NIE 31-5

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A005600040012-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: January 14, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

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Office Memorandum
TO
THRU
FROM
* UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
' Deputy Asst. Director for National Estimates
:/)Assistant Director for Operations
: Chief, FBID/00
SUBJECT: WEE 31-5
DATE: 14 January 1955
Attached review of propaganda bearing on Yugoslav relations
with the Soviet Bloc was prepared in support of subject estimate.
Enclosure:
"Yugoslav-Soviet Relations in
Radio Propaganda"
CC: AD/CI
STAT
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CONFIDENTIAL
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YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELPLT IONS IN RADIO PROPAGANDA
1. Since Soviet and Satellite media completed at the end of last sum-
mer the progressive elimination of anti-Yugoslav propaganda from
their output they have begun to use a moderate amount of material
favorable to Yugoslavia, reporting items of economic and cultural
-progress and exploiting Yugoslav leader& statements which coin-
cide with Soviet policies. Broadcasts repeat Saburovis 7 Novem-
ber assertion that Yugoslav-Soviet estrangement was advantageous
`only to the enemies of both countries?the enemies of peace. The
Soviet radio has forborne to exploit a rich source of anti-Western
material, the Djilas-Dedijer case, in its effort to avoid intrusion
into Yugoslav internal affairs.
2. The initially skeptical Yugoslav reaction to these overtures re-
mains cautious, but has come to the point of recognizing the "good
will" behind the "constructive proposal" of Saburovis 7 November
speech. The Belgrade radio now rarely criticizes Soviet policy
without adding compensatory criticism of the West, and does not
feel obliged so to compensate for critical comment on Western
policies. Tito's own speeches insist that Yugoslavia is only
accepting Soviet initiative toward improving relations and has
no intention of joining either camp.
00/FBID
13 January 1955
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CONFIDENTIAL LI
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YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATION.5 IN PADIO PROPACANDA
A. Bloc Overtures
1. The October Revolution speech of Soviet Deputy Premier M. Z. Saburov,
which made a frank bid for closer ties with Yugoslavia and boldly iden-
tified Soviet and Yugoslav interests, represents the upper limit ,
reached to date in Bloc propaganda for friendlier relations with Yugo-
slavia. A change in Bloc propaganda on Yugoslavia had been perceptible
as early as mid-1953 in the moderation end finally the cessation of
attacks on Tito personally and in the softening of the hostile tone
characteristic of Bloc comment Since the break. By August 1954, Mos-
cow had reached the point of limiting its broadcasts on the signing
of the Balkan Pact--sharply condemned earlier in the year--to a few
factual reporta, scrupulously Avoiding criticism of Yugoslavia. The
Yugoslays, in turn have officially confirmed that the anti-Yugoslav
campaign in East Europe has ended. (Bebler, 29 December 1954).
2. A more positive phase in the new Bloc treatment of Yugoslavia com-
menced in the fall of 1954 and was highlighted by Moscow's coverage
of Tito's speech at Ostrozno (19 September), the first favorable
treatment of a Yugoslav leader's speech since the break. Since Moscow
had passed up earlier opportunities to exploit the Yugoslav position
on foreign affairs, the treatment of the Ostrozno speech represented
a new development in Soviet policy rather than merely the expedient '
use of material from any source to support the Soviet European secu-
rity proposals. The portions of Tito's speech publicized by Moscow
made it appear that the Yugoslav President's remarks were in harmony
with the Soviet position. Caution was manifest, however,?in that
Bloc broadcasts made no independent comment on the speech. Treatment
of the Ostrozno speech laid down the pattern for subsequent handling
of Yugoslav statements on foreign affairs. At the same time Bloc
radios began reporting favorable items on Yugoslav economic and cul-
tural affairs to domestic audiences and derogatory references were
completely avoided.
