ANALYSIS OF THE SCALE AND NATURE OF SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMED FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: August 17, 1951
• Content Type: MEMO

t
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18:
CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3 kAITTAI Qi ID
IIAMI1Jr11 I I MI- J1.11
DATE
)114.
UILDING
REMARKS:
ROOM NO
FROM:
Oaf
BUILDING
1ROOM NO.
EXTENSION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18:
CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
5P7 s'7,7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050E3?'-3
rr.f.DP S REr_
STANDARD FORM NO. 64
Office Memoran
TO OCI, CIA
FROM :
SUBJECT:
11M ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Attn: Mr. Paul Borel DATE:
17 August 1951
Chief, Special Research Branch, PD, G-2
Analysis of the Scale and Nature of Soviet Military
Assistance to the Chinese Communist Armed Forces
Attached are ten copies of a study dated 17 August 1951, subject as above,
which was prepared by 0-2 in Co-ordination with Navy, Air, JIG and CIA, at the
request of IAC.
.BAKER
Co Onel, GSC
Chief, SIDE=ar7h Branch, G-2
NO CHI:INGE IN CLASS.
0 DECLASSIFI7D
VIEW DATE:
'..'FIANGED TO: TS S c
TOP -IR 70-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A00190005002-3.-3
9 50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
(4. j..%.".&- - 1
STANDARD FORM NO. 64
Office Memor dum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO
:
OCI, CIA
Attn: Mr. Paul Borel DATE: 17 August 1951 50X1
FROM
:
Chief, Special
Research Branch,
ED, G-2
SUBJECT:
Analysis of the Scale and Nature of Soviet Military
Assistance to the Chinese Communist Armed Forces
Attached are ten copies of a study dated 17 August 1951, subject as above,
which was prepared by 1G2 in coordination with Navy, Air, JIG and CIA, at the
request of IAC.
'JOSEPH E. BAKER
Colonel, USC
Chief, Special Research Branch, 0-2
50X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/01/18 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
50X
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
?c?) I l).Elt.V.A.)
Copy No.
Auth. by AC of S, G-2
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE AC OF S, q-2
INTELLIGENCE
Date: 17 August 1951
ANALYSIS . OF THL SCALE AND NATURE
OF
SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TO THE--
CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMEDFORIEp
s ermined ihal
w of this docontont by CIA has
0. CIA has no objection to declass
ye. II coclains information of CIA
? interest that must remain
cinssitied at TS
Authority: HA
Ej It contains nothing of CIA infers
oti? 1.1419,444 Eszissw
NOTE:-This document is to be read only by United States personnel
officially indoctrinated and authorized to receive the information re-
ported herein.
50X1
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence
Department of the Army
? Washington, D. C.
DeettivnITM
N.,.
ticivewlievewVITIT,
50X1
-1,..r4WINIP4rmarrtrrt
C 12 I--. iwommonoollmm
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A0019000500233(1)(1
U504-Z1id k...1 rd I
ANALYSIS OF THE SCALE AND NATURE OF SOVIET
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMED FORCES
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:
To prepare a study on the scale and nature of Soviet
personnel: logistical and economic support to the Chinese
Communist Armed Forces.
FACT$ BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:
1. The Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Government
are parties to a treaty of mutual friendship and assistance,
dated 14 Feb 50: the military terms of which have not been
revealed.
2. Sovi t military advis rs in considerable numbers have
been identified in all areas of China since the conclusion of
the treaty and have been active in many areas of China
than one year.
3. On the extent of Soviet assistance to the Chinese
Communists in Korea
limited evidence.
4. There has been more evidence from all sources
for more
50X1
only
which
indicates that substantial Soviet assistance has been given to
the Chin se Communists in China and particularly in Manchuria.
CONCLUSIONS:
1., Although Soviet military and economic aid to Communist
China increased notably after the Chinese Communists entered
the Korean conflict: the amounts noted do not indicate that
Soviet aid has been of a magnitude sufficient for the Chinese
to fight a full-scale prolonged war. Soviet over-all aid to
Communist China in the past year appears designed for long-range
development and is primarily concerned with bolstering the
Chinese Communist economy with essentials unobtainable elsewhere.
0-1-1 (1 T1 017?-3 1G? rT1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
5nxi
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
7*- ? 1 WV 3.U.l.4.1ttr..
? 2. The known logistical support given the Chinese
Communists undoubtedly represents only a portion of the whole
the actual magnitude of Soviet support is unknown. The Chinese
are being required to pay for a substantial percentage of this
logistical assistance, primarily through barter agreements.
3. No insurmountable difficulties for the USSR in supplying
the present scale of aid to the Chinese Communists have been
nor are the
apparent
Soviets and her Satellites the sole suppliers.
4. For at least the past year, a part of the Chinese
Communist Armed Forces have ben undergoing a modernization,
re-equipping and retraining program under Soviet jurisdiction,
principally in Manchuria.' This program appears to be designed
to bring the combat efficiency of the Chinese Communist ground
forces up to the relatively high level hich existed in the
North Korean forces prior to the outbreak of the Korean war,
and, in addition, to provide the Chinese Communists with a
commensurate air force.
5. The Chinese Communist armies that have been committed
in Korea to date have not been the recipients of this retraining
and re-equipping, nor have they had the benefit of full air
support.
6. There is no firm evidence to substantiate the existence
of an International Volunteer Force as a new and separate military
body, distinguished fram, those forces now in the Korean-Manchurian
area.
