SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES THROUGH 1957

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A002200020001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 16, 1953
• Content Type: NIE

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SECURITY INFORMATION
COPY NO.
P 3,9,?65
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES THROUGH 1957
NIE-65
Approved 9 June 1953
Published 16 June 1953
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 9 June 1953. The FBI abstained, the subject
being outside of its jurisdiction.
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
030965
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-
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?
3.
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SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES THROUGH 1957
THE PROBLEM
To analyze the principal factors affecting Soviet Bloc capabilities and to estimate
the probable development of those capabilities, through 1957.
ASSUMPTION
That there will not be general war within the period of this estimate.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Developments within the USSR result-
ing from the change in leadership may
ultimately affect Soviet Bloc capabilities,
but so far the economic and military bases
of Soviet power are believed not to have
been affected by Stalin's death. This
estimate, therefore, is based on the trends
within the Soviet Bloc since 1945, and
does not attempt to estimate whether, or
to what extent, these trends may be af-
fected by changes within the ruling
group.'
'The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department
of State, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intel-
ligence, Department of the Army, and the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believe
that this sentence should be replaced with the
following:
It is impossible as yet to estimate with confi-
dence whether or not a prolonged struggle for
power among the new leaders will develop dur-
ing the period 1953-1957. We believe, however,
that if such a struggle for power should develop,
it would be confined to the higher echelons of
the Soviet Communist Party and Government
and would probably not precipitate open conflict
within or between the armed forces and security
police, or involve the Soviet population. We es-
timate, therefore, that the stability of the regime
in the USSR is unlikely to be jeopardized by dif-
ferences that may develop among the Soviet
leaders.
2. The rate of growth of the Soviet econ-
omy will almost certainly remain higher
than that of the US or any other major
Western state. However, the output of
the USSR will remain much lower than
that of the US, and the output of the en-
tire Bloc will remain much lower than
that of the NATO states.
3. Bloc scientific and technical capabili-
ties will continue to increase throughout
the period of this estimate. However, the
scientific assets (the number and quality
of trained personnel, facilities, equip-
ment, and financial support) of the US
will remain greater than those of the
USSR, and the assets of the West as a
whole will remain far greater than those
of the Bloc.
4. By mid-1957, the USSR may have a
stockpile of from 335 to 1,000 atomic
weapons (30-100 kiloton yield). We
have no evidence that thermonuclear
weapons are being developed by the
The estimates beyond mid-1955 are tentative
projections of the estimates for the earlier years.
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USSR. Soviet research, development,
and even field testing of thermonuclear
reactions based on the disclosures of
Fuchs may take place by mid-1953. How-
ever, it is very unlikely that the USSR
could test a full scale thermonuclear de-
vice based on these disclosures before
mid-1954. There is also a possibility that
Soviet field tests based on independent re-
search and development along other and
advanced approaches to the thermonu-
clear weapons problem might occur by
mid-1954. Testing of advanced models
might be possible earlier if US develop-
ments were known through espionage or
other compromise.
5. The USSR now has the capability seri-
ously to disrupt Western long-range radio
communications and navigation sys-
tems." Soviet capabilities in related elec-
tronic fields indicate that the USSR is
now capable of developing equipment for
jamming frequencies up through SHF,
and the USSR could produce such equip-
ment by 1957. If such equipment were
produced on a large scale and placed in
operational use, it would probably con-
stitute a threat to Western short-range
radio communications, navigation, and,
to a lesser extent, bombing systems, un-
less Western anti-jamming capabilities
were improved.
6. We estimate that the size of Bloc
forces-in-being will not increase sub-
stantially by 1957. The emphasis in the
program for increasing Bloc military
strength will continue to be placed upon
modernizing the armed forces and upon
enlarging the atomic stockpile.
For more detailed information, see SE-38, "So-
viet Bloc Capabilities and Probable Courses of
Action in Electromagnetic Warfare" (24 April
1953) .
2
7. We estimate that the Bloc now has the
capability to undertake' concurrent
large-scale operations in continental Eu-
rope, the Middle East, and mainland
Asia. The Bloc could reinforce with Chi-
nese Communist and Soviet forces the
Communist forces now in Korea, and at
the same time undertake' an invasion of
Japan by Soviet forces.
8. The USSR now has the capability to
undertake' concurrent air operations
against the US, the UK, continental Eu-
rope, the Middle East, Japan, and the off-
shore island chain of Asia. However,
operations against the US would be much
more difficult than those against the
other areas. The USSR has the capa-
bility to reach all parts of the US and to
attempt the delivery of its full stockpile
of atomic weapons. However, even a
stripped-down TU-4 could reach only the
extreme northwestern corner on two-way
missions without aerial refueling. Even
with aerial refueling and other range ex-
tension techniques, attack upon the stra-
tegic northeastern industrial area and
upon most of the principal strategic bases
almost certainly would involve the ex-
penditure of the attacking aircraft and
most of the crews on one-way missions.
Until it has a heavy bomber available for
operational use, the USSR will not have
the capability to reach most of the stra-
tegically important areas in the US on
two-way missions. A heavy bomber based
upon a type which has been seen in flight
' No estimate of the success of these operations
can be made without considering the effects of
the actions of opposing forces.
We believe that the USSR has the capability to
utilize range extension techniques, but we have
no evidence that any of these techniques have
been exploited.
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may be in production and may be avail-
able for operational use within the period
of this estimate.'
9. We estimate that the Bloc has the ca-
pability of providing vigorous opposition
against air attacks on critical targets in
the interior of the USSR, under condi-
tions of good visibility. Under clear
moonlit night conditions, Bloc defense
capabilities are fair against piston bomb-
ers and negligible against jet bombers.
Under conditions of poor visibility, day or
night, Bloc interception capabilities are
negligible.
10. Currently known trends point to an
increase of Bloc air defense capabilities
during the period of this estimate. How-
ever, it is impossible to estimate the ex-
tent of significance of any increase, be-
cause the future development of airborne
intercept (Al) equipment and of guided
missiles is obscure; in any case, such an
estimate would require knowledge of the
characteristics of attacking aircraft
through the period of this estimate.'
11. Bloc naval forces (except for ocean-
going submarines, and new cruisers and
" For more detailed information, see SE-36, "So-
viet Capabilities for Attacks on the US through
Mid-1955" (5 March 1953).
