PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN GUATEMALA AND POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS DURING 1952

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A002000010001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 11, 1952
• Content Type: NIE

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COPY NO. 1 4 1
tECURITY INFOR11101131i
.i.eatio
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN GUATEMALA
AND POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS DURING 1952
NIE - 62
Published 11 March 1952
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DOCUMENT NO. 2
NO CHANGE :N CLASS. t
X DECLASSE.)
;LASS. CHANC.10) TO: TS 5 C
ilEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: REVIEWER' 0 ?
24 1.412 /-1r,
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SECURITY INFORMATION
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN GUATEMALA
AND POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS DURING 1952
NIE-62
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff par-
ticipated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the prepa-
ration of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 6 March
1952. See, however, footnotes to paragraphs 7 and 27.
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PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN GUATEMALA AND
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS DURING 1952
THE PROBLEM
To analyze the'present political situation in Guatemala and possible developments
during 1952.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The Communists already exercise in
Guatemala a political influence far out
of proportion to their small numerical
strength. This influence will probably
continue to grow during 1952. The polit-
ical situation in Guatemala adversely
affects US interests and constitutes a po-
tential threat to US security.
2. Communist political success derives in
general from the ability of individual
Communists and fellow travelers to iden-
tify themselves with the nationalist and
social aspirations of the Revolution of
1944. In this manner, they have been
successful in infiltrating the Administra-
tion and the pro-Administration political
parties and have gained control of organ-
ized labor upon which the Administration
has become increasingly dependent.
3. The political alliance between the Ad-
ministration and the Communists is likely
to continue. The opposition to Commu-
nism in Guatemala is potentially power-
ful, but at present it lacks leadership and
organization. So far Communist-inspired
Administration propaganda has succeed-
ed in stigmatizing all criticism of Com-
munism as opposition to the Administra-
tion and to the principles of the still
popular Revolution of 1944.
4. Future political developments will de-
pend in large measure on the outcome of
the conflict between Guatemala and the
United Fruit Company. This conflict is
a natural consequence of the Revolution
of 1944, but has been exacerbated by the
Communists for their own purposes.
5. If the Company should submit to
Guatemalan demands the political posi-
tion of the Arbenz Administration would
be greatly strengthened. It is probable
that in this case the Government and
the unions, under Communist influence
and supported by national sentiment,
would exert increasing pressure on other
US interests, notably the Railway.
6. If the Company should withdraw from
Guatemala a worsening economic situa-
tion would probably result. It is unlikely,
however, that the economic consequences
during 1952 would be such as to threaten
political stability unless there were a co-
incident and unrelated decline in coffee
production, prices, or markets.
7. Any deterioration in the economic and
political situations would tend to increase
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the Administration's dependence on and
favor toward organized labor, with a con-
sequent increase in Communist influence.
However, it is unlikely that the Commu-
nists could come directly to power during
1952, even though, in case of the incapaci-
tation of President Arbenz, his present
legal successor would be a pro-Commu-
nist.*
8. In present circumstances the Army is
loyal to President Arbenz, although in-
creasingly disturbed by the growth of
Communist influence. If it appeared that
2
the Communists were about to come to
power in Guatemala, the Army would
probably prevent that development.
9. In the longer view, continued Commu-
nist influence and action in Guatemala
will gradually reduce the capabilities of
the potentially powerful anti-Communist
forces to produce a change. The Com-
munists will also attempt to subvert or
neutralize the Army in order to reduce
its capability to prevent them from even-
tually taking full control of the Govern-
ment.
DISCUSSION
The Arbenz Administration
10. The present political situation in Guate-
mala is the outgrowth of the Revolution of
1944. That Revolution was something more
than a routine military coup. From it there
has developed a strong national movement to
free Guatemala from the military dictator-
ship, social backwardness, and "economic co-
lonialism" whch had been the pattern of the
past. These aspirations command the emo-
tional loyalty of most politically conscious
Guatemalans and the administration of Pres-
ident Arbenz derives corresponding strength
from its claim to leadership of the continuing
national Revolution.
11. President Arbenz himself is essentially an
opportunist whose politics are largely a mat-
ter of historical accident. Francisco Arana,
* The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department
of State, would substitute the following paragraph:
"Any deterioration in the economic and political
situation would probably at first tend to increase
the Administration's dependence on and favor to-
ward organized labor, with a consequent increase
in Communist influence. However, an economic
crisis might force the Government to turn against
the Communists in order to save its political posi-
tion. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the
Communists could come directly to power during
1952, even though the incapacitation of President
Arbenz would bring a pro-Communist as his legal
successor."
the principal military leader of the Revolution
of 1944, became Chief of the Armed Forces
under President Arevalo and Arbenz, a lesser
member of the military junta, became Minis-
ter of Defense. As the Arevalo Administra-
tion turned increasingly leftward in its poli-
cies Arana opposed that trend. His possible
election to the Presidency in 1951 became the
one hope of moderate and conservative ele-
ments in Guatemala. In view of Arana's polit-
ical position, Arbenz, his personal rival for
military leadership, became the more closely
associated with Arevalo and the leftist posi-
tion in Guatemalan politics. The assassina-
tion of Arana in 1949 cleared the way for
Arbenz' succession to the Presidency in 1951.
