REARMAMENT BY GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001700040005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 7, 1951
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001700040005-6
Sit:1AfTY INFCHIATION 46),
7-101.%. art? Q - o ./40
7 November 1951
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Director, National Estimates
FROM: Deputy Director Central Intelligence
You might be interested in the attached memorandum
on German rearmament prepared by whose
background I can explain to you if you are interested?
Possibly you know it?
Endo
OCIINIENT HO.
NO NAM HI CLASS.
in DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANDED, TO:
NEXT REVIEW DATE;
AUTH: RR 104
DATE: 3 Alm, REVIEWER:_000256
0
TS S C
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STAT
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REARMAMENT BY GERMANY
The vital problem of whether or not Western Germany
should be permitted to have an army has been much debated in
Germany ever since September 1950 when the New Conference
of Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom and
France published a communicue on the participation of the
German Federal Republic in the common defense of Europe.
During my many trips to Gelmany (eleven in 1950 and
nine in 1951) I had occasion to witness a strong fluctuation
in the reactions of the Germans to this vital issue. While
it is not possible to state with any certainty what the majority
of the German people feel towards a new German Army, the follow-
ing opinions were expressed at meetings and speeches held in
Germany, in German newspaper articles and in conversations I
had with a great many Germans:
1. We cannot leave the defense of Europe alone to America,
England, France and the smaller powers. Our fate is sealed with
the West. We can survive only if we line up with the Atlantic
Powers. Our contributron in the military and armament field is
an important step towards this necessary integration. That is
the official view of the' Western German Government.
2. The Social Democrats in Germany who are as much .glagae..d.
as Dr. Adenauer to any deal with the Russians, are at the same
time cTss/gga to any rearmament. They are skeptical of the idea
of a Western European Federation. The armament issue is used
by them merely as an instrument for obtaining more independence
and freedom from all controls. They deem it to be their mission
as the largest party in opposition to the present German Govern-
ment to force the present cabinet to increase its demands for
unreserved and unconditional political equality.
In their eyes the political status is the all important
factor. They refuse to commit themselves on the armament issue.
At the same time they intimidate the Geimans by declar-
ing that any public endorsement by the German Government of a
military contribution would only precipitate war between East and
West and lead to inevitable destruction of all of Germany. It
is their contention that the critical period of survival is from
now up to 1953. Even if Germany agreed to create German divi-
sions, it would take at least two to three years before an army
fully equipped and able to resist any invasion would be ready
to fight. Consequently, it would be suicidal for Germany to
take any steps towards rearmament unless during the interim period
the Allies have in Germany armed forces in sufficient numbers
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so that they can withstand on. the Elbe line any invasion.
Indeed, this argument made quite a deep impression.
3. The large camp of veterans in Germany, of which
there are millions, is watching developments with the closest
interest. They have formed Veterans Organizations headed by
Nazi generals who are making irresponsible and aggressive
speeches. They arelittle interested, if at all, in becoming
part of Western Europe. In fact they have contempt for French
military leadership ahd little respect for England and feel
superior to any American combat solider. Unconditional surren-
der did not teach them any lesson. They are advocating a strong,
powerful and dominating Germany and look to the day of reestablish-
ing a unified country with boundaries as they existed in 1937. If
necessary this must be accomplished by force or threat of force.
Some of the leadingveterans are calling criminals and traitors
the Germans who conspired for the overthrow of Hitler and had to
make the supreme sacrifice in July 1944.
Thus, the appraisal of the German anti-Nazi underground
movement is coming to the forefront again. Unfortunately, those
who condemn the patriotic anti-Hitler Germans are more vocal than
those who put up a defense in favor of the persons who were convic-
ted by the German people's tribunal and hanged. This is a sad
drama to watch in present-day Germany.
Unquestionably, the resurgence of the power of the
Veterans Organizations is menacing and instills the good democrats
with fear and skepticism as to what the future will bring.
4. The number of persons who advocate a neutralized and
de-militarized Germany is relatively small. They wish to dis-
entangle Germany from any ties or alliance whether with the Eastern
or the Western World. They believe that Germany can be independent
and best survive if it is not involved in the East-West struggle.
It is their hope that Germany being centrally located, having 80
million people, and great economic resources and power may be destined
to play the role of umpire between the two World Powers. This move-
ment is headed by Pastor Niemoeller and Professor Nowak and the
former Minister of the Interior, Heinemann. The followers are
mainly Protestant and oppose the strong Catholic trend of Dr.Adenauer.
5. Pacifistic thinking is not much developed, much less than
after World WarI. In general the new generation which is not
politically minded, is anti-militaristic, against regimentation,
uniforms, parades and above all they are war-weary. Their urge
to live in peace is partly quite extreme. The well-knomhpolitical
leader, Carlo Schmid, once stated that it is better to live with
a healthy body in intact homes even though under s Soviet regime
rather than to lie with broken bones in cellars and trenches and
to sacrifice oneself for some nebulous belief of democratic freedom.
6. There is also a growing sentiment, which is now subconscious
but nevertheless strong, that any war in which a divided Germany
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becomes engaged is bound to be ,fratricidal. It is inevitable
that the Western Germans would have to fight and kill Germans
in the East and that, therefore, any war in which Germany takes ,
part on the side of the Allies must result in a civil war among
Germans. This perspective that Germans will have to shoot their
own countrymen is a great deterrent to any ready acceptance on
the part of Germany to make a military contribution.
I may add, it is often overlooked here that an agree-
ment made by the present German cabinet on this armament issue
would not be effective unless ratified by the Parliament. As
far as this ratification is concerned, it is debatable whether
a simple majority suffices. The basic principle of the new
German constitution was designed to be anti-military, therefore
the organization of any army even under Allied control is clearly
contrary to the fundamental theory reflected in the constitution.
In the circumstances, it would be unwise to ask the
Chancellor to sign an agreement on making a contribution to the
common defense unless one is assured that he has the necessary
support in the German Bundestag. This support depends entirely
upon Schumacher and his very large ?art .
November 2, 1951.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/31 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001700040005-6