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March 15, 2000
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April 28, 1952
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Approved For F~elease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R0 0 2A002 *USAF Declass/ lease Instructions On Fil : Top ~LL c 7.534/ 01002-3 TOP SECRET AUTH.CS. US" D/I, USAF CONTRIBUTION TO NIE 64 (Part I) 28 April 1952 SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES, THROUGH MM-1953 I 0 NTE L POJGITT CAS FACTCIBS P CTIIJG SOVIET MOC CAPABILITIES P'OR POU CAL AHD MILI__ W1 FARE A,, The highly meshed, mutually dependent relationship existing between the Communist Party, the Secret Police and the military forces in the USSR .s, strictly defined and controlled by the Politburo, which serves as an interlocking directo. rate, Any strains which might exist within any of these groups or between them are not serious enough to affect the stability of the regime, Even the considerable rivalry which might be precipitated between high ranking Communists in the event of Stalin's death probably would not materially'.weaken the regimens hold over the populaces, There is no intelligence which suggests that the Soviet military forces have either the desire to challenge the supremacy of the Communist hierarchy, or, the opportunity to implement the desire in case it existed* D4'. Soviet control over the European Satellites is virtually complete, This control results from (1) the subservience of Satellite governments and parties to Moscow, (2) the presence of Soviet military forces and other Soviet personnels within the Satellites or in immediate proximity; (3) the effectiveness of the Secret Police system, and '(4.) economic exploitation and subjugation, Soviet control depends in a large measure upon the Soviet military forces stationed either within the Satellite countries or along their broders, To a lesser extent this control is exercised through the Satellite police and military forces, While the complete loyalty of the Satellite military forces is uncertain,. Soviet supervision,, continued purges of the tRAVAWdf 1,r iuaoliticaal indoctrimation are extensively employed to delorminod that . . CIA has no ohjectton j to deasassa p It contains Information of CIA Interest that must remain classic' d at TS Q Apt ro c ~ a or R e l e a s e - , . 2 , ~, /03/04 C r3 It eontaii nothing o CIA 1S .. f t ; Sato 10 Apt. 11 Reviewer " J`uj s a Page -I- of m pages P79 R ' e0?!1 02 Md" Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R0'02A002100020002-3 sngthen Soviet cent olq The Kremlin has not been successful in 4rasing wwide:,sp re vol ntaty a ppo: t of its policies by the Satellite peoples; howeverc, it has been able to eliminate effective opposition to those policies,, P', Popular discontent with Soviet policies will probably continuae and Derhape become en' more intense as the, Sovietization of the Satellites increases, Rowe?7ero it is unlikely that such disconaent will reach the point of jeep dieing or cue kerting Soviet control, The Soviet proposal for a rearmed. neuter and tnified Ge %any might possibly Arouse fear among some of the Satellites which have suffered from Gems wiiitarism particularly C ecboslcvak a exid. Poland, However. the proposal is m h more likely to strengthen Soviet bloc cspabilitie' fra political warfare against the Western Powers This would,, be especially true if the Soviets should bolster their proposals with offers of real concessions, such as withdrawal of Soviet military forces from East Gn2 ,x 0 G. & Neither the continuation of the cold war and of'\the present conflicts in Yorea. and Indochina or the making of limited. Communist attach-" y in the Middle East is likely to change the political situation w .thin. the Communist Flow If the war should be extended in the rar East the Chinese Communists would probably be subjected to additional internal political pre ssuY s, growing out of the increased sacrifices required of the populaces Moreovrero the Chinese Communists would become far more dependent upon the USSR than at present for additional qpuanti ties of Military equipment and SS of p ,ges Approved For Release 2 9R01 012AO02100020002-3 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R0 O'112A002100020002-3 particularly for defense a inst air atthke, This would be true whetaer or not weapons of mass destruction were used against the Chinese iistsa, Extension of the '' in the Par Fast would not materially affect the politic a sit4ation within the USSR, or within China eo long as the OblueDe Cor ist control mechanisms remained intact, In the case of general e (with or without ma destruction weapons) some of the E open. Satel11tes might attempt to tweak with the Soviets, especially if the dissident elements in then beliw?ed that there was a good chance of succeeding in their rovolt, Th, success o:t such revolts would be depondent upon the availability of as- sistance from the Waste= powers, as a general war in which mass destruction woappons were uned. the Cos i.st Bloc might well be faced with insurmountable political, prob1t ? The s3h.ock effect of such weapons would probably be enormous. Extreme fear, disorder,, and, panic among survivors In target areas would likely be produced by atomio bombing, and if Communist control mechanisms should be sericmaly wakened the Kremlin and Peiping might be unable to prevent a decline in popular mlo from materially affecting the ' potential of their ate=, s ctive cou:W;ri.eso Furthermore,, with Communist control mechamismg seriously weakened there would probably be revolts in some of the European Satellites and possibly (men within the USSR and Communist Chimo #5 of B Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02100020002-3 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO 0'10 2A002100020002-3 111, SWTD' ' BLOC CAPABILITIES FOR POLITICAL 74ARFARE B Political warfare as i ged by the Soviet Bloc is highly dependent upon military power, The use of this power and/or the threat to use it enables the Soviet Moo to "lead from strength" in its various maneuvers of political warfare. Recent history affords n erou ; examples that de- pendence upon military force is not only a r Art or 00 rfi cc+ st ideology but is also a frequently employed policy. Soviet military forces within Po rch Hungary,, Ru an:.ae Bulgaria,, Albania and East Ger ,rry and adjacent.. to Czechoslovakia made it possible fear the Communists to take over the governments in these countrieso At present the immediate security of the Communist regimes in the European Satellites depends capon such control machar ss as a highly competent secret police and strong inte rral security forces. Howovere their ultimate security root 3 upon the Sovi military forces insido or near. their borders. The ovor diel ng might of these i'orces has convinced the Satellite peoples that wader present conditions overt resistance to the Conic ist regime is ' opeless4 The po ao r of the soviet military forces also provides the background against which than Kremlin conducts political warfare against the hon`L oviet world, Sometimesq as in its policy toward Y1 gosiavia the threat to use ad force may be only thinly vei1edo :fin other political warfara m euversa as in the Middle Eastq the Soviet threat of a- ed intervon:bion is much more subt ' p0ioy - Page 6-s ?s __~ges Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02100020002-3 Approved For Rele 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R0 02A002100020002-3 Fu The military capabi3.1ties of the USSR and its satellites would be enhanced in the envent of war by the actions of Communists and fellcw. travellers in Italy and France, and to a much less extent in West may y0 In the r i: rag countries of Western Europe,, the effects of Soviet political warfare would be extremely miner. Although Communist penetration of the Air Forces of Italy and France has been reduced in the last, few ya are., some members remain (including a few high-ranking officers and civilian officials) all of whom would doubtless sabotage effective air operations within the reach of their influence? The security of plans and of new weapons and equipment would be almost nil in both Italy and France,, except probably at the highest national: levels, Mary military personnel, in the lower ranks would desert in both countries in the event of warn Sabotage and espionage would be systematically carried out in aircraft factor: es of the two countries on a large scale,, The airfields of Italy and France would be subject to both sabotage and espionage from civilian employees,, many of whom today are of questionable ' loya l ty0 Although the internal security forces in France and Italy would arrest maV known Co unists on the outbreak of war with the USSR., the party membership is so large that.only certain key personalities cold be arrested, and some of these probably would go into hiding and escape detentions Page of pages .: 1 k479R01012A002100020002-3 Approved For Release ID&L164, Approved For Re ea a 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R0' 2AO02100020002-3 IV0 , SCIENTIFIC A TECHNIML I.i.CT RS. ''PUPA G SOV13T 33LOO CApAI$ILITIES FOR MILLTA ARM T ?3 sectioaa is deli, ed wc~_~yoe~dn ~ri._ Etc -Si8 wLf lmc caa bi. .I In Lh mot at n. eng 19 age a1 fie j?&_ and of the ilea-eons and Woxrons s ~e *~ xi c; reaY.