12. By 1951 the toleration of Communist ac-
tivity which had characterized the early years
of the Arevalo Administration had developed
into an effective working alliance between
Arevalo and the Communists. Arbenz, to at-
tain the Presidency, made with the Commu-
nists commitments of mutual support which
importantly affect the present situation. He
did not, however, surrender himself com-
pletely to Communist control.
Communist Strength and Influence
13. The Communist Party of Guatemala has
no more than 500 members, of whom perhaps
one-third are militants. The Party, however,
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has recently reorganized and is actively re-
cruiting, especially in Guatemala City, on the
government-owned coffee plantations, and
among United Fruit Company workers. It is'
in open communication with international
Communism, chiefly through the Communist-
controlled international _labor organizations,
the Latin American CTAL and the world-wide
WFTU.
14. The Communists have achieved their pres-
ent influence in Guatemala, not as a political
party, but through the coordinated activity of
individual Communists in the leftist political
parties and labor unions which emerged from
the Revolution of 1944. The extension of their
influence has been facilitated by the applica-
bility of Marxist clich?to the "anti-colonial"
and social aims of the Guatemalan Revolu-
tion.
15. With the assistance of the Government,
Communist and Communist-influenced labor
leaders have been the most successful organiz-
ers of Guatemalan labor, especially among the
United Fruit Company and government plan-
tation workers. Their formation of the Gen-
eral Confederation of Guatemalan Workers in
1951 and Government pressure for labor unity
have facilitated the extension of their control
over all organized labor. They have been less
successful in converting to political Commu-
nism the mass of labor, which is illiterate and
politically inert. In the important railway
workers' and teachers' unions there is opposi-
tion to association with Communism.
16. Through their control of organized labor
and their influence within the pro-Admin-
istration political parties the Communists
have been successful in gaining influential
positions within the Government: in Con-
gress, the National Electoral Board, the Insti-
tute of Social Security, the labor courts, the
propaganda office, and the official press and
radio. Their influence is extended by the
presence of an indefinite number of Commu-
nist sympathizers in similar positions. The
Communists do not fully control the Adminis-
tration, however. Over their protests Presi-
dent Arbenz has recently dismissed a pro-
Communist Minister of Education and ap-
pointed a non-Communist Minister of Com-
munications.
17. If President Arbenz should become in-
capacitated his legal successor would be Julio
Estrada de la Hoz, the President of Congress,
an ardent nationalist but a Communist sym-
pathizer. In this event, however, the Army
would probably seize power itself in order to
prevent the Communists from gaining direct
control of the Government.
The Anti-Communist Potential
in Guatemala
18. Various elements in Guatemala, including
many loyal adherents of the Revolution of
1944, view with misgiving the rapid growth of
Communist influence in that country. The
principal elements of this latent anti-Commu-
nist potential are:
a. The Catholic hierarchy, implacably op-
posed to Communism. While its influence
has been considerable, the Church has been
handicapped by the small number of priests
and by a lack of a constructive social program.
b. Guatemalan landholding and business
interests. These interests, which are now en-
joying prosperity, resent increasing taxes and
labor costs, but so far have not been subjected
to direct attack, as have corresponding for-
eign interests. They may shortsightedly hope
for advantage at the expense of these foreign
interests.
c. The strong railway workers' union, which
has repudiated its adherence to the Commu-
nist-controlled Confederation and has ousted
its former leaders.
d. A large proportion of university students
and an important segment of leadership in
the teachers' union.
e. The Army, which has shown some con-
cern over the growth of Communist influence.
The Army command is loyal to President Ar-
benz and to the Revolution of 1944, but is
probably prepared to prevent a Communist
accession to power.
19. So far, Communist-inspired Administra-
tion propaganda has been successful in stig-
matizing all criticism of the Administration
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as opposition to the principles of the Revolu-
tion of 1944. So long as it remains possible to
discredit opposition to Communism by identi-
fying it with opposition to the Revolution of
1944 and with support of foreign "colonial-
ism," it is unlikely that a coherent, sustained,
and effective opposition to Communism will
develop. Moreover, political dissatisfaction in
Guatemala has been strong enough to unify
the pro-Administration parties, and to pre-
vent members of these parties from openly
opposing the Communists. For the period of
this estimate, therefore, it is likely that the
alliance between the Administration and the
Communists will continue, and that the po-
tentially powerful opposition to Communism
will remain ineffective.
