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March 16, 1954
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 41 L,IC 4 JSW ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,ONE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE V,7 THE EUROPEAN DEPENDENCIES IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA. NIE 87-54 Approved 9 March 1954 Published 16 March 1954 DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. L DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: FIR 70-2 DATED t Y 1 REVIEWER: The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 9 March 1954. The FBI abstained, the sub- ject being outside of its jurisdiction. The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intel- ligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the re- cipient's office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Further dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the information for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following: a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of State b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,. for the Department of the Army c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission g. Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation h. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other Department or Agency 2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA. 3. The overseas dissemination of this intelligence will be limited to a period of one year or less, at the end of which time it will be destroyed, returned to the forward- ing agency, or permission requested of that agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953. WARNING This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans- mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. DISTRIBUTION: White House National Security Council Department of State Department of Defense Foreign Operations Administration Operations Coordinating Board Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of Investigation United States Information Agency Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 THE EUROPEAN DEPENDENCIES IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA THE PROBLEM To estimate the current situation and probable developments in the British, French, and Dutch dependencies in the Caribbean area, with particular reference to internal security; and to.evaluate the current attitudes of the Latin American repub- lics toward those dependencies. CONCLUSIONS 1. The European possessions' in the Caribbean area are of strategic impor- tance to the US primarily because of their geographic position. In time of general war, US military bases in most of the de- pendencies would. be essential to the se- curity of strategically vital US and West- ern Hemisphere areas, installations, and lines of communication. Conversely, control or even covert use of any of the dependencies by enemies of the US could in wartime threaten vital US interests. 2. Certain dependencies are also impor- tant producers of -strategic bauxite and petroleum products. Dutch Guiana (Surinam), British Guiana, and Jamaica currently produce approximately 59 per- cent of the Free World's supply of bauxite ore. They provide nearly 50 percent of the total US supply and the major part of Canada's supply. The capacity of the petroleum refineries of Dutch Aruba and Curacao amounts to about 6 percent of Free World capacity. In the event of war, the importance of the Caribbean A list of these possessions, including their popu- lation and racial composition, is in Annex A. - sources of these commodities would be greatly enhanced, and might become crit- ical, owing to the distance and vulner- ability of other major sources. 3. For the most part, the dependencies are characterized by political immaturity and depressed social and economic condi- tions. Political tensions within the de- pendencies are unlikely to abate, and local disorders will continue to occur. However, for the foreseeable. future, the European authorities will retain the ca- pability to restore order with their police and military forces. 4. The Communist movement in the de- pendencies is connected 'with that in the respective metropoles and with the WFTU, rather than with Communists in Latin America, and we believe that this situation will continue. The Commu- nists are strongest in Martinique and Guadeloupe, where the French authori- ties impose no restrictions on ,their or- ganizational or propaganda activities. The 'Communists there could probably organize serious disorders, and their ca- pabilities in this respect are growing. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 Nevertheless, the. French authorities could restore order unless the Commu- nists were armed from overseas. If, how- ever,-in the event of war or paralyzing social disorders in France, the Commu- nists were given arms and instructions to seize power, loyal French security forces in the area would probably be unable to restore order without external assistance. 5. In the British West Indies, Commu- nism is presently weak, but its influence is growing, particularly in Jamaica and Trinidad. In British Guiana its influ- ence is strong. The Communists have capabilities for sabotage in each of these colonies, and they can be expected to have an increasing capability in Jamaica and Trinidad for fomenting or abetting disorders. We believe that the control of British Guiana will remain in the hands of British officials backed by troops and a strong police force. In British Hon- duras there is as yet no evidence of Com- munist activity, although the population would be susceptible to Communist agita- tion. 6. In.the Netherlands dependencies there is as yet-no significant -Communist move- ment. 7. Preservation of European authority in the Caribbean dependencies tends to in- sure the availability of the strategic ma- terials and bases in the area. However, US support for the European position occasions difficulties in relations with friendly but anticolonial powers, pri- marily the Latin American republics. DISCUSSION 1. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE CARIBBEAN DEPENDENCIES 8. Geographic. The Caribbean dependencies are of strategic importance to the US prima- rily because of their geographic position. In time of general war, US air and naval bases and radar sites in most of the dependencies would be essential to the security of strategi- cally vital US and Western.Hemisphere areas, installations,, and lines of communication. In World War II, US forces used facilities in the Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, Trini- dad, Aruba, Curacao, and all the Guianas. 9. Conversely, control or even covert use of any of the dependencies by enemies of the US could in wartime threaten vital US interests, since their location would make feasible their utilization as bases or staging areas for infil- tration, sabotage, or commando-type opera- tions, and for submarine supply. 10. Military. Apart from the extensive World War II naval and air base facilities, most of which would have to be redeveloped to support sustained military operations, the military resources in the dependencies are meager. Each of the three metropoles main- tains small armed forces in the area.2 In addition, each has colonial police forces and reserve police units in its dependencies. The mission of all these forces is to preserve in- ternal security. In event of general war, they could be augmented somewhat by local re- cruitment, but they could not be expected to perform missions other than local security. The dependencies could provide an estimated maximum of. 360,000 untrained men of poor quality and limited utility for military service. The entire burden of financing, training, and equipping this personnel, however, would have to be borne by the metropole or by the US. 11. In event of general war or imminent threat of war, the British, French, and Dutch Governments would almost certainly make available needed base facilities and sites in the dependencies to US forces. In addition to Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 3 the present US naval station in Trinidad, the US enjoys leaseholds through the year 2040 on base sites in Trinidad, Jamaica, St. Lucia, An- tigua, the Bahamas, and British Guiana. Facilities in the French and Dutch possessions could be obtained without serious difficulties, provided friendly governments retained au- thority. In any event, the seaward defenses of the whole Caribbean area would almost certainly fall to US responsibility. 12. Economic. The European dependencies are important producers of two strategic com- modities, bauxite and petroleum products. In the event of general war, the importance of the Caribbean sources of these commodities would be greatly enhanced and might become critical, owing to the distances and vulnera- bility of other major sources: France and West Africa in the case of bauxite, and the Middle East in the case of petroleum. 13. Currently, Dutch Guiana (Surinam), British Guiana, and Jamaica respectively pro- duce about 25, 21, and 13 percent of the Free World's supply of bauxite. Exports to the US amount to about 80 percent of total US im- ports of the ore, i.e., nearly 50 percent of the total US supply. In addition, Canada obtains the major part of its supply from the same dependencies. The transshipment facilities at Trinidad are important in the overseas movement of bauxite from the Guianas. In French Guiana, extensive bauxite deposits have been proved, but exploitation. has not yet begun. 14. The petroleum refineries at Curacao. and Aruba are among the world's largest. Sup- plied by Venezuelan crude, these refineries have a capacity amounting to about 6 percent of Free World capacity. The refineries pro- duce virtually every kind of petroleum prod- uct, including motor and aviation gas, jet fuels, special fuel oils used- by the .US Navy, and POL used. by the US Army. Trinidad makes a minor petroleum contribution, cur- rently less than 1 percent of both crude pro- duction and refinery output of the Free World. Trinidad's pitch lake is an important source of pure asphalt. 15. Finally, relatively small quantities of the strategic minerals, columbite and tantalite, are produced in British Guiana, amounting in 1953 to 2 or 3 percent of Free World supply. Manganese explorations in that colony show promise. 16. Although the bauxite production of the European territories in the Caribbean area is of vital strategic importance to the Free World and petroleum production is of considerable importance, these territories generally are not essential to the economies of the metropolitan powers. II. CONDITIONS AND TRENDS IN THE CARIBBEAN DEPENDENCIES General 17. The Caribbean dependencies of the UK, France, and the Netherlands have a rapidly expanding population of. some 4.5 million. The great majority is Negro-mulatto, and only about 2 percent is white. There are large Asian minorities in Dutch and British Guiana and Trinidad.3 The economies of the de- pendencies (excepting the Dutch West Indies) are based wholly or largely on agriculture. For the most part, the area is characterized by political immaturity and depressed social and . economic conditions, with increasing overpopulation, chronic unemployment, high disease rates, ignorance, and underdeveloped economies. 18. Such adverse conditions, combined with post-World War II political currents which are operating in most of the world's dependent areas, have produced widespread local pres- sures (except in the French territories) for improvement through increased self-govern- ment and ultimate autonomy. Numerous radical and demagogic native leaders - in- cluding Communists and Communist sympa- thizers - have risen in nearly all the depend- encies to organize and direct mass followings. The resultant tensions, which at times erupt into disorders, have posed a continuous threat to stability in most parts of the area, and The estimated population and racial composition of each of (the dependencies are contained in Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79R01012A004600030001-9 they require the metropoles to maintain in the Caribbean trained military units as well as large police forces. 19. The Communist movement in the depend- encies is connected with that in the respective metropoles and with the WFTU, rather than with Communists in Latin America. This pattern conforms to that of the dependencies limited overseas contacts and is likely to con- tinue indefinitely. 20. Despite the generally insignificant con- tributions of the dependencies to the metro- politan economies and the financial and administrative burdens they impose, the UK, France, and the Netherlands intend to hold on to them, largely for prestige reasons. The two basic problems which the metropoles must meet if.explosive discontent is to be eliminated from the dependencies are: (a) economic de- velopment to provide adequate levels of living, and (b) except in the French colonies, new political relationships between metropole and dependency involving concessions to local pressures and aspirations. 21. In the postwar period, the metropolitan powers have each sponsored increased native participation in local government, but not at the pace demanded by many native leaders. For the improvement of economic and, social conditions, the powers have sponsored and financed investment schemes which have been generous in relation to the metropoles'. own postwar resources, but usually inadequate in relation to the needs of the area, especially in -view of -the rapid population growth. Thus, the outlook for the abatement of tensions in the Caribbean dependencies is not bright, and occasional local disorders will continue to occur. British West Indies (Bahamas, Jamaica, Leeward Islands, Windward Islands, Barbados, Trinidad) 22. The central problem of the BWI is eco- nomic. The area contains more people than it can adequately support, and the population is increasing rapidly. On the basis of exist- ing trends, the population is expected to dou- ble in the next thirty years. Even in the best of times, unemployment is serious and living conditions are extremely poor. Prospects for relief through large-scale emigration and birth control are practically nil. UK-financed programs for agricultural and industrial de- velopment, as well as some foreign private investment in mining and secondary industry, have helped to alleviate the situation. How- ever, the feasible rate of such expansion and development can probably do little more than maintain present living conditions for the growing population. 23. Poor living conditions, constant economic difficulties, and urban crowding have pro- duced chronic instability and occasional strife in the region. Despite these obstacles to orderly political development, and also the political apathy and immaturity of the masses, Britain has granted each of the col- onies in the last decade new constitutions containing substantial advances toward local self-government. In the las t four years, the major colonies - Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad - all acquired virtual control of their domestic affairs, although the British- appointed governors retain ultimate emer- gency powers. In view of the numerous haz- ards to stability, as well as the factionalism, corruption, demagogy, and inexperience that characterize West Indian politics, these new constitutional systems may break down, nota- bly in Jamaica and Trinidad. In such event, the British governors would act to enforce order as in British Guiana in October 1953. 24. In the small islands, the powers of the legislatures, which generally have leftist ma- jorities representing the negro working class, are still very limited, and the governors do not hesitate to suppress disorders by force. 25. Within a few years, the BWI (excepting the Bahamas) are likely to federate under a constitution which grants something ap- proaching Commonwealth status. With Brit- ish financial aid for some years, which has been promised, such regionalization of com- mon problems may somewhat enhance eco- nomic and political stability in the area. 26. Communism. The Communist movement in the BWI is weak but growing in numbers and influence. Trained Communist leaders Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79R01012A004600030001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 are so far very few in number, but organiza- tional efforts have been increased, with funds and advice forthcoming from both the British Communist Party and the Communist- controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). No Communist party appears to have been organized as yet in any of the islands, but Communists and fellow-travelers have been actively building front organiza- tions involving political, labor, youth, cultural, and "peace" groups. Considerable quantities of Communist literature have been coming to the BWI through the mails from Europe. 27. The typical Communist tactic in the BWI is to organize study groups, and then turn them into activist front movements. The Communists generally concentrate on fanning social and economic grievances, and on preaching the evils of capitalism and imperi- alism rather than on advocating Communism. The. Communists advocate self-government, as a necessary step toward Communist control. 28. Although there are some Communists active in all the colonies, Communism has so far emerged as a significant problem only in Jamaica and Trinidad. Communist leaders in both islands have maintained contacts with European Communists and they appear to be getting increasing aid and advice from Eu- rope. However, no outstanding popular lead- ers have emerged. In Jamaica, the Commu- nists were expelled from the People's National Party and from its affiliated Trades Union Congress (TUC), which they had infiltrated. Nevertheless, Jamaican Communists are ac- tively proselytizing Jamaican youth, sugar workers, and also the large Chinese commu- nity. Prominent members of the latter group belong to the Chinese Benevolent Society, which is dominated by Communist China. Other front organizations are the People's Educational Organization, an embryo Com- munist Party of possibly 500 members, and the recently organized Federation of, Trade Unions, a rival to the TUC. The influence of both is small so far. 29. In Trinidad, Communists generally dom- inate the Trades Union Congress and the re- cently organized West Indian Independence Party. Their Oilfield Workers' Trade Union is the main union in the oil industry. In the last two years, they have become increasingly bold in propagating the Communist line. However, the Communists suffered a setback last November, when second-rank union lead- ers forced withdrawal of the TUC from the WFTU. 30. Spurred by the incidents in British Guiana, British authorities are increasingly alert to Communist activities. They have in- creased their efforts to obstruct the inflow of Communist publications and the intercolony movements of Communist organizers. More- over, the British will have the help of local anti-Communist political leaders, who are in- creasingly aware of Communist-aims. At the same time, the British programs in the social, economic, and political field may partially al- leviate the worst popular discontents which the Communists have exploited. 