PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM TO JULY 1956

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A005900050001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 19, 1955
• Content Type: NIE

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CONFIDENTIAL N I E 63.1-55
19 July 1955
SECRET
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 63.1-55
(Supersedes Portions of NIE 63-7-54 on North Vietnam)
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN
NORTH VIETNAM TO JULY 1956
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 19 July 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intel-
ligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy
Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant to
the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the
subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONFIDENTIAL
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
TO JULY 1956
(Supersedes Portions of NIE 63-7-54 on North Vietnam)
THE 'PROBLEM.
To analyze the present strengths and weaknesses of North Vietnam and to esti-
mate probable future developments and trends to July 1956.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The immediate concern of the "Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam" (DRV) is to
consolidate its control in the area north
of the 17th Parallel and to gain control
of South Vietnam. (Para. 14) ?
2. We believe that the DRV will experi-
ence no great difficulty in maintaining
effective control of North Vietnam during
the period of this estimate and will prob-
ably retain a considerable measure of
prestige and general acceptance. How-
ever, passive resistance and discontent
resulting , from harsh control measures
and poor economic conditions may in-
crease toward the end of the period. If
the situation in the South does not de-
teriorate, the nationalist appeal of Ho Chi
Minh and the DRV will probably be re-
duced throughout Vietnam. (Para. 23)
3. The DRV is confronted by serious eco-
nomic problems of which the current rice
shortage is the most critical. Its present
export potential falls far short of pro-
viding sufficient funds to pay for neces-
sary imports. However, the Sino-Soviet
Bloc will almost certainly provide suffi-
cient economic and technical assistance
to meet minimum requirements for sta-
bility and control. With such assistance
the DRV will probably make gradual
progress in gaining control of the econ-
omy. and in rehabilitating transporta-
tion, irrigation, and industrial facilities.
? (Paras. 24-30)
4. Since the Geneva Conference, the
strength of the DRV regular army has
been increased substantially by drawing
on regional forces to form new units and
by the receipt of new and heavier mili-
tary equipment from Communist China.
DRV forces are capable of defeating all
military forces, including the 'French,
now located in South Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia. (Paras. 31-35)
5. The present DRV tactic with respect
to South Vietnam is to pose as the
champion of Vietnamese independence
and unification, and as the defender of
weiteop--.
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the provisions of the Geneva Agreement.'
The DRV probably still believes that it
could emerge from free nationwide elec-
tions with control of all Vietnam. It will
attempt to 'appear reasonable in any ne-
gotiations concerning procedures for elec-
tions. While the Communists almost
certainly would not agree to complex and
elaborate safeguards and guarantees,
they probably would agree to some form
of "neutral" (but not UN) supervision.
They would probably estimate that such
election controls would work to their ad-
vantage in the South and, as manipu-
lated, would not adversely affect their
position in the North. (Paras. 44-45)
6. In the meantime, the DRV will con-
tinue its efforts, through subversion, in-
timidation, and propaganda, to weaken
the Diem government, and to bring to
power in the South men prepared to ac-
cept a coalition with the DRV. (Para.
46)
7. The Communists in their propaganda
have revealed sensitivity to the implica-
tion of the Manila Pact which incorpo-
rated Vietnam, Cambodia, ,and Laos in its
area of protection. We believe that con-
cern for Western, and particularly US re-
actions, together with general considera-
tions arising from over-all Bloc policy,
will prevent the DRV from openly in-
vading the South during the period of
this estimate. Similarly, the resumption
of widespread guerrilla activities appears
unlikely prior to the election deadline,
unless the DRV should come to the con-
clusion that South Vietnam can be won
For an estimate of probable developments in
South Vietnam, see NIE 63.1-3-55, "Probable
Developments in South Vietnam Through July
1956," to be published in August 1955.
only by force. Such a conclusion would
become more likely should the Diem gov-
ernment persist in refusing to enter the
election discussions, should election dis-
cussions not proceed favorably for the
DRV, or should the Diem government
succeed, with US assistance, in consoli-
dating its strength to the point of be-
coming a nationalist alternative to the
Ho regime. Moreover, if during the
period of this estimate little progress is
made towards relaxing tensions, Peiping
and Moscow might permit the DRV
greater freedom of action. Should the
DRV decide to use force short of open
invasion, it would probably attempt to
undermine the Saigon government by
initiating a campaign of sabotage and
terror, seeking to formation of a new gov-
ernment more amenable to demands for
a national coalition. These tactics are
likely to include the activation of DRV
guerrilla units now in South Vietnam and
their reinforcement by the infiltration in
small units of regulars from the North.
(Para. 47)
8. The DRV will probably refrain from
launching an attack with its own forces
to seize Laos during the period of this
estimate.' It will probably continue ef-
forts to convince the Royal Laotian gov-
ernment of the propriety of the DRV
attitude toward Laos, while covertly
strengthening the rebel Pathet Lao move-
ment. The DRV would probably infil-
trate armed units into Laos to assist the
Pathet Lao if Royal government military
action should seriously threaten the
oran estimate of probable developments in
Laos, see NIE 63.3-55, "Probable Developments
in Laos Through July 1956," to be published in
July 1955.
