COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA THROUGH MID-1952

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001700010001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 7, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

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COPT NO. 1.44
SECURITY INFORMATION
I
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND
PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION
IR, KOREA THROUGH MID-1952
N1E-55
Published 7 December 1951
DOCUMENT NO.
HO CHANGE Lii CLASS. 0
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SATE: VIEWER:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OETtION TO AR Ti CENTER
;ion Frl_c_...1014: _Box VI
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SECURITY INFORMATION
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND
PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION
IN KOREA THROUGH MID-1952
NIE-55
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff par-
ticipated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the prep-
aration of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 29 No-
vember 1951.
-01*X=S"T
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COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF
ACTION IN NORTH KOREA THROUGH MID-1952
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Communist capabilities and probable courses of action in Korea through
mid-1952 in their relation to the Communist position in the Far East.
CONCLUSIONS
1. We believe that the Communist objec-
tive, to extend Communist control over
all Korea, remains unchanged.
2. The Communist forces are capable of
continuing large-scale operations in Ko-
rea through mid-1952.
3. We believe that during the period of
this estimate it will not be possible for
Communist forces to drive the UN from
Korea, unless major ? Soviet units are di-
rectly committed. We do not believe the
USSR will be willing to commit such units
because of the inherent risks of precipi-
tating general war. However, unless the
present unrestricted Communist air
build-up is checked or countered, we be-
lieve the growing power of the Chinese
Communist forces, even without direct
commitment of Soviet units, will enable
them to deal severe damage to the UN
forces and may make it impossible for the
UN to conduct general offensive opera-
tions except at prohibitive cost.
4. Prolongation of the war in Korea at
present levels would add to the economic
and political difficulties of Communist
China and North Korea, and would in-
volve increased risk of extension of the
war, but would be unlikely to have serious
adverse effects on the USSR or on Sino-
Soviet relations.
5. We believe that so long as the Korean
war continues, the Chinese Communists
are unlikely to engage in large-scale mili-
tary operations against Indochina or
Burma.
6. We believe that the Communists de-
sire a suspension or termination of hostil-
ities in Korea, but that their present po-
sition is not such as to oblige them to
accept terms which they may regard as
seriously disadvantageous. We believe
the Communists will protract the military
negotiations while there is a chance of
obtaining concessions of actual or propa-
ganda value. Thereafter, political nego-
tiations will be prolonged in the confi-
dence that while negotiations continue
the UN will not renew or widen hostilities,
and in the hope that popular pressures in
the West will oblige the UN to conclude
a settlement on terms more favorable to
the Communists.
7. On the other hand, the possibility can-
not be excluded that the Comunists are
protracting the armistice negotiations
merely to gain time to build up the Chi-
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,
nese Communist air and ground forces
preparatory to launching an all-out offen-
sive against UN forces in Korea. A deci-
sion to launch such an offensive might
be taken at any time during negotiations.
8. Finally, we believe that the Commu-
nists will not agree to any political settle-
ment unless they are convinced that it
provides opportunities ultimately to sub-
vert the Republic of Korea.
DISCUSSION
I. DETERMINANTS OF COMMUNIST
INTENTIONS
Military Capabilities In Korea
Ground Forces Strength
1. Enemy ground forces in Korea are estima-
ted at 610,000 personnel including 378,000
Chinese and 232,000 North Koreans. In ad-
dition, there are 258,000 Chinese Communist
troops in Manchuria plus three North Korean
divisions.
2. There is evidence that the North KOrean
Army is now unable to replace its combat
losses completely. ,One North Korean divi-
sion was deactivated in July 1951 and a
Korean corps was recently relieved by a CC
division ? the first relief of this type since
the hostilities began. On the other hand, the
Chinese Communists have been able to re-
place their heavy losses.
3. Despite hardships, heavy casualties, and the
growing proportion of only partially trained
recruits, the effectiveness of Communist and
North Korean troops has not been serious-
ly affected by a decline in morale. Communist
troops have surrendered in numbers only
when unit control has broken down and resis-
tance was hopeless. The high proportion of ex-
Kuomintang troops among the Chinese Com-
munist forces does not appear to be a signifi-
cant factor affecting Communist reliability or
morale.
