NIE-49: SWEDEN'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT (FOR BOARD CONSIDERATION)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001500020023-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 1999
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: February 12, 1952
• Content Type: NIE

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SECURITI INFORMATION
FjUIVFIDENTIAI,' I
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 'P
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
12 February 2952
SUBJECTS NIE-49s SREIET'S.POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT
(for Board consideration)
THE PROBLEM
To assess (a) Sweden's strategic imps tance; (b) its present
policy in the Easti. Vest conflict; (a) the possibilities of a change in
this policy; and (d) the consequences of Svsedents possible policies to
the NATO peters and the USSR,
CONCLUSIONS
1, Swedents geographic locationg, sizeable economic resources and
considerable military potential give it substantial strategic importance
to both NATO and the USSR, Of chief importance is Sweden's potential
role in the defense of Scandinavia1 and particularly Norway' against a
DOCUMENT NO.
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20 Despite, its pro.Vtestern and anti-Communist outlook, Sweden will
probably cling to its "alliance-free" policy as long as possible, even in
event of war.
However, there is an even chance that Sweden would join the NATO
powers in event of a-Soviet attack on Norway, provided that the NATO forces
could came quickly to its defense. Moreover, Sweden would certainly fight
.if itself attacked,
4. The chief disadvantage to the NATO powers of Sweden?s neutrality
policy is that it seriously hampers the develoonent of adequate Scandinavian
defenses against a Soviet attack, Until the NATO powers are strong enough
to defend at least Norway, Swedens active participation might well be
essential to the defense of key Scandinavian base areas in event of war,
Moreover, if these areas could be held they would be valuable for potential
offensive ? operations against the Soviet Baltic flank,
If Sweden remained neutral in event of war while the USSR occupied
Norway, Sweden would be effectively isolated from the West, Its valuable
trade with the Tiest would be cut off and it world be forced, under Soviet
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economic pressure, to make an important contribution to the Soviet war
economFo
6m, On the other hand, once NATO becomes strong enough to defend
Norway in event of war, Sweden could no longer be wholly out off-from the
West; Swedish neutrality would still be advantageous to the USSR, however,
In that it would deny the Went the use of Swedish forces and bases and
would thus help to protect the Soviet Baltic flanks
1. SWEMN O S ST ATEGIC I TAI+ E
Ceohi.c ? Sweden, comprising over halt of the Scandinavian
peidnaula, lies across the most direct air routes between the norrn and
western USSR and Norway, the UK, Greenland, Iceland, and North America,
a could provide offensive and defensive air and early warning facilities
to either the USSR or the Western allies. It is also a major factor in the
control of the Baltic and its western cntranoe a Moreover, Sweden provides,
with Finlandp a buffer between the US?R and the valuable air and naval base
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site along the'lorwbgian coast, the most logistically feasible appr+cach
to ishich lies through Sweden itself . Fir-a11y, the Scandinavian peninsulas
insiuding Swedens overhangs the North German plain, the chief military
r o u t e aaroas western E u r o p e a n d if h o l d s e c u r e l y b y the N A T O p a r s , could
be used-as a base from which to threaten Soviet lines of communication
across Germany and the Soviet Baltic flank,
2? Political, Economic and Scientific, Sweden is a stable, politi.
sally mature democracy of about seven million people, Its present social
Imocratie-*grarian coalition government enjoys solid popular suppoeto
Sweden has only a small Communist party, numbering an estimated 35,000o
3a As ore of the most highly industrialised nations in the world,
Sweden is an important producer of ships, ball and rdLler bearings, indus-
trial machinery, engines and turbines, electrical apparatus, steep and
numerous other manufactures, as well as high quality iron are, The Swedish
Bofors firm designs and produces excellent naval and anti-aircraft g rA.
Sweden?s aircraft industry is capable of producing.1i ited numbers of
modern jet fighters. Its marine engineering and aeronautical inetallations
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are capable of =tensive research and dcel t cork, Sweden's basic
scientific and technological research is excellent in a masher of.
fields. Its scientists rank with the world's beat in physical chemist%7
and medicine, for souls, and it expects to have an undorgrou atonic
pile operating in 1953.
