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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A00290002-06-01-9 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR , ONE SECURITY INFORMATION IAL 031273 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE APPENDICES NIE-90: SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES THROUGH MID-1955 Appendices Approved 29 September 1953 Appendices published 13 October 1953 )DOCUMENT NO. _ 1 (Supersedes Appendices to NIE-64/1 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. NIE-90, "Soviet Bloc Capabilities Throutbh DECLASSIFIED Mid-1955," published 18 August 1953CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S 'NEXT REVIEW DATE: tiqt AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE:17 t REVIEWER: The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 29 September 1953. The FBI abstained, the subject being outside of its jurisdiction. The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intel- ligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY "2. q Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 DISSEMINATION NOTICE 1. This copy of this publication is fr; the information and use of the recipient designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the re- cipient's office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Further dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the information for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following: a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of State b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission g. Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation h. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other Department or Agency 2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA. 3. The overseas dissemination of this intelligence will be limited to a period of one year or less, at the end of which time it will be destroyed, returned to the forward- ing agency, or permission requested of that agency to retain it in accordance with IAC?D-69/2, 22 June 1953. WARNING This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans- mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. DISTRIBUTION: White House National Security Council Department of State Department of Defense Mutual Security Agency Operations Coordinating Board Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of Investigation Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 .6 rtnikinfIcNi UAL Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 TABLE OF CONTENTS ? Page APPENDIX A: Non-Military Factors Affecting Bloc Capabilities . 1 Internal Political Factors 1 Economic Factors 3 Scientific and Technical Factors 5 ' APPENDIX B: Estimated Bloc Military Strength 9 Summary 9 Bloc Ground Strength 10 Bloc Air Strength 13 Bloc Naval Strength " 16 Bloc Air Defenses 19 APPENDIX C: Bloc Political Warfare Strengths 23 Definition of Bloc Political Warfare 23 Factors Affecting Bloc Political Warfare Strength 23 Probable Development of Bloc Political Warfare Strength . . 25 Tables on Bloc Military Strength 29-33 Nature of the Evidence Available for Estimates of Bloc Armed Strength 34 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2-01-3761715 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 orm. 1004****Pitt* APPENDIX A NON-MILITARY FACTORS AFFECTING BLOC CAPABILITIES INTERNAL POLITICAL FACTORS USSR 1. It is inherently unlikely that the 25-year rule of Stalin could be ended, and his suc- cessors assume control, without at least tem- porary uncertainties and confusions within the USSR and the Bloc generally. Stalin's death removed from the Soviet power struc- ture its chief arbiter and final authority ? the leader who provided a stabilizing influence for the regime and a living symbol around which to rally the population. Despite the extensive bureaucratization of the Soviet Party and governmental structures, the co- hesion of the system depended in part on personal relations which have probably been upset by shifts of position among the topmost leaders and by the uncertainty that accom- panied these shifts. The turnover among Party chieftains, which on the top included Presidium members Beria, Melnikov, and .Bagirov and Party Secretary Ignatiev, has been greater than for any comparable period since the purges of the 1930's. Extensive per- sonnel changes throughout the apparatus of power may continue for some time, and it is possible that Soviet and Satellite leaders will be preoccupied by the prospects and the prob- able consequences of such changes. There may consequently be occasional uncertainties in tactics and hesitancies in deciding on policy, even though the basic economic and military strength of the USSR and of the Bloc is virtually unaffected. 2. The emphasis placed on the principle of "collective leadership," the strictures against one-man rule, and the condemnation of the cult of heroes suggest that no individual is yet ready to occupy the place of Stalin. Relation- ships among present Soviet leaders are not yet clear. The reversal of the doctors' plot, the removal of several high-ranking persons from the Presidium, the many personnel changes in the governments of the Soviet Republics, and above all the arrest of Beria establish that there has been sharp dissension within the Soviet hierarchy. It is not yet clear whether this dissension arose principally from a strug- gle for power or from differences over basic policy, nor is it clear whether Beria's fall has ended the dissension. 3. The considerations cited above must be taken into account in estimating the situa- tion within the Bloc. On the other hand, there is no evidence that the authority of the Soviet regime has in any fundamental respect been weakened by Stalin's death or by the events since that death. There are no indica- tions that Soviet Bloc military and economic capabilities will be reduced, during the period of this estimate, by reason of a weakening of the Soviet regime. Since March 1953, the Party and governmental structure at both central and regional levels has been reor- ganized and consolidated. Power has been placed in the hands of a group almost identical with the Stalinist Politburo. Malenkov ap- pears to be increasing the firmness of his hold on the leading position of power, even if he has not yet assumed the peculiarly elevated position of Stalin. There is no evidence of a weakening of the Party's control over the security and military forces, or of a loosening of the regime's hold over the population. Furthermore, " the bureaucratization of the Soviet system and the interlocking character of Soviet controls gives the system a certain inertia and stability which will probably pre- vent open conflicts from breaking out during the period of this estimate. The Satellites 4. Soviet control over the European Satellites is essentially physical in character; i.e., it is 1 rnNFINNTI L Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Uili ILJLIV riwkaii#0061419K founded on military domination and is main- tained by force. The force, however, is for the most part not exercised directly by organs of the USSR. Rather, it is exercised for the Kremlin by Satellite organs ? principally the local Satellite Communist leadership ? which are firmly under Moscow's control but which are made to appear distinct from Moscow and autonomous. These are intended to serve as a facade of ostensibly independent national government in each Satellite state, behind which Soviet policy can operate with mini- mum use of Soviet manpower and with mini- mum loss of efficiency through conflict with local usage and sensibilities. The depth and extent of the various Soviet controls vary somewhat from Satellite to Satellite. 5. Recent developments in Eastern Europe indicate that the Soviet leadership continues to be faced with problems in the Satellites. During June and July new programs, both political and economic in nature, which called for a modification of extreme Sovietization policies, were announced in East Germany and Hungary. More limited changes in existing programs were also announced for the other Satellites. In East Germany these changes were accompanied by a popular uprising (16- 17 June) which has seriously undermined the prestige and authority of the East German Government, and compelled the USSR to use overt military force to keep the anti-Commu- nist demonstrations under control. 6. However, we believe that Soviet ability to maintain effective control in the European Satellites has not been impaired by anything that has happened since the death of Stalin. Soviet suppression of the riots in East Ger- many demonstrated the thoroughness of that control, while at the same time indicating that the Satellite governments themselves may be unable, without Soviet armed force in reserve, to maintain their populations in subjection to the will of the Kremlin. The possibility that the Satellite populations will be encouraged to follow the example of popular resistance in East Germany may require the Soviet leaders to devote more attention and resources to the problem of control in the Satellites and thus somewhat reduce over-all Bloc capabilities. Communist China 7. The Chinese Communist regime has firm control over the territory which it administers, and there is little likelihood of this control being threatened or shaken by domestie forces within the period of this estimate. The rela- tions of Communist China to the USSR are more those of an ally than a Satellite. The alliance is based on a common ideology and at least a temporary community of interests which is not likely to be affected by changes in Kremlin leadership. Moscow and Peiping are apparently agreed upon the following aims: a. To eliminate Western power and influ- ence from Asia. b. To increase Communist strength in Asia. c. To prevent the resurgence of an armed and non-Communist Japan. d. To advance the world Communist move- ment; in particular, to divide the non-Com- munist countries and to weaken their ability and determination to combat Communism. 8. The military dependence of Communist China upon the USSR will almost certainly continue. The Chinese Communists have launched an industrialization program, which will require large-scale imports of capital equipment. So long as Western trade con- trols continue, these requirements can be met only by imports from the Bloc. However, should there be a reduction of tension in Asia, the military and economic dependence of Communist China upon the USSR might be reduced. 9. Sino-Soviet relations may be strained by problems relating to levels of Soviet economic aid, by the extent of Soviet military commit- ments to Communist China, by disagreement over the control of border territories, and by the definition of Mao's role in the Asian Com- munist movement. We believe that the new Soviet leadership will deal cautiously with Mao and that a split between Peiping and Moscow is unlikely during the period of this estimate, unless the stability of the Soviet regime should be seriously weakened. Mao Tse-tung may become disposed to increase the scope of his rnimrincNITIA1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release jUilitT/r9i1/.1)5t:n?likilliDLP79R01012A002900020001-9 RANNAMONOW T independent activity in Asia, especially if any uncertainty of leadership within ,the USSR is long continued. However, the continuing military and economic dependence of Commu- nist China on the USSR will limit Communist China's capacity for independent action. ECONOMIC FACTORS Introductory Note 10. Estimates of Bloc economic developments must still be based largely upon an analysis of published Bloc economic plans and of re- cent general trends in the USSR, the Satel- lites, and Communist China. There are vari- ous indications that the Bloc may in the near future devote a somewhat greater proportion of resources to the production of consumers' goods, and a smaller proportion to the produc- tion of capital goods, than in the recent past. These indications are clearest with respect to East Germany and Hungary, but they are not lacking for the USSR itself. As yet they are insufficient to warrant an estimate that sig- nificant changes in over-all Bloc economic policy have occurred or are likely to occur. We believe it unlikely that any changes which may be made in Bloc economic policy will significantly alter either the basic emphasis placed upon development of heavy industry and military potential or the general trends of Bloc economic development which have been observed since 1945, and on which our present estimate of probable future Bloc economic developments is largely based. However, the rate of increase in the production of capital goods, and perhaps of military end-items, may be smaller than that set forth in the projec- tions presented in this estimate. General Trends 11. The Soviet Bloc is self-sufficient in food, has a strong modern heavy industry, and possesses adequate supplies of nearly all the natural, resources required further to develop its industrial economy. The economies of the Satellites are being progressively integrated with that of the upsR in the interests of pro- moting Bloc self-sufficiency and the growth of Bloc military production capacity. During the period of this estimate, the Soviet Bloc 3 economy will be capable of supporting a major war effort. 12. The gross national product (GNP) of the Bloc has been increasing rapidly during the postwar years. Calculation of its magnitude and comparisons with prewar years are neces- sarily subject to considerable error. We esti- mate, however, that by 1948 the over-all level of production in the Bloc as a whole was ap- proximately equal to that of the same terri- tories in 1938. We estimate further that by 1952, Bloc GNP was about one-third greater than in 1948, thus having increased on the average about 7-8 percent per annum. 13. We believe that Bloc GNP will continue to increase, although at a somewhat reduced rate, during the period of this estimate. Un- less there is a drastic reorientation of Bloc economic programs, the rate of growth of the Soviet economy will almost certainly remain higher than the rate which the US or any major Western state will maintain, and the rate of growth of the Bloc GNP will be about one and one-half times that of the NATO states. ESTIMATED GROWTH OF THE BLOC GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, JANUARY 1953-JUNE 1955 (in percent) PROPORTION OF BLOC GNP IN 1952 AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF TOTAL GROWTH INCREASE USSR 55.8 6.5 ? 8.0 17 ? 21 European Satellites 23.0 3.5 ? 5A 9 ? 14 Communist China 21.2 2.0 ? 2.8 5? 7 Bloc Total 100.0 5.0 ? 6.2 13 ? 