4. The 7,500 battle-hardened guerrillas esti-
mated presently to be in South Korea con-
stitute a threat to public security and ROK re-
habilitation in that area. The ROK has re-
cently withdrawn two divisions from the bat-
tle lines for commitment to anti-guerrrilla
activities.
Ground Force Logistics
5. The logistic capabilities of the Communists
in Korea have been limited by the UN interdic-
tion of supply lines and the lack of flexibility
of their supply system. Supplies have had to
be accumulated over a long period to support
their offensives. Moreover, Communist in-
ability to provide adequate transport facilities
to support front line units has prevented the
Communists from maintaining the momen-
tum of their offensives. Present stockpiles
are sufficient in volume to support an offensive
with forces now deployed for about thirty days.
Although in past offensives the enemy could
not move supplies from forward stockpiles to
using units rapidly enough to maintain the
momentum of an offensive for more than five
to seven days, the Communists may now be
overcoming this difficulty.
6. Although the Communists have brought in
increasing amounts of transport equipment
and have made a tremendous effort to repair
and maintain lines of communication, UN air
attacks have exacted a heavy toll on rail facili-
ties, trucks, and bridges, and have greatly re-
duced operational efficiency of the Communist
supply lines. Truck losses apparently have
been replaced by deliveries from the USSR.
7. The food situation in North Korea is serious
and the Communist forces in Korea must de-
pend to a large extent upon Manchurian food
supplies. The Manchurian harvest is believed
to have been normal and to have provided an
ample grain surplus to meet military require-
ments.
Air Force Strength
8. The Chinese Communist-North Korean Air
Forces are estimated to have available approx-
imately 1,450 combat aircraft of which at least
800 are jet fighters. Of this total 1,075 aircraft
(including 535 jet fighters) are estimated to
2
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Soilagirr
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be in Manchuria and the remainder are be-
lieved to be based in China proper,primarily
around Peiping, Shanghai, and Canton. Dur-
ing recent months Communist air strength in
the China-Manchuria-North Korean area has
increased rapidly, with the greatest increase
being in MIG-15 jet fighters.
9. The combat potential and effectiveness of
the CCAF-NKAF have improved rapidly dur-
ing the past six months and must now be con-
sidered formidable. By USAF standards the
Communists are believed to be reaching a
fairly high state of training. There have been
numerous reports of intensive ground attack,
navigational and paratrooper training. Actu-
al UN experience has demonstrated that the
Communists are capable of successful day and
limited night interception, radar directed high
altitude antiaircraft gunnery, and large for-
mation tactics with jet fighters. The MIG-15
has been highly effective in the role of fighter
versus bomber, the purpose for which it was
designed. The performance pattern of the
MIG-15 jet fighter units has been spotty, how-
ever, particularly in operations against UN
fighters.
10. The full extent of Soviet Air Force partici-
pation is not known, but the use of Soviet
technical advisors and the organizational pat-
tern strongly indicate a dominating Soviet in-
fluence throughout the CCAF. It is probable
that Soviet Air Force personnel are operating
aircraft accredited to the CCAF.
Air Force Logistics
11. The Chinese Communist and North
Korean Air Forces are wholly dependent upon
the USSR for aircraft spare parts and asso-
ciated equipment and largely dependent upon
Soviet sources for POL. It is within the Soviet
capability to augment greatly the Chinese
Communist air strength at any time. These
aircraft could come from the Soviet Far East-
ern Air Forces, from Europe, or from Soviet
production which is estimated to include 500
MIG-15's per month. Within a relatively short
period of time a large part of the estimated
T/O and E strength of 5,500 aircraft in the
Soviet Far East Air Force could be made avail-
able for operation in the Korean air war.
12. The intensive airfield repair and facili-
ties build-up which has been accomplished
throughout China and Manchuria during the
past year has produced a system of airfields
which would enable the CCAF-NKAF to em-
ploy all types of aircraft, including jet fighters
in sustained operations and TU-4's in limited
operations. The newly developed air facilities
in Manchuria provide excellent air, defense
of Manchuria and support to the Communist
forces fighting in Korea. In addition, they
could be utilized as medium bomber bases for
attacks against important United States bases
in South Korea, Japan, and Okinawa. Maxi-
mum efforts to recondition and expand air-
fields in North Korea have continued. Three
new airfields in northwest Korea may be ready
for jet fighter operations by mid-December.