4. Same 92-93 of dish trode is with the West, the IM aid West
Geis being Sweden's largest customers. Sweden's li arge exports of
iron ore, lumber, pulp and paper, bearings, machinery and ships etc. 9
make an important contribution to Western European economic strength,,
For eacnmple, about Il, of the free world's iron is derived Swedish
5. Although : weden is slightly more dependont on trade with the
Soviet Bloc than most other Western European countries, this accounts
for only 7- of Swedish trade. It consists chiefly of an emobange of
iron ores ball and roller bearings, and machinery for Polish coal and
some mines al ores. This trade has been declining steadily over recent
years,, and under Western pressure, Sweden has adopted East-teat trade
controls cable to those of the Lin flATO countries. It sells
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no mmiti ms to the Soviet Bloc and only surrenders strategic goods,
such as iron ore and bd23 becrings, uhore necosaarg to obtain such
essc3ntia1 imports as Polish coal.
However, Sweden's dependence cn foreign sources four too-tbirds
of its raw matt r n1o and practically. all of its cool, coke, and
petrole11 products renders its econcaq critically vulnerable to external
pressures. Airy major Interference with the flow of iuporte such as could
probably occur in uartine would inevitably have serious disruptive effects
on 'the Swedish eccn .
7. A,}saed E=gg. Sweden is modernizing and eat parading its 75,E
man armed forces, the largost and best in Scandinavia., although fur less
than its resources would a1loca. l4hile the for'tlcaming defense budget
trill probably be more than 4ai', above that of the present fiscal year,
Sweden will still or1y be sponcUng 5 ,0, of its natianal incase for defense.
It is building nodern jet aircraft -(and buWIng others frm the 13K),
enlcrgingIand modernizing its fleet and wing ground force training.
Htwtaver, the armed forces suffer frcaa serious weaknesses uIi ch sharply
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Unit their capabilities in time of war. The gtu+.lity of Swedish zmn-
pourer and basic training is excollent, but the armed forces are Ian
in combat experience and high level staff and c rniand training for lie
operations, while serious logistical deficiencies also mist.
8. Sweden's a=W of 50,000 comprises only 15,000 regulars,
although mobilizable aster manpower totals acne 675,000 men, most of them
s i-trained. The 9-10 month conscription period is inadequate by TIATO
standards, and there is a shortage of modem equipment.
9. Sweden's navy is a ue3.3..rounded force of high sus designed
for coast defense. Built around three cruisers, twelve destroyers,, and
twenty-ono dos, it is weak in modern equipment, though a nov
construction and modernization progr m is in progress. By the and of
1952, fore ple, an sumrinos will be fitted with radar, sonar, and
snorkels.
10. The Air Force, Western Europe's second best, is. considered by
Streden to be its first line of defense. it has 1,688 aircraft (1,095
of then in operational smite) , of which 366 are jeta. Of Sweden's 62
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airfields, six can nou: sustain jet fighter or medium beciber operations,
fan more am sustain jet fighters and be developed for baabera, and a
furbber ten can support limited jet fighter operations. Sweden's air
defenses have been great3y improved
but the air force is lacking in combat experience,
its equipment is unequal to that of the 'OSSE, and it suffers from critical
logistic deficiencies, particularly fuel.
U. In the light of the above military weaknesses, the Swedish
forces are presently incapable of more than a delaying action against a
major Soviet attack. The duration of their defensive effort would depend
upon whether they had sufficient time to mobilize and received substantial
outside support. on the other band, Sweden's already sizable military
potential and resources provide a basis for a narked expansion in Swedish
m4litary capabilities, perhaps to the point where, together faith the NATO
Northern Ca?and forces, they could successfully defend large areas of
Scandinavia. Such a build-up of Swedish defenses, hwever, would require
outside assistance.
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12. edexao axle Sear~ditaa ~+~ aef M. The ultimate teat of
Sueden' a strategic importance to the USSR and the NATO powers lies in
its potential role in the defense of the Scandinavian peninsula in event
of var. Should war cone, the chief objective of both sides would probably
be to hold the valuable air and naval bases and radar sites along the
Ilorwegian coast. Ibtil -the NATO poera are strong enough to defend Den =k
or at least Norte, Sweden, because of its geographic location and suable
ai aed forces, could make a valuable contribution to Nor *' a defense (see
pars. 34 ff ,) .