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Pathet Lao position in the northern prov-
inces. (Paras. 48-49)
9. The Communists now have few assets
in Cambodia and will probably be unable
to develop a significant internal threat in
that country until their position is great-
ly strengthened in Laos or South Viet-
nam.' In the meantime, the DRV will
probably continue its efforts to promote
3
friendly relations and to secure Cambodia
neutrality. (Para. 50)
10. We believe the DRV will- be willing to
continue political and economic contacts
with the French. However, it almost
certainly will be unwilling to make any
agreement which in fact would permit
the French to retain an economic and cul-
tural position in North Vietnam. (Paras.
51-56)
DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
11. Under the terms of the Geneva Accords,
and with the final withdrawal of French forces
from the Haiphong area on 18 May 1955, a
Communist regime known as the "Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam" (DRV) has as-
sumed full responsibility for the administra-
tion of the territory of Vietnam north of the
17th Parallel, pending a political settlement
and the unification of the country.
12. The DRV, known also as. the Viet Minh,
was established at the end of the Second World
War when a coalition of Vietnamese of all
political leanings drew together under the
leadership of the veteran Communist, Ho Chi
Minh, and proclaimed Vietnamese independ-
ence. The DRV openly and frequently pro-
fessed its solidarity with the Sino-Soviet Bloc
after 1949. Since then any loss by the DRV of
its Vietnamese support has been offset by a
considerable increase in organizational and
material strength and by the prestige of vic-
tories over French forces.
13. Although the recent assumption of re-
sponsibility over 13 million people and several
large cities has confronted the ?DRV with
major problems, thee problems are not en-
tirely new or unrelated to previous DRV ex-
perience. During its years of resistance,
which was conducted until 1950 with little or
'For an estimate of probable developments in
Cambodia, see NIE 63.2-55, "Probable Develop-
ments in Cambodia Through July 1956," to be
published in August 1955.
no external assistance and under conditions
of severe physical hardship and austerity, the
DRV leadership was able to weed out the weak
and timid, build an effective army, train a sub-
stantial number of experienced cadres and
local administators, and obtain considerable
experience in the techniques of political con-
trol. Thus, when the DRV assumed control
of all North' Vietnam in 1954, it possessed con-
siderable advantages over the Diem govern-
ment in terms of military strength and ex-
perience, organization and sense of unity and
purpose. ,
14. While the immediate concern of the DRV
is to consolidate its control in the North and to
gain control of South Vietnam, its longer run
objectives almost certainly are to build a
strong Communist state in all Vietnam and to
assist in the extension of Communist control
throughout Southeast Asia.
II. INTERNAL SITUATION AND TRENDS
Stability and Effectiveness of the Regime
15. The DRV is organized on the normal pat-
tern of all Communist "peoples democracies."
Although the government of the DRV ostensi-
bly represents all elements in a "united front"
grouping (the Lien Viet) , actual power resides
in the Communist party (the Lao Dong or
Workers Party) . Out of a total population in
North Vietnam of some 13 million, the Lien
Viet is estimated to have approximately 8 mil-
lion members, including the Lao Dong, which
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claims a membership of approximately one
million.
16. The regime is undergoing many admin-
istrative modifications in order to cope with
the changed situation resulting from the end-
ing of the war. The clandestine shadow gov-
ernment in the Red River delta region, whose
organization was probably begun in1946 fol-
lowing the collapse of French-Viet Minh ne-
gotiations, is being converted into a normal
bureaucracy with overt lines of authority and
channels of communication. Although still
rather primitive in a technological sense, the
government appears effective. Its operations
are characterized by close copying of typical
Communist planning and organization.
DRV Leadership
17. The DRV owes its success to date in large
measure to a cohesive, adaptable, and skilled
leadership possessing long experience in the
Communist movement and to the prestige
acquired in its early years as the focus of the
anticolonialist struggle. The greatest de-
ficiencies in the leadership, as in the popula-
tion at large, are in technological and manage-
ment skills.
18. Ho Chi Minh, President of the DRV, is
probably the ultimate authority within the re-
gime. No other Vietnamese currently pos-
sesses his great popular appeal among the
Vietnamese as the symbol of nationalism. He
also has considerable prestige in Asia and long
years of contact with European as well as
Asian Communist movements. The other
principal DRV leaders appear to be: Vo
Nguyen Giap, the capable Commander-in-
Chief of the "Vietnam People's Army," ap-
parently second to Ho Chi Minh in national
popularity; Truong Chinh, party secretary-
general, leading theoretician, and probably
second to Ho in the party hierarchy; and
Pham Van Dong, DRV Vice-President and
Foreign Minister. All of these individuals are
members of the Central Committee of the Lao
Dong Party.
19. There is no reliable evidence of factional-
ism at present. However, "normal" competi-
tion for personal power is almost certainly
present within the top leadership and there
exists a potential for disputes over such mat-
ters as internal domestic policy, courses of
action with respect to South Vietnam, and re-
lations with Communist China. The DRV
leadership , will probably remain unified
throughout the period of this estimate.