Naval Forces
13. The naval forces of the Chinese Commu-
nists and North Koreans are insignificant.
The combat effectiveness of these forces is
considered to be very low and their potential,
barring the possible use of Soviet submarines,
would continue to be distinctly limited for the
period of this estimate. Mines laid by impro-
vised mine layers present a continuing threat
to UN Naval forces.
The USSR as a, Source of Supply
14. The USSR must provide Communist forces
in Korea with a large share of the replace-
ments of munitions and other equipment for
military ,use, including weapons, ammunition,
tanks, trucks, artillery, petroleum, and air-
craft, as well as trained personnel for instruc-
tion (tanks and artillery) and operation (anti-
aircraft guns and aircraft) . Munitions and
equipment can probably be supplied from
Soviet stocks or current production without
creating a strain on the USSR. Since a sub-
stantial part of these supplies must be sent
to the Far East from western and central
USSR, however, the Korean war has undoubt-
edly placed a heavy burden on the Trans-Si-
berian Railroad.
15. The practical capacity of the Trans-Si-
berian Railroad is believed to be fully em-
ployed at the present time. It is unlikely that
a significant increase in the flow of supplies to
awatedio. 3
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dikel0Or
Korea could occur over the Trans-Siberian
without cutting seriously into important So-
viet military and civilian traffic.
16. There is some evidence that transloading
points on the Siberian-Manchurian border are
now handling cargo at close to capacity. Non-
military railroad traffic has, moreover, been
embargoed from time to time in Manchuria,
which indicates that a significant increase in
transit traffic to Korea might cause serious
difficulties for the Manchurian economy.
Over-all Current Military Capabilities
17. The enemy can attack at any time with
forces, presently in contact. These forces are
composed of 29 infantry, 1 armored, and 4
artillery divisions with a personnel strength
of 219,000, an estimated 80-120 tanks and ap-
proximately 500 artillery pieces. Also avail-
able in Korea are 43 infantry divisions, 2 ar-
mored divisions, 1 mechanized division, and 1
antitank division (391,000 personnel and 240-
280 tanks). These forces could be committed
within 2 to 10 days, but such a commitment
would materially reduce Communist coastal
defenses in Korea. In addition to his of-
fensive capabilities, the enemy can defend in
place with forces presently available and can
conduct limited guerrilla operations behind
UN lines.
18. Although the CCAF has been employed
in a predominantly protective role thus far, it
nevertheless poses an increasing threat to the
safety of the United Nations forces deployed
in the Korean theater. The CCAF has in-
creased over-all Communist defensive and of-
fensive capabilities, and has gained air su-
periority as far south as Sinanju on the
Chongchon R iver to the extent of making
UN daylight medium bombing efforts in the
area exceedingly costly and diverting UN air
elements from interdiction missions. The
CCAF could launch an intense air attack
which might inflict serious damage upon
United Nations ground forces, naval and air
installations, and lines of communication in
Korea.
19. There are sufficient numbers of MIG-15
aircraft located in southern Manchuria to
provide a strong fighter defense for this area.
The fighter defense capabilities of China
proper are considerably less and, should sev-
eral areas of China be attacked simultaneous-
ly, the presently available forces would be
spread too thinly for effective defense.
Trends in Military Capabilities
20. Through mid-1952 the Chinese Commu-
nists can maintain their present troop
strength and combat potential in Korea. As-
suming that the present ratio of UN Commu-
nist air effectiveness remains unchanged, the
Chinese Communists could deploy and logis-
tically support in Korea 9 to 12 additional
divisions, including the equivalent of three
armored divisions. It should be noted, how-
ever, that if the Communists decided to make
a maximum effort in Korea, reduced the
effectiveness of the UN interdiction, and sac-
rificed commitments elsewhere they might be
able to increase troop strength in Korea to
approximately 1,500,000 men. On the other
hand, an increase in the effectiveness of the
UN interdiction effort would make difficult
even a moderate increase in Communist troop
strength. It is Unlikely that within the next
few months the effectiveness of Communist
units now in Korea could be substantially
raised by the receipt of increased amounts of
heavy equipment alone. Although the USSR
has the capability to make available substan-
tial quantities of heavy equipment to Com-
munist troops in Korea, these troops would
require considerable further training to use
such equipment effectively.
