CONDITIONS AND TRENDS IN TROPICAL AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A002700040001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 30, 1953
• Content Type: NIE

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COPY NO.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR , ONE
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
CONDITIONS AND TRENDS IN TROPICAL AFRICA
NIE-83
Approved 22 December 1953
Published 30 December 1953
DOCUMENT NO. .
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to.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 22 December 1953. The FBI abstained, the
subject being outside of its jurisdiction.
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
'OW
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CONDITIONS AND TRENDS IN TROPICAL AFRICA
THE PROBLEM
To assess the strategic importance of Tropical Africa and to estimate probable
long-range trends and developments in the area and their strategic consequences.'
CONCLUSIONS
1. The strategic importance of Tropical
Africa arises chiefly from its supply of
such materials as uranium, cobalt, dia-
monds, and columbite; from its location
with respect to sea and air lanes in the
South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and Red
Sea areas; and from its potential as a site
for LOC, staging, and training facilities.
2. The chief problem in Tropical Africa
is that increasing African discontent and
demands for self-government, although
varying widely in different colonial de-
pendencies, will gradually weaken Euro-
pean control and pose a threat to Western
access to Tropical Africa's strategic re-
sources. Over a long period there will al-
most certainly be an uneven and uneasy
transition from colonial to self-rule.
3. Recent and impending political
changes in British West and British Cen-
tral Africa, Italian Somaliland, and the
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan will stimulate
elsewhere the growth of African senti-
ment for self-government. Particularly
in the British dependencies, Africans will
make increasing demands for self-govern-
ment without regard for differences in the
1 This estimate deals generally with all African
territories south of the Sahara Desert and the
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, except for the Union of
South Africa (covered in NIE-72, 20 October
1952) . Only the more important territories are
considered individually, however.
stages of development of the various ter-
ritories. Interracial tensions are almost
certain to grow, especially in British East
and British Central Africa.'
4. Despite the present weakness of the
Communists, their influence and numeri-
cal strength will increase. As African
unrest grows, various African groups are
likely to welcome assistance from any
quarter. Communist efforts in the long
run probably will have greatest effect
upon the more advanced Africans ?
young intellectuals, nationalist activists,
and labor group members ? to whom
Communism might appear as an aid in
weakening European control.
5. The breakdown or overthrow of exist-
ing authority is nowhere imminent in
Tropical Africa. We believe that the co-
lonial powers will undertake the policy
adjustments and retain the security capa-
bilities necessary to prevent discontent
from erupting in large-scale revolt over at
least the next decade. However, such ad-
justments probably will not keep pace
with African demands, and varying de-
grees of unrest and even sporadic violence
2British West Africa: the Gold Coast, Nigeria,
Sierra Leone, and Gambia. British Central
Africa: Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia,
and Nyasaland. British East Africa: Kenya,
Uganda, Tanganyika, and Zanzibar.
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are likely, especially in areas of heavy
white settlement. Emerging self-govern-
ing territories, such as the Gold Coast and
Nigeria, probably will also experience
considerable instability.
6. Prospective disorders in Tropical Af-
rica probably will require additional com-
mitments of European forces, but not to
a degree which would seriously burden
the metropoles. Such unrest probably
will hamper but will not prevent Western
use of military facilities in event of war.
2
7. In the short run, Tropical African ex-
ports of strategic and essential raw mate-
rials will increase as development pro-
grams are completed. Over the longer
run, however, disorder and unrest are
likely to impair the production and trans-
port of such materials. Of the important
producing areas, the Belgian Congo prob-
ably will be the most stable, while British
West Africa and probably British Central
Africa will bcome less dependable sources
of supply.
DISCUSSION
Africa once the rail link from Southern Rho-
desia to Lourengo Marques is completed; (b)
iron ore from West Africa; (c) copper and
cobalt from Uganda; and (d) manganese from
the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial
Africa. Most of the aluminum needs of the
UK could be met from the Gold Coast if the
Volta River project is successfully completed.
10. The major Tropical African colonial pow-
ers ? the UK, France, Belgium, and Portu-
gal ? gain various economic advantages from
their dependencies. They enjoy protected
markets for their goods and have acquired raw
materials and food at advantageous prices.
Their Tropical African territories account for
about 10 percent of their total foreign trade,
except for the Portuguese colonies, which
account for about 15 percent of Portugal's
combined exports and imports.
11. Among the African colonial powers, the
UK and Belgium derive the most substantial
economic benefits from their colonies. Since
World War II, gold and dollar earnings prob-
ably have been the most important of such
benefits to the UK. As a result of strict con-
trol by the UK of imports into its African
dependencies from the dollar area these terri-
tories earn annually a dollar surplus equal to
the value of one-fourth of all UK imports from
the US. The only other net earner of gold
and dollars is the Belgian Congo, but its con-
tribution to Belgium is on a much smaller
scale. The UK and Belgium, and to a lesser
I. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF
TROPICAL AFRICA
8. Economic. Tropical Africa is important to
the West primarily as a producer of raw mate-
rials, particularly minerals.3 The Belgian
Congo, the Rhodesias, and the Gold Coast are
the most important producing areas. The
most important strategic commodity is ura-
nium, of which the Belgian Congo is a major
source. Tropical Africa also supplies over 75
percent of Free World production of cobalt,
industrial diamonds, and columbite, and from
10 to 25 percent of manganese, tin, vanadium,
copper, chrome, cadmium, and graphite. It
provides over 65 percent of Free World require-
ments of cocoa and sisal, and 80 percent of
palm oil. Moreover, the area is almost the
sole world supplier of several materials of
highly specialized usage, such as strategic-
grade chrysotile asbestos. Mineral produc-
tion in Tropical Africa would become much
more important were the Free World denied
access to Indian manganese, Turkish and New
Caledonian chrome, and Malayan and Indo-
nesian tin.