16 14. Despite Soviet achievements during the postwar years, the output of the USSR during the period of this estimate will remain much lower than that of the US, and the output of the entire Bloc will remain much lower than that of the NATO states. We estimate that Soviet GNP was about one-quarter to one- third that of the US in 1952, and that the GNP of the entire Bloc was about one-third that of We believe that for the Satellites the average annual rate of growth and the total increase in GNP during the period of this estimate will tend to fall close to the upper limit of the esti- mated ranges. 14*****Imir rnimarTNIT1111 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 uunrium the NATO states. These disparities in ratio terms will probably be reduced slightly dur- ing the period of this estimate, although the Western superiority in absolute volume of production will be somewhat increased. Bloc output in the basic industries ? energy, min- erals, metals, and chemicals ? will remain substantially below that of the NATO states. 15. However, comparisons of total output of all types of goods and services are not neces- sarily indicative of relative capacity to pro- duce military equipment in peacetime. Since the end of World War II, the USSR has di- verted a much larger proportion of its GNP to military purposes than has any Western state. We estimate that about one-sixth of the Soviet GNP is now devoted to military outlays, and that the proportion will probably remain at about this level through the period of this estimate. Probable Developments in Major Sectors of the Bloc Economy 16. During the period of this estimate, the Bloc, and especially the USSR, will probably continue to concentrate upon expanding its industrial base. The level of Soviet indus- trial production will probably be about one- quarter higher in mid-1955 than at the end of 1952. Output of producer goods and military end-items (measured in value terms) will con- tinue to increase at faster rates than that of consumer goods, although, in line with Malen- kov's recent announcement, output of con- sumer goods may be increased more rapidly than we have estimated.2 Barring a drastic revision of economic programs, Satellite in- dustrial production will probably increase 12 to 15 percent during this period. Although Communist China's industrial output will probably rise by 20 to 23 percent during this period, it will continue to be a small part ofi the Bloc total. 17. The growth of Bloc agricultural produc- tion will probably continue to lag behind the growth of industrial production. Barring 2 For detailed estimates of the growth of selected sectors of the Bloc economy during this period, see the table on page 6. 4 heavy drought, Soviet agricultural output dur- ing the period of this estimate will probably increase by 5-8 percent. However, imple- mentation of the agricultural tax, price, and procurement policies announced by Malenkov may result in somewhat larger agricultural output. Assuming the continuation of grad- ual collectivization of agriculture in the Satel- lites, we estimate that Satellite agricultural production in mid-1955 will increase by only 3-5 percent, and will remain below prewar levels. As a result of population increases, a slight decline in per capita food supply in the Satellites can be expected. Agricultural out- put in Communist China which was unusually high in 1952 will probably not increase over that level during the period of this estimate, although it is probable that the general post- war recovery trend in Chinese Communist agriculture will continue. 18. Trade between the countries now compris- ing the Bloc and the West3 has declined mark- edly in the postwar period owing largely to the Bloc policy of economic self-sufficiency and to Western trade policy. In 1951, the last year for which full-year statistics are avail- able, this trade amounted to roughly 2 per- cent of the total trade of the West, compared with 6 percent in 1938. Bloc trade with the non-Communist world consists primarily of an exchange of Western capital goods, textile fibers, and industrial raw materials for coal, agricultural, and forest products from the Bloc. In 1951, textile fibers and manufac- tures (21.8 percent) , machinery and transport equipment (21.1 percent) , crude rubber (12.8 percent) , metals and manufactures (9.3 per- cent) , and chemicals (8.6 percent) accounted for almost three-quarters of total Bloc im- ports from the West. Similarly, Bloc exports of food products (39.7 percent) , coal (13.0 per- cent) , forest products and manufactures (6.8 percent) , and textile fibers and manufactures (8.0 percent) accounted for approximately two-thirds of total Bloc exports to the West. 19. The gradual eastward shift in the center of gravity of Soviet industry will probably con- tinue during the period of this estimate. a As used here, the "West" includes the whole non- Communist world as presently constituted. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 _ - - Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 %AM' .JL/LII1II- However, the older industrial regions (includ- ing the Urals) will still provide the bulk of Soviet industrial production. Although pro- grams to disperse Soviet industry and to create self-contained regional complexes will continue, the production of many basic mate- rials and of most equipment will remain geo- graphically concentrated. 20. The USSR has a stockpiling program which is designed to maintain vital sectors of the economy under peacetime and wartime conditions and to facilitate the conversion of industry to a wartime footing. Stockpiles of food, raw materials, and capital equipment are maintained in regional base depots and in plants and warehouses. In peacetime, these stockpiles are used in emergencies, but only after normal plant stocks and inventories have been depleted. We are unable to estimate the magnitude and composition of the Soviet stockpiles, but increases in total production through mid-1955 will support an enlarged program. The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951- 1955) called for doubling of Soviet stockpiles. Soviet-type stockpiling programs are being adopted throughout most of the Bloc. 21. By mid-1955, the Bloc economy will have achieved a higher level of self-sufficiency than at present, altho,ugh certain imported items will remain of substantial importance to cur- rent Bloc industrial and military production. These items include electronic tube com- ponents, certain chemicals, certain types of machinery and equipment with their spare parts, and probably also tin, natural rubber, copper, zinc, and cork. If these items of im- port ceased to be available, bottlenecks would appear in the Bloc productive system and dur- ing a limited period of time adverse repercus- sions would spread through the economy.4 22. We estimate that by mid-1955 the Bloc economy will be better prepared to support a major war than in any previous year. The increase in the aggregate mobilization poten- tial will result primarily from the expansion of the Bloc economy, especially the industrial base, and the continued growth of stockpiles 4 For more detailed discussion of this problem, see INZIE-59, "Probable Economic Effects of a Sev- erance of East-West Trade" (16 April 1953) . 5 essential to maintaining production under war conditions. For example, in 1955 the USSR will probably produce 42 million tons of steel, in comparison with annual produc- tion during World War II of less than 10 million tons. However, the Bloc output in the basic industries (energy, minerals, metals, chemicals), and Bloc resources in technical manpower, machinery, and facilities will re- main substantially below those of the NATO states during the period of this estimate. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL FACTORS 23. Soviet scientific and technical capabilities have increased rapidly since World War II, and we believe that they will continue to in- crease throughout the period of this estimate. The USSR has given science and technology a high priority and has given great emphasis to increasing the contribution of science and technology to Bloc military capabilities, with results most evident in the development and production of nuclear5 weapons, and to a lesser extent in air defense equipment. 24. The scientific assets of the US (the num- ber and quality of trained personnel, facilities, equipment, and financial support) are greater than those of the USSR, and the assets of the West as a whole are far greater than those of the Bloc. However, the USSR is expending great effort to reduce this disparity, and in some fields the USSR may have equalled or excelled the US. 25. Soviet higher education in most scientific and technical fields is roughly comparable to that of the West, but a shortage of scientific and technical personnel will continue throughout the period of this estimate. We estimate that there are about 1,440,000 Soviet citizens who have received scientific or tech- nical degrees from colleges and universities (about 80 percent the US total) . About 185,000 people are engaged in scientific re- search and in teaching science in the USSR, compared to about 240,000 similarly engaged 5 The term nuclear weapons as used in this esti- mate means all weapons employing the principle of nuclear fission or fusion or both in combina- tion to contribute energy either directly or in- directly to an explosion. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 LAJIIii IL.LIr1L ESTIMATED GROWTH OF SELECTED SECTORS OF THE BLOC ECONOMY, JANUARY 1953 - JUNE 1955 SECTOR USSR SATELLITES COMMUNIST HINA ' TOTAL BLOC % GNP 1952 TOTAL INCREASE % (JAN. '53 TO JUNE '55) % GNP 1952 TOTAL INCREASE % (JAN. '53 TO JUNE '55) % GNP 1952 TOTAL INCREASE % (JAN. '53 TO JUNE '55) % GNP 1952 TOTAL INCREASE % (JAN. '53 TO JUNE '55) GNP 100.0 INDUSTRY 41.8 Consumer Goods 10.8 Producer Goods 21.0 Military End-Items 10.0 17-21 22-25 13-16 22-25 30-33 100.0 40.2 na 2 na na 9-14 12-15 na na na 100.0 14.4 na na na 5-7 20-23 na na na 100.0 35.0 na na na 13-16 19-22 na na na AGRICULTURE 20.1 5-8 20.8 3-5 51.1 _ 0 ' 26.3 3-5 TRANSPORTATION & COMMUN. 9.3 14-17 6.3 13-16 1.7 13-16 7.9 13-16 TRADE 4.1 12-15 14.1 5-9 na na ( ( SERVICES 18.2 14-17 14.2- 1-4 ( 32.8 na ( 30.8 na ( ( CONSTRUCTION 6.5 13-16 4.4 10-14 ' na na 1 Because of the fragmentary nature of the data available, our estimates of Chinese Communist eco- nomic development are extremely fragile. 2 Not available. This estimate represents initial thinking by agricultural specialists. It is subject to revision as a result of current research efforts. "iNgitrinrIttm Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 - _ Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 %/vial trum in the US. We believe that during the period of this estimate the USSR will probably grad- uate about 1.4 times as many people in engi- neering and the physical sciences as will the US. 26. Soviet science and technology are subject to the same type of centralized planning and control as all other Soviet activities. Even though Soviet scientists are a privileged group, their research is subject to many of the usual totalitarian restrictions. Such restrictions will probably have a more deadening effect upon long-range theoretical research than upon practical applications within the period of this estimate. While numerous theories in chemistry, physics, and biology have been attacked, there is no evidence that ideological restraints hamper developments directly af- fecting military weapons. 27. East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser extent Poland and Hungary, possess scientific and technical manpower and facili- ties which provide a significant increment to the total resources at the disposal of the Bloc. On the other hand, Communist China, be- cause of the extreme shortage of scientific and technical manpower and facilities, is unlikely to contribute to Bloc science. Scientific and Technical Capabilities in Particular Fields 28. The quality .of Bloc research in the sig- nificant scientific fields varies greatly. In some fields, notably in mathematics, physics, and microbiology, much research is original and of high quality. On the other hand, pub- lished Soviet research in most biological sciences and in medicine indicates that capa- bilities in these fields are generally mediocre. 29. Since World War II, the USSR has made substantial achievements in atomic energy, aircraft design and production, and electron- ics. Soviet science will continue to contribute substantially to the increase of Bloc military strength and capabilities throughout the period of this estimate, particularly in the following fields: a. Nuclear Weapons. The Soviet atomic energy program will continue to have one of E4 7 the highest priorities in the allocation of Bloc resources. Soviet capabilities for atomic re- search will remain considerably less than those of the US in both personnel and equip- ment. We believe that the Soviet atomic energy program will continue to concentrate almost entirely upon the development and production of weapons.6 b. Aircraft. The aircraft industry is esti- mated to be technically capable of completing development and placing in production dur- ing the period of this estimate the following types of aircraft: a heavy bomber, a jet medium bomber, an improved jet day inter- ceptor, and a jet all-weather interceptor. In addition, several Soviet projects in the turbo- jet field, including axial flow engines in the 10,000 pound thrust class and at least one turbo-prop engine, are known to be in ad- vanced stages of development. c. Electronics. The USSR has made sub- stantial progress in expanding its electronics industry and in adapting Western equipment. The industry is now capable of independent research and development, and electronic equipment of modern design is being pro- duced. We believe that during the period of this estimate the USSR will have the capa- bility of developing new or improved versions of the following equipment: early warning radar, fire control radar, blind bombing/ navigational radar, and airborne intercept equipment. Some of these improved equip- ments may be placed in production during the period. d. Electromagnetic Warfare. The USSR now has the capability seriously to disrupt Western long-range radio communications and certain navigation systems.7 Soviet capa- bilities in related electronics fields indicate that the USSR is now capable of developing a See paragraphs 2 and 3 of Appendix B for esti- mated size of the Soviet nuclear weapons stock- pile, and for a discussion of Soviet capabilities in this field. 7For information concerning Soviet jamming capabilities, see SE-38, "Probable Soviet Courses of Action in Electromagnetic Warfare" (24 April 1953), and Appendices to SE-38, "Soviet Bloc Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Electromagnetic Warfare" (12 June 1953). rinntrinPKITIAI Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 VO../1111 I Li1-1 I I IfiL equipment for jamming frequencies up through 30,000 megacycles. On the basis of known or reported Soviet capabilities in the development of magnetrons, we believe that the USSR is now technically capable of pro- ducing limited quantities of ground based and airborne jamming equipment to cover fre- quencies through 10,000 megacycles. It is considered unlikely, however, that the USSR will have significant jamming capabilities in the frequency ranges above 10,000 megacycles during the period of this estimate. 