NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 11-5-55 AIR DEFENSE OF THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC, 1955-1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A005100040007-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 12, 1955
• Content Type: NIE

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NIE 11-5-55
12 July 1955
032524
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE:
NUM 6 E R ~ 1 -5--55
AIR DEFENSE OF THE SING-SOVIET BLOC,
1955-1960
Submitted by the
DIBSCTOR OF CENTRAL IIJTEI.LIGBNCB
The following intelligence .organizations participated. in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central InteiZigence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Afr Force, and The Joint Staff.
INTELLI(~iENCE ADVISORY C014IIIIITTEE
on i2 July 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff; G 2, Department of the Army; the Director of 1Vavul
Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the
Deputy Director far Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The
Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the LAC, and
the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
abstained, the sxcbject being outside of their jurisdiction..
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~~. -~?.-
1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per-
sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination
map be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of
State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
h. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other De-
partment or Agency
2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli-
cable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrange-
ment with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should
either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be re-
quested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22
June 1953.
WARNINQ
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
DISTRIBUTION
White House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Operations Coordinating Board
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation
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AIR DEFENSE OF T'HE SINO-SOVIET BLOC, 1955 -1960
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the capabilities of Sino-Soviet Bloc air defense, and probable trends
through 1960.
SCOPE
This estimate does not concern itself
with the detailed strategy or tactics that
might be employed by US air forces in an
attack against the Sino-Soviet Bloc, nor
does it attempt to evaluate the kill prob-
abilities of the Bloc air defense weapons
against attacking aircraft or missiles. It
should also be recognized that many of
the deficiencies of the Bloc air defense
system are common to all air defense sys-
tems and should not necessarily be con-
sidered as weaknesses unique to the Bloc.
Section I represents the probable Soviet
appraisal of the US air threat and Bloc re-
quirements to meet it; Section II esti-
mates the present .strength and compo-
sition of the Sino-Soviet air defense sys-
tem and Section III estimates the prob-
able future trends of Bloc Air Defense in-
cluding economic capabilities of the Bloc
to support its air defense system. The
estimate in Section III is based on the as-
sumption that neither domestic or inter-
national political factors nor unexpected
technological breakthroughs will alter
the general nature of weapons programs
as now envisaged in the Bloc and the
West.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Air defense of the Sino-Soviet Bloc has
been undertaken on a high priority. De-
velopments to date have revealed two ma-
jor areas of air defense concentrations.
The most important is a huge area em-
bracing all of European Russia and the
European Satellites. In this area is con-
centrated about 70 percent of the Bloc
fighter establishment with associated an-
tiaircraft artillery and radar. The se-
cond .major area is the Soviet Far East,
in which is concentrated about 15 per-
cent of Bloc fighter strength. Thus
about 85 percent of Bloc air defense forc-
es are concentrated in critical areas cov-
ering only approximately 2,000,000 square
miles of the total Bloc area of 12,000,000
square miles. Outside of these main
concentrations local defenses exist in a
few chosen areas but large portions of
the interior and certain border areas may
have little or no active air defense. (Pa-
ras. 36-37, 42, 50-51, 118, 120, Map III)
SECRET 1
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2. The Sino-Soviet Bloc has large num-
bers of air defense forces and weapons
of which the fighter aircraft units cur-
rently appear to be the most formidable.
The Soviets have made great strides in
radar development and have large quan-
tities of both obsolescent and modern ra-
dar equipment. We estimate there are
a total of about 900,000 men actively en-
gaged in air defense in the Bloc and that
the Bloc has an authorized fighter
strength of some 14,600 including about
14,000 jets.l About 3,800 fighters are
assigned to Fighter Aviation of Air De-
fense (IA-PVO) ; the remaining fighters
assigned to other organizations also have
some air defense responsibilities under a
"multiple mission" concept. (Paras.
46-51, 70-75, Map III)
3. The USSR has an integrated passive
air defense organization under the control
of the MVD. A few cities have extensive
underground installations. However,
we believe the passive defense system does
not greatly affect over-all Soviet air de-
fense capabilities. (Paras. 105-109)
Present Over-all Capabilities
4. Against daylight bomber formations
at altitudes between 5,000 and 35,000 feet
in clear weather, we believe that Bloc
fighters are now capable of inflicting se-
vere losses against piston bombers and
moderate losses against high-speed jet
bombers. Above 35,000 feet altitude
this capability would begin to diminish,
and above 40,000 feet it would fall off
markedly. Under circumstances of per-
sistent visible contrails, these capabili-
1 Actual strength is estimated to be approxi-
mately 85 percent of authorized (TO&E)
strength but varies considerably as new aircraft
are phased in.
ties would, on the other hand, be marked-
ly increased. Primary limitations would
then be the numbers and individual ca-
pabilities of fighter interceptor aircraft
available. (Paras. 52-57, Appendix C)
5. Although its all-weather air defense
capabilities are increasing, the Bloc could
offer only limited resistance under condi-
tions of poor visibility. (Paras. 51-57,
59-75, Appendix B)
6. AA gun defenses are most strongly con-
centrated around Moscow and other
areas of strategic importance. They
can provide continuously aimed fire up
to about 45,000 feet under both good and
poor visibility conditions. However, pre-
sently deployed AA guns probably will
not be capable of a high percentage of
kills at these maximum altitudes or very
low altitudes, even though controlled by
modern fire control equipment. (Paras.
59-63, 66-67, Appendix C, Map III)
7. Although there is no conclusive evi-
dence that surface-to-air guided missiles
have been produced and deployed, we es-
timate that the USSR now has some sur-
face-to-air guided missiles, probably con-
centrated in the Moscow area. These
could considerably increase the kill prob-
ability against Allied bombers even in bad
weather. (Paras. 68-69)
8. Against multiple-pronged penetrations
utilizing altitude stacking, diversionary
tactics, and electronics countermeasures,
we believe the Soviet air defense system
is susceptible to serious failures. (Paras.
21-23, 27-35, 52-104)
9. Against forces penetrating peripheral
defended areas at high speed and mini-
mum altitude the effectiveness of the de-
fense would be very low. (Paras. 34, 52-
104,110-111)
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10. Future Over-all Capabilities. 2 The
objectives of Bloc air defense planners are
almost centainly to: (a) develop and pro-
duce in quantity equipment capable of
combating the Western air attacks; (b)
rapidly improve the training of air de-
fense units; (c) develop better communi-
cations facilities; (d) improve the airfield
network; and (e) improve the air defense
organization. In meeting these objec-
tives, the Sino-Soviet Bloc will probably
emphasize the development of guided
missiles, supersonic all-weather fighters,
and improved radar equipment. (Paras.
110-111)
11. In accordance with these objectives,
we believe that Bloc air defenses will be
substantially strengthened during the
period of this estimate. Considerable
numbers of fighters of new types will be
introduced into operational units, replac-
ing older types; there will be a particular-
ly significant increase in the proportion
of all-weather fighters. Improved radar
equipment will be available, and early
warning and GCI systems will be extend-
ed into areas which are at present wholly
or partially uncovered. New and im-
proved antiaircraft artillery will come in-
to use. Guided missiles with nuclear
warheads will probably be developed by
1958, and will become increasingly im-
portant in air defense. These develop-
ments, and particularly the latter, will
greatly increase the kill probability
against Allied air attacks and will magni-
fy the problems of such attacks. (Paras.
112-125)
2 The estimates in Paragraphs 10-13 are based on
the assumption that neither domestic and inter-
national political factors nor unexpected tech-
nological breakthroughs will alter the general
nature of weapons programs as now envisaged
in the Bloc and the West. See also SCOPE note
above.
12. Despite these improvements, we esti-
mate that Bloc- air defenses would fall
considerably short of providing air de-
fense of the scale and nature required by
the probable Western air capabilities.
(Paras. 21-35, 112-125)
13. The estimated Bloc air defense pro-
gram through 1960 would constitute a
substantial but not impossible burden on
the Bloc economy. We believe the cost
would be such as to require either a di-
version of resource from other military
uses or an increase in total military bud-
get such as would probably lead to some
reduction in the rate of growth of the
economy. Fulfillment of the electronics
requirements of the program would be
particularly difficult. (Paras. 126-133,
Appendix D)
Defense Capabilities by Region
14. The estimates of regional capabili-
ties are based upon available evidence at
this time. In those areas where there
is almost a complete lack of evidence on
air defense, we have assumed that air de-
fenses are weak. However, it is pos-
sible that air defense forces and installa-
tions do exist in these areas.
15. European Satellites. Air defense of
the European Satellites (except East Ger-
many) insofar as it depends upon Sa-
tellite forces is estimated to be generally
inferior to that of critical regions within
the USSR. The Satellite air defense
forces are generally poorly trained and
equipped with obsolescent aircraft and
equipment and they would be incapable
of meeting air defense requirements or
of preventing transit of Western bomber
forces enroute to the USSR. Under day-
light conditions at altitudes between 5,000
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and 35,000 feet, they could inflict consid-
erable damage on attacking bomber for-
ces unescorted by fighters. These capa-
bilities would be increased to the extent
that Soviet air defense forces were de-
ployed to these areas.
16. Soviet Far East. The concentration
of radar, antiaircraft artillery, and fight-
ers in the Soviet Far East make it one of
the best defended areas of the USSR. The
Kamchatka and the Chukotski regions
are less well defended than the Maritime
Provinces of the Far East but do have rea-
sonably adequate early warning radar.
Because of the operational difficulties and
the limited fighter and AAA forces avail-
able in these areas, only limited resist-
ance could be provided. We believe the
air defenses of these areas will be consid-
erably strengthened between now and
1960 but will still be below that of the
Maritime Provinces.
17. Kola and Leningrad Areas. These
areas are considered to be relatively well
defended in terms of forces and equip-
ment. Radar coverage extends eastward
from Kola to approximately 50? East
longitude, but the density of radar in the
eastern part of this area is probably not
as great as in other critical approach
areas. We believe it will be considerably
strengthened during the period of this
estimate.
18. Baltic-Central and Western USSR-
Black Sea. These are the most heavily
defended regions of the USSR. The ma-
jor portion of Fighter Aviation of Air De-
fense, large concentrations of AAA in-
cluding possible guided missile sites, all
of the fighters of the Baltic and Black Sea
fleets, and the bulk of the Soviet tactical
air forces are located in this area. It is
estimated that continuous tracking of
hostile aircraft can be accomplished
throughout this area since the concen-
tration of radar sites is greater than our
assessment of actual requirements.
19. China -North Korea -North Viet-
nam. Substantial air defense capabili-
ties exist in North Korea, Manchuria, and
North China. Along the extreme south-
ern coastal areas the air defense capabili-
ties are less and in the interior areas are
virtually nonexistent. Early warning
capabilities are being extended southward
along the coast. Air defenses are gen-
erally being expanded in the Shanghai-
Canton-Changsha area. The size of the
entire region makes the development of
an air defense network a task of great
difficulty and expense. Consequently
we believe that the air defense to be pro-
vided the region during the period of
this estimate will remain considerably in-
ferior to that attained by the USSR itself.
20. Other Areas. As far as is known,
there are virtually no air defense forces
available along the northern Siberian
coastline and very few forces or radar
sites in central Siberia. We estimate
that practically no air defense capabili-
ties exist in this area except around local
critical target areas along the Trans-Si-
berian railway. In like manner, the
southern borders of the Bloc in Central
Asia also appear to be practically unde-
fended. We estimate that early warn-
ing radar lines will be established along
these borders by 1960 -and that all air
defense forces will be increased. How-
ever, we do not believe the USSR will be
able to provide a strong air defense sys-
tem in these areas by 1960 due to the size
of the areas and the many problems re-
lated to operations and logistics.
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DISCUSSION
I. THE MAGNITUDE OF SINO-SOVIET BLOC
AIR DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS
Soviet Estimate of the Air Threat
to the Blocs
21. The intensive buildup of Bloc, and partic-
ularly Soviet, air defenses since World War
II indicates that the USSR is acutely aware of
the threat posed to the USSR by Western
nuclear air power. The Soviet planners recog-
nize that the Bloc is geographically sur-
rounded by US and Allied air power to such
an extent that from present or programmed
overseas bases, the major portion of the Bloc
can be reached by US medium bombers on
two-way unrefueled missions (See Map 1) and
that US heavy bombers, or refueled medium
bombers, can reach anywhere in the Sino-
Soviet Bloc either from overseas or from ZI
bases. They also probably estimate that a
large portion of the Bloc can be attacked by
refueled fighter bombers, light bombers, and
by carrier aircraft, and that US air strikes
could penetrate the Bloc at any point.
