PROPAGANDA EVIDENCES CONCERNING SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001800010011-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: April 30, 1952
• Content Type: MISC

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30 APRIL 1952
PROPAGANDA EVIDENCES CONCERNING
SINO-SOVIET RE1ATIO1
(An analysis of Soviet and Chinese comment on the 1951
and 1952 anniversaries of the Sino-Soviet treaty)
A detailed study of Chinese and Soviet press and radio propaganda
surrounding the 1951 and 1952 anniversaries of the Sino-Soviet
Treaty of Friendship.. Alliance, and Mutual Assistance suggests
that:
1. There are differences concerning Soviet aid to
China. The issue of Soviet aid is related to
the Korean war.
2. There appears to be a minor struggle to determine
China's status in the Communist orbit. The
evidence, however, does not point to the possibility
of a Chinese "Titoist break."
3. A divergence of interests is developing with regard
to Japan. (The evidence is less firm here than in
the preceding cases.)
4. Despite possible differences, the similarity in
volume and direction of Chinese and Soviet propa-
ganda indicates that relations have not deteriorated.
5. The Soviet Union is not making a concerted effort to
"woo" a disgruntled China.
6. Soviet broadcasts to China are clearly avoiding the
subject of Soviet advisors in China.
7. China is sensitive regarding the portrait of its
ideological role which is presented to the Chinese
people.
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GENERAL APPROACH
FDD-FBID have proceeded on the assumption that neither Soviet nor
Chinese propaganda would directly express annoyance or hostility to
or about each other. It was felt that some variations might appear
which would indirectly reflect the existence of difficulties between
the partners and which could not be explained away on the grounds
of propaganda techniques. (For example, it has been claimed that
Soviet failure to comment on the Far Eastern situation to the same
extent as China revealed difficulties between the two. The fact is,
however, that Moscow is habitually more general in its comments on
local situations than is the propaganda of the orbit state immediately
concerned, e.g. East Germany on Germany, the Satellites on Yugoslavia,
China on Southeast Asia, etc.) Therefore, FDD-FBID scrutinized the
appearance, deletion, and shifts in emphasis on the propaganda themes
used in the celebration of the Sino-Soviet anniversary in 1951 and 1952.
In the absence of firm objective intelligence on the nature and
direction of possible animosities between the Soviet Union and
China, two methods were used in examining the propaganda evidence
available:
1. The propaganda data was examined to see whether
any of the differences in propaganda emphasis
might suggest areas of disagreement.
2. The existence of differences was posited, propa-
ganda policies were deduced in the light of these
assumed differences (chiefly in terms of themes to
be emphasized or avoided), and then the propaganda
evidence was examined to see whether the patterns
observed supported or contradicted the propaganda
policies deduced.
FDD-FBID has attempted herewith not only to present the propaganda
"facts" but has also attempted to offer possible tentative explanations
of the observed differences. It was felt that the data would be more
valuable if the hypotheses and inferences were presented explicitly
? rather than implicitly. The observations made in this paper are drawn
from propaganda alone.
This report is given in four sections: Section I discusses possible
areas of discord suggested by the propaganda, Section II presents the
evidence suggesting harmonious relations, Section III outlines
deductively what propaganda elements would be present if the Soviets
were attempting to appease a disgruntled China and then examines the
evidence in the light of these assumptions, and finally Section IV
presents certain observations of general relevance to the subject of
Sino-Soviet relations.
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The following Tabs are appended:
Tab A: Outline of sample used and the quantitative
analysis techniques employed and the list of
categories.
Tab B: Chart presenting the quantitative data in
summary form.
CON FIIrIAL
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0 SECRET 0
SECTION I -- AREAS OF DISCORD
The propaganda behavior of Communist China and the Soviet Union gives
no indication of a general deterioration of relations between these
two states. There are indications, however, that several points of
friction may exist (at least as of February 1952) and that these
areas of difficulty primarily concern the interests of the Chinese
People's Republic.
1. There appear to be differences concerning Soviet
aid to China. The issue of aid is apparently
connected with the Korean war.
2. It seems possible that a struggle may be in
process over the delineation of Communist China's
status in the Communist world. This struggle
does not appear to be crucial at present; that
is, it does not appear to warrant predictions of
a "Titoist break."
3. There are indications of a possible clash of
interests regarding Japan, but the propaganda
evidence is less than in the preceding cases.
1. Indications of Differences Concerning Soviet Aid to China: The
most marked differences in Soviet and Chinese propaganda about the
anniversaries of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and
Mutual Assistance is related to Soviet aid to China. In 1951 Chinese
propaganda media gave somewhat more stress to this topic than did
Soviet media. Such propaganda behavior seems appropriate to a
situation in which a grateful China assumes the major burden of
publicizing the Soviet gesture.
In 1952, however, the situation was completely reversed. Chinese
sources sharply reduced their attention to Soviet aid, while the
Soviet media showed a marked rise in attention to the topic. The
shift appears more meaningful in view of the fact that the Sino-Soviet
patterns of attention to most of the other categories remained
approximately the same.
