TIMING AND NATURE OF SOVIET CAMPAIGNS AGAINST SCANDINAVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001500020009-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: February 4, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE GROUP
TIE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
4 February 1952
JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File
IYIEMORANDT31 FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Subject: Timing and Nature of Soviet Campaigns
Against Scandinavia
1-. In reply to your memorandum 53920, dated 28 January
1952, informal comments are submitted as follows:
a. Paragraph 1 a. In the event of a general war
between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, it is
considered that Soviet action would follow generally
along the lines of undertaking:
(1)
against
Simultaneous campaigns and operations
a Western Europe
b The British Isles (aerial bombard-
ment and sea and air interdiction of LC)Cts)
c The Near and Middle East
d The Far East
e Canada and the United States, in-
cluding Alaska and the Aleutians
f Allied sea communications
g) Targets of great importance to the
Allies, including areas from which Allied
strategic bombers would operate.
(2) Sabotage and subversive activities against
Allied interests in all parts of the world con-
currently with (1) above.
(3) Defense of the USSR against hostile attack.
(4) As soon as feasible, campaigns and operations
against :
a The Scandinavian Peninsula
b 5 Italy (subsequent to gbMnr1-1 isc anent by CIA has
trol over Northern Yugoslavia) determined that
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(c) The British Isles (an invasion
dependent upon the outcome of (1) (b) above,
and after the occupation of Channel port
areas and seizure of control over essential
sea communications)
(d) The Iberian Peninsula.
Soviet operations against Western Europe would
involve nearly simultaneous attacks against Western
Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, France
and Denmark. The main thrust of a Soviet attack on
Western Europe would in all probability develop through
the North German plain, secure the Channel port areas,
and thence proceed down the western coast of France to
the Pyrenees. Secondary attacks would probably develop
across central and southern Germany and thence through
the Lorraine and Belfort Gaps into central and southern
France, with a minor thrust into Denmark.
With the capability to mine the Skagerrak and
Kattegat and with Sweden remaining neutral, the Soviet
Union would probably attack Norway shortly after the
occupation of Denmark. The main effort could be an
amphibious and airborne operation striking at Oslo from
Denmark. A secondary and possibly simultaneous operation
involving one division could be mounted from Murmansk to
strike the Narvik area from the sea. The main thrust in
the south would extend from Oslo along the railroads and
highways leading to Trondheim, Bergen, Stavanger, and
Kristiansand. The forces landing in the Narvik area
would strike south as far as logistical conditions would
permit. The entire operation would be supported and pro-
tected by air.
b. Paragraph 1 b . The current view is that if Sweden
remains neutral, the USSR will not attack that country
unless it is found necessary to do so. This view holds
both in the event of war in 1952 and 1954.
c. Paragraph 4 a. If the Soviet rulers believe
that their object cannot be fully attained without
involvement in a general war against the Western Powers,
they may decide deliberately to provoke such a war when,
in their opinion, the balance of strength of the Soviet
Union vis-a-vis the Western Powers is in their favor.
It is estimated that such a period exists now and will
extend from the present at least through 1954.
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rWagraph 1 -b 'See mobilization, and pertinent
comments enclosed herewith with respect to Norway and
Sweden.
2. It is recognized that the above comments are not as
definitive as we would like to furnish, but are believed to
be the best available at the present time.
FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE :
'j- ; -
S . N. LANSING
Colonel, USA
Executive Officer
Joint Intelligence Group
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 SEC R E T EDMM T I~~UIIt~IMIW Ji I ~?
SMURITY INFORMATION
ENC LO SURE "All
Mobilization Potential (Norway)
1. The speed of mobilization is indicated in the following table:
Time
Strength
Units
M - Day
18,000
1 Mixed Brig; 1 Bn
M 1,30 Days
65,000
6 Mixed Brigs
M / 180 Days
120,000
6 Mixed Brigs
Reserves
2. Trained Reserves. There are approximately 90,000 men
who can be considered trained reserves. Groups of 3,500 are
receiving two monthst refresher training.