22. Warning Times. Due to the fact that
the Bloc is almost surrounded by US bases
and the fact that US carriers can operate in
waters adjacent to Bloc boundaries, the prob-
lem of achieving adequate warning must ap-
pear extremely difficult to the Soviet planners.
This problem will become more difficult dur-
ing the period of this estimate, since the
speed of US aircraft is increasing at a more
rapid rate than the increase in range of early
warning radar (See Map 2). Thus, although
a minimum of two hours' warning can be
achieved by the Bloc for a considerable por-
tion of their land area in 1955, by 1960 they
would not be able to achieve a maximum of
two hours' warning of attack by aircraft even
for the central area of their territory unless
? This Soviet estimate of the US air threat is based
upon information available to the USSR in open
sources such as newspapers, magazines, and
officials releases.
their early warning zone were extended be-
yond their frontiers at least 750 nautical miles.
23. Aircraft. The USSR probably estimates
that during this period the Bloc could be at-
tacked by Western jet and piston aircraft with
radii of action up to 4,000 nautical miles,
speeds up to 1,150 knots, and operational
altitudes up to 64,000 feet. Based upon their
own experience and upon knowledge of US
organizational goals, production capabilities,
budgetary considerations, and aircraft dev-
elopment, the Soviets could probably make
a fairly accurate estimate of the numbers of
US aircraft which would be available for
strikes against the Bloc. We believe that this
estimate might be approximately as follows
Heavy Piston Bombers
300
200
....
Heavy Jet Bombers
a few
200
600
Medium Piston Bombers
100
....
..
Medium Jet Bombers
1,000
1,200
1,000
Light Jet Bombers
100
350
350
Jet Fighter Bombers
2,050
2,900
3,000
Navy Patrol Bombers
120
120
100
Carrier-Based Aircraft
800
800
800
(See Appendix A for probable Soviet estimate of
performance characteristics of aircraft and mis-
siles and dates of availability for operational use.)
24. Guided Missiles. The Soviets probably
could not estimate with any accuracy the
numbers of guided missiles which could be
employed against them during the period of
this estimate; however, they could probably
arrive at a fairly good estimate of missile
availability in terms of total production and,
in some cases, order of battle. On this basis,
they probably estimate that US and Allied
stockpiles would include by 1960 a few long-
range missiles and several thousand of the
smaller types. They would probably estimate
that the following general categories of guided
missiles might be available for use against
them
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Alti- War-
Miles tude Mach head
Range (ft.) Speed Weight
up to 64,000 feet. They probably would an-
ticipate attacks against the Bloc by medium
bombers from bases in the US, UK, France,
Italy, Greece, Spain, Turkey, North Africa, the
Philippines, Okinawa, Japan, and Alaska.
Land-based fighter-bomber aircraft could be
launched from bases in some of these areas
and from bases in other forward areas, such
as South Korea, Formosa, and West Germany.
(See Map 1) . Attacks could also be made by
heavy bombers and refueled medium bombers
from bases in the US and Canada, and from
such forward base areas as Guam, Greenland,
and the Azores.
Short-Range SSGM 500-800 45,000 m0.9 3,000
Medium-Range SSGM 1,200 60,000 m2.4 3,000
Long-Range SSGM 3,000 80,000 m3-4 1,200
Long-Range SSGM 5,000 50,000 m.8-.9 6,000
Long-Range SSGM 5,500 85,000 m3-4 7,000
Long-Range(Ballistic) 5,500 200nm m10-20 3,000
Air-to-Surface GM 100 60,000 m2.5-3 5,000
Air-to-Underwater GM 20 .... m0.5 500
They also probably estimate that some of
these missiles could be launched from naval
vessels and that several carriers, cruisers, and
submarines will be equipped for such launch-
ings.
25. Aircraft Armament and Electronics. The
Soviets probably estimate that US bombers
will have: (a) improved radar-sighted ma-
chine guns with automatic fire control; (b)
air-to-air rockets; (c) air-to-air guided mis-
siles; (d) airborne radar detection and jam-
ming equipment; (e) aself-contained navi-
gational system to operate over all types of
terrain and under all weather conditions; (f)
improved bombing-navigational radar; and
(g) defensive radar for detection and fire
control.
26. Bombs and Warheads. The Soviets prob-
ably estimate that all strike aircraft could
carry either nuclear or conventional weapons;
however, delivery tactics, dictated to some
extent by the characteristics of a specific air-
craft type, would fix the limits of the yields
of nuclear weapons which could be utilized.
Dive or toss-bombing could be employed for
the smallest-yield weapons, loft-bombing for
medium-yields, and high altitude horizontal
bombing for high-yield weapons.
27. Scale and Direction of Attacks. The
Soviets probably estimate that the US pos-
sesses great flexibility in methods and direc-
tion of attack. They probably estimate that
the scale and direction of attacks might in-
clude: (a) simultaneous attacks from all di-
rections by several hundred aircraft; (b)
sustained attacks over a period of several
hours from one direction only; and (c) widely
separated sustained attacks by individual air-
craft from all directions and at all altitudes
28. The Soviets might expect air attacks
launched from carrier task forces operating
in the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea, the
Mediterranean, and in the western Pacific.
They probably. calculate that carrier task
forces could operate 300-400 miles from their
coast lines in these areas which would allow
penetration by carrier aircraft to distances
up to 800 nautical miles.
29. The Soviets probably expect guided mis-
siles to be launched against Bloc targets.
Medium-range ,missiles could be launched
from overseas bases and naval vessels; short-
range missiles from forward US overseas bases,
surface ships, submarines, and aircraft; and
possibly long-range (intercontinental) guided
missiles from bases in the continental US
and Canada.
Probable Air Defense Requirements to
Meet Estimated Threat
30. Introduction. The requirements for an
effective Bloc air defense system have been
considered in the light of : (a) the probable
Soviet appraisal of Western capabilities for
attacking the Bloc; (b) evidence of the type
of air defense system already developed by the
USSR; (c) US air defense experience and con-
cepts; and (d) the estimated characteristics
of such Bloc air defense equipment as radar,
aircraft, and AAA weapons. Many of the
problems inherent in the efficient functioning
of an air defense system have not been evalu-
ated in arriving at these requirements. How-
ever, we believe the air defense requirements
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stated herein constitute the most probable
objectives of Soviet air defense planners
through the period of this estimate. Any
great increase over the requirements stated
might be considered toa costly and any large
decrease would probably be considered too
risky by Soviet authorities. Although it is
possible that the Soviets might plan an air
defense system entirely different from the one
envisioned in these requirements, present
Soviet air defense trends indicate that the
chances favoring this would be slight.
31. Detection.. During the period of this esti-
mate we believe the Soviet Bloc will have a
requirement for an early warning system
which will allow detection of all types of air-
craft and nonballistic guided missiles at alti-
tudes up to 85,000 feet. In terms of the prob-
able speeds of attacking aircraft and a desir-
able warning time of 30 minutes, the dis-
tances at which early warning is required
from Bloc frontiers will vary from 300 nautical
miles for present aircraft to 750 nautical miles
for aircraft and missiles by 1960. To meet
these requirements, the Soviets would have
to (a) extend their early warning instal-
lations beyond their present boundaries in
certain areas by the use of early warning air-
craft and picket ships, and- (b) generally ex-
tend their present capabilities by use of im-
proved radar equipment and a greater number
of sites. A theoretical minimum of some 600
early warning radar sites would be required
to provide two rings around the Bloc.
32. Tracking, Reporting, and Command Re-
action. In order to provide a coordinated
picture of the air situation in the responsible
control centers and to provide continuous de-
tailed information on specific targets, radar
coverage would be required in depth to the
major target areas. In addition, an auto-
matic data processing and control system
would be required to meet the demands for.
more rapid evaluation and transmission of
data. This requirement would necessitate at
least 350 GCI radar sites in the Soviet Bloc,
together with greatly improved communica-
tions facilities in general, including a total of
some 200,000 miles of landlines or other secure
communications channels and an automatic
data handling system. To permit efficient
command reaction at all levels, a highly cen-
tralized air defense organization permitting
prompt general direction of all passive and
active air defense units would be required.
However, the critical nature of the time ele-
ment in air defense requires that many of the
operational decisions heretofore made by
major commanders must be relinquished to
lower command echelons. This would be
highly dependent upon individual responsi-
bility and initiative and would necessitate a
high level of individual and unit training for
all air defense organizations.
33. Identification. The Soviets will have a
requirement for an IFF system which will
provide identification of friendly aircraft
under all conditions. Such a requirement
would necessitate some 21,000 IFF sets for.
equipment of operational aircraft.
34. Engagement and Kill. In view of present
trends in Soviet air defenses, the Soviets al-
most certainly estimate that they could not
rely upon one weapons system alone, and that
several would be required far an acceptable
capability for interception and kill under
night and all weather conditions. To meet
these needs, they will have to greatly improve
the performance characteristics of their inter-
ceptor aircraft and AAA weapons. Defensive
missiles will almost certainly be required for
use against enemy supersonic aircraft and
missiles. Defense against low altitude at-
tacks will require missiles (guided and un-
guided) in large numbers in addition to im-
proved automatic weapons. The Soviets would
probably estimate the following as Bloc opera-
tional weapons requirements for air defense
of the Bloc during the period of this estimate
AW Fighters
10,000
Day Fighters
5,000
Light AAA Weapons
17,000
Heavy Antiaircraft Guns
13,000
Short-Range SAGM
30,000
Air-to-Air Guided Missiles
120,000
Rockets or Missiles
(for low altitudes)
500,000 to 1,000,000
35. Air Facilities. There are now about 1,200
airfields in the Bloc suitable for fighter opera-
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tions. However, the Soviets probably consider
many of these fields unsuitable to meet air
defense requirements through the period of
this estimate. They probably estimate that
many have to be improved and that new fields
have to be constructed in peripheral areas and
in highly important defense regions. They
might require a total of some 2,000 airfields by
1960, of which about 1,500 would be needed
for air defense and 500 for other operational
requirements.
II. PRESENT BLOC AIR DEFENSES
36. Soviet appreciation of the growing West-
ern air and nuclear capabilities is reflected in
the intensive postwar buildup of Soviet air
defenses, and the high priority and great re-
sources allocated to this effort. Postwar
Soviet air defense doctrine was greatly influ-
enced by the USSR's evaluation of US/UK
wartime strategic bombing, Western and Ger-
man scientific developments such as radar,
jet aircraft and guided missiles, and the air
defense systems developed by the Germans
and the Western Powers. Since the war the
USSR has seen the vast growth in the US nu-
clear and delivery capabilities. From its
evaluation of these developments has emerged
new air defense concepts geared to the facts
that the US and its NATO allies are the chief
potential enemies of the USSR, and that the
most immediate critical threat they pose to
the USSR lies in their extensive capabilities
for nuclear air attack.
37. To meet the postwar air defense require-
ments of the USSR, the Soviet planners em-
barked upon an intensive re-equipment and
reorganization program. Jet interceptors and
ground radar equipment were the first major
new items to appear in quantity. At the same
time, the Soviets recognized the need for im-
proved antiaircraft fire control equipment,
air defense guided missiles, an improved sys-
tem for employment and control of air defense
forces, and an airfield network suitable for use
in air defense.
38. Soviet doctrine is now clearly showing the
impact of nuclear warfare considerations.
This problem has been under intensive study
at Soviet High Command level and in Soviet
staff academies since 1945. Only recently,
however, have the Soviets begun to dissemi-
nate to the armed forces and the civil popula-
tion instructions for dealing with nuclear war-
fare. This action became discernible during
the latter half of 1953 and has been more
prominent during 1954 and early 1955. Nu-
clear warfare considerations are now a con-
spicuous part of Soviet military doctrine.
Over-all Organization of Air Defense
39. The organization of Soviet air defense re-
mained essentially the responsibility of local
commanders until 1949, when a more central-
ized system of air defense was instituted with
appropriate headquarters and geographic sub-
divisions. The Ministry of Defense is respon-
sible for active air defense measures while pas-
sive air defense programming is handled at
the ministerial level by the Chief Directorate
of Local Air Defense which is subordinate to
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) .
