NIE 22-54: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A005500010047-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: December 8, 1954
• Content Type: NIE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
8 December 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)
? Lt. Colonel Paul S. Reineche, USA (G-2)
? Captain B. E. Wiggin, USN (ONI)
Colonel William S. Boyd, USAF (AFOIN-2B2)
Colonel Floyd E, Dunn, USA (JIG)
SUBJECT FIE 22-54: Probable Developments in France
1. The attached terms of reference uero agreed on at
the meeting of the IAC representatives on Tuesday, 7 December.
2. All agencies are invited to contribute to any section
within their competence to do so.
3. It is requested that contributions be received in
this office by the close of business on "Wednesday, 5 January.
Distribution HP,
PAUL A. DOREL
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates
DOCUMENT NO.
D!,-IANGE IN CLASS.
0 DECL A SSIPIE 0
CLASS. CI-l'ANGED TO: TS S C
'NEXT REVILVV DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE:
REVIEWER.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
8 December 1954
SUBJECT: TERNS OF REFERENCE: NIE 22-54: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS
? IN FRANCE
THE PROBLEM
To assess the present situation and to estimate French domestic
developments and foreign policy oVer-thenext several years.
NIE 22-54 is designed to supersede NIE-63, 'France's probable
Future Role in the Western Security System" (23 January 1953), and
NIE-63/1, "Probable Short-Term Developments in French Policy" (1 De-
cember 1953). Portions of these appear still pertinent. However,
out requirements call for an assessment of France's position neither
as detailed as NIE-63 nor as specialized as NIE-63/1. We therefore
are not employing the usual revision procedure.
QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
I. WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR FRENCH RATIFICATION OF THE LONDON
AND PARIS ACCORDS? '
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Except as otherwisenoted, the following questions assume the
ratification of the London and Paris Accords.*
II. POLITICAL TRENDS
A. Is the Mendes-France "experiment" the beginning of a major
overhauling of the Fourth Republic, or is it a temporary
aberration in a continuing 'series. of weak postwar coali-
tions? Has Mendes-France adquired strong popular fol-
lowing? What effect has he had on the strength and policies
of the non-Communist parties? How long is he likely to
retain in office? What governments are likely 'to succeed
him prior to the 1956 elections? What are the prospects
for a true left-center coaliton? For a "popular front" govern-
ment either supported by or including the Communists?
B. What is the likely outcome of the 1956 elections? What
electoral procedures will be used? Is further Gaullist
disintegration likely? What political groups are likely ?
The D/I, USAF representative favors the elimination of this as-
sumption in order that the consequences of French acceptance or
non-acceptance of the Paris agreements may be fully examined in
all facets of French foreign policy, military trends, etc. The
consequences of French nonacceptance should not be assumed out
of this stage in the development of this estimate.
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to benefit most from a further disintegration of the
Gaullists? Will the "Classical Right" move further to-
ward the right? What are Communist prospects in the
elections? What are the prospects of the MRP? Of the
Socialists?
C. In general, what is the likely character of French govern-
ments in the post-election periOd?- What is the prospect for
stable government? Is continuation of some form of center
coalition most probable? What are the prospects for an ex-
tremist government? For either a Communist or rightist coup?
D. What are the prospects for constitutional reforms?
III. TRENDS IN COMMUNIST STRENGTH
A. What are the probable trends in Communist strength over the
next several years? What capabilities will the Communists
be able to exercise? Will they increase their predominance
in the trade union movement? Will they have greater success
in organizing strikes? Are they likely to make gains in poli-
tical respectability? What are their likely policies toward
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North Africa and Indochina? What effects will those parties
policies have on their domestic position andobjectives?
B. What are the implications of the Dides affair? What
steps will French governments take te combat Communist
internal influence and subversion over the next several
years? What elements in France ,favor such anti-Communist
measures? How successful would such actions be?
IV. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TRENDS
A. What are the reasons for France's present improved economic
position? To what degree are they of uncertain duration?
What is the role of US aid, both direct and indirect? What
is the extent and importance of French economic interests
abroad, especially in North Africa and Indochina? What is
the effect of French control of the Saar?
B. What have been the effects of the Mendes-France economic
policies thus far? In what respects do these policies dif-
fer from those of previous governments? Are there substantial
differences between the views of Mendes-France and Fare? How
L.
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far is Mendes-France likely to get with his economic program?
Are successor governments likely to continue the reformist
trend?
C. Assuming continued center governments, what are France's
economic prospects over the next several years? Probable
rate of economic growth? What is the likelihood of sub-
stantial modernization of the. econOmy? Of a more equitable
distribution of the national income?' What are probable
foreign trade policies? What are the prospects for devalu-
ation? What is the outlook for substantial reduction of.
budgetary deficits? What relative budgetary provisions are
likely to be made for military expenditures, investment,
social services, etc.?