+*~1 b +alavel.oued and ux?a~dao ~m9 c Weauona a di,al~t~ ~e_ Rielecal Weaa~aoas Chemi cal. Wea~ozas DI/ USAF contributions relative to items "l0 2, 3 and 4 have been submitted separately through the medium of . YOIN-j3 participation in JA M% JBWICR and JCWICQ 5-o F.sctrccsaa (a) xr1, Larninp Radar Eauiment: The Soviet Bloc has developed and produced in quantity three types of native gro3unds,radlaar sets that may be used for early warning purposesr, These are the R!I 2? tho PEMTIT3 and the "'Dt O", all operating between 65 and 75 M'c/eo It is bolf'.eved that the Soviets bane sacrificed high performance for simplicity of designt, ease of ,intenanceD and economy of component partsa The RT2 and the Pegmatit radars are charac terised by similar antenna construction,, The RL 2 is a mobile radar and is probably used for early warning and local control of aircraftQ The PEGMATIT le apparently a static version of the RID-2 with improved performances, A large majority of the IIDUMRON radars reported have been located on pr near airfieldso and it is believod. that this radar is presently used pri oily as a GOl radar .th a secondary function of early warning,, The range to be expected from these .% dare is approximately 75 miles on a medium bomber flying at altitudes of 10 ,,000 or highera ~-s Approved For Release t2 Q1/Q$/O'4- ~;, , DP79R 2 02 00 20( Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO 0' 1.2A002100020002-3 25X1 D The recant sigh? i g in the Moscow zre of radar sets very simils in outward appearance to the US. AN/CM,-6 radar indicates that the Soviet Bloc is well aware of the limps tionE; of present radars in use and may be about to provide their operational, units, with a radar with significantly increased performance characteristicso A recent report reveals the use of an ScR.= 602A rya o ten of which were received through lent% 1ease,N The S(2 6C2& is light weighed? portable diu s,range radar for search and h?:igh findi by iobas witchingg It was designed for use in assault operations to provida limited warning until longer range and more acctnhate egnlpmen. eocsl,d be installed, Against bombers it has a range of 45 miiee above 1O$OOO fee'vc, Agazins t fighter aircraft performance as about 43 miles, 25X1 D At the present time, theae radars are still capable of providing effective early warning agains-b rcaraft0 It is expected that by mid 19, 3 the Soviets will have in limited operational use a radar similar to our CP:'-6Q capable of searching to 50,000 feetD with reduced effectiveness above 35aOOO feed, It Is probable that the Soviets will employ this ras& both for early warning and for OCI p oses (b) 7 n ? ? ~ The radio communications equip nt `cased by the Soviet Bloc Air Forces operates in the high=froquen y bands rs Page 7 of pages Approved For Release I 0 3/ Q PITP79ROl 01 2AO02100020002-3 Approved For Release 200. 19RO10 A002100020002-3 Two basic tn)es are used in all aircraft, The are the RSI_6 (%5 50 Nb/s) and the RSBbis series (2,5 - 12,0 tic/5)Q The RSIc6 series is noslly^ mounted in fighter aircraft and the RSBbia series is frequently rmounted in vehicles and used as a mobile communications station by the. air forces and the ground a ,, The ground equipment used by the Soviet air force is basically the same as that used. in World War TZ and consists of the 1transmitter (2,5 - 7Q5 /s)m the transmitter (2.5 '. 1.2,0 /s)o and the LT0S0 receiver (175 kc/s -.12,0 Ma/c)0 The radio com.nications equipment recently captured in Korea indicates a constant improvement in manufacturing techniques and in component desigsa mist-1955, it is estimated that the Soviet Bloc will have installed greatly improved communications equipment in the majority of their operational aircraft0 The short and medic range equipment will utilize high-frequency and. med1u frequency equipment, The extreme long-range communications equipment will probably utilize the very low frequency speed The use of very high-frequency (VEP) cor ioationa equipment in. large q ntities is not considered likely in 1953 0raund Cain n13 Qd I _cerat R, And ar As regards gounir, controlled-intercept radar, it is believed that the Soviet Bloc Is using their present operational early-warning radars-(RUG-2 and 'IDT14BO14) also as 0OI radars, These radars do not have adequate height-finding chp teristics or .scope. pressentation for effective control of modern interceptor 5-5' Page_?_p:f_.ffL pages Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02100020002-3 Approved For Rele`a~se 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1OAO02100020002-3 aircreft0 However, the recent aighting of what appear to be a radar similar to the U. S. OP", if produced in quantity" and possessing perform-. ence characteristics sirrai1s to the U.S, set, will give the Soviet Moo a good GCI afdaro As mentioned before,) this radar can also be used as an PV radar, (d) 1-i le o.? ;s As Bards Fire Control Radar, the Soviet Union received British and American automatic gt 1ayiug radar and. directorsp and also acquired German equipment during World War IIA The U,SU equipment.iras of the most ad-vanced design at that time, and is still considered good equipment, These British and Ua S, sets are the primary man-~1aying radars used by the Soviet Moo today, 'ire is evidence. that the Soviet Bloc is now producing a native version of the U S11S( ,584 radar and may in fact have improved upon the origi=2 design, This a da has a maximum search range of MONO yards with automatic trackIng from 32,,OOO yards, This set if coupled with a modern director will give the Soviet Bloc a good all-weather gam laying fire control, s< stem, (e) Ai b Res There is no positive intelligence of production by the Soviet Bloc of airborne interception equipments, The potentialities of this equipment have been well know, for many yearec, and since British America and German equipment have been in Soviet hands for more than :five years9 it should be within Soviet abilities to make Al radar available to the Bloc air forces., In view of the fact that no such radar has been observed, it in probable that the Soviet Bloc planners Approved For Releas(P 'Milo rs P79R01012A002100020002-3 pproved For Rel a e 0'I O3/ 79 R01 10A002100020002-3 have rejected such World. War II models as the U ,,S. 5 720 or the German Loichenstein, and ,have concentrated efforts on the development of Al radare of significantly greater perforance,o It is estimated that by mid-1993 some units of the Fighter Aviation of Air Defense interceptor force till be equipped with an AI radar with a maxi mt a operating ceiling of approximately i.OOO feet and a range of approximately eight miles against a medium bombers A set of this type, however,, would require an operator, It is possible. but not probable that the Soviet Bloc could produce a pilot operated set by mid-1953 with an operational ceiling of L.5a000 feet and. a range of 12 miles against a sned .um bomber, In any event0 it is essential that the Soviet Bloc gain an all-weather fighter. except capability since without it they are limited to good eather operations against invading bombereG, It is estimated that the Soviets have radar equipment in service as a further step towards increasing strategic bombing capa- bilities, The Soviets obtained. U,,S. . 'BAPQ 43 blind-bombing and navigation radar equipment in 2-29? s interned during World War IIa Farther,) intelli- gence has confirmed that the Soviets have obtained U. S. SCR. 71"1Bf O0 and .A /APB-15; British ASY HK II and E` I I; German Berlin (PUG 22Z} o and Berlin A ani D search and . bombing radar sets, Photographs of the Soviet TT-4 show am object beneath the fuselage that appears to be a copy of the radome used with the UoS,, AN1A. 13 radar set. Recent obser-4 vations of the Soviet Type.-2'7 Jet light bomber reveals a streamlined and relatively flat protuberance indicating the possible existence of a .tX Page--offer;=s Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R01012A002100020002-3 Approved For Relase 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R012A002100020002-3 25X1 D microwave, blinddbom`bing radar, 25X1 D (f) . as ff& a,fio . The Soviet Bloc continue to place reliance upon medium frequency radio direction finde:rso grouted and airborne types? as a major aid for a air-natig tiono 'No evidence has been received pertaining to the design, testo or operatio-a of an unu3asa,1 navi- gation aid in the Soviet Bic countries, They have made excellent progress in the dar,relorment of portable ground type direction finders,. The PKV 45 portable direction finder recently captured in Korea covers the requuncy :plectrum froi L5 to 16G8 gels and tests indicate it is comparable, if not superior to U?So direction finders of a comparab: a types Continued development of airborne direction finding equipment to also evident, and aa. new set known as the R X-45 has been reported.. This new set appears to be a true ADIP (Automatic Radio Directions Finder), Reports tend to cop-firm that the Soviets are attempting. to develop as long aange, radio-navigation system employing transit-time techniques? Both peke and CW systems have apparently been the subject of much experimental research, Recent intelligence :Leads to the conclusion that some of this equipment, may soon be in the test stage, The only blind landing or instrument approach systems known to be practiced by the Soviet Bloc pilots eonafl4 to of a standard 5S Paac;M iL of pages 1,105 C-7- Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02100020002-3 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO 2A002100020002-3 lete=do , procedure utilizing the airborne CIO(M) direction find s which is activated, by an airport transmitter and a msrker beacon trans . tter suitably paced on or near, the le dote yX111 Additional ground aids consist of the fcillo= in (a) Radio telegraph transmitter when within the frequency coverage of the airborne ?