31. The outlook over the next few years is for a limited increase in Communist numbers and influence. Although the Communists will have capabilities for sabotage and for foment- ing disorder, the British will continue to be able to maintain a reasonable degree of in- ternal security. However, in. the event of a serious economic recession in the area, Com- munist strength and capabilities would prob- ably grow rapidly, and the difficulty of main- taining internal security would increase. British Guiana 32. In the past few years, a few exceptionally able Communists built in British Guiana a well-organized, militant, and popular party, the People's Progressive Party (PPP), with a program for broad social and economic re- form. The PPP last year swept the first elec- tions to be held under a new, more liberal constitution, and, as a result, took over the important ministries of the local government. The.subsequent disruptive and undemocratic behavior of the PPP Ministers led the British Governor in October 1953 to call in security troops, suspend the constitution, and assume control of the government. 33. Thus, the most immediate problem in British Guiana is the replacement of a very &MENMOTMIT vwwowowwl Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 popular Communist leadership in local poli- tics and labor organizations. To deal with the economic and social grievances which the Communists have exploited, the UK has has- tened to draw up a broad-scale economic de- velopment plan, and has allotted funds to finance it. This plan includes a program for housing and other social welfare measures which should alleviate the worst grievances. The British hope that, in time, general eco- nomic and social conditions will appreciably improve. 34. Communism. Hard-core Communists are probably few in number. Also, they may have lost a small part of their mass following since October 1953. However, they still control the PPP, and they control or strongly influence several leading labor unions. They maintain contacts with the British Communist Party and the WFTU. 35. The PPP is continuing to pour out propa- . ganda against the government, employers, opposition groups, imperialism, and capital- ism. It does not openly advocate Commu- nism, but rather advocates self-government with sweeping social and economic reforms. The Communists' immediate aim is probably to extend their influence in the trade unions, preserve PPP solidarity and popularity until the next election, whenever that may come, and stir up as much discontent and damage to the economy as possible. Their ultimate objective is a self-governing British Guiana under Communist control. 36. Although the Communists will have capa- bilities for widespread sabotage and for fo- menting disorder, the British can almost cer- tainly maintain general order in the colony. They are restricting the movements of PPP leaders within the colony, the holding of meetings, and the circulation of propaganda. They are making vigorous efforts to alleviate the worst popular grievances and they are holding out the promise of appreciably im- proved living conditions in the future. Also, they are encouraging opposition political groups and are attempting to split the PPP followers from their leaders. 37. However, the PPP remains in an advan- tageous position to retain popularity. The opposition is poorly organized and lacks any broad appeal, while general- economic and social improvement will come slowly. There- fore, we believe that constitutional govern- ment will continue to be suspended, and that the control of the colony will remain in the hands of British officials backed by troops and a strong police force. British Honduras 38. Like most other colonies in the Carib- bean, British Honduras suffers from the poor living conditions inherent in a stagnant- plantation economy. Resultant discontents boil up occasionally in disorders, fomented by local extremist leaders who are anticolonial and anti-British, but not Communist. Such disorders are likely to 'continue to occur, but the police and British troops will almost cer- tainly retain the capability to cope with them. Though the population would be susceptible to Communist agitation, there is as yet no evidence of Communist activity in British Honduras. 39. Elections this year under a liberalized constitution, if held, will probably reflect the rise to dominant political influence of the People's United Party (PUP). PUP leaders are militant nationalists who appear to have organized a mass following. They have prob- ably received funds from Guatemala, which has long aspired to absorb the-colony, but British Hondurans see few attractions in such a fusion. French West Indies (Martinique and Guadeloupe) and French Guiana 40. Like most other Caribbean dependencies, the French colonies have underdeveloped, plantation ' economies. Living standards are low and disease rates high. Since the popu- lations of Martinique. and' Guadeloupe are growing rapidly, living standards are likely to fall even further unless substantial eco- nomic development is undertaken. France in the postwar years has devoted substantial sums to the colonies, mainly for education, transportation, and sanitary improvements, but economic development has not yet gone Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79R01012A004600030001-9 far beyond the survey stage. The inability of the colonial economies to provide a satisfac- tory living for the population is the source of constant social tension. This tension is re- flected in the resentment of the workers to- ward the controlling interests, composed largely of a few white families, and gives rise to strong racial antagonisms. 41. In contrast to the British and Dutch de- pendencies, the French possessions have a mutually satisfactory political relationship with the metropole. The three possessions are "overseas departments," in theory assimi- lated to metropolitan France. They send -elected representatives to the Chambers of the French Parliament and are administered by the French Ministry of the Interior. There is no significant opinion favoring local auton- omy or separation from France. 42. However, this situation has had adverse consequences for security and stability in the French Caribbean territories, for the political party divisions in France are mirrored in the dependencies and aggravated there by local antagonisms. In postwar elections, the Left secured a dominant position in local politics. The Communists gained a stronghold in Mar- tinique and Guadeloupe which they have been able to retain, since opposition parties are less well-organized and have less dynamic leader- ship. 43. Communism. Communism is consider- ably stronger in the French West Indies than anywhere else in the Caribbean. In Mar- tinique and Guadeloupe, respectively, the Communists' electoral strength is over 60 and over 40 percent. The delegates they succeed in electing to the French National Assembly form part of the Communist bloc there. Com- munist strength is concentrated in densely populated areas, which include the important administrative centers, and the Communists dominate the labor force. The Communist parties are under the direction of the French party, with which they maintain easy contact through their delegates to the French parlia- ment and through periodic visits to the area by French party officials. They have no known intercourse with Communists in non- French Caribbean territories. 44. Locally, the party has the standard cell and politburo organization, but discipline ap- pears to be much less strict than that of the European parties. On the basis of scanty in- telligence, we believe that the number of hard- core Communists is small. The great major- ity of Communist voters are concerned solely with improving their material conditions. The party's tactics appear aimed at preserv- ing its electoral strength by advocating work- er benefits, at improving party cohesiveness by fanning economic grievances and racial re- sentments, and at educating party members and followers on international questions and doctrine. The success of the last aim has been dubious. At least in Martinique, the party has a school for training militant cadres. The long-range Communist objec- tives depend on those of the French party. 45. The Communists of Martinique and Gua- deloupe could probably organize serious dis- orders, and their capabilities in this respect are growing. Nevertheless, the police, the elite security force, and the French military in the islands could restore order, unless the Communists were armed from overseas. If, however, in the event of war or paralyzing social disorders in France, the Communist leaders were given arms and instructions to seize power, loyal French security forces in the area would probably be unable to restore order without external assistance. If the Communists could tie such an insurrection to some popular emotion like racial bitterness, and thus obtain wider cooperation, they could probably seize power unless external assist- ance was rapidly given the local French forces. 46. In French Guiana, Communist influence is weak. There appear to be no tight party machinery and few hard-core militants. Com- munist electoral strength depends on the per- sonal popularity of an individual who polled 21.3 percent of vote in the 1951 election to the French National Assembly. Aside from the small branch of the French Communist-con- trolled trade union organization (CGT), the Communists have created no front.organiza- tions. Their capabilities will remain limited to isolated acts of sabotage. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79R01012A004600030001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 47. Maintenance of internal security in the French dependencies is the responsibility of prefects appointed by and responsible to the government in Paris. These officials prob- ably maintain surveillance of Communist leaders, but as long as the Communist party remains a legal party -in France, they are highly unlikely to restrict Communist organi- zational or, propaganda activities in the de- pendencies unless the local Communists pro- duce a clear challenge to public security. Netherlands West Indies (Curacao, Aruba, and the minor -islands) and Dutch Guiana (Surinam) 48. The main problem of the Netherlands de- pendencies is the establishment of mutually satisfactory political relationships with the metropole. The NWI comprise the most pros- perous European territory in the Caribbean area, since the oil refining industry provides a relatively high standard of living and virtu- ally full employment. Dutch Guiana is poor by contrast with the NWI, despite its impor- tant bauxite industry, but it is relatively well off when compared to other Caribbean terri- tories. 49. The Netherlands in recent years has granted a considerable measure of self-gov- ernment to the dependencies in pursuance of pledges to grant a status in the kingdom equal to its own, but has retained decisive authority in major fields. Occasional con- flicts between the metropolitan and local au- thorities are therefore likely. Local party politics reflects the immaturity and extreme factionalism characteristic of the whole Car- ibbean area, and interparty and interracial friction almost certainly will produce occa- sional minor disorders. It is unlikely, how- ever, that such disorders will pose a threat to internal stability or the Netherlands position. 50. Communism. There is no significant Communist movement or influence in the Netherlands dependencies, though reports in- dicate the presence of a few Communists and the existence of a few minor fellow-traveling groups with tenuous European connections. A small amount of Communist literature is smuggled in, mainly by seamen, but Dutch security forces maintain a fairly efficient in- telligence net. Immigration is strictly con- trolled, and suspected subversives are sum- marily deported. Local police and oil com- pany police cooperate to prevent infiltration of the oil industry of NWI. In Dutch Guiana, security at the bauxite installations appears effective, though transport is vulnerable. III. THE ATTITUDES -AND POLICIES OF LATIN AMERICA TOWARD THE.DEPENDENCIES 51. Throughout the Latin American republics there has traditionally been a strong current of opinion opposed to colonialism. This atti- tude has been manifested officially in unilat- eral and joint statements calling for elimina- tion of European _ control over territories in the Western Hemisphere. - Such expressions have been voiced most often and most force- fully by Guatemala, Argentina, and Chile, countries whose interest in principle is rein- forced by self-interest. Each has territorial claims against the UK. 52. It is significant that most Latin American official and public opinion denounced the British action in British Guiana last fall, subordinating dislike of Communism to that of colonialism, despite US support for the UK. However, the Latin American republics have produced no positive program for action on the colonial issue. For the foreseeable fu- ture, they are unlikely to resort to direct action, unless the people of a colony should undertake to fight for independence. In such case, unless the revolt was clearly Com- munist-led, some republics might give mate- rial aid to the revolutionaries, especially to those in the mainland dependencies. Mean- while, the republics will almost certainly air the issue at every opportunity. The dispute over the colonies between Latin America and Europe, especially the UK, will continue to be a source of some friction, but it will almost certainly not seriously affect political or com- mercial relations between the metropoles and Latin America. - Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 IV. THE EFFECT OF EUROPEAN CONTROL OF THE DEPENDENCIES 53. For the foreseeable future, preservation of European authority in the dependencies tends to insure the availability of the strategic ma- terials and the area. The levels of stability and order maintained by the metro- poles in the dependencies contrast favorably with those of many of the independent Carib- bean states. 54. Ultimate European responsibility for gov- ernrrient and order in the dependencies pro- tects from local political vagaries the opera- tions of US and foreign companies engaged in bauxite production, in the petroleum indus- try, and in other enterprises. European re- sponsibility for the economies probably re- lieves the US of financial burdens; if the colonies were independent, they would prob- ably demand much greater aid than that provided through FOA programs. 55. Since Britain, France, and the Nether- lands intend to maintain dominance in their possessions, any US opposition to such a posi- tion would raise serious difficulties with these allies. 