50X1
DISCUSSION:
I. SIM-SOVIET MILITARY AGREEMENTS
Since the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet treaty
and mutual alliance
there have been many accounts of uncertain reliability
of
friendship
concerning
the xistence of secret military agreements between the Soviets
50X1
2
? 50X1
PTI t-N, T1 C4 T7 T") rrrM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3X1
riIUJJiaA1tI1I1
and Chinese Communists. There is no concrete information
cone rning the t rms, but the reports provide information on
the purported nature and provisions of the agreements.
A. Ground Forces
Available evidence suggests that the Soviets have
undertake considerable responsibility for the modernization
of the Chinese Communist forces.
alleges that the Sino-Soviet
50X1
plan stipulates that approximately 50 Chinese divisions -are
to be train ;d and equipped by the Soviets, while another claims
that the Chinese Communist forces will eventually be reorganized
to include an elite combat force of 30 divisions for tactical
operations* 30 divisions for coastal defense and 50 divisions
to maintain internal security. To implement this latter program,
it is alleged that the Soviets will supply medium and light
tanks to equip 10 tank regiments.
It has also been alleged that th Soviets have agreed
to train' and equip 20 armored divisions; and another report
states that the Sovi ts will assist in the training of, and
provide arms for, 24 infantry divisions, 2 tank divisions and
1 paratroop division of Chinese troops.
an
50X1
50X1
agreement was reached on 1 Oct 50 to supplement the Sino-Soviet
treaty of February 1950. In substance this agreement allegedly
provides that the Chinese will maint in 405000000 combat troops
in their field armies, plus a reserve of 70000,000 troops, with
all field armi s following the org nization of the Soviet Army.
Weapons, ammunition and equipment are to be furnished by the
USSR. The re-equipping of the 4,500,000 field forces is to be
completed in three 3-month increments by 31 July 51.
B. Air Forces
it appears that the
basic agreements for Soviet aid to the-CCAF were prescribed in
3
50X1
50X1
rT-I el T1 CI 1117 !-`1 T1 17 r1-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
cnX1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
IUIhJi1.Jtt1I
the Mao-Stalin Pact of February 1950 and further clarified
or augmented in November of that year. The most important
provisions of the original pact apparently were: (1) The
Chinese were to assign air bases in Northeast and North China
to the USSR; (2) the USSR agreed initially to supply up to 800
aircraft, including 300 fighters, 140 ground attack, 100 light
bombers and 260 transport and reconnaissance types; (3) the ,CCAF
was to be reorganized with a Chinese commander but with Soviet
advisers to occupy the key staff positions; (14) Soviet technical
advisers should be invited to aid the CCAF.
Major provisions of the November agreement are reported
to have been: (1) The USSR was to provide and maintain 770
aircraft, including 200 jets, during the period November 1950 -
July 1951; (2) Soviet personnel were to pilot the aircraft
until a sufficient number of Chinese pilots were available;
(3) the USSR w s to provide the Chinese with all equipment and
technical personnel as required in the construction of military
bases and airfields; (4) the Soviet Air Force was permitted to
use any airfield in China.
In addition, numerous unconfirmed reports have been
received indicating that supplementary military agreements have
probably been reached between the Soviet Union and Communist
China. The principal common features of these reports are:
(a) d Soviet plan to provide substantially increased assistance
to the CCAF -- reports have mentioned figures up to 3,000
aircraft; (b) a plan for Chinese Communist participation in
Southeast Asian hostilities particularly in Indo-China -- with
Soviet logistical support; and (c) a provision that personnel
and materi1.1 obligations be completed by some time in the
(.7) summer of 1951.
Developments since these agreements have generally
appeared to conform to the terms listed above with a few
4
50X1
? rri TI 11T4
_Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
cnX1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
1 WV 3
exceptions, to wit: There has been no indication of the subju-
gation of the Chinese to an over-all Communist force; to date,
the Chinese have only an estimated 74 Soviet transports; there
is some evidence that Chinese Communists are being trained to
operate jet aircraft, although the subordination of the jets
is undetermined.
C. Naval Forces
reports of Sino-Soviet
agreements relating to the transfer of vessels from the Soviet
to the Chinese Communist Navy. The fact that the Chinese have
received Soviet small craft suggests that formal agreements have
been concluded, but reliable details are not available.
II. DEFICIENCIES OF THE CCF
A. Ground Forces
In general, the Chinese Communist Forces have been
composed of a heterogeneous assortment, of fi ld organizations
with no consistent standardization in TO&E. The average Chinese
Communist division numbers approximately 10,000 men and is armed
principally with small arms of varying type and manufacture and
an insignificant number of artillery pieces and armored vehicles.
The multiplicity of artillery and infantry weapons of
diverse origins, models and c libers in the hands of the CCF in
Korea creates complex logistical problems. Their artillery has
ben insufficient in quantity, and armored vehicles have been
conspicuous by their absence. CCF units in contact with UN
forces have also lacked technical and heavy equipment, particularly
engineer construction and bridging equipment, and signal communi-
,
cations equipment in lower echelons. Shortage of motor transport
in field units has also resulted in maldistribution of vital
supplies.
The Chinese Communist munitions industry cannot produce
aircraft, motor vehicles, heavy artillery and other heavy and
50X1
5
?
50X1
PT1 (1 T1 U 1'4 U r1-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A0019000500233-0
7 A
IUI)FAKI11
technical materiel employed by modern armies. Mortar and
artillery shell production in 1950 is estimated at only 5,000
rounds per day. Small arms ammuniti9n production in early 1951
was at a rate which provided only 5 cartridges per d y for
each soldier in Korea. Three-fourths of the 160000 tons of
copper required for even this small production had to be imported.