Control Policies and Popular Appeal
20. Since the Geneva Conference the regime
has been generally successful in imposing its
authority throughout North Vietnam. It has
employed well-known Communist control
methods, including secret police operations,
"peoples courts," and large-scale indoctrina-
tion. DRV armed forces are far larger than
necessary to maintain order and they are sup-
plemented by experienced internal security
and intelligence organizations.
21. Extension of the DRV's control has prob-
ably been facilitated by the prestige and pop-
ular support which accrued to the regime from
its victories over the French and by its prom-
ises of an improved life for the people in the
future. The flight of over 600,000 civilians
? mainly Roman Catholics ? to the south
removed a large portion of those people most
inclined to resist Communist indoctrination.
Despite shortages of food and consumer goods,
the general attitude among the population is
probably one of relief that the war is over and
of passive acceptance of stern DRV control as
the normal pattern of existence.
22. However, the regime will probably face dif-
ficulties in obtaining the cooperation of some
segments of the population. The remaining
Catholic population of approximately 1,000,-
000 may resist DRV efforts to "nationalize"
the church. The substantial ethnic minor-
ities, who live outside the river deltas, have an
ingrained dislike for all Vietnamese. In ad-
dition, landlords and merchants resent the
Communist regime.
23. Nevertheless, we believe that the regime
will experience no great difficulty in maintain-
ing effective control in North Vietnam during
the period of the estimate, and will probably
retain a considerable measure of prestige and
general acceptance. Although the DRV will
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use harsh measures where necessary, it will
probably place emphasis on subtle and widely
advertised appeals for public support through
the activities of the National United Front,
"patriotic" religious conferences, "autono-
mous area" governments, and other programs
composed primarily of nationalist slogans
and appeals. However, passive resistance and
discontent due to harsh control measures and
poor economic conditions may increase toward
the end of the period. Providing the situation
in the South has not deteriorated, the Na-
tionalist appeal of Ho Chi Minh and the DRV
will probably be reduced throughout Vietnam.
Economic Policies and Courses of Action
24. The DRV is confronted by serious eco-
nomic problems of which the current rice
shortage is the most critical. Prior to 1954,
the annual rice deficit of North Vietnam aver-
aged about 200,000 metric tons. As a result
of serious crop failures the shortfall of rice
in the crop year 1954-1955 increased to an
estimated 700,000 metric tons. The DRV has
obtained only a few small shipments of rice
from South Vietnam, formerly its principal
source of supplementary supply, and at least
10,000 tons from Communist China. Despite
rationing and other control measures, rice
prices in Hanoi have doubled since the Com-
munist occupation, and current reserves are
low. Since the spring harvest appears to have
been poor, a large portion of the population
in North Vietnam may face conditions ap-
proaching famine this summer and fall unless
substantial quantities of rice are imported.
25. The DRV must also deal with a deficit in
its balance of payments position, a situation
which has been chronic to the North Vietnam
area. The regime must import substantial
quantities of textiles, capital goods, military
equipment, and petroleum. Supplies of local-
ly manufactured goods will probably be less
than in 1954 because the regime lacks trained
manpower to operate efficiently the textile
mills at Nam Dinh and Haiphong, the cement
plant at Haiphong, and other enterprises for-
merly operated by the French. In view of re-
habilitation requirements import needs are
unlikely to be less than before the Geneva
5
Agreements when annual imports into the
area now held by the Communists totaled
about US $100,000,000. The DRV, however,
is incapable of financing large-scale imports
from its own resources. Maximum exports ?
including possible 500,000 metric tons of coal,
lesser amounts of cement and raw materials
? could earn only about US $20,000,000 in
1955.
26. To assist in meeting this problem, the
DRV has been negotiating with the Sino-
Soviet Bloc for technical and economic assist-
ance. In December 1954, Communist China
agreed to supply the necessary equipment and
trained p_.:sonnel to assist in the restoration
of railroads, highways, telecommunications,
meteorological services, and water conserva-
tion projects. Transportation, manufacturing,
and other fields of activity in North Vietnam
will probably receive long-term support from
Communist China. The Chinese Communists
have recenty announced a grant of roughly US
$300,000,000 although a portion of this may
cover assistance already provided. East Ger-
many, Poland, and the Soviet Union have also
promised to send needed equipment, machin-
ery, and technicians to assist in training DRV
personnel. The USSR has negotiated with
Burma for surplus rice which may be shipped
to the DRV. We believe that the Bloc will,
in any event, provide emergency economic
assistance sufficient to avert any serious
threat to the stability of the DRV.
27. Although the DRV appears to be develop-
ing its trading relations mainly with the Bloc,
it has made overtures to South Vietnam for
the resumption of economic relations and has
attempted to convince the French that mutu-
ally profitable trade is possible. Although
political considerations predominated in these
instances, the DRV certainly realized that it
could obtain economic benefits from trade
with South Vietnam and France.
28. The rapid rehabilitation of transportation
and irrigation facilities, which has been the
principal accomplishments of the regime in
recent months, demonstrated the DRV's abil-
ity to mobilize large pools of unskilled man-
power. It also indicