LIKEIHOOD OF GENERAL WAR THROUGH 1957

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A003400050001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 10, 1954
• Content Type: SNIE

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&NWRCT ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,ONE l
CONFIDENTIAL
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
8 : Js W
ESTIMATE
WI-P
LIKELIHOOD OF GENERAL WAR THROUGH 1957
SNIE 11-54
Approved 10 February'1954
Published 15 February 1954
DCCUME.NT NO. 1
NO CHANCE IN CLASS. t
C iDECLASSiFI= D
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIE
W DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE REVIEWER: J
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 10 February 1954. See, however, footnotes
of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff,
to paragraphs 5 and 6. The FBI abstained, the subject
being outside of its jurisdiction.
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CONFIDENTIAL
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1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient
designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the re-
cipient's office who require the information for the performance of their official duties.
Further dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the
information for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of
State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
h. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other
Department or Agency
2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by-burning in accordance with
applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by
arrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
3. The overseas dissemination of this intelligence will be limited to a period of
one year or less, at the end of which time it will be destroyed, returned to the forward-
ing agency, or permission requested of that agency to retain it in accordance with
IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953. .
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CONFIDENTIAL
LIKELIHOOD OF GENERAL WAR THROUGH 1957
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the likelihood of general war with the USSR during the period
through 1957.
ESTIMATE
1. We believe that the Kremlin will remain
fundamentally hostile to the US and that the
capability of the USSR to wage general war,
including its capability to attack the con-
tinental US, will continue to increase during
the period of this estimate. .
2. The Kremlin probably considers that op-
portunities will continue to exist during the
period through 1957 for increasing Soviet in-
fluence and perhaps expanding the area of
Soviet control by methods short of general
war. As its major course of action short of
general war the USSR will continue to use the
pressure of its growing military capabilities
and its international Communist apparatus to
try to undermine the political, economic, and
psychological strength of the free world in or-
der to give the Kremlin greater initiative in
the struggle for its ultimate objective of a
Communist world dominated from Moscow
and to reduce the freedom of action of the US
and its allies to combat it.
3. Soviet Bloc superiority in ground forces
employing conventional weapons will continue
throughout the period of this estimate. The
Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons will stead-
ily grow. The Kremlin is aware, however,
that the West will through 1957 have superior
strategic air power and naval power, a larger
atomic stockpile, and greater industrial po-
tential. The Kremlin also probably considers
that the USSR is making substantial progress
toward reducing its disadvantages in these
respects, particularly as regards stockpile and
types of nuclear weapons.
4. We believe that during the period of this
estimate the Communist rulers will continue
to consider general war a hazardous gamble,
involving at a minimum the certainty of wide-
spread destruction in the USSR and at the
same time carrying with it the risk that the
Soviet system itself would be destroyed.!
5. On the basis of the foregoing, we believe it
unlikely that the Kremlin will deliberately
initiate general war during the period through
1957. We also believe that the Kremlin will
try to avoid courses of action which in its
judgment would clearly involve substantial
risk of general war.2
will be no basic change in US policy with respect
to the utilization of nuclear, weapons for defense
against aggression.
It is the view of the Deputy Director for Intelli-
gence, The Joint Staff, that paragraph 5 should
read as follows:
5. It seems logical, therefore, to estimate that
the Soviets should prefer to avoid general war as
a means of accomplishing their objectives and
that the Kremlin should try to avoid courses of
action which in its judgment would clearly in-
volve substantial risk of global conflict. We be-
lieve it probable that through 1957 the odds are
somewhat against Soviet initiation of general
war. Nevertheless, the intelligence supporting
this estimate is insufficient to warrant a conclu-
sion that the, USSR would not resort to such
action should the Soviet leaders believe:
a. That they had the capability to neutral-
ize Allied forces and so disrupt and isolate the
United States as to provide positive assurance
of the success of Soviet efforts on a world-wide
basis.
b. That a shift in the balance of power was
developing and that it constituted a grave
threat to the security of the USSR that could
be successfully countered only by general war.
c. That a Western attack on the USSR was
imminent and unavoidable and that Soviet
chances of surviving such an attack would be
improved by seizing the initiative.
1
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6. We believe, however, that the Kremlin _
would not be deterred by the risk of general
war from taking counteractions against a
western action which it considered an immi-
nent threat to Soviet security. Moreover, the
USSR or one of the Soviet Bloc countries
might take action creating a situation in
which the US or its allies, rather than yield
an important position, might have to take
counteraction involving -grave risk of general
war with the USSR. Thus general war might
occur between now and the end of 1957 as the
climax of a series of actions and counter-
actions, initiated by either side, which neither
side originally intended to lead to general
war.3
'It is the view of the Deputy Director for Intelli-
gence, The Joint Staff, that paragraph 6 should
read as follows:
6. In addition, general war might occur be-
tween now and the end of 1957 as the climax of a
series of actions and counteractions, initiated by
either side, which neither side originally in-
tended to lead to general war.
C N ONIFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
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