D. What has been the effect of the present government's actions
on French social groups? What are the prospects for the
working class gaining a larger share of the national income?
What are prospects for a more rational distribution of the
tax burden? What is the likely trend in trade union strength
and influence? What are the prospects for labor unrest sub-
stantial enough to disrupt the balance of social forces?
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V. TRENDS IN MILITARY STRENGTH
A. In general, what are the present levels, effectiveness, and
deployment of French military forces? What proportion of
forces is derived from overseas manpower (including Algerians)?
What are, and what will be the effects of the Indochina and
North African situations on the French military posture? What
is the extent of Communist infiltration of French forces?
B. In view of declining defense exPenditures, what are likely
developments with respect to the size, effectiveness, and
deployment of French military forces? Is France likely to
fulfill its NATO commitments through 1957? Are French contri-
butions to NATO likely to be reduced substantially below
present goals? What plans exist for utilizing France's
trained reserves? What is the outlook with respect to French
military research and development? What are the prospects for
France increasing ite nuclear weapons capabilities?
VI. PROBABLE TRENDS IN FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY
A. Probable Trends in French Attitudes and Morale
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1. What is the prevailing French view of the world situation
and of France's role in it? What do the French regard as
their potential for protecting and improving France's power
status? To what extent is nationalism in France likely to
be a major force in French attitudes?
2. How might a prolonged period o' reduced tensions affect
French attitudes and policies? Under what circumstances
night neutralist sentiment increase?
3. What is the likely impact on French attitudes and policies
of the continued growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities
(including potential missile delivery)? Will it diminish
French.willinEness to support the US in meeting cold war
threats?
4. In view of the above, what are probable trends in French
morale and will-to-fight in event of war?
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B. French Attitude toward the Atlantic Alliance
1. What are French attitudes toward the US and the
UK? What relative emphasis do the French give
their relations with each? To what degree and in
which areas do the French regard theBritish
alliance as a counterweight to US influence?
2. Will France continue to regard the Atlantic alliance
as fundamental to its .security and tower status?
Will it seek to strengthen NATO activities? Are the
French likely to regardNATO as a brake on US policy?
Under what circumstances might France change its
attitude toward US bases and facilities on its
territory? Toward NATO membership itself?
C. French Policy-toward Germany
1. How acute are French fears of a revived Germany --
divided or reunified -- and how do they affect
French policies? Do the French fear Germany more.
than the USSR, both in the short and longer term?
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2. What is likely French policy toward West Germany
following its entry into NATO and WEU? Will the
French seek to use those organizations to prevent
further expansion of West German power end influence?
HOW far will France be willing to-go toward improving
Franco-German relations? Will the Saar continue to be
a serious source of friCtiOn? What would be the French
attitude toward an attempt by West Germany to use its
new status for negotiations -On reunification? Will
german membership in NATO stimulate France to make
a larger defense contribution?
3. What would be French policy toward West German
sovereignty arid rearmament if the Paris Agreements
were rejected by the French Parliament? If rejected
by the West German Parliament?
D. Policy toward the USSR
What is the likely course of French policy toward
the USSR? What is the likelihood that France would
press for a four-power conference on terms unacceptable
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to the US and UK? In the event of a conference,
would France be likely to accept Soviet proposals
which were rejected by the US and the UK? What
are the chances that France might- seek a bilateral
accommodation with the Soviet Bloc?
E. Attitude toward Western 8urOpean Integration
Will French nationalisMiand EUrOpean supranational
institutions prove incompatible over the next
several years? Whet will be France's attitude
toward further integration? :Toward existing institutions,
such as the CSC? What will be the French view of WEU
as a possible instrument of integration?
F. Policies toward French overseas Territories
What is the attitude of the French toward their
overseas possessions and interests? What role
do the French assign those possessions in
support of the metropole? What plans exist
for implementing that role?
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1. Policy toward North Africa. What would be the
effect of continuing Algerian disturbances on
French policy? What are the prospects for
successful Franco-Tunisian negotiations? What
actions are the French likely to take to resolve
the Moroccan problem?' What is the likely character
of French relations With the Arab States? Under what
circumstances might France change its attitude toward
US bases and facilities?
2. Policy toward Indochina. What will be the
dominant French military, economic, political,
and cultural objectives in Indochina through
1956? In the longer term? Under what cir-
cumstances would the French cooperate whole-
heartedly with the US in Indochina? Under
what circumstances would they take actions
contrary to US policy? Under what conditions
might they seek to relieve themselves of respon-
sibility and pull out of Indochina?
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VII PROSPECTS FOR A REDRESSEMENT IN FRANCE
In the light of I-V above, what are the prospects fora
domestic redressement in France? For a revision of Social and
economic attitudes and institutions 'which will permit modernization
of the economy and a stronger political and social framework to
emerge? Or is France likely tO:reimin for the foreseeable future
one of the chief "problem areas" of' Western Europe?
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