9. Tropical African exports of strategic min-
erals probably will be increased substantially
by new developments either underway or soon
to be started. These will enlarge the supply
of: (a) copper and chrome from Central
3 Appendix A lists Tropical African production of
selected commodities.
Willpso,
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extent the other metropoles, also can save
dollars by importing from their colonies goods
which otherwise would have to be purchased
in hard currency areas. The substantial
sterling balances (equivalent to about $2
billion) of the British dependencies ? which
in effect have been credits extended to the UK
and the sterling area ? normally would be
drawn down by the dependencies but for
British exchange and trade control policies.
12. Metropole investments in Tropical
Africa ? estimated at $5 billion at present
value ? are only a small percentage of total
metropole overseas investments. Loss of their
African investments by the colonial powers
would not be a critical financial blow, even to
Belgium and the UK. However, loss of the
resources of the colonies or drastic disruption
of their over-all trading pattern would neces-
sitate substantial adjustments, especially in
the economies of the UK and Belgium.
13. Military. In event of general war, bases
in Tropical Africa would be an important fac-
tor in the control of the South Atlantic, In-
dian Ocean, and Red Sea, especially if the
Suez Canal and Middle East bases were denied
the West. In that event Tropical Africa could
provide air and naval facilities to support
Western lines of communication and could
afford a safe haven for staging, training, and
supply bases.4
14. A large reservoir of military manpower
exists in Tropical Africa, but its utilization
would depend on Western training and equip-
ment as well as on political conditions in the
area. We believe that approximately 300,000
troops from French West and French Equa-
torial Africa could be made available for em-
ployment in Africa or overseas in event of
general war. About 125,000 British West
African troops served during World War II;
an equal number probably could be made
available in a future war, if newly independent
or autonomous territories felt disposed to co-
operate with the Western Powers. About
230,000 British East African troops served dur-
ing World War II; although that number
4 The most important existing military facilities
are shown on the attached map.
3
might be available again, a large proportion
of these troops might be required to deal with
local disorders and to preserve the security of
the region. Probably neither British Central
Africa nor the Belgian Congo could provide
significant forces for use beyond their bound-
aries. The relatively ineffective Ethiopian
army is to be reorganized with the assistance
of a US military mission, with the objective
of creating an M-Day force of about 53,000
men. In event of war Ethiopia could prob-
ably raise additional forces.
15. Native internal security forces, augmented
by European officers and NCO's, appear ade-
quate to preserve order in most territories at
present. In event of general war or disorders
as serious as the Mau Mau outbreak, however,
European units would be required in support
of local troops in many areas. Some Western
forces would almost certainly be needed to
protect LOC facilities established in Tropical
Africa.
II. OVER-ALL PROBLEMS AND TRENDS
IN TROPICAL AFRICA
16. One of the world's least developed areas,
Tropical Africa is in process of economic, so-
cial, and political transformation, although
the pace of this development varies widely in
different territories. Nearly all African socie-
ties are in relatively rapid transition from
isolated subsistence to money economies, and
a few are rapidly moving from tribal organi-
zation to national states on the Western
model. Increasing Western investment in
Tropical Africa and the area's expanding con-
tact with Western culture, especially in the
postwar period, have upset primitive so-
cial and economic organization and are pro-
ducing native aspirations largely incompatible
with colonial status. Growing tension and
unrest are gradually weakening European
control in certain areas and pose a prospective
threat to Free World access to Tropical
Africa's resources. The colonial powers are
confronted with the major problems of mak-
ing the adjustments necessary to allay spread-
ing African discontent, and of winning the
cooperation of native regimes once they come
to power, while at the same time preserving
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the degree of control necessary to prevent dis-
orders and continue the flow of raw materials
necessary for the well-being of both Africa
and the West.
17. Tropical Africa's nearly 8,000,000 square
miles (roughly the size of North America) and
approximately 135,000,000 people are distrib-
uted among more than thirty separate terri-
tories administered (except for South West
Africa and independent Liberia and Ethiopia)
by six European powers.5 The territorial divi-
sions imposed by European politics bear al-
most no relation to geographic, social, and
economic factors. Political boundaries cut
across climatic zones, natural features, lan-
guage groups, and tribes; the Moslem north-
ern portion of Tropical Africa blends south-
ward into pagan, pseudo-Christian, and Chris-
tian areas; peoples with Hamitic blood have
migrated into Negro areas and created mixed
racial groups. This diversity, added to exist-
ing tribal antagonisms and to the ignorance
and political indifference of the great majority
of natives, retards the growth of sentiment for
nationhood in most territories.
