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December 9, 2016
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March 9, 1999
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January 13, 1953
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Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300050031-7 TAB Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300050031-7 via 4101 Approved For Release Qi000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012AQ013000500317 ,C4 Security Information CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY map OF NNT/ONAL ESTIMATES 13 January 1951 MENORAMOIFORI Mr. Allan Evans (OIR) Colonel Gerald F. Lillords, USA (G-2) Captain Allan L Reed p USN (ONI) Colonel Jack E. Thome% USAF (AFOIN40 Captain John A, Holbrook, USN (JIG) SUBJEDT Summary of Oral Contributions to NIE415: "Probable Free World Attitudes in the East- )est Conflicts, through mid-1954p under Certain Assumed Conditions" I. Attached is cur working summary Of the oral oontribu- tions to the Latin American section of subject paper. In accordance with the understandings accompanying this procedures, these are circulated for your comment, arbich may be by informal memorandemp marginal notation, or any other method you deem suitableo It is requested that comment be received in this office by the close of businees on Thursdey, 22 January, Please note that this summary is not the final papero which will be cast in usual estimate leh and will be circulated in the usual manner following initial Board review, 25X1A9a Executive Secretary LV17IVM.) NO CHANGE IN CLASS. i XDECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE. 11( MAR_ ( REVIEV,VER. 0 ( 557 Approved For Release 2000/0/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300050031-7 Approved For Release 9400/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A9Z300050031-7 * Latin America 14 With the exception of Argentina and Onatema1a9 the coun- tries of Latin Amerioa will probab4 continue generally pro, Western and cooperative with the West during the period of this estimate,. Eventually the trend toward exaggerated nat4onallem9 if it continues) will seriously affect Hemisphere solidarity and US security intereets in Latin America. For the next several years9 however, change la not likely to be so far reaching as to reduse substantially the present degree and soope of Latin American cooperation4 2,, There is unlikely to American military cooperation ane agreements entered into ably be ratified and an nt will probably be concluded ie. There is no likelihood that any other nation now haIing a US Military Mission would follow Argentinaos example and allow the Mission contract to lappet, However Llhe Latin American countries will genera14 continue to a limited view of the importance of Hemisphere defense9 and their cooperation will be affected hy self-seeking and by * See NIE-709 "Conditions and Trends in Latin America Affect- ing US Security," 12 December 19520 especially paragraphs 69 36-489 and 53-62? be any great change in Latin c ill. bilateral military assist- Brasil and Uruguay will prob- with the Dessinican R **Mak Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300050031-7 Approved For Release2300/08/29 : CIA-RDP79ROI 01J1 300050031-7 (A, some apprehension toward their neighborsLleading to demands for national foreit rather than the types of forces best suited to *moral.). pleasing,, 3* No Latin American country is likely to change its policy an granting bases in time of peace, at least without a substan- tial .WA gm se. This applies particularly to Veneauele, Nicaraguap Ecuador (faith respect to the Galapagos Islands), and Brasil,, Although the Latio American countries will remain gen- erally willing to ship strategic materials to the US, difficulties are likely to cont!nue, especially over price* 4. Although Latin American countries will probably continue generally to eoeperate in Bast-West trade restrictionk any de- cline in the price of mw materials could lead to Worsened pressure for violating ttle Battle Act. Chile, with copper? and Bolivia, with tin, would be particularly likely to increase Soviet Bloc trade in this eventc, 5? Latin American support for the Korean War is almost certain to aoatinue passive, and there mar be a total withdrawal of Colombian forefeet, parttly for internal reasons) so that there would remain no Latin American forces there, Within the UN, however, the Latin American countries will probably continue to support the US on the POW issue, Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300050031-7 Approved For Release.4200/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012Aa91300050031-7 *Mar 3, 6, In the UN generallys, while Latin American cooperation on basic Bast-West issues such as Korea will probably continue stroll& Latin American countries may tend to attempt an inde- pendent line especially if there Is division between the US and MC, On colonial issues*, the Latin American countries may support the Arab4sian bloc to some degree o but such support would not extend toast's' of doubtful legality,' such as Tunisia*, and the Latin American attitude would also be affected by the identity of the colonial power involved*, being friendly to ?ranee but hostile to the UK or Belgium. There is little chance of log- rolling by the Latin American and Arab-Asian groups 9 each for the other*, since the Latin American countries have no major issues that can be used for trading purpoaes. 7q Latin American diplomatic relations with the Soviet Bloc are likely to center around simple questions of diplomatic recognition. There is some possibility that Brasil may eject the two satellite misaions now accredited there. Overall*, it is unlikely that the Soviet bloc will be able to add to its diplo- matic representation*, and it may lose additional poste. O. With respect to internal Commanism9 many Latin American governments are likely to take firmer measures, and there may be joint action in such limited fields as restriction of Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300050031-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012,4y01300050031-7 travel, Roweverp sush measures are likely to be balanced by inmvommied Communist opportunities in some countries Thus Brasil has recently enacted an anti-Communist lawp but the close identification of Communist's with Nationalists, makes it difficult to take effective measures', and the Prestos *Army of Liberation" may be an increasing threat. In Argentinap the official Comm., slot Party has rimentisrteken a position Less hostile to Pomp and the Peron government may avoid any action whatever against Ccamunietc, In Osatemalap the situation of Communist penetration of government is likely to continue as at present', with some p0- :Ability of further Communist gains from the dislocation of the new agrarian lava, Despite possible Communist gains the Bolivian government is not taking effective anti-Comsmist measures and is unlikely to do so. In Venesuela and Cuba, the governUmmilitary man will act strongly against overt Communist activityp but the Communists could nonetheless gain in influence , through present instability or an overthrow of the government--\. 9. In generale, Latin American attitudes an the East-West conflict are unlikely to be more affected than at present by Soviet Bloc propaganda and tactics within the range of the assumed courses of action. Local Communist efforts to merge their efforts with nationalist groups will tend to increase Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300050031-7 - Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300050031-7 slime *10 44111001" 5 Communist strengthe as in Brasile and Communists will probably continue to contribute significantly to anti-American sentiment, ',odd Soviet Bloc tactics succeed in mooting serious divisions between the US and Western Europee Latin karts& might tend to take the European point of views, which would probably mean a relaxation of defense efforts and cooperation? Latin American popular groups will continue moderately auptib1e to Soviet peace propaganda, Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300050031-7