3. Bloc propaganda has not gone beyond the line laid down in Saburov's
October Revolution speech, but his remarks have been incorporated in
subsequent broadcasts. A Kraminov PRAVDA article on the Yugoslav
Day of the Republic (broadcast 29 November), for example, repeated
Saburov's assertion that Yugoslav-Soviet estrangement was advanta-
geous only to the enemies of both countries--the enemies of peace.
In addition to utilizing 'Yugoslav statements as propaganda support
for the Soviet position, Moscow continues to concentrate in broadcasts
to Yugoslavia a disproportionate amount of European security propa-
ganda stressing the dangers of German militarism and extolling the
Soviet proposals. During the first three quarters of 1954 the Yugo-
slays and the more directly affected West European audiences as a .
whole each heard one-third more Soviet commentaries on European secu-
rity than on all other topics. Reminders to the Yugoslays of their
fate in two world wars against the Germans were reiterated in the
Soviet note replying to the Yugoslav rejection of its invitation to
attend the Moscow conference.
CONFIDENTIAL
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COIVIDENTIAL
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4. Neither Moscow nor the Satellites took note of the initial stages of
the Djilas controversy in Yugoslavia in the winter of 1953. Mbacow's
Home Service news programs have reported recent developments,in the
Djilas-Dedijer affair, but without comment. Moscow has carried a fac-
tual report of Dedijer's expulsion froM office and a French press
agency version of the Djilas interview in the NEW YORK TIMES (includ-
ing his criticism of the Yugoslav system); and a TASS account noted,
without amplification, that Djilas and Dedijer had been charged with
offering their services to "hostile foreign powers." Home Service
excerpts of Kardelj's speech at the Bosnian Congress, the first cpeech
by a Yugoslav leader other than Tito to be noted, include a brief ac-
count of his sharp criticism of Djilas and Dedijer but focus pri-
marily on his advocacy of coexistence and normalized relations with the
Bloc. Satellite transmitters have followed Moscow's lead in reporting
on the case without comment. The Bloc's effort to avoid the appearance
of interference in Yugoslav internal affairs is partieularly striking
in this case, inasmuch as Yugoslav commen'6 on the case provides ample
anti-Western material for Soviet exploitation.
A. yugoslav Reqctions
1. Belgrade's reaction to Soviet overtures remains cautious, but Yugoslav
propaganda has become progressively leas critical in comments on the
USSR, since Tito's Ostrozno speech. Initially, Yugoslav comment on Bloc
bids for normalization of relations stressed the inadequacy of words
as a substitute for deeds. Belgrade summarily dismissed Satellite
radio overtures as late as the spring of 1954 as empty phrases which
required the backing of tangible demonstrations of good will. Such
statements have now been eliminated from Yugoslav media.
2. Belgrade reported Moscow's approval of Tito's Ostrozno speech as a
victory and a justification of Yugoslav policy, but questioned Soviet
motives. One Belgrade broadcast said the Soviets "unrealistically"
thought to exploit the speech. Belgrade also presented the passage
in Saburov's speech as a vindication of Yugoslav policy and in addi-
tion saw, "good will" in what it termed Saburov's "constructive pro-
posal." Radio Zagreb, however, commented that "the Soviet leader ap-
pears to have rather freely bracketed the enemies of the Soviet Union
with those of Yugoslavia."
3. Belgrade continues occasionally to broadcast critical analysis of the
Bloc system to its domestic audience but the comment has been less bit-
ter and more infrequent than during the Stalin era. In broadcasts to
the USSR and Satellites criticism of internal Bloc affairs and intra-
Bloc relations has virtually disappeared, although Belgrade continues
to affirm the correctness of the Yugoslav position. In comment on
international relations, the Yugoslays now rarely criticize aspects
of Soviet policy without adding compensatory criticism of the West,
a delicacy not equally manifest in their treatment of the foreign poli-
cies of Western powers. Belgrade repeatedly criticizes the West's
policy of "bloc" formation, its stress on strictly military West Euro-
pean. unification, U.S. policy on admission of China to the United Na-
tions and on Formosa, and Western failure to see anything new in Soviet
policy.