18. Economic Problems. Tropical Africa is
poor in developed resources. The soil is gen-
erally low in fertility, and is deteriorating
through misuse and natural erosion. Mineral
fuels are almost entirely lacking, and the
great resources of water for power and irriga-
tion are still largely undeveloped. Access to
the interior is made difficult by the scarcity of
navigable river routes, of rail and road trans-
port, and of adequate harbors along the West
coast. Labor productivity is low because of
climate, pests, disease, malnutrition, lack of
training, and the reluctance of Africans to
undertake regular employment. There is also
widespread maldistribution of labor; in several
territories the over-concentration of Africans
has created serious local population pressures.
Over-population in rural areas further im-
proverishes the soil, since most natives are
Appendix B lists Tropical Africa's territories and
their population. The estimated population is
about 134,000,000 natives, 675,000 Europeans, and
240,000 Indians; the great majority of non-
natives are settled in the eastern half of the
area.
4
still engaged in primitive subsistence agricul-
ture.
19. Increase of Tropical Africa's productivity
will require costly and time-consuming pro-
grams to improve the health and capabilities
of the people, as well as large-scale capital in-
vestment in transportation and production
facilities. Colonial governments are under-
taking extensive development programs, and
are attempting to avoid the social and eco-
nomic dislocations which characterized earlier
concentration on raw material production.
However, the speed with which development
can take place will be limited by the deficien-
cies in physical and human resources de-
scribed above. Moreover, because of the prob-
able shortage of local funds available for both
public and private investment, Tropical Africa
will continue to require relatively large
amounts of outside capital if the present pace
of development is to be continued. The met-
ropoles probably will not be able to increase
significantly their current financial contribu-
tions because of their own economic difficul-
ties. Existing and potential African unrest
also tends to discourage investments from
other non-African sources. Thus further pub-
lic and private investment programs will have
to be supported largely from additional reve-
nue derived from foreign trade. However,
with a continuing fall in world prices of Afri-
can exports, the outlook for any great expan-
sion in investment programs becomes in-
creasingly dim.
20. Social Problems. European efforts to
improve communications have ended the iso-
lation of many tribes, and world demands for
raw materials have changed the economic pat-
tern of many areas. The enforcement of
European concepts of law and order has weak-
ened the authority of tribal government, and
artificial political boundaries have been sub-
stituted for those based on tribal organization.
These developments have increasingly under-
mined the tribal basis of Tropical African soci-
ety. A few Africans now live almost entirely
according to Western patterns, but large num-
bers have achieved only a partial transforma-
tion and are given support and guidance by
neither the old social pattern nor the new.
Many of those Africans who so far have been
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relatively unaffected will be increasingly
drawn into new ways of life by continued
development.
21. Thus traditional African social relation-
ships centering around tribal organizations
are being gradually replaced by new institu-
tions of the Western type, in the direction of
which most Africans play little or no part and
toward which they feel little or no obligation.
The transition is complicated by the mixing
in a new political relationship of African so-
cieties once isolated from and hostile to each
other. The problems of adjustment are espe-
cially difficult in those territories, such as
Kenya and the Rhodesias, where both Africans
and Europeans must be fitted into a single
political system.
22. The most disruptive force in this gradual
realignment of African society is the growth
of new socio-economic classes?wage laborers,
cash farmers, and educated well-to-do Afri-
cans ? which have benefited most in a mate-
rial sense from contact with the West. In
most areas, these groups are dissatisfied with
their position vis-a-vis the whites, and with
the lack of recognition of their new economic
status in terms of social standing and political
authority. They will agitate increasingly for
greater power and prestige. Those in a posi-
tion of leadership will influence their illiterate
and apathetic fellows to support their de-
mands.
23. Political and Racial Problems. One re-
sult of these developments has been the
growth in many areas of African demands for
more self-government. Africans making these
demands have been stimulated by and have
found justification in recent and impending
political changes in British West and British
Central Africa, Italian Somaliland, and the
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. UN consideration of
the problems of several Tropical African terri-
tories, as well as South African racial issues,
gives international publicity to African dis-
content and encourages further local appeals
against the colonial powers. Moreover, na-
tionalist agitation in North Africa, Libya's at-
tainment of independence, and the anti-West-
ern activities in the Middle East all play a
role ? if a minor one ? in arousing the Trop-
5
ical African's concern with his political and
social status.
24. The growth of sentiment for self-govern-
ment varies widely in Tropical Africa. At
present such sentiment is extensive in British
West Africa, negligible in the Portuguese colo-
nies and the Belgian Congo, and generally
confined to small numbers of educated, ur-
banized Africans in most other important
areas. However, developments in one area
rapidly become known in other parts of Africa
despite the scarcity of modern communica-
tions; for example, the progress toward self-
government in the Gold Coast is widely known
in the Tropical African territories. Particu-
larly in the British dependencies, Africans in-
creasingly will demand similar advances to-
ward self-government without regard for
differences in the stages of development of
various territories, or for differences in popula-
tion pattern. Since a basic principle of Brit-
ish colonial policy is to increase the participa-
tion of Africans in their governments, British
policy will have an unsettling effect on the
dependencies of the other colonial powers.
25. The chief political problem facing the
European colonial powers, therefore, will be
that of reconciling European interests with
increasing African demands for self-govern-
ment. However, in an atmosphere of grow-
ing local pressures for rapid reform, it will be
difficult for even the most liberal territorial
governments to obtain widespread native un-
derstanding and support for their gradualistic
policies and programs. In many areas, a few
leaders probably will be able to collect substan-
tial followings of politically unsophisticated
Africans for sometimes violent demonstrations
against the policies of colonial governments,
even when those policies are in the interests
of the native population. Throughout Trop-
ical Africa political affairs will remain un-
settled and local crises, such as the Nyasaland
riots and the recent deposition of the king of
Buganda (a native kingdom in Uganda) by
the British, will continue to occur with little
advance warning.
26. An integral part of the growth of African
demands for self-government is the increasing
dislike of white control and mistrust of white
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leadership in much of Tropical Africa. Inter-
racial tension has appeared throughout Trop-
ical Africa, although it varies with the number
and power of white settlers and with the de-
gree of social disorganization produced by the
impact of Western civilization. The primary
attention given in most areas to the develop-
ment of European rather than African enter-
prise and the fact that some of the best land
is in the hands of white settlers have created
animosity, which is greatly heightened by so-
cial discrimination, particularly in the British
areas. We believe that over the long run in-
terracial tension throughout Tropical Africa
will increase.
27. Communism so far has had little impact
on Tropical Africa. Despite the opportunities
presented by the dislocation of African society,
racial conflict, and political unrest, Commu-
nist influence thus far has been only inciden-
tal in the rise of anticolonial sentiment. The
principal obstacles to the spread of Commu-
nism are: (a) its aspect as a white movement;
(b) the small proportion of industrial and ur-
ban workers, and the small size of the intelli-
gentsia; (c) the multiplicity of languages,
tribes, and cultures; and (d) the opposition
and close surveillance of Tropical African gov-
ernments. Recognizing these obstacles, the
Communists largely refrain from attempts to
spread Communism per se through ideological
conversion.
28. The only organized Communist party is
the insignificant one in Madagascar. The
only party that was ever an important front
(the Democratic African Rally in French West
and French Equatorial Africa) openly broke
with the Communists in 1950; since then its
leadership and orientation have clearly been
anti-Communist, although some Communist
members remain in this organization. Some
active Communists are known to reside in
French areas and there probably are a few in
urban and mining areas of the Congo, British
East and British Central Africa, and Mozam-
bique; their present influence is almost cer-
tainly small. The Mau Mau terrorist move-
ment in Kenya presents an excellent target
for Communist exploitation; however, we have
no conclusive evidence of Communist influ-
ence in the movement. Although certain
6
nationalists from several colonies have been
exposed to Communist influence, probably
none of the principal nationalist leaders is a
Party member. Communists have had some
success in infiltrating labor unions, especially
in French areas, but apparently are not now
dominant in union activities in any territory.
29. Notwithstanding the present weakness of
the Communists and the many obstacles to
their activities, we believe their influence and
numerical strength will increase. Their prob-
able short-term aims are to undermine West-
ern prestige in Tropical Africa, weaken and
subvert local European authority, and portray
Soviet Russia as the champion of Africans in
the fight against "discrimination" and "ex-
ploitation." As African unrest grows, various
African groups are likely to welcome assist-
ance from any quarter. Communist efforts in
the long run probably will have greatest effect
upon the more advanced Africans ? young in-
tellectuals, nationalist activists, and labor
group members ? to whom Communism
might appear as an aid in weakening Euro-
pean control.
III. SELECTED REGIONAL PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS
30. British West Africa (the Gold Coast,
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Gambia) . The
UK's basic colonial policy of encouraging edu-
cation and advancing natives toward self-
government at whatever pace each depend-
ency appears able to handle has received
fullest expression in West Africa. The suc-
cess or failure of this approach probably will
influence strongly political development else-
where in Tropical Africa. While over the long
run probable instability in British West Africa
may threaten its pro-Western orientation, in
the short run there is no prospect of dis-
turbances seriously inimical to Western in-
terests.
31. In the Gold Coast and Nigeria, the natives
have advanced further toward self-govern-
ment than in other Tropical African depend-
encies, in large part due to: (a) the existence
of economic resources especially exploitable by
Africans; (b) the virtual absence of white set-
tlers; (c) relatively long and extensive contact
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with Western culture; and (d) the adapta-
bility of British policy under African pressure
for political advance. The UK has allowed
far-reaching postwar constitutional revision
in response to increasing political demands in
all British West African territories, but espe-
cially in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, where
African capabilities and aspirations have been
highest. As Africans in these dependencies
move toward independence, they face two
major political problems: how to share power
among themselves and how to exercise it.
32. The Gold Coast probably will move direct-
ly toward full self-government within the next
few years because nationwide acceptance of
Nkrumah's Convention People's Party leader-
ship gives at least a temporary basis for an
all-African government. The party system in
the Gold Coast is only partially developed, but
has reached the point where even members of
the central legislature elected by tribal insti-
tutions acquiesce in national party control.