'The Director of Naval Intelligence believes that
this paragraph should read as follows:
We believe the Bloc will continue its present
emphasis on air defense, and that its capabilities
In this respect will increase during the period
of this estimate. Operational use of improved
early warning and ground intercept radar, and
the extensive employment of airborne intercept
equipment will contribute to this increase. The
development and production of all-weather jet
fighters and guided missiles, which are within
Bloc capabilities, would further improve Bloc air
defense. However, we cannot estimate the sig-
nificance of these improvements relative to fu-
ture air offensive capabilities.
3
destroyers) as now constituted are de-
signed to protect Bloc coastal areas and
seaward flanks of ground campaigns.
We believe that, as new construction with
improved characteristics becomes opera-
tional, emphasis will be laid on the crea-
tion of striking forces which could oper-
ate within the limits of the range of
land-based air support. Bloc minelaying
capability is extensive, and in the event
of war, could seriously interfere with
Allied sea communications in Europe and
the Far East, or with Western naval op-
erations in waters adjacent to the USSR.
The Soviet submarine force will increase
its capability to undertake offensive pa-
trols and mining operations along most
of the world's strategically vital sea lanes,
and possibly, if the specialized craft have
been developed, simultaneously to launch
guided missile attacks against targets on
both the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards
of the US.' .The Soviet Navy will have no
long-range amphibious capabilities with-
in the period of this estimate, but it will
remain capable of mounting short-range
amphibious operations in considerable
force.
12. The principal sources of strength
upon which Bloc political warfare capa-
bilities are based will remain Bloc mili-
tary power, which generates fear and
defeatism, and the Bloc's size, strategic
position, economic power and potential,
and centralized direction. Other sources
of Bloc political warfare strength are the
highly organized Communist interna-
tional movement, and the leadership and
discipline of the individual Communist
'We believe the USSR capable of adapting sub-
marines to this use, but we have no evidence to
Indicate that such modifications have been made.
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Parties; Communist ideas and doctrine,
which influence many non-Communists
as well as Communists; and the accumu-
lated experience and professional skill of
Soviet intelligence, propaganda, and sub-
versive organizations and of Soviet use of
front organizations. Finally, the fixity
of Communist purpose to impose Commu-
nism on the world and the unified direc-
tion of Communist action give the Com-
munists a tactical political warfare
advantage in determining the nature, di-
rection, and intensity of courses of action
to be used against the non-Communist
world.
13. It is difficult to estimate how Bloc
political warfare capabilities will develop,
since they depend to a large degree not
only upon the situation within the USSR
but also upon the success with which the
non-Communist world meets the chal-
lenges to its stability which would exist
even if there were no Communist threat.
It is also difficult to estimate the develop-
ment of Bloc political warfare capabilities
because they are dependent not only on
the relative attractive power of Commu-
nist and non-Communist ideas, but on
the relative military strength of the Bloc
' and the West. If Western military
strength should increase, relative to that
of the Bloc, Bloc political warfare capa-
bilities would probably decline. On the
other hand, fear of war and consequent
vulnerability to Bloc political warfare
would probably increase in the non-Com-
munist world, if the Bloc's capability to
deliver atomic weapons should increase
relative to Western defenses, and if the
Bloc should improve its air defenses rela-
tive to Western offensive capabilities."
4
14. We believe that during the period of
this estimate Communist capabilities to
establish Communist governments by po-
litical warfare techniques will be most
likely to increase in Southeast Asia and
the Middle East. These capabilities will
probably remain greatest in Iran and
Indochina.
15. In other areas of the world, Commu-
nist capabilities to influence the attitudes
of non-Communist governments and peo-
ples will constitute the principal danger
posed by Bloc political warfare. The
Communists may be able to undermine
support for Western programs of defense
and for increased political and economic
unity, and they may be able to heighten
tensions among the members of the West-
ern coalition. For these purposes, they
can exploit national differences between
the Western Powers, economic and trade
difficulties, nationalism in colonial and
dependent areas, and dread of war.
The Director of Naval Intelligence believes this
paragraph should read as follows in order to
render the military hypothesis more realistic and
inclusive:
It is difficult to estimate how Bloc political
warfare capabilities will develop, since they de-
pend to a large degree upon the situation within
the USSR, the success with which the non-
Communist world meets the challenges to its
stability which would exist even if there were
no Communist threat, and the relative military
strengths of the Bloc and the West. Thus, Bloc
political warfare capabilities will increase if the
non-Communist world fails to solve adequately
the problems of economic stability, national
rivalries, common defense, and aspirations for
independence in the colonial areas. If Western
military strength and cohesion should increase
substantially relative to that of the Bloc, Bloc po-
litical warfare capabilities would probably be
checked, and might decline in some areas. On
the other hand, if the over-all military strength
of the Bloc should substantially increase relative
to that of the West, Bloc political warfare capa-
bilities would rise, particularly with respect to
the promotion of appeasement, apathy, and the
fear of war.
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NON-MILITARY FACTORS AFFECTING
BLOC CAPABILITIES
Internal Political Factors
DISCUSSION
USSR and to continue rigorous limitations on
access to Western information."
18. A major reorganization of Soviet agricul-
ture might, at least temporarily, weaken
Soviet stability. Before Stalin's death, there
were indications that the Soviet regime might
attempt a major reorganization of Soviet
agriculture, through an attack upon the
kolkhoz market and the private sector of
agriculture. While we believe it unlikely
that the new Soviet rulers will adopt this
policy, there is not sufficient evidence to make
this estimate with confidence. Such a move
would ensure more complete control of agri-
culture and would satisfy the doctrinaire
Communists. However, it would almost cer-
tainly evoke peasant resistance and disor-
ganize the food supply, at least temporarily.'2
USSR
16. Developments within the USSR resulting
from the change in leadership may ultimately
affect Soviet Bloc capabilities, but so far the
economic and military bases of Soviet power
are believed not to have been affected by
Stalin's death. This estimate, therefore, is
based on the trends within the Soviet Bloc
since 1945, and does not attempt to estimate
whether, or to what extent, these trends may
be affected by changes within the ruling
group.'"