3. Untrained Reserves. There are approximately 11.0,000 reserves
liable for recall, who must be considered untrained.
Combat Efficiency
11.. Army. Except for the Occupation Brigade, the Norwegian Army
is not prepared for combat. Its strength lies in its hardy manpower
and high morale. Its weaknesses include a lack of permanent personnel
(officers, career noncommissioned officers, and technicians), inadequate
staff training for officers, short conscript training period, lack of
large-scale maneuvers, lack of combat experienced leadership, and
absence of operational units except for the brigade In Germany. While
the Norwegian Army has been trained in British tactical doctrines and
techniques, more and more United States doctrines and techniques are
being adopted. Because of the nature of the terrain, the Army has
been specially trained in snow and mountain warfare. Guerrilla
tactics have been studied and have reached a fairly high degree of
development. Infiltration tactics are also fairly well developed,
5. Navy. Although the Norwegian Navy suffers from a lack of
properly trained personnel and modern equipment, it is believed to
have the capabilities of performing ASW, escort, minelaying and
minesweeping missions at an acceptable standard.
SECRET
8''TYFORMATION - 4 - .Enclosure "A"
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6. Air Force. The Norwegian Air Force is a small defensive
arm on the same organizational level as the Army and Navy. Lack
of adequate spares, and a poorly organized supply system, have
an adverse effect on serviceability. The morale of Air Force
personnel is good, and is coupled with a strong determination
to resist aggression with all means available. Norway is engaged
in a realistic plan for improvement of her air force, This plan
calls for an intensive training program of present personnel and
an expansion of the jet fighter forces, At present the combat
value of the Norwegian Air Force is negligible against a major
power because of lack of equipment.
7.
Home Guard is capable of maintaing internal security.
b' To Defend
(1) Borders. Norway is not capable of defending her
northern border but would probably attempt in the event
of invasion from the north to abandon all of Finmark and
hold a narrow line at Lyngsfjord until aid could arrive.
She is not capable of defending her Swedish border.
Allowing a week to mobilize, Norway's forces would be
6 Brigades. Stocks would permit a month's action.
(2) Strategic Areas. Norway could not defend
strategic areas in the south for more than a month.
(3) Utilization of Guerrilla Warfare. It is probable
Relative Efficiency
a'To Assure Internal Security. Norway with its Army and
that by means of guerrilla warfare, an invader could be
harassed and considerably delayed but could not be
prevented from occupying the country.
c, To Wage Offensive War. The Norwegians have negligible
offensive capability.
SEC R E T
S)URITY INFORMATION - 5 - Enclosure "A"
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Quasi-Military Organization
B. Norway has a large and growing Home Guard, which is being
given extensive part-time training to support, the Army in defense
of the country. Present strength is about 90,000, and it is
planned to increase this total to 120,000. The Home Guard is
being armed and trained in many roles, such as antiaircraft,
coastal defense, and particularly sabotage and countersabotage.
It represents a potential underground and guerrilla force which
would present serious difficulties to an invader and would play
a major role in the event of internal disturbance,
VULNERABILITY
Economic
9. Since only 3 per cent of the land is arable, one half of
the total food requirements must be imported, as must fuel and
several minerals.
Social-Political
10. Norway is socially and politically homogeneous and would
strongly resist disunifying influences.
Military
11. Norway is open to Invasion from the southeast, east and
northeast along established routes. Oslo, the most important
governmental and industrial center, is the most vulnerable to
attack.
SECRET
SMURITrWFORMATION - 6 - Enclosure "Al'
SECRET
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S E C R E T
SECURITY INFORMATION
Pf U RD P',"'
ENCLOSURE "B"
Mobilization Potential (Sweden)
in 72
Based on World War II tests, mobilization could be effected
hours but several weeks would be required for unit organization
and training.