30. Chemical Warfare. The USSR has the capability to produce and disseminate stand- ard CW agents. It also possesses scientific and technical capabilities for the production of nerve gases. Although there is much evi- dence of research closely related to chemical warfare, there is no evidence that any bas- ically new chemical warfare end-item is likely to be developed by mid-1955.. 31. Biological Warfare. Soviet microbiolog- ical research will probably continue to em- phasize modification and stabilization of bac- teria and viruses and, thereby, could lead to an increase of BW capabilities. On the basis of known and estimated Soviet capabilities, it is estimated that the USSR can produce and disseminate during the period of this estimate several highly virulent BW agents. The effec- tiveness of these agents against livestock would probably be severe, against certain crops possibly severe, and against humans questionable. 8 32. Guided Missiles. While no Soviet mis- siles are known to be operational now, the USSR Icould have several types operational within the period of this estimate. This esti- mate is based principally upon the fact that the USSR has exploited the missiles in the German World War II program; the nature of Soviet work and the rate of progress subse- quent to full utilization of German knowledge is largely unknown. a. Surface-to-Air Missiles, based on German designs (Wasserfall) with improved guidance, control, and homing, could be available now or in the immediate future. In addition, a sur- face-to-air missile of native design could be developed by 1955. b. Surface-to-Surface-Missiles. It is known that the USSR has built at least a limited number of German V-1 and V-2 type missiles. A single stage ballistic missile, powered by a 120-metric-ton thrust engine, could be near the prototype stage of production by 1955. The range of this missile with a one-ton war- head would be less than 900 nautical miles; we believe that an "intercontinental" missile will not be available within the period of this estimate. c. Air-to-Surface Missiles. The USSR is capable of producing subsonic types, and some of these are probably available now. By 1955, a high subsonic speed rocket-powered glide bomb could probably become operational. d. Air-to-Air Missiles. Although the USSR has knowledge of two German subsonic winged rockets, there is no information on any Soviet interest in air-to-air guided missiles. CONHDENTIAL Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 rtramerertrftrri A I Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 APPENDIX B ESTIMATED BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH SUMMARY 1. We estimate the present and probable future strengths, as of mid-1955, of the Bloc armed forces as follows: Mid-1953 a. Personnel Strength Soviet Satellite Corn. China North Korea Viet Minh Mid-1955 4,100,000 4,100,000 1,395,000 1,805,000 2,500,000, 2,500,000 295,000 300,000 I 123,000 125,000' Total 8,413,000 8,830,000 b. Security Troops Soviet 400,000 400,000 Satellite 290,000 305,000 Corn. China 1,450,000 1,450,000 Viet Minh 62,000 62,000 Total 2,200,000 2,217,000 c. Air Forces (organizational strength) Total combat a/c strength 26,000 Major categories Jet Fighters 11,600 Piston Med. Bombers 1,200 Jet Light Bombers 2,400 Jet Medium Bombers Heavy Bombers d. Soviet Naval Forces Major combatant ships 8 Submarines 184 348 (Incl. 112 long-range) 27,400 13,600 1,100 3,800 502 200' 240 377 (Incl. 149 long-range) This estimate is based on a continuation of present conditions and is therefore highly tenuous. The estimate of heavy bombers and jet medium bombers is based on assumption of series pro- duction of these types beginning by mid-1953 and April 1954, respectively. There is presently no intelligence to indicate that either type is in series production or in use in operational units. If production actually begins before or after the dates indicated, the strength estimates shown will be affected accordingly. Major combatant-type surface vessels include battleships, heavy and light cruisers, and fleet and coastal destroyers. Some are obsolete or obsolescent. See attached Table for details. The number of weapons estimated is based on the assumption that the entire amount of fis- sionable material believed available to the Soviets is fabricated into fission weapons of 30- 100 KT yield. 9 2. We believe that the USSR now has a stock- pile of about 120 nuclear weapons of from 30 to 100 kiloton yield. By 1955 the total number may be about 300 weapons of the same range of energy yield.4 In view of our uncertainty concerning the production of fissionable materials, particularly uranium- 235, the actual number of nuclear weapons may be as low as two-thirds or as high as twice this estimate. In the event that the USSR should choose to stockpile weapons of smaller or larger yield, the estimated number of weapons in the stockpile would be altered accordingly. 3. On the basis of information now available on the Soviet explosion of 12 August 1953, it is concluded that the USSR is capable of pro- ducing air delivery type nuclear weapons with explosive powers in the range of a few thou- sand tons of TNT to approximately one million tons of TNT. Throughout this range ther- monuclear reactions may be used to increase the energy yield from the fissionable mate- rials present without directly contributing a substantial amount to the total energy yield. Having demonstrated the capability to utilize thermonuclear reactions to increase energy yields from fissionable materials, the Soviets may direct efforts toward the eventual modi- fication of the estimated stockpile of 30 to 100 KT weapons in one or more of the follow- ing ways: a. Increase the number of 30 to 100 KT weapons. b. Increase the energy yield per weapon in the stockpile, the number being approximately the same. c. Produce very high yield weapons (e.g., 500-1,000 KT) by accepting corresponding reductions in the total number of weapons in the stockpile. The 12 August test may also indicate an ad- vanced stage, but not the culmination, of a Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 UVJU IVILIV I irtiL thermonuclear program having as an objec- tive the production of weapons yielding more than a million tons of TNT in which thermo- nuclear reactions directly contribute a sub- stantial amount to the total energy yield. BLOC GROUND STRENGTH The Soviet Army 4. We estimate that the Soviet ground forces now total about 2,500,000 men, and that the internal security forces constitute an addi- tional 400,000 troops. The Soviet Army is estimated to consist of 175 line divisions (of which 105 are rifle divisions, 40 mechanized, 25 tank, and 5 horse-cavalry) and 45 support- ing divisions (25 antiaircraft and 20 artillery divisions). On the basis of present mobiliza- tion plans, estimated trained reserves, and estimated stocks of military equipment, we believe that the Soviet Army and internal security forces could expand to a total strength of 7,500,000 organized into 300 line divisions, by - M+30 days. The estimated maximum mobilization potential by M-1-360 is 12,500,000 men. In the absence of general war, however, we believe that the Soviet ground forces will remain at approximately the present size through mid-1955. The armament, the mobility, and capability of these forces for sustained combat will con- tinue to improve, but the various armies, corps, and divisions will continue to vary greatly in quality. 5. The Soviet ground forces are estimated to include approximately 100,000 trained para- chutists and another 100,000 men in partially- trained, air-transportable units. Airlift ca- pacity is believed sufficient to permit a maximum-effort, single lift of about 28,000 fully-equipped airborne troops, depending upon the availability of air facilities. 6. The Soviet Army is the most powerful land force in the world today. Its combat effec- tiveness is high; the senior command is dy- namic and experienced; junior officers can be expected to execute orders faithfully; and the individual soldiers are courageous and have good physical stamina. Soviet equipment is plentiful and adequate in quality. In gen- 10 eral, Soviet weapons compare favorably with Western types. Mobilization would lower in- dividual unit efficiency but the rapid increase in numbers of units would tend to overcome the effects of this drop even in the short term. 7. The Soviet Army has been reorganized and modernized since the end of World War IL We believe that current Soviet line divisions probably possess good equipment, generally of World War II design, in adequate quantity. The Soviet ground forces in Eastern Europe, particularly in Germany, probably constitute the best-equipped and best-trained units of the Soviet Army. Soviet forces in the Far East may also be at a somewhat higher level of readiness than other units in the USSR. The thorough Soviet training program prob- ably ensures a high degree of combat skill. Discipline is good, and morale is almost cer- tainly high. The training system provides an input to the ground reserve of something under 500,000 men each year. 8. Soviet ground forces are concentrated pri- marily in East Germany, the Western USSR, the Caucasus, and the Far East. This dis- position facilitates logistical support and also provides for the defense and security of the most important and vulnerable areas of the USSR. 9. The USSR is now manufacturing substan- tial quantities of all types of basic ground force weapons. The volume of production is ample to meet the current requirements of the Bloc armed forces. During the period of this estimate, production of ground force weapons, with the possible exception of armored vehicles, is not expected to increase. 10. Certain weaknesses of the Soviet Army will continue to limit its offensive capabilities during the period of this estimate. The great extent of Soviet territory and the limitations of the road and rail networks present difficult logistic problems. The Army lacks experi- ence in large-scale combined amphibious operations, and it has never conducted suc- cessful large-scale airborne operations in wartime. The Army suffers from a shortage of technicians, a weakness that is being met rni\IP1111P1ITIAI Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 tAJIMULE1 ItlilL by intensive pre-military and military train- ing and by the recall of some specialists from the reserve. Soviet Ground Forces in Europe 11. Soviet ground forces in Eastern Europe are organized into 30 line divisions totalling 535,000 troops, of which 22 divisions com- prising about 400,000 troops are in East Ger- many. While not at full war strength, the highly mechanized Soviet group of armies in East Germany are in a high state of combat readiness and represent the core of Bloc mili- tary power in Europe. The Satellite Armies 12. Satellite ground forces constitute a sub- stantial addition to Soviet military strength in Europe. We estimate that the Satellite armies including the East German Garri- soned Peoples' Police (KVP) now total 1,286,- 000 men organized into 75 line divisions (57 rifle, 1 cavalry, 11 mechanized, and 6 tank) , 2 artillery divisions, 6 antiaircraft divisions, and various independent brigades and regi- ments. The Satellite Security Forces consti- tute an additional force of some 290,000 troops. We estimate that by mid-1955 Satel- lite ground forces will be stabilized at a strength of about 1,690,000 men, organized into about 100 line divisions. All Satellite forces will remain dependent upon Soviet logistical support. Trained reserves of the Satellite ground forces amount to approxi- mately 5,000,000 men (of which only about 1,500,000 are considered fully-trained). By mid-1955 trained ground reserves will total 4,850,000 men, of which 2,500,000 will prob- ably be fully-trained. There is little equip- ment available for reserves, except in Bul- garia and except for the equipment and stock- piles of Soviet forces now stationed in East- ern Europe. 13. The Satellite 'armies are equipped largely with Soviet World War II equipment of good quality. The Satellites are now manufactur- ing for their own use non-combat vehicles, light artillery, small arms, and ammunition. They are dependent upon the USSR for most of their tanks, self-propelled guns, and heavy artillery, and for some of their light artillery. 11 The most obvious deficiency is in motor trans- port; few Satellite divisions are motorized or mechanized. However, a concentrated effort is being made to overcome this weakness by increasing deliveries of motor vehicles from the USSR and from Czechoslovakia and by some vehicle production in other countries. There will be major shortages of heavy armor and artillery at least until 1955. The Satel- lite ground forces are also weak in communi- cations equipment, and their antiaircraft de- fenses have few gun-laying radars. 14. Although the Satellite ground forces are being reorganized to conform to the Soviet pattern, differences still exist in training, equipment, morale, and general capabilities. Satellite war readiness should improve, how- ever, by mid-1955 as the combat units become better organized and better equipped. The Bulgarian Army is considered the best of the Satellite forces. The Hungarian and Polish Armies, however, are being pushed toward the Bulgarian level of achievement. 