SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GUIDED MISSILES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A003700020078-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 78
• Publication Date: March 10, 1954
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/18: CIA-RDP79R01012A003700020078-6
L) .---SECKET 10 March 1954
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles
8753
1. The Administrator of the Federal Civil Defense Administration
has submitted to the Director of Central Intelligence the attached
letter requesting estimates on Soviet capabilities in the field of guided
missiles.
2. At present, there is no National Intelligence Estimate extant
which presents detailed estimates of Soviet capabilities and intentions
to develop short-range or long-range missiles.
3. It is believed that the resources of the entire intelligence com-
munity are required to adequately treat this problem,. A realistic
intelligence estimate of Soviet capabilities and probable courses of
action in this field requires detailed consideration of the basic scientific
advances which must be made, the related problems of applied engineer-
ing and technology, the impact on the economy, operational capabilities,
and underlying military doctrines and philosophy.
4. Although there is little direct information available on this
subject, it is believed that a reasonably reliable national estimate can
be derived with the help of a detailed review of all of the evidence at
hand by intelligence officers (working together with a small group of
key U.S. authorities knowledgeable on all aspects of a guided missiles
program) against a theoretical frame of reference consisting of the
scientific, technical, and economic accomplishments required to develop
and produce guided missiles which constitute a threat against U.S.
interests.
5. Therefore, it is requested that the IAC approve undertaking
a National Intelligence Estimate on thestatus of the Soviet guided
missiles program through 1960, ? this estimate to be completed during
the third quarter of 1954.
6. This matter will be considered at the IAC meeting of
16 March 1954.
RICHARD D. DRAIN
Secretary
IAC-D-81
10 March 1954
\44.
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zsx? Iv to
IAC-D-81
10 March 1954
COPY
Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Mr. Dulles:
SEGRE1'
29 January 1954
Federal Civil Defense Administration must base its plans for the civil
? defense of this country on the best and latest intelligence. The esti-
mates of Soviet capabilities produced by your Agency, s well as per
National Security Council documents, are the best basis for such
planning.
? For the present, and for some years to come, we believe that the prin-
cipal threat to the continental United States is that of nuclear weapons
delivered by manned aircraft'. Under present conditions of warning,
?we- can advocate only a "duck ?and cover" doctrine for people, utilizing
the shelter provided by existing buildings and some dispersal of equip-
ment. Weare, however, approaching the time when the progress of
presently planned warning systems will give us a reasonable chance of
receiving enough advance warning to make it practicable to plan for a
dispersal of the populations of our principal cities. As the warning
system increases in effectiveness our civil defense plans will be modi-
fied to meet the new developments.
At some time in the not too distant future this situation may change
radically. When the Soviet Union succeeds in developing a true inter-
continental ballistic missile of reasonable accuracy and capable of
carrying an atomic warhead, all defense plans based on the detection
and warning system would have to be re-evaluated. If no effective
warning can be expected, the civil defense problem cannot be met by
relying on emergency dispersal of people, and must be re-examined
from the ground up.
For this reason it would be extremely helpful to us to know the poten-
tialities of the Soviet long-range guided missile programs as far, in
advance as possible. There are available to us various brief state-
ments on the subject, ranging from the NIS series to Section 25 of
TAB A to
10 March 1954
SECRET
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cc)? SEC,TRE1 (.4.) 'At-D-81
10 March 1954
SE 36/1, but these do not meet our requirements, either as-to detail
or projection into the future. I am, therefore, requesting you to
furnish us an estimate of Soviet capabilities in the field of long-range
guided missiles, giving your opinion on probable range and weight of
the weapon and its accuracy of aim with-at least -a-. minimum date at
which we can expect them to exist in operational numbers. While
our main interest is in these long-range weapons, we would also like
to have your latest estimate of Soviet progress in the shorter range
missiles suitable for launching from submarines or surface ships, as
well as developments in air-to-ground types.
I would naturally like to have these estimates as soon as possible.
However, it is more important to have a complete round-up and a
thorough evaluation of all the available information in a few months
than to have a hurried job in a matter of weeks. I do not wish to appear
to set a deadline on this request, but we would like to have the study by
the middle of May, if you think it reasonable. The paper will be used
only in our Washington office, and it is not to be given to State or
local authorities, so that a high security classification will not be an
inconvenience.
Sincerely,
s/ Val Petersen
-2-
TAB A to
IAC-D-81
10 March 1954
SECRET-
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