THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN ISLANDS OFF THE COAST OF MAINLAND CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A004800010002-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 4, 1954
• Content Type: SNIE

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-SNIE 100-4-54
4 September 1954
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SNIE NUMBER 100-4-54
411$
THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN
ISLANDS OFF THE COAST OF MAINLAND CHINA
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 4 September 1954. Concurring were the Special Assistant
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, 0-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval
Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic
Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assist-
ant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, ab-
stained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
For the dissenting view of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Department of the Army, with respect to Chinese Commu-
nist intentions, see footnotes to paragraphs 11 anclIgIgtHANTNCI.
NO CHANCE IN CLAW 0
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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June 1953.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN ISLANDS OFF
THE COAST OF MAINLAND CHINA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate (a). Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions with respect to
the off-shore islands occupied by. the Chinese Nationalists; (b) the effects on Chi-
nese Communist intentions of certain possible US courses of action with respect to
these islands; and (c) the consequences under certain given conditions of successful
Communist attacks on these islands.
ESTIMATE
I. THE CURRENT SITUATION Tachens
1. The Nationalist Position. The Chinese Na-
tionalists, since withdrawing from the main-
land in 1949, have maintained control- of a
number of islands off the southeast and east
past of China on which they have stationed
regular or guerrilla forces.' From these islands
Nationalist forces also exercise control over
numerous unoccupied islands. The National-
ist-held islands fall into three main groups:
the northern group (between 29-00 and 27-00
degrees north latitude) centered on Nan Chi
Shan and the Tachen islands; the central
group (between 27-00 and 25-30 degrees north
latitude) centered on Matsu and White Dog
islands; and the southern group (between
25-30 and 24-00 degrees north latitude) cen-
tered on Chinmen (Quemoy) island.
2. The occupied islands serve as outposts in
the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores.
They serve as bases for Chinese Nationalist
operations which include intelligence activi-
ties, escape and evasion, and raids on coastal
traffic and on mainland targets. Moreover,
the early warning site in the Tachens could
serve to extend the US early warning capabili-
ty for Okinawa.
3. At present the Chinese Nationalists main-
tain the following forces on the islands:
See map at end of text.
'abt
Nan Chi Shan
Matsu and White Dog
Chinmen (Quemoy)
- 10,000 regulars plus
about 1,000 guerril-
las. Other guerrillas
on nearby islands
number 3-4,000.
- 3,000 regulars plus
1,300 guerrillas.
- 5,000 regulars.
- 43,000 regulars plus
11,000 guerrillas.
Regular forces on the Tachens, Matsu, iand
Chinmen (Quemoy) include about 15-20 per-
cent of the Chinese , Nationalist MDAP
equipped units, which have high combat ef-
fectiveness ratings. In the event of Commu-
nist attacks, the ground forces could receive
limited support from operational elements of
the small Nationalist Navy and Air Force.2
4. Although the Nationalist garrisons on the
northern and central islands are small, the
Three destroyer escorts and 13 small patrol
craft are based in the Tachens. Naval rein-
forcements for the Tachens or other islands
would come from 2 destroyers, 6 DE's, and ap-
proximately 100 patrol craft now at Taiwan. Air
support would depend entirely on Taiwan-based
aircraft which now include 8 1/3 combat air
groups. (At present the only jet aircraft avail-
able are a group of F-84G fighter-bombers and
this group is Still in a training status. The re-
maining combat groups are only 45 percent
?
combat-effective.)
,..0000-MONS T
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.00410140Watagir
defense of these islands is aided by fortifica-
tions, by small beach areas, and by weather
conditions unfavorable to amphibious move-
ment and debarkation from October through
March. Chinmen (Quemoy) has the most ex-
tensive fortifications, considerable AA, the
largest garrison, and an operational airstrip;
but the island is within range of Communist
artillery on the mainland and on other islands
around the seaport of Amoy. Any of the
islands could be attacked by Chinese Commu-
nist airpower, although Communist air units
as currently disposed offer no immediate
threat to Chinmen (Quemoy) .
5. Recent Developments. During the good
weather period from May through August in
1953, the Chinese Communists occupied num-
erous undefended or lightly held islands in
the northern and central groups. Some of
the islands occupied at this time were later
abandoned. A similar pattern of increased
Communist activity along the coast and
among the off-shore islands began in May
1954. The Communist have occupied several
undefended islands within 20 miles of the
Tachens, and the Nationalists have reported
new troop and naval concentrations in the
islands and along the coast near the Tachens,
Matsu, Nan Chi Shan, and Chinmen
(Quemoy) . On 3 September 1954 the Chin-
mens (Quemoy) were heavily bombarded by
Communist artillery and intermittent artillery
fire continued on 4 September.