15. However, the relative unreliability of Satellite armed forces is a factor detrimental to Bloc military capabilities. The Kremlin could not now rely Upon the majority of the Satellite armies in a general war except for employment in secondary roles. If political tension and popular resistance in the Satel- lites increase, the USSR may find the military usefulness of Satellite forces and Satellite ter- ritories greatly reduced. Logistical Position 16. Bloc ground forces in Europe al.e in a good logistical position. We estimate that the Soviets have a stock of equipment and supplies in Germany sufficient for 22 divisions for 80-90 days, or 60 divisions for 60 days of combat. We believe that. military stockpiles within the USSR, except for POL, are prob- ably sufficient to maintain 175 divisions in combat for an extended period (i.e., up to one year, depending upon the intensity of com- bat) The road, rail, and inland waterway G We have no estimate of POL stockpiles for ground forces alone; for all Soviet armed forces POL stockpiles are estimated sufficient for from 4 to 6 months of combat. nnmrinnwri Al Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 TOP SECRET 12 nets in Eastern Europe are adequate to per- mit full utilization of those Bloc divisions now in Eastern Europe and, in addition, to move and to support a considerable number of addi- tional divisions from the USSR. Soviet Forces in the Far East 17. The USSR represents both the founda- tion and the arsenal of Bloc military power in the Far East. Soviet ground forces in the territory east of Lake Baikal operate within n autonomous command structure. These forces total an estimated 415,000 men, organ- ized into 30 line divisions, of which 5 are mechanized and 1 tank. There are also 78,- 000 Soviet security troops in this area. We estimate that the USSR could mobilize an additional 15 divisions by M+30 days from three military districts which constitute the Soviet Far East. 18. Transportation facilities constitute the major limitation upon the support of large- scale military operations in the Far East over an extended period. The Trans-Siberian Railroad carries at least 90 percent of the *military supplies shipped from the western USSR to the Far East. The USSR has at- tempted to reduce the danger deriving from this transport limitation by maintaining large reserves of military and other supplies in the Far East. However, the USSR has equipped and provisioned the North Korean Army and has furnished large amounts of equipment and POL to the Chinese Communists. While we do not know what proportion of these supplies were drawn from stocks in the Far East, we believe that Soviet forces in the Far East now have sufficient supplies and equip- ment (with the exception of POL) to support 30 divisions in combat from 6 to 8 months. Chinese Communist Army. 19. The over-all strength of the Chinese Com- munist Field Forces is estimated at 2,380,000 troops, organized into 65 armies and 221 line divisions (194 rifle, 7 cavalry, 5 armored, 12 artillery, and 3 parachute) and various inde- pendent units. 20. The Chinese Communist forces are bas- ically infantry. Their weapons are a hetero- geneous assortment of European, American, Japanese, and Soviet manufacture. Limited amounts of Soviet heavy equipment (tanks, artillery pieces, and trucks) have been re- ported in various parts of China, but the ex- tent of Soviet equipping of Chinese Commu- nist units other than those in Korea is not known. Most of the armored equipment was apparently shipped to the Chinese Commu- nists during late 1950 and early 1951, but ammunition and other types of material for the Chinese Communist armies in Korea has sinee been furnished on a continuing basis. Communist China has become increasingly dependent upon the USSR for ammunition, spare parts, POL, and replacement equipment, although this dependence has become less urgent with the termination of hostilities in Korea. We estimate that despite the flow of Soviet material, the disparity between the equipment of the average Chinese Communist division and that of the average Soviet divi- sion will probably not be reduced significantly in this period. 21. The morale and .combat effectiveness of the Chinese Communist troops in Korea and Manchuria are high. We estimate that the combat effectiveness of the Chinese Commu- nist troops elsewhere will be lower because of the heterogeneity of the weapons and equip- ment, deficiencies in heavy weapons, equip- ment, training, and the lack of supporting services. The combat effectiveness of the Chinese Communist Army has also been limited by the absence of tactical air support. However, if Soviet aid in the form of advice and equipment continues, the over-all combat effectiveness of Chinese Communist forces will almost certainly continue to increase. North Korean Army 22. We estimate that the North Korean Army now totals about 280,000 men, organized into 18 rifle divisions, 7 infantry brigades, 6-10 armored units up to regimental size, 2 mortar regiments, and 2 artillery regiments. 23. The North Korean soldier in 1950 was well trained, but severe casualties forced the in- duction of large numbers of untrained men into combat units. Recent evidence indicates TOP SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 TOP SECRET 13 that the past 12 months have been utilized to raise the standards of training and equip- ment. Rigid discipline, experienced leader- . ship, and Soviet staff advice will continue to give the North Koreans a general over-all combat efficiency rating of from fair to good. Viet Minh Army 24. We estimate that the Viet Minh military forces consist of a regular army of 123,000 (organized into 6 infantry divisions, 1 artil- lery division, and numerous independent for- mations) , 62,000 regional troops, and 115,000 poorly armed irregulars. The combat effec- tiveness of the regular Viet Minh forces is considered fair, to good, considering the ter- rain, climatic conditions, and type of opera- tions conducted. Three-fifths of the regulars are deployed in the strategic Tonkin area. BLOC AIR STRENGTH Soviet Air Forces6 25. We estimate that the Soviet Air Forces have an organizational strength of about 20,500 aircraft, including 10,200 fighters, (8,700 jets) ; 2,600 attack aircraft; 3,500 light bombers (2,250 jets) ; and 1,200 piston medium bombers. We also estimate that the Soviet stored reserve of military aircraft is approxi- mately equal in number to the aircraft in units. There are insufficient data available to permit a sound estimate of the composition of the reserve; however, we believe that most re- serve aircraft are World War II piston types. 26. Although the size of the total air establish- ment is not likely to change appreciably through mid-1955, we estimate that a signifi- cant increase in over-all operational effective- ness will result as conversion to jet fighters and bombers progresses. We estimate that 6 Current estimated over-all actual strength is about 85 percent of the estimated organiza- tional strength. Actual strength of piston fighter, attack, and piston light bomber regi- ments is estimated at 95-100 percent; transport and reconnaissance regiments are estimated at 90-95 percent of organizational strength; jet fighter units are estimated to average approxi- mately 80-85 percent; medium bomber 75-80 percent; and jet light bomber, and jet recon- naissance, 60-65 percent of organizational strength. by mid-1955 the Soviet Air Forces will have an organizational strength of about 20,500 in- cluding 10,000 jet fighters; 2,500 attack air- craft (1,000 jets) ; 3,700 light bombers (3,500 jets) ; and 1,050 piston medium bombers, 50 jet medium bombers, and 200 heavy bombers.7 27. The Soviet Air Forces have been under- going steady modernization. We estimate that about 50 percent of the aircraft are jets, compared with about 33 percent in mid-1952 and about 40 percent in January 1953. We estimate that about 70-80 percent of organiza- tional aircraft will be jets by mid-1955. MIG-15 types will probably be retained as a standard fighter aircraft through mid-1955. Improved fighter aircraft, probably an out- growth of the MIG-15 type, are entering operational units but their characteristics are unknown. An all-weather jet interceptor may also have been developed, and may be in op- erational use by mid-1955. During this period, bombers will probably receive consid- erable emphasis. The 11-28 and Type 35 (jet light bombers) will constitute standard Soviet equipment during the period of this estimate. A new and improved jet light bomber may also enter service by mid-1955. Within the period of this estimate, the USSR may com- plete development and begin series produc- tion of a jet medium bomber. A heavy bomber may already be in production and, if it be assumed that series production began in mid- 1953, about 200 may be available by mid-1955.8 28. The combat effectiveness of Soviet military aviation is, on the whole, not as good as that of the air forces of the US and the UK, and is expected to remain below US and UK stand- ards throughout the period of this estimate. By mid-1955, air crew proficiency, quality of equipment, and standards' of maintenance and 7 The estimate of heavy bombers and jet medium bombers is based on assumption of series pro- duction of these types beginning by mid-1953, and April 1954, respectively. There is presently no intelligence to indicate that either type is in series production or in use in operational units. If production actually begins before or after the dates indicated, the strength estimates shown will be affected accordingly. 8For more detailed information, see SE-36/1, "Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US through Mid-1955" (3 August 1953). TOP SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 TOP SECRET 14 training will have improved generally. How- ever, units operating advanced and complex equipment (e.g., in all-weather fighters) prob- ably will not have resolved all of the problems which accompany the introduction of such equipment. 29. The aircraft industry has been maintained in steady operation throughout the postwar period. Soviet aircraft and aero-engine in- dustries are estimated to be currently operat- ing at about one-third their maximum peak. We believe that two years would be required for the industry to reach capacity production. We estimate combat aircraft production in 1952 was: TYPE Jet fighters Piston light bombers Jet light bombers Piston medium bombers Jet medium bombers Piston heavy bombers Jet heavy bombers 1952 5,280 240 1,280 4,10 none none none TOTAL 7,210 30. The present logistical position of Soviet military aviation is good, and will probably improve during the period of this estimate. 31. We believe that about 60 percent of the present total Soviet air strength, including nearly 65 percent of the jet fighter force and almost 85 percent of the medium bomber force, is now concentrated in Eastern Europe and the western and southwestern portions of the USSR. We believe that these dispositions will not change significantly by mid-1955 ex- cept that a greater proportion of the total medium bomber strength will be stationed in the Far East. 32. There are five major combat components of Soviet military aviation: The Air Force of the Soviet Army, Fighter Aviation of Air De- fense, Long-Range Aviation, Naval Aviation, and Aviation of Airborne Troops.9 The Civil Air Fleet, while not an operational component of Soviet military aviation, is under the War Ministry. Together with other civil air organizations, it operates about 1,650 transports on scheduled and non-scheduled operations. It could make an estimated 1,000 of these available for military purposes. However, this would pro- duce a corresponding reduction in Soviet domes- tic air transport. a. The Air Force of the Soviet Army (1) The Air Force of the Soviet Army, consisting of units assigned to the 14 Tac- tical Air Armies and to the 4 Military Dis- trict Air Forces, is the largest component of Soviet military aviation. The primary mis- sions of the Air Force of the Soviet Army are to carry out tactical operations in support of ground forces and to defend areas against penetration by hostile aircraft. In areas where other fighter forces are available, the interception mission is shared with fighter units subordinate to Fighter Aviation of Air Defense, or to Naval Aviation. (2) We estimate that the Air Force of the Soviet Army has an organizational strength of 11,100 aircraft including 4,020 jet fight- ers, 1,750 jet light bombers, and 2,440 at- tack aircraft. The estimated organiza- tional strength by mid-1955 will also be 11,100 aircraft, of which 4,400 will be jet fighters, 2,600 jet light bombers, and 900 jet attack aircraft. The Soviets are continu- ing to employ the I1-10 (Stormovik) piston attack aircraft for close support operations. There are indications, however, that the MIG-15 and the 11-28 may assume ground support roles on an interim basis, until an aircraft specifically designed for this work appears in operational units. b. Fighter Aviation of Air Defense (1) Fighter Aviation of Air Defense has the mission of defending important target areas in the USSR. In many areas it shares this mission with fighter elements of the Air Force of the Soviet Army and Naval Aviation. The force has an organizational strength of 3,500 interceptor aircraft, of which 3,100 are jets. By mid-1955, the estimated organizational strength will be 3,500 jet interceptor aircraft. c. Long-Range Aviation (1) Long-Range Aviation, consisting of 3 Air Armies, 1 in the Far East and 2 in Western USSR, plus units of undetermined subordination, constitutes the strategic striking force of the Bloc. This force has an estimated actual strength of 1,000 piston medium bombers (TU-4's) ; and an organi- zational strength of 1,220 piston medium TOP SECRET _Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 TOP SECRET bombers. By mid-1955, we estimate that the bomber force of Soviet Long-Range Aviation will maintain approximately 'its present organizational strength, but may include up to 50 jet medium bombers and 200 heavy bombers.n During the period of this estimate, the TU-4, the only known operational Soviet bomber capable of de- livering the atomic bomb in the US, will remain the principal vehicle for Soviet inter- continental operations. The TU-4, under normal operating conditions, is estimated to have a combat radius of 1,700 nautical miles and a combat range of 3,100 nautical miles with a 10,000 pound bomb load." (2) We believe that the over-all combat effectiveness of Soviet Long-Range Aviation will continue to remain well below that of the US strategic air arm. The average Soviet medium bomber crew is considered less skilled than the average US medium 'bomber crew of World War II. Moreover, Soviet staff planners lack the extensive operational experiences obtained by the US. However, Soviet Long-Range Aviation is known to be undergoing a training pro- gram for strategic bombing missions, and selected crews probably could, within the limitations set by equipment, approach standards attained by present average US crews. Moreover, bombing capabilities are enhanced by the abundance of Western target and navigational data which is read- ily available to the Soviets. (3) On the whole, the chief limiting fac- tors in the operational effectiveness of Soviet Long-Range Aviation in the conduct of long-range strategic air missions are: (a) the absence of advanced bases; (b) the performance characteristics of the TU-4 1? The estimate of heavy bombers and jet medium bombers is based on assumption of series pro- duction of these types beginning by mid-1953, and April 1954, respectively. There is presently no intelligence to indicate that either type is in series production or in use in operational units. If production actually begins before or after the dates indicated, the strength estimates shown will be affected accordingly. "For more detailed information, see SE-36/1, "Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US through Mid-1955" (3 August 1953) . 