17. Conflict within the ruling group would
be the internal development most likely to
jeopardize Soviet stability during the period
of this estimate. The dissatisfaction latent
among large numbers of the Soviet popula-
tion over low living standards and over the
severity of police controls will remain great,
but it will not constitute a threat to the
stability of the new regime. The years of
isolation and indoctrination and the cam-
paign to instill hostility toward the West
have almOst certainly reduced but not elim-
inated the reservoir of popular good will
toward the US. During the period of this
estimate, the regime will almost certainly be
able to reduce further the effect of external
propaganda on the general population of the
The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department
of State, the Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2, and
the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, believe that this sentence should be re-
placed with the following:
It is impossible as yet to estimate with confi-
dence whether or not a prolonged struggle for
power among the new leaders will develop dur-
ing the period 1953-1957. We believe, however,
that if such a struggle for power should develop,
it would be confined to the higher echelons of
the Soviet Communist Party and Government
and would probably not precipitate open conflict
within or between the armed forces and security
police, or involve the Soviet population. We es-
timate, therefore, that the stability of the regime
in the USSR is unlikely to be jeopardized by dif-
ferences that may develop among the Soviet
leaders.
5
" The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department
of State, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
believe this sentence should be replaced with
the following paragraph:
We believe it improbable that any internal po-
litical development, including a possible struggle
for power among Soviet leaders, will jeopardize
the stability of the Soviet regime during the
period of this estimate. As long as the Soviet
leaders are able to resolve their differences or to
keep incipient conflicts from spreading to the
armed forces and security police, the existing
system of controls over the population will al-
most certainly prevent any group or faction in
the USSR from posing a serious threat to the
Soviet regime.
"The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department
of State, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2,
believe this paragraph should be deleted. Al-
though Stalin indicated in October 1952 that
the Soviet regime was planning to introduce, at
some unspecified time, measures that would re-
duce or eliminate that kolkhoz market and the
private economy of collective farmers, he also
stated that such changes could become effective
only gradually and over a long period of time.
The new leadership is certainly aware that a
drastic change would probably antagonize the
peasants and has specifically reiterated the need
for caution in making any changes in the agri-
cultural sector of the Soviet economy.
The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Depart-
ment of State, and the Assistant Chief of Staff,
0-2, believe the following paragraph should be
substituted for paragraph 18:
The new Soviet leadership will almost certain-
ly pursue the basic domestic policies established
during recent years. In particular, it will con-
tinue to maintain a fundamentally hostile atti-
tude toward the West and to emphasize the
increase of Bloc military power and the expan-
sion of the Bloc industrial base. It is also un-
likely that the new leadership will institute any
radical changes in Soviet agriculture during the
period of this estimate.
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The Satellites
19. Soviet control over the Satellites is virtu-
ally complete and is unlikely to diminish or
to be successfully challenged from within
during the period of this estimate. If a
struggle for power should break out within
the Soviet ruling group and if it were con-
fined within the higher echelons of the Soviet
Communist Party and Government, Soviet
control over the Satellites would not be sig-
nificantly affected.' 3 However, if the strug-
gle within the Party should spread to the
Soviet Army and the Soviet Security Forces
and should lead to open conflict within or
between these forces, Soviet control over the
Satellites would be shaken.
20. In the unlikely event that the new Soviet
rulers should adopt a policy of rapid col-
lectivization of agriculture in the Satellites,
peasant resistance would increase and agri-
cultural production in the Satellites would
decline for some time. However, even rapid
collectivization of agriculture in the Satel-
lites would probably not seriously shake So-
viet control.
21. There will continue to be purges of the
various Satellite Communist Parties, but the
purges are unlikely to weaken the reliability
of these Parties or their control over the
Satellite populations. The USSR will almost
certainly not be able by 1957 completely to
isolate the population of the Satellites from
Western information, and the passive hos-
tility now general among the Satellite peo-
ples will persist and perhaps increase. In-
tensive Communist indoctrination of selected
segments of the population, including the
youth, and favored treatment of some groups
will almost certainly increase the number of
supporters of the Soviet system.
The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department
of State, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
believe that this sentence should read:
Even if a struggle for power should break out
within the Soviet ruling group, the struggle
would probably be carried on within the higher
echelons of the Soviet Communist Party and
Government and would not significantly affect
Soviet control over the Satellites.
6
Communist China
22. The Chinese Communist regime has firm
control over mainland China, and there is
little likelihood of its control being threat-
ened or shaken by domestic forces within the
period of this estimate, unless Communist
China should suffer a serious military defeat
or unless conflict should develop within the
Chinese Communist Party over the relation-
ship between Moscow and Peiping.
23. Communist China has accepted Moscow
leadership in the international Communist
movement, but appears to be more an ally
than a Satellite. Moscow and Peiping pre-
sent a united front to the world and are
apparently agreed upon the following aims:
a. To eliminate Western power and influ-
ence from Asia.
b. To increase their military potential in
Asia.
c. To prevent the resurgence of an armed
and non-Communist Japan.
d. To advance the world Communist move-
ment; in particular, to divide the non-Com-
munist countries and to weaken their ability
and determination to combat Communism.
24. The military dependence of Communist
China upon the USSR will almost certainly
increase, at least until the Korean war
has ended. The Chinese Communists have
launched an industrialization program,
which will require large-scale imports of cap-
ital equipment. So long as Western trade
controls continue, these requirements can be
met only by imports from the Bloc. How-
ever, should there be a reduction of tension
in Asia, the military and economic depend-
ence of Communist China upon the USSR
might be reduced.
25. Sino-Soviet relations may be strained by
problems relating to levels of Soviet economic
aid, by the extent of Soviet military commit-
ments to Communist China, by disagreement
over the control of border territories, and by
the definition of Mao's role in the Asian
Communist movement. However, we believe
that the new Soviet leadership will deal cau-
tiously with Mao and that a split between
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Peiping and Moscow is unlikely during the
period of this estimate, unless the stability of
the Soviet regime should be seriously weak-
ened.
Economic Factors"
26. The gross national product of the Bloc
has been increasing rapidly during the post-
war years. Calculation of its magnitude and
comparisons with prewar years are neces-
sarily subject to considerable error. We esti-
mate, however, that the 1938 level of produc-
tion for the Bloc as a whole had been regained
by 1948. We estimate further that by 1952,
Bloc gross national product was about one-
third greater than in 1948, thus increasing
on the average about 7-8 percent per annum.
27. The rate of growth of the Soviet economy
will almost certainly remain higher than the
rate which the US or any other major West-
ern state will attain, unless there is a drastic
reorientation of Soviet economic programs.
We estimate that the Soviet average rate of
growth during the period from 1952 to 1957
will be 5 to 7 percent annually and that
Soviet gross national product will increase 30
to 40 percent.