Another significant change in the propaganda pattern concerns attention
to "Western aggression." In 1951, both Chinese and Soviet media gave
major attention to this topic, Soviet sources giving it slightly
more stress. Again, such propaganda behavior seems appropriate to the
objective situation. Communist China was at war with the West in
Korea, and for the Soviet media to make bellicose charges against the
West in the same volume as China bespoke accord concerning the war
in Korea.
A year later, however, Soviet attention to Western aggression was
considerably less, while Chinese attention remained much as it was
in 1951. Paralleling this development, there was a decrease in
.CONFfL TIAL
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Soviet attention to Korea per se* while China maintained attention
to this area at about the same level as that of 1951.
Third, there was a sharp decline in the volume of both sides'
references to collaboration and cooperation. In 1951 both gave
considerable attention to this subject; this would seem to be an
appropriate propaganda reflection of harmonious relations between
the two. In 1952, both made significantly fever references to
this subject.
These appear to be the major differences in Communist Chinese and
Soviet propaganda which reflect a possible area of discord between
the two nations. In each case, there was a shift away from that
propaganda behavior which appeared most commensurate with mutually
satisfactory relations.
Assuming that the drain of the Korean war has been a major factor
contributing to China's need for aid, these propaganda developments
may be inter-related. The decrease of attention to Soviet aid in
the Chinese media, at a time when the Chinese audience most required
such assurance, may reflect Chinese dissatisfaction concerning aid.
General agreement in de-emphasizing the topic is precluded by the
increased Soviet attention. The increased Soviet attention to the
subject of aid suggests an attempt to appease Chinese dissatisfaction
and to compensate for the Chinese de-emphasis.
The drop in Soviet attention to Western aggression and to the Korean
war and continued Chinese attention to these subjects seems to
indicate a change of Soviet attitudes and tactics, which China,
because of its vital interests, did not wish to parallel. This
inferred difference of interests regarding Korea lends itself to a
logical construction of the propaganda picture--the Soviet audience
hears less about China's major problem, Korea, and more about Soviet
aid to China; the Chinese audience, on the other hand, still hears
a great deal about China's struggle in Korea, and much less about the
aid it is receiving.
It therefore appears that the simultaneous decrease in attention to
Sino-Soviet collaboration may be a consequence of the above two
developments, and may well be a reflection of fact: if differences
have arisen over Soviet aid, then collaboration, at least on these
points, has probably been reduced. Furthermore, since declarations
of collaboration and cooperation usually involve an issue to be
"collaborated on," it may be possible that both sides are reluctant
to be committed to the other on specific matters because of their
differing interests.
* It should be noted that there was a general decline in attention
to aggression charges and to the Korean war between the first quarter
of 1951 and the first quarter of 1952. It was not possible to
determine whether the anniversary propaganda was directly affected
by the general decline.
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2. Individualization and the Struggle for Status: Chinese media
show a distinct tendency to focus on China as opposed to focusing
on mutual relations). This individualization was developed at the
expense of references to China and the Soviet Union as acting in
concert or having similar or identical motives, purposes, or in-
tentions. It also occurred at the expense of individual references
to the Soviet Union. Specifically, the Chinese press and radio in
1952 talked more about China, less about the Soviet Union, and less
about the two together. The Soviet press and radio in 1952, on the
other hand, behaved as it did in 1951, maintaining and even
increasing slightly the generally high level of mutual references.
Soviet sources did show one marked change, however: there was a
sharp increase in the number of individual references to the Soviet
Union's contributions to China.
This tendency toward individualization and self-depiction evident
in the Chinese media coincides with the ever-enlarging role of
Communist China in world and orbit affairs, and as such, this co-
incidence may reflect the Chinese leaders' awareness of China's
world status. The only significant change in the Soviet media was
the increased attention to the Soviet Union itself. Therefore, it
appears that Soviet propaganda reacted to the drop in attention to
the USSR in the Chinese media by coupling an emphasis on the USSR
with its basic effort to identify the purposes and policies of the
two countries.
Although these developments suggest a Chinese effort to have China's
status defined in a satisfactory measure, there are qualifying
elements which suggest that this shift is a matter of "normal
politiking" between China and the Communist world and the Soviet
Union in particular. In other words, the qualifying evidence
contradicts the possibility that China's dissatisfaction is
sufficiently great that it would consider rapprochement with the
West as an alternative to decreasing its aspirations for intra-
orbit status. Specifically, Chinese media increase attention to
the theme that the Soviet Union is the "teacher" or source of guidance
for China. This increase is within a low numerical range, but exists,
nonetheless. Also, although Soviet sources showed a marked increase
of individual self-references, the level of individual references to
China was increased in 1952, and these, as in 1951, were concerned
with the achievements of Communist China. The fact that China pro-
motes the idea of Soviet leadership and guidance appears to modify
its struggle for status to a matter of"politiking'for position within
a range whose extremes are marked by satellite status and favored
lieutenant of the Soviet Union. The Soviet propaganda tributes to
China's successes indicate that the Soviet Union is certainly not
playing down China's role in the Communist camp. Also, the area of
harmony in the propaganda of both nations is of sufficient breadth
to suggest general accord.