21. The aircraft strength presently available
to the Communist forces operating in Korea
could be increased by mid-1952 to a level de-
pendent only on Soviet intentions and capa-
bilities. The continuing extensive build-up
of aircraft, ostensibly operating as units of
the CCAF, has been to meet the specific re-
quirements of the Korean operation. The over-
all air defense capabilities of China will prob-
ably continue to increase. '
22. In the event of an armistice, Communist
ability to increase their military potential in
North Korea would depend to some extent on
the nature of the inspection provisions. Even
should the armistice provide for inspection
measures effectively preventing the augmen-
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girkeitAC
tation of forces in Korea, however, Commu-
nist capabilities could be increased consider-
ably by the repair and construction of roads,
railroads, and other facilities under the guise
of rehabilitation.
Military Capabilities In the Far East
Elsewhere Than In Korea
23. The Chinese Communists have the capa-
bility of undertaking military operations else-
where in the Far East in addition to the pres-
ent large-scale operations in Korea. They
could initiate large-scale operations as an al-
ternative to the present military operations
in Korea.
a. Taiwan. The Communists have been
building up their air and coastal defense capa-
bilities on the mainland opposite Taiwan.
Thus far, the heavy Communist military
commitment in Korea and the assignment of
the US Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan
straits probably have forced the Chinese Com-
munists to postpone any attempt to invade the
island.
b. Hong Kong. Regardless of the outcome
of the cease-fire negotiations, the Chinese
Communists will continue to have the capa-
bility of launching a successful attack on
Hong Kong with few preparations and with
little advance warning.
c. Southeast Asia. In Indochina, the Chi-
nese Communists probably could support ap-
proximately 100,000 men for a series of lim-
ited offensives Of short duration. Logistic
preparations in South China are sufficiently
advanced to support limited Chinese Commu-
nist air operations against Indochina. The
Chinese Communists probably could make
available approximately 50,000 men for sus-
tained operations in Burma. However, so
long as they are committed in Korea, the Chi-
nese Communists probably would not be able
to support logistically large-scale ground op-
erations in Burma and Indochina concur-
rently.
d. Japan. The Chinese Communists do not
have the capability to attack Japan without
large-scale Soviet support.
The Internal Situation in Communist China
24. The mobilization of Communist, China's
limited economic resources for the prosecution
of the Korean war has undoubtedly increased
internal economic and political pressures and
required Peiping to modify its economic and
political programs. There is evidence that, at
least in part as a consequence of hostilities in
Korea, inflationary pressures have increased,
production of certain consumer goods has
lagged, production objectives have been re-
duced, purges of "counter-revolutionaries"
have been intensified, and popular support of
the regime has decreased. In addition, some
reports hint at policy disagreements within
the Chinese Communist Party stemming from
the Korean war.
25. On the other hand, the Chinese Commu-
nists thus far have apparently been able to
support their military operations in Korea
without suffering such serious consequences
in China as a breakdown of rail transporta-
tion, an increase in anti-Communist guerrilla
activity, outbreaks of large-scale civil dis-
orders, or a shortage of manpower on the
Korean front. It is believed that the Commu-
nists can continue the war through the com-
ing winter without incurring any of these con-
sequences.
26. Communist China is not likely to face seri-
ous problems supplying its forces in Korea
during the next several months. To an in-
creasing extent the USSR is providing Chi-
nese as well as North Korean forces in Korea
with heavy munitions and equipment, while
Communist China continues to furnish most
of the small arms, ammunition, food and
clothing to its own troops. There is no evi-
dence that the drain on the Chinese transpor-
tation system resulting from the transfer of
trucks and rolling stock to Manchuria and
Korea has as yet had a serious effect on the
Chinese economy. However, continued in-
creases in military transport requirements
will necessitate further reductions in com-
mercial freight movements in China and will
place further pressure on the already-strain-
ed railroad maintenance facilities.