The United Fruit Company Crisis
20. The United Fruit Company, which con-
ducts extensive operations in nine Latin
American countries, dominates Guatemalan
banana production. The Company controls
the only effective system of internal eranspor-
tation, the International Railways of Central
America. Through its merchant fleet the
Company has a virtual monopoly of Guate-
malan overseas shipping. It owns or leases
large tracts of land in Guatemala and is sec-
ond only to the Government as an employer
of Guatemalan labor.
21. The important position of the United
Fruit Company in their economy has long
been resented by Guatemalan nationalists,
regardless of the fact that the wages and
workers' benefits provided by the Company
were superior to any others in the country.
When the Revolutionists of 1944 undertook to
"liberate" Guatemala from "economic coloni-
alism" they had the Company specifically in
mind. The Government can therefore count
on the support of Guatemalan national senti-
ment in its conflict with the Company.
22. The present crisis had its origin in the vir-
tual destruction of the Company's principal
Guatemalan plantation by wind storms in
September 1951. In view of previous Commu-
nist-inspired labor troubles, the Company un-
successfully demanded Government assur-
ances against future increased labor costs be-
fore it would undertake to rehabilitate the
plantation. Meanwhile the Company sus-
pended some 4,000 out of the 7,000 workers at
that plantation. With Government support,
the Communist-led union demanded that
these workers be reinstated with pay for the
period of suspension and the labor court ruled
in favor of the union. The Company refused
to comply with the court's decision and in con-
sequence certain of its properties have been
attached to satisfy the workers' claim for back
pay. The scheduled sale of these properties
has been postponed, however, in circum-
stances which suggest the possibility of a
compromise settlement of the dispute.
23. The Communists have an obvious ulterior
purpose in forcing the issue with the Com-
pany. The Government, however, probably
does not desire to drive the Company from
Guatemala at this time, preferring that it re-
main in the country on the Government's
terms. The Company's employees also have
an interest in the continuation of its opera-
tions. For its part, the Company has an in-
terest in preserving its investment in Guate-
mala.
Possible Future Developments
24. Future developments will depend in large
measure on the outcome of the struggle be-
tween the United Fruit Company and the
Guatemalan Government.
25. If the Company should submit to Guate-
malan demands the political position of the
Arbenz Administration would be greatly
strengthened. The result, even if it were a
compromise agreement, would be presented
as a national triumph over "colonialism" and
would arouse popular enthusiasm. At the
same time the Company would continue its
operations, paying taxes and wages. The
Government and the unions, under Commu-
nist influence and supported by national sen-
timent, would probably proceed to exert in-
creasing pressure against other US interests
in Guatemala, notably the Railway.
26. If the Company were to abandon its in-
vestment in Guatemala there would also be a
moment of national triumph, but it would
soon be tempered by realization of the eco-
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nomic consequences of a cessation of the
Company's operations. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that these consequences during 1952
would be severe enough to threaten the sta-
bility of the regime unless there were a coinci-
dent and unrelated decline in coffee produc-
tion, prices, or markets.
27. Any deterioration in the economic and
political situations would tend to increase the
Administration's dependence on and favor to-
ward organized labor, with a consequent in-
crease in Communist influence. However, it
is unlikely that the Communists could come
directly to power during 1952, even though, in
case of the incapacitation ofPresident Arbenz,
his present legal successor would be a pro-
Communist.*
* The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of
State, would substitute the following paragraph:
"Any deterioration in the economic and political
situation would probably at first tend to increase
the Administration's dependence on and favor to-
ward organized labor, with a consequent increase
in Communist influence. However, an economic
28. If during 1952 it did appear that the Com-
munists were about to come to power by any
means, the anti-Communist forces in Guate-
mala would probably move to prevent that
development. In particular, the Army com-
mand would probably withdraw its support
from the Administration and seize power
itself.
29. In the longer view, continued Communist
influence and action in Guatemala will grad-
ually reduce the capabilities of the potentially
powerful anti-Communist forces to produce a
change. The Communists will also attempt
to subvert or neutralize the Army in order to
reduce its capability to prevent them from
eventually taking full control of the Govern-
ment.
crisis might force the Government to turn against
the Communists in order to save its political posi-
tion. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the
Communists could come directly to power during
1952, even though the incapacitation of President
Arbenz would bring a pro-Communist as his legal
successor."
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