50
X1
B. Air Forc
The CCAF would be deficient in all the requirements
of an air force and would be practically non-existent without
Soviet aid. The following deficiencies are confirmed: There
are no aircraft or aircraft supporting industries in China;
there is relatively little indigenous production of POL in
China; there is a short ge of trained pilots and technicians;
with the exception of the Nationalist defectors and personn I
engaged in present operations, there ar no combat- xperienced
air crews; the Chinese Co munists do not have the personnel or
facilities to train their personnel without outside assistance.
Despite Soviet assistance, th principal air facilities
of the CCAF are vulnerable to int nsive and sustained air attacks
by UN aircraft. The radar, fighter and antiaircraft defense
systems as now developed by the Chinese Communists for the
protection of their principal air facilities probably would not
be capable of effectively interfering with all-out intensive
and sustained UN air attacks.
C. Naval Forces
Chinese Communist naval forces are presumed to be
deficient in number of ships, types of ships, training and
6
50X1
ri-cm Ci T7 e--1 T1 T7 r174
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/01/18 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
1. . kJ 14) 3 ta ,4 r.
experience.
report
that small numb r of coastal frigates and gunboats are'
possibly operational. The Chinese Communist Merchant Fleet
is currently operating a number of LSM2s, LSTs and LCIls which
are subject to recall by th Navy at any time and have been
placed under Navy operation at various times in the past.
A few naval auxiliaries are also believed to be operational.
III. SOVIET PERSONNEL ASSISTANCE TO CCF
A. Militan
1. Ground Force Advisers
indicate that approximately
5,000 Soviet dvisers" made their appearance in China within
60 days after the Sino-Soviet conference was concluded in
F bruary 1950. At present, it is estimated that at least 10,000
Soviet "advisers" are assisting the Chinese'. Communists in the
military field alone, plus numerous others in economic, medical
and governmental activities, as well as the Chinese counterpart
of the Soviet Ministry of State Security (MGB).
The entire advisory commission has been variously
reported to be directed by either the Soviet Ambassador to
North Korea, Col Gen T. F. Shtikov, or by Lt Gen Kuzma Derevyanko,
the Chief of the Military Advisory Group in China. It is
considered quite probable that both officers are directly
connected with the Soviet assistance program, to the CCF. It is
also reported that Marshal Malinovski, who is known to command
all USSR Forces in the Soviet Far East, also acts as the over-all
commander of Soviet activities in Korea and China.
Various reports state that an advisory group of
varying size is attached to each Chinese Communist Field Army.
there are 800 advisers attached to the
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
rTi (1 T1 C e'4 T1 1D r11-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3 X1
I VA? k_.1:41i..td 1
4th Field Army. Each group has a group chief and three
sections: a General Staff section, a technical section, and a
training section. Members of ?ach group are assigned as
instructors in subordinate units.
5,000 Soviets arrived in Hunan
to train Chinese Communists.
Soviet personnel are reported
50X1
50X1
Province
50X1
to be in command of paratroop training in Chiamussu, Hainan,
Kaifeng, Kweiyang and Tientsin. Soviet specialists and
numerous Soviet-trained Chinese personnel are reported at
chemical warfare schools at Changchun and Tangshan, and Soviet
radar instructors at the naval training establishm nt, Tsingtao,
and the government radar school, Changchun. The Tunghua,
Manchuria, engineer school was organiz?d jointly by the 'Soviets
and Chinese in 1945 with a Soviet-trained staff of Koreans and
Chinese.
2. Air Force Advisers
report that Soviet personnel
hem been utilized in every phase of development of the CCAF.
Military advisers reportedly occupy the key jobs at all echelons.
Within Headquarters CCAF, it is believed that while Liu Ya-Lou is
nominally Commander-in-Chief, in actuality Soviet advisers
(.7) control the CAF by occupying the offices of deputy commander:
chief of staff, and heads of the departments controlling plans,
operations and training. The same situation prey ils within
8
50X1
50X1
50X1
r1-4 fl T1 II:, /^I r111-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
fl)(1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
IJ11KJi11.
? :fp
0
the tactical units, thus giving control of the CAF to the
Soviets. Training at all air force schwas is believed-to
be supervised by Soviet officers and a large portion of the
instructors are believed to be Soviet. Throughout China,
Soviet technicians are engaged in and are believed to control
airfi ld construction, assembly of aircraft, installation and
maintenance of communications and radar, and other phases of
logistical support.
the Chinese Communist Air
Force is Soviet trained and equipped.
50X1
50X1
50X
3. Naval Forces Advisers
50X1
9
50X1
rT1 el T1 Ci /"I T1 17 rTI
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A00190005002-31
1 UV Nt.1:41t.t. 1
It is reported that
the organization 'of the Soviet advisory group parallels that
of the Chinese Communist Navy on down to the lower echelons.
Direct Soviet participation is prevalent in the Chinese Communist
50X1
naval training program. It has been reported 50X1
that the instructors, corps of the naval school at
Tsingtao is compos d entirely of Soviets.
While it is apparent that virtually all Chinese
Communist naval training is conducted or supervised by the
Soviets, there is no direct evidence that the over-all training
program is Soviet financed.
B. Technical
information shows
that Soviet technical specialists are active in the following
fields:' telecommunications, administration, municipal govern,
ment, industry, transportation and construction of installations,
such as airfields, air defense facilities, shipbuilding
facilities, repair and maintenance depots and naval bases. The
exact extent and nature of Soviet fforts to provide technical
advisers cannot be definitely determined, but the scope of such
,activity is believed, to be quite considerable.