40. PVO STRANY. The agency within the
Ministry of Defense primarily responsible for
active air defense is PVO STRANY, literally
"Antiair Defense of the Country." PVO
STRANY appears to be a major operational
headquarters co-equal in status with the two
other ministry-level commands : Long-Range
Aviation and Airborne Forces. Its com-
mander-in-chief is probably a Deputy Minister
of Defense for Air Defense and directly sub-
ordinate to the Minister of Defense. Through
the various air defense regional commanders
he has operational control over fighter air-
craft, AA artillery, and communications and
warning units assigned or made available to
PVO STRANY. However, these units remain
administratively subordinate to their respec-
tive ground, air, or naval services as shown in
Chart I. For example, the fighter units
of PVO .STRANY are administratively sub-
ordinate to the headquarters called Fighter
Aviation of Air Defense (IA-PVO), which is
in turn administratively subordinate to head-
quarters of the Air Forces of the Soviet Army.
41. Responsibility for air defense has con-
sistently remained under ground force officers,
and the CINC of PVO STRANY has tradi-
tionally been an artilleryman. The air forces,
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SECRET
Presidium of Central Committee
of the Communist Party
Ministry of Defense
d First Deput ies
for Army and Navy
HQ Ground Forces
of the Soviet A
rmy
Abn.
Si
g.
Arty.
Trps.
Trps.
Trps.
Radar,
Ground
Observer
6 Control
HQ Air Forces
of Sov. Army
Tact.
Air Army
(fighter
forces)
Fighter
Aviation
of Air De-
fense
(I A-PVO)
Aviation
of Abn.
Trps.
AAA
Gun
Laying
Radar
Radar
Units
Long
Range
Aviation
GCI
Radar
Q Fighter
Control
Centers
Area, Region, and
Subregion Hqs.
Local Air Defense
Autonomous Repubs.
Z- SECRET 9
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Naval 0'b servations
Units
Chief Directorate of
Local Air Defense
Naval Radar Units.
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as a whole, have not achieved independent
status in the USSR as they have in many
Western nations and the IA-PVO has re-
mained under the command of ground force
commanders at most operational levels. IA-
PVO is traditionally commanded by an air
officer but it is believed that operational com-
mand flows directly from the CINC PVO
STRANY to the Commanders of Air Defense
Regions rather than through the IA-PVO
commander.
42. The forces of PVO STRANY are probably
unified at the regional defense level under
regional air defense commanders. We be-
lieve that the air defense regions correspond
generally with the major industrial and mili-
tary areas of the USSR. The commander of
a region probably controls all units of control
and warning, IA-PVO, and antiaircraft artil-
lery forces assigned to PVO STRANY as well
as other elements of the Army and Navy
having air defense functions in his region.
In addition, he probably coordinates the air
defense activities of the passive defense units,
the border guards of the MVD, and the ground
observer units. He appears to be directly re-
sponsible to a major control headquarters for
coordination and control of all air defense
activities in his region. There are probably
two such headquarters : one in Khabarovsk
and one in Moscow. Lower organizational
levels of PVO STRANY have probably been
unified below the regional air defense level
into subregional organizations. Operational
channels of responsibility are believed to be as
indicated in Chart II.
43. The Soviet Navy is responsible for the
defense, including air defense, of the sea ap-
proaches, the coasts, and major ports and
naval bases of the USSR. The PVO organiza-
tion of the Navy, operating within the various
fleets which exercise regional control, receives
top level direction from PVO STRANY. There
are also PVO departments in the headquarters
of the Air and Artillery Forces of the Soviet
Army in Moscow which are believed to main-
tain coordination with PVO STRANY. PVO
headquarters elements also exist at each
Group of Forces and Military District head-
quarters and at subordinate levels for the pur-
pose of coordinating air defense activities in
the ground and air units of the Soviet Army
in the field.
44. The European Satellites, North Korea, and
Communist China have independent air de-
fense systems modeled after the USSR's and
integrated into the Soviet system. The
major control centers are located in the re-
spective capitals. Thus early warning in-
formation can be passed laterally among the
Satellites or the air defense regions of the
USSR as well as vertically to the central air
defense control headquarters in Moscow.
45. Air defense of Soviet military establish-
ments in the Satellites and occupied areas is
the responsibility of the respective Groups of
Forces and is provided from the antiaircraft
artillery, tactical air armies, and early warn-
ing units assigned to these commanders. At
present there is little evidence of unified com-
mand of Soviet territorial and Satellite air de-
fense forces, as such, although operational
control channels and possibly command
channels for air defense are probably in the
process of establishment at the present time.
By the Warsaw Agreement of 14 May 1955, a
combined military command for the USSR
and European Satellites was established under
Marshal Konev with headquarters in Moscow.
This combined command will almost certainly
provide an administrative framework for more
effective control and integration of air de-
fense forces.
46. Air Defense Personnel. Sino-Soviet Bloc
active air defense units are estimated to com-
prise about 880,000 personnel:
Euro-
pean
Viet
Minh,
North
Satel- Korea,
Bloc
USSR
lites
China
Fighter Aviationl
288,600
220,000
39,900
28,700
AAA
445,100
293,000
77,300
74,800
PVO Regions and
Control Centers
62,000
52,000
2,000
8,000
PVO Hq. and Adm.
Staff
2,750
1,500
500
750
Ground Observer
Units
50,0002
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Radar Installations
34,000
22,000
7,300
5,000
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CHART II
Presidium of Central Committee
of the Communist Party
Ground
Forces
Military
District
Commander
Commander
Group of
Forces'
Commander
Long Range
Aviation
Tactical Air
Units
Ministry of Defense
A First Deputies
for Army and Navy
Commander
Airborne
Troops
Local Air Defense
MPVO
Commanders
Air Defense
Regions &
Subregions
Army Early
Warning
Units
Army Anti-
Ai rcr_aft
Artillery
Fighter Forces
of Army Tactical
Air Units
Commander
Air Defense
PVO STRANY
Commander
Naval Fleets
Commanders
Air Defense
Areas
Fleet PVO
Units
Fleet
Air Forces
Fighter PVO Control Naval
Units of & Warning Fighter
IA PVO Units Units
Chief Directorate of
Local Air Defense
Naval
Radar
units
~~
Naval
Air Observa-
tions Units
MPVO
Units
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In addition, there are substantial numbers of
full-time local observers and passive air de-
fense personnel; all men and women between
the ages of 18 and 50 are subject to this
service.
Bloc Fighter Organization, Strength,
and Equipment
47. Organization. Fighter aircraft of the
USSR comprise 280 regiments of which 123 are
in tactical aviation, 102 in IA-PVO, and 55 in
the Naval Aviation. In addition there are 64
regiments in the Satellite Army and Fleet Air
Forces and 49 in the North Korean and
Chinese Army and Fleet Forces. Geographic
distribution of fighter regiments is estimated
as follows:
Northwestern USSR
Western USSR
Central USSR
Caucasus
East Central
Soviet Far East
East Europe
East Germany
Poland
Soviet Zone Austria
Hungary
Rumania
r Bloc Units
20
3
6
3
3
38
62
36
36
19
54
35
Bulgaria
11
Czechoslovakia
14
East Germany
8
Hungary
6
Poland
19
Rumania
6
China
42
North Korea
7
Albania
1 squadron
48. The IA-PVO. Those fighters known to be
under PVO STRANY are assigned to IA-PVO,
Footnotes from page 10.
lIncludes IA-PVO (77,400) and fighter elements
of Tactical -Air Armies, Military District Air
Forces, and Naval Aviation.
2 Tliere is insufficient evidence to permit further
subdivision by geographic areas.
with an authorized strength estimated at
3,800 aircraft. The basic operational unit of
IA-PVO is the division made up normally of
three regiments. The division is the basic
command echelon for control of actual in-
tercept operations. The divisions in turn are
subordinate to air armies or unidentified
fighters formations.
49. The remainder of Soviet operational
fighter aircraft are assigned to units of (a)
the tactical air armies and military district
air forces, and (b) Naval Aviation. These
forces operate under a "multiple mission" con-
cept which includes an air defense role.
50. Strength and Deployment -Mid-1955.
The estimated over-all authorized (TO&E)
strength of Bloc fighter forces is 14,600 air-
craft while actual strengths are estimated at
about 12,400 fighter aircraft.4 Soviet fighter
forces with an authorized strength of 10,400
constitute over 75 percent of the total Bloc
fighter TO&E strength.
51. The largest number of fighter units in the
Bloc are deployed in the Western USSR.S Most
of the principal target and approach areas to
the USSR are covered by presently deployed
fighter forces with the exception of the North
Central, North Eastern, and Central Asian
border areas. Distribution of authorized (TO
&E) fighter strength within the Bloc is as fol-
lows
Day AW
Total
Eastern Europe
3,320
40
300
3,660
Soviet Western Frontier
2,570
40
2,610
Soviet Northwest
520
30
550
Moscow and Approaches
1,770
120
1,890
South Central Frontier
1,510
40
1,550
Ural Area
330
330
Siberian Baikal Area
190
190
Far East Area
1,970
30
2,000
Manchuria-China-
North Korea
1,530
290
1,820
TOTAL
13,710
300
590
14,600
' Actual aircraft strengths average approximately
85 percent- of TO&E, although this varies con-
siderably as new aircraft are phased in. (See
Appendix B for estimate of strength by year.)
5 See Map III for deployment of air defense equip-
ment.
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52. The Soviet fighter forces are .now all
equipped with jet fighters and the keystone of
present programs elsewhere in the Bloc is the
re-equipment of fighter forces with jet fight-
ers. At present, only 50 piston fighters (ac-
tual strength) remain in the European Satel-
lites. Poland is completely equipped with the
FAGOT. There was a reorganization of the
East German Air Force in 1954 but little in-
crease in strength and no indication of re-
sumption of jet training. In the Far East,
Communist Chinese-North Korean actual
fighter strength increased from 1,050 to 1,220
while TO~uE aircraft strength increased from
1,330 to 1,584 during the period 1 January
1954 to 1 April 1955. As a result of a series
of redeployments, the bulk of the Chinese jet
fighters are now concentrated in the Shang-
hai area, and the forces in Manchuria have
been reduced.
53. Equipment. Present Bloc fighter forces
are primarily equipped with two types of air-
craft which from a performance standpoint
can be used for air defense: FRESCO (MIG-
17) and three versions of FAGOT (MIG-15) .
While these are all employed as day intercep-
tors, some of the FRESCO'S are now equipped
with AI (Air Interceptor) radar. The FAG-
OT could also carry AI radar but it is unlikely
that this conversion will be made. (See Ap-
pendix Cfor performance characteristics of
these fighters. )
54. Both of the above types are armed with
23mm or a combination of 23mm and 37mm
guns. All of these guns have a relatively low
muzzle velocity of 2,250 ft./sec. The FAGOT
is equipped with a gun sight which is equiv-
alent to the USAF K-14 with manual range
input. Some models of the FRESCO are
equipped with this sight but it is also probable
that some have sights with radar ranging.
55. Two new fighter types have recently been
observed in considerable numbers. Both were
twin jet swept-wing fighters of which one, the
FLASHLIGHT, is probably an all-weather
fighter and the other, the FARMER, appears
to be capable of level flight speeds in excess
of Mach 1. Both of these aircraft are estim-
ated to be in serial production and a few of
each are estimated to be in operational units.s
The FARMER is believed to have a radar range
type gunsight. The FLASHLIGHT is esti-
mated to be equipped with two large caliber
guns, probably 37mm. It is also possible that
some models carry air-to-air rockets. The fire
control system of the FLASHLIGHT almost
certainly includes an airborne intercept radar
with probable search ranges up to 16 nautical
miles and lock-on ranges up to 10 nautical
miles.'
56. The .over-all effectiveness of present Sov-
iet interceptor forces is probably limited by
the number of AI-equipped interceptors, the
low cyclic rate and muzzle velocity of the
guns, and the limited fire control capability.
