NOTES ON NIE 11-13-55 SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN THE LIGHT OF THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A005400050003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: NIE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP79R01012A005400050003s4 \T
Li?
,
Notes on N1E 11-13-65
SOVIET ?PAISIGN OLICT 111 THE LIG= OF THE SUILLIT 0 C
1. Nature of the New Soviet Behavior
A. Manifestations of the New Soviet Behavior
Pre-Genova-a
Austrian State Treaty
b. "Normalization' of Soviet-!ugoaiau telatiou6
Invitation to Adenauer to visit Ma ow and to dicu?a the
oatablivhiuent of diplomatic relations.
d. Soviet position on diarmatent in 10 May proposal, moved
closer to estern position.
c. Negotiations begun with Japan on a peace treaty,
Soviet propaganda output has been less hostile toward U.S.
since Geneva meeting
a. Attacks on U.N. policy and ares8ive1ose have vir u ly
diappoared from Soviet propaganda.
b. Tension-building propaganda to borne audience reduced.
Friendly attitude of Soviet offloials
4.Relaxation of controls on travel into and out of the U.S.S.R.
B. The new behavior will last as long as the Soviets ?estimate that
it i8 being successful in accomplishing the objectives it is intended to.
C. Chief MotivatiOns of the New Behavior
1. Harsh tactics were unuocessfu1 in preventing the strengthening
of the Wes defense and the adoption of a plan to rearm West Germany.
2. Soviets desire a period of relaxed tensions to strengthen industry
and agriculture and to improve their ni itary position vis-a-vis the West.
Also possibly to permit the U.S.S.R. to provide greater ?canonic assistanea
to the Chinese Communists.
3. Fear that continuation of cold war might degenerate into a hot
nuclear war in which the Soviet Union ould now be at a disadvantage.
D. Objectives of the Now Behavior--to obtain a relaxation of tensions*
in order to:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP79R01012A005400050003-6
rA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP79R01012A005400050003-6
ip e eye(
1. obtain a reduction of Western defense efforts, divide the Allied
powers, dissolve NATO, obtain the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe, and
delay and eventually block West German rearmament.
2. stabilize the situation in Europe while increasing Conuuniat ef-
forts in Southeast Asia, and the 1Oar and Middle East*
3* strengthen the Sino-Soviet Bloo econoui ally and militarily,
B. Soviet leaders may estimete that, without making any concessions,
their conciliatory behavior will be suffioient to achieve the imnediate ob-
jective of obtaining a relaxation of Western defense efforts. If the con..
ciliatory behavior by itself does not sustain the "spirit of Geneva", Moscow
may make concessions on some issues' Cultural end trade relations with the
West, disarmament, and peaoefUl uses of nuclear energy are areas in which
the U.S.S.R. could reach agreement with the West without being forced to
retreat from what the Soviets consider to be positions vital to their
urity.
An agreement to the unification of Germany on terms acceptable to the West,
however, would constitute a reversal of Soviet policy. It is unlikely that
Moscow is now prepared to alter its stead on German unity in order to sustain
an amicable atmosphere.
F. No contribution
O. The new behavior does not imply a fundarntal change in Soviet
policy. Rather it is a tactic designed to accomplish what the "hard" lint
failed to accomplish. This estimate is supported by the disparity between
Soviet actions in Western Europe and actions in the Near ind Middle East and
Southeast Asia* While working for a relexation of tensions in Europe (and
possibly the Fur East), a contrasting approach to Hear East and Southeast
Asia affairs is apparent* Moscow is exploiting differences between Near
East states and the West, especially those states that have opposed estern
efforts to erect a Middle East defense bloc. Moreover,the Laotian Communists
are engaged in military action against the Royal Laotian Government. A "soft"
line is being applied in one area while the usual "hard" line continues in
others. If a fundamental change in Soviet policy had occurred there would
not be this inconsisteacy*
Be e
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP79R01012A005400050003-6
AI&
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP79R01012A005400050003-6
YIP
Soviet Positions on Principal Issues
A man Unification
I. Present indications are that Soviets will not agroe to the
unification of Germany on terms acceptable to the Gest.
2. Soviets evidently envisage the existence of two
sorne (several) years,
3 U.S.S.R. will agree to the Unification of Gry on condition
that Germany is neutralized, HATO is dissolved?, and U.S.opswithdrama
frorn Europe.
D. European Security
1. Soviets hold that European Security pact mzst precede German
2. One aiEn of the Soviet proposal for a European Security pact
in to bring about the dissolution of NATO. Nevertheless, Mosoow may agree
to a security arrangement which would preserve aATO in its present forms
a. in order to provide evidence" of conciliation and to
sustain in the "spirit of Geneva
b. if both West and Fast Germany were parties to the pact.
3. Soviets, however, would not consider a security pact in which
ATO is preserved as meting their requirement that a European security pact
must precede German unification.
C. Disarmament suggest that before attempting to osimate Soviet
position on various aspects or disarnamcnt, we await dovelopxsute in U.U.
sub-committee
1 Soviets probably estimate that on diaa nt issue they can
demonstrate ocnoiliatory attitude and met Western requirements for an
adequate system of control and inspection without substantially impairing
their political oontrol or relative military strength*
D. Contacts between the U.S.S.R. and lest
1. Trade..-Soviots will probably push for increased trade with
the West and for a relaxation of C0001 controls,
2, Colommicatima-.1.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP79R01012A005400050003-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP79R01012A005400050003-6
IWP
44
3 Travel?Soviets currently are indicating B willingness?.if not
an oagerness-..to reduce somewhat the restrictiens on travel, of foreigners
entering the U.S.S.R. and of Soviet citizens visiting foreign countries.
This is an iasue which the Soviets can employ as evidence of conciliation
without impairing their strategic intermits
E. Other issue*
1* Although the agenda for the Four Power Conference of Foreign
Zinistors is established, Soviets may attempt to raise questions related
to Far East at Geneva in October, such as:
a, admission of Communist China to the 170.
b. discus non of the Formosan Straits issue
Effoot of Current Soviet Policy in Europe on ConunistPo1icy and Action
in the Far East and Vice-Vers
A. The U.S. historically has been tactically flexible and has
adapted its actions to the exigencies of various and varying situations*
Soviet loaders currently believe apparently that a conciliatory attitude
is required to aohiove a relaxation of tensions in Europe and thus a relaxation
of Western deibtu3e efforts. In contrast in the Soviet attempt to capitalize
on the instability existing in the Near and Middle Fast, Moscow is probably
pleased to aeo the pot boiling there and will probably covertly encourage
a continuation of differences and conflicts. Communist activity in Indochina
does not appear to have taken account of the atmosphere created at the Geneva
Conference. Thus, Lloscow apparently is fbllowing two lines, one for primary
areas such as Daropc and another for secondary areas where the risk of general
war is not as great and where its efforts in recent years have generally been
successful,
,56&re
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/21 : CIA-RDP79R01012A005400050003-6