Time
Strength
Units
M - Day
50,000
None
bi t~ 30 Days
600,000
36 RCT's
M / 180 Days
600,000
36 ROT' s,
combat ready
Reserves
2. Trained. It is estimated that Sweden has a, trained reserve
of 850,000. During 1951 some 120,000 personnel received one month
of refresher training.
3. Untrained. Sweden has had compulsory military training since
1812 for all physically fit males and it may be assumed that the
mobilization potential has all been trained to a certain degree.
Combat Efficiency
It. Arm. The Swedish soldier is strong, rugged, accustomed to
hardship and outdoor life, and individually well-trained. Principal
weaknesses are lack of large unit training, lack of high level staff
experience and complete lack of combat experienced leaders and men.
Tactical doctrines for small units and for winter warfare are well
developed. During 1951 a large scale maneuver involving 35,000 men
was held.
5. Navy. In terms of available modern ships, the Swedish Navy
ranks first among the minor navies of the world. An exceptionally
high standard of seamanship, discipline and material maintenance
creates a tendency to overrate the Swedish Navy; however, postwar
SEC R E T
SECURITY INFORMATION
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S E C R E T
SECURITY INFORNNATION
Swedish naval exercises have shown that combat conditions of the 1930's
are the prevailing standards for doctrine and training. The Swedish
fleet has been untested by war for well over a century, consequently,
there can be no true assessment of its combat effectiveness.
6. Air Force. The Royal Swedish Air Force is the world's fourth
air force in effective strength, and its combat value would be high
initially. However, lack of experience in actual combat and failure
to appreciate fully capabilities of aircraft are limiting factors.
Its mission is defensive. It is significant that almost two-thirds
of the total number of aircraft of the Swedish Air Force are in tactical
units. The major portion of aircraft are fighters. The Swedes have
started production on the J-29, a high performance jet fighter of
Swedish design.
Relative Efficiency
a. To Assure Internal Security
(1) Against Sabotage. The presence of an organized
Home Guard in Sweden and the nationalistic nature of the
Swedish people would be the determining factors in the
control of sabotage in the event of a national emergency.
(2) Against Riots and Insurrections. The very nature
of the stolid, patriotic Swedes and the extremely stable
government exclude the danger of riots and civil war.
b. To Defend
(1) Borders. The long coast line and the long
Norwegian and Finnish borders are difficult problems in
defense. Once the border or coast line of Sweden is
penetrated, the country offers little in the nature of
natural defense lines to protect the strategically
important industrial southern third of Sweden. A brief
delaying action is the most that Sweden could perform.
Sweden's military forces could be mobilized in an esti-
mated time of one week to a strength of approximately
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12 divisions without effective armor. These divisions could
be sustained under combat conditions, on the basis of avail-
able supplies, for probably six months. However, since the
entire army would need at least a four-to-six months period
of unit training after mobilization, a brief delaying action
is all that Sweden could perform in the face of an immediate
invasion.
(2) Utilization of Guerrilla Warfare. The Swede is
rugged and able. This characteristic together with his
knowledge of mountain and winter combat should enable Sweden
to carry on effective guerrilla warfare.
c.. To Wage Offensive War. The present condition of Sweden's
armed forces makes it incapable of offensive warfare.
Quasi-Military Organizations
8. Sweden has a Home Guard of roughly 100,000 men. There is
sufficient equipment to arm these men for localized defense. Their
greatest deficiency is a lack of refresher training.
VULNERABILITY
Economic
9. Sweden is moderately vulnerable to a blockade of its coast
line. Normally, it imports all its coal and petroleum, but its
possession of a large hydroelectric power capacity and fuel sub-
stitutes lessen the importance of this deficiency. The greatest
vulnerability of the transportation network results from the
necessity for a high proportion of bridging and tunneling, by the
dependence of much of the railroad system upon electricity for
motive power, and of motor transport upon imported fuel.
Military
10. Sweden's poor conception of the requirements of modern defense
and its over-optimism about its ability to withstand a modern invasion
are its main strategic military vulnerabilities.
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I`TY INFO RIti1AT ION
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