15 aircraft and its associated equipment; (c) the current lack of a true intercontinental bomber; and (d) the lower proficiency of the average Soviet long-range bomber crew, compared to its US counterpart. By mid- 1955, it is expected that the USSR will have made progress in overcoming some of the limitations cited above. d. Naval Aviation is responsible for cooper- ation with naval surface and submarine units, furnishing close support for the seaward flanks of the Soviet ground forces, and for air defense of certain areas, a mission which it shares, in most cases, with fighter elements of Fighter Aviation of Air Defense and the Air Force of the Soviet Army. It is capable of providing fighter cover for naval units within a combat radius of 360 nautical miles from shore bases. Naval Aviation can per- form antisubmarine patrol, aerial reconnais- sance, and aerial-mining, and it is equipped to deliver torpedo, rocket, and bombing at- tacks against surface vessels. It is estimated that Naval Aviation has an organizational strength of 3,600 aircraft, including 1,960 fighters (1,560 jets) ; 940 light bombers (490 jets) ; and 390 reconnaissance aircraft (310 jets). e. Aviation of Airborne Troops has the mission of conducting airborne training and providing airlift and equipment for air- borne operations. Its organizational aircraft strength consists of approximately 550 trans- port aircraft and 250 gliders. Transport air- craft from other Soviet aviation components and the Civil Air Fleet would have to be uti- lized to supplement the aircraft of this com- ponent for large-scale airborne opera- tions. (See paragraph 5, Appendix B, for Airborne troop strengths.) Satellite Air Forces 33. It is estimated that the jet fighter re- equipment program of the Satellite air forces will have been completed by mid-1955. In addition, the Soviets have begun to re-equip at least one of the Satellites with jet light bombers (I1-28's). These developments por- tend increased operational capabilities. How- ever, development of these capabilities will be TOP SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 TOP SECRET 16 dependent on the Soviet assessment of the political reliability of the Satellite air forces. We estimate that these air forces have an organizational strength of about 3,200 air- craft, including 1,430 jet fighters, 310 piston fighters, 680 ground attack, 470 light bombers (80 jets), and 140 transports.12 The organi- zational strength of the Satellite air forces, by mid-1955, will be approximately 3,300 air- craft, of which 1,500 will probably be jet fighters and 120 jet light bombers. The Satellite forces will remain almost completely dependent upon the USSR for logistic sup- port, and virtually all aircraft will be Soviet types. Communist Air Forces in China (CAFIC) 34. The strength and capabilities of the Com- munist Air Forces in China have been in- creasing steadily. The estimated organiza- tional strength of the CAFIC is 2,400 opera- tional aircraft, including 1,500 jet fighters, 200 piston fighters, 160 ground attack, 360 light bombers (100 jets) , 10 piston medium bombers, and 170 transports.13 Assuming that Soviet support continues in the future on the same scale as in the past, it is esti- mated that by mid-1955 the organizational strength of this force will be about 3,550 air- craft, including 2,100 jet fighters, 300 piston fighters, 300 ground attack, 510 light bombers (160 jets), 50 piston medium bombers, 240 transports, and 50 piston reconnaissance. We estimate that the CAFIC will remain de- pendent upon the USSR for aircraft and equipment, spare parts, technical supervision, and aviation fuel and lubricants. 35. CAFIC combat potential has been in- creased during the past few months by the conversion of two light bomber regiments in Manchuria to 11-28 light bombers., The " It is estimated that the over-all actual strength of Satellite air forces is about 65 percent of organizational strength. The actual jet fighter strength is estimated to be 40 percent of organi- zational fighter strength. " It is estimated that the over-all actual strength of Chinese Communist air forces is about 85 percent of organizational strength. The actual jet fighter strength is estimated to be 75 percent of organizational fighter strength. CAFIC has not demonstrated any capability for carrying out either air-ground support operations or high-altitude bombing. The effectiveness of the CAFIC will probably con- tinue to improve throughout the period of this estimate through increased proficiency of flying personnel. However, over-all effective- ness will be largely determined by Soviet will- ingness to continue to supply additional air- craft, especially jet fighters and jet light bombers, together with the necessary parts and equipment. BLOC NAVAL STRENGTH Soviet Naval Forces 36. The tasks assigned the Soviet Navy (in- cluding Naval Aviation) in the discharge of its mission are: a. Offshore and inshore defense of the maritime frontiers; b. Protection of the sea approaches and coastal lines of communications; c. Conduct and support of amphibious operations; d. Offensive action against hostile naval units and enemy sea lines of communications; e. Protection of the seaward flank of a ground campaign. 37. The total surface strength of the Soviet Navy is about 184 major combatant-type sur- face vessels,14 and some 2,000 escort, patrol, mine, amphibious, and auxiliary types. Ma- jor ship strength centers around 6 effective heavy cruisers, 15 effective light cruisers, and 116 effective destroyers. We further esti- mate that there are 348 submarines,15 of which 112 are long-range (combat radius of 3,500-6,000 nautical miles), 88 medium-range (combat radius of 1,000-1,800 nautical miles), " Major combatant-type surface vessels include battleships, heavy and light cruisers, and fleet and coastal destroyers.. Some are obsolete or obsolescent. See Table for details. Obsolete submarines have been omitted from this figure; included are 12 long-range, 32 medium- range, and 38 coastal submarines which are obsolescent (overage) by US standards. TOP SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 TOP SECRET and 148 coastal submarines.16 Naval Avia- tion has an authorized strength of 3,600 air- craft of which 1,560 are jet fighters. 38. The Soviet Navy has an estimated per- sonnel strength of about 895,000 men, in- cluding about 95,000 attached to Naval Air. This total includes 400,000 General Service, of whom 100,000 are in training, 275,000 in Coastal Defense and Naval Infantry, and 125,000 in coastal (border) security opera- tions, such as beach patrols and lookouts, offshore patrol craft and small bases for pa- trol craft, and communications for coastal security. Current reserve strength of the Soviet Navy personnel is approximately 1,000,000. We estimate that reserve strength will be maintained at this level through mid- 1955. 39. There is no force in the Soviet Navy comparable to the amphibious forces of the US Navy, although the naval infantry com- ponents have received training in amphibious warfare. The Soviet Navy does not possess sufficient modern amphibious vessels and craft to launch and sustain long-haul am- phibious operations. It is capable, however, of mounting short-range lifts in considerable force. 40. We estimate that by mid-1955 the Soviet Navy will have a total of 240 major com- batant-type surface vessels, centering around 6 effective heavy cruisers, 21 effective light cruisers, and 163 effective fleet destroyers.17 The total of minor and auxiliary vessels prob- ably will not increase substantially, but will comprise a greater percentage of new and modernized units. We also estimate that by mid-1955 there will be 377 submarines, of which 149 will be long-range, 72 medium- range, and 156 coastal types.18 Newly con- " We have no evidence that Soviet submarines are fitted with snorkel, other than the 16 acquired from the Germans. We estimate that they could be so fitted at the rate of about 25 percent of the force per year. We believe new Soviet submarines are or will be so fitted, but feel it unlikely that those approaching the end of their fully effective life will be so equipped. " See Table for details. " Obsolete submarines have been omitted from the 1955 totals; a number of obsolescent but still usable submarines are included. 17 structed submarines will probably have in- creased combat radii. We believe that the organizational strength of Naval Aviation will be about 3,600 aircraft in 1955. How- ever, almost all aircraft will be jet types. 41. The operational efficiency of the Soviet Navy is still below that of the navies of the major Western Powers. However, it will con- tinue to improve during this period, and by mid-1955 it will probably equal that of West- ern navies in the employment of small craft. It may approach US standards in operations involving major combatant-type ships. Rel- atively little' is known of the operating effi- ciency of the Soviet submarine force, but it must be assumed that it has profited by the lessons of World War II, and from German experience. Personnel of the submarine force are the pick of the Soviet Navy, and their morale is high. Like other elements of the fleet the submarine force is believed to be in a good state of operational readiness. 42. We estimate that adequate supplies of ammunition, stores, and POL are now avail- able in all areas except the Far East to service the Soviet fleet for a period of one year at the present scale of operations. In the Far East, POL supplies are adequate only for six months. 43. The mine warfare capabilities of the Soviet Navy are extensive, and pose a serious potential threat to Allied naval operations in Europe and the Far East. Nearly all Soviet warships, including most of the lesser vessels, are equipped to lay mines, and the capabili- ties of submarines and aircraft in this respect extend the range of the threat to the Western approaches of the British Isles, the Far East- ern island chains, and the Mediterranean area. Large stocks of German World War II mines were captured by the Soviets, and de- velopmental work has been given a high pri- ority. The Soviet Navy is known to have large stocks of mines, probably including all types. 44. Naval construction in the Soviet Union is presently estimated at about 175,000 NSDT TOP SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 TOP SECRET 18 (Naval Standard Displacement Tons) per year, broken down as follows: Cruisers 3.5 Ocean Patrol Destroyers 20 Submarines 20 Smaller Types 110 Coastal Submarines 20 We believe this tonnage total could be raised to 485,000 NSDT per year by utilizing the entire Soviet ship-building capacity on a one- shift basis, and, by using Satellite facilities, to 773,000 NSDT. Currently 6 large vessels, of which 3 are known to be cruisers, are under construction. Probably 4 of these have reached the fitting-out stage. Construction of battleships and carriers is possible in all fleet areas except the Far East. There is no firm evidence of such construction, and we believe it unlikely that any ships of these types will become operational during the period of this estimate. 45. The operating forces of the Soviet Navy are divided among four major fleet areas, Baltic, Northern, Black Sea, and Pacific. The Baltic and Pacific Fleets are each sub-divided into two components covering the northern and southern sectors of their areas of respon- sibility. Each of the six fleets has a naval air component directly under the operational con- trol of the naval commander. In addition to the fleets there are three flotillas which serve as local defense forces ,on the Amur and Danube Rivers, and the Caspian Sea. (See Table for detailed composition of these fleets.) a. Baltic: This is the largest Soviet fleet concentration; it consists of the 4th and 8th Fleets, to which should be added the Polish and East German sea forces. Submarine forces assigned are estimated at 138, of which 88 are long and medium-range craft. With the use of merchant shipping normally in the area (approximately 450,000 GRT) , amphibi- ous lift and support for a force of 100,000 men could be provided, but the port capacity in the target area selected would be the controlling factor in determining the actual size of the force to be lifted. Naval Aviation assigned to the Baltic Fleets has an organizational strength of 1,020 aircraft including 340 jet fighters and 160 jet light bombers. b. Northern: The Northern Fleet comprises 2 cruisers, 31 destroyer types, and approxi- mately 192 escort, mine, amphibious, and auxiliary craft. Submarine strength is esti- mated at 33, all but 4 of which are long or medium-range types. With merchant ship- ping normally in the area, amphibious lift for about one division (14,000 men) is available. Naval Aviation assigned has an organizational strength of 370 aircraft, of which about 170 are jet types, largely fighters. c. Black Sea: The Black Sea Fleet comprises 2 battleships, 8 cruisers, 26 destroyer types, and approximately 298 escort, mine, am- phibious, and auxiliary vessels. The Black Sea Satellites (Rumania and Bulgaria) add 5 destroyers and some 90 other craft to this total. Naval Air has an organizational strength of 600 planes, including 300 jet fighters and 90 jet light bombers. About 70 submarines are assigned to this Fleet, of which 27 are long and medium-range types. Mer- chant shipping in the area generally averages about 188,000 GRT, and amphibious lift for 40,000-45,000 troops and their continuing re- supply is possible. Port facilities in the tar- get area would determine the actual size of the assault. d. Far East: The 5th and 7th Fleets in the Far East total 2 cruisers, 47 destroyer types, and about 340 escort, mine, amphibious, and auxiliary vessels. The Chinese Communist Navy could provide another 130 minor vessels. An estimated 107 submarines are based in the area, of which more than half are long and medium-range types. Naval Air assigned to the Far Eastern Fleets has an organizational strength of 1,610 aircraft, of which 800 are jet fighters and 200 jet light bombers. With the use of merchant vessels, amphibious lift for about 120,000 troops against Japan is avail- able. In addition the Chinese Communists have sufficient shipping to lift about 200,000 troops for a short distance. Early acquisition of port facilities and good weather conditions would be essential for any assault in force. 46. The principal weakness of the Soviet Navy will continue to derive from the division of its major surface forces, which, because of their widely separated bases, are not mutually sup- TOP SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 TOP SECRET porting. This seriously complicates admin- istrative control, logistic support, and strate- gic mobility, although the development of the inland waterway system and the increased use of the Northern Sea Route now permit some interchange of vessels. A further weak- ness is the lack of adequate supply lines to the Northern and Far Eastern areas. 