28. Despite Soviet achievements during the
postwar years, the output of the USSR will
remain much lower than that of the US, and
the output of the entire Bloc will remain
much lower than that of the NATO states.
We estimate that the Soviet gross national
production was about one-quarter to one-
third that of the US in 1952, and that the
gross national product of the entire Bloc
was about one-third that of the NATO states.
These disparities in ratio terms will proba-
bly be reduced slightly during the period of
this estimate, although the disparities in ab-
solute terms will be widened somewhat.
Bloc output in the basic industries ? energy,
" These estimates of Bloc economic developments
are based largely upon postwar published eco-
nomic plans and recent trends in the USSR, the
Satellites, and Communist China. The esti-
mates do not consider whether, or to what ex-
tent, these trends or plans may be affected by
changes within the ruling group of the USSR
or by developments outside the Bloc.
7
minerals, metals, and chemicals ? will re-
main substantially below that of the NATO
states.
29. However, comparisons in terms of total
output of all types of goods and services are
somewhat misleading as indicators of rela-
tive capacity to produce military equipment
in peacetime. Since the end of World War
II, the USSR has diverted a much larger pro-
portion of its gross national product to mili-
tary purposes than has any Western state.
We estimate that about one-sixth of the
Soviet gross national product is now devoted
to military outlays, and that the proportion
will remain at least as high through the
period of this estimate.
30. The Bloc during the period of this esti-
mate will almost certainly continue to con-
centrate upon expanding its industrial base.
Total Soviet industrial production will prob-
ably expand by about 40 to 50 percent. So-
viet production of consumer goods (excluding
housing) , will probably increase only about
one-fourth to one-third. Satellite industry
as a whole will probably expand rapidly,
though not so rapidly as that of the USSR.
Although industrial output in Communist
China will probably also increase, it will con-
tinue to be a small part of the Bloc total.
Production of consumer goads in the Satel-
lites and in Communist China will probably
expand more slowly than in the USSR.
31. Present per capita food consumption in
the USSR (in terms of calories) is nearly
equal to the 1935-1939 average. Agricultural
output in the USSR will probably increase
between 10 and 20 percent during the period
of this estimate. The largest gain will be in
non-food crops. Qualitatively, the average
diet will probably improve somewhat during
the period of this estimate.
32. Despite the growth of new centers of in-
dustry in the USSR, the older industrial re-
gions (including the Urals) will still provide
the bulk of Soviet industrial production.
Programs to disperse Soviet industry and to
create self-contained regional complexes will
continue, but the production of many basic
materials and of most equipment will remain
geographically concentrated.
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33. The Soviet stockpiling program is de-
signed to maintain vital sectors of the econ-
omy under wartime or emergency conditions
and to facilitate the conversion of industry
to a wartime footing. We are unable to esti-
mate the magnitude and composition of the
Soviet stockpiles, but we believe increases in
total production through 1957 will support a
considerably enlarged strategic stockpile.
Stockpiling has already begun in some Satel-
lites, and we believe that during the period
stockpiling programs will be adopted through-
out the Bloc.
34. By 1957, the Bloc economy will have
achieved a higher level of self-sufficiency
than at present, although certain imported
items will remain of substantial importance
to Bloc industrial and military production.
These items include electronic tube com-
ponents, certain chemicals, certain types of
machinery and equipment with their spare
parts, and probably also tin, natural rubber,
copper, zinc, and cork. If these items of im-
port should cease to be available, bottlenecks
would appear in the Bloc productive system,
and for a limited period of time adverse reper-
cussions would spread through the economy.'5
35. We believe that Bloc capabilities for ex-
port to the non-Communist world will in-
crease somewhat during the period of this
estimate. We estimate that by 1957 the Bloc
will be capable of exporting capital equip-
ment and increased quantities of raw mate-
rials to the non-Communist world.
Scientific and Technical Factors"
36. Soviet scientific and technical capabilities
have increased rapidly since World War II,
and we believe that they will continue to in-
crease throughout the period of this estimate.
The USSR has given science and technology a
high priority and has given great emphasis
to increasing the contribution of science and
'5For more detailed discussion of this problem,
see NIE-59, "Probable Economic Effects of a
Severance of East-West Trade" (16 April 1953) .
" These estimates of developments in Bloc sci-
ence and technology are based on the assump-
tion that scientific and technical capabilities
will not be significantly affected by political
developments.
8
technology to Bloc military capabilities, with
results most evident in air defense and in
the development and production of atomic
weapons.
37. The scientific assets of the US (the num-
ber and quality of trained personnel, facili-
ties, equipment, and financial support) are
greater than those of the USSR, and the assets
of the West as a whole are far greater than
those of the Bloc. However, the USSR is ex-
pending great effort to reduce this disparity,
and it will probably continue to devote a
higher proportion of its scientific and tech-
nical assets to military purposes than the US.
Therefore, the difference between Soviet and
US scientific capabilities in this period may
not be so significant as the over-all superiority
of the US in scientific assets would suggest.
38. Soviet higher education in most scientific
and technical fields is roughly comparable to
that of the West, but a shortage of scientific
and technical personnel will continue
throughout the period of this estimate. We
estimate that there are slightly over one mil-
lion Soviet citizens who have received scien-
tific or technical degrees from colleges and
universities (about three-fifths the US total).
About 170,000 are people are engaged in scien-
tific research and in teaching science in the
USSR, compared to about 210,000 similarly
engaged in the US. We estimate that during
the period of this estimate at least as many
people will graduate in engineering and the
physical sciences in the USSR as in the ,US.
39. Soviet science and technology are subject
to the same type of centralized planning and
control as all other Soviet activities. Even
though Soviet scientists are a privileged group,
their research is subject to many of the usual
totalitarian restrictions. Such restrictions
will probably have a more deadening effect
upon long-range theoretical research than
upon practical applications within the period
of this estimate. While numerous theories in
chemistry, physics, and biology have been 'at-
tacked, there is no evidence that ideological
restraints hamper developments directly af-
fecting military weapons.
40. East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and to
a lesser extent other Satellite countries,
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possess scientific and technical manpower and
facilities which provide a significant incre-
ment to the total resources at the disposal of
the Bloc. On the other hand, Communist
China, because of the extreme shortage of
scientific and technical manpower and facili-
ties, is unlikely to contribute to Bloc science.
