CURRENT STRENGTH OF THE TUDEH PARTY IN IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001400010001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 13, 1951
• Content Type: IM

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OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH ? DEPARTMENT OF STATE
370
THIS IS AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT: NOTHING IN IT IS TO BE CONSTRUED AS A STATEMENT OF U.S. OR DEPARTMENTAL POLICY OR AS A
RECOMMENDATION OF ANY GIVEN POLICY
Copy No. 73
CURRENT STRENGTH OF THE TUDEE PARTY IN MAN
September 13, 1951
Problem
Estimate of the current capability of the Tudeh Party to seize
control in Iran.
Discussion
Since the suppret3sion of the Tudeh following the attempted assn...
sination of the Shah in February 1949, the party has operated openly
through the Peace Partisans and the Society Organized to Fight T..m pr-
ist Oil Companleso Up to April, 29, 1951, when Mosadeq became -
Prime Minister, the usual official method of controlling Tudeh wa
by invoking martial law, making arrests, and, sup, ressing newspapers
Mosadeq, however, lifted martial law, released certain Tudeh. leathers
from prison, and appealed to the entire population to maintain order.
Public parades and-demonstrations since that time have been tightly
controlled by, the participants, with the exception of the demonstration
in Tehran on July 15, 19510
Since a major objective of Soviet policy in Iran - is to end western
influence there, the Tudeh actively supported. Mosadeq in his national.
ization policy, except when it appeared likely that he might arrive at
an agreement which would retain significant British control in Iran.
Although Mosadeq has welcomed all, support for r %tionalizatior, there
is no evidence that he or any of his principal advisers, except pos-
sibly Abdul Qad.ir Azad and Dr. All Shayegan, have Communist sym-
athies 0 They are all, however, strong nationalists E
The Tudeb suffered a significant check as the result of a vigorous
anti-Communist campaign carried on by religious groups during the:
month of Rama., and a severe setback on Tuly 15 when they engaged
in open fighting with the. police and military in front of the Majlisr. This
street fight lost them the respect of many Iran
i,dbtaae`'
determined that
CIA has no objection to deciast
State Dept. review completed SECRET It contains Information of CIA
---~.-...ET Interest that must remain
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repucxnance for public ruden :ss to a national guest (Harriman), and
$ignifican1rly chilled the ardor of hangers-on and co-demonstrators.
'r, addition to the suck in Tehran, the strength of Tudeh in
Isfahan was recently broken when the chief of police arrested all
the ringleaders, jailing some, exiling some to Bandar Abbas, Yezd,
and Kerman, and giving others suspended sentences., In Tabriz, Tudeh
-:suffered another reversal when the ringleaders among university students
were arrested and jailed. The major significance of these developments
has been to demonstrate openly that there to a strong, effective anti-
Tudeh force which can and will resist Tudeh pressures. This has had a
distinctly wholesome effect in raising public morale.
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active mem ers p ausuou,
estimates
Tadeh. leaders have undoubtedly been instructed by Soviet agents to
agitate for the expulsion of the Anglo `iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and
to emphasize alleged British Imperialism in Iran.. Since support for
Mosadeq is almost universal and anti-British sentiment is intense, it
is very difficult to estimate public support for Tudeh. It is probable
that Mosadeq himself could get Majlis and non-Tudeh acceptance of
any compromise settlement which he would present and support. How-
ever, should he or a successor government approach an agreement with
the British, Tudeh opposition will probably come into the open. It may
ado be expected to offer open opposition if the government presents any
new legislation not related to the oil nationalization issue
In the event that Mosadeq is forced out of office, part of his large
popular following will probably join the anti-AXOC organization and
ultimately the Tudeh ranks. Since any successor government would
probably have to maintain order by force if it accepts any agreement
which will, in effect, restore the AIOC to its former position in Iran,
Tudeh may be expected to exploit the anticipated popular indignation
to the fullest extent. The allegiance of the security forces, if ordered
to support an unpopular settlement, is doubtful.
The balance of political power in Iran is now held by a third force
composed principally of skilled workers, students, government em-
ployees, teachers, and industrial labor. The spokesmen of this force
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_S_
-Ar(- the National Front leaders. Nazi, Soviet, and Western propaganda
in the past 10 years has convinced this group that a better, freer stand-
ard of living is possible in Iran. The contrast between possible methods
for achieving this end -- that is, between revolution and evolution -- is
often overlooked or disregarded. Unless effective demonstration of
evolutionary procedures appear, it is inevitable that increasing numbers
of Iranians will be attracted to revolutionary methods. Cessation of
.revenues from the oil operations, and the economic dislocations that
are occurring in consequence, will present Tudeh with increasing op-
portunities to promote revolution. At the present time the Shah's In-
fluence is practically nil. If the oil controversy continues to be regarded
by Iranians as a fight for their national independence, it is probable that
revolution will be ultimately .accepted rather than acquiescence in any
compromise which calls for retention of British predominance in the
oil industry.
Conclusion
At the present time, Tudeh is not capable of seizing control.
Given a continuation of the present economic deterioration and/or the
replacement of the Mosadeq government by one willing to reestablish
the British economic position within Iran, it is possible that that
capability may exist by the early part of 1952. .
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