3. The Difference in Attention to Japan: In 1951 both nations de-
voted considerable attention to Japan as a source of aggression in
the Far East. In 1952, on the other hand., there was a basic change
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in the pattern of attention to Japan. In 1951 Japan received
almost parallel attention from both Chinese and Soviet sources
and in 1952 both nations diminished attention to Japan. Soviet
attention declined more sharply with Chinese sources giving it
attention about four times as great as the Soviet media. One
factor accentuating this changed propaganda relationship is the
fact that in 1951 a campaign against Japanese rearmament was in
full swing on the Chinese mainland when the Sino-Soviet Pact
anniversary occurred. Therefore, some drop in attention to Japan
could be expected from Chinese media in 1952 when no such campaign
was in progress. But there is no such ready explanation for the
drop in Soviet attention to Japan. One factor which may be related
to the decreased Soviet attention was the Stalin message of friend-
ship to the Japanese people which was sent only a few weeks before
the Pact anniversary.
Attention to Japan, as recorded in this project, appears to be a
function of attention to the subject of aggression for the largest
single decrease of attention to Japan occurs in the aggression
category. Decreased Soviet attention to Japan and aggression in
the Japanese context, then, coincides with the over-all changes in
Soviet propaganda and the possible changes in attitude or tactics
which the propaganda changes may reflect.
But China's propaganda attention suggests no change of attitude
toward Japan. Therefore, it appears that Soviet attitudes or
tactics may diverge from the Chinese pattern. This in turn suggests
the possibility of a shift away from the compatibility which formerly
marked Sino-Soviet attitudes toward Japan.
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SECTION II -- EVIDENCES OF SINO-SOVIET ACCORD
While there is some propaganda evidence to suggest the above-
mentioned areas of discord in Sino-Soviet relations, the primary
characteristics of the comment suggest general accord between the
two nations. At least they do not indicate a state of general
discord between them. Both nations give comparable and high-level
attention to Sino-Soviet friendship. Chinese attention underwent
a slight decline, but remained at a high level, while Soviet
attention increased within a high-level range. The treatment of
strength, peaceful intent, and resistance to aggression was
basically the same in Soviet and Chinese propaganda in 1951 and
1952. More significant, perhaps, is the fact that China increased
attention to the leadership and guidance of the Soviet Union.
Also significant is the decline in the media of both nations of
references to equality.
Although the increased Chinese tendency toward individualization
suggests some friction stemming from China's desire for individual
status, the total pictureespecially the elements listed above-seems
to indicate basic agreement. This is substantiated by the Soviet
sources' endorsement of China's self-praise, that is, both sides
gave comparable, high-level attention to Chinese achievements. The
failure of China to sustain or increase references to the topic of
equality coincides with Soviet de-emphasis on this subject and
suggests, therefore, some measure of agreement between the two on
the exploitation of this significant theme.
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SECTION III -- THE DEDUCTIVE APPROACH
Because of the lack of time, this section will not attempt to out-
line all the major possible combinations of annoyance or accord
between the two partners. Rather, one particular situation has been
assumed for purposes of analysis and has been elaborated for
illustrative purposes. The situation chosen seemed at least as
plausible as others that might have been chosen.
On the purely hypothetical assumption that there were difficulties
between the USSR and China of a serious enough nature to be
reflected in the propaganda, an attempt has been made to posit how
the Soviet Union might alter its themes in order to appeal to its
partner. For this purpose, it is specifically assumed that the
Chinese Communists are annoyed with their Soviet partners and that
the latter are attempting to ameliorate this feeling.
1. Statements Which Moscow Might Play Down or Completely Ignore:
a. The USSR is the teacher, model or guide for China (in
order to avoid offending Chinese nationalist sentiments.)
While this category is low, it remains remark-
ably level with last year's attention. More-
over, in three elite sources* it has increased
slightly but consistently from 1950 through
1952. The absence of a decrease does not
suggest a Soviet desire to avoid the possibility
of offending its partner.
b. "Need" statements, namely, that Soviet backing of China is
a prerequisite to Chinese advance, current and historical.
While such claims are extremely infrequent
(less than 1%), there has been a slight
increase (although the difference is not
statistically significant.) In any event,
they do not disappear from Soviet output
entirely. In one case, however, a "need"
statement was edited out of a Home Service
commentary when the commentary was broadcast
in Mandarin. Again, the fact that Soviet
propaganda does not take pains to completely
eliminate these statements does not demonstrate
extreme sensitivity to Chinese feelings.
* A comparison was made of the same three sources--editorials in
PRAVDA, IZVESTIA, and LITERARY GAZETTE--over a three-year period,
thus including comment on the occasion of the signing of the
original pact. This allows a more reliable perspective on the
nature of the comment.
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c. Claims that the two powers' "interests"* are served by the
Pact (in order to avoid the implication that China's alliance
with the Soviet Union results from necessity rather than
choice.)