Scientific and Technical Capabilities in
Particular Fields
41. Since World War II, the USSR has made
substantial achievements in atomic energy,
aircraft design and production, electronics,
and ordnance. Soviet science will continue to
contribute substantially to the increase of
Bloc military strength and capabilities
throughout the period of this estimate, par-
ticularly in the following fields:
a. Atomic and Thermonuclear Weapons.
The Soviet atomic energy program will con-
tinue to have one of the highest priorities in
the allocation of Bloc resources. Soviet ca-
pabilities for atomic research will remain
considerably less than those of the US in both
personnel and equipment. We believe that
the Soviet atomic energy program will con-
tinue to concentrate almost entirely upon the
development and production of weapons."
We have no evidence that thermonuclear
weapons are being developed by the USSR.
Basic research which may be related to a
thermonuclear program is being carried on,
and the USSR has a growing capacity for
quantity production of materials which could
be used in the development of thermonuclear
weapons. Soviet research, development, and
even field testing of thermonuclear reactions
based on the disclosures of Fuchs may take
place by mid-1953. However, it is very un-
likely that the USSR could test a full scale
thermonuclear device based on these dis-
closures before mid-1954. There is also a pos-
sibility that Soviet field tests based on inde-
pendent research and development along
other and advanced approaches to the thermo-
nuclear weapons problem might occur by mid-
1954. Testing of advanced models might be
possible earlier if US developments were
known through espionage or other compro-
mise.
r See paragraph 50 for the estimated size of the
Soviet atomic stockpile.
9
b. Aircraft. Soviet aircraft laboratories and
factories will continue to develop and produce
aircraft of high performance qualities. By
the end of 1957, most Soviet combat aircraft
will be gas turbine (turbo-jet, turbo-prop)
powered. Fighter aircraft superior to the So-
viet jet fighter, the MIG-15, may already have
been developed and may be in serial produc-
tion in 1955. An all-weather jet interceptor
may also have been developed, and such an
interceptor may be in operational use before
1957. Within the period of this estimate, the
USSR may complete development and begin
serial production of a jet medium bomber. A
heavy bomber based upon a type which has
been seen in flight may be in production and
may be available for operational use within
the period of this estimate.
c. Electronics. The USSR has made sub-
stantial progress in expanding its electronics
industry and in adapting Western equipment.
It is now developing and putting into opera-
tion electronic equipment of modern design.
The Soviet electronics industry is now capable
of independent research and development and
has the technical capability to produce com-
plex electronic equipment. We believe that
by 1957 the USSR will have developed and put
into production the following equipment. We
are unable to estimate the priorities given
each of these kinds of equipment or the quan-
tities of each kind which will be produced.
(1) Improved early earning radar with
performances at least equivalent to the best
now in operational use in the West.
(2) Ground control intercept radar for
strategic areas by 1954, and for general de-
ployment by 1957. (The USSR now has at
least 50 V-Beam GCI sets in operational use.)
(3) Fire-control radar, including ship-
borne radar, comparable to equipment now
in operational use in the West (by 1954) ;
field radar for field artillery fire (by 1957) ;
and airborne fire-control radar (by 1957).
(4) Blind bombing/navigation radar.
(The USSR now has some operational air-
craft with this equipment.)
(5) Airborne intercept equipment. The
USSR almost certainly now has experimental
quantities of some type of Al equipment, and
it may have some type of Al equipment avail-
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'
able for limited operational use, although the
indications are not as yet conclusive. We
estimate that Al will come into extensive use
within the period of this estimate.
d. Electromagnetic Warfare. The USSR
now has the capability seriously to disrupt
Western long-range radio communications
and navigation systems.' Soviet capabili-
ties in related electronic fields indicate that
the USSR is now capable of developing equip-
ment for jamming frequencies up through
SHF, and the USSR could produce such
equipment by 1957. If such equipment were
produced on a large scale and placed in oper-
ational use, it would probably constitute a
threat to Western short-range radio commu-
nications, navigation, and, to a lesser extent,
bombing systems, unless Western anti-jam-
ming capabilities were improved.
e. Chemical Warfare. The USSR has the
capability to produce and disseminate stand-
ard CW agents. It also possesses scientific
and technical capabilities for the production
of nerve gases. Although there is much evi-
dence of research closely related to chemical
warfare, there is no evidence that any
basically new chemical warfare end-item is
likely to be developed by 1957.
f. Biological Warfare. On the basis of
known and estimated Soviet capabilities, we
estimate that the USSR can develop and dis-
seminate several highly virulent BW agents.
Within the period of this estimate, the USSR
might also accomplish the directed mutation
of selected viruses and bacteria and the crys-
tallization of certain animal viruses. Success
in the application of such research to the
production of virulent and stable variants
might increase Soviet BW capabilities.'"
In
For more detailed information, see SE-38, "So-
viet Bloc Capabilities and Probable Courses of
Action in Electromagnetic Warfare" (24 April
1953) .
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the
Director of Naval Intelligence believe that
available scientific evidence at present raises
doubt as to the probability of crystallizing
animal viruses and indicates limitations as to
which viruses could be crystallized. Further-
more, there is no evidence at this time that if
one or several animal viruses could be crys-
tallized that this would affect BW capabilities.
T 10
g. Guided Missiles. While we know that
the USSR acquired German operational mis-
siles, plans, and personnel and that a pro-
gram to develop guided missiles has been in
progress for several years, we lack adequate
data to determine the priorities which may
exist between the various categories of mis-
siles, the characteristics of the weapons de-
veloped, and the quantities which are being
produced. We know that the USSR has
built at least a limited number of German
V-1 and V-2 types. We believe that it has
the capability to produce, within the period
of this estimate, operational quantities of
other guided missiles, including surface-to-
air, air-to-air, and air-to-surface types. We
also believe that the USSR has the capability
of fitting atomic warheads to V-1 type mis-
siles and of adapting submarines to launch
such missiles.
MILITARY FACTORS AFFECTING
BLOC CAPABILITIES 20
42. The Bloc now possesses a significant quan-
titative superiority over the major Western
Powers in combat forces-in-being and in con-
ventional ground and air armament. More-
over, the Bloc profits from centralized control
and direction and from greater geographical
concentration.
43. Total forces-in-being, including Security
Forces. Total armed force strength will
probably increase by about 600,000 to a total
of about 9,600,000 men." At present, the
total is about 9,000,000, of which about 4,500,-
000 are Soviet; 1,600,000 Satellite; 2,450,000
These estimates are based upon an analysis of
trends in the development of the Bloc military
forces, of current Bloc military strength, of the
Bloc weapons research and development pro-
gram, and of data from other sources. They
do not consider whether, or to what extent,
these trends or plans may be affected by
changes within the ruling group of the USSR
or by developments outside the Bloc.
For more detailed information concerning Bloc
military strength, see the Appendices to NIE-
64 (Part I) , "Soviet Bloc Capabilities through
Mid-1953" (24 December 1952) and the Appen-
dices to N.IE-90, "Soviet Bloc Capabilities
through Mid-1955," which will probably be pub-
lished in July 1953.
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Chinese Communist;22 300,000 North Korean;
and 185,000 Viet Minh. Most of the increase
in Bloc armed force strength will be contrib-
uted by the Satellites, whose forces-in-being
will probably increase from about 1,600,000 to
over 2,000,000 men.
44. Ground Forces. In 1957, Bloc ground
troops will probably total about 7,500,000 of
which 2,500,000 will be Soviet; 2,000,000 Satel-
lite; 2,400,000 Chinese Communist; 300,000
North Korean; and 185,000 Viet Minh. The
mobilization capacity of ground forces for
M+30 will probably be about 16,000,000 men,
compared with a present capacity of approxi-
mately 14,600,000. The disposition of Soviet
ground troops will probably not change sig-
nificantly, with about 65 percent remaining
stationed in Eastern Europe and the Western
USSR; 15 percent in the Far East; 10 percent
in the Caucasus; and 10 percent in Middle
Asia. The troops in East Germany will re-
main the most combat ready, and in general
the troops along the borders will be consider-
ably more combat ready than those in the
interior.
45. Air Forces. We estimate that at present:
(a) the actual strength of the Bloc air forces
is about 21,500 aircraft, including 8,600 jet
fighters, 950 piston medium bombers, and
1,300 jet light bombers, and (b) the authorized
strength is aproximately 26,000 aircraft, in-
cluding 10,000 jet fighters, 1,200 piston medi-
um bombers, and 1,950 jet light bombers.
Over-all authorized strength is not expected
to increase significantly by 1957, but the actu-
al strength will probably be closer to the au-
thorized strength than it is now.
46. The following significant developments are
also expected by 1957: complete conversion of
Soviet fighter and light bomber components
to jet aircraft, and a marked expansion of the
jet fighter and jet light bomber elements of
the Satellite and Chinese Communist air
forces. It is also possible that some jet
medium bombers and turbo-prop heavy bomb-
"This does not include 1,450,000 Chinese Com-
munist Public Security (provincial) troops, a
lightly-armed and equipped full-time force,
used largely for security purposes and as a
source of trained manpower for the field forces.
11
ers will be introduced into the long-range
striking force. We have very little informa-
tion on Soviet development work on new types
of medium or heavy bombers, but it seems
safe to assume that the USSR is planning to
replace the TU-4 piston medium bomber with
aircraft of higher performance characteristics.
While no Soviet prototype jet medium bomber
is known to exist, there is firm evidence of the
advanced stages of the development of the
German-designed EF-150 jet medium bomber,
and a prototype of such an aircraft may al-
ready have been flown. A prototype heavy
bomber has been observed; it was probably
then powered by piston engines, but it may
now be powered by turbo-prop engines. This
type of aircraft is not known to be in series
production.
47. About 60 percent of the present total
Soviet air strength, including nearly 65 per-
cent of the jet fighter force and almost 85 per-
cent of the medium bomber force, is now
concentrated in the European Satellites and
the western and southwestern portions of
the USSR. We believe that these disposi-
tions will not change significantly by 1957,
except that about one-third of medium bomber
strength will be in the Far East. The Satel-
lite and Communist Chinese air forces will
almost certainly remain dependent upon the
USSR for logistic support.
48. Naval Forces. We believe that the present
Bloc naval construction program will be con-
tinued, concentrating upon cruisers, de-
stroyers, submarines, and patrol craft. The
number of major surface vessels23 will prob-
ably increase from about 215 to 305 units,
and submarine strength will probably in-
crease from about 371 (of which 195 are
ocean-going types, i.e., 106 long-range and
89 medium range) to a total of about 430
(of which 215 will be ocean-going types, i.e.,
175 long-range and 40 medium range). Soviet
Naval Aviation will probably continue to
23 This includes all naval vessel types down to
and including coastal destroyers. The figures
for surface vessels include a number of obso-
lescent units; i.e., 4 battleship/monitors, 5
heavy and light cruisers, and 68 destroyer types.
Submarines over 20 years old are considered
obsolete and are not included in these estimates.
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broaden its concept of operations and in-
creasingly to stress fleet support tasks and
coordinated operations with surface and sub-
marine forces.
49. The USSR has the capability of building
carriers and battleships (as well as cruisers)
in all its fleet areas except the Far East, and
the emerging pattern of its present building
program indicates a concept of operations
beyond defense of the coast. While it is
possible that one or more battleships or air-
craft carriers may be laid down, we do not
believe that any capital ships other than
cruisers will be completed during the period
of this estimate. The Bloc will probably also
continue to lack modern amphibious vessels.
The Baltic fleet comprises about 40 percent,
the Pacific and Northern fleets each about 20
to 25 percent, and the Black Sea fleet about 15
percent of the major surface vessel and sub-
marine strength. We cannot estimate the
type and extent of redeployment which will
take place as new construction becomes oper-
ational.
50. Atomic Weapons. In our calculation of
the Soviet atomic stockpile, weapon types
yielding 30-100 kilotons are assumed. The
estimate of the cumulative Soviet stockpile of
such weapons follows. In view of our uncer-
tainty concerning the production of fission-
able materials, particularly uranium-235, the
possible minimum and maximum quantities of
weapons in that stockpile are also indicated.
Date
Estimate
Possible Range
Mid-1953
120
80- 240
Mid-1954
200
135- 400
Mid-1955
300
200- 600
Mid-195624
400
265- 800
Mid-195724
500
335-1,000
We believe that weapons yielding 200-500 kilo-
tons are probably within Soviet capability and
that the USSR could make ?smaller weapons
(as low as 5 kilotons). In the event that the
USSR should choose to stockpile weapons of
smaller or larger yield, the number of weapons
in the stockpile would be altered accordingly.
2' The estimates beyond mid-1955 are tentative
projections of the estimates for the earlier years.