27. Athough Communist China has enor-
mous manpower resources, the inflexible labor
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requirements of Chinese agriculture limit the
mobility of the Chinese labor force. Thus lo-
cal labor shortages do exist and will, probably
be intensified by Peiping's conscription of
manpower for military and para-military pur-
poses. Furthermore, Communist China is
faced with an urgent need for technicians for
both the army and the expanding bureauc-
racy. This shortage of trained personnel has
serious implications for? the administrative
capabilities of the regime.
28. The marked increase in the rate of public
expenditure since the start of the Korean war
has forced a drastic increase in taxes and a
marked intensification of tax collection, es-
pecially in rural areas. A continuation of the
Korean war with an inevitable additional in-
crease in taxes will further diminish the rural
support which was gained by Peiping during
the initial period of land redistribution. In-
flationary pressures have been built up as a
result of the budgetary deficit and the con-
tinued diversion of production to military
uses. Consequent price increases, while in no
sense as sharp as those characterizing the Na-
tionalist postwar economy, have been signif-
icant, and prices will almost certainly con-
tinue to rise as the Korean war goes on.
29. The Korean war has undoubtedly obliged
the Chinese Communists to rely increasingly
on police and administrative controls rather
than on popular support. Within the Com-
munist party leadership itself, the Korean
war may raise, if indeed it has not already
done so, potentially divisive issues such as:
(a) the protraction of the war at the con-
tinued sacrifice of domestic objectives; (b) in-
creased Soviet intervention in internal Chi-
nese affairs as a concommitant of Soviet aid;
and (c) further intensification of internal
controls at the expense of popular support.
The Internal Situation In North Korea
30. The North Korean regime is faced with
much more serious internal economic and
political problems than is Communist China,
and a continuation of hostilities will almost
certainly intensify these difficulties. The re-
gime continues to control the North Korean
police and army; however, and decreasing
popular support poses no serious threat. The
North Korean regime can be expected to con-
tinue to support Soviet policy regardless of
the consequences within Korea since it is
dedicated to the Kremlin's international ob-
jectives and is incapable of exercising a deci-
sive influence on major Communist policy de-
cisions with respect to the war. However, the
maintenance of a viable and stable Satellite
regime in North Korea may be an important
objective of Soviet policy.
31. The food situation in North Korea may be-
come critical for the civilian population by
spring. Consumer goods other than food are
virtually nonexistent. Transportation and
communication facilities are apparently
maintained only along essential lines of
supply. Industrial establishments have been
in large part destroyed. Manpower shortages
have already interfered with rehabilitation
and agricultural production. They may soon
affect essential rear area services for the army
and further cripple the civilian economy.
32. These difficulties, together with the so-
cial and psychological effects of prolonged
devastation and inconclusive war, have ac-
centuated antagonisms between the people ,
and the regime of North Korea. The tempo-
rary occupation of large areas of North Korea
by UN forces, the presence of large numbers
of unpopular Chinese troops and the frus-
trated hopes of victory and unification have
been additional factors forcing the regime to
resort increasingly to harsh police controls.
33. There have been reports of serious fric-
tion between the leadership of Communist
China and that of North Korea, including re-
ports of friction with regard to the respective
roles of the Chinese Communists and the
North Koreans in the conduct of the war.
There is no convincing evidence, however, that
friction is sufficiently serious to threaten
united Communist prosecution of the war or
the conclusion of an armistice.
Sino-Soviet Relations*
34. While the Chinese Communists probably
entered the Korean war in full accord with the
*A comprehensive analysis of Sino-Soviet rela-
tions, NIE-58, is currently in preparation.
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USSR, the heavy burden of the war and
Peiping's dependence on the USSR for vital
war supplies have undoubtedly created prob-
lems in the relations between the two govern-
ments. There is no evidence, however, that
these problems are sufficiently serious or are
likely to become so serious as to create major
divergences in the policies of the two powers.