In addition, the FAGOT is limited to some
degree by undesirable flight characteristics at
high speed and by low duration of fire. The
FAGOT has a good degree of effectiveness un-
der visual intercept conditions against cur-
rent B-47 jet bombers. The FRESCO and
FARMER will be more effective against jet
bombers due to their higher speed, ability to
initiate diving attacks, and greater stability
at higher speeds. The AI equipped FLASH-
LIGHT will be considerably more effective
than the earlier AI equipped fighter (possibly
FRESCO) against jet bombers under all
weather conditions, due to better armament,
and better fire control and AI search capabil-
ity.$
57. Airborne Radar. There is considerable
evidence of employment of AI radar and re-
cent sightings tend to confirm that it is in-
stalled in the FRESCO and almost certainly
is installed in the FLASHLIGHT. We be-
lieve it could also be installed in the FAGOT.
Although there is no evidence of tail warning
radar on Soviet fighters, we estimate they
could be so equipped. Present Soviet air-
borne IFF SRO equipment is similar in per-
formance to the US MARK III system. It ap-
pears to operate inside the 153-187 MC band
See Appendix C for performance characteristics
of Bloc fighters.
' AI radar ranges are under study and are sub-
ject toy revision.
8 See Appendix B for estimated number in opera-
tional units.
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employed by the MARK III but has 28 iden-
tification pulse groups compared to six for
the MARK III. This set when combined with
the interrogator responder "FISHNET" will
provide a reliable identification system but
has a low traffic handling capacity. This
system could be used to extend the GCI range
control of fighters. Soviet naval IFF com-
patible with "FISHNET" has also been ob-
served.
Antiaircraft Artillery
58. The Soviets continue to place considerable
emphasis upon AA artillery. Technical and
administrative control of AAA units is pro-
vided by the Main Directorate of Artillery
Forces of the Soviet Army. However, the
commander-in-chief of PVO STRANY has a
large number of AAA units under his oper-
ational control, and probably coordinates the
efforts of AAA elements attached to ground,
naval, and air components which contribute
to the mission of PVO STRANY but are not
subordinate to it. Operationally, AA artil-
lery units probably come under the control of
the PVO commanders of the regional and sub-
regional headquarters as do units of IA-PVO.
Warning information from radar sites is
passed to a control center and pertinent AAA
fire direction center which alerts the AA artil-
lery. Usually, a system of zones from the
control center is set up, so that when a tar-
get reaches a certain line AAA is alerted for
action.
59. AA Guns. Two significant post-World
War II developments in heavy AA guns have
been noted. The 100mm gun, now standard,
was first observed in Moscow in 1951. It
may be operated manually or by remote con-
trol. Anew heavy gun of at least 122mm
caliber was first seen uncovered in the 1955
May Day parade in Moscow. It is estimated
to have an effective ceiling of from 40,000
to 45,000 feet with conventional projectiles.
Despite its altitude advantage over the 100mm
gun, it is possible that the latest heavy gun
may not be widely used, particularly if opera-
tional quantities of guided missiles become
available in the near future. (See Appendix
C for operational performance characteristics
of AA guns. )
60. The 85mm AA gun was the standard
Soviet heavy weapon from 1939 until the
100mm gun appeared. Although consider-
ed obsolescent, it is still deployed widely
throughout the Soviet Bloc bath in the PVO
and in field divisions. These guns are being
turned over to secondary and Satellite defens-
es as soon as they can be replaced with the
100mm. We estimate that the 100mm gun,
director, and associated "WHIFF" radar as
a weapons system can engage subsonic aerial
targets within the range of the gun itself. A
similar fire control system probably will be
used with the new 122mm gun.
61. Proximity Fuses. The Soviets are fully
capable of developing the necessary electronics
components and vacuum tubes for use in
proximity fuses. They have acquired many
thousands of late model American VT fuses.
During the period of this estimate, they should
be able to produce quantities of proximity
fuses for use in the air defense system.
62. Automatic Weapons. The 37mm M1939
gun has been the standard Soviet light anti-
aircraft weapon but it is now being replaced
by a 57mm automatic weapon. The 37mm
probably will be encountered in increasing
numbers in the Satellite forces as it is phased
out of Soviet units. The 57mm automatic is
designed to engage subsonic aircraft up to
15,000-18,000 feet. The angular tracking
rate is not known. It is considered likely
that aradar-director fire control system has
been provided in addition to on-carriage me-
chanical sights for all-weather operation. A
mechanical on-carriage sight would limit its
effective ceiling to about 6,000 feet. A high
cyclic rate (500 to 600 rpm. per barrel) 30mm
multibarrel automatic gun is expected to be-
come a standard low altitude antiaircraft
weapon.
63. The standard machine gun assigned to
Soviet AAA units has been the 12.7mm Degt-
yarev M1938, but it too is being replaced. The
replacement weapon is a 14.5mm machine
gun which is available in single, dual, and
quadruple mounts.
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64. Searchlights. Soviet searchlights vary in
diameter from 40cm (15.7 in.) to 200cm (79
in.) . Some of the 200cm diameter search-
lights probably have radar units as integral
parts of the mount.
65. Unguided Rockets. During World War II
the Soviet forces used ground-to-ground rock-
. ets for defense against low level aircraft at-
tacks, but with little effectiveness. Soviet
interest in developing unguided rockets for
antiaircraft defense was probably increased
by the availability of German scientists and
rocket developments which were exploited aft-
er World War II. The Taifun, a German un-
guided rocket designed for strategic defenses,
probably formed the basis for Soviet research
projects. Atwo-stage, high-level rocket de-
veloped by Germans in the USSR, called
"Zenith," has also been reported, and we have
indications that it could be available now in
limited quantities. Barrage-type rockets for
use against low level attacks could be in a late
stage of development and possibly available in
limited quantities in 1957. Afire control
system for unguided AA rockets will prob-
ably be a modification of that now used with
the 100mm AA guns.
66. AAA Strength and Deployment. It is dif-
ficult to determine the allocation of AAA
weapons. Moscow is apparently the first to
be supplied with new weapons. As they be-
come available in greater numbers, they are
allocated to other important areas in the So-
viet Union and finally to the Satellite coun-
tries. There is some indication that the
Soviets are now strengthening AAA defenses
of occupied airfields in the European Satel-
lites. The lack of adequate AAA defenses
at such airfields has been a deficiency of post-
war Soviet defenses. We estimate that the
USSR now has about 13,850 operational AA
guns, including 50 122mm guns, 3,000 100mm
guns, 2,900 85mm guns, and 7,900 37mm and
57mm guns. There are large stockpiles of
serviceable 37mm and 85mm AA guns.
67. Heavy AA guns are deployed in some 286
regiments of which 172 are in Soviet forces,
44 in European Satellite forces, and 70 in the
Asian Bloc forces. In addition, light AAA
units are deployed throughout the armed for-
ces of the Bloc in regiments of AAA divisions,
AAA regiments and battalions of line divisions
and corps, and batteries of heavy tank and
self-propelled gun regiments. (For geograph-
ic deployment of AA guns, see paragraph 121,
page 25).
68. Guided Missiles. Based on the equip-
ment, facilities, and personnel connected with
German World War II developments and upon "
intelligence on subsequent activities in the
USSR, it is estimated that the USSR could
now have an improved version of the Wasser-
fall with the following characteristics: range
30,000-35,000 yards, altitude 50,000 feet, a
two radar mid-course guidance system with a
semiactive terminal homing, and a warhead
under 600 pounds. This would significantly
increase the kill probabilities against Allied
bombers, even in bad weather. In July 1953,
an installation was sighted in the Moscow area
which may have been a guided missile launch-
ing site. Between mid-1954 and the present
approximately 23 more such sites have been
observed in the Moscow area plus one in the
Leningrad area.
69. Other than these installations there is
no evidence available concerning actual So-
viet deployment of guided missiles for air de-
fense at the present time. Nevertheless, we
estimate that the Soviets do have some sur-
face-to-air guided missiles in operational use
at the present time and that they could have
an air-to-air missile.
Control and Warning
70. Organization. The USSR has an exten-
sive warning and control system, although the
precise means by which the various elements
and levels are integrated or the precise desig-
nation of units are not known. Top-level
control is probably exercised from Moscow
through the headquarters of PVO STRANY.
The control and warning organization of PVO
STRANY probably corresponds to the region-
al and subregional PVO organization and pro-
vides over-all coordination of AAA forces,
fighter forces, and control and warning at
these various levels.
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71. In addition to warning units of PVO
STRANY, tactical air elements of the Army
and Navy have their own organizational radar
which is operated for the control and pro-
tection of their respective forces. For air
defense purposes, these radar units are also
available to PVO STRANY and are probably
integrated at the same geographic organi-
zation levels as the control and warning units.
Each air division also has its own divisional
GCI radar for control of interceptors, which
results in considerable duplication of radar
and probably accounts to some degree for the
high radar density in many regions. Probably
one of the greatest weaknesses of the Soviet
air defense system has been a lack of adequate
decentralization of command responsibilities
below the regional or subregional headquar-
ters causing duplication of radar and loss of
time in command reaction. At present, inter-
cepts by fighters are largely controlled by the
divisional radar but the Soviets are probably
now in the process of decentralizing to permit
control of interceptions by individual radars.
72. Equipment. Soviet radar has steadily
improved from the native World War II PEG-
MATIT and RUS 2 EW radars operating in the
70 MC band. In 1949 the DUMBO radar ap-
peared which was essentially an improvement
of the earlier Soviet World War II radars. In
1951, a Soviet version of the US antiaircraft
fire control radar SCR-584, designated
"WHIFF," began to appear in quantity. Al-
so in 1951, a new Soviet EW and GCI ground
V-beam radar designated "TOKEN" similar to
the US AN/CPS-6B, was first observed. In
1953, two different EW type antennae arrays
were observed in the USSR and in Czechoslo-
vakia, designated "GAGE" and "WOOD-
GAGE," respectively. Aheight-finding ra-
dar designated "PATTYCAKE" appeared at
the same time. In 1952, a new EW radar
designated "KNIFEREST" and operating on
73 MC began to replace the older "DUMBO"
radar and in 1953, a new antenna, designated
"FISHNET," was identified as an IFF anten-
na which, in conjunction with the airborne
transponder SRO, forms an IFF system com-
parable to the MK III system used by the Al-
lies in World War II.
73. The following estimate of Soviet radar ca-
pabilities is based largely on the composite
characteristics of the DUMBO, TOKEN, and
KNIFEREST radars, which are in most wide-
spread use at the present time. We estimate
that the capabilities of the Sino-Soviet Bloc
early warning radars are such that the maxi-
mum altitude coverage extends above 45,000
feet and may extend to about 60,000 feet, de-
pending on factors such as range, size, and
aspect of target. The ranges at which Block
EW radars provide coverage with a 50 percent
probability of detection are estimated to fall
within the limits indicated in the following
table
Altitude (feet)
Range (nautical miles)
B-47 size
B-36 size Jet Fighter
25,000
100-150
115-185
60-90
35,000
125-160
135-200
50-80
45,000
125-170
145-210
40-70
55,000
125-180
145-210
limited
74. The ranges at which Bloc radars provide
GCI coverage are estimated to fall within the
limits indicated in the table below. To effect
interception at bomber detection ranges, Sov-
iet fighter aircraft would require transponder
beacons in order to permit tracking the Soviet
fighters as well as the intruding bombers.
The USSR has the capability to utilize tran-
sponder beacons.
Altitude (feet)
Range (nautical miles)
B-47 size B-36 size Jet Fighter
25,000
60-90
70-110
35-55
35,000
75-95
80-120
30-50
45,000
75-100
90-125
25-40
55,000
75-110
90-125
limited
75. Numbers and Deployment. The Bloc has
carried out a massive postwar radar construc-
tion program. At present it is estimated to
have operational some 1,075 early warning
and GCI radar, including no less than 450
TOKEN types and 25 of the new GCI radars.
In addition, we estimate they now have some
600 fire control radars and about 1,000 sur-
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SECRET 17
face IFF interrogators. The early warning
and shipboard GCI radars have been general-
ly deployed throughout the Bloc with the ma-
jor concentration being in the European Sat-
ellites, Western USSR, and the Maritime
Provinces of the 'Far East. In the West, a
radar chain extending from the Barents Sea to
the Caspian Sea provides radar coverage of
the Western USSR and the European Satel-
lites. In the Far East, radar coverage ex-
tends from the Bering Straits area south to
Hainan Island in the South China Sea with
the exception of a few isolated gaps. In the
course of normal operations, .Soviet naval
units provide incidental extension of this
early warning chain. (See Paragraph 118,
page 24, for deployment of radar by region.)