Soviet references to "interests" almost disappeared
in 1952, although they had been present (at a
very low level) in the previous two years. How-
ever, the importance of this seems diminished
by the fact that the equally infrequent Chinese
references to this category last year disappeared
entirely in 1952.
There is little evidence that Moscow appreciably
and in general played down Stalin as the
inspiration for Chinese successes as compared to
last year's anniversary. It is true, however,
that the effusive praise usually accorded him
in most contexts is generally lower in dis-
cussion of the USSR's relations with China.
And in at least one verified case there seems to
be a clear toning down of praise for Stalin.
This instance occurs in a commentary broadcast
both to the home audience and to China, both
versions of which are available. The version
heard by Russian listeners says (albeit quoting
a Chinese source): "'Every single one of our
achievements we owe to the Soviet Union and the
great Stalin."' In the Mandarin-language
version, this statement becomes "The Chinese
people are grateful for the just aid of the
USSR and voice their praise of Comrade Stalin."
* Soviet propaganda habitually avoids references to the "interests"
of the USSR, probably because most of its propaganda themes are framed
in "moral" rather than "pragmatic" terms. Moreover, references to
"interests" tend to suggest self-involvement; this is a picture that
Moscow avoids. (For example, the recent Soviet popular protest
meetings over bacterial warfare were only the third round of such
meetings since the war, as contrasted to innumerable Satellite
"protests."
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0 .
2. Statements Which Moscow Might Emphasize or Play Up:
a. Explicit references to "equality" (in order to reassure the
Chinese of their coordinate rather than subordinate role
in the Pact.)
The evidence on this point is negative. Total
references to equality decline in 1952.
Judging by the three editorials, attention to
this category was about the same in 1950 and
1951 but declined in 1952. Chinese references
to equality also declined in 1952. This seems
contrary to the presumption that they would
increase if the Chinese desired to remind the
USSR of China's coordinate rights.
b. Celebrations of the anniversary by the Soviet people (in
order to imply equality of the relationship)
There is some evidence suggesting that Radio
Moscow broadcast several programs in 1952--
apparently absent in 1951--which actually
described (rather than merely claiming the
occurrence of) anniversary celebrations in
Soviet cities. They were broadcast to the
Chinese people only. Thus on 15 February,
Moscow's Mandarin shows contained reports
describing anniversary celebrations,
exhibits of Chinese books in Moscow, Chinese
motion pictures shown, and lectures and
parties held in various parts of the USSR.
It might be added that these elements were
broadcast only in Mandarin, and that similar
celebration material is not usual in the
propaganda surrounding anniversaries with
other Satellites. The interjection of this
type of propaganda seems particularly
calculated to present a picture of a mutual
partnership.
c. Prrise for China's specific contributions to the USSR (in
order to defer to Chinese nationalism and prestige). The
manner in which the propaganda refers to Chinese-Soviet
relations can take three forms. For example, in discussing
collaboration, the propagandists can allude to mutual
collaboration, Soviet collaboration with China or vice
versa.
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While most of the references in both years are framed in
terms of mutual relationships (closely followed by the
Soviet-to-China relationship), it is at least plausible
that the smaller category of China-to-Soviet relation-
ship might increase in 1952, given a Soviet desire to
appeal to China.
An examination of the evidence, however, does
not reveal this to be the case. In fact in the
largest single category--Chinese achievements--
Soviet sources show no hesitancy in attributing
Chinese advances to Soviet help and inspiration.
Specific discussions of Chinese aid,* friendship,
collaboration and trade with the USSR show, if
anything, a slight decrease in 1952 as compared
with 1951.
Thus, there is no apparent effort by the USSR to
institute even a minimal appeal to Chinese pride.
d. Discussions of cultural relations, particularly from China to
the USSR. (Emphasis on the latter would represent a
gratuitous compliment to Chinese culture and its impact on
the USSR; presumably it would appeal to Chinese nationalism.)
Within the sample of material measured, Soviet
sources increased only slightly their references
to culture. On the specific issue of China's
cultural contributions to the USSR, there was
no increase during the second year. Rather,
there was an increase in the number of
acknowledgements of Soviet cultural contri-
butions to China. The 1952 increase was of
small magnitude however.**
An examination of the titles of the 1952 Soviet
broadcasts to China--not included in the sample
because they were unavailable in Washington--
would indicate that there was more stress on
culture this year than last. Although no firm
observation can be made as to the direction of
cultural flow, it is perhaps indicative that
Radio Moscow broadcast a program covering the
celebration of the anniversary by a group of
"Chinese actors now in the Soviet Union."
* Only five such references occurred, and then in a 1952 radio
commentary broadcast only in Mandarin.
** The PRAVDA editorials in both years are careful not to allude
to Soviet cultural contributions to China without immediately
alluding to contributions in the other direction.
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It is interesting that Chinese sources
gave some attention to both their own cultural
achievements and their own cultural impact on
Russia.; both were absent last year.
e. Praise for Chinese achievements (in order to appeal to Chinese
nationalism).