3.3. While Sweden e a strategic i>anportanoe to the NATO powers is
pri ari y defensive, moo these powers were strong enough to defend the
Scandinavian peninsula (and perhaps Dommark), Sueden would have potential
value as a base for offensive air and perhaps eventually naval and
amphibious operations against the Soviet Baltic flank. Such operations
would be seriously hmpered, , by the difficulty of achieving. local
air and naval superiority over Soviet forces operating fry nearby bases,
and by the logistical difficulties of awing allied forces in Suedeao
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II. 5l 'S PF SI T POLICY IN T TAST 4 EST COT]FLICT
14. The Swedish people and gavel eat reesain fii 1y attached to
their tsaditinal policy of 'freodam froth military. alliances". Thin n
policy, together with the maintenance of adequate defenses, in designed
to avoid Swedish inv olveane' t in arty general war. To the Swedish public,
which overwhelmingly imports the neutrality policy, the most persuasive
argtmient in its behalf is the peace that the country has enjoyed for
approodmately 150 years. Although cognizant of the Soviet threat to
Swedish security, the Swedes are not convinced that they have no hope of
escaping imrolvMent in a future war. They are i.n er no delusion that
they could withstand attack without Western support, but they believe they
coo maintain their armed forces at a level that would make invasion not
worthwhile. Moreover, they are confidant that, regardless of their mm-
membership in fkTO, the Western poJera will cane to their assistance in
event of Soviet attack.
15. While on four non-Cam wn st parties support in pri iple the
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non-alli nce policy, ' the leaders of the Liberal and Conservative op-
position parties have criticized the station of the policy by the
Social Damocratic-,A.grarian Government as being too rigid, doctrinaire,
and lacking in foresight. They contend that at a miaim= Sweden should
undertake technical military cooperation with Denmark and Norway, lest
the absence of advance planning prejudice Western aid to Sweden. in event
of war. They also profess great concern over the impact of Sweden's
official neutrality policy on Western opinion. A small but vocal minority
led by some of the Liberal paw press, Includin Sweden's largest daily,
has gone further and attacked the neutrality policy, arguing that better
security would be found in affil cation with NATO. A number of high.-ranking
Swedish military officers apparently share this view, but it has not at
this juncture gained amV appreciable public or political support.
16. Despite their official Ong-a1].iancd" policy, both the Swedish
govesmm&t and people are pro-Western and anti-Comm at. The Swedish
,/ Sweden's Xll Cameanai st party, while not objecting to neutrality
as such, professes to regard it as a fraur3,, alleging that Svodish
foreign policy is actually pro-Western and non-neutral.
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people have a deop-oeated fear and mistrust of the USSR. This mistrust
is based large3y on historical oonf1icts with Tsarist Russia, which was
Sweden's traditional eney, but it has been strengthened in the postwar
period by the USSR's aggressive international policy, in osaant Soviet
attacks on Sweden's grant of asy1m to political refugees, and the recent
disclosure of Soviet espionage in Sweden. Swedish relations with the
Soviet bloc.. eapecic117 with Po]mxl, have worsened over the past year,
17. Sweden's aympatbies, as wen as its major 'commie interests,.
are with the Western countries, particu3ar3y the UK and M. Despite
reservations over certain aspects of American foreign policy, and same
',lingering anti-Amorican sentiment in Social Democratic circles against
the alleged bonne of a easive capitalism, there is a Friendly feeling for
the American people. Swedish domestic and foreign policy has booms more
orvert3y Western in its emphasis since the conflict in Korea, and partiou-
3nr3y since UAT0 defensive capabilities have begun to grow.
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III. P _ O $ I L I T I ,-E?A CH MME IN9 I H Ij
18. D ,the Cod,, K ax. Despite its pro-Western and anti.-C t
outlook.. Swodem is unlikely to change its fc ial nno.allionco" policy
during pea ne, and will f4 n3y resist 'Soviet or Western pressure
in this direction. Neither the people nor the govermmb are readily
auaceptiblo to outside pol.iti . and psychological pressures, to trbich
their history and spirit of independenee,, canbined with a strang element
of .stubbornneca, make them strongly averse.