While the Korean war has increased the mili-
tary prestige of Communist China, the war
has almost certainly strengthened the hold
of Moscow on Peiping.
35. North Korea is important to the defense
of Soviet and Chinese borders, and any seri-
ous. threat to its integrity may, in the Com-
munist view, be a threat also to the USSR
and Communist China. South Korea is of
strategic value to the Communists principal-
ly as an offensive base and, in anti-Commu-
nist hands, represents a military and psycho-
logical threat to the Communist position in
North Korea.
II. CURRENT INDICATIONS OF COMMU-
NIST COURSES OF ACTION
36. Current intelligence provides no conclu-
sive indications of probable Communist
courses of action with regard to either Korea
or other areas in the Far East. Recent Com-
munist propaganda and their concessions in
the armistice negotiations both can be inter-
preted as indications of a Communist desire
to obtain a cease-fire. Moreover, the pattern
of Communist military activity in Manchuria
and North Korea can be interpreted as an at-
tempt to improve the Communist bargaining
position in the armistice negotiations. On the
other hand, the prolongation of these dis-
cussions can be interpreted as an indication of
Communist efforts to create dissension among
participating UN governments and undermine
their resolution to remain in Korea. Further-
more, Communist efforts to develop air cap-
abilities, maintain ground strength in Korea,
and mobilize the total resources of China may
indicate a Communist intent to resume large-
scale offensive actions at a later date.
Indications of Communist Intentions From
Communist Military Activities
37. Communist military ,activities in Korea,
Manchuria, and China indicate that the Chi-
nese are making preparations to continue
military operations for an indefinite period of
time. Current indications suggest that these
operations in the immediate future will prob-
ably be characterized on the ground by limit-
ed objective attacks and determined resist-
ance in depth to UN offensives and in the air
by further efforts to extend Communist air
superiority over much of Communist-held
North Korea. On the other hand, the
introduction of some armor and increasing
amounts of artillery into North Korea, the
continued efforts to achieve a logistic build-
up, and the strenuous efforts to develop air
capabilities could be interpreted as indications-
of a Communist plan to mount a major of-
fensive.
38. The _Communist air build-up, though pri-
marily a Soviet effort, does not provide con-
clusive evidence as to future Soviet courses
of action with respect to Korea. It could in-
dicate any or all of the following: (a) a Soviet
recognition that a major Communist air effort
is necessary to bolster Chinese Communist
morale and improve their military positions;
(b) a Soviet intent to secure the defense of
Manchuria in the event of an expansion of
the war; (c) a Soviet attempt to improve the
Communist bargaining position in the armis-
tice negotiations; (d) a Soviet intent to chal-
lenge UN air superiority in Korea; and (e) a
Soviet intent to build up Soviet air defenses
throughout the Communist Far East and
gain air combat experience.
39. Other activity in China proper indicates
a Communist determination to continue full-
scale military mobilization. Furthermore, the
indications are that the Chinese Communists
intend to continue supplying material and ad-
visory assistance to the Viet Minh and the
Burmese Communists. There are no positive
indications of an early intent to send regular
Chinese Communist troops into either area.
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Indications From Communist Prooaganda
40. Communist propaganda after the Chinese
Communist intervention in Korea stressed
determination to drive the UN forces from
Korea and insisted that any settlement must
include Chinese Communist acquisition of
Taiwan and the admission of Communist
China to the UN. Shortly before the Malik
statement, propaganda emphasis shifted. The
"Drive-the-invaders-into-the-sea" theme was
replaced by the claim that driving the "in-
vaders" back to the 38th Parallel represented
a great victory. Previous political demands
were no longer mentioned in the context of
the immediate problem of a Korean settle-
ment. Although Communist propaganda can-
not be interpreted as a firm indication of
Communist intentions with respect to Korea,
propaganda analysis suggests, on balance,
that the Communists desire a suspension or
even a termination of hostilities. It also sug-
gests that the Communists are desirous of ob-
taining a Korean political settlement based
on the pre-invasion situation in Korea and in-
cluding the withdrawal of UN troops. Further-
more, Communist propaganda emphasis on
"Asian unity" in the face of US "imperialist
aggression" suggests that ultimate Commu-
nist objectives in Asia?including the with-
drawal of US protection from Taiwan and ad-
mission of Communist China to the UN?have
not changed.
