SOVIET OFFER OF AUSTRIA TREATY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A005300010028-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: April 20, 1955
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22: 0 w- 'l 1955'
CIA-RDP79R01012A005300010028-4
SOVIET OFFER OF AUSTRIA TREATY
I. Board of National Estimates believes
that new Soviet offer of peace treaty
to Austria is made in all seriousness.
A. Although USSR can always produce
last-minute gimmick, (tying treaty /
to German issue or seeking right
of post-treaty intervention), so
far indications are Kremlin intends
to go through with treaty.
II. If--as we expect--USSR does so, action
will be highly significant, and will
indicate a new flexibility in Soviet
policy following Stalin's death.
A. Would mark first substantial
Soviet concession in Europe
since end Worldock4EA44.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. /
CHANGED TO: TS S .
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS.
NEXT REVIEVV DATE C
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AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE:a6AA
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CIA-RDP79R01012A005300010028-4 always estimaied'
USSR position in Austria not
vital to Soviet, we have pre-
viously considered USSR would
tie settlement small Austrian
problem to larger one of Germany
(as Molotov said at Berlin).
B. Fact USSR now apparently willing
to reverse long-standing policy
procrastination, settle Austrian
treaty separately, indicates--in
our view--Soviet concern at recent
international developments.
1. Bohlen reports, after recent
talk with Bulganin, his impres-
sion of "greater degree of un-
certainty and even concern in
Soviet government it general
International situation."
?2?
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III. Causes of apparent Soviet policy rever-
sal many and complex, but chief among
them is probably Soviet concern over
situation created by ratification of
Paris accords.
A. Soviet are preoccupied with threat
of a rearmed, pro-Western Germany.
#
B. French ratification of accords
probably forced USSR to make move
on Austria, to restore maneuver-
ability on German question.
1. Kremlin must estimate that
reunification plus neutral-
ization, on Austrian model,
44AtK Pa OJER.F0t- APPE?41- A,.(? WI Lc-
wialpead-to Wrest German
pressure for postponement
rearmament while new nego-
tiations take place.
-3-
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z. uotc can sLiii play it both
ways: if Austrian move has
hoped-for repercussions on
German question, Kremlin can
go through with treaty; if it
fails, can renege at last
minute, blame West for failure.
C. We believe that threatening situa-
tion in Far East, together with
Soviet desire to reinforce neutral-
ist opposition to US Far East policy,
also a factor in USSR's Austrian
gambit.
1. Disagree, however, with Lippmann
view that Soviet desire to
neutralize and protect its
European rear in case of Far
East hostilities was dominant
Soviet motive.
-4-
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much, if not more, concerned over
European as over Far East problems.
D. Another factor in Austrian gambit many
have been Soviet desire to insure
Austrian neutralization.
1. Given likely Soviet suspicions that
US plans bases in Western Austria,
USSR may have been willing to pay
price for Swiss-type neutrality.
2. Perhaps Soviets are moving toward
broader buffer zone of neutral
states as counter to US "encircle-
ment."
IV. One major lesson to be learned from Austrian
settlement is new flexibility of Soviet
policy, an possiblity of further moves.
A. Austrian move may reflect uncertainty-,
of new Soviet leadership andl
its concern over recent trend of-cold
war.
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B. In background may be Soviet worry
Over nuclear arms race.
1. Despite Moscow's careful repudi-
ation of Malenkov remark that
World War III could mean end
of civilization, Mikoyan last
week told Austrian State Sec-
retary Kreisky that Soviet
development of nuclear weapons
had involved "frightful cost."
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