19. Sweden woii1 be particularly resistant to psoo otbae Soviet
threats, although it might be forced to make tether 3?nited ocanomia
concessions to the Soviet bloc in response to such eccnc~mic uarfnre
measures as a threat to deir it Polish coal. Beyond this, b wrever, it
would not yield to Soviet pressures to alter its foreign or mil tax
policies, although Soviet threats might lead the Suedes to ta1ce a more
cautsi o m approach in their relations with the M wt.
20. On the other hands, there is little protect that Sweden would
join NATO in peacetime. The Swedes apparently see little tion
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through NATO 3n nberahip for what they believe would be a definite increase
in intearnatio?ul tension and possible soviet retaliation against rinlond,
should Sweden join the Wester a114, e. Host Swedes, relatively satin-
Pied with the state of their on'x defeaaoes, have not been greatly impressed
to date with NATO 7pd1itary assistance to Nosy and Denmark.
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The Suedes, however, would be very sensitive to any
hint of Western pressure in these negotlaticros, which anigit only increase
their stubbornness.
21. Although opposition leaders have contended that the disappearance
of rin and as a buffer for Sweden would necessitate reconsideration of
Suo[denos policy, we do not believe that Sweden would join NATO If the
USSR occupied Pinlamd. A recent public qpUdam poll indicates that only
205, of the people would favor a departure from neutrality in this event.
The Swedish government's reaction would probably not be detertflined so much
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by the. notuai eub jugat5.on of Fin11nnd as by its asoesm ant of ubat the
next Soviet step zrould be. Only if it were convinced that Finland was
meroly a s boord far a fmfter Soviet move into the Scandinavian
areas 3malnOng Sweden, would it prubobly make or ues to the West for
same form of military ties. On the other hand, if Sweden, believed the
USSR intended to move no further than PInIand there would very likely be
no avert change in its policy. Swedes would a3noat aertalh2y expand its
own defense preparations, bowev+ers and night enter into aocp~loacatcaly MIU_
tart' talks with the West. The sympathetic attitude that Sweden would
oertain3 take tovard Finnish refugees, together with the increased
pz iwti ty of Soviet farces, would create a public opinion in~arecaf r
hostile to the USSR and therefore more willing to think of sae form of
Western military cooperation to rectify the altered power balance in the
Dn].tio.
22. I ofWe believe that Sweden would stin prefer to
mania neutral as long an possible, particularly if Norway' were not di-
ready attacked. As lug as ! orwey were not invaded, the Swedes uould
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hope that the area rdCht not beams an active theater of operations and
that Suedes could keep open some lines of camcnmication with the West.
Then if Deowrk were invaded, which seems likely in the initial. stages of.
c European war, the Swedes probably still would not openly join the NATO
posters, although they would certainly mobilize and might open eDlarataay-
conversations with the Went.
23. Should Norway be attacked, boiever? or should Sweden become
convinced that an attack on Norway an/or itself were Imminent, there is
an oven almnoe that Sweden, would abandon its neutral policy, especinLly
if by that time NATO was Mlitarily strong enough to extend immediate
large-scale assistance in case of attack. A Soviet attack on Norway, even
though it bypassed Sweden, would face the government with the question of
fighting then or being surrounded and almost con 1etely isolated from the
West. A though, govar=mnt leaders have boon reserved on this point, we
believe that they might ueU regard an attacks on Norway as necessitating
the entry of Sweden into. the war. If, however, the attack should come
before NATO strength had been built up and the government tt believed"
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that quick and adequate Uoatorn aid would not be farthc , Staedem night
well decide to rniv in neutral regardless of the risks.
24. If Swedcn itself u are atta&-ed by the USSR, it would resist with
all its resources. Public opinion polls have indicated that 755,, of the
Swedish people are detoxmined to resist Soviet attack, while only 7 favor
nos-reelatance. If Suedes were invaded and occupied, rents of the
Swedish forces would flee to Allied territory, and the Suedes would attempt
to cwt gucarrilla marfhre and sabotage operations.