/' seta (b) jai-directional beacons with 500 watt transmitters placed near an airfield or on aixvays(c) Radio stations for which frequencies and identification can be changed every two or three hours, (d) Directional radio beacons transmitting sixteen letters on 32 compass segments by means of an array of 16 aerials For these 'beacons only a radio receiver is needed in the' aircraft? (e) Ground radio D/' stationsx, These send bearings to the home station which transmits this information to the aircraft on request,. (f) Although a type of grundcontrolledapproach radar has been reported in use, there is no information to confirm these reportoo It is con.sidere that by mid-1953 the Soviet Bloc will con- tinue to utilise the present radio/radar navigation aids mentioned above;; The probability of the development of some type of GC( radar s stern for major airports can be a cted? Also the development . of some type of electronic long range navigation system can be_ expected but the date of completioi ?? of the project cannot be estimatek S'S Rzi 1, Approved For Release /0' SI R P79R01012AO02100020002-3 Approved For Re eas a 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R01 2A002100020002-3 $~.e Intelligence concerning Soviet Bloc research and development in iatfraered is very inadequate and most official eEtimsteu contain considerable speculation It is known that practically all Infra- red. techniques developed by the Germans have been atv.ed by they Soviets, Enough Germ technicians are already 'under Soviet control to duplicate the Germs devices and to improve on them with the aid of technical data published. in U.S. scientific journals, Some informations of awn- confirmed reliability, has been received concerning troop exercises using infra-red night-viewing devices, installations of infrared radio fire control equipment on tanks. experimental prototype production of infra ,--red antiaircraft proximity fuzes and seeker, and of passive heat detectors, It has been previously established? through reliable irzforr oration, that the Soviets developed infras- ed automati fir:i equipment for use in the Russe 'innieh Ware Scientific publications indicate that considerable research in the field of pho a conductivity is taking place behind the Iron Cartain, It has also been reported that the Soviets are engaged. in a program for the development of infr=red homers for their SAN and AAM. However, it is not considered that by mid 1953 the Soviet Bloc will have any imfra red homers available for operational use, (.b) E1.cactrcnilc CouYt a eE ee: The Soviet Bloc is be. iieve3d engaged in an active program to provide the SaTiet Air Forces page U_ of pages SJCJRFT Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02100020002-3 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO 0 ,2A002100020002-3 with electronic countermea ;ures fa,cilitieso It Is believed that Soviet knowledge of offensive. countermeasures teae1riques is based on. ivlowmtien of the countermeasures employed by the Grmans during World War II,, In addition, both U. S. and 'British war surplus equipment for use in electronic reconnaissance aircraft have been purchased by the Soviet Union, The lend.-lease program supplied the Soviets with ampler of U.S. "window" and specifications for its use,, Technical in-Formation on the TVY-l jamming transmitter and the R D O wide-,band search receiver was m a d e e available to the Sovietso The Soviets have full knowledge of U.S,, and Allied. World War II radar search receivers, Amerioaxi airborne equipment interned, by the Soviets during World Wax, II included AN/APP 5 (jammers), . al 8 5. (forr.G.t receiver) Q /. A 11 (pulse analyzer), . /APQ Z ( o oa Mole jam ar)o Some actual evidence of Soviot posutrar progress in countermeasures has been detected, The Soviet Blv,c is capable of large scale Jwmiing. operations at frequencies up to 309 megaeyeleso Airborne J rs may be available, utilizing the same spectrum sole as airborne passive BOX. Since specimens of Ger World War II Vim' Jammar2 are considered available to the Soviotsa this capability may well extend as high In frequency as the V' band Directional equipment utilising the common S and Y bbndau and possibly some i band, may be available but large gaps in the spectrum will not be covered Other measures of passive defense may include directional radio equipment capable. of inter cepting any type signal In the frequency speetrirn frcm very low to about ss Page.G Of pages Approved For Release 10' ' O3/4 79R01 012AO02100020002-3 Approved For Relea e,.OQ 03/04: C1.A-RDP79R0 1O2A002100020002-3 a Pr 300 megacycles VHP* Soviet T aircraft a ,y use false radio identifi- cation as well as tom" markings in an effort to evade identification as enemy? Soviet infra red. camouflage paint for use of aircraftf, similar to British paint covering optical wave lengths from 0.7 to 1.3 microns has boon fouu& The Soviet Bloc can be expected to possess some knowledge of German anticja $ng techniques. No anti-jamming devices are known to be on Soviet egaipmenta Although there is no evidence of large-scale production of radar magnetrons It is believed that the Soviets are capable of equipping a sufficient number of Soviet long range aircraft to conduct largeryscale countermeasures operation6r, While the Soviets must be con- ceded the capability to employ some of the above RCM gear or Soviet gear similar to it, the information available is not sufficient to determine what types or what tactics might be used,, (0 Prt~xim3 t ~h~s? The availability of radio type proximity fuzes for ground and antiaircraft ? tillery will depend on the ability of the Soviet Bloc to overcome the problems of production, It Is doubtful that efficient fuues will become available to the Soviet Bloc in si fj cant-quantities until late in the period under consideration, Beverv because of less exacting engineering requirementsd it is believed that the Soviet Bloc is capable of producing operational quantities of proximity fees for such guided missiles as may become available during the period, (j) Tn ne Rjjn By mid=l95I6 and possibly by mi l953 the Soviet Bloc will have available operational quantities of influence Page a.4 of pages Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02100020002-3 Approved For Release 04 ,. lA_ 9R012A002100020002-3 rp P. seines for aircraft similar to those developed by the Gerwans during World. War IIQ These will include pressure-magnetic ,coustic combinations with elaborate period delay and ship counter mechanise, (k) Aixax #t Z adoe ad In 1953 the Soviet Bloc is capable of having available in operational quantitiee improved copies of the Germs patter:-xning9 wire controlled, active and passive acoustic homing toxpedoeso These torpedoes may have such refinements as aria d.sl ste ring and possibly combination active and passive acoustic ho se, cs Page of pages Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02100020002-3 Approved For Release 20 While no guided missiles are known to be operational in the Soviet Bloc, it is evident that with the aid of German engineers and labor that the Soviets have built up a sizable guided missile program. (a) mace to Air iise lesa It is estimated that by mid-- 1953 the Soviet Bloc could have operational quantities of an all-,weather supersonic SAM based on the German "Wasserf all's 4 This missile could have an operational ceiling of 50.,000 --60.,000 feet and a horizontal range of approximately 12 nautical miles. It has been reported that the Soviets are working on an infrared homer for this missile and that existing AAA fire control di:,;?ector systems will be utilized for the launching and initial guidance of the missile0 This information cannot be biatq- v'eri fied, lit seems to follow the pattern of simplicity favored within (o) Air-to-Air Missiles: It is estimated that despite an almost complete lack of intelligence in this field, the Soviet Bloc could at present have completed' development on a visually- guided, radio-controlled supersonic missile. It is probable, however, that there will be no large scale productia:_ of AAM until development of an adequate homing system has been completed,, It is reported that the Soviets are working on an infrared homing device for use in the Air--to-Air field0 It is estimated that any air=to--air missile produced will also employ proximity fusing. (0) Surface-to-Surface Missiles: Two types of German surface-to surface missiles have been studied., produced and tested in tha `F i ~ J I Paige 1, m .of ages C Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02100020002-3 3ARfMP R01012AO02100020002-3 Approved For RelseTV Sovi Bloc a These are the V-1 flying bomb and the V-2* The Soviets appear to have concentrated more on the V-2 missile, and it appears that they are engaged in a long-range program to provide themselves with long-range strategic missiles for -inter=continental use.. It is kno;n that they have already increased the thrust of the V-2 from 25=metric tons to 35=-metric tons and it is reliably reported that they have been engaged since 1948 in the designing and testing of a 120-metric ton thrust engine for use in one and taro-stage strategic missiles based on the Germs V-20 It is estimated that these long-range programs will not materialize before 1955 at the earliest. However., by mid-1953 the Soviet Bloc is capable of ops rational quantities of V-1 and V-2 type missiles with,ranges of 200 nautical miles and 350 nautical miles respectively. (d) Airto-Surface Missiles% There is evidence of Soviet Bloc interest In the German air-to-surface missiles the HS-293, a radio -_ controlled glide bomb, rocket-poawered, and guided visually from an aircraft; and the Fritz 7; (FX-1400), a radio-controlled bomb, guided visually from an aircrafta These missiles could be sufficiently improved so that by mid=1953 they could have increased ranges and accuracy and greatly improved guidance sya n s. It is therefore estirn ted that by mid-195 3 these missiles could bo available .ixn operational quantities employing radar or television and radio coaaad and having ranges of approximately 10 nautical miles. 