50X1
50X1
50X1
10
50X1
rT-4 (1 T1 Ci /9"-'1 T1 T7 r11-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
IUi I?&KI?1
50X1
C. Direct Soviet Partici ation n the Combat Oper tions
of CCF
Since the beginning of the Korean War: there has been
an inoreasing number
reports of uncertain
reliability concerning the presence of Soviet ground units in
China. An examination of the accumulated evidence provided by
these reports suggests principally a probable increase in the
number of Soviet military advisers in all Chinese headquarters
11
50X1
50X1
rlri el 71 Cl e'N T1 rirl
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-31
1 k/ iti.) _CA) /C.V.. I
ad major units. In addition, an increasing number of
so-called Soviet units have been reported, but they are not
believed to be line combat units; they are mostly reported
as antiaircraft artillery, signals, engineer and coastal
? artillery units. It is not certain that these units are
wholly Soviet. MO may well be units with a fairly large
proportion of qualified Soviet personnel and some Chinese0
nese'Chinese may be either permanently assigned to the units,
or undergoing training, subsequent to which they are posted
to Chinese units containing a varying number of Soviet advisers.
Shipments of materiel particularly guns and tanks delivered
by Soviet instructional and maintenance personnel, may well
have given rise to the large number of reports of the arrival
of Soviet line divisions in China.
? Soviet instructors actively participated in the super-
vision and instruction of air force schools. Within tactical
?uni'ts it is believed that Soviet personnel control all operations,
supervise training, and serve as lead pilots on training flights.
With regard to Soviet rtici ati n
operations, the
? 50X1,
Soviet jet units
flying alert patrols in the Antung area.
5
OX1
12
50X1
rr n p Svc-'m
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
50X
? gnvi
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
,I kJ 3.r.k.A 'tr. 1 '
D. Soviet-8 moored International Volunteer Force
The existence of an International Volunteer Force is
regarded as a possibility, although the available reports
appear to have little foundation in f ct. For the last eight
months there have been reports of the
possible formation of such a force. According to soma reports,
it; is to b employed against the UN forces in Ebrea. Other
reports, however, claim that, this force ill be employed for
the invasion of Japan and Formosa. The composition of the
force as reported, runs the entire gamut of possibilities.
50X1
For example: different reports allege that the force is composed'
of natio ais from every Eastern European Satellite, "Mongols",
Japanese, Chinese, Indians Malays, Indonesians, Burmese and
Filipinos, as well as Soviets. One report states that the force
Is on the front in Korea, others that it will be committed in
the future. The most conservative report indicates that the
International Volunteer Force is merely another, name for a
Soviet-sponsored tactical advisory group whose 80000 personnel
will be distributed among the North Korean and Chinese Communist
tactical units opposing th UN forces. Other reports place as
many as 200,000 Japanese alone within the fore and that it
will include as many as 400 tanks. The figure most frequently
referred to is in the Vicinity of 250,000 men, although a figure
as high as 14-million has been reported. None of these reports
has been confirmed. The Chinese Communists themselves participate
in Korean combat under the title of "Volunteers", and it is
conceivable that this situation alone is the source of many
13
50X1
TOP SF.C.R V.`TH
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
I at-Iv,'
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3 '
1 VIV3V.A.AltE 1
rumors concerning an International Volunteer Fore
50X1
In March 1951, it was reported
that an International Volunteer Air Force was organized with
headquarters at Mukden. The commander of this force reputedly
is the deputy commander of the Soviet Far Eastern Air Forces,
but there is no confiimation of this. Under the agreement
setting up this force, it is reported that'the USSR was to
supply 10400 aircraft (estimates of 3,000 have been reported,
believed to include the estimated 1,000 aircraft in the CCAF/
NKAF). In addition most of the pilots were to be Soviet.
Reports of "volunteer" pilots and ground crews from satellite
countries and Japanese POW's have not been substantiated. It
is believed that the existence of such a unit is possibl and
that Soviet personnel have participated in it because: (1) The
reported demands of the Chinese for air support of their ground
forces in Korea; (2) there are insufficient numbers of qualified
Chinese pilots to engage in such support; (3) it is believed
that the pilots of MIG-15's in Korea are not all Chinese;
(4) the us of "volunteers" is a device of the Communists
previously employed, as witness the Chinese "volunteers" in
Korea and Soviet volunteers in the Spanish Civil War,
50X1
? CF.C.12 rr
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023:3
1 E It; 1
The principal confirmed fact that emerges from reports
of an International Volunteer Force in Manchuria or Korea is
that the Communist air and ground forces involved in .the Korean
conflict are already of an international character, and, insofar
as the Chinese Communists are,conCerned, they' have a "volunteer
aspect". The foreign units now committed are almost certainly
.contained within the existing Sine-Soviet-North Korean command
framework. The assumption that they.are also subordinate to a
headquarters of the International Volunteer Force does not
appear to be substantiated. The value of such a headquarters
mould appear. to be largely political and psychological in that
its introduction into the' Korean fighting could be represented -
as a "popular Movement of thp,peopless democracies spontaneously
going to the aid of the oppressed North Koreans". The nature of '
the force now committed is such that this "movement" could be
effected almost by fiat. The' possibility of the appearance of
a Soviet-sponsored International Volunteer Force cannot therefore
be overlooked, despite the fact that it is not now considered to
exist as a force distinguished from the troops already: committed
in the Korean theater, Or available in the Chin se Communist-
'.North Korean reserves located in Manchuria'.