IV. TILE C0I $ E UEIICES OF SZ I 's PMOS ITION TO TI- MT-0 12MIS ID THE
25. Swadijeh-20MM2 to PIAT(I d e=. The inclusion in
NAM of Sweden's potentially strong ' ilitaxy establiabuent would increase
ITATO capabilities for the defence of Scandiaaavia and provide an additional
deterrent to Soviet attack. It would pesffit advance planning; and coordina-
tion with the NATO tlorthern Cam=3d$, facilitate Western mildtoxy advice and
asgistance in building up Sweden's defenses, and give a sharp boost to
Norwegian and Danish morale. Given IMP aid (which the Swedes could largely
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pay four), Sweden's defense capabilities, together with those of the 1M
tTo here Cemmnd, might be built up over several yyears to a point suf-
ficient to prevent a successful Soviet assault (see par. 36) .
26. While Swedish adherence to NATO would increase internationYol
tensions, it a3most ceTtaiu]Y would not be considered as a MW beLU
by the tTSSR. However, it might lead the MM to occt y Finland or at least
to secure further concessions fray the Finns. 1?1oroaver, if the MM launched
a Scarvdinavinn oampoip in event of war, Sweden would certainly be attacked.
27. goyyp 't Swath ties ui 4 the West during neaceti
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Although by no neana as beneficial as direct Siredish adherence to NATO, it
would .somewhat increase Scandinavian defense capabilities and night, if
kept secret from the tai., avert Soviet retaliation against Finland. The
timing of such advance planning or o~aitaents would be of great Vie,,
since the earlier the NATO powers could be assured of Sweden's position, the
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more effective their advance preparations could become.
2(3. Con c+d ZMUgh M dug e?d . Continued Swedish
neutrality during peocetine, particularly so long as NATO wealmesa prevents
I1orva7 and Demiark from being adequately defended' Jeopardizes the develop-
ment of effective S~adinavian defenses. It prevents the full utilization
of Sweden?e defense potential bya (a) mokIn difficult if not impossible
joint planning and coordination; (b) dig Sweden full access to NATO
military advice and assistance; and (c) h&aperi NATO efforts to induce
Sweden to strengthen its defenses.
29. On the other band Sweden's continued adherence to a "no-alliance"
policy is not wholly disadvantageous to the West. Sweden's East-West trade
controls already parallel those of the European IAATO co retries, and are
likely to continue to do so. Soviet policy toward Finland is probably
somewhat rest:rained by a desire not to alienate Sweden, alter this factor
some . overstressed by the Swedes. Moreover, Sweden's awed fame and deter-
s .ttn to resist already provide some deterrent to a Soviet, assault on
Scandinavia in event of war.
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30. ~.ed Qty r1 ut +.~ i Dv nt ofd. The caweqm+ces of Sweden I s
xnenrulity droning wartine would vary according to the military strength of
the jaT0 powers and the resultant mesas of the USSR to undertake a
Scaadfnaviaa oampaj gn. Should war cue during the period at NATO weelmeea
and before Norway in partioular could be adequately defended, the USSR would
probably bypass Sweden and launch an early invasion of Nord W primarily
through Denmark. By observing Swedea's neutrality the USSR would (a) avoid
the necessity of diverting large forces to cape with the Swedish forces;
(b) avoid 6nw'ge to the Swedish industrial eetablishuent as a result of the
fighting and of a Swedish "scorched earth" oaapaign; and (a) avoid the
necessity of occupying Sweden and of coping with probable guerrilla warfare.
P?.moreover, once the USSR had occupied Noway and D==k, Sweden would be ' almost
wholly isolated and its ammiderable eats to Western Europe would be out
off. The USSR, through its control over Sweden es essential imports, could
then force Sweden to re??oriearrt its trade toward the Soviet bloc and to
contribute'to the Soviet war econaW.