33. In Nigeria, on the other hand, it is un-
likely that sufficient national unity will de-
velop within the next few years to make
possible a strong central government. Nigeria
is four times larger than the Gold Coast and
has six times its population. Under the fed-
eral constitution, the representation of the
Islamic Northern Region is equal to that of
the non-Islamic Eastern and Western Regions
combined. Strong ethnic, cultural, and polit-
ical differences exist in the territory. The
relatively advanced Eastern and Western Re-
gions believe themselves ready for self-govern-
ment, while the backward North depends
greatly on the British administration and
fears domination by the other two regions if
the UK were to grant Nigeria early independ-
ence. Thus no national parties have yet
emerged in Nigeria. However, in the two
southern regions pressure for early self-gov-
ernment is exerted by political parties based on
tribal groupings ? Azikiwe's National Council
of Nigeria and the Cameroons in the predomi-
nantly Ibo Eastern Region, and Awolowo's
Action Group in the Yoruba West. The UK
is meeting this pressure by granting increased
self-government to each of the three Regions,
while trying to establish effective federal in-
stitutions. The emergence of a unified Nigeria
will largely depend on the speed with which
the Northern Region can develop a capacity
for self-government that will enable it to pro-
tect its interests against the Eastern and
Western Regions without reliance on the
British Colonial Office. However, there is at
least an even chance that the southern regions
will secure self-government independently of
the North.
34. In any case the British West African ter-
ritories probably will attain self-government
before their peoples acquire enough capable
administrators and technicians, and funds for
social and economic development. Therefore,
the effectiveness of their governments will be
limited and public confidence in those govern-
ments and their leaders will be shaken. When
the superficial unity created by nationalist de-
mands disappears, African leaders probably
will attempt to explain their difficulties by
blaming "foreign intervention." This eventu-
ally will almost certainly result in efforts to
eliminate the remnants of British influence.
However, these territories probably would be
willing to remain within the British Common-
wealth. They would seek to join the UN, but
would avoid membership in any multilateral
Western military association. Nevertheless,
they might be willing to allow Western eco-
nomic and strategic use of the area, though
only in return for large and immediate
benefits.
35. Eager to assert their independence, West
Africans increasingly will attempt to develop
and control their resources themselves, how-
ever incompetently. Expansion of their econ-
omies may be hindered by their suspicion of
foreign financial interests, and they may
finance development with the agricultural
stabilization funds which constitute their
main protection against a fall in world prices.
To the extent that they are willing to accept
foreign capital and technical assistance, they
will probably seek to minimize the danger of
exploitation by a single country by drawing
on a number of foreign sources.
36. West African UN Trust Territories (Brit-
ish Togoland, British Cameroons, French
Togoland, and French Cameroons) . A num-
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ber of proposals have been made to redesign
the boundaries of British and French Togo-
land and Cameroons in order to: (a) create a
United Togoland; (b) set up a United Cam-
eroons; (c) establish a single and united ter-
ritory for the Ewe tribe now divided between
both Togolands and the Gold Coast; (d) join
British Togoland to the Gold Coast; or (e)
annex British Cameroons to Nigeria. The
last two proposals are the most likely to be
carried into effect; each trust territory already
is closely integrated administratively with the
adjoining British colony. If a self-governing
Gold Coast obtains control of British Togo-
land, it may also demand, with doubtful suc-
cess, control of French Togoland, thereby em-
bittering its relations with France. The Ewe
are not likely to win their territorial demands
since they ? like all other major groups in
these trust territories ? cannot agree on what
they desire. Moreover, their proposed area
does not possess sufficient economic strength
to stand by itself. Of the four trust terri-
tories, the French Cameroons alone has suffi-
cient economic strength to be self-supporting.
37. British Central Africa (Southern Rho-
desia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland).
Over a long period the greatest threat to
Western interests in Tropical Africa is likely
to arise in British Central Africa. This area
possesses the largest group of European set-
tlers and is influenced most strongly by racial
issues in the neighboring Union of South
Africa. Central Africa has become one of the
most important African sources of strategic
materials. Its rapid economic expansion, in-
volving large-scale white immigration and the
formation of a detribalized native urban class,
has complicated political development and
aggravated labor and racial tensions. The
pressure which the white settlers are exerting
on the British Government is forcing the UK
to tend toward acceptance of settler domi-
nance in Central Africa.
38. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasa-
land, which is expected to be in full operation
by early 1954, represents a new form of polit-
ical organization designed to reconcile the in-
terests of Africans and white settlers. The
effectiveness of the Federation in coping with
8
this racial problem will be closely observed
both in and beyond Africa as a test of whether
a harmonious, self-governing, multiracial so-
ciety can be created in Tropical Africa. How-
ever, it will be difficult to create a feeling of
partnership between a dominant minority
composed of 200,000 whites and a 6,300,000
African majority which fears exploitation.
The federal constitution gives the whites con-
trol of the legislature, and British promises
that native interests will be protected by the
Colonial Office have not been sufficient to re-
assure the Africans.
39. We do not believe that the Europeans who
dominate the federal government will take
sufficient action to convince Africans of their
good intentions. The Europeans believe the
economic advantages brought by federation
will benefit the natives to such an extent that
Africans will be reconciled to a white-con-
trolled federal government. However, for the
foreseeable future, federation will be of greater
benefit to European than African interests.
With the main functions of government firmly
in European hands, the areas of principal eco-
nomic development will be those of primary
benefit to the white settlers. Africans will
benefit somewhat from any increase in general
prosperity, but they will almost certainly con-
sider their share negligible compared to that
of the white settlers. In any depressed eco-
nomic situation Europeans would probably
use their political power to minimize decreases
in their own share of the national income.