7. Aerial Weapons (Bomber, Fi. ;hits ?, Attack and Other SDecial. k' 'C3~ta C-ra j 7Isng-3Na- , Axiw e -cent) Since 194.5 the Soviet Union has made remarkable progress in rs- Oage4_.oy ages Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02100020002-3 79 R01-OA002100020002-3 Approved For Rel sa a 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R01Q2A002100020002-3 I-9 aircraft development 4 In addition to aircraft and engines in various tagges of development, they acquired complete factories as well as several thousand skilled specialists from Germany. Exploitation of the German air- eraft industry has permitted the Soviet Union to advance its technical develop- lent tremendously. This advance has been assisted by the availability of American and British aircraft and enninea~, There will be a constant effort on the part of the Soviet Bloc to increase speeds, ranges and ceilings by modifying existing aircraft and by the use of new operational techniques. (a) Bomber Aircraft: t: The TU 4 was first d? mdnstr-ated in :.947, approximately three years after the Soviet Union obi ained an lueerican ?329-, Since then, this aircraft has been in series production and has formed the basis for creation of a long--range striking fo:rceo The appear- 25X1D ance in July 1951 of a heavy bomber, approximately one-third larger than the TU-4 and estimated to have range capabilities approaching those of the U.S. Bab, marked the second known major step forward in Soviet develop=- mont of modern long-range aircraft. Other logical steps which the Soviets may be undertaking in the long-range field would be improvement of the TU 4 to give it the capabilities comparable to the U.S. B-50, and development of a jet medium bomber. There has been some indication of effort in this direction. In the light bomber field, the most significant developmex has been the introduction into operational units of twin-jet bombers, now in series ptoduction6 Thus far, the jet bombers identified in units of the 25X1 D Air Force of the Soviet Army have been - somewhat comparable to the British Canberra. Two larger types have also been se?, Approved For Releas o1/ IF- DP79R01Q~' M0 25X1 D Approved For Reloe 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R01OA002100020002-3 25X1 D 25X1 D the latter of which may be intended for use by navy air units. The has also been associated with at least one reconnaissance regi- ment, and there is a possibility that this aircraft may also be utilized in a ground attack role o It can be expected that the present jet light bomber re- equipment program will continue through 1953 and there is also the probability that present models will be modified tp increase range, speed, and operational altitudes (b) Fighter Aare; Emphasis in the :?fighter field has been placed on mass production of the MIG-15, upon which a decision to standardize was apparently made sometime in 1947 or ea:Aly 1948 after development of various jet fighter designs. Analysis of the MIG=15 power plant and airframe indicates that this aircraft was fabricated by means of modern mass production methods and techniques,, The aircraft has demonstrated itself in combat in Korea to be first-class fighter, com- parable in performance to the F-860 Two Soviet versions of the Rene engine have been used in the MIG--15, the earlier one known as the RD-45 and an improved version known as the VKa1? Modifications of the 14IG-15 have been seen, indicating a continuing development effort. A particular effort is being made to convert fighter units from piston to jet equipment and at the time more than 50% of the total: fighter strength is estimated to be jet typeeb Of significance is the fact. that piston engine fighter production has ceased. No all-weather equipped fighters are knotai to be in opera- Approved For Release [/0 ( 0 9R0101? 491% Approved For Relve 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R01A002100020002-3 25X1D 25X1D tiona.l use. Prototype aircraft with, protuberances which could ho i e intercept radar have been seen, indicating that development work on all- weather fighter types is in progress. An examination of all available information on Soviet prototype's shows that could easily meet the requirements for an ail-weather interceptor. This aircraft is a twin- jet swept-wing type. Performance-wjse, it is estimated to have a 5000 ft. per minute rate of climb and a maximum speed of 525 knots,, It has suffi- cient space for the installation of Al equipment and the necessary .arr-a.ent plus an additional crew n mbero It is estimated that if the Soviets should decide to produce this aircraft that a limited number could be made available to operational units, in 1953. In the field of supersonic aircraft, available lnfoation indicates that the Soviets in the summer of 1948 acquired two rocket--powered types-- the German ?9 163/263 and the DFS-346(Blohm and Foss)? The latter was designed as a supersonic research aircraft, Three models were built by the Siebel plant, in Germany before it was moved to the Soviet Union. A re-- search aircraft similar to the DFS-346 has been observed in the lklvsc?at area It is therefore considered that the Soviet Union is engaged in the development of supersonic aircraft o However,, it is not consider that the Soviet Bloc will have any rocket powered aircraft in operational units during the period under consideration, (c) Attack afft In the attack field the Soviet Bloc is presently utilizing World War 11 types. These are the 11-2 which became operational in 1941, and the 11-10 a latter version of the first. To date Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R01012gp2~0Q~9 Approved For Relas, a 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R0101' A002100020002-3 25X1 D pr q arily. as an. attack aircraft}, S ae wal reports have i. d. sated. u ser=e have boon no firm indications -o: ? a prototype jet aircraft d(-:siggned #iiiG-150-s have been engaged in firing rockets at ground ta~.~getsk houle'ver no 14IG16 h?? e been observed with r?ockets or facilities for :rockets'o another 1-possibility is the. use of Jet light, bomber in t:.b:.s role9 hewever., there'are no indications that this will be. done,. It is t a ; fired that the Soviets could have a jet attack aircraft in use in raid-1953 capable of 440 knots at sea level and with a combat radius of 2`1` nautical miles a (d) F ines: Prior to, the end of World War. H the Soviet #:Ta : oc~ appe?red to have had a good basic theoretical kno~-iledge of het engines and their capabilities. This knowledge is currently considered to be comparable with that of the United Stratesa. Follarl.ng the war, the Soviets acquired German turbojets and. Walther rocket engines in service operation ,, development and design status0 British tur'b.-3jets, 1.e?, ; ne and Derwrent, V were imported by the Soviets in 1947. `There are indications that the Soviet Bloc is developing the high powered G r_tmazn Jet eng Ju_.Qo-,O'_L2 and ! m ',0oo - 8,000> (pounds static thrust), There are also indications that develop tent of at least one engine of native design erwayo Further indications are that the Soviets have expended con- siderable effort in the deveiopmen:, of the German Jumo 022 turboprop engine and it is estimated that this engine could be available for )p: -_r t onai employment with 5(W shaft horsepower. It is estimated that ~RP Approved For Releas ~03 79R01012A00219020002-3 Approved For Re ea a 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R0t0,2A002100020002-3 by id-1953 the, Soviet Bloc could have available for operational use turbojet engines of lO OOO to i1,500 pounds thrust and turboprop engines of 5,000-to 7,000 shaft horsepower. (a) Aircraft Weapons: It is estimated t .hat Soviet Bloc aircraft will utilize conventional type automatic guns a3 their principal armament installation, These guns may be of calibers up to 3?, with a cyclic rate of 550 rounds per minute and a muzzle velocity of 2,300 feet per second. Unguided aircraft rockets with and without probity fuzes, may be available to supplement guns for air-to-air and air=to-ground use. It is probabl_o that automatic rocket launchers installed internally will be used in addition to presently developed launchers. T1ha use of optical computing