IV.'SOVIET LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE
A. Ground Forces
Information on Chinese Communist stockpiles is drawn
almost entirely from CCF weaperie consist
largely of products of the Chinese munitions industry, materiel
captured from the Nationalists and the munitions obtained from
?
the defeated Japanese. The exact extent of this stockpile at
the beginning of Chinese intervention in Korea cannot be
accurately estimated. However, it has been previously concluded
by G-2 that the Korean operations may already have consider bly
decreased this stockpile. At what point the stockpile will be
15
50X1
TiD CI 13 lr 50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
fl')(1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
1 kliklar.A.Altrd 1
exhausted and the CCF will require large-scale importation
of munitions cannot be determined.
From the entrance of the CCF into the Korean War, no
conclusive evidence has been obtained of standard issue of
Soviet weapons to the CCF in Korea, although small quantities
of such weapons captured have been of the same models which
were standard issue to the NKPA as originally constituted, and
in many instances these OCF units were contiguous to NKPA units
in the line.
On the other hand, there is considerable evidence,
including capture, that Japanese and other miscellaneous older
weapons of non-Soviet origin obtained by the Soviets- in Manchuria
at the close of World War II were turned over to the CCP,
beginning as early as 1945. Firm evidence of ordnance materiel
aid to the CCF forces in China
an emplaced battery of Soviet 85mm guns
height finder and director in Shanghai.
Although Soviet signal equipment and Soviet signal
manuals printed in Chinese have been captured in Korea, direct
Soviet supply of such equipment has not been definitely
confirmed. There are no indications that the USSR has supplied
the CCP' with significant CW equipment, but it is believed that
some Soviet smoke pots were employed in COF smoke operations
in the recent spring offensive.
M 19392 including
50X1
of
50X1
50X1
16 50X1
TflP SF.C!R F.T4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
uIVNEURET
reports indicate that a program
50X1
,of re- quipment and resupplyof CCF units withdrawn from the
Korean front is underway in Manchuri North Korea and North
China. Various unconfirm d reports state that Soviet tanks
and artillery are arriving in Manchuria but this equipment has
not as yet appeared in the Korean theater. It is quite possible-
that it may be destined for,the reported re-equipment program.
The extent of this reported program cannot be determined by
currently av ilable information.
. B. Air Forces
'Evidence from all sources indicates that the CCAF
units are completely dependent on the USSR for logistical
support. All items of supply, including spare parts and most
of the current POL, are furnished by the Soviets. Logistical
-support in the form of airfield construction, maintenance,
communications, radar, etc., have been supervised, and in some
cases the work done by, Soviet personnel.
The Soviets have mad availabl to the CCAF total
of aggeoximat ly 1,000 aircraft, including about 100 aircraft
of the North Korean Air Force (NKAF), and approximately 500
aircraft (400 of which are jet fighters) of undetermined sub-
ordination, operating in coordination with the CAF. These 1,000
aircraft, with the xception of an estimated 25 twin-engine
U.S.-type transports acquired through defection from the Chinese
Nationalists, consist of fighters (jet and piston), ground .
attack, light bomber and transport types made and furnished by
the Soviets. 50X1
18
early in 1950 for the
-50X'
-50X
PT, 1111 CI 7-? 49-.4 --
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-
_
any,'
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
purpose? of facilitating the delivery of a large _number of
aircraft to the CCAF. Aircraft types delivered included TU-2,s,
Lie-10Ts0 ILA-91s, Soviet-type trainers, transports, and jet
fighters. There was evidence that the conventional types were
being turned over to the Chinese. .However, this was not
apparent as far as the jet aircraft were concerned. That this
logistical support was not limited to aircraft was'also apparent.
50X1
shipments of POL
into, China, Manchuria and Korea from the IMSR. The same is true
for aircraft spare parts and various items of air force equipment.
OX1
5
C. Naval Forces
the following developments
regarding Soviet logistical assistance to the Chinese Communist
naval forces were noted:
1. Vessels Transferred
At least six, and possibly as many as 120
Soviet-manufactured PT boats are operating out of Tsingtao.
Reports disagree as to whether they are operated by Soviet or
Chinese Communists. Despite numerous reports that the Chinese
50X1
Communists are operating submarin s transferred from the USSR,
confirmation of this is lacking; however, Chinese crews are
probably being trained aboard Soviet submarines in the Dair n
area, and possibly lso at Tsingtao and Yulin.
2.Ordnance. Eqint
The USSR has supplied an increasing flow of
ordnance material to th Chinese Communists since that regime
has come to Power. The Chinese Communist Navy is a miscellaneous
collection of small vessels of div rse origins, and the ordnance
19
50X1
T'OP SF.C.12 P.11
neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3 K1
1 kl ItY /tr. 1
equipment is a motley assortment procured from many sources.
Most ofthe naval ordnance equipment of the
Chinese Communists i8 of US and Japanese World war II origin.
While some stocks of spare parts:and ammunition formerly,
purchased from the US and Japan are .available from the deposed
Chinese Nationalists s it has been n cessary to request ordnance
. assistance from the USSR in order to maintain Chinese'Communist
naval units in a State of efficient readiness as Chinese
armaments production f cilities are not producing weapon for
,naval utilization.
It has been reported with increasing frequency
that the USSR has supplied medium and heavy guns for coastal
defenses (a Soviet naval responsibility) of important rivers and
harbors in several areas of China. These reported gun batteries
vary from 76.2mm to 150mm and above. It is certain that' -
,
considerable quantities of antiaircraft guns have be n shipped
into vital coastal areas.