40. The Federation's European leaders appear
sincere in their desire to avoid a racial policy
based on the principle of "apartheid." How-
ever, because of self-interest, it is unlikely that
racial partnership will ever reach the stage
where the senior partner voluntarily grants
equal status to the junior. The majority of
Africans may temporarily appear reconciled to
federation, but a hard core of dissidents prob-
ably will continue to agitate against it. With-
in the next decade the basic African?European
conflicts probably will erupt in sporadic vio-
lence.
41. British East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tan-
ganyika, and Zanzibar) . So long as Tan-
ganyika retains its UN Trusteeship status, no
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political federation is feasible for these terri-
tories, despite white settler demands for closer
association. However, a measure of economic
union does exist. UK Colonial Office control
of East Africa is likely to continue for some
years. Racial tensions and the need for eco-
nomic development are East Africa's major
problems.
42. In Kenya, the chief immediate problem is
the outbreak of violence perpetrated by the
Mau Mau, a fanatic secret society composed of
members of the Kikuyu tribe. While the
British eventually will suppress the organized
terrorist activities of the Mau Mau, Kenya will
recover very slowly from the shock of the con-
flict and a serious native problem will remain.
Lands allotted to the natives are inadequate to
support the increasing population; many na-
tives are forced to leave these lands and are
unable to find other employment. British ef-
forts to make more land available meet the
double obstacle of white settler reluctance to
yield any of the fertile highlands and the high
cost of clearing other land. Thus the Afri-
cans in Kenya face a deterioration in their
economic situation. Neither Africans nor
white settlers are psychologically ready for the
adjustments necessary if further friction and
violence are to be avoided. Moreover, both
groups are suspicious of the intentions of the
Indian population. The struggle among these
three groups and the struggle of the groups
with the UK for a larger share in the colony's
government will be prolonged and bitter.
Furthermore, because of its limited economic
base, Kenya will remain dependent on con-
siderable outside assistance, especially if re-
settlement and educational programs are to be
undertaken on the scale required to solve its
long-term problems.
43. Owing in part to less acute economic pres-
sures and the smaller non-native population,
there are good racial relations in Tanganyika
and Uganda. These good relations are likely
to continue unless an economic crisis occurs.
However, probable continuing friction in
Kenya will test severely interracial harmony
in these neighboring territories.
44. The rapid growth of British East Africa's
Indian community is regarded by the tern-
9
tonal governments and the white settlers as a
menace to European predominance and as a
threat to economic opportunities for African
natives; many Africans share the latter view.
The Indian population in 1948 was 168,500,
about four times as large as the European. Its
rapid growth is the result of high birth rates
and extensive immigration, though the latter
has declined following restrictive legislation in
1948. Large numbers of Indians have long
been resident in East Africa and are strongly
entrenched in the business community. They
object to economic, social, and political dis-
crimination in favor of Europeans. However,
only a small but probably growing radical
group of Hindus is vigorously articulate
against the territorial governments on that
issue.
45. Most Indians are politically inactive and
will continue to avoid close collaboration with
dissident Africans. They fear that African
anti-European sentiment eventually might
become antiforeign and endanger Indian in-
terests. However, the radical Indian elements
will seek increasingly to collaborate with Afri-
cans to make common cause against white
domination, probably on the pattern of South
Africa, unless their demands for greater po-
litical representation are satisfied. The Gov-
ernment of India has voiced in the UN and
elsewhere its intense interest in the Indian
community's welfare, and may raise the ques-
tion in the UNGA. India probably regards
East Africa as a future sphere of influence and
may increase its attempted intervention in
African affairs. It is possible that, as many
whites in East Africa believe, New Delhi is pro-
viding guidance for local Indian political lead-
ers. Thus the presence of the Indian popula-
tion complicates solution of East Africa's
racial and political problems and creates a
source of international friction.
46. Belgian Congo. The Congo, under pa-
ternalistic Belgian control, is one of the least
restive colonial dependencies in Tropical
Africa. The racial problem is not yet an issue
in the Congo, largely because the government
has discouraged both European settlement
and political advances for either race. Bel-
gium has instituted relatively progressive eco-
nomic and social programs for Africans but its
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?411Wilatit
policy is to keep the area under close metro-
politan control. The Belgian Government
has an importance influence on all industrial
developments in the Congo.
47. However, the administration is aware of
growing discontent among detribalized and
semieducated Congolese, as well as of the in-
evitability of local repercussions from events
elsewhere in Tropical Africa. The Belgians
therefore are planning to permit limited na-
tive participation in local government.
48. In the long run, Belgium is likely to be
faced with increased African political and
economic demands. The Belgian Government
probably would suppress serious political dis-
orders with force. However, if convinced of
the strength and inevitability of African pres-
sure, it probably would eventually grant
extensive concessions in order to forestall con-
tinuing disorders and safeguard Belgium's
economic interests.
49. French West and French Equatorial
Africa.6 French control of West and Equa-
torial Africa nowhere appears threatened by
the social and political situation. The two
federations are members of the French Union
and are represented in the French National
Assembly and Council of the Republic, as well
as in the Assembly of the French Union.
However, the territorial governments are con-
trolled by Europeans despite African predom-
inance in the advisory assemblies. France's
colonial policy thus far envisages political and
cultural assimilation of these territories to the
metropole, with only a gradual increase in
African participation in local government.
50. The great majority of natives outside the
few urban centers in French Africa are illiter-
ate and uninterested in political events beyond
their tribal areas. Most politically articulate
Africans appear to value their connection with
France and to look for further advancement
within the framework of the French Union.