56. European possession of the dependencies occasions difficulties in US relations with- friendly but anticolonial powers, primarily the Latin American republics. Nationalist, Communist, and other anti-US groups in these countries make capital of the apparent dis- crepancy between the traditional anticolonial position of the US and its support of Euro- pean "imperialism." Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 ANNEX A ESTIMATED POPULATION AND RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE EUROPEAN DEPENDENCIES IN THE CARIBBEAN NEGRO- MULATTO WHITE ASIAN OTHERS TOTAL PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT POPULATION British Guiana 48.2 2.9 44.5 4.4 444,000 British Honduras 69.3 4.0 2.6 24.11 70,000 Jamaica 95.6 1.1 3.1 insig 1,464,000 Trinidad 61.0- 2.7 36.3. insig 664,000 Barbados 94.8 = 5.1 insig insig 218,000 Windward and Leeward Islands 96.1 1.3 2.3 insig 412,800 Bahamas 88.0 . 11.5, insig insig 83,000 French Guiana) ....................... over insig insig 3.01 30,000 Martinique .) 95.0 1.0 insig insig 261,000 Guadeloupe ) under 1.0 insig insig 271,000 TOTAL French subjects 582,000 Dutch Guiana (Surinam) 49.0 under 1.0 48.0 1.01 208,000 Aruba ) .......................85.0 15.0 insig insig 51,100 Curacao ) 95,200 Other islands ) 8,600 TOTAL Dutch subjects 362,900. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 ANNEX B MILITARY FORCES IN THE CARIBBEAN DEPENDENCIES British. Ground Forces. In Jamaica, the British have one metropolitan battalion (less one company stationed in British Honduras) and one colonial battalion, which serve as a security force for the entire British Caribbean area. The total strength of the two battalions is 1,450 men. There are also 650 metropolitan troops temporarily in British Guiana. It is planned to activate a second colonial battalion of 500 men in Trinidad. There are active army reserve units of 360 colonials in Barbados and 200 colonials in British Honduras. Navy. Royal Navy ships available for rapid deployment in the Caribbean area are assigned to the Bermuda station. The squadron normally maintained on station consists of one light cruiser and three frigates, one of which is usually in the Carib- bean area. This force is expected soon to be reduced by one frigate. The remaining three ships will have a total peacetime complement of about 1,100 men. French. Ground Forces. The French army in the area is largely colonial, consisting of 700 troops in Martinique, 200 in Guadeloupe, and 200 in French Guiana. Navy. The French maintain one submarine chaser and 30 men based on Martinique. Dutch. Ground Forces. The Dutch have one metropolitan infantry battalion of 750 men in Surinam and one marine battalion of 650 men divided between Curacao and Aruba. Navy. Currently, one gunboat is on station at Curacao. Five hundred naval per- sonnel are assigned to the ship and the naval operating base. Naval Air Force. One squadron of conventional . engine fighters, with 75 officers and men, is based on Curacao. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 eclassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 ED~,w~L~11~1 VLrLI' I #I L ILJ II 4 ,, L %_,A,',>?3EAN 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 UNITED ~ STATES * WALKER CAY . ' G U L F 0 F a r DEPENDENT AREAS GRAN 1-3r D . BAHAMA ? v R ^ British 0 ? ti ^ French 'Q ^ rNVD? ^' 4 OV DENCE 9 ^ Dutch 25 ~ T ~ ELEUTHERA /`\ T 25 I \ ssau- eb.?St / BASES USED IN WORLD WAR II MEXICO ASDR ISLAND 05 BY U. S. FORCES , WATLING s ? GREAT ?' EXUMA \\ 9 /1/ ! Arm O Army Habana Y ? ? 1\\l N T Q Navy (surface or air) 4 C 13 IG [3 Air Force v MARI ANA / GU B ??~ ^ International boundary ~? ? ?.? : ? C` ? Capital e GRAND TURK o Cy ISLA DE PINGS GREAT INAGUA ? e 9ti ,' Administrative center a J 0 SAO "-~~ Scale true at 15? latitude 20 P S P 0 100 200 300 400 MILES 20 MEXICO -.CAYMAN BRAC EO ~A 100 100 300 400 KILOMETERS LITTLE CAYMAN 11ND G GRAND CAYMAN HAITI DOMINICAN E cp VIRGIN ISLANDS CF R PUBLIC R ? F V'j B h au-Penc Kingston ? Trujillo " Ghe`~o0PQ00DP ? . e ze j OA ^ s %0T . T ~~ 5 O d ~ T ' BOLT SH A o r B O .I HONDURAS - RAT 91 S V' ~ " Q C A R I B B E A N GUADELOUPE Promptl` Bosse-Terre Q DOMINICAo 15 HONDURAS Roseau z c 15 ] ' MARTINIQUE ! 0 Fort-de-France San Salvador Tegucigalpa ? -ft-dory by the gourd of Cast a! ST. LUCIA ' EL the o6ing ol5pgf n S J S E A OA 13 O~ T S V.ADO 9 ft BARBADOS ST VINCENT B NICARAGUA . ridgetown 13 ARUBA CURACA0 AI RE ^ GRENADA Manag 8 Wi lled Plot. George's ISLA DE MARGARITA QTOBAGO f S i I COSTA 0 -o - pa n ?Caracas TRINIDAD 10 ? San JOSG Log d O & 10 CANAL M A RICA ZONE P a anam P ? A N P P A C I F I C Q V E N E Z U E L A Georgetown 0 " .. r ' Paramaribo 0 Q ^ 5 Bogotb BRITISH Cayenne 5 ? FRENCH SURINAM 0 C E A N C 0 L 0 M B I A V GUIANA GUIANA I ECUADOR BRAZIL B R A Z I 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO04600030001-9