gun sights, similar to the U. S. K-14., the Bri?'ish Mark II and comparable Geraaxa sights, will be in wide used `here is no intelligence pertaining to Soviet development of radar gun sights; however, it is known that they are interested in the application of inf ,:-aredo It is estimated that the Soviets will have sufficient blind boinbing and navi- gational radars for pathfinder missions or critical long range bombing missions. S5" Page? of ., pages Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-R~ 79R01012AO02100020002-3 Approved For Reba a 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79ROl A002100020002-3 Antiaircraft Art r-v LArtillery o :e s~ The Soviets now have a capability of delivering continuously pointed antiaircraft artillery fire at altitudes up to 40,000 feet by tactical employment of a new antiaircraft gun of apprc nately 85 Mm to 10 in caliber which became operational during 1951. Fire control directors for use with this new weapon have not been identified but will most likely fully exploit the capabilities of the gun. The SCH-584 gun- laying radar is reported being produced and will be used primarily in the fire control system for the acquisition of radar data. It is estimated that by mid-1953 the Soviets will have sufficient-numbers of light, medium and heaver antiaircraft guns of advanced design to provide an off =c . defense for priority target areas only. It 'a1,t,~? is estimated that erf~/all~weather fire will be encountered up to 40,000 feet,, The Soviet Bloc will probably have opera There is every indication that the combat effectiveness of Soviet military aviation is low by U. S. standards. The Soviets continue to experience difficulty in replacement of worn and damaged piston aircraft and aircraft parts. Under conditions of sustained combat, it is believed that not more than 50 percent of assigned aircraft could be kept operational. The general level of training of Soviet ground and air personnel is considered to be inferior to that of United States and United Kingdom personnel, although the Soviets are conducting an intensive training program. (2) Air Force of the Soviet Az Personnel of the Air Force of the Soviet Army are, in general, well versed in operations related to the support of ground forces. The Air Force of the Soviet Army has been strengthened since World War II by reequipment with jet fighters and jet light bombers, but the majority of its combat aircraft are still World War II types. The equipment of its tactical 'air control system is definitely N'& -31" Of pages / 61i7,'rI-Aj DP79R01012A002100020002-3 Approved For Relea*ei2 Approved For Releas 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R010124002100020002-3 ~Md inferior to that used by the United States, and there are indications that the overall development of the system permits less flexibility than the United States system. The retention of large numbers of the IL-10 piston engine attack aircraft as the primary close support weapon results in a heavy requirement for fighter escort and reduces the counter-air capability of the fighter force. The tactical bomber force is being improved by re- equipment with an excellent twin-jet light bomber, and it may be expected that this force will be capable of considerably better performance than in World War II, when its operations were relatively ineffective. In spite of the weaknesses noted above, the Air Force of the Soviet Army is capable of providing effective support to the Soviet ground forces, because the rela- tively fixed and stereotyped pattern of Soviet ground force operation does not require great flexibility. (3) Fighter Aviation of Air Defense-- While the Soviet Union has an effective day interceptor aircraft in the MIG-.l5, the effectiveness of this aircraft cannot be fully exploited because of the lack of adequate amounts of effective ground control radar equipment. There is no evidence that an all-weather interceptor, equipped with adequate airborne intercep- tion radar, is available in-Soviet units; it is therefore believed that the Soviet night and all-weather interception capability is extremely limited. On the whole, it is estimated that Soviet day interception capabilities would be good in the areas of heavily defended targets because of the con- centration of the best radars in those areas, and that night and all-weather Page of , Pages Approved For Rele 01 91 1 A RDP79R01012A002100020002-3 Approved For Releas 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO10.12AO02100020002-3 capabilities would be extremely, limited in any area, (4) L O S -- World War II operations of Soviet long-range bomber units were handicapped by poor navigation and lack of skill in instrument and all-weather flying9 Units of Long Range Aviation are known to be undergoing intensive training to meet the Soviet goal of a capability to undertake ~4,rategic bombing missions by day or night in any weather. This will become possible when radar blind bombing and navigational devices are in general use; at present, it is believed that some aircraft are equipped with these devices. In spite of intensive Soviet efforts, it is believed that the combat effectiveness of Soviet Long Range Aviation remains well below that of the United States and United Kingdom strategic air arms; the average Soviet medium bomber crew is considered to be less skilled than the average United States medium bomber crew of World War II, and Soviet staff planners lack the extensive operational experience obtained by the United States and United Kingdom. (5) Naval Aviation-- The experience of Naval Aviation units during World War II was largely confined to support of the coastal flanks of the Soviet Army and to anti-shipping operations against German convoys in the Black Sea and the Baltic. Toward the end of the war it had achieved a considerable degree of competence in operations of both kinds, but it ob- tained no experienca against heavily defended naval task forces. The Soviet Union obtained some excellent German anti-shipping weapons, such as air-to- surface missiles and pattern--running and homing torpedoes, but it is not Approved For Re 1-RDP79 R0101g202A0gQ2 02- ages Approved For Rele s 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02100020002-3 ~fto known whether the extensive development production and training programs necessary to develop a capability with these weapons has been undertaken. Naval Aviation units are considered capable of carrying out patrol, anti- shipping, and mining operations to a radius of 300-700 miles, and possibly capable of employing developments of more advanced German and Soviet anti- shipping weapons. There is reliablekevidence of the assignment of jet aircraft to naval units, and it must be expected that the effectiveness of Naval Aviation will be considerably improved by mid-1953. Support of Soviet ground forces would be adequate at the present time, fo Disposition- The Soviet Air Forces are estimated to be disposed as outlined in the following table, and it is estimated that this general disposition will remain in effect-- barring unforeseen military operations-- through raid-1953e S75" gge -_ of pages Approved For. Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO101,2A002100020002-3 Approved For Rele s 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1 01 2 40021 00020002-3 SECE oR-:' ESTIMATED GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET AIR STI GTH Br AIRCRAFT TYPE 1 6pill 0232 (A r0Ximats FiauraS. Based on O&E Strength) AIRCRAFT TYPE EASTERN EUROPE WESTERN USSR 2 SOUTH WESTERN US S$ SOUTHEIN USSR FAR EASTERN U, TOTALS Fi ht?r Jet 1,120 1,650 890 670 1 270 600 5 Piston 200 1,300 750 650 , 1,300 , 4,200 Attack 500 19050 220 260 630 2,660 Yht Bomber Jet 210 420 40 m - 670 Piston 340 910 650 380 1,600 39 88O Medium Bomber - 400 300 - 100 Soo Transport 150 680 220 90 360 1,500 Reconnaissance Vr0 360 120 130 37.0 1 090 TOTALS 2,9690 6,770 3,190 2,180 _ 5,570 , 20,400 SIC' Pale of pages C R rr= rqp Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012A002100020002-3 Approved For Rele s 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO101 2/002100020002-3 ~... 1J L C R F T 20 COMMUNIST CHINA: The Communist Air Force in the China,-Manchuria area is estimated to have aT%'ailable a total of approximately 1800 combat aircraftg including 1000 Jet fighters, 250 piston fighters, 160 ground attack aircraft, 240 piston light bombers, and 150 twin-engine transports. The main concentra- tion is in Manchuria, where approximately 1100 aircraft (including 606 jet fighters) are based. The balance of approximately 700 aircraft, including 400 jet fighters, is d@ployed in the Peiping, Shantung Peninsula, Shanghai- Wanking, and south China areas. While definite information is lacking, these units presumably are organized along Soviet lines and would have relatively good mobility. Morale is believed to be fairly high as a result of preferential treatment and the enthusiasm generated by the growing size, activity and prestige of the air forces. As a result of intensive training and combat experience, the Chinese Communist Air Force is considered to have reached a fair level of efficiency and combat effectiveness. On the whole, the Chinese Communist Air Force would be relatively formidable in its present operating areas, but it is almost wholly dependent on the Soviet Union for logistic support. Should this support be withdrawn or interdicted, the combat- efficiency of the Chinese Communist Air Force would decline rapidly. 