The evidence on this point favors the hypothesis
that the Soviets are gratuitously playing to
Chinese pride more this year than last.*
Not only does this category show an increase
but most of that increase reflects Soviet
statements about Chinese successes unrelated
to Soviet aid and guidance.
f. Praise of Mao (in order to appease wounded pride).
The propaganda gives no evidence that Mao is
singled out for even the mildest heroization.
Not only do the total number of references
remain small, but the manner in which Mao is
characterized remains restrained--thus the
PRAVDA editorial calls him "experienced" but
calls the Chinese Communist Party "glorious."
Not even in the comment beamed to China is
there any apparent effort to play up Mao.
3. Comparison of the Propaganda Evidence:
Assuming the correctness of the hypotheses postulated above, there
is no clear and consistent pattern suggesting a Soviet attempt
to appeal to a China which is clearly at odds with the Soviet Union.
While there is some data which could be interpreted as an attempt
to play up to Chinese sensibilities (by stressing Soviet celebrations,
Chinese cultural contributions to the USSR, and Chinese achievements),
no extreme avoidances of presumably more sensitive themes (Stalin,
interests, needs, and teacher) are noted this year.
* The chart in Tab B concerning the category of achievements shows a
broken line for Soviet references to the category in 1951. This was
done because one item in the sample--a single voice commentary broadcast
in Mandarin-contained such a large number of references to Chinese
achievements as to make it completely unrepresentative. A correction
made for this bias would reduce the incidence of this category to about
5.9%, indicated on the chart as a plus line.
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SECTION IV -- OTHER OBSERVATIONS
1. Soviet Sensitivity Displayed in Discussing "Advisors": There
is clear evidence that the Soviet radio is carefully avoiding the
whole question of Soviet experts in China in the commentaries it
beams to Chinese listeners. The evidence is based on the following
points:
a. On 7 February, Radio Moscow broadcast a commentary
by Vysokov, a PRAVDA correspondent in China. It
was broadcast to China and to the Soviet home
audience only; FBID was able to obtain both versions.
Whereas the Home Service version contained 13
allusions to the work of Soviet advisors in China
(more than a third of the entire commentary), the
version beamed to China contained only one such
reference. This marked reduction in emphasis does
not appear to be the result of mere chance editing.
b. Another commentary beamed to China gave very heavy
emphasis (over half) to the subject of Soviet aid
but completely avoided any references to Soviet
advisors. Most of the references to advisors which
did occur in the press and radio were made in the
context of aid, a fact which points up the omission
of advisors in this case.
c. The omission of allusions to advisors cannot be
explained on the ground that Soviet media generally
played the subject down, for a PRAVDA correspondent
in China devotes almost half of his article to
praising the assistance rendered China by Soviet
experts. This commentary, however, was beamed only to
two European Satellite audiences (of interest in it-
self, as Moscow rarely discusses its advisors there).
d. Almost all of the little comment on advisors occurs
in quotations from Chinese workers and newspapers.
While there is firm evidence that Soviet sources are sensitive on
the subject of advisors, the facts suggest that this sensitivity
results from a Soviet desire not to offend the Chinese people
rather than the Chinese leaders. While it is true that elite
sources (i.e. speeches by prominent leaders and major newspaper
editorials) on both sides allude to advisors a very few times,*
Chinese regional sources and secondary Soviet material do not
demonstrate anything like an extreme avoidance of the subject.
Assuming the subject was a sore point with Chinese leaders, it might
be expected that Soviet leaders would eliminate virtually all refer-
ences to advisors from all of their propaganda. This they have
done only in their Mandarin-language broadcasts.
* It is plausible to expect that these sources, which receive greater
international attention than does routine local propaganda, would lean
over backwards to avoid any implication that the USSR dominates China
via-its "experts."
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2. Chinefie Sensitivity Concerning its Ideological Role: There is
some indication that the Communist Chinese elite is sensitive about
the depiction of its role in the ideological framework of Communism.
FBID was able to obtain two versions of a 1951 Peking commentary on
the dissemination of ideological literature in Sinkiang, one in
English Morse to North America and one in Chinese Numeral Code to the
Chinese press. In the version beamed to the West, reference was
made to the dissemination of the works of "Marx, Engels, Lenin and
Stalin." In the version directed to the Chinese audience, Peking
changed the passage to include "Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao s -
tung,and Liu Shao-chi. "
This differentiation in the text of the same commentary, released by
the same source, NCNA, appears to be more than happenstance. This
occurence suggests a desire on the part of the Chinese radio to
strengthen the prestige of Communist Chinese ideological development
in the eyes of the Chinese public by presenting it on a par with
traditional Communist ideology.
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-i- Tab A
PROPOSED ANALYSIS OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
The analytical method employed in attempting to determine the state of re-
lations existing between the Soviet Union and Communist China takes into
consideration what (content) is said by these two nations (communicators
about each other (actors) or about significant issues or areas (contexts)
on the occasion of Sino-Soviet Pact anniversaries (events), and also w mu
(quantity) these factors appear in content directed to specific audiences.