76. Ground Observer Posts. The USSR also
has what is believed to be a very extensive
ground observer system, which consists of the
naval observer units (SNIS) manned by So-
viet naval personnel and the VNOS, a joint
Army/civilian agency within the USSR,
(which also operates radar) and correspond-
ing Satellite organizations. The exact num-
ber of observation posts operated by these
organizations is not known.
Communications
77. Organization. The precise nature of the
Soviet communications system is not known,
but on the basis of the North Korea-Man-
churia network, both landline and radio
communications are employed between early
warning stations, airfield GCI stations, and
control centers. More modern UHF equip-
ment is now known to be in use in some areas.
78. In order to accomplish the control and co-
ordination function, a knowledge of the air
situation within and adjacent to the air de-
fense region or subregion is necessary, and
it is therefore probable that the early warn-
ing stations channel their reports, perhaps
through subregional centers, to the regional
control centers where major operational de-
cisions are made. Filter centers are probably
employed in conjunction with subregional
centers to coordinate the visual and radar
information and eliminate duplications or
erroneous information. .Control centers prob-
ably exist at the regional and subregional
headquarters and at the Central PVO head-
quarters. In addition, control centers are
probably required at each fighter division
headquarters and at all AAA organizational
levels.
79. Communications pertaining to hostile air
traffic are probably reported from the early
warning radar site to the subregional, and
area headquarters. Coordination between
local AAA and fighter forces is probably ac-
complished- on an information basis at the
subregional control center, perhaps by assign-
ment of liaison personnel. Major command
decisions, however, probably occ~zr at the re-
gional center with decisions being passed
down to the AAA and fighter units through
the fighter control center. At the same time,
information is probably passed laterally be-
tween regional headquarters and vertically to
the area headquarters. We estimate that
there are approximately 240-260 control cen-
ters in the Soviet Bloc air defense system con-
sisting of the following:
Area Defense Centers
2
Regional Control Centers
30-40
Subregional Control Centers
80-90
Divisional Control Centers USSR
Divisional Control Centers
91
(European Satellites)
Divisional Control Centers
(Asian Bloc)
80. Air-Ground Communications Equipment.
Until recently, the Soviets primarily utilized
HF equipment for air-ground communica-
tions. The standard communications in-
stallation in Soviet fighters was an improved
version of World War II equipment. We be-
lieve that this equipment has been supple-
mented beginning in 1952 by four-channel
VHF equipment. The ground equipment has
been employed in mobile trucks containing
one or more transmitters and as many as four
receivers, covering the low, medium, and high
frequency bands. A VHF transmitter and re-
ceiver between 100 and 150 MC now has been
added to this system. To date there is no in-
dication of changing the air-ground equip-
ment to UHF.
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81. Ground Communications Equipment. For
ground communications, the Soviets use ordi-
nary and high speed telegraph, radio, tele-
phone, teletype, and facsimile and multiplex
radio telephone for both military and civil
needs. The land lines are mainly concen-
trated in European Russia, thinning consider-
ably north of Moscow, Leningrad, and in the
Southern Urals, and East into Siberia which
has only one main route with several subor-
dinate branch lines. High, medium, and low
powered transmitters for high speed tele-
graphy and ordinary voice communications
in the low, medium, and high frequency 30
KC to 30 MC range are scattered thickly
through the European Soviet areas. They
provide the sole means of rapid communica-
tions in many areas which are sparsely settled
or where climatic conditions make it impossi-
ble or difficult to maintain land lines.
82. While there is no evidence of Soviet use of
scatter techniques in long distance communi-
cations systems, there are strong indications
that they are aware of the usefulness of these
techniques, and their advantage of lower sus-
ceptibility to jamming and intercept. We esti-
mate that the USSR has the capability to de-
velop such systems and may have them in
current operation.
83. During the past few years, the USSR has
been using UHF relay station equipment. This
equipment provides up to 16 voice or 48 tele-
type subcarriers. It may be used in mobile
installations for extreme flexibility or may be
sited at permanent locations. Operational
ranges up to about 50 nautical miles are pos-
sible, depending upon the intervening terrain.
Recent reports indicate this type of equipment
has been installed in East Germany and is
functioning in an air warning net which is
believed to be linked to installations in other
Bloc countries.
84. Automatic Computation and Data Han-
dling Equipment.. Soviet equipment known to
be available for this purpose includes land
lines, low, medium, and high frequency radio
links, multichannel microwave radio links,
and television or broad-band radio links. This
TV link equipment could be employed to
transmit data very rapidly or even transmit
TV pictures of complete status boards. Pro-
cessing of data for transmission by any of the
above mentioned systems would greatly in-
crease data handling capabilities. Computers
would play an important role in such a system.
The USSR is developing, and may now have in
operation, automatic computation and data-
handling devices.
85. Radio Navigation Equipment. The So-
viets are placing heavy reliance upon ground
and airborne radio direction finding aids for
the major portion of their air navigation, in-
cluding approach and landing. Soviet and
Satellite territory and airfields are well sup-
plied with ground direction finders, omni-
beacons, and rotating beacons. Requirements
still exist for more precise navigation and
landing aids. There is considerable evidence
of development work being accomplished to
provide a more precise localizer in the VHF
or UHF band and incorporating distance
measuring equipment. Ground located VHF
direction finding facilities are available.
There is a standard landing procedure for
fighters which uses a medium frequency hom-
ing beacon and a marker beacon at each air-
field. Recently several GCA type radars have
been sighted at some airfields. We estimate
installations will be made at key fighter fields.
Electronic Countermeasures
86. Active Jamming Equipment. The cur-
rent Soviet capability for seriously disrupting
Western long-range communications and
radio navigation systems gives them a high
capability for jamming such radio communi-
cations and navigation systems as may be
used in an air attack against the Soviet Bloc.
Research is now being conducted on magnet-
rons, suitable for jamming in the S and X
band, as well as the decimeter ranges but we
have no information of any equipment that
utilizes these magnetrons. The USSR prob-
ably has a capability for electronic jamming
up through 12,000 megacycles and possibly
through 46,000 megacycles.
87. Passive Countermeasure Equipment. We
have evidence of extensive Soviet interest in
the electronics intercept and analysis equip-
ment. We also have evidence that electronic
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reconnaissance is being conducted by the So-
viets. We estimate that the USSR will make
extensive use of chaff in electronic warfare.
The Soviets have also indicated interest in
antiradar coatings and at least one German
scientist concerned with World War II radar
camouflage may still be in the USSR.
88. Soviet Vulnerability to Electronic Counter-
measures. The Soviets are aware of the effec-
tiveness of countermeasures' against radar
and have the capability of developing devices
which would make their equipment less vul-
nerable to jamming or spoofing. It is not
presently possible to estimate the exent of
development and/or current incorporation of
such features in operational equipment.
Known Soviet low and high frequency com-
munication equipment, ground and airborne,
is susceptible to' the usual types of jamming.
Their employment of VHF for air/ground
communication would make jamming more
difficult. Increased Soviet employment of
highly directional microwave point-to-point
communication equipment has also greatly
reduced their vulnerability to jamming
89. Conventional Soviet radio navigation aids
such as omnidirectional landing and route
beacons are individually susceptible to long-
range jamming. All other systems or aids
known to be used by the Soviets, suitable for
fighter operation, are vulnerable to both
spoofing and jamming. The active and pas-
sive electronic missile guidance systems esti-
mated to be in existence are also all suscepti-
ble to electronic countermeasures.
Air Facilities
90. During the last several years, the USSR
has put great emphasis on airfield develop-
ment, particularly in perimeter areas. Since
1950 airfield construction has been extended
in the Khabarovsk Vladivostok area and
north-eastward to the Chukotski Peninsula,
thus strengthening the perimeter network of
airfields. Recent construction activities have
also taken place in the Murmansk-Leningrad
areas, the Baltic States, South Ukraine,
Crimea, and Caucasia. A general improve-
ment of airfields along the Far East supply
line and the construction of better facilities
at civil airports have also been noted. It is
believed that runway construction inside the
Soviet Union has been extensive in recent
years, and apparently minimum requirements
for concrete runways at home bases have been
standardized at 5,900 to 6,000 feet for fighters
and light bombers and 7,900 to 8,200 for
medium bombers.
91. In nearly all areas of probable operations,
there appear to be adequate networks of air-
fields for the employment of present Bloc
fighters forces. The principal exceptions are
in the northeastern and north central Si-
berian areas. In the northeastern area, ex-
tensive operations at the present time would
probably still entail the use of substandard
fields even though airfield construction has
been in progress in the Chukotski area since
1952. In the north central area, additional
improved airfields would alsa be required even
though some airfield construction has been
carried out along the Arctic coastline in the
past few years. Thus, for optimum air de-
fense coverage, extensive additional airfield
construction in these areas is required
through the period of this estimate.
92. The existing airfield net in the European
USSR and Satellites affords an adequate
fighter base capacity for present aircraft, but
in a major war bases in some sectors might not
provide sufficient flexibility of fighter forces
for air defense in addition to meeting the in-
creased needs of other types of aircraft. The
need for greater flexibility in certain areas is
apparently recognized by the Soviets, since
new airfield construction is still taking place
in the Satellites, where the number of major
airfields increased during 1954 from 98 to 112.
There are at present 20 additional airfields un-
der construction, of which 17 are in Poland.
Three new runways were added in East Ger-
many and there are indications that more will
be built in 1955. Work continues on Gross
Dollin, the new airfield near Berlin, with an
11,000 foot runway. In Czechoslovakia, four
long grass strips have been added, bringing
the total of this type to nine. In several of
the Satellites, there have been signs of reac-
tivation of former grass landing grounds and
two of the "forest landing grounds" in East
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Germany were used for the first time in ma-
neuvers.
93. Estimated availability of airfields of over
4,000 feet in length in the Sino-Soviet Bloc is
as follows:
Soviet Western Frontier
162
Soviet Northwest
39
Moscow and Approaches
179
South Central Frontier
114
Ural Area
55
Siberia-Baikal Area
55
Far East Area
149
TOTAL IN SOVIET UNION
753
Eastern Europe
241
Asian Bloc
208
TOTAL 1.
202
Logistic Support, Maintenance, and
Training
94. The technical supply system is well organ-
ized to meet Soviet air defense requirements.
Since antiaircraft installations, airfields, and
radar stations are located adjacent to popu-
lated areas and main transportation and com-
munications lines to most areas, the major
Soviet problems of logistic support arise in
connection with the peripheral areas, parti-
cularly the northern and northeastern Si-
berian areas and in Communist China, North
Korea, and North Vietnam where adequate
transportation facilities do not exist. These
problems lie mainly in the transportation of
parts, and in the availability, transport, and
storage of jet fuels.
95. Very little information is available on the
exact location of jet fuel storage points or the
amount of fuel stored. It is known that jet
fuel in large quantities is stored at the refin-
eries, at regional distribution points, and at
air army central fuel depots. In addition,
limited amounts of fuel are stored on the
operational airfields. The over-all availability
of jet fuel is believed to limit the amount of
flying accomplished at the present time to
seven hours per fighter pilot per month. We
believe this limitation is ,probably due to: (a)
transportation deficiencies; (b) increased re-
quirements due to rapid build-up of Soviet jet
forces; (c) the allocation of considerable
quantities of jet fuel to a reserve storage pro-
gram; and (d) limited base storage facilities.
96. Intelligence is lacking for a complete ap-
praisal of the Soviet military aviation main-
tenance system as it affects fighter aircraft,
although certain limitations are indicated.
The maintenance system is highly centralized
and controlled, with rigid definitions of duties
and responsibilities which might be cumber-
some and subject to breakdown in time of war.
Inspection requirements are excessive and
technical personnel are not used in the most
economical manner. On the other hand, the
level of training of technical personnel seems
to be good and technical manuals are ade-
quate. Historical evidence indicates Soviet
maintenance capabilities during and immedi-
ately after World War II were substantially
lower than those of the US. Since that time,
there appears to have been slow but steady
improvement, probably influenced to a large
degree, by the retention in the service of
trained maintenance specialists and the in-
troduction of the jet fighter which is easier to
maintain.