Indications of Communist Intentions From
Their Conduct of Armistice Negotiations
41. Communist actions during the armistice
negotiations indicate a strong desire not to
have the discussions terminated. The Com-
munists have made a number of important
concessions which, taken together, represent
such a significant departure from their orig-
inally announced position as to indicate de-
sire to secure a cease-fire. The negotiations to
date do not provide indication, however, of
Communist willingness to conclude? an armi-
stice on terms satisfactory to the UN.
Indications of Communist Intentions From
Communist Policies Elsewhere in the Far
East
42. In addition to the continued propaganda
stress on the need for military preparedness,
Peiping has placed increasing emphasis re-
cently on domestic problems. Taken together
with the ostensible Communist interest in a
Korean armistice, this could indicate a Chi-
nese Communist intent to reduce its Korean
commitment in the near future in order to
concentrate for an indefinite time on do-
mestic programs. Communist policies else-
where in the Far East give no clear indication
of Communist intentions with regard to Korea
but indicate that toward other neighboring
countries the Communists intend to follow
their present policy based on "Asian unity"
and "national liberation."
III. COMMUNIST INTENTIONS
43. The Communist forces are capable of
continuing large-scale operations in Korea
through mid-1952. We believe that during
the period of this estimate it will not be possi-
ble for Communist forces to drive the UN
from Korea, unless major Soviet units are di-
rectly committed. We do not believe the USSR
will be willing to commit such units because of
the inherent risks of precipitating general
war. However, unless the present unrestricted
Communist air build-up is checked or coun-
tered, we believe the growing power of the
Chinese Communist forces, even without di-
rect commitment of Soviet units, will enable
them to deal severe damage to the UN forces
and may make it impossible for the UN to con-
duct general offensive operations except at
prohibitive cost.
44. Unless the Soviets are prepared to provide
the support necessary to achieve maximum
Communist objectives in Korea, the Commu-
nists have two alternative courses of action:
(a) to accept an indefinite prolongation and
possible expansion of the war, or (b) to set-
tle the conflict on the best terms possible.
45. Taking into account the various factors
bearing on Communist policy in Korea, we
believe that the Communists desire to stop
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wiat ET
the fighting in Korea in order to: (a) avoid
a possible expansion of the war which might
oblige the USSR either to introduce Soviet
military forces on a large-scale or to accept
the extension of non-Communist control as
far as the Soviet and Manchurian borders of
Korea; (b) prevent the further development
of strains on the Communist regimes of China
and North Korea which might ultimately
threaten their stability; (c) permit Commu-
nist China to complete the modernization of
its armed forces, to develop more effective
administrative and police controls, and to
develop a stronger industrial and economic
base; (d) restore North Korea as a "model
satellite" with the potential for the subversion
of the Republic of Korea; (e) permit increased
efforts to extend Communist influence and
control to southeast Asia and the Far East
generally. We are unable to determine what
relation a Communist desire for a suspension
or termination of hostilities in Korea would
have to Soviet global policies.
46. We believe that the Communists desire a
suspension or termination of hostilities in
Korea, but that their present position is not
such as to oblige them to accept terms which
they may regard as seriously disadvantageous.
We believe the Communists will protract the
military negotiations while there is a chance
of obtaining concessions of actual or propa-
ganda value. Thereafter, political negotiations
will be prolonged in the confidence that while
negotiations continue the UN will not renew
or widen hostilities, and in the hope that pop-
ular pressures in the West will oblige the UN
to conclude a settlement on terms more favor-
able to the Communists.
47. On the other hand, the possibility cannot
be excluded that the Communists are pro-
tracting the armistice negotiations merely to
gain time to build up the Chinese Comunist
air and ground forces preparatory to launch-
ing an all-out offensive against UN forces in
Korea. A decision to launch such an offen-
sive might be taken at any time during ne-
gotiations.
48. Finally, we believe that the Communists
will not agree to any political settlement un-
less they are convinced that it provides oppor-
tunities ultimately to subvert the Republic of
Korea.
tektraleer
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