3o EUROPEAN SATELLITES: The air forces of the European satellite nations- aggregate some 1450 aircraft in operational units; this :umber includes approximately 100 Page __18__ of _-r_ pages Approved For Release i0 /03 I ~P79R01012AO02100020002-3 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02100020002-3 W %W R P' Jet fighters, 450 piston fighters, 440 ground attack, 1#30 light bombers, 150 reconnaissance, and 120 transports. The satellite forces are almost completely dependent on the Soviet Union for logistic support, and virtually all aircraft are Soviet types. Units are modelled after those of the Soviet tactical air forces, and Soviet influence is exerted through the integration of Soviet officers into satellite organizations, often down to the regimental level. Mobility would be comparable to that of the Soviet Aiir liorces if the satellites operated under Soviet control and direction. Morale ranges from relatively good in the Bulgarian Air Force to very low in the Czechoslovakian Air Forces. Training ranges from relatively good to ver7 poor, On the whole, combat effectiveness is low by United States-United Kingdom standards, but acting in concert and with Soviet logistic support and direction, the satellite air forces would have a significant combat value against small individual nations such as Greece, Turkey, or Yugoslavia. Page of pages Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02100020002-3 Approved For Rele s 20&1/ 4 7R01012002100020002-3 t--: t+ air ta" "'lam 2Q LL d-. l f present Aoldil A Mid itarv ~auiv3aexst =. While there is little direct information available concerning the size and quality of Soviet stockpiles of military aviation equipment (it is believed that all bloc stockpiles are under Soviet control'o the estimated production rate of Soviet aircraft has greatly exceeded the attrition rate since World War II, In addition a large stockpile of relatively new aircraft was avail- able at the end of the warn Further, it is known that Soviet policy requires that large reserves of aircraft be maintained in storage, Prom consideration of these factors,, and the estimated size and composition of Communist air forcesg it has been calculated that the Soviet stockpile of military air-- craft may be approximately equal to the active inventory but not identical as to tYpe0 Few If any medium bombers or light jet bombers are consideref to be in stored ;reserved With respect to stockpiles of aviation fuels and lubricants, it is believed that the Soviet doctrine requires that sufficient P( be ava Table to support 120 days of combat operations Of this amountp it is probable that 30 days supply is held below Air Army level, 30 days in pipe linen, and 60 days in storages While it is known that stockpiles exist in each of the areas in which Soviet aviation forces operateD the level at which these stockpiles are actually being maintained is not know It is considered that adequate quantities of bombs, ammunition? and rockets are available foz' one year of r0 3Q It La~ution Retee - On the basis of the estimated composition of the Soviet air forces for the period m U.1952 to mad .1953 Page . of IF, pages Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02100020002-3 Approved For Release 2001/0,3/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02100020002-3 and the esti>meted attrition rates for that period, the peacetime aircraft lose would be roughly as follows : Fighters Jet 825 Piston 8W Ground Attack Piston 550 Light Bombers Jet 100 Piston 700 Medium Bombers Transports 100 Reconnaissance Jet 20 Piston 180 This does not include any combat lose in Korea or any satellite attrition, The requirement for peacetime usage rates of aviation fuels is estimated at arproxiT ately 1D?50000 metric tons of aviation gasoline and, 615,)000 metric tone *of jet fuelas for a total of approximately 196650000 metric tons of aviation fuels, Expenditure of aircraft boobs, ammunition, and rockets are estimated to be well below. the level required for the Soviet Union to ,)air ta$n and increase stockpiles of these products? according to Its desires0 Z Coordination and Direction of Bloc Air Forte p (aas) General - The Objective of Soviet policy - a Communist world state dominated bya Kremlin organization which it'-self rests on a secure power base - is the central theme which ginds together Soviet military, economic, political, foreign and domestic policies into an integrated plan for the weakening and ultimate destruction of the non-Communist world,, Page 41 of -~ pages Approved For Release 2 I I P 9R01 01 2AO02100020002-3 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02100020002-3 Accordinglyv all the means by which the Soviet Union can bring its pour to bear against non-Communist states are coordinated at the highest levels the Politburo and the Council of People?s Minister?0 The Politburo members ship generates the general policies and concepts governing the pioyment of Soviet military forces in pursuit of the Soviet goal; the general policies thus established are translated into w r,plans at the Ministry of War level and these pl?rns.presumably mks provisions for the coordinated use of military forcee,0 There is considerable evidence that inWorld War II Stalin and, the Politburo took an active part in developing both the general policies governing the employment of Soviet forces and the actual war plans for Ong these policies into effectr, and it is reasonable to presume that the Politburo has retained control over these matterso Within the general policies and plans established by the Council of People?s tdinistere and the War and Naval Ministries, area military commands:es are raspondible for coordinating the forces wader their command to fulfill the command ob-t jective0 Assuming continuation of the World, War II syst1 m except where there may be some evidence to the contra2rp the 'v'arious components of Soviet military aviation would be affectod in the following ways.- l. Air Force of the Soviet Army - It to believed that the general coordination of tactical forces is accomplished by the War Ministry. which develops overall operational plans for Soviet forces and details specific "Front" (Army Group) commanders to execute their portions of the overall plan. The Front commander and, the Air Army commander, who 6S Page _12_ of , pages s Approved For Release 2 ? /?3/0 ~ E 79R01012A002100020002-3 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012,AO02100020002-3 is directly subordinate to the Front Coaam xderp develop in conference with their staffs a general concept for the employment of tactical aviation in Conjunction with the contemplated ground force operation, Such a plan provides for coordinated use of the air forces in assisting the ground forces, and sometimes make specific allocations of air units to support specific ground force units, such as the armored comrxi spearheading a breakthrough. A directive is then issued by the Front ^ommander to the Air Array commnder, setting forth the tasks to be performed by the Air a The Air Army staff develops an operationsl plan for accomplishing these tanks and,, after approval by the Front Corander, this :L incorporated in the full operational plan and sent to the War Ministry :?or approval. Com r,nd and control of the air forces in the combat operation is; held by the Air Army commander, and coordination with ground force operations as they develop is accomplished through the tactical air control system, (b) Naval Aviation - Naval Aviation is directly subordinate to the Ministry of the Na,oy, When air forces of INavaai Aviation operate in support of Soviet Array operations, the relationship of the aviation commander to the "Front commander is apparently the rime a? that 01' the Air Army eon mandere, Milo no Specific iuformatl,,an is available? it is believed that pl.anE for air support of iriavai operations are developed and pact into operation in much the same, manner as those for support of ground force operations, (c) ` Aviation of Air Defense - Fighter Aviation of Air Defense rt Pace -41_ of 57 pages Approved For Release IP93/gF&A-%179RO1012AO02100020002-3 Approved For Rele4a 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79ROl 1 ,2AO02100020002-3 RET is subordinated to an air defense organization in the War Ministry which commands or coordinates all.the elements of air defenses including active and passive measures, The Air Defense Directorate in the Ministry of War is believed responsible for coordination of overall Soviet air defense mean ouresg coordination of air defense fighters in the field with other elements of air defense is accomplished through the air defense radar and communicate tions net established in each air defense region0 The defense of key iz. duetrial, political, and economic areas is organised under PV'O Points (control centers); all air defense activity within the radius of a Point is operationally controlled and coordinated by a Point commander, (d) Long Range Aviation - Long Range Aviation is directly subordinated to the War Ministry, and it is believed that the War Ministry coordinates plans of the Long Range Aviation with those of other elements of Soviet military aviation and with overall military plans.. (e) Aviation of Airborne Troops The organisational status of this component