97. It is estimated that a current serviceabil-
ity rate for present jet fighters on the order of
85 percent of assigned aircraft can be achieved
under normal operating conditions. For tac-
tical fighter units an initial maximum service-
ability rate of 85-95 percent could be obtained
following a complete or partial stand-down.
This rate could be maintained for the first day
or two of intensive operations but would prob-
ably decline to around 50 percent through the
sixth or seventh day, followed by a gradual
buildup to around 60-65 percent sustained
rate. Initial maximum serviceability rate for
air defense fighters would probably be around
95 percent since these forces are held in a
semi-stand-down condition until committed.
After commitment, the serviceability rate of
these fighters would probably drop below that
of tactical fighters due to recovery at alterna-
tive bases, causing increased logistic and
maintenance problems. As new and complicat-
ed all-weather fighters are introduced, the ini-
tial maximum serviceability rate will be low-
ered considerably, probably to around 50 per-
cent.
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98. Under extreme cold weather conditions in
the Arctic areas, serviceability rates of all
types of equipment will be considerably re-
duced even though the Soviets have designed
their equipment for low temperatures and
have wide Arctic operational experience.
Not only is maintenance more difficult, but
the logistic problem is magnified by increased
requirements for heavy clothing and special
ground equipment, such as heaters and air-
craft shelters. This, together with the fact
that the Arctic areas are usually not served by
adequate transportation facilities and the
fact that morale is generally lower will serious-
ly limit maintenance and serviceability rates.
99. Maintenance. Soviet electronics equip-
ment is similar to Western equipment and
consequently maintenance problems are prob-
ably comparable. Our knowledge of the op-
eration of Soviet electronics equipment indi-
cates that it is reliable and well-maintained.
Soviet equipment has also been designed for
use under wide temperature ranges. Cap-
tured Soviet equipment which has been tested
has been found to be within current US Joint
Army-Navy (JAN) specifications.
100. Training. Intelligence currently avail-
able is insufficient to permit a satisfactory as-
sessment of training of air warning personnel.
Considerably more information is available
concerning pilot training in the USSR. A
fighter pilot is believed to acquire approxi-
mately 100 hours of flying time in flying
school. To this could be added the DOSAAF9
flying time of about 45 hours which pilot
candidates receive prior to entering the flying
school. In the past Soviet and Satellite pilots
reported to operational units with only about
100 hours flying time in trainer type aircraft,
without having flown tactical aircraft and
without having received gunnery or night-
flying experience. At the present time, how-
ever, the Soviet training establishments have
a total of some 700 jet fighter aircraft which
are being used for pre-operational training.
This type of training is also carried out to a
considerably lesser extent in some European
Satellites.
B All Union Voluntary Society for Cooperation
with the Army, Aviation, and Fleet.
101. Soviet fighter pilots receive only about
seven hours flying time per month after join-
ing an operational unit. We believe that ap-
proximately 30-35 fighter pilot schools exist
in the USSR which probably produce an aver-
age of 100 pilots per school each year or a total
of 3,000 to 3,500 pilots. Jet training, however,
has been increasingly conducted by the pre-
operational flying schools and by operational
units.
102. The current training program of the IA-
PVO units is not known. However, informa-
tion available for 1950 indicated that the
training goals were to acquire fully the tech-
nique of interception and destruction of large
hostile air formations through oioordination of
all air defense weapons. We estimate that
these goals now include interception and de-
struction of single aircraft and small forma-
tions of jet bombers as well as large forma-
tions. Night flying was known to be limited
in 1950 to nights when the natural horizon
was visible and probably averaged around six
hours per pilot annually. Although the night
flying standards have increased considerably
since that time, they are still probably well
below US standards.
103. We believe that there is no instrument
school available as such in the Air Forces of
the Soviet Army, other than that for the train-
ing of bombardier-navigators in Soviet Long-
Range Aviation. Instrument training for
fighter pilots is conducted in operational units.
104. In general, training in the European and
Asiatic Satellites is patterned after that in
the USSR, but the standards are believed to
be lower.
Passive Defense
105. Organization. Passive air defense is car-
ried out by the civil organization known as
the MPVO which is subordinate to the MVD.
Each constituent and autonomous republic
in the Soviet Union has its own MVD and a
directorate of the MPVO. However, the MPVO
directorates have little independence and re-
ceive policy and administrative guidance from
the All Union MVD in Moscow. The MPVO
system is well integrated in the governmental
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structure of major cities and industrial areas
vulnerable to air attacks. Existing civil
agencies such as health and fire departments
are utilized to implement MPVO measures.
City officials rather than MVD personnel are
responsible for directing local air defense
activities. MVD personnel actually enforce
loc~.l air defense policies as formulated in
Moscow.
106. Deception. In Korea, false road convoys
were employed at night to lure United Nations
aircraft into flak traps or hanging cable de-
fenses. Dummy aircraft, airfields, and field
guns were also noted. To date there have
been no observations of camouflage on a mass
area basis such as construction or simulation
through radar camouflage of false cities,
factories, and lakes. However, these tech-
niques were used by the Germans during
World War II, and it must be assumed that
the Soviets are aware of this potentiality.
Some sites have been observed in the USSR
and in some of the Satellites which may be
dummy airfields, but no replicas of large
elaborate airfields have been noted.
107. Aircra f t Dispersal. In combat areas dur-
ing World War II, the general Soviet practice
was to avoid high concentrations of aircraft
on a particular field. The necessary opera-
tional concentrations within a given sector
was achieved by using satellite fields around
a major airfield. The current practice of uti-
lizing natural surface airfields even where ade-
quate hard surface runways are available in-
dicates that the Russians are still dispersal-
conscious. Furthermore, the ability to use nat-
ural surface airfields is a tremendous asset to
a dispersal concept even though some mainte-
nance and operational problems may be mag-
nified. By using a mass take-off technique,
the Soviet air forces have demonstrated an
ability to evacuate a regiment of fighter air-
craft from a natural surface field within a pe-
riod of three minutes, although several hours
advance notice may have been given. A cur-
rent practice of the Soviet air forces is to base
one or two fighter regiments at one field. Dur-
ing wartime, in areas subject to air attack, it
is probable that no more than one fighter reg-
iment will be based at any one field.
108. Underground Installations. Some peri-
pheral cities such as Vladivostok, Baku, and
Sevastopol have retained and improved elabor-
ate defensive tunnel systems constructed dur-
ing World War II. Some airfields in the Far
East are equipped with underground storage
space and repair shops, and there have been
several reports of underground hangar con-
struction in Germany, Poland, and Rumania.?
Underground command posts and filter cen-
ters have been reported in Hungary and Bul-
garia and it is assumed that similar installa-
tions exist in major cities and defense centers
throughout the Soviet Bloc. Extensive under-
ground installations for the protection of
population groups are believed to exist in only
a few major cities.
109. Training. Passive defense against air
attack is included in training programs
throughout the Soviet forces. Field manuals
and pamphlets are published for troop issue,
and defense against chemical attack is in-
cluded in school curricula. Recent maneu-
vers in East Germany have included defensive
tactics against atomic weapons and indicate
that Soviet military leaders are aware of the
problems of survival in atomic warfare. There
is no known organization within the military
forces charged solely with bacteriological war-
fare defense but it is probably that the
military medical organization has this respon-
sibility. Troop training stresses discipline
with regard to avoiding water, foodstuffs, and
areas of contamination. The current issue
gas mask is believed to afford adequate pro-
tection against BW Aerosols.
III. TRENDS IN BLOC AIR DEFENSES
THROUGH 1960 10
110. The Bloc, and particularly the USSR, is
continuing its intensive efforts to improve the
existing air defense system in order to cope
with the growing Western capabilities. (See
Section I). The objectives of the Bloc air
10 The estimates in this section are based on the
assumption that neither domestic or inter-
national political factors nor unexpected tech-
nological breakthroughs will alter the general
nature of weapons programs as now envisaged
in the Bloc and the West.
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defense planners during 1955-1960 will al-
most certainly be to: (a) develop and produce
in quantity equipment with performance
characteristics capable of combating the
Western air threat; (b) rapidly improve the
training of air defense units; (c) develop bet-
ter communications facilities; (d) improve
and increase the number of airfields; and (e)
improve their air defense organization.
111. To meet these objectives would be a task
of such magnitude as to require a major effort
during the 1955-1960 period. Achievement of
a high degree of effectiveness would require a
very large scale program of research, develop-
ment, and production in order to keep pace
with Western developments. If our estimate
of their analysis of the air defense problem is
sound, the Soviets will probably seek to do the
following:
a. Develop all-weather interceptor aircraft
with airborne intercept equipment able to
operate from low altitudes to 65,000 feet acid
at speeds better than 1,150 knots;
b. Develop improved AA rockets and mis-
siles;
c. Develop an early warning system around
the entire Sino-Soviet Bloc : to provide early
warning as far out as 750 miles from Bloc
border at altitudes up to 80,000 feet;
d. Develop airborne early warning aircraft
and associated equipment;
e. Develop a more effective communications
system, and provide more land lines;
f. Develop an integrated automatic data
handling system;
g. Continuously train personnel to operate
all elements of the air defense system;
h. Improve and enlarge existing airfields
and construct new airfields;
i. Modify the command policy of the air
defense organization to permit operational de-
cisions at lower levels;
j. Improve range and altitude capabilities
of GCI radar; and
k. Develop countermeasures equipment to
render hostile navigational and bombing ra-
dar ineffective and to prevent jamming of the
radar and communications equipment of the
Bloc air defense system.
Trends in Strength and Equipment
112. New Fighter Types. The USSR will
probably introduce additional new day and
all-weather fighter types during the period
of this estimate as indicated in Appendix B.
As these new fighters are phased in, the older
types will be dropped from the order of battle
so that all FAGOTS will probably be replaced
by 1957. We estimate the FRESCO will prob-
ably be further developed, if not so already,
by the installation of an 8,000 lb. thrust engine
and will continue to be used throughout the
period of this estimate but in reduced num-
bers by 1960. By 1960, we believe the Bloc
will have both day and all-weather fighters
with speeds up to 850 knots, time to climb to
40,000 feet of about two minutes, and combat
ceilings up to 62,000 feet. (See Appendix C
for estimated performance characteristics of
new fighters.)
113. Over-all Fighter Strength Through 1960.
We estimate that there will probably be only
a modest increase in authorized Bloc fighter
strength from some 14,600 in 1955 to 15,530
in 1960. However, a far more significant in-
crease will probably take place in the propor-
tion of all-weather fighters, which we estimate
will grow from 300 in 1955 to 6,100 by 1960.
Estimated total TO&E strengths by year are
as follows: 11
Jet Day
9,500
8,100
6,900
6,300
6,100
Jet AW
1,000
2,500
3,800
4,500
4,800
European Satellites
Jet Day
2,530
2,480
2,380
2,180
1,880
Jet AW
Manchuria-Chi
0
na-Kore
100
as
200
400
700
Piston
100
100
100
100
100
Jet Day
1,670
1,750
1,700
1,570
1,350
Jet AW
30
100
200
350
600
TOTALS
14,830
15,130
15,280
15,400
15,530
AW
1,030
2,700
4,200
4,950
6,100
Day
13,800
12,930
11,080
10,450
9,430
We believe a small Viet Minh Air Force will be
developed during the period of this estimate.
u For strength by type and phasing in of aircraft,
see Appendix B.
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SECRET,
114. Future Radar Coverage. On the basis
of observed trends in Soviet radar develop-
ment and deployment, we estimate that the
USSR will gradually replace many of its pres-
ent radars with improved radars. By 1960
the range coverage capabilities of Soviet EW
and GCI radars will probably be increased by
as much as 50 percent (within propagation
limits) over the ranges listed in the table in
paragraph 73. Against a B-47 size target
EW coverage will probably extend to 100,000
feet by 1960 and GCI coverage could extent
to as much as 85,000 feet.
115. Estimated Soviet air defense programs
through 1960 would provide operational radar
as follows:
Equipment
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
TOKEN
450
525
600
600
600
600
70 MC Types
600
650
700
675
665
650
New EW
....
....