CONFIDENTIAL
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4. Belgrade continues to deplore the lack of trust between Washington and
Moscow and welcomes what it calls evidences of the "narrowing" of the
gap between East and West. It expressed satisfaction with "the en-
couraging signs" it found in NAlenkov's New Year interview and criti-
cized Washington for saying there is nothing new in the Soviet Pre-
mier's statement. "Not only do they refuse to accept the tolerant
tone which permeates Malenkov's statement, but they persist in their
old ways," one broadcast said, citing a UP report on U.S. bases in
Spain. Yugoslav comment similarly saw in President Eisenhower7s State
of the Union message an expression of faith in the possibility of
peaceful coexistence and criticized Moscow's "completely negative"
reaction to the speech, but took the occasion to recall U.S. reaction
to the Nalenkov statement.
5. The Djilas-Dedijer case has occasioned the strongest Yugoslav criti-
cism of the West in recent months. Belgrade castigates the Western
press both for its involvement in the case and for its treatment of
it. Djilas and Dedijer are charged with collaborating with "certain
Western circles" in order to damage Yugoslav prestige abroad at pre-
cisely the time of Tito's visit to India and Burma. This charge has
been broadened to the assertion that it is all part of a plot to drive
Yugoslavia into one bloc or another, suggesting that Djilas and Dedijer
and perhaps other elements in Yugoslavia oppose Belgrade's reception
of Soviet overtures.
6. Tito's speeches touching on Soviet-Yugoslav relations have been more
pointed than routine Yugoslav propaganda in several respects:
a. He has repeatedly emphasized that the initiative for normalization
came from Moscow and has cited this as proof of Stalin's wrong
policy and as a vindication of Yugoslavia in connection with the
1948 break. Addressing the Indian Parliament, he said that the
present Soviet leadership has admitted that Yugoslavia had been
wrongly treated and condemned in 1948. Tito said that such admis-
sions and others "which will one day be known" have contributed to
improving relations. In a shouting speech at Koper. (21 November)
he said the Soviet leaders "are now saying this themselves, though
not in sufficiently clear terms, yet clearly enough for those who
know something of these things to see who was responsible."
b. Tito has insisted that the improvement of relations with the USSR
is the result of a change in the domestic and foreign policy "which
is being brought about by the present leaders of the Soviet Union."
He has said, however, that Soviet leaders are themselves unwilling
to admit that change "despite the fact that this could, in my
opinion, be only to their benefit."
c. It is significant that Tito stated these views before the Indian
Parliament. He is apparently anxious to convince the non-Communist
world that the Soviet-Yugoslav normalization has not come about
through any change in Yugoslav policy. He has given repeated as-
surances that normalization of relations with the Bloc would not
affect Yugoslavia's friendly relations with the West and has on
several occasions expressed his appreciation of Western aid during
difficult times.
CONFIDENTIAL
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d. At the same time, Tito has sharply criticized those who see nothing
but traps in the Soviet bids and has given his assurance that Yugo-
slavia knows how "to distinguish between .:a maneuver and a positive
stepi" Tito has gone further than routine Yugoslav propaganda in
his suggestion that Belgrade would be willing to cooperate with the
Soviets not only economically but, "where necessary, politically--
when we see it is correct to do so."
6. At Koper (21 November) Tito set the following limits to Yugo-
slavia's relations with both East and West:
Accordingly, those in the West...who do not like us as a
socialist country must be aware once and for all that the
illusion is futile that one day we may renounce socialism
and join some capitalist camp. There can be.no question
of thia. On the other hand, it must be clear to the Ehst-
ern hide that we have no intention of returning to the
potation which we were in until 1948, or rather that posi-
tion in which they wanted us to be.... There is no question
of that.
CONFIDENTIAL
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