of Soviet military aviation is not firmly establishedo Some evidence indicates that the Commander in Chief of Airborne Troops Is a Deputy of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force of the Soviet ArmY0 , Other evidence indicates that the Commander in Chief of Airborne Troops is subordinate to the Minister of Was and actually may have the status of a Deputy War Minister0 At any rate9 it is believed that this official coordi, hates and arranges for the aviation requirements of airborne troops,, The overall plane for the employment of airborne troops in connection, with Page of XI pages M i ' .:! % ; --"1 -*1 Approved For Relea 4DP79R01 01 2A0021 00020002-3 'Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02100020002-3 N104 ~Md TOOP SECREH ground force operations may be developed by this directorate,, and it is considered probable that final. plan are coordinated with overall Soviet military plus by the War Ministry. (f) Civil Air Feet -;-4 The Civil Air plee+i, is orgard2ationally subordinated to the War Ministry,, and it is assured that the War Ministry is responsible for coordinating its operations with military operationsc, Sa Bl+ac Strat%ELO and T ca , Dora. -ind (a) Strategic Doctrine - The general strategic doctrine of the Soviet bloc is reflected in coordination at the highest level -. the Politburo to bring to bear all sources of power of the Soviet bloc in order to weaken and ultimately destroy the non.-Communist states, With respect to strategic air power,,,its doctrine appears, ox the basis of its equipment and research efforts,, to be bo: owed from that of the United States and Great Britain; its aim is to bring its power to bean' directly against the internal sources of enemy strength through the mass destruction weapon and the long range aircraft operating in any condition of weather and visi.~ bility,, ind`ipendently- or in coordination with other forces, (b) Tactical Doctrine - The tactical doctrine of overwhelming Soviet military aviation in World War II was reflected in the employment of overwhelming numbers of air craft operating in support of a x'elatively stereo typed patterns of ground force operations, with the whole= effort depending for its success largely on the concentration of forces r.terically superior cc Page A5- of pages Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02100020002-3 Approved For Reles 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R0104002100020002-3 %NO Alf, 011 to those of the enemy,, With some adjustment for the more modern equipment and methods which the Soviets have put into operationo this appears to be substantially the present doctrine of Soviet tactical av.6ation0 Nowevere there appears to be a growing consciousness of the usefulness of operations at great depth behind enemy linesL, and the longer range jet light bombard ment aircraft now entering Soviet tactical units indicate a growing capaaa bility and intent to undertake operations which may be independent of immediate ground force operations or affect the outcome of the ground battle only after the lapse of a considerable period of time,, The tactical doctrine of righter Aviation of Air Defense is essentially one of mass and concentration in the areas of critical targets? with relatively large 'au ua mportextAalmost completely undefended, There is little information on the taactice.I doctrine of Naval Aviation with respect to attack on naval forces? although the best operations against the Germans,?* during the latter 'stag g of World War IT were characteriased by excellent coordinated attacks by ff.ghters and attack aircraft executing a well-developed attack plate, cc Page of _iyL w pages n, T sai P.. r ' ' Approved -For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02100020002-3 `Approved For Release 2001 79R01012A002100020002-3 B. ESTIMATED BLOC MILITARY CAPABILITIES to Cavity to Initiate and Maintain Various Military Campaigns -- It is estimated that the Soviet Bloc Air Forces are capable of furnishing air support to large scale ground force operations on the Eurasian. continent, in addition to conducting an active air defense of the Soviet Union and a strategic air offensive against the United States, the United Kingdom, Allied lines of communication, and the deployed strength or deployment capability of Allied air power. The Soviet Air Forces are capable of executing these campaigns with or without the use of mass destruction weapons, although capabilities against targets at great distances from the Soviet Unions long range bomber bases would be greatly reduced unless mass destruction weapons were utilized; in parti- cular, the strategic threat against the United States would be reduced to almost negligible proportions in terms of decisively influencing its war effort and that against the United Kingdom would be greatly reduced. goo 2, Offensive Ca abilities ao Offensive Capabilities A nst the United States? It is estimated that the Soviets have a TO&E strength of F9C TU-4 medium bomber aircraft at the present time. The TU-4 with a normal combat range of 3,320 nautical miles and a combat radius of 1,800 nautical miles -w th a 10,000 pound payload is the only known operational Soviet bomber capable of delivering the atomic bomb in the United States. It could be modified to have a combat radius of 2,150 nautical miles and a combat range of 3,960 nautical miles when carrying a 10,000 pound bomb load. There is no confirmed intelligence to indicate the Soviets have so modified any TU-48s. Similarly, the Soviet long range capability could cc 4.7 P ~. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02100020002-3 Approved For ReIes 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R01QA002100020002-3 FP) v SECRET be increased by aerial refueling. Soviet Long Range Aviation is considered capable of attempting the following operations against the United States: (1) One way atomic attacks from bases in the Murmansk area, the Soviet zone of Germany, the Baltic area and Northeast Siberia against any important target in the United States: (2) Two way attacks employing atomic weapons, or other mass destruction weapons, or conventional bombs from bases in Northeast Siberia against that segment of North America bounded by a general line passing through Seattle, Calgary, and Churchill.' (3) Possible two-way attacks with one aerial refueling employing atomic or other mass destructions weapons from bases in North- east Siberia against that segment of North America bounded by a general line passing through Los Angeles., Denver, and Minneapolis. Two aerial re- fuelings would extend this radius to include an,are running from Galveston to Cape May. However, there is no evidence that the Soviets have in fact developed aerial refueling techniques,, ba Offensive Capabilities Against the United Kingdom? In addition to the substantial numbers of medium bombers which could operate from bases within the Soviet Union and Soviet occupied Europe against the United Kingdom., significant numbers of light bombers could reach the United Kingdom on D=Day with only minor redeployment taking place prior to the attack. The weight of air attack would increase sub-- stantially as the Soviet ground forces moved across western Europe and Page of pages Approved For E M U UDMR01012AO02100020002-3 Approved For Rele s 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO10JA002100020002-3 acquired bases nearer the United Kingdom. Some jet light bombers in Europe are believed probably capable of carrying spme fo;;i of atomic bomb. C" Inventory crf Atozuic Weapons at~d Probab:l? Bloc Target Priorities- The inventory of Bloc atomic weapons is3 estimated as follows Mid-1952 - 50 Mid-19 53 - 100 Data on Soviet production of fissionable material is such that the size of the atomic weapon stockpile may be as low as half or as much as twice e estimates indicated above. No direct information is available as to probable bloc target priorities. On the basis of what appear to outside observers to be a logical distribution of effort in term?s of estimated Soviet war aims9 it is considered that a major portion o_' the stockpile would, be employed against targets in North America, and unlikely that any significant number would be allocated to targets elsewhere than in the United Kingdom and North America. d. ()peraional Readin~~s of Bloc Lon}?[7(yjj~4e Air_? While specific information is lacking on the operational readiness of Soviet long range regiments,the Soviets have had a flyable B-29 type aircraft since 1944 and have had numbers in operational training units since 1948. Since this period is much longer than that which would 6S Page of _ pages . 92 Approved For Releas` X100 I RDP79R01012A002100020002-3 Approved For Relewss 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R01Q A002100020002-3 be required in the United States or United Kingdom to develop an operational capability with these aircraft, it is estimated that operational readiness is adequate to warrant an attempt to deliver, in the United States and United Kingdom, the full stockpile of atomic weapons that is or will become available. 