In order to gather such information and to group it into meaningful patterns
it is proposed that the analysis should include the recording of all means
units (each idea represented in a sentence by a subject and predicate) con-
tained in the sample of text materials which fall into one of the categories
of content listed below.
I. Sam le: The sample will include press materials from leading newspapers
and periodicals of China and the Soviet Union. Insofar as possible, the
same newspapers and periodicals will be compared for the different years
as will be speeches and articles by the same personages. Similar treat-
ment will be afforded to broadcast materials, although analysis of the
beaming of rebroadcasts to different audiences will be limited since
most of this information is unavailable. (Such information, however, can
be obtained for future periods if there is advance planning in sample
selection.)
II. Categories of Content:
Collaboration: Statements of mutual endeavor or agreement and statements
of one's support for the other. Such statements are commitments of support.
ExamT)le: "We cooperate with each other"; "The USSR has steadfastly
upheld China's right to sit in the U.N." (cooperation, support, unity,
solidarity; not concrete aid, trade, etc.)
Possible Significance: If China were annoyed at the USSR, it would not
emphasize Soviet support of China, while the USSR, if attempting to
ease friction, would emphasize its support of China. If the Soviets
were reluctant to enter the Far East conflict, the USSR would not
emphasize mutual collaboration in.-military matters, while China
might go ahead and do so to appear strong before its opponents.
(Other information would be derived from considering to whom such
statements are directed, concerning what areas, etc.)
Teacher: Acknowledgments by one (primarily China) that the other is a
guide or leader. Implicitly acknowledges different levels of status.
Presence indicates that nationalistic considerations are subordinate.
xam le: "The USSR is a model for China"; "China learns from the
USSR" (model, learn, teach, use experience of, etc.)
Possible Significance: China would not be expected to emphasize
Soviet superior knowledge or progress if China were dissatisfied
with the USSR. The USSR would not be expected to remind China of
the Soviets' teacher status if amiable relations were such that
China itself emphasized this line.
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-ii- Tab A continued
Equality: Somewhat counter to the "teacher" category. Declarations of
equality in status, relations, dealings or treatment. Implicit denial
of different levels of status. Presence suggests consideration of
nationalistic factors. Code only explicit references.
Example: "Our relations are an example of true equality"; not:
"The October Revolution and the Chinese People's Revolution were
two great forces affecting world history."
Possible Significance: This category, even more than the others,
is meaningful when t changes. It is difficult to postulate a
high or low volume of references, so that shifts in volume of
this category when related to the volume of "teacher" references
would indicate a changing degree of sensitivity to status in the
Communist orbit.
Friendship: Explicit declarations of friendship. Absence or decreased
volume mi' ht indicate annoyance, or preoccupation with a contrary way
of discussing Sino-Soviet relations (e.g. in terms of national interests).
Example: "Sino-Soviet friendship grows each day"; "Chinese friend-
ship for Soviet people" (love, sympathy, affection, etc.).
Possible Significance: If China is displeased at the Soviet Union,
will decrease a number of friendship references, especially
in comment directed to rural China.
Interests: Statements referring to the interests of China and/or the
ovi$ et union. (Not characteristic of Communist propaganda.) Implies a
different and probably a greater effort to sell a point. Somewhat of
a counterpart to "friendship," though it may be purely a supplement to
"friendship." Code only references where interests is clearly the
central point.
Example: "It is in China's interest to have Soviet friendship";
'C h gains from trade with the USSR."
Possible Significance: If China emphasizes its own interests when
Talking oo _ nno o iet relations to its own people, then there is
suggested a serious effort to convince its audience of desirability
of Sino-Soviet collusion. The effort suggests a resistance that
must be overcome. If it talks in terms of mutual interests, then
there is still the suggestion of an effort to convince. If it
talks in terms of friendship, without emphasis on interests, then
there is apparently no serious resistance to be met by propaganda.
Aid: Statements pertaining to the rendering of concrete aid, one to the
osier, or mutual. Explicit statements of aid have implications of
obligation. Reluctance to emphasize aid suggests a reluctance to emphasize
ensuing obligations.
Example:
General Aid: "We have received great assistance from the USSR."
Equipment (and raw materials): "China has sent cotton to the
USSR"; "Soviet tractors have arrived in China."
Advisors: (Closely akin to teacher, but actual presence of
advisors or experts seem to make this a form of
aid) "Soviet advisors help us."
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-iii- Tab A continued
Possible Significance: If China is dissatisfied at the amount of
Soviet aid, it will not publicize what Soviet aid is forthcoming.
If the Soviets are annoyed at Chinese increased demands, or want to
alleviate Chinese avoidance of this issue, they will emphasize
Soviet aid to China, especially in content directed~to Chinese
audiences.
Trade: Explicit references to trade either with each other or with other
nations. This is an important concrete type of relation between the two
nations Which may reflect to a considerable degree the state of political
relations between the two.
Example: "The exchange of goods between China and the Soviet
Union has expepded"; "the trade ties between Japan and China...."