12
51. Over-all Trends. We believe that the em-
phasis in the program for increasing Bloc mili-
tary strength will continue to be placed upon
modernizing the armed forces and upon en-
larging the atomic stockpile.
52. The over-all capabilities of Bloc ground,
naval, and air forces will almost certainly con-
tinue to increase during the period of this
estimate as a result of: continued intensified
military training; progressive modernization
and standardization of weapons and equip-
ment, particularly those incorporating elec-
tronic guidance and control; increased com-
bat efficiency of Satellite and Communist
Chinese forces; enlargement of the Bloc logis-
tical base; and the growth of Soviet stocks of
war materiel.
53. However, the Bloc armed forces will con-
tinue to be hampered by certain weaknesses:
deficiencies in experience, training, and equip-
ment for strategic air operations and air de-
fense; the lack of experience and of specialized
equipment for the conduct of long-range am-
phibious and naval operations; significant
qualitative disparities between Bloc units, both
within and between national forces; and the
complicated logistics arising from the size of
Bloc territory and the relatively inadequate
road and rail network and merchant fleet.
Bloc Military Capabilities
54. We estimate that the Bloc now has the
capability to undertake25 concurrent large-
scale operations in continental Europe, the
Middle East, and mainland Asia. The Bloc
could reinforce with Chinese Communist and
Soviet forces the Communist forces now in
Korea, and at the same time undertaken an
invasion of Japan by Soviet forces.
55. Bloc naval forces (except for the ocean-
going submarines, and new cruisers and des-
troyers) as now constituted are designed to
protect Bloc coastal areas and the seaward
flank of a ground campaign. However, the
characteristics of the new construction now
appearing, and the increasing coordination
between Naval Aviation and the Fleet indi-
cate a growing emphasis on offensive opera-
No estimate of the success of these operations
can be made without considering the effects of
the actions of opposing forces.
? i?
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tions. We believe that, as new construction
becomes operational, emphasis will be laid on
the creation of striking forces which could
operate within the limits of the range of land-
based air support. With respect to mine war-
fare, the USSR now has the capability of seri-
ously interfering with Allied sea communica-
tions. In the European area, this effort could
include all the ports and approaches of the UK
and Western Europe. In the Far East, most
of the vital Allied port areas and sea lanes
around the perimeter of the Bloc could be
similarly attacked. The advancement in the
design and use of mines and the introduction
of jet bomber types for minelaying purposes
will increase this threat to Allied supply lines.
The Soviet Navy will have no long-range am-
phibious capability within the period of this
estimate, but it will remain capable of mount-
ing short-range amphibious lifts in consider-
able force. The Soviet submarine force will
increase its capability to undertake offensive
patrols and mining operations along most of
the world's strategically vital sea lanes, and
possibly, if the specialized craft have been de-
veloped, simultaneously to launch guided mis-
sile attacks against targets on both the Atlan-
tic and Pacific seaboards of the US.2"
56. The USSR now has the capability to un-
dertake27 concurrent air operations against
the US, the UK, continental Europe, the Mid-
dle East, Japan, and the off-shore island chain
of Asia. However, operations against the US
would be much more difficult than those
against the other areas. The USSR has the
capability to reach all parts of the US and to
attempt the delivery of its full stockpile of
atomic weapons. However, even a stripped-
down TU-4 could reach only the extreme
northwestern corner on two-way missions with-
out aerial refueling. Even with aerial refuel-
ing and other range extension techniques,'
We believe the USSR capable of adapting sub-
marines to this use, but we have no evidence to
indicate that such modifications have been
made.
No estimate of the success of these operations
can be made without considering the effects of
the actions of opposing forces.
We believe that the USSR has the capability to
utilize range extension techniques, but we have
no evidence that any of these techniques have
been exploited.
13
attack upon the strategic northeastern indus-
trial area and upon most of the principal stra-
tegic bases almost certainly would involve the
expenditure of the attacking aircraft and most
of the crews on one-way missions. Until it
has a heavy bomber available for operational
use, the USSR will not have the capability to
reach most of the strategically important
areas in the US on two-way missions. A
heavy bomber based upon a type which has
been seen in flight may be in production and
may be available for operational use within
the period of this estimate.2"
57. We estimate that the Bloc has the capa-
bility of providing vigorous opposition against
air attacks on critical targets in the interior
of the USSR, under conditions of good visi-
bility. Under clear moonlit night conditions,
Bloc defense capabilities are fair against pis-
ton bombers and negligible against jet bomb-
ers. Under conditions of poor visibility, day
or night, Bloc interception capabilities are
negligible.
58. Currently known trends point to an in-
crease of Bloc air defense capabilities during
the period of this estimate. However, it is im-
possible to estimate the extent or significance
of any increase, because the future develop-
ment of AT equipment and of guided missiles
is obscure; in any case, such an estimate would
require knowledge of the characteristics of
attacking aircraft through the period of the
estimate.""
For more detailed information, see SE-36, "So-
viet Capabilities for Attack on the US through
Mid-1955" ( 5 March 1953) .
'"The Director of Naval Intelligence believes that
this paragraph should read as follows:
We believe the Bloc will continue its present
emphasis on air defense, and that its capabili-
ties in this respect will increase during the
period of this estimate. Operational use of im-
proved early warning and ground intercept
radar, and the extensive employment of air-
borne intercept equipment will contribute to
this increase. The development and produc-
tion of all-weather jet fighters and guided mis-
siles, which are within Bloc capabilities, would
further improve Bloc air defense. However, we
cannot estimate the significance of these im-
provements relative to future air offensive
capabilities.
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FACTORS AFFECTING BLOC POLITICAL
WARFARE STRENGTH
59. Political warfare plays an extremely im-
portant role for Communists, who consider
military warfare only an extension of political
warfare in their persistent campaign to under-
mine the strength of the non-Communist
world. Bloc political warfare techniques in-
clude political and economic pressure, dip-
lomatic manoeuvres in the UN and elsewhere,
propaganda and front activities, the action of
Communist Parties and Communist-con-
trolled trade unions outside the Bloc, sabotage,
exploitation of subversive and revolutionary
movements and of civil wars, and psycholog-
ical warfare.