3. Defensive Capabilities--In the post war period, and particularly during the past year, the Soviet Union has made notable progress in improving its air defense system. During the past year the PVO Point system has been transformed into a system of integrated defense areas centrally controlled from Moscow. The reequipment of interceptor units with MIG15 aircraft has continued. The early warning system of the satellites has been incorporated into an overall Soviet system and the reporting and communications system has been expanded. A new type radar similar to the US AN/CPS 6 may have been developed and placed in operation. A new 85 or 100 millimeter antiaircraft gun has appeared in positions in Moscow and Liningrad and there has been a related increase in quantity of SCR 584 type gun-laying radar equipment.. The radar network has been enlarged (over a period of years) so that the Soviets now have peripheral coverage in the east, west, and southwest as well as coverage in depth in European Russia. Soviet interception capa- bility has been further increased outside the Soviet Union through continued reequiping of Soviet fighter units with jet- interceptor aircraft. In spite of these improvements, however, there remain major weaknesses in the Soviet air defense system? The early warning system utilizes radars of generally IA,. Page - of pages Approved For ReleaW bi DP79ROl 012A002100020002-3 Approved For Relee 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79R01QA002100020002-3 obsolete and obsolescent types which are susceptible to jaxg. The quantity and quality of ground control interception radar is considered inadequate to cope with saturation tactics, even in the areas of major targets. Gun-laying radar is not available in sufficient quantity and the gun defense itself does not provide adequate defense against high speed, high altitude aircraft. The reporting system utilizes radio communications which possibly can be jammed. There is no indication of the operational use of airborne interception radar, so interception capabilities would be limited to conditions of daylight and good visibility. In sum, while the Soviet Union has expended considerable effort in the period since World liar II to improve its defenses, and in particular has made notable progress during the past twelve months, the system is not yet adequate to assure the Soviet Union any substantial degree of protection from air attack by a capable enemy. sc Page JA- of pages Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO02100020002-3 Approved For ReleQ 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R010,,`? 002100020002-3 . j ,city to Maintain Campaigns While Bconpff and Supply Linea Under Various Kinds of Attack a. Anything more than a highly generalized comment on this subject would require detailed war gaming, involving consideration at length not only of Soviet vulnerabilities, but also of the strength, capabilities, and expected operational utilization of all the forces opposing the Soviet Union. b. It can. be stated in general that significant segments of the Soviet economy are considered highly vulnerable to atomic attack, An atomic offensive against selected key target systems throughout the 3oviet Union could produce a crippling reduction in the output and distribution of materiel and supplies needed to sustain a war efforts The immediate effect on specific cam- paigns of such an attack upon the Soviet economy would depend in considerable part on the degree to which stockpiles had been created and tine extent to which Soviet leaders were required to alter their campaign plans by destruction and dislocation of the Soviet economy. The ultimate effect would depend not only upon the effectiveness of the atomic offensive in terms of physical destruction, but also upon such incalculables as the effect of an atomic offensive upon Soviet Bloc cohesion, control systems, and will to fights Co With regard to supply lines, the Soviet Union enjoys the advantage of internal lines of communication, but there are aI o significant vulnerabilities in the internal, transport system, such as the general sparseness of t:raneportation facilities between various important center:,, and heavy dependence on certain lines like the Trans-Siberian rail link between European Page 52 of 55 pages T rR) RD C. Approved For Releai'e`2( 01/Q /0:4y^ R - DP79R01012A002100020002-3 Approved For Rele she 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79ROlO A002100020002-3 TOP Russia and the Soviet Far 'gast. In view of these vulnerabilities, the ability of the Soviet. transport system to sustain a flow of supplies from the Soviet rear to various campaign areas could be adversely affected.. both as the result of direct attacks and by the indirect results of an atomic offensive which would disrupt transport operations and schedules. d. Advanced Soviet supply lines to forces in the field axe 'considered to be vulnerable to air attack at various points., such as rail bridges., highway bridges, rail yards, rail transfer sites and supply depots. eo Soviet ability to sustain air operations would be af- fected more or less directly not only by attacks upon airfields, POL dumps$ communications facilities and other such targets, but also by attacks on selected war-supporting segments of the Soviet economy, Page 53 of 55 pages e Approved For Releas R 10 81,"'kr-~ DP79R01012A002100020002-3 Approved For Relee 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R01Q12A002100020002-3 4. Capacity of Bloc Forces to Hold and Utilize Territory Added to Bloc-- In view of the presence of Communist parties of varying sizes and potentials in most of the nations bordering the Soviet Bloc, it is con- sidered that the Bloc has a nucleus for a national government in each nation which could maintain itself in power, with the assistance of Bloc military occupation forces, in the face of any domestic opposition which might develop. However, if popular unrest in any occupied country resulted in the creation of organized opposition forces which could be assisted from the outside, serious difficulties might be created for the government and the occupying forces. The ability to utilize the economy of the occupied terri- tory in support of the Soviet war effort would be dependent on many factors, of which one of the most important would be the state of the economy and the condition of production facilities when occupation occur3. If extensive demolitions were accomplished in occupied areas prior to occupation, and serious destruction accomplished in the Soviet Union through strategic attack., it is doubtful that the Soviet Bloc would be capable of using such facilities as steel mills and other heavy industrial organizations for a considerable period of time. In any case, demolitions would very seriously hamper Soviet efforts to organize the economies of occupied countries. Finally, Soviet efforts would be greatly hampered if key members of the Communist Party of the occupied country had been removed prior to occupation. However., if the Soviet Bloc took over the nation with the economy, producing facilities and national Communist Party reasonably intact, it is considered that the economy of the occupied nation could be utilized effectively by the Soviet Bloc after Approved For Release /0 FPP79R01012A0020003W02-3 d, `!x U83,Kku '~f -?r 1~t3t~~' Approved For Rel a 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R01 01 AGO2100020002-3 ti a national government had been established and an economic plan placed in operation. In the case of facilities capable of manufacturing end products with specific military applications, such as ordnance and. almunition, it is considered that the Soviet occupying forces could place the relatively few such facilities in each country into operation within a few weeks after occupation, with or without the cooperation of a friendly national govern- mento Supply of the necessary raw materials for these producing facilities could probably be assured by absolute priorities, and difficulties with the local labor force forestalled through the use of suitable repressive measures. SS ss Plage _-%_ of ` _ pages Approved For Release ( 'P/0 /;I 4 C F~QP79R01012AO02100020002-3 ?? ? s SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET 25X1 A 09 9S DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION REGISTRY SOURCE D I USAF CIA CONTROL NO. 75341 _ DOC. NO. DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED DOC. DATE 28 April 1952 29 April 1952 COPY NO. / LOGGED BY NUMBER OF PAGES 5 i NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS none ATTENTION: This form will be attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret material is limited to those individuals whose official duties relate to the material. Each alternate or assist- ant Top Secret Control Officer who receives and/or releases the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. The name of each individual who has seen the Top Secret document and the date of han- dling should be indicated in the right-hand columns. REFERRED TO RECEIVED RELEASED SEEN BY OFFICE SIGNATURE DATE TIME DATE TIME NAME AND OFFICE SYMBOL DATE OAD NE D ? s ~~ 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A ! Review o elarmine this document by CIA has that I It has no objection to declass oftains information of CIA t i c hat musi rema n assified at TS S C Aafhorit a HR 70-2 r E3 H ontalns nothing of CIA 1 re Reviewer NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record. THE TOP SECRET MATERIAL DETACHED FROM THIS FORM WAS: BY (Signature) DOWNGRADED ^ DESTROYED ^ DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) TO OFFICE DATE FORM NO. 3 8 MAR 1851