TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-98: COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION IN THE FAR EAST THROUGH MID-1955

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A003300020018-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2013
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: August 13, 1953
• Content Type: MEMO

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Lo) SECURITY INFORMATION .
AUG 14 1963.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
13 August 1953
SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-98: COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION
IN THE FAR EAST TPROUGH MID-1955
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable Communist courses of adtion in the Far East*
through mid-1955o
QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
Note: This estimate is Undertaken in conjunction with NIE-90: Soviet
Bloc Capabilities through mid-1955; and NIE-95: Probable Soviet Bloc
Courses of Action through mid-1955, both of which are scheduled to be
published during the third quarter of 1953. NIE-90 will cover Commu-
nist military and political warfare capabilities in the Far East.
NIE-95 will attempt, with reference to the capabilities and strengths
enumerated in NIE-90 and other considerations, to estimate the general
course of Soviet Bloc policy through mid-1955.
* Countries included in the Far East: Japan, North and South Korea,
Communist China, Formosa', Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, Indonesia,
Malaya, Burma, Ceylon, and India.
DOCUMENTNO.'
NO CHANGE !N CI
.)6ECLASSRED ?
CLASS. CHANGED TO: 'TS S C
NEXT.REVIEW DATE: ?
AUTH: HA 70-2
DATE:ntiagli. REVIVNER.: .12.11i522'
AN.*
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The purpose of this estimate is to examine the probable
Communist courses of action in the. Far East under the over=a11
Bloc policies as estimated in NIE-95 and within the limits of
'Communist capabilities as estimated in NIE -90e
It is hoped,
therefore, that the contributions to this estimate .can be
restricted to a discussion of probable courses of action, except
to the extent that reference to capabilities or strengths is
essential to the argument or to the extent that more recent
developments necessitate revisions of the coordinated text of
NIE -90 and its appendices.
Ao Soviet and Chinese Communist Objectives
1. What are specific Communist objectives in the Far East
during the period of this estimate?
2. What divergencies?if any:exist between the objectives of
Communist China and the USSR? -
Bo Factors Affecting Communist/ Courses of Action in the Far East.
1. What is the current status and what are the probable develop-
ments during the period of this estimate in Communist armed forces in
the Far East, with particular reference to:
a0 the readiness of the Communist armed forces in North
Korea, Communist China, and the Democratic Republic of
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'Viet Nam to engage individually or collectively, in
'aggressive action within the regional theatre;
b0 the ability of Communist para-military and guerrilla
units in Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Thailand,
Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, and India to:
1) harass or overthrow existing govethmenets; or
2) support an external Communist Attack on their
respective countries.?
c0 the readiness of the Soviet Union to assist Communist
forces in the Far East to accomplish the courses of action
in a and .b above.
2. What is the current economic situation and what are the
?
probable economic developments expected in the Far Eastern bommu-
nist countries during the period of this estimate, with particular
reference to:
a. economic ability of the existing Communist countries of
the Far East to support military operations, locally and in
a larger regional theatre;
, b0 economic ability of the existing Communist Countries of
the Fat East to support economic and political warfare
against non-Communist countries, in the region; and
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c0 economic ability of-the Soviet Union to assist the
Communist countries of the Far East to achieve a and b
above as well as to contribute to their economic developigent?
3. What is the current political situation and what are the
probable political developments expected during the period of this
estimates with particular reference to:
a0 the stability, organizations and orientation of Commu-
nist governments in North Koreas Communist Chinas and the
Democratic Republic of Viet Nam;
b0 the political strength of Communist movements in the
non-Communist countries of the Far East; and
c0 the ability of the Soviet Union and Communist China to
assist the indigenous Communist movements in the non-Communist
countries in the Far East in waging political warfare against
the existing governments?
4. What is the existing relationship between the Soviet Union
and Communist China and what developments are expected during the
period of this estimates with particular reference to:
an the influence of the Chinese Communists in the formation
of Communist policies in the Far East;
b0 the exercise of direction of the Communist movement in
the countries of the Far East (other than Communist China)?
- 4 -
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is:
0
In the determination of Communist policy, how important
ao? the Communist estiAate of US policies in the Far East
during the period of this estimate? '
bo the Communist estimate of possible US reaction to the
following developments:
1) A Communist violation of a Korean armistice by a
resumption of hostilities?
2) A considerable increase in Chinese Communist material
assistance to the Viet Minh; the provision of Chinese
Communist rear-area service units to the Viet Minh9
including. antiaircraft artillery units?
3)
A decisive Viet Minh victory resulting from large .
Chinese Communist material and/or service forces
assistance?
4) A Chinese Communist invasion of Indochina?
.5) A Communist offer to negotiate a "peaceful" settle-
ment in Indochina?
6) Large-scale Chinese Communist material assistance
to the Burmese guerrillas; movement of Chinese Communist
forces into Burma?
7) Chinese Communist supported and directed guerrilla
activities on large-scale in thailand?
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8) Communist attempted invasion of Taiwan?
9) An intensified peace offensiVe including
economic and political concessions and inducements
in the 'Far East with particular reference to Japan?
Co What Indications Can Be Derived from the Followin S ecific
Deve the
o ments as to Future Communist Courses of Action in
Far East?
10 The death of Stalin, the removal of Beria?_and otherper-
sonnel changes in the Soviet Union; personnel changes in the European
satellites Communist China, and North Korea?
2p Communist willingness to conclude an armistice in Kerea?
3. The decision on the part of the Chinese Communists to lower-
.
the goals of their program of economic development?
40 The substantial increase in Chinese Communist assistance to
the Viet-Minh beginning in 19530
5. The Viet Minh invasion of Laos at a time when world Communism
was speaking of "peace" and acting to reduce international tensions?
6. Apparent change in the tactics of the Communists in Philip-
pines, Indonesia, and Malaya over the past two years to policies
emphasizing for the most part non-violent political and propaganda
efforts to iAcrease Communist political power and popular support?
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7. Communist Chinese attacks on the offshore islands during
the spring and summer of 1953.
8. Apparent efforts of the Soviet Union and Communist China to
increase its trade with Japan.
9. The formation of the "Thai Autonomous Area? in Communist
China.
10. Soviet and Folish offers to contribute to the UN technical
assistance program.
1/0 Other specific develivments.
Do Communist Courses of Action in the Far East?
L What are the probable Communist courses of action in the
individual countries of the Far East and for the region as a Whole
during the period of this estimate? '
2. How might these courses of action be modified or changed.
by the following contingencies:
? a. Major developments in the implementation of the armis-
"tice and in the course of the political conference* particularly:
1) ROK breaking of the truce by renewinghostilities.
2) ROK unilateral withdrawal from the political conference
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(1/4)
before agreement has been reached for the withdrawal
of foreign troops from Korea; ROK and US joint withdrawal.
b. A major shift in US policy, either becoming more aggres-
sive or more conciliatory than ComMunist estimate in Section
C 5 above.
C0 An open split between the US and its allies over Far
Eastern policies'.
d. French offer to negotiate with the Communists to end
Indochina conflict.
e. Vigorous Japanese efforts to renew traditional trade
with the Asian mainland.
f. Initiation of military action by Nationalist China
against Communist China.
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