47. The tasks assigned Naval Aviation in- clude: air cover and support for amphibious operations, antishipping strikes, aerial mine- laying, air reconnaissance, and antisubmarine operations. It also has the function of pro- viding air defense within its operating areas. In this regard it is closely integrated with the over-all air defense system. Each of the 6 fleet commanders in the 4 major sea areas has direct operational control of the naval air components assigned. During the postwar period training has been stepped-up, with the emphasis on night and all-weather flying, for- mation flying, gunnery, and bombing. Night and all-weather capabilities nevertheless re- main relatively low. Exercises aimed at the improvement of coordination between air, sur- face, and sub-surface elements have been noted. Satellite and Chinese Communist Navies 48. The strength of both the Satellite and Chinese Communist Navies during the period of this estimate will remain negligible. The naval forces of the Satellites will probably be capable of aiding the Soviet Navy in mine- sweeping, minelaying, escort, and coastal de- fense duties. The Chinese Communist Navy, although small and ill-equipped, is the largest indigenous naval force in the Far East. It is capable of short-haul amphibious operations, coastal mining, motor torpedo attacks, limited escort work, and minor gunfire support. The Soviet Far Eastern Naval Forces are providing training, advisors, and logistic support to this force. Bloc Merchant Fleet 49. We estimate that the Soviet Bloc seagoing merchant fleet (including Communist Chinese vessels) totals 788 ships (1,000 gross tons up- ward) of 3,393,025 deadweight tons. More 19 than 80 percent of these ships are slow and overage. Since the end of World War II the Bloc has continually sought to strengthen the merchant fleet, and still retains, despite re- peated requests for their return, some 38 lib- erty ships from US Lend-Lease. We estimate that by mid-1955 the merchant marine of the Soviet Bloc will reach a total of 873 vessels of 3,641,740 deadweight tons. BLOC AIR DEFENSES Soviet Air Defense System' 50. The USSR maintains a large air defense system which includes the active air defense elements of all military services under the operational control of a single air defense organization (PVO-Strany). A passive de- fense organization, which includes the re- sources of the police and other civil organiza- tions, is also under control of PVO-Strany. The European Satellite and Chinese Commu- nist air defenses are integrated with those of the Soviet system. We estimate that the Bloc has the capability of providing vigorous op- position against air attacks on critical targets in the interior of the USSR, under conditions of good visibility. Under clear moonlit night conditions, Bloc defense capabilities are fair against piston bombers and negligible against jet bombers. Under conditions of poor visi- bility, day or night, Bloc interception capa- bilities are negligible. Deficiencies are re- lated generally to equipment and to associated training which is directly conditioned by the availability and capabilities of equipment. The lack of operational interceptor units equipped and trained for all-weather opera- tions is the most critical deficiency. A limited number of all-weather jet interceptors may be in operation by mid-1955. We believe that, during the period of this estimate, gradual improvements will be made in the following aspects of the air defense system: a. Early Warning (1) While areas along the northern and southern borders may have some radar gaps, it is believed that significant numbers of early warning and GCI radars will be found " See paragraphs 32-a and 32-h, Appendix B. TOP SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 TOP SECRET 20 on approaches to the most important areas in the USSR. Radar coverage during the period of this estimate is expected to develop further along lines indicated during the past two years, the most notable feature of which will be the introduction of more mod- ern radars in the early warning system. Low altitude coverage will continue to be a problem and will be only partially, offset by the use of ground observers. (2) It is estimated that by the year 1955, the Soviets will have several types of early warning radars which when suitably em- ployed together in an early warning system should afford reasonable coverage against medium bombers flying up to 60,000 feet altitude; such a system should provide reli- able detection range from 120 to 170 nau- tical miles. Detection ranges against fight- er aircraft at the same altitude should be no more than 75-80 nautical miles. b. Ground Control of Interception (1) The capacity of the air warning and control system will probably show a steady increase during the period of this estimate. The advancements in the technical equip- ment field will not be reflected immediately in increased system capacity. ? As new and improved equipment becomes available and training continues, the system capacity will improve as a result of increases in the num- ber of targets one radar can hold under surveillance, increases in the over-all target reporting capacity before saturation point is reached, and an increased fighter aircraft control capacity. (2) Improvements in radar, communica- tions (particularly through use of UHF radio) , and identification methods should result in more effective use of close control methods for fighter interceptions. Present use of fighter grid and zonal systems em- ployed in controlling fighters is expected to be largely replaced by vectoring for close control. (3) Within the period of this estimate, the USSR is expected to have GCI radar of several types, including the V?Beam sets presently in use, which should be capable of detecting medium bombers at a maxi- mum range of 120-170 nautical miles. They also should provide reliable coverage for interceptor control, without the use of transponder beacons, to a maximum range of 70-85 nautical miles and an altitude cov- erage up to 40,000-42,000 feet. The use of transponder beacons in Soviet interceptor aircraft, a development of which the Soviet Union is capable, would increase range and altitude coverage for controlled intercep- tion. c. Communications (1) Control center operating procedures are expected to improve. The filtering phase of air raid reporting procedures will continue to be a major problem during the period of this estimate. The increasing numbers of V?Beam radars will probably reduce the amount of filtering required at the collection center level since much of the filtering will probably be completed at the radar site. However, filtering will still be required at the various control centers where overlapping coverage will result in a duplication of information. (2) Wider use of newer radars will tend to increase warning time available and will tend to improve the handling capacity of the raid reporting system by reduction of filtering requirements. The increasing use of multi-channel microwave radio link sys- tems will improve air defense capabilities as well as greatly increasing security and de- creasing vulnerability to jamming. None of the equipment changes are expected to alter reporting procedures mate.rially; however, some refinement of present procedures will undoubtedly take place in order to improve the passing of raid reports for timely ap- praisal and action. d. Fighter Aircraft Improved fighter aircraft, probably an out- growth of the MIG-15 type, are entering operational units, but their characteristics are virtually unknown. An all-weather jet interceptor may also have been developed, and may be in operational use by mid-1955. e. AI Radar We know that the USSR has World War II airborne intercept equipment obtained from the Germans and through Lend-Lease. We TOP SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 TOP SECRET estimate that the USSR has the technical knowledge and production capability to pro- duce an Al radar superior to World War II types as well as passive detection Al equip- ment of electronic, infrared, and possibly sonic types. The USSR almost certainly now has experimental quantities of some type of Al equipment. It may now have some type of Al equipment available for limited opera- tional use, although the indications are not yet conclusive. We estimate that Al equip- ment will come into operational use within the period of this estimate. (See d. above.) f. Antiaircraft Weapons (1) AAA. It is estimated that during the period under consideration the Sbviets will employ a family of antiaircraft artillery weapons capable of delivering continuously pointed fire against subsonic aerial targets at all altitudes up to 36,000-38,000 feet with barrage types of fire up to about 45,000 feet. Sufficient numbers of directors and gun-laying radar will be available for em- ployment with the medium and heavy type guns. (2) Unguided AA Rockets. Supersonic unguided AA rockets may be available, but it is believed that dispersion problems will limit their employment as a predicted fire weapon to about 40,000 feet with a barrage fire capability up to about 50,000 feet. (3) Surface-to-Air Missiles. Surf ace-to- air missiles based on German designs (Wasserf all) with improved guidance, con- trol, and homing could be available now or in the immediate future. In addition, a surface-to-air missile of native design could be developed by 1955. (4) Air-to-Air Missiles. Although the USSR has knowledge of two German sub- sonic winged rockets, there is no informa- tion on any Soviet interest in air-to-air missiles. Air-to-air unguided rockets un- doubtedly would be used; it is possible that air-to-air rockets might incorporate homing heads. Satellite and Chinese Communist Air Defenses s 51. The European Satellite and Communist Chinese air defense systems are integrated 21 with the Soviet system. They deepen the Bloc early warning coverage net. Despite some increase in the air defenses of the Satel- lites and of Communist China (notably in the Korea-Manchuria area), we estimate that during the period of this estimate the air de- fenses of both the Satellites and Communist China will remain inferior to those of the USSR. Soviet Civil Defense 52. The USSR has a large, complex, and well- organized civil defense system which is in- tegrated into the over-all Soviet Air Defense Organization (PVO). The civil defense sys- tem includes a full-time civil defense staff or- ganization. Comprehensive plans have been made for utilizing existing agencies and facili- ties, and for training large groups by various mass organizations, but there is no evidence of present mass participation in the civil de- fense program, or of a program of passive defense measures specifically designed for defense against atomic attack. In addition, civil defense needs are apparently considered in urban and regional planning, in stockpil- ing, and in decentralization programs. 53. The USSR probably has a greater civil de- fense capability than any other major coun- try, except perhaps the UK. Its present civil defense system appears well-planned and or- ganized, although we cannot estimate its ef- fectiveness in dealing with wartime emer- gencies', especially atomic attack. The elaborate totalitarian control system, the highly regimented character of the popula- tion, and, to some extent, the dispersal of population and industry constitute strong points in the Soviet civil defense system. However, we believe that a serious shortage of transport facilities and of materials would handicap efforts to meet a wartime civil de- fense emergency. Soviet Coastal Defense System 54. The Soviet Coastal Defense establishment, which includes radar nets, coast watchers, coast artillery, antiaircraft, and naval infan- try, has an estimated strength of 275,000 TOP SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 TOP SECRET men. 'Defenses have been established in im- portant ports, harbors, and straits. Coastal security personnel total an estimated 125,000. While not part of the Coastal Defense estab- 22 lishment, these forces would in wartime help provide surveillance of the coast for detecting the arrival of raiding forces, agents, or saboteurs. TOP SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 TOP SECRET 23 APPENDIX C BLOC POLITICAL WARFARE STRENGTHS DEFINITION OF BLOC POLITICAL WARFARE 1. Political warfare plays an extremely im- portant role for Communists, who consider military warfare only an extension of political warfare in their persistent campaign to un- dermine the strength of the non-Communist world. Bloc political warfare techniques in- clude: diplomatic action, both through nor- mal intergovernmental channels and in such international organizations as the UN; propa- ganda and front activities; political and eco- nomic pressures and inducements; the action of Communist parties and of Communist- controlled trade unions outside the Bloc; in- filtration of Communists or their sympa- thizers into key governmental posts; espio- nage and sabotage; the fomenting of civil un- rest, civil war, and colonial revolt; and the exploitation of nationalist and revolutionary movements. ? FACTORS AFFECTING BLOC POLITICAL WARFARE STRENGTH 2. The principal sources of strength upon which Bloc political warfare capabilities are based consist of the Bloc's military capabili- ties; the size, power, and centralized leader- ship of the Bloc; Communist doctrine; and the Communist international movement. Size, Power, and Centralized Leadership 3. The USSR, which is the base of the Com- munist world revolutionary movement, covers 8,500,000 square miles and has a population of about 200,000,000 people. The Bloc now includes 10 states,' which control a territory of about 13,320,000 square miles (one-fourth 1USSR, Communist China, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland,? Rumania, and North Korea. For the purposes of this general discussion, Communist China is included among the states forming the Bloc. However, it should ,be noted, as paragraph 7 in- dicates, that the Sino-Soviet relationship is sig- nificantly different from the other Soviet- Satellite relationships. of the world total) and a population of about 750,000,000 (one-third of the world total). The size of the Bloc and the rapidity with which the Bloc and the Communist move- ment have expanded, particularly since World War II, constitute important elements of Bloc political warfare strength. 4. In its conduct Of political warfare, the Bloc benefits greatly from centralized leader- ship and from effective discipline and con- trol, which make possible flexibility in the selection and use of particular courses of action. The Bloc's unique ability to conceal the realities of life within the Bloc from for- eign observation enables Soviet propaganda to ,present a deceptive picture to, the outside world. The freedoms and opportunities pro- vided Bloc agents and supporters in the non- Communist world also constitute important advantages for the Bloc in the conduct of political warfare. 