Information on shipboard ordnance has not
boon as plentiful as that on coastal inst 11 tions; however,
there is. definite information available that 100mm (3.9n) guns
have been installed on certain Chinese gunboats and that 85mm
naval guns. are being accumulated at naval bases. It has also
been reported that considerable quantitiep of automatie
aircraft guns of 20M,37mm and 40mm calibers haverbeen
piledefor naval use. The Chinese Communist PF (Frigate
'CHOU
anti-
stook-
'WANG
KWANG CHOU has probably
been rearmed with 2-5.1" Soviet guns and the KAIBOKAN,s have
probably been rearmed With 2-3.9/56 Soviet guns.
Fire control equipment assistance Is not knowns
although it may be assumed that the Puazo 3 and some type of
radar ranging equipment has been suppli d.
50X1
50X1
20
50X1
'TOP SRC:14 -PT'
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023:1
.1 lw ElAti. E 1
30 Mines
Although the Chinese have stocks of World
War II Japanes mines, It has been reported that the Soviets
have given additional stocks of Japanese mines to the Chinese.
-Although there-is DO confirmation of the few low evaluation
reports that mines -of Sovi t manufacture hav ben supplied by
the D8SR0-there is considerable evidence that Soviet advisers
and technicians are supervising mine assembly and defensive
min laying operations along th China coast. It is expected
that the Sovi ts will also provide the Chinese with at least
the types or ines given to the North Koreans. These types
include two moored contact types, the M-26 and M-RB? and one
ground influence typ the R Type 1A. However, the Soviets
have other types of mines which they could supply-to the Chinese
in quantity. These include the folio ing: -the M-08 and the
M-AG, which are moored contact types laid from surface craft;
the PLT and the PLT-30 also moored contact mines, but laid from
submarines; the A1G-10 an aircraft laid moored contact min
the MIRAB0 a small magnetic-induction'ground mine laid from
_surface craft; and two small river type mines called "Fishmines"
which are also moored contact types. Canton and Shanghai have
been named as the-loc tion of assembly and storage bases.
4. Mg-02M
The Chinese Communibts have stocks of World
War II Japanese torpedoes, both 18-inch and 21-inch0 llowever,
the Soviets can be expected to furnish. the Chinese withboth
18-inch and 21-inch torpedoes similar to those Supplied, to the
North Koreans The maximum .range of, these torpedoes is reported
. to be 4500 yards at 43 knots. (A-torpedo round in Korea had a
maximum range setting of Approximately 15,000 yards, speed unknown)
Both transverse and nes eiploders ar used With these torpedoes.,
Although no specific reports of Soviet torpedo training of, Chinese
21
'1111 12 91-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
50X1
(-)x1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
-I J1ii7 ri k.4
?
Communist personnel have been received, it may be assumed
that such trai4ing is being given in conjunction with submarine
and maB traini g programs believed to be underway.
5. Technical Eouipment - Electronic Gear, etc.
Although specific information is limited, the
known facts indicate that the Chinese Communists must be relying
almost entirely upon the Soviets for technical equipment.
Soviet logistical assistance to the Chinese Communists
by way of providing water-borne carriers to transport supplies
to Communist China and thereby decrease the load of the Chinese
Communist Merchant Fleet, which has limited facilities, has
been on the increase since the end of November 1950 when Soviet
merchant ships r Burned voyages first to Dairen and then to other
Chinese Communist ports after discontinuing such voyages at the
outbreak of the Korean conflict. Since late November 1950,
at least 37 Soviet merchant ships including cargos cargo
passenger and tanker types, totalling approximately 200,000
groso tons, have been observed in the Dairen area. Many of
these vessels, however, were observed to be undergoing repairs
or alterations. The Soviet cargo vessel ALDAN (20161 OT) has
been making scheduled trips between Dairen and northern Chinese
Communist ports sine November 1950, and is believed to have
been chartered by the Chinese Communists from the Soviet Union.
Since the beginning of 1951, the Soviets have used
three of their Far Eastern tankers to carry petroleum products
from Vladivoetok to the Chinese Communist port of Tsingtao.
One Soviet tanker, th SOVETSKAYA NEFT (8,288 GT) has made
three such-trips and the tankers BATUMI (6,236 GT) and SAKHALIN
(5,124 GT) have made one each. The Soviet tanker IOSIF STALIN
(7s745 GT) arrived at Teingtao on 12 July from the Black Seap
bringing the total of Soviet petroleum products brought to
Tsingtao in this manner to approximately 56,000 tons.
22
50X1
rrityp C.14 WT1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01812A001900050023:3(1
UNY 6.tdUKE-1.-
? The Soviet ship chartering organization SOVFRAKHT
has been very active in chartering western bottoms forChinese
Communist use and for transporting supplies to Communist China
from abroad. At least two tankers, the ASTER (Costa Rican,
7p053 GT) and FAWN A (Liberian, 7,019 GT) have been chartered
50X1
recently by SOVFRAKHT for use by the Chinese
Communists duri g the remainder of 1951. Many other western
merchant ships hav be -n similarly chartered to carry supplies
from Europe to Chinese Communist ports. The Soviets are also
believed. to be responsible primarily ,for the greatly increased
number. of Polish ships now engaged in carrying goode to China,
plus the western ships Chartered by the Poles, Czechs and
Hungarians which are engaged in this activity.