There are many political parties in these ter-
ritories but, except in Senegal, they are pri-
6 West Africa: Senegal, French Guinea, the Ivory
Coast, Dahomey, French Sudan, Mauritania,
Niger, Upper Volta. Equatorial Africa: Gabon,
Middle Congo, Ubangi-Shari, Chad.
10
manly concerned with local issues. The once
pro-Communist Democratic African Rally,
which is still an important political factor in
the Ivory Coast and perhaps in the French
Sudan, is now generally cooperative with the
French administration.
51. Nevertheless, as neighboring British West
Africa moves further toward independence,
small political groups in the French areas are
seeking increased local autonomy within the
French Union. Over a long period dissatis-
faction with French colonial policy may in-
crease to the point where African nationalist
leaders will demand full self-government
within the French Union, if not complete in-
dependence. However, the immensity, isola-
tion, diversity, and poverty of these territories
tend to impede the rapid development of any
effective independence movement, and en-
courage regional movements within each fed-
eration. Political discontent probably would
develop first in relatively accessible and eco-
nomically important coastal areas of Senegal,
the Ivory Coast, and French Guinea, and
would spread only very slowly into the in-
terior over a period of years.
52. Portuguese Colonies (Angola, Mozam-
bique, and Portuguese Guinea) . Widespread
political disorders among Africans in the Por-
tuguese dependencies are unlikely in the fore-
seeable future. The rate of social and eco-
nomic change has been slow, and there has
been little or no African political activity.
Portugal is not likely to revise its conservative
colonial policies. Interracial relations do not
appear to be a significant problem, largely be-
cause the basis of political and social distinc-
tion officially is not race but the degree of
assimilation of metropolitan culture. Forced
recruitment of native labor in Angola and
Mozambique generates resentment, which,
however, probably will find no important out-
let. Development of native political con-
sciousness will continue to be retarded by illit-
eracy, tribal ethnocentrism, and autocratic
colonial administration. The fact that some
Africans can qualify for Portuguese citizen-
ship and the absence of a color bar also will
deter the growth of political opposition to
European control.
*NAM*
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53. Liberia. Well into the present century
Liberia remained one of the least developed
areas in Tropical Africa; the government, con-
trolled by a small "elite" composed of de-
scendants of American slaves returned to
Africa, exercised authority over only a narrow
coastal strip of territory. In recent years US
economic assistance and the development of
Liberia's rubber and iron resources through
private foreign investment have opened the
interior, broadened the economic base, and in-
volved a small though increasing number of
natives in a cash economy. On the other
hand, pressures for social and political change
are growing only at a slow pace, largely be-
cause of the cultural and physical isolation of
the communities of the interior. Neverthe-
less, the process of economic change probably
will necessitate eventual adjustments in
Liberia's autocratic system of government.
Although the ruling class itself is likely to
become divided over the implementation of
even limited reforms, the oligarchic character
of the government probably will not be sig-
nificantly changed, at least in the short
term. Over the long term, political insta-
bility in Liberia will almost certainly increase.
54. Ethiopia. The federation of Ethiopia and
Eritrea is leading to widespread dissatisfaction
in the latter area due to Ethiopia's tendency
to ignore the local autonomy assured Eritrea
by the UN. The federation increasingly will
be dominated by Ethiopia despite Eritrean
protests.
55. The succession to the Imperial throne of
Ethiopia traditionally has provoked a dynastic
contest, with army control a major determi-
nant of the issue. The chance of temporary
disorder whenever the succession question
next arises has been reduced, but not elimi-
nated, by the central government's growing
power over the provinces. The territorial in-
tegrity of Ethiopia probably will remain in-
tact.
IV. OUTLOOK FOR PRESERVATION
OF WESTERN CONTROL
56. The breakdown or overthrow of existing
authority is nowhere imminent in Tropical
Africa. We believe that the colonial powers
11
will undertake the policy adjustments and
retain the security capabilities necessary to
prevent African discontent from erupting in
large-scale revolutionary violence over at least
the next decade. However, such adjustments
probably will not keep pace with African de-
mands. Territorial governments probably
will not have access to sufficient develop-
mental funds to satisfy economic demands.
Moreover, the objective of Africans ultimately
will be full equality of status, which in prac-
tice would mean domination of the whites by
the natives. As a result, occasional outbursts
and even some concerted violence are proba-
ble, especially in areas of heavy white settle-
ment. Such disorders probably would inter-
rupt economic activity and discourage further
private investment.
57. Over a long period there will almost cer-
tainly be an uneven and uneasy transition
from colonial to self-rule. Political control by
the European powers already is diminishing
in the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and Italian Somali-
land, and similar trends will almost certainly
develop elsewhere in Tropical Africa. Never-
theless, if they so choose, the European powers
probably can retain control of their depend-
encies in the foreseeable future.
58. Emerging self-governing areas probably
will experience considerable instability. Like
many newly independent Middle and Far
Eastern states, they probably will adopt anti-
colonial policies and neutralist positions in the
conflict between the Soviet Bloc and the West-
ern Powers.
V. STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS
59. In the short run, Tropical African exports
of strategic and essential raw materials will
increase as development plans now in progress
are completed. However, production costs of
strategically significant raw materials will be
increased by African pressures for more social
benefits and higher wages. In the longer run,
disorder and unrest arising from economic
and political causes are likely to impair the
production and transport of such materials
and to decrease the availability of military
manpower. Of the important producing
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afidAINFIP.1k,
areas, the Belgian Congo probably will be the
most stable, while British West Africa and
probably British Central Africa will become
less dependable sources of supply. As the ter-
ritories of British West Africa move toward
political independence they will want to con-
trol, or at least obtain a greater share in the
management of their own economic resources;
attempts to achieve these ends probably will
involve a loss of efficiency and production.
60. Prospective disorders in Tropical Africa
probably will require commitments of Euro-
pean armed forces and materiel beyond pres-
ent levels, but not to a degree which would
seriously burden the metropoles. Such un-
rest probably will hamper but will not prevent
12
Western use of military facilities in event of
war.
61. Developments in Tropical Africa also are
likely to have some external repercussions.
The way in which the Western Powers respond
to African aspirations and react to prospective
disorders may affect Western relations with
Arab and Asian countries. These countries
increasingly will regard Western policies to-
ward colonial problems as indicative of the
Western attitude toward all underdeveloped
nations. India probably will continue to de-
nounce the treatment of Asians in Africa.
Moreover, African unrest will be used by the
Soviet Bloc as a propaganda weapon against
the NATO powers.
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4141111111119PfN 13
APPENDIX A
1951 Production of Selected Commodities in Tropical Africa
(in thousands of metric tons unless otherwise indicated)
Commodity
Chief
Producers
Production
of Chief
Producers
Total
Tropical
African
Production
Percentage
of Free World
Production
A. Minerals
Columbite
Nigeria
1.097
1.218
94
Belgian Congo
.095
Diamonds
Belgian Congo
10,565.0'
14,044.0'
84
(Industrial
and gem)
Gold Coast
1,632.0'
Cobalt
Belgian Congo
5.9
6.6
78
Northern Rhodesia
0.7
Manganese
Gold Coast
425.0
487.4
24
Copper
Northern Rhodesia
314.1
519.0
22
Belgian Congo
192.0
Chrome
Southern Rhodesia
144.1
149.6
16
Vanadium
South West Africa
0.529
0.616
16
Tin
Belgian Congo
13.9
23.0
14
Nigeria
8.7
Cadmium
South West Africa
650.42
674.72
12
Graphite
Madagascar
18.3
18.3
11
Asbestos
Southern Rhodesia
70.5
102.6
9
Swaziland
31.7
Uranium
Belgian Congo
B. Agricultural Commodities
Palm Oil and
Nigeria
505.0
961.0
80
Kernels
Belgian Congo
214.0
Sisal
Tanganyika
148.0
245.0
68
Cocoa
Gold Coast
214.0
444.7
66
Nigeria
107.0
Peanuts
French West Africa
780.0
1,824.0
26
Nigeria
470.0
Coffee
-
308.7
13
Rubber
Liberia
35.4
72.0
4
' Thousand metric carats.
Thousand kilograms.
" Not available.
801111ME T
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.043:=Mar 14
APPENDIX B
Population of Tropical Africa
(in thousands)
Territory
Total Population
Mid-1951 Estimate
Non-Native Population
European
Indian
Other and
Not Stated
Ethiopia-Eritrea
16,100
27.0
1
16.0
Liberia
1,600
1
1
0.5
Belgian Congo and Ruanda Urundi
15,375
70.0
2.5
2.5
British Territories
British West Africa
Gold Coast and Togoland
4,330
4.4
1.0
1.3
Nigeria and Cameroons
26,000
7.0
1
5.0
Sierra Leone
2,000
1.0
1
2.0
Gambia
280
0.3
1
0.1
British Central Africa
Southern Rhodesia
2,160
152.0
4.6
1
Northern Rhodesia
1,950
37.0
2.6
1
Nyasaland
2,400
3.8
5.2
2.0
British East Africa
Kenya
5,680
30.0
98.0
28.0
Uganda
5,190
3.4
35.0
2.3
Tanganyika
7,830
11.0
46.0
13.0
Zanzibar
270
0.3
15.0
49.0
High Commission Territories
Bechuanaland
290
2.4
0.1
1.1
Basutoland
580
1.7
0.3
0.6
Swaziland
200
3.2
1
0.7
British Somaliland
500
1
1
1
Portuguese Territories
Angola
4,130
79.0
1
26.0
Mozambique
5,780
48.0
13.0
27.0
Portuguese Guinea
520
2.3
1
5.4
French Territories
French Equatorial Africa
and Cameroons
7,610
28.0
1
1.5
French Somaliland
55
2.0
1
1
French West Africa & Togoland
18,210
54.0
1
45.0
Madagascar
4,370
57.0
17.0
1
Italian Somaliland
1,250
4.0
0
1
Rio Muni (Spanish)
135
1.5
1
1
South West Africa (Union of
South Africa mandate)
420
49.0
1
1
TOTAL
135,215
679.3
240.3
229.0
'Not available.
NOTE: Total population figures are UN estimates published in April 1953. Non-native population figures
are based on reported census and official estimates between 1948 and 1952 with the exception of the
British High Commission Territories and Rio Muni, which are for 1946 and 1942 respectively. Of
the non-native population, European includes Americans, and Indian includes Pakistanis and
Goans.
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