5. Bloc political warfare depends to a large degree upon the stability and power of the USSR, which is the nucleus of the complex of Bloa states, national Communist parties, and auxiliary organizations. Bloc political war- fare strength would be seriously reduced if the authority of the Soviet regime were weak- ened by a prolonged and indecisive struggle for power within the USSR. However, we do not believe that any power struggle is likely to lead to a breakdown of the authority of the Soviet regime within the period of this esti- mate. 6. The USSR determines the fundamentals of Bloc political warfare. The Satellites and the national Communist parties outside the Bloc are under the control of the USSR. The na- tional Communist parties outside the Bloc accept Soviet authority even at the expense of lessening their power and influence in their own national affairs, alienating significant elements of their membership, and intensify- ing the repressive measures directed against them by national governments. TOP SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 TOP SECRET 24 7. Communist China occupies a unique posi- tion within the Bloc. It remains dependent upon the USSR for military and economic support. However, it appears to be more an ally than a Satellite, and it almost certainly participates in the formulation of Commu- nist policy in Asia. The prestige and mili- tary power of Communist China help to in- crease Bloc political warfare strengths in Asia, while at the same time they strengthen Chinese Communist national power. As a consequence, Communist China exercises some influence, the exact degree of which we are unable to estimate, on the national Com- munist parties and movements of Asian countries. Communist Doctrine 8. Communist doctrine constitutes a power- ful force for the international Communist movement. Much of this force, however, de- rives from the fact that Communism is the official ideology of one of the world's most powerful nations, which uses it in the pursuit of its foreign political aims. Aside from this consideration, the considerable attraction of Communism stems from its Utopian message. Many are attracted by its promise to end social, and particularly economic, injustices, and may, in addition, find in it a secular reli- gion which provides them with a certainty of purpose. For the party member Communism provides a system of values and a guide to action. Furthermore, the doctrinal tenets of Communism involve acceptance of a rigid dis- cipline which provides the leadership with a unique measure of control. These tenets are an important source of Communist resolution and of the Communist will and capability to fight. 9. The ideas and doctrines developed in the nineteenth century by Marx and Engels have had varying degrees of influence throughout most of the world. Marxist doctrine had exer- cised great influence in the West before the Russian Revolution, and Lenin and Stalin both profited from the fact that the philoso- phies of many 'non-Communists and even anti- Communists had been influenced by the philosophy upon which they began the erec- tion of the Soviet state. Since 1917, Marxist doctrine, although not necessarily as inter- preted by the Kremlin, has spread even fur- ther; for example, it exercises a strong influ- ence in Japanese universities today, and it has helped to create groups of fellow-travelers in most non-Communist countries. Communist International Organization 10. The international Communist movement is a vital element of Bloc political warfare strength, and its rise to international im- portance has been one of the major political phenomena of the twentieth century. The Bloc now has a network of more than sixty national Communist parties with an esti- mated 24 million members, as well as a variety of international mass organizations. Most party members live within the Bloc, but at least 3,250,000 are scattered throughout the non-Communist world. These figures do not include the membership of the front organiza- tions, trade unions, etc., which the national Communist parties influence or control. While the power of the national Communist parties to influence national policy is rela- tively small in the Western Hemisphere and in West European countries, except for Italy and perhaps France, these parties have dem- onstrated the power to organize, maintain, and control armed rebellion on a significant scale in a number of the underdeveloped coun- tries of the world, to create economic and political disruption in a number of other coun- tries, and to maintain important espionage and propaganda efforts in nearly all countries. 11. The Bloc controls and operates the largest and most complex system of mass communi- cation in the world. For example, the USSR leads the world in volume of international radio broadcasting, and the combined output of the Satellites and Communist China ex- ceeds that of any other state. The Bloc sys- tem of mass communication, which includes radio, publications, posters, demonstrations, agitators, etc., enables the Bloc to disseminate a tremendous stream of propaganda and to attempt to mobilize public opinion among key groups throughout the world in support of Bloc policies. The themes which Bloc propaganda employs ? "peace," "national in- dependence," "anti-Americanism," "anti-im- TOP SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 TOP SECRET perialism," etc. are designed to encourage neutralism, to exploit national rivalries, to bring nationalist movements under Commu- nist leadership and control, and to cause di- versions of strength from the centers of West- ern power. 12. The Bloc has frequently been able to take the initiative in the East-West struggle. This has been due in large part to the Bloc's or- ganizational strength and its great experience in the techniques of political warfare, but it also derives from the fact that the Bloc has succeeded in identifying its revolutionary ap- peals with the social and national aspirations of many dissident forces throughout the world. Thus, the Communists have obtained control over some of the major labor confed- erations in France, Italy, Indonesia, Latin America, and many individual unions else- where, and they have gained influence or con- trol over a number of nationalist movements in colonial areas. 13. There are some factors, however, which tend to place limitations of varying degree upon Bloc political warfare strength. These include the limitations of Communist philoso- phy and Communist world outlook, especially in evaluating political developments in the non-Communist world; the Communist in- sistence upon the maintenance of totalitarian controls, which has increased the awareness of Communist objectives and techniques in the non-Communist world; occasional conflicts between the policies of the Kremlin and the interests of national Communist parties out- side the Bloc, which have reduced the strength of some of the national Communist parties; and increasing awareness in the non-Com- munist world since 1945, especially in the West, of the actual conditions prevailing with- in the Bloc and of the Kremlin's aggressive intentions. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENT OF BLOC POLITICAL WARFARE STRENGTH 14. One of the bases of Bloc capabilities for political warfare has been a stable, centralized, and unified leadership in the Kremlin. It is probable that these capabilities were tern- 25 porarily reduced by the transfer of power to new leadership and by the evidences of top- level dissension, provided especially by the fall of Beria, which have accompanied this trans- fer. We believe, however, that the temporary weakness and confusion which marked Bloc political warfare in recent months will not be serious or prolonged. Only a continuing struggle for power within the Soviet hierarchy, or a sierious impairment of the authority of the Soviet regime, would significantly weaken Bloc political warfare capabilities. Such develop- ments are unlikely. Moreover, the death of Stalin has given the Kremlin an opportunity to gain credence for its claim that Soviet policy is motivated by a sincere desire to lessen international tensions and to coexist peace- fully with the West. In this sense Bloc political warfare capabilities may have been enhanced by the death of Stalin. Western Europe 15. The strength of Communist parties in Western Europe varies from country to coun- try, from the illegal party of an estimated 150 members in Ireland to the mass parties of France and Italy. Throughout Western Eu- rope, the Communist parties since 1946 have suffered losses both in membership and pres- tige. However, the hard core of the party has been preserved everywhere, and in most coun- tries the party continues to influence large numbers of non-Communists. 16. The popular strength of the Communists remains highest in France and Italy, where the Communists are a strong minority in the parliaments, control many municipal govern- ments, and hold the leadership of the most important trade unions. We estimate that the Communist Party of France now has 450,- 000 members, compared with the peak of 850,- 000 in 1946. However, in each national elec- tion in France since 1945, the Communist Party has obtained more than 5,000,000 votes, about one-quarter of the total vote cast. The Communist Party of Italy is estimated to have 1,700,000 members, compared to only 5,000 in 1943 and to the peak of 2,300,000 in January 1948. In the 1948 elections in Italy, the Pop- ular Front coalition, dominated by the Com- munist Party, polled 8,000,000 votes, about 30 TOP SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release -26'13707/1V. 81V-IkIS11)79R01012A002900020001-9 percent of the total vote cast. In the June 1953 elections, the Communist Party polled 6,122,638 votes, about 22.5 percent of the total vote cast, and the left-wing Socialists polled 3,440,222 votes, about 12.2 percent of the total vote cast. 17. As a result of a decline in direct-action strength in recent years, marked by the fail- ure of mass political strikes and demonstra- tions, the French and Italian Communist Parties have concentrated on increasing their popular following through the tactics of the "United National Front" and on attempting to attract individuals and groups from all political parties and sections of society to sup- port the Communist goal of neutralizing Eu- rope's role in the East-West conflict. The Communists have tried to make common cause with individuals of all social groups on the basis of a broad program of "peace, na- tional independence, and democratic liber- ties." In directing their appeals against the Western coalition, and against the US in par- ticular, the Communists have attempted to link international issues with pressing domes- tic problems, such as wages, taxes, and hous- ing. Thus, the Communists' basic appeal in France and Italy is to the sense of interna- tional insecurity and to the deep dissatisfac- tion over domestic conditions which have long existed, and which would exist in the absence of the Communists. 18. We estimate that the French and Italian Communist Parties will retain their electoral and parliamentary strength throughout the period of this estimate, and that they will maintain their influence through numerous front organizations, their extensive party press, and Communist leadership of the largest trade union federations. In both France and Italy, the Communists, as the heirs of the strong tradition of the extreme left, will continue to lead the groups discon- tented because of social and economic condi- tions. 19. In the other countries of Western Europe, the Communists have little mass appeal. Communists do hold important positions in some trade unions and in some strategic in- dustries in most countries, but they are much 26 less numerous and influential than they are in France and Italy. Middle East and Africa 20. The forces of nationalism, anti-Western- ism, and social unrest, instead of the institu- tional strength of Communist parties, provide the main vehicles for Bloc political warfare in the Middle East and Africa. The strength of the Communist parties in this area will probably remain low during the period of this estimate. Most Communist parties have been forced underground, and only that in Iran and those in North Africa linked to the French Communist Party have thus far had any marked influence. However, despite the slight organizational gains of the Commu- nists, the continued growth of nationalist and anti-Western extremism and of social unrest will continue to provide the Communists with opportunities for increasing their influence among students, workers, and peasants. 21. The Bloc agent in Iran, the Tudeh Party, had prior to Mossadeq's downfall an esti- mated hard-core strength of 1,000, a card- carrying membership estimated at from 20,000 to 45,000, and probably an additional 80,000 fellow-travelers. It has been the only sizable united and disciplined political party in Iran, demonstrating great cohesion and considerable organized strength. It has de- veloped techniques for the controlled use of mass demonstrations, strikes, and riots for political purposes. South Asia 22. Communism does not now pose a major immediate threat to India or Pakistan, al- though the Indian Communist Party and al- lied parties received 6,000,000 votes (of 106,- 000,000) in the 1952 elections. The Indian Communist Party still has only about 40;000 members, but it has small vocal groups in several state legislatures and the national legislature. The Communist Party members in the national legislature will be able to do little more than to embarrass the government and to use their positions to spread Commu- nist propaganda. In those states where Communist strength is., greatest, the party nnharirarlkilln RI Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 CONFIDE.N IAL may be able to obtain representation in local coalition governments and even seriously to disrupt parliamentary processes. 23. At the present time, the major task of the Indian Communist Party is to build up its organizational strength. In urban areas, the party uses trade unions and "peace" movements as vehicles of propaganda, and in rural areas, peasant organizations are used to stir up the agrarian population and to enlist support for subversive activities. To a considerable extent, party strength in respect to organization will depend on the policies of the Indian Government toward the party. Far East and Southeast Asia 24. Although the Japanese Communist Party now has less than 100,000 members (about half of whom are underground) , it is well organized and well disciplined and has a sig- nificant potential for espionage, sabotage, and propaganda, as well as for promoting at least limited and sporadic incidents of mass violence. However, the strength of the party will continue to be limited by the official re- straints of the Japanese police and intelli- gence services and by the party's open identi- fication with and virtual subordination to the interests and policies of the USSR. The existence of such issues as trade with the Bloc, especially China, fear of Japanese in- volvement in a general war in Asia, the pres- ence of US forces in Japan, and a peace treaty with the USSR, should provide the Bloc with considerable opportunities for political pres- sure on the domestic and international levels. 