50X1
50X1
Recent railroad shipments of
Soviet
Vaval ordnance from the
Vladivostok section of the Naval
Artillery Directorate
could
50X1
,have been for transport
to either the Chinese,Communist
or the
North Korean forces.
50X1
50X1
D. 201Illmal_121WARLI, Information - TranspaAllaa
Facilities
, 1. Railroads -
50X1
indicate that
the Soviets and Chinese Communists have been very active in
the past year improving and enlarging existing railroad facilities
and constructing new ones along the Sino-Soviet border. At the
present time, the doub/e-tracked Trans-Siberian Railroad must ?
23 50X1
? r-r1?11TM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023:3?(1
'JJu.Y,Ji"4J1I1lI
handle all Soviet domestic traffic in transit been European
USSR and the Soviet Fgr East in addition to carrying all
railroad shipments between the ussii and China.' Two spur lines
of this railroad currently are handling the major part of
Sino-Soviet railroad traffic at border transshipment points
located at Otpor-Manchoull (northwest corner of Manchuria)
. and at Grodekovo-Suifenho or Pogranichnaya on the Manchurian
border (north of Vladivostok). The Soviet eingle-track
feeder lines to these transshipment points are 5-fo6t gauge,
while the Manchurian lines are 4-foot, 6. inches, thus
necessitating transshipment at the border. Extensiv, work is
being done at both places to increase facilities for r loading
from one car into another. Also in existence are two less
important feeder lines entering Outer Mongoli from the Soviet
Unien. These two lines leave the Soviet Far ,Eastern- main line
near lJlai Ude and Borzya and terminate at the Outer. Mongolian
cities of Ulan Bator and Choj Balsan (Bayan Tumen) respectively.
There is some evidence that work is being carried on which will
eventually connect these two cities by railroad. Also improve-
ments are currently being made on the Borzya-Choj Balsan line
which is operated by the Soviets as part of their Far Eastern
railroad system.
Two relatively short feeder lines leave the
Soviet Far Eastern main line near the northern border of
Manchuria at K ibyshevka and Bireya for the Amur. River parts
of Blagoveshchensk and Poyarkovo. Indications are that the
Chinese are'curre tly extending a line' to meet the Soviet line
across th riv r from Blagoveshchensk. These two AMUP ports
re also currently av liable for transshipping Soviet supplies
to river vessels for transport on the Amur. River and the Sungari
River into Manchuria as far as Harbin, thus relieving railroad
congestion at points further- east. The Soviet-Far Eastern main
24 50X1
rreiP C.P rrri
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
(-"(1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
v.m.lar_durtr, 1
line crosses the Amur at Ehabarovek and goes south to
Vladivostok. In addition to the major transshipment point
in this section at Grodekovo-Suifenho noted above-, another
spurline goes to the ManChtlrian border at Iman,:to which the
Chinese are completing or have completed a connecting line.
,Railroad facilities going east from Vladivostok
to the port of Nakhodka are being,J.Mproved and will. facilitate
handling the 'anticipated increase in shipments being carried
by Sea,between the two countries.- In addition? the Soviets
have completed a linefroM Vladivostok south through Kraskino
to connect with the North Korean railroad system
The Soviets and the Chinese are also planning
other railroacLprojects,Which When completed, would greatly
Improve their respective logistical papabilitiee for moving
supplies from one country to another, Some construction work
is believed underway on the proposed railway to connect Central _
.China with Soviet Kazakh MIL In late 1950, the Chinese Railroad
Constructing Bureau was at work on the line extending :Westward
50X1
to Lanchow while the Soviet
were working on 4 line extending eastward from the USSR Turkish? Siberian line ,to Tih0a. Cempletion-of:such a line to connect
Tihwa nd LanchoW would be a major construction job, possibly
requiring years of extensive effort and large quantities of
-materielvhowever, if-aceempliShed, ,this railroad line would
Alleviate tis present bottleneck of railroad shipments hic'xv
must not/ enter Chita through Manchuria and would also aid
Soviet efforts to exploit Western China's resources. The
Soviets are still engaged in the construction of .an alternate
route to the Trans,Siberian which:moUld-run north of Lake Baikal
from Taishet to Komsomolsk. This line 'would augme t the eL8ting
all faciltces in the Soviet Far East but the expected date
of completion - of this route is not known.
25 50X1
rrnp SF.C.R F.T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18 CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023X1
1 (l./ .14.? arik,atr_,
2inlandterways
The newly establis ed inland waterway system
between China and the Soviet Union via the Amur-Sungari Rivers
is currently increasing in importanc as a method of transPort-
ing Soviet supplies into Manchuria. The Soviets are now
definitely utilizing this route for effecting shipments of
petroleum products into Manchuria as far as Harbin. The use
of this system for effecting transport will ease the burden on
Soviet Far Eastern railroads and the Chinese Manchurian railroads.
This systems, however is not available for use during the wi ter
months. It was recently reported .that the Chinese Communist
Sungari port of Harbin was enlarging Its marine construction
and repair facilities ostensibly for the purpose of increasing
shipping capabilities On this waterway. The Soviet Amur ports
of Blagoveschensks Poyarkovo and Nhabarovsk.appear to be Soviet
transshipment ports and the Chinese ports of Harbin and Chiamussu
the important Chinese centers for this new activity.
3. 'Civil Air Fleet
The Soviets also have established three Civil
Air routes into China and are operating a Civil Air Line in
North China and Manchuria long these routes which assists in
maintaining logistical support of the Chinese Communist Air
Force. These three civil air routes were established in late
1949 and originate at Alma Atte: Irkutsk and Chita in the Soviet
Union and terminate at Peking. Stop-over points are maintained
along 11 three routess particularly along the route from Chita
through Manchuria to Peking. This Soviet-oper ted civil air
activity is called the Sino-Soviet Aviation Joint .Stock Company
but is entirely Soviet controlled and'operat d.
V. SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
that trade between
Communist China and the U SR-has steadily developed since April
50X1
26 50X1
rr (VP CV P.1) -G"1-4
npriaccifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18 CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
(-)X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
? I ariun.r_,
1950 as 4 result of the Goods Exchange Agr ment of 19 April
1950 and the contracts conclud d on that data and in October
1950.-
50X1
50X1
The commodity
categories of Soviet exports to China include (a) chemicals
drugs and laboratory equipment; (b) couiunications, power and
el ctrical equipm nt; (c) machinery and m chine tools; (d) trans-
portation equipment; (e) petrol um products; (f) semi-processed
iron and steel products; (g) foods; and (h) probably armaments.
Technical assistance also may be classified as an important
Soviet export category. Thus the basic pa of Sino-Soviet
trade is Chin se raw materials in Ichange for Soviet-manufactured
products and industrial equipment.
,Soviet exports to China during this periods while greatly
increased over past yearss still represented only partial
fulfillment of Chinats requirements. In comparison to Soviet
shipment to China of possibly $2180000000 worth of goods ($131
million arbitrarily projected on a basis of about 60% coverage)
during the 12-month periods Chinese Purchases from Hong Kong
alone averaged 02,5000000 per month for. the first quarter of
1951. In addition to this China has carried on subst ntial
trade with the rest of the worlds including the .Unit 4d States
and Japan_until cember 1950.
50X1
50X1
27 50X1
T (1 P "G' C. 14
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A0019000500231
ki .14.:) .r.k.,4nr,
As previously noted it is believed that the figures
above represent exchange only -under the Goods Exchange Agreement
'of 19 April 1950. ,On 14 February 19500 another agreement was
signed wherein the Soviets extended a_300 'million dollar credit
to the Chinese for heavy industrial and capital equipment.
Shipments under this were calculated to average $60 million
-annually for .fiv years.
have noted that a separate arms
agreement between China and the USSR was also concluded.
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
OF GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET MATERIEL -
ASSISTANCE AND IMPLICATIONS THEREOF
A. Korea
there are indications
th.
Soviet-equipped Chinese Communist armored units have moved into
North Korea.
B., Manchuria
Soviet efforts to strengthen ChineSe Commun
forces by furnishing mechanized equipment and
to forces in M nchuria have been reported
st ground
modern weapons
with
increasing frequency. Thes reports suggest that certain
Chinese Communist units in Ma churia may already have been
equipped with standard Soviet weapons and equipment comparable
to that given the North Koreans.
? More than 400 -Jet fighter aircraft of .MIG-15? MIG-9
and xxx-15 typ s have been made available to the CCAF.
50X1
50X1
50X1
28
50X1
?rrmpiiir.
r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
crlvd
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
WJtAJKII.
quantities of Soviet petroleum product
?large
are being shipped
into M nchurla. In all probability, the majority of all
Soviet goods comes into Manchuria. This does not mean that
it is all being used there, because there is evidence that
Manchuria.is the transshipment point for most of these goods.
.-.Mancheuli, on the Sol/Jet-Manchurian border, is a_large rail
transshipment .point as is Shenyang. Dairen and Yinkow ate'
identified as large transshipment ports for petroleum -products.
Certain amounts -of these products are used in Manchuria,' and
in all probability certain amounts go to the Chinese Armed
Forces in Korea.
C. North China
50X1
Tsingtao is the distribution-pi:Ant for petrOleum
pro ucts from the USSR for Central and South China. It is also
a storage area and probably the distribution point for the
vest of North China. There is also Some eVid nee of ,tankers.
arriving at the port of Tientsin.
D.? Central China
Shanghai is usually considered as the fo.al point
for Chinese foreign trade. It is the transshipment point for
Central China because of its location at the mouth of the
Yangtze River. There is evidence
that Soviet tires, machine, tools and petrol
m products are
se into Shanghai for,use in that area or for transshipm nt
up the Yangtze River.
E. South China
29
71(113 1-4 r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3
there is considerable-.evidene
50X1
50X1
,25X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3?fl
ii;07 Li
f the
movement of arms:, munitions and some industrial material into
this area. I flications of shipment of Soviet arms into-Soutb.-
China could be many, but thy can be broken down into four
rough categories: (i) for use in the invasion of Taiwan?;
(ii) for use in the Chin:se Communist invasion of Indo-China
and Burma; (iii) for use in supplying the needs of Viet Minh;
(iv) for use in the defense against Chinese Nationalist or
American landings.
I% Western China
of China adjacent to th
50X1
areas 50X1
Soviet border are receiving a great
deal of Soviet attention. In northwestern Chinas two of the
Soviet civil air routes terminating :t Peking cross through
this area. The Soviets, in additions maintain a widespread
net of heavily staffed consulates thronghout northwest Chinas
through which Soviet activities appear to be coordinated. The
USSR Consulate General in this arva is located at Urumchi
and there are other consulates at
,Kashgar
Chuguchak
and Sharasume
50X1
Kuldja g656
5ax11
The business
of supplying most of this trritoryts economic needs including
petroleum supplies and transport equipmet and also of exploiting
the territoryts resources app
ars to b
In Soviet hands.,
50X1
0
30
50X1
(11) CP C!-12
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A001900050023-3