25
75
150
200
New C4CI
25
150
300
400
400
400
Fire Control
600
650
700
650
600
500
New Fire
Control
25
200
'400
600
800
900
IFF Inter-
rogator
1,000
1,250
1,500
1,700
1,900
2,000
116. Priority deployment of the radar indi-
cated above will probably be made to the West-
ern and Southwestern frontiers of Bloc terri-
tory from Murmansk to the Caspian Sea, in
the Maritime Provinces of the Far East, and
perhaps to a few internal areas. As improved
equipment appears in these high priority loca-
tions, the shift of presently available TOKEN
types to lower priority areas now covered by
obsolete equipment, will also result in the im-
provement of detection capabilities in those
areas. As the average detection range of So-
viet radar is increased by the build-up of
TOKEN strength and the introduction of im-
proved radar types the general disposition of
the equipment may be expected to spread in
order to realize the full advantage of the in-
crease in range capability.
117. Such a spread should enable more com-
plete coverage to be afforded Arctic areas
where penetrating aircraft enroute to import-
ant target areas might be expected to enter
Communist territory. Increased detection
coverage of the south central USSR border
area adjacent to Iran and Pakistan might
also be anticipated, and an increased flow of
radar into China is also to be expected. We
believe that by 1956 sufficient TOKEN radar
will be available to provide complete coverage
in the area between Hainan Island and
Shanghai. Tracking facilities to back up the
improved coastal detection capability will
probably appear first in a zone some 100-150
miles inland from the coast, and in the
vicinity of important inland cities such as
Hankow and Changsha.
118. Radar Deployment. Estimated geo-
graphic deployment of Bloc early warning and
ground control intercept radar is as follows
Eastern Europe
Soviet Western Frontier
Soviet Northwest
Moscow and Approach
South Central Frontier
Ural
Siberian Baikal
Far East
Manchuria, China, Korea
TOTAL
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
300
300
300
300
300
300
150
175
200
200
200
200
50
75
100
125
125
125
175
175
200
200
200
200
50
75
100
125
125
125
25
50
100
125
125
125
0
5
100
125
140
150
195
200
200
200
200
200
130
245
325
375
400
425
1,075
1,325
1,625
1,750
1,815
1,850
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119. Communications. Considerable improve-
ment in Soviet air defense communications is
probable through 1960, as the USSR has dis-
played considerable technological capabilities
in this field. Automatic data handling
equipment may be used in some critical areas
although we consider it unlikely that the
USSR will have an integrated country-wide
system in operation by 1960.
120. Antiaircraft Artillery. The Soviets ap-
parently still plan to place considerable re-
liance on AA artillery. We estimate that the
following new weapons will become available
through 1960:
low-yield nuclear warhead, and a maximum
effective range on the order of 100 nautical
miles.
122. Air-to-air guided missiles may become
operational as fighter armament during the
period of this estimate. Although there is no
evidence of a Soviet air-to-air missile program,
it is estimated that the USSR now has the
capability to produce a missile with the fol-
lowing characteristics: range in the order of
5,000 yards varying with release altitude, su-
personic, infrared homing, weight 175
pounds, and a 25-30 pound warhead. Such
Weapon
Max. Vertical Effect.
Available Range Ft. Ceiling Ft.
Muzzle
Velocity
Ft. Sec.
Rate of
Fire
RPM
Multi-barrelled
30 mm
1956
18,000
5,000
3,500
!500-600
Unguided High-
50,000
4,000
per barrel
50-60 per
Level Rocket
over
to
burn-
sec per
(Zenith) ~
1955-1957
60,000
60,000
out
vehicle
velocity
Unguided Low-
Level Rocket
May appear by 1960
Estimated deployment of AA guns through 1960 is as follows:
(See table on page 26)
121. Guided Missiles. It is highly likely that
the USSR will place increasing reliance on
guided missiles for air defense use.12 During
1957-1958, we estimate that series production
could begin on a surface-to-air missile with
terminal homing, a maximum effective range
of 50,000 yards at 60,000 feet altitude and a
warhead on the order of 500 pounds. The
low-yield nuclear warhead probably available
for this missile in 1958 would greatly increase
the kill probability as well as the problems of
attack. Sometime after 1960 the Soviets
could have a further improved surface-to-air
missile with terminal homing equipment, a
'~ See NIE 11-6-54 "Soviet Capabilities and Prob-
able Programs in the Guided Missile Field," dated
6 October 1954 for a detailed estimate.
a missile would be limited to tail cone attacks
under generally fair weather conditions at the
attack altitude. The FRESCO could be mod-
ified to carry four such missiles with infrared
homing and be operational now. During the
period 1955-1958, the range of this missile
could be increased to approximately 10,000
yards and might not be limited to tail cone at-
tacks. By 19581960 a completely new air-to-
air missile with a semiactive terminal homing
system, a warhead of about 50 pounds and an
effective range of approximately 10,000 yards
varying with release altitude could be ready
for series production. If this missile does not
appear until the latter part of the 1958-1960
period, an active homing head could be in-
corporated.
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ESTIMATED DEPLOYMENT OF OPERATIONAL SOVIET BLOC AAA,
MID-1955-MID-1960
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
Heavy
Light
Heavy
Light
Heavy
Light
Heavy
Light
Heavy
Light
Heavy
Light
European Satellites
1,700
1,600
1,850
1,750
2,000
1,900
2,150
2,150
2,300
2,300
2,500
2,500
Soviet Establishments
in Europe
550
1,550
800
2,300
800
2,300
800
2,300
800
2,300
800
2,300
Soviet Western
Frontier
Soviet Northwest
1,850
300
2,550
350
2,400
350
3,750
450
2,400
350
3,750
450
2,400
350
3,750
450
2,400
350
3,750
450
2,400
350
3,750
450
Moscow and Approaches
South Central
Frontier
l
1,150
700
200
?00
600
450
1,450
850
350
1,100
900
800
1,450
850
350
1,100
900
800
1,450
850
350
1,100
900
800
1,450
850
350
1,100
900
800
1,450
850
350
1,100
900
800
Area
Ura
Siberia and
Baikal Area
300
300
400
450
400
450
400
450
400
450
400
450
Soviet Far East
900
1,400
1,250
2,000
1,250
2,000
1,250
2,000
1,250
2,000
1,250
2,000
Communist China
North Korean-Viet Minh
1,950
2,350
2,100
2,500
2,200
2,500
2,300
2,500
2,400
2,500
2,500
2,500
NOTES: Heavy-includes 85mm, 100mm, and 122mm AA guns
Light-37mm and 57mm automatic AA guns
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123. Probable Future Guided Missiles for Air
Defense. Characteristics of Soviet missiles
that could be available during the period of
this estimate are as follows:
127. We estimate that the cost of the esti-
mated air defense program of the Sino-Soviet
Bloc will be about 38 billion 1951 rubles for
1955 and about 86 billion 1951 rubles for 1960.
'Maximum altitude of the missile is limited by the combat ceiling of the parent aircraft available for
use during the period of this estimate.
124. We estimate that the USSR might have
more than 200 -surface-to-air missile sites in
1960.
125. Electronic Countermeasures. Soviet
countermeasures capabilities are already high
and will probably improve through 1960. We
estimate, for example, that by 1960 the USSR
can have jamming equipment in operational
use for frequency ranges up through 30,000
megacycles.
Economic Impact of Air Defense Program
.126. Cost of Air Defense 1955-1960. The cost
of the air defense program which we have esti-
mated the Sino-Soviet Bloc leaders will prob-
ably undertake during this period, has been
measured in aggregate terms. While we rec-
ognize that money calculations of Soviet pro-
duction costs and capabilities are only ap-
proximations, they do permit the establish-
ment of reasonable magnitudes with which to
weigh the economic significance of the pro-
gram. Such calculations also serve as an in-
dication of the priority and effort which would
be required and the possible effects on other
military and industrial programs.
Figure I shows how the total cost of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc air defense program is allocated
through time and by principal air defense
function. Of these totals, approximately 22
billion rubles in 1955 and 53 billion rubles in
1960 would be initial costs while the remainder
would be operating costs.
128. The impact of these costs may be illu-
strated as follows: if total Bloc military ex-
penditures conform to a previous estimate,13
the cost of this air defense program would rise
from about 22 percent of the total in 1955
to about 45 percent in 1960; expenditures
for other military programs would have
to decline accordingly. If, on the other
hand, expenditures for these other military
programs did not diminish, but instead rose
13 Military expenditures by the USSR during the
period 1955-1960 were estimated in NIE 11-3-55
"Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses
of Action through 1960," published 17 May 1955.
Since corresponding agreed estimates of the
military expenditures of other Bloc countries do
not exist, tentative estimates have been made
for the purposes of the above paragraph. Even
should such tentative estimates be proved to be
considerably in error the conclusions arrived at
would not be materially altered.
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SECRET 28
Billion
1951
Rubles
ESTIMATED SINO-SOVIET BLOC AIR DEFENSE PROGRAM
INITIAL AND OPERATING COST, 1954 TO 1960
SA Guided Missiles
Aircraft (incl. AAGM)
AA Artillery
Command and Warning
W f/r+!'~M
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at the rate previously estimated for total mil-
itary expenditures by the USSR alone (a 15
percent increase by 1960 over 1955), the re-
sult would be an increase of 40 percent in ab-
solute Bloc military expenditures over the
period. (See Figure 2)
129. The burden of the air defense program
would not fall equally upon all. countries of
the Bloc, however. Specialized industrial
equipment and trained manpower for the air
defense program would have to be provided
primarily by the USSR itself, with the assist-
ance of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and perhaps
East Germany and Hungary.
130. This air defense program would con-
stitute asubstantial but not impossible bur-
den upon the Bloc economy. We believe that
the cost would be such as to require either a
diversion of resources from other .military
uses, or an increase in the total military bud-
get such as would probably lead to some re-
duction in the rate of growth of the economy.
131. Electronic Equipment and Precision In-
struments. The electronics requirements for
the estimated air defense program are very
great. Taken together with other military
and essential civilian demands they would put
a serious strain on the Bloc electronics indus-
try. Estimates of future performance in this
industry are necessarily somewhat tenuous.
It appears highly likely, however, that the
Bloc could not carry out the estimated air
defense program without (a) diverting elec-
tronics equipment, from other military de-
mands or (b) expanding the electronic in-
dustry to the limits of feasibility. The latter
course would be the more difficult because the
rate at which military electronics production
facilities could be expanded might be less than
the rate applicable to the electronic industry
in general. We do not believe that fulfillment
of electronics requirements would offer such
an obstacle as to make the estimated air de-
fense program impossible;we are certain, how-
ever, that it would constitute a very formid-
able difficulty.
132. A further limitation in the air defense
program may well exist in the precision
mechanism sector in view of the tolerances
involved and the skilled labor required. For
example, the estimated number of gyroscopes
required for new equipment in 1953 was about
75,000 of which approximately 80 percent
were for aircraft use, and few of these gyro-
scopes were of the degree of precision and
miniaturization necessary for use in guided
missiles. By comparison the estimated air
defense program will continue to demand at
least as many gyroscopes for aircraft use and,
in addition, estimated air defense missile pro-
duction would require 4,300 gyros in 1954;
15,000 in 1955; 54,000 in 1957; and 270,000 in
1960.
133. Other Equipment. An examination of
Soviet Bloc industrial facilities available to
fulfill air defense procurement requirements
reveals no other apparent restrictions. Al-
though the total poundage of aircraft and
engines required to be produced for the esti-
mated program would increase substantially
by 1960, these demands are within the capaci-
ty of the industry. Similarly, the increase
in guided missile production required is prob-
ably within the present economic capacity of
the Bloc. For other air defense weapons, the
production increases required are considerably
less than for aircraft and guided missiles and
are well within the capacities of the present
armament industries. Under current circum-
stances of supply, basic materials required for
the air defense program are apparently not
a serious problem to the Bloc. Manpower
limitations seem unlikely to place any general
restrictions on the program, although some
qualitative problems might develop in the
precision engineering skills.
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RELATION BETWEEN SINO-SOVIET BLOC TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES
AND ESTIMATED COST OF AIR DEFENSE PROGRAM, 1955-1960
1/ 1960-A - If total military expenditures are held to levels previously estimated.
footnote to paragraph 125)
2/ 1960-8 - If cost of other military programs grows 15 percent from 1455 to 1960 and air
defense costs are added.
SECRET
Billion
1951
Rubles
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APPENDIX A
A PROBABLE SOVIET ESTIMATE OF
PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF US WEAPONS
Speed at
Combat Specified Combat Bombioad or
Ceiling Altitude Radii Warhead Wt.
