on the POW issue,
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*Mar 3,
6, In the UN generallys, while Latin American cooperation
on basic Bast-West issues such as Korea will probably continue
stroll& Latin American countries may tend to attempt an inde-
pendent line especially if there Is division between the US and
MC, On colonial issues*, the Latin American countries may support
the Arab4sian bloc to some degree o but such support would not
extend toast's' of doubtful legality,' such as Tunisia*, and the
Latin American attitude would also be affected by the identity
of the colonial power involved*, being friendly to ?ranee but
hostile to the UK or Belgium. There is little chance of log-
rolling by the Latin American and Arab-Asian groups 9 each for
the other*, since the Latin American countries have no major issues
that can be used for trading purpoaes.
7q Latin American diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Bloc are likely to center around simple questions of diplomatic
recognition. There is some possibility that Brasil may eject
the two satellite misaions now accredited there. Overall*, it is
unlikely that the Soviet bloc will be able to add to its diplo-
matic representation*, and it may lose additional poste.
O. With respect to internal Commanism9 many Latin American
governments are likely to take firmer measures, and there may
be joint action in such limited fields as restriction of
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travel, Roweverp sush measures are likely to be balanced by
inmvommied Communist opportunities in some countries Thus
Brasil has recently enacted an anti-Communist lawp but the close
identification of Communist's with Nationalists, makes it difficult
to take effective measures', and the Prestos *Army of Liberation"
may be an increasing threat. In Argentinap the official Comm.,
slot Party has rimentisrteken a position Less hostile to Pomp
and the Peron government may avoid any action whatever against
Ccamunietc, In Osatemalap the situation of Communist penetration
of government is likely to continue as at present', with some p0-
:Ability of further Communist gains from the dislocation of the
new agrarian lava, Despite possible Communist gains the
Bolivian government is not taking effective anti-Comsmist
measures and is unlikely to do so. In Venesuela and Cuba, the
governUmmilitary man will act strongly against overt Communist
activityp but the Communists could nonetheless gain in influence
,
through present instability or an overthrow of the government--\.
9. In generale, Latin American attitudes an the East-West
conflict are unlikely to be more affected than at present by
Soviet Bloc propaganda and tactics within the range of the
assumed courses of action. Local Communist efforts to merge
their efforts with nationalist groups will tend to increase
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Communist strengthe as in Brasile and Communists will probably
continue to contribute significantly to anti-American sentiment,
',odd Soviet Bloc tactics succeed in mooting serious divisions
between the US and Western Europee Latin karts& might tend to
take the European point of views, which would probably mean a
relaxation of defense efforts and cooperation? Latin American
popular groups will continue moderately auptib1e to Soviet
peace propaganda,
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