Possible Significance: If the Soviets are unable to supply China
with appreciable amounts )f required goods, then an increasing
number of references to trade with other nations might well be
expected from Chinese sources, especially in content directed to
external audiences. Soviet media on the other hand might well
underplay this subject with references only to the interflow of
available goods.
Achievements: Positive statements referring-to the successes and achieve-
ments of themselves or the other. Praise for the other is a declaration
of good relations, implying support. Maybe a category where one nation
would attempt to "woo" the other, thus implying a current state of dis-
pleasure on the part of the other. Self-praise has implications of nation-
alism and the-necessity of standing alone on certain issues.
Example: "The Chinese economy is flourishing"; "the elimination
of corruption has paved the way for production successes."
Possible Significance: If China were displeased at the amount of
Soviet aid forthcoming, the USSR might praise the Chinese for their
reconstruction successes. China would probably compensate for the
dearth of aid by stressing its own successes.
If China were pleased with the Soviets, it would emphasize Soviet
achievements. The Soviets would probably divide attention between
their own achievements and those of China.
General Strength: References to the might of either, including those to the
might of the Pact. Declarations of mutual strength are testimonials of
united opposition to the enemy, and in this sense are commitments by one
of the other. Most of the implications of the category "achievements"
apply here.
~Zamplg: "The Sino-Soviet Treaty is a bastion of strength"; the
power of 700 million people..."; "China defeated America in Korea."
Possible Significance: If both are in accord on combined opposition
to or aggression against the enemy, both will stress mutual strength.
JU one is reluctant in this regard it will stress the strength of the
other, while the less reluctant one will stress mutual strength with
its entailed commitment of the other.
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-iv- Tab A continued
Military Strength: Explicit references to the military strength of
either or both; the military aspects of the Alliance.
Example: "The Chinese People's Volunteers will surely
defeat the aggressors"; "the Soviet and Chinese Armies are
the most formidable in the world."
Possible Significance: Similar to "general strength,"
but of greater import because of explicit military context.
Culture: Statements pertaining to the influences or development of
culture; movement of cultural delegations; cultural displays (movies,
books, etc.). This might well be another category where one of the
nations would seek to alleviate the annoyance of the other by inter-
jecting praises and declarations of support (neglected in other
categories) in the cultural sphere. The treatment of the subject
of culture may well be governed by nationalistic sentiments and as
such may reflect objective deterrents to closer Sino-Soviet ties.
Example: "The Soviet people are enthusiastic about learning
the Chinese language"; "a Chinese cultural delegation arrived
in Moscow"; "the Soviet Union can profit from the study of
Chinese literature."
Possible Significance: If China is annoyed, it will avoid
stressing Soviet cultural achievements, and USSR will emphasize
Chinese culture to "woo" China. Both will avoid if there is
much Chinese sensitivity.
Resistance-to-Aggression: Declarations of-steadfastness or resolve
to resist aggression (the explicit reference to aggression must
be made). Major importance of this category lies in the fact that
it focuses attention on areas and issues. These attention points
we must know.
Example: "The Pact provides that both parties will resist
the remilitarization of Japan"; "China is resolved to prevent
an extension of the Korean War by the Americans."
Possible Significance: If both nations are in accord on
measures to be taken in given areas, both will probably
commit the other (in references of mutual resolve, etc.) to
resist aggression in that area. If one is reluctant, it will
refrain from making this type of comment in terms of that
area. If one is adamant against being involved in a given
area or on a given issue, it may force the other to also
refrain from making mutual commitments regarding the issue
or area at stake. Thus, one nation will probably avoid
stressing the issue, while the other's comment will commit
only itself.
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Tab A continued
Warnings: A particularized and intense sub-category of "resistance-
o-aggression."
Ugression: The actual charges that the United States and/or one of
its cohorts intends to aggress against either or both China and the
Soviet Union or elsewhere. This category serves pretty much the same
purpose as "resistance-to-aggression," i.e. focuses attention on
areas and issues, and also is most meaningful in terms of who is
aggressing against whoa.
Example: "The United States is planning to attack China and the
So Union."
Peaceful Intent: Declarations by either or both nations that they
do not intend to aggress nor desire to aggress; that they seek peaceful
coexistence; that it is known that they do not intend to aggress, etc.
Example: "China does not want war with any country"; "It is well
that the United States lies when it says that China intends
to intervene in Vietnam."
NOT: "China wants peace"; "The Soviet Union is a bulwark of
peace"; "China and the Soviet Union work for peace"; "China has
acquired 300,000,000 signatures to the peace appeal."
Possible Significance: If China were to stress its peaceful
intent by en ng Its aggressive intent while the USSR stressed
Western Aggression and not declarations of Soviet and/or Chinese
peaceful intent, it might well indicate that China and the USSR
did not see eye to eye on the subject of future aggressive
measures. This category, however, will probably take on most
meaning from its relation to the pattern revealed by attention
given to the other categories. This is true of all, these
categories, but more especially of "peaceful intent" Which will
be more valuable after the other categories have been analyzed.