31. On the other hand., a neutral. Sweden would be of same, initial value
to the Allies. The USSR would be d%vived of the most direct line of cassrsmi-
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.cations to its Nowogian bases;
it would probably give refuge to fleeing Danish
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and Norwegian foroes; and it wou1rd probably beard a base for resistance
activities in these eountries and in rinland. Once the USSR had isolated
Sweden, however, it would probably place Increasing pressure on the Suediah
government to halt these activitiesy and Sweden could be compelled to comp27
at ]east par ualiy.
32. Despite its neutrmlity, Sweden would probably not actively resist
the overflight of Western aircraft, although it voild officially protest.
Pea ticu1ar3y if these overfil&ts were at high altitude, the Swedes might only
through the notion of Interception and AA fire, and the pro-
Western airforce might actually assist host or disabled Western aircraft.
Sweden mould more actively defend its nmrLToUty against Soviet overf,hts,
although not to the point of creating serious complications with the WSR.
After Sweden had been isolated through Soviet occupation of Norurq, howeaers
the Goverment miJat feel campell.ed by Soviet pressure to protest, more strongly
and take more active raoasures against Western overf fights. Even is this case,
the Swedish air force uoU1d be unlikely to a out in practice the more
stringent neasures ordered by the govei i nt itae1.f 0
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330 Owe NATO strength had groan sufficiently to hold in testern
Europe, and Der lark or at least Normy could be adequately. defended,
Swedish neutrality would be s newhat less disadvantageous to the Westo.
The USSR might not be able to divert the necessary forces for an early
Scandinavian campaigns and Sweden, which .could no longer be wholly isolated
by the UJSSR, would be leas vulnerable to Soviet economic pressures and
could still conduct limited trade with the "'est. Even under these circumw
stances the USSR would probably look upon Swedish. neutrality as advantageous,,
as it would screen the Soviet Baltic flank and would prevent the NATO
powers from making offensive use of Swedish bases
3L dish beUig n r in event of wars If Sweden declared war as a
result of a Soviet attack on Nomay, or if Sweden were itself attacked, this
USSEt would be coanpelled to employ substantially larger tcrees and overall
Scandinavian defense capabilities would be considerably increased. 1Vhetho?
not the NATO powers would be this enabled to hold substantial areas in
Scndinavia, however, would depend upon: (a) the strength of the NATO and
Swedish forces at the time war came; (b) the time they had to in bilize;
and (0) the outside assistance which NATO could provide. While the Swsdee
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VVa4 pecabably be unable to contribute materially to the defense of
Denmark., they'cauld make a valtmble contribution to Norway ?a defense,
35. During 1,952 at least it seems unlikely that the S1eedish and NATO
forces would be able to oanduat any more than a prolonged delaying action$
although isolated parts of Norway might be held. Logistical and other
difficulties would make difficult adequate and timely NATO assistance to
the Swedish forces, but Swedish delaying action might gain valuable time
for NATO reinforcement of Norway at least, Moreover,. those Swedish forces
which could retre atinto Norway would be able to assist in its defense,
Finally,, even if Weden were overruns the consequent destruction of Swedish
factories, transport linens etc?s as well as continuing guerrilla warfare
might seriously reduce Soviet ability to utilize s edish facilities and
resources after Sweden had been c+coupd.ed,
36. on the other hand., if general war did not. occur for several years,
Swedish and NATO defense capabilities might be developed to the point where
the addition of S'weden'., forces to those of NATOs particularly if these
foioes were given time to'mobigizee might enable a successful, defense of
A~}t~'~eFcAfR1'eafo~ll~'9~'~t1 N~~I~`1 ~5odg~z0oz37
23 - CONFIDENTIAT3
 Approved For R se 20 ~A-RDP79R04P12AO01500020023-7
_~CONNIDTrN~~
Combined NATOSediah fo*aes be able by y11 this time to hold large areal of
Scandinavia, bases would be available for air and perhaps eventual naval
and amphibious operations against the Soviet Baltic flank. The logisticaa
difficulties of supplying NATO foxes in Sweden in the face of probable
Soviet local air superiority in the Baltie mould doubtless limit NATO
use of bases in Slraden itself' but the valuable Nregian Coastal bases
would be protected and Soviet egress cm the Baltic wade more hazardous*
Q,24a
Approved For Release 200O W ~1'T'8TMDP79R01012AO01500020023-7