25. Bloc political warfare strength varies throughout Southeast Asia. It is greatest in Indochina where the Viet Minh is a forceful instrument of control and terror. The Viet Minh retains considerable nationalist appeal and maintains heavy military pressure upon the French, with Chinese Communist assist- ance. The Viet Minh has received diplomatic recognition by the Bloc states, it has the sup- port of numerous non-Communists not only within the zones of its control, but also in the Franco-Vietnamese areas. The continuation of the Viet Minh's popular hold on substantial proportions of the populations in its own 27 zone, based partly on military prestige, partly on continued nationalist appeal, and partly on the mechanism of compulsion and terror, will depend upon the degree of military power and ideological appeal which the free world may be able to bring to bear against it. 26. The prospects for Bloc political warfare in Burma, Thailand, and Malaya will depend largely upon developments in Indochina. In Burma and Malaya, the Communists are capable of conducting guerrilla operations in small scattered areas. In Thailand, the Com- munist Party is small and relatively ineffec- tual. However, Communist political war- fare strengths in Thailand would probably grow considerably if the Viet Minh or the ' Chinese Communists ' should consolidate a position along the Thailand borders. 27. The Communist movement in Indonesia has gained considerable political strength since the end of World War II. Communist strength derives from representation in par- liament and support from some non-Com- munist members of parliament; from Com- munist control of SOBSI, the dominant In- donesian labor union; and from successful adoption of united front tactics, which have frequently resulted in participation by front parties in the government.2 28. In the Philippines, Communist strength has declined considerably since 1951, and, except for some influence in labor unions, tenant farmer groups, and women's and youths' leagues, is confined almost exclusively to the greatly weakened Huk movement. Latin America 29. The Communist threat in Latin America is greater than the present party membership of about 200,000 in the area would suggest, because of the ease with which a relatively few Communists operating behind labor, in- tellectual, and other fronts can exploit the social unrest and Yankeephobia already exist- ing in the non-Communist population. Guate- mala is a prime example of how a small Corn- 2 The current critical situation in Indonesia has been examined in SE-51, "The Significance of the New Indonesian Government" (18 Septem- ber 1953) . 1M Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 UUrinULli I ki munist minority? can, through its militant advocacy of social reforms and nationalistic policies and through its occupancy of key posi- tions in labor and governmental agencies, convert a government into an effective, though indirectly controlled, instrument of the Communists. 30. The organizational strength of Commu- nist parties in Latin America has declined in recent years, and in many countries the parties have been officially suppressed. Never- theless, Communist influence is great in Guatemala, considerable in British Guiana and the French West Indies, and moderate in Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, and Cuba. This influence will probably be maintained during the period of this estimate and may even increase in the event of a decline in eco- nomic activity. The Communists dominate completely one of the three Latin American international labor federations, the Confed- eration of Latin American Workers (CTAL) , and, through their influence in labor, they have gained a considerable potential for in- stigating and prolonging strikes in strategic industries, such as in the Bolivian tin and 28 Chilean copper mines. In Brazil, the Com- munists have been influential in preventing the development of Brazil's petroleum re- sources by US capital. In most Latin Amer- ican countries, the Communists have worked closely with the ultranationalists, and they have attempted to form "national liberation" fronts based on labor unity and the exploita- tion of local nationalist issues, such as the bilateral military pacts between the individual republics and the US. 31. The Communists have also been success- ful in penetrating Latin American educa- tional systems, intellectual circles, and those patriotic organizations formed to give expres- sion to the spirit of ultranationalism. By employing front organizations and sponsoring "peace" congresses, the Communists have ex- ploited the fear of war and have stressed that Latin America has nothing to gain and much to lose from embroilment in a world conflict. These local Communist propaganda activities have received support from Soviet radio broad- casts to Latin America, which have increased in volume since the outbreak of the Korean war. CONFIDENTIAL Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 - Table, 1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 CONFIDENTIAL ESTIMATED BLOC ACTIVE MILITARY AND SECURITY PERSONNEL STRENGTH July 1953 - July 1955 PERSONNEL STRENGTH (IN THOUSANDS) TOTALS COUNTRY SERVICES JULY 1953 Jur.x 1955 JULY 1953 I JULY 1955 ARMY AIR FORCE NAVY SECURITY ARMY AIR FORCE NAVY SECURITY USSR 2,500. 800. 800.1 400. 2,500. 800. 820.1 400. 4,500. 4,520. SATELLITES (total) 1,286. 79. 30.6 290.5 1,690. 79.2 36.9 305. 1,686.1 2,110.9 Albania 40. 0.2 0.8 10. 40. 0.2 0.9 10. 51. 51.1 Bulgaria 220. 14. 4.8 40. 250. 14. 6. 40. 278.8 310. Czechoslovakia 185. 14. 35. 250. 14. .. .. 50. 234. 314. East Germany 100. 6.5 8. 25. 250. 6.5 10. 25. 139.5 291.5 Hungary 185. 12. 37.5 , 250. 12. . 40. 234.5 302. Poland 330. 20.3 9. 65. 350. 20.3 11. 65. 424.3 4463 Rumania 226. 12. 8. 78. 300. 12. 9. 75. 324. 396. COMMUNIST Asia (total) 2,873. 75.2 58. 1,512. 2,785.4 75.4 66. 1,512. 4,428. 4,438. China 2,380. 60. 58. 1,450. 3,948. North Korea 280. 15. 295. Viet Minh 123. ? ? ? ? 62. 185. BLOC TOTALS 6,569. 954. 888.6 2,202.5 6,975. 954. 922.9 2,217. 10,614.1 11,068.9 Excluding 95,000 Naval Air personnel, but including 125,000 Naval security personnel. " 'Not including 5,000 of unknown subordination. This estimate is based on continuation of present conditions and is therefore highly tenuous. Air Force strengths are carried at 1953 levels in the absence of sufficient information on which to base an estimate for 1955. CONFIDENTIAL Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 29 Table 2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 CONFtDENT ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF BLOC GROUND FORCES, JULY 1953 COUNTRY FORCES Dry'sroNs BY TYPE, JULY 1953 LINE CAV. RIFLE MECH. ARNE'D OR TANK SUP- PORT- ING USSR (total) 105 40 25 45 Occupied Europe Caucasus MD's. NW. MD's. W. MD's. ?Not available by type ? W. Central MD's. E. Central MD's. Far East SATELLITES (total) 1 57 11 6 8 Albania 3 Bulgaria 1 11 Czechoslovakia 8 4 East Germany 2 1 Hungary 9 1 1 4 Poland 12 5 1 Rumania- 12 1 3 COMMUNIST ASIA 7 218 5 16 (total) China 7 194 5 15 North Korea 18 Viet Minh 6 1 BLOC TOTALS TOTAL LINE DIVISIONS DISTRIBUTION, JULY 1953 WESTERN CAUCASUS CENTRAL USSR FAR EAST JULY JULY PERSONNEL LINE PERSON- LINE PERSON- LINE PERSON- DIV'S 1953 1955 DIV'S NEL DIV'S NEL Dry's NEL LINE 175 175 1,385,000 95 220,000 17 455,000 33 415,000 30 30 30 535,000 30 17 17 220,000 17 14 14 190,000 14 51 51 660,000 51 19 19 275,000 19 14 14 180,000 14 30 30 415,000 30 75 98 1,286,000 75 3 3 40,000 14 16 220,000 14 15 185,000 3 12 100,000 11 15 185,000 17 22 330,000 13 15 226,000 246 191 2,783,000 Est. 221 184 2,380,000 18 280,000 7 7 123,000 471 2,671,000 170 220,000 17 455,000 33 3,198,000 30 CONFIDFIVTiAi Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Table 3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 CONFIDENTIAL. PRESENT ESTIMATED TO/E STRENGTH AND GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF BLOC AIR FORCES (Aircraft Types) USSR SATELLITES CAFIC Distribution Type A/C East Ger. West USSR S. W. USSR South USSR Cen. USSR Far East TOTALS Alban. Bulg. Czech. East Ger. Hung. Poland Rum. TOTALS TOTALS Jet ?bn Piston c) Jet ce Piston .4_ ;.., :142 Jet Piston al g t. Jet ..-cl Ii E Piston GIC.)1 2,42 Jet Piston E-4" a.) Jet 0 ca a) w Piston 0 1,400 570 340 260 170 30 120 2,570 500 1,030 1,030 420 630 830 200 210 1,170 250 130 90 110 400 160 60 40 1,130 100 120 120 60 30 60 300 200 120 120 40 60 30 2,130 450 630 540 460 190 590 200 100 8,700 1,500 2,600 2,240 1,290 1,220 1,870 520 560 10 290 50 130 130 30 40 220 50 170 30 ... 60 110 110 50 ? ? ? 80 80 30 550 50 220 80 100 20 40 150 100 80 80 30 30 1,430 310 680 80 390 - 140 170 1,500 200 160 100 260 10 170 20,500 3,200 2,400 roafts**0-am, CONFIDENTIAL Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 31 .1. Table 4 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 C40 F MM E ESTIMATED BLOC AVAL FORCES JULY 1953- JULY 1955 FLEET BALTIC NORTHERN BLACK SEA PACIFIC TOTALS BLOC TOTALS SHIPS AND PERSONNEL USSR SATELLITES USSR USSR SATELLITES USSR COMMUNIST USSR SATELLITE JULY JULY 1953 1955 1953 1955 JULY JULY 1953 1955 JULY JULY 1953 1955 1953 1955 JULY JULY 1953 1955 CHINA JULY JULY 1953 1955 & COMMUNIST JULY JULY 1953 1955 1953 1955 CHINA Surface and Shore Personnel 348 357 Naval Air (000) 32 32 Surface Vessels (Total) 1,254 1,275 A. MAJOR COMBATANT (Total) 66 87 Battleships/Monitor 2 2 Cruisers 11 19 Destroyers2 40 54 Coastal Destroyers 13 13 B. MINOR COMBATANT (Total) 1,188 4 Submarines (Total)5 138 165 Ocean Patrol 49 65 Medium Range, 39 34 Coastal 50 66 15 19 2 2 87 137 1 ?1 86 136 2 2 2 2 98 100 162 165 ? 13 17 192 198 58 66 800 820 86 100 886 920 9 9 21 21 .3 .3 33 33 ... 95 95 2 2 97 97 225 236 334 346 136 138 389 400 131 137 2,202 2,258 354 378 2,556 2,612 33 44 36 48 5 5 49 60 1 184 240 7 7 1918 2473 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 4 4 4 2 2 8 8 . . 2 2 11 23 31 1 1 24 32 29 40 19 31 5 5 36 47 124 172 6 6 130 178 2 2 7 7 11 11 33 33 33 , 33 192 4 298 4 131 133 340 130 136 2,018 4 347 371 2,365 . 33 49 70 75 1 1 107 88 348 377 3 3 351 380 26 40 18 19 19 25 112 149 112 149 3 3 9 9 1 1 37 26 88 72 3 3 91 75 4 6 43 47 51 37 148 156 148 156 On side in 1949 ? Present status unknown. 2 Based on continued construction at estimated present rate on building facilities presently utilized. These figures include some overage types useful primarily as amphibious support ships, i.e., the battleships/monitor, 2 cruisers, 8 destroyers, and 16 coastal de- stroyers. By mid-1955 the estimated number of overage cruisers will increase to 4. These will remain at about present strength. 5 Based on estimated construction programs. Obsolete boats are deleted from USSR totals. All Satellite submarines are obsolete, and thus effectiveness is nil. CONFIDFNTIAI Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 32 Table 5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 ORPFIDE ESTIMATED COMPOSITION OF BLOCHANT FL MIDr -1953 AND MID-1955 FLEETS (Vessels 1,000 Gross Tons Upward) MID-1953 MID-1955 COUNTRY SHIPS NON-TANKERS' TANKERS BLOC TOTAL NON-TANKERS1 TANKERS BLOC TOTAL No. 1 Dwt. No. Dwt. No. Dwt. No. Dwt. No. 1 Dwt. No. I Dwt. USSR 569 2,513,794 36 184,329 605 2,698,123 626 2,677,334 50 218,104 - 676 2,895,438 SATELLITES (Total) 85 405,583 2 21,490 ?87 427,073 99 456,983 2 21,490 101 478,473 COMMUNIST CHINA 85 249,739 11 18,090 96 267,829 85 249,739 11 18,090 96 267,829 BLOC TOTALS 739 3,169,116 49 223,909 788 3,393,025 810 3,384,056 63 257,684 873 3,641,740 'Includes passenger ships, freighters, and miscellaneous types such as crab canneries, whale factories, trawlers, and hydrographic ships. 33 CONFIDENTIAL Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15 : CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 ???. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 CUNHULN , 34 NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE FOR ESTIMATES OF BLOC ARMED STRENGTH a. G-2 comment of the nature of the evidence available for estimates of Bloc ground force strength: The reliability of Order of Battle intelligence on Communist countries varies directly with distances from friendly areas; accessibility or degree of contact being the major factor. For example, for CCF and North Korean units recently in contact, Order of Battle information is excellent and considered reliable. To 'a slightly lesser degree, Order of Battle information on Soviet units in Eastern Europe can be considered "reliable." This degree of reliability decreases, however, as distance from contact increases. As a result, elements of Order of Battle intelligence in the interior of the Soviet Bloc, such as subordination of units, names of unit commanders, or even precise knowledge as to exact location of major units are often lacking in reliability. This condition applies equally to both the interior of USSR and to Communist China. b. AFOIN comment on the nature of the evidence available for estimates of Bloc air force strength: Estimates of Soviet air strength are derived from intelligence which is considered of acceptable reliability, but collection coverage is incomplete. Estimates of over-all size and composition of Soviet Air Forces are derived from identification of individual units and estimated Table of Organization and Equipment strengths authorized for the various types of air regiments. Current estimates of jet fighter and medium bomber strength are considered reasonably valid. While aircraft count data are limited, they support an estimate that the current average levels of actual strength for the various types of aircraft amount to the following percentages of authorized TO and E strength: for jet fighters, 80-85 percent; for piston medium bombers, 75-80 percent; for jet light bombers and jet reconnaissance, 60-65 percent; and for all other types of aircraft, 90-100 percent. c. ONI comment on the nature of the evidence available for estimates of Bloc naval strength: Evidence confirming the existence of the major surface combatant vessels is firm and accurate. Identification of individual ships as to name and/or pennant numbers has been supported by evidence from a number of sources. Reliable evidence confirms the existence of 80 percent of the submarines and supports the existence of 15 percent; there is doubt about 5 percent. Of the 95 percent (333 submarines) whose existence is con- firmed or supported, 308 have been identified. Future strength estimates are based on current strength, observed building rates, identified new construction activity, and obsolescence factors. CONFIDENTIAL Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9 CONFIDENTIAL Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9