B-36 40,000 350/35,000 3,600 10,000
B-47 40,000 450/35,000 1,700 10,000
B-52 47,000 500/40,000 3,000 10,000
B-57 46,000 500/18,000 1,000 5,000
B-66 43,000 500/40,000 1,200 10,000
Fighters
F-86 45,000 525/35,000 400 500
F-84 40,000 525/35,000 375 3,000
F-100 54,000 750/35,000 375 800
F-101 53,000 900/35,000 800 1,000
AD 30,000 300/17,500 1,000 3,000
AJ 30,000 400/35,000 750 10,000
A3D 45,000 500/43,000. 1,150 8,000
A4D 50,000 500/35,000 800 3,000
F3H 45,000 5'50/35,000 700 3,000
F4D 54,000 800/35,000 650 3,000
F9F-9 55,000 650/35,000 650 3,000
P2V low alt. 282/s.i. 1,200 8,000
Tactical SSGM
Short-Range SSGM 45,000
Air-to Surface 60,000
Speed in
Mach No.
3-4
0.9
2.5-3.0
Range
75-100
500-800 3,000
100 5,000
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Speed at
Combat Specified Combat Bombload or
Ceiling Altitude Radii Warhead Wt.
lOnly those weapons with higher performance than those for 1955 are shown.
2 Only those weapons with higher performance characteristics than those for 1957 are shown.
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APPENDIX B
Fagot
3,800
1,500
.... .
Fresco
6,100
7,000
5,900
Farmer
200
1,000
2,200
1957-Day
.....
.....
.....
1959-Day
.....
.....
.....
Total Day
10,100
9,500
8,100
A/W
1954 A/W (Fresco)
200
400
.....
1955 A/W (Flashlight)
100
600
2,500
1957 A/W
.....
.....
.....
1959 A/W
Total A/W
.....
300
....
1,000
.....
2,500
2,700
300
.....
3,600
4,200
2,900
600
1,800
2,600
.....
.....
600
6,900
6,300
6,100
3,400
2,900
1,800
400
1,600
2,500
.....
3,800
.....
4,500
500
4,800
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APPENDIX C
AIRCRAFT
1955
Rate of
climb at
sea level
Time to
altitude
Maximum
speed at 1
sea level
Combat
ceiling
Combat
radius
without
external
fuel
Combat
radius
with
external
fuel
FAGOT (RD~5)
(5,000 lb. thrust)
FAGOT (VK-1)
(ft/min)
8,300
10,000
(min/ft)
8.0/40,000
6.2/40,000
(kts)
564
580
(ft)
49,000
54,000
(nm)
240
225
(nm)
380
360
(6,000 lb. thrust)
FAGOT (VK-lA)
na
6.0/40,000
595
54,000
225
360
(7,000 lb. thrust)
FRESCO
12,200
6.0/40,000
622
56,000
190
na
(without after-burner)
(7,000 lb. thrust)
FRESCOZ
25;400
3.7/40,000
_634
58,000
na
na
(with after-burner)
a
(7,000 lb. thrust)
FARMER Q
33,400
2.7/40,000
645
58,200
325
na
Twin Jet
FLASHLIGHT
15,200
5.7/40,000
620
51,000
475
na
Twin Jet
1 At combat weight
2Includes use of afterburner for climb and combat
a 4.5 min. with external tanks
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SECRET
1957 1959 1957 1959
(New (New (New (New
Day) Day) AW) AW)
Time to climb
to 40,000 ft. (min) 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.0
Maximum speed-
sea level'
(knots)
Maximum speed'
40,000 ft.
(knots)
Maximum speeds
35,000 ft.
(knots)
Combat ceiling
(ft)
Combat radius
(nm) (with
external fuel)
Combat range
(nm) (with
external fuel)
400
400
400
400
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1It is estimated that these aircraft will be equip-
ped with the armament and fire control equip-
ment shown to the right:
a All speeds are with thrust augmentation.
Armament - 50 2" - 3" Rockets or
4 30mm guns of 1,000 RPM or
4 air-to-air guided missiles
Fire Control -range only radar with automatic
computer
Armament - 50 2" - 3" Rockets or
4 30mm guns of 1,000 RPM or
4 air-to-air guided missiles
Fire Control - AI radar with search range up
to 20nm. and lock on range up to 14nm.
Armament -same as for 1957 day and AW
fighters.
Fire Control - AI radar with search range up to
24nm. and lock on .range up to l6nm.
ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
1955
Estimated Performance of Operational Soviet AA Weapons
12.7mm MG
14.5mm MG
MV Rate of Est. eff.
ft/sec Fire (RPM) Proj Wgt (ibs) Ceiling (ft)
85mm M1939 2,625 15-20 20.2 25,000
85mm M1944 2,950 15-20 20.2 30,000
100mm M19491 3,200 25-30 35.0 35,000
122mm 3,300 10 55.0 40,000-45,000
37mm M1939 2,950 160-180 1.6 4,500
57mm M1950 3,000 130-150 6.6 15,000
3,500
2,900 550-600 .10 1,300
3,000 500 per barrel .15 1,500
ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OF ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY FIRE CONTROL EQUIPMENT
(estimated to appear in 1955)
Max track range (ydsJ
80,000
80,000
50,000
Max search range (yds.)
170,000
170,000
90,000
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SECRET 36
APPENDIX D
1. The calculation of costs of the air defense
program outlined in Section II of this esti-
mate includes all items which can be directly
charged to the Bloc air defense program over
the period of this estimate. In estimating the
cost of this complex air defense program, it
was necessary to distinguish between initial
costs and operating costs. Initial costs are
those that occur only once during the estab-
lishment of a program and include such items
as base facilities, major equipment, spares for
stocks and pipeline, initial training, and trans-
portation. Operating costs are those expend-
itures which recur regularly, representing the
consumption of fuel and maintenance spares,
the provision and support of personnel, and
the replacement of equipment. However,
three types of initial and operating costs were
specifically omitted from the calculation. The
first type includes costs incurred before 1955,
such as drone aircraft and some radar. The
second type includes costs incurred in provid-
ing facilities and services used for other pur-
poses as well as air defense, such as common-
use air bases and the superior command struc-
ture. Finally, certain costs of warheads were
not included because nuclear warhead costs
were not available.
2. In order to reflect changes in weapon sys-
tems and the composition and numbers of
operating units, cost data were organized and
summarized at the smallest practical opera-
tional military unit. For scheduling, we have
taken the number of units (i.e., missiles, AAA,
and aircraft) estimated to be deployed at mid-
year as the average number of units operating
in the air defense system for that year. It
is assumed that the initial costs were incurred
the year previous to .the first full operating
year. Initial costs of the units for each cate-
gory of major equipment and equipment
spares were estimated, giving consideration to
the lower costs associated with the volume of
production implied in this estimate. It was
assumed that trained operating units were the
goal of the program. As soon, therefore, as
sufficient major equipment became available
from production, an operating unit was sched-
uled for activation and provided with a com-
plete set of special and organizational equip-
ment, initial stocks, and personnel.
3. This activation schedule became the basis
of phasing the initial system costs into
a time pattern. The cumulative total of the
various types of units activated form the basis
for working up the operating costs. The op-
erating costs, reflecting the consumption of
fuels and spare parts, the maintenance of the
establishment and the replacement of major
equipment were then applied. During the
period of the estimate some primary operating
units will be deactivated. In such cases the
air defense system is credited for those items
that could properly be carried over to a new
unit provided with higher performance major
equipment.
4. The estimated initial costs of the program
from 1954 to 1960 are detailed in Table 1 by
sub-categories of programs and similar detail
is presented for estimated operating costs in
Table 2. It should be noted that the initial
costs exceed total operating costs. Because
the guided missile program must start from
a zero base there is a very large ratio of initial
to operating costs in the early years. The
ratio of other programs will vary from year
to year according to the quantity of initial
equipment introduced to the air defense pro-
gram.
5. In Table 3 the air defense program is re-
cast in terms of the economic sectors upon
which the program must impinge for the
satisfaction of its requirements. From the
standpoint of investment goods the important
item in the table is the amount of total in-
dustrial procurement which amounts to 21
billion rubles in 1955 and 69 billion rubles in
1960. Put another way, 21 of the currently
estimated 7E billion rubles of military indus-
trial goods procurement in 1955 is for the air
defense program. Asuming that the current
level of hard goods procurement for military
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programs other than air defense will not de- would have to increase 62 percent from 1955
cline in the aggregate over the period of this to 1960 to implement the required air defense
estimate, military hard goods procurement program.
Estimated Sino-Soviet 81oc Air Defense Program
Initial Cost, 1954 to 1960
Aircraft Program
6.25
6.64
10.67
11.06
14.57
15.73
18.71
Aircraft Armament Program
0.07
0.12
0.21
1.62
2.90
4.40
5.56
Spare Engine Program
1.75
1.91
3.31
4.00
4.57
4.39
5.10
Airfield Augmentation
3.00
4.58
4.58
3.81
3.05
3.05
2.29
Command and Control Program
0.21
0.05
0.03
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
Communication System
0.40
0.40_
0.40
0.40
0.40
0.40
0.40
Radar Program
1.80
2.00
2.49
1.47
0.74
0.74
0.49
Heavy Gun Program
1.29
2.40
2.40
2.43
1.35
1.35
0.00
Fire Control (Heavy Gun)
0.32
0.41
0.46
0.36
0.36
0.18
0.18
Light Gun Program
0.99
1.15
1.21
1.25
1.19
0.64
0.00
Fire Control (Light Gun)
0.00
0.36
0.72
1.08
1.44
1.53
1.44
SA Guided Missile Program
0.73
2.36
2.90
2.32
7.47
8.52
17.30
TOTAL
16.81
22.38
29.38
29.82
38.04
40.93
51.47
Estimated Sino-Soviet Bloc Air Defense Program
Operating Cost, 1954 to 1960
Aircraft Program
7.13
7.81
8.97
10.95
12.25
13.81
16.20
Aircraft Armament Program
0.11
0.12
0.13
0.16
0.77
1.89
3.63
Spare Engine Program
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Airfield Augmentation
0.00
0.18
0.27
0.55
0.78
0.96
1.14
Command and Control Program
'0.78
0.85
0.87 .
0.88
0.88
0.88
0.88
Communication System
0.02
0.02.
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.04
Radar Program
0.56
0.81
1.06
1.36
1.53
1.62
1.70
Heavy Gun Program
2.27
2.56
2.72
2.84
2.87
2.85
2.74
Fire Control (Heavy Gun)
0.12
0.17
0.23
0.30
0.34
0.38
0.38
Light Gun Program
2.46
2.52
2.69
2.82
2.91
2.88
3.02
Fire Control (Light Gun)
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.09
0.18
0.30
0.43
SA Guided Missile Program
0.00
0.15
0.65
1.26
1.95
2.98
3.95
TOTAL
13.45
15.19
17.65
21.24
24.49
28.59
34.11
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.Estimated Sino-Soviet Bloc Air Defense Procurement
by Sectors of Origin, 1954 to 1960
Aircraft and Engine Procurement
8.87
9.31
15.42
18.57
23.24
25.75
31.32
Guided Missile Procurement
0.23
0.81
1.15
2.52
6.70
9.78
16.40
Armament Procurement
2.17
3.21
3.43
3.67
3.00
2.76
1.24
Ammunition Procurement
0.31
0.42
0.55
0.63
0.71
0.65
0.58
Special Electronic Procurement)
2.49
4.07
5.32
5.38
7.23
8.59
11.93
Fabricated Metals, NEC
1.47
1.80
2.09
1.79
2.96
3.28
5.06
Fuels
1.39
1.63
1.83
2.00
2.28
2.52
2.84
Total Industrial Procurement 1
Construction and Construction Material
6.93 2
4.77
1.25
6.79
29.79
7.02
34.66
6.26
46.12
5.88
53.60
5.90
69.37
5.75
Transportation
0.40
0.56
0.67
0.78
1.06
1.22
1.55
Personnel and Services
5.98
6.53
6.83
7.10
7.25
6.70
6.79
Training
2.18
2.44
2.72
2.26
2.22
2.10
2.12
Total 3
0.26 3
7.57.
47.03
51.06
62.53
69.52
85.58
x Electronic procurement such as ground radar, AAA fire control, and ground
guidance equipment, which is not included in other procurement categories.
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