III. Contexts and Characterizations: In addition to determining what
Communist C ina and the Soviet non say which might throw light on
the state of relations existing between them, it is essential that
]gyr they say these things be noted. When they charge the United
States with planning aggression, do they both cite the same locale
for the intended aggression? Do they do so consistently and with the
same amount of emphasis? When either speaks of Mao Tse-tung or
Stalin, do they do so in the same fashion, attributing similar
characteristics to these Communist leaders and affording them similar
praises? Are they consistent in this? Do they speak of Mao regularly
when they speak of Soviet aid, or does this usually occur when the
topic of discussion is the achievements of China?
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Tab A continued
Such questions essentially ask, "what are the contexts in which the
contentions (categories) occur and in what manner are these
contentions presented?" To answer this question requires that
notations be made of those contentions which are presented in such
a fashion or context as to contribute to their meaning. Therefore,
the following contexts and characterization categories are proposed
to determine the focus of attention of each of the sources, and also
to record some of the significant manners in which the content is
presented.
Contexts Characterizations
Treaty Provisions Mao, Stalin
Collateral Agreements (loan, Dairen, etc.) Need (e.g. Chinese success
Korean War depended on Soviet aid)
United Nations Chinese Admission) Obligations (parties to
United Nations Embargo) Pact must support Japanese
Ideological October Revolution, etc.) resistance)
Kuomintang Chiang, Taiwan, etc.) Gratitude (Chinese grateful
Areas Burma, Japan, Hong Kong, etc.) ,for aid)
IV. Actor Relations: If an article in a Chinese newspaper contends
that China is grateful for Soviet aid, then under the precedure
guiding this analysis it would be recorded that a Chinese source made
reference to the subject of "aid." But much more than this simple
relation of a source to a topic would be noted, for the content itself
contained reference to the sources under study (China and the Soviet
Union). Such references in the content itself to nations or symbols
for nations are termed references to "actors." For example, if the
contention is made that "China will resist American aggression,"
two actors are involved: China and America. Just as sources of
content are noted to record who makes the contentions; and just as the
audiences are noted to record to whom the contentions are directed; so
the actors in a contention are noted in order to record ]Lho is said to be
doing what to whom.
It is apparent that what nations are spoken about in any contention vitally
affects the meaning of that contention, for it is here that the source's
description of the state of relations existing between the various nations
under study is found. For example, if China frequently refers to joint
Chinese and Soviet resolve to resist aggression in Vietnam, while the USSR
consistently alludes only to Chinese steadfastness on this issue, then there
is an apparent effort on the part of China to present a united show of
strength on Vietnam, and an apparent reluctance on the part of the Soviets
to become involved in this issue.
It may be inferred, then, that the concentration of references to joint
endeavors on the part of China and the Soviet Union, and references to the
individual actions of each, may vary considerably with each source, and
when these differences are related to the issues and categories involved,
there may well be reflected facets of the relations existing between the two
countries.
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-vii- Tab A continued
V. Conclusion: Since the state of relations between China and the
Soviet Union cannot be assessed for any given period, there is no
precedent for relating propaganda to this problem. Therefore, there
is no alternative but to postulate the propaganda conditions for
assumed states of relations between the two countries. This operation
is now in progress. For the purposes of this analysis, three basic
characterizations of the relations between China and the USSR have
been assumed: excellent, poor, and a middle ground, called "normal."
It is further assumed that either country may consider that relations
are characterized by any one of the three conditions. This leaves
nine alternative states of relations existing between China and the
USSR. (The USSR may feel that relations are excellent, while China is
dissatisfied; both may feel that relations are poor, etc.)
Until "norms" of propaganda behavior (in terms of the categories,
contexts, etc. of this analysis) can be established over a period of
time, the chances are poor for ascertaining any but the more extreme
conditions. However, the analysis of what is said by China and the
USSR to whom, in what context, and in what manner in the propaganda
surrounding the Sino-Soviet Pact anniversaries should contribute in
some measure to determining the existing state of relations between the
two and should have an excellent chance of revealing the more extreme
changes in the condition of relations between them.
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-i-
e 2~
Achi
ev
merits
4-
12"
Friend-
ship 4
12
Peaceful
Intent
Aggr.
4%?---
12%-
Teacher
4%-
Propaganda on the Sino-Soviet Treaty Anniversaries
1
Resistance
to Aggr.
4%
0
12f
4%
12%
4%+~
12%
Enemy
Weakness
1
Equality
12%
124
General
Stren
th
Warnin
s
g
g
4%
4%
12%
12%
Military
Interests
Strength 4%
4%
*See footnote on page 13.
TAB B
LEGEND: Soviet Propaganda
Chinese Propaganda-
4%
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0 ?
Propaganda on the Sino-Soviet Treaty Anniversaries
CONTEXT CATEGORIES
151
'52
4%-
Taiwan
the KMT
% -
h-
4
Japan
4%
Pact
Provisions
4%
Collateral
Agreements
Embargo
4%
4%
TAB B, Cont.
LEGEND: Soviet Propaganda
Chinese Propaganda - - - --
SECRET
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