60. The principal sources of strength upon
which Bloc political warfare capabilities are
based will remain Bloc military power, which
generates fear and defeatism, and the Bloc's
size, strategic position, economic power and
potential, and centralized direction. Other
sources of Bloc political warfare strength are
the highly organized Communist internation-
al movement, and the leadership and disci-
pline of the individual Communist Parties;
Communist doctrine, which influences many
non-Communists as well as Communists; and
the accumulated experience and professional
skill of Soviet intelligence, propaganda, and
subversive organizations and of Soviet use of
front organizations. Finally, the fixity of
Communist purpose to impose Communism on
the world and the unified direction of Com-
munist action give the Communists a tactical
political warfare advantage in determining
the nature, direction, and intensity of courses
of action to be used against the non-Commu-
nist world.
61. On the other hand, there are factors which
tend to place limitations upon Bloc political
warfare strengths. These include the limita-
tions of the Communist philosophy and the
Communist world outlook, especially in eval-
uating political developments in the non-
Communist world; the Communist insistence
upon the maintenance of totalitarian control;
frequent conflicts between the interests of the
Soviet Communist Party and the interests of
other national Communist Parties; and in-
14
creasing awareness in the non-Communist
world since 1945, especially in the West, of the
actual conditions prevailing within the Bloc
and of the Kremlin's aggressive intentions.
62. Bloc political warfare capabilities depend
upon the stability and power of the USSR.
These capabilities would be seriously reduced
if a prolonged and indecisive struggle for
power should develop within the Soviet Com-
munist Party or if a struggle for power within
the Soviet Communist Party should spread to
the Soviet Army and the Soviet Security
Forces and should lead to open conflict with-
in or between these forces.
63. For some time, the new Soviet leaders will
not be able to achieve Stalin's status as the
symbol of the international Communist move-
ment and as the undisputed leader of World
Communism. This may have an adverse ef-
fect upon rank-and-file Communists outside
the Bloc, at least temporarily, although we
believe that the loyalty of the hard core of the
Communist Parties outside the Bloc will not
be impaired. If there should be a prolonged
struggle for power within the Soviet Com-
munist Party, the cohesion of the interna-
tional Communist movement would almost
certainly be weakened.
64. It is difficult to estimate how Bloc politi-
cal warfare capabilities will develop, since they
depend to a large degree not only upon the
situation within the USSR but also upon the
success with which the non-Communist world
meets the challenges to its stability which
would exist even if there were no Communist
threat. Thus, Bloc political warfare capa-
bilities would increase if the non-Communist
world should fail to maintain economic pros-
perity; if nationalist conflicts in Western Eu-
rope should be intensified; if conflicts between
the US and its allies should undermine the
program for improved Western defenses; and
if nationalist movements in colonial areas
should stimulate rebellions against the West-
ern Powers. Bloc political warfare capabili-
ties would decrease if the non-Communist
world during the period of this estimate
should succeed in neutralizing or overcoming
the dangers arising from problems such as
these.
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65. It is also difficult to estimate the develop-
ment of Bloc political warfare capabilities
because they are in large part dependent on
the relative military strength of the Bloc
and the West. If Western military strength
should increase, relative to that of the Bloc,
Bloc political warfare capabilities would prob-
ably decline. On the other hand, fear of war
and consequent vulnerability to Bloc political
warfare would probably increase in the non-
Communist world, if the Bloc's capabilities
to deliver atomic weapons should increase
relative to Western defenses, and if the Bloc
should improve its air defenses relative to
Western offensive capabilities.'"
Bloc Political Warfare Capabilities
66. We believe that during the period of this
estimate Communist capabilities to establish
Communist governments by political warfare
techniques will be most likely to increase in
Southeast Asia and the Middle East. In
these areas, the political and economic foun-
dations of some states are unstable, and polit-
ical changes are often sudden and violent.
Communist capabilities for infiltration and in-
surrection may increase because of the in-
tense nationalism in those areas, the social
disintegration and economic dislocations
which afflict those societies, and the ineffec-
tive leadership of the governments. These
capabilities will probably remain greatest in
Iran and Indochina.
a. Iran. Iran will probably remain polit-
ically unstable, and the Tudeh Party will re-
The Director of Naval Intelligence believes that
this paragraph should read as follows in order
to render the military hypothesis more realistic
and inclusive:
It is also difficult to estimate the development
of Bloc political warfare capabilities because
they are in large part dependent on the relative
military strength of Bloc and the West. If
Western military strength and cohesion should
increase substantially relative to that of the
Bloc, Bloc political warfare capabilities would
probably be checked, or even decline in some
areas. On the other hand, if the over-all mili-
tary strength of the Bloc should increase sub-
stantially relative to that of the West, Bloc
political warfare capabilities would rise, partic-
ularly with respect to the promotion of appease-
ment, apathy, and the fear of war.
15
main a danger throughout this period, since
the National Front appears to be insufficiently
unified to develop a stable government and
since the peasants will remain restive. How-
ever, a settlement of the oil crisis might
diminish Tudeh capabilities.
b. Southeast Asia. The Communists will
continue to have dangerously significant
capabilities for political warfare in this area,
with the probable exception of the Philippines.
The political fate of most of this region may
be decided in Indochina.
67. In other areas of the world, the Commu-
nists have some capability to establish Com-
munist governments through political war-
fare techniques, but their capability to in-
fluence the attitudes of non-Communist gov-
ernments and peoples will constitute the
principal danger posed by Bloc political war-
fare. The Communists may be able to un-
dermine support for Western programs of de-
fense and for increased political and economic
unity, and they may be able to heighten
tensions among the members of the Western
coalition. For these purposes, they can ex-
ploit national differences between the Western
Power, economic and trade difficulties, na-
tionalism in colonial and dependent areas,
and dread of war.
a. Western Europe and Japan. In West-
ern Europe and Japan, the Communist Parties
will retain a capability to harass governments,
to confuse opinion, and to interfere with
parliamentary processes, even though some
of these Parties will probably decline in -size
and in influence. Moreover, in these areas
the Bloc may be able to use economic warfare
with particular effectiveness. For example,
the Bloc may be able to conclude and to ful-
fill trade agreements damaging to the trade
pattern and to the export controls of the non-
Communist states.
b. Germany. The Communists retain the
capability to use the German problem to un-
dermine the Western program for defense and
for increased unity. This capability will be-
come increasingly dangerous unless Western
Germany is formally brought into the West-
ern coalition in the near future and unless
the fears of France are calmed. Even if
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Western Germany is brought into the West- European neighbors will probably continue to
em coalition, the traditional mutual suspi- offer opportunities for creating dissension
cion between Germany and her Western and friction.
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3 k
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