6. Although the pattern of Nationalist and
Chinese Communist operations in the north-
ern group this year has been similar to 1953,
the scale of these operations has been larger
and has included Chinese Communist em-
ployment of MIG-15's as air cover in landing
operations. These activities probably reflect
an improvement in both Nationalist and Com-
munist capabilities, and an increased willing-
ness on the part of the Nationalist Navy and
Air Force to engage the enemy. Beginning
in June and increasing in intensity since the
end of the Geneva Conference there has been
a Communist propaganda campaign involving
pledges by high-level leaders in Peiping to
"liberate" Taiwan and the off-shore islands
and warnings that if anyone "dares to inter-
fere in our internal affairs, they must take
upon themselves all the grave consequences
of such acts of aggression." In the past three
weeks the Chinese Communist "liberation"
theme has also been given prominent treat-
ment in the leading Moscow papers, but with-
out independent commentary.
II. CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND
INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE
OFF-SHORE ISLANDS
A. Factors Affecting Chinese
Communist Intentions
7. Chinese Communist Capabilities. In the
area between Shanghai and Canton the Chi-
nese Communists have long had sufficient
troops and means of improvising amphibious
lift to overwhelm within a few days after the
commencement of an assualt any one of the
Nationalist islands, except Chinmen (Que-
moy) , against Nationalist opposition only, al-
though some of the operations would probably
involve substantial losses. In the case of Chin-
men (Quemoy), which is well defended by at
least 3 selected Nationalist divisions, the as-
sault would require completion of the assem-
bly and subsequent movement of about 150,000
men. A successful assault would be far more
difficult and time-consuming and would in-
volve particularly heavy losses. Chinese Com-
munist capabilities have been increased in re-
cent months by the movement of experienced
armies from Korea into the region between
Shanghai and Canton, by the southward de-
ployment of jet fighter units from Manchuria
since the end of the Korean war, and by some
limited amphibious training. However, there
has been no great increase in troop strength,
which now stands at about 425,000. Chinese
Communist air power is now sufficient, if com-
mitted, to gain air superiority over the Nation-
alist air force in the area of the islands and to
make Nationalist naval support operations
costly.
8. Other Considerations. The Chinese Com-
munists regard the off-shore islands as in-
tegral parts of China. They look upon the
Nationalist occupation as an infringement of
Communist sovereignty and refer to it as an
affront to Communist China's honor. There
is no doubt that the Communist objective is
..04080MaiteSaior
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to take over the islands at some time, and that
they look upon such action as an essential
part of the consolidation of the control of all
China.
9. Up to this time the Communist failure to
exercise their capabilities to take the princi-
pal Nationalist-garrisoned off-shore islands
has probably been due to the following con-
siderations:
a. Communist preparations for an invasion
in 1950 were frustrated by the Korean war,
the subsequent US intervention in Korea, and
the US guarantee to defend Taiwan, backed
by the presence in the western Pacific of
strong US naval and air forces.
b. In Peiping's view the threat posed by the
Nationalist forces on the islands and the value
of the islands themselves may have been in-
sufficient to justify the military costs of tak-
ing the islands. The Communists do not have
experience with or adequate equipment for
major joint amphibious operations and they
may feel that even against Nationalist opposi-
tion their losses would be relatively large. '
c. Peiping may have estimated for some
time that an attempt to take the islands
garrisoned by regular Nationalist forces would
involve risk of war with the US. This risk
has almost certainly been increased in Peip-
ing's view by recent US actions, particularly
the visit of US naval elments to the Tachens,
and by the remarks of the Secretary of State
during his press conference on 24 August 1954.
10. However the following considerations may
cause Peiping seriously to consider early
attacks against the Nationalist-occupied
islands:
a. Peiping may feel that the time is op-
portune for a further step toward achieving
its objectives in light of recent Communist
successes in Indochina and of divergence of
views among non-Communist countries with
respect to Far Eastern issues.
b. Recent Nationalist blockade efforts have
greatly hampered the movement of seaborne
cargo from Europe to North China. Although
the capture of the off-shore islands would not,
by itself, relieve the blockade of ocean ship-
ping, it would afford a greater degree of se-
curity to coastal traffic.
3
c. Peiping's recent propaganda takes note
of a possible formal US guarantee of the
islands and Peiping may desire to move in
before any such guarantees are put into effect.
d. The Communists may desire to seize some
of the Nationalists-occupied islands to lend
credence to their current threats to invade
Taiwan or as a preliminary to such an inva-
sion.
e. The Communists may feel that attacks
on the off-shore islands could serve to aggra-
vate differences between the US and its allies.
Although apprehensive about undertaking
large-scale attacks, the Communists may ini-
tiate small attacks designed to incite local
US armed reaction, which could then be put
formally before the UN as a case of US aggres-
sion and of US interference in the internal
affairs of China. The Communists might esti-
mate that this would exacerbate relations
between the US and such states as the UK
and India over China policy, and possibly de-
ter the US from extending a long-range com-
mitment to Chiang Kai-shek.
B. Probable Chinese Communist
Intentions
11. We believe that Peiping, presently esti,
mates that an all-out effort to take the major -
Nationalist occupied offshore islands might
well invave a substantial risk of war with the
US, and that this risk will continue so long
as sizeable US forces are maintained in the
western Pacific and so long as the, Chinese
Communists believe that these forces may be
used to support the Nationalist position on
the offshore islands.3
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department
of the Army, believes that paragraph 11 should
read as follows: "We believe that Peiping pres-
ently estimates that efforts to take the National-
ist occupied off-shore islands would involve a
risk of war with the US. The Communist prob-
ably will continue to feel that this risk exists
so long as sizeable US forces are maintained in
the western Pacific, and so long as US policy
to support Nationalist China remains unchanged.
We believe that the Chinese Communists desire
to avoid war with the US. ? However we believe
that in spite of the Communist feeling that
risk of war will be involved, they are likely to at-
tempt to seize some of the Nationalist-occupied
islands."
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12. Nevertheless, we believe that the Chinese
Communists will be increasingly willing to
undertake probing actions designed to test
US intentions. They will probably conduct
raids against the defended islands, occupy ad-
jacent islands, and increase air, naval, and
artillery activities. If such actions encounter
no appreciable US counteraction, the Chinese
Communists will probably increase the scale
of their attacks even to the extent of attempt-
ing to seize major off-shore islands occupied
by the Nationalists. I The Chinese Commu-
nists will also attempt to take advantage of
any involvement of US forces in incidents in
the area so as to provide a source of propa-
ganda material for further vilification of the
US. The Communists will accompany these
activities with a continued propaganda and
diplomatic offensive designed to irritate US-
allied relations and diminish prospects of an
anti-Communist coalition in Asia, enhance
the prestige of the Chinese Communists
among Asian nations, and bring about a de-
terioration of the US position in Asia.
III. EFFECTS OF A US GUARANTEE OF THE
DEFENSE OF THE OFF-SHORE ISLANDS
13. Peiping's propaganda has consistently in-
dicated that it regards the US as involved in
the defense of the off-shore islands. Any US
guarantee would be regarded by the Chinese
Communists as further evidence of the per-
manent hostility of the US and as a further
infringement of their territorial rights. The
Chinese Communists would regard a unilater-
al US extension of the present promise to de-
fend Taiwan as less of an affront than a guar-
antee which was part of a formal mutual de-
fense pact. The latter would be considered
by the Chinese Communists not only as a US
underwriting of the defense of Taiwan and
the islands but also as added evidence of a US
determination to guarantee the continued ex-
istence of the National Government.
14. However, in the eyes of the Chinese Com-
munists the difference between these two
possible forms of US guarantee would be one
of degree and would probably have no sub-
stantial effect on their own immediate policy
with respect to the islands. We believe that
4
they would continue to be deterred from an
all-out attempt to seize the major islands by
the prospect of US counteraction, which the
US guarantees would have transformed into
a virtual certainty. We believe that Chinese
Communist policy with respect to the islands
would continue substantially as described in
paragraphs 11 and 12 above, i.e., the Com-
munists, while initially refraining from major
invasions of the islands held by regular Na-
tionalist forces, would continue efforts to test
US intentions. Maximum propaganda ex-
ploitation of the US move would, of course, be
undertaken by the Communists.'
15. If the US guarantee by its terms included
all the Nationalist-controlled islands, or alter-
nately, if it were indefinite in scope, the Chin-
ese Communists might feel that the US did
not actually intend to defend all of the is-
lands, and they might attempt to seize certain
minor islands in an effort to test US inten-
tions and to discredit the US. If the US
guarantee were restricted to specific islands,
the Chinese Communists might then proceed
to occupy such of the other islands as they
considered would give them strategic or pro-
paganda advantage.
16. Concurrent imposition of restraints on
Nationalist use of the islands for offensive ac-
tions would have no material effect on Chinese
Communist reactions. Peiping would have
little confidence in the good faith of US im-
posed restraints.
17. A US guarantee of the off-shore islands
would be considered ill-advised and provoc-
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of
the Army, believes that paragraph 14 should read
as follows: "However, in the eyes of the Chinese
Communists, the difference between these two
possible forms of US guarantees would be one of
degree and would probably have no substantial
effect on their own immediate policy with re-
spect to the islands. We believe that they would
not be deterred from an attempt to seize some
of the islands by the prospect of US counter-
action, which a US guarantee would transform
into a virtual certainty. We believe Chinese
Communist policy with respect to the islands
would continue substantially as described in
paragraphs 11 and 12 above. Maximum propa-
ganda exploitation of the US move would, of
course, be undertaken by the Communists."
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ative by the UK and India. Thus it would
sharpen the fundamental differences in Far
East policy between the US and those coun-
tries. It would cause uneasiness in Japan,
which would fear that it increased the likeli-
hood of war in the Far East. A US guarantee
would encourage the governments of the
ROK, the Philippines, and Thailand. Such
reactions would probably have little net effect
on present prospects for cooperative action for
mutual defense in Asia, a subject on which
most countries in the area are now to a sub-
stantial degree committed. On the other
hand, these reactions would considerably
hamper the attainment of US political objec-
tives in certain countries of the area. Con-
current imposition of restraints on the Chin-
ese Nationalists would not materially alter the
reactions described above.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF CHINESE COMMU-
NIST OCCUPATION OF THE MAJOR OFF-
SHORE ISLANDS GARRISONED BY NA-
TIONALIST TROOPS.
18. Without a formal guarantee of the islands.
In the absence of a formal guarantee, Chinese
Communist action to seize the islands would
be taken in an atmosphere of uncertainty as
to US intentions. The fall of the islands
would have significance beyond the military
importance of the islands themselves. Na-
tionalist morale would fall, Nationalist guer-
rilla activities would be reduced in scale, the
will to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores
would be reduced, and the d?clining interna-
tional prestige of the National Government
would be further impaired. Korea would ex-
press great concern at the turn of events.
Japan, the UK, and Western Europe would
generally be relieved that no crisis had devel-
oped. Southeast Asian governments, including
that of the Philippines, would not place great
importance on the loss of the islands.5 There
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff; the Director of Naval Intelligence; and
the Director of Intelligence, USAF, would add:
"but they would tend to interpret US inaction
as a demonstration of irresolution."
5
would be some loss of US prestige. On the
other hand, the prestige of the Chinese Com-
munist government would be enhanced both
at home and abroad.
19. The Communists would exploit the occu-
pation of the islands as evidence of their de-
termination to "liberate" Taiwan and as a
victory over the US. They would be uncer-
tain, however, of the significance of the lack
of US intervention. They would probably
continue probing actions designed further to
test US intentions. On balance, we do not
believe that lack of US action in defense of the
islands would by itself lead the Communists
to assault Taiwan in the face of US commit-
ments.6
20. In the political warfare field the Chinese
Communists would fully exploit their capture
of the islands in propaganda directed at Ja-
pan, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and the world
at large. They would further stress their
claim of being the only rightful government
of China, and their position with regard to
admission to the UN.
21. Subsequent to a US Guarantee. If the
islands should fall to the Communists after
the US Government had guaranteed their de-
fense, this would mean that the US Govern-
ment had failed to back up its guarantee with
force or had been unwilling to commit force
adequate to defeat the Communist attack.7
The adverse effects on the Nationalist Gov-
ernment described in paragraph 18 would be
greatly intensified and US prestige through-
out the Far East would suffer a serious blow.
Japan would probably reappraise its US align-
ment, and non-Communist states in South-
east Asia would question seriously the willing-
ness and ability of the US to back up defense
commitments in that area.
22. The Communists would exploit the failure
of the US to fulfill its commitments, particu-
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Joint
Staff, believes that the lack of US action in the
defense of these islands might encourage the
Chinese Communists to initiate attacks on Tai-
wan/Pescadores.
7 The discussion in paragraphs 21 and 22 is based
on the assumption that the US has not exercised
its military capability to recapture the islands.
psmwowitim?
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larly in propaganda and psychological war-
fare directed at Japan, Taiwan, Southeast
Asia, and even Western Europe. The Chinese
Communists would feel that the risks of vio-
lations of the armistice agreements in Indo-
china had been lessened considerably. Com-
munist naval and air actions would probably
be stepped up in the Taiwan straits.
NOTE
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, feels that this
estimate is not complete without some examination of the consequences
of a Chinese Communist failure in an attempt to capture a US-guaran-
teed major off-shore island (s). Such a failure would have important
political and psychological effects in the Far East, particularly because
it would constitute "loss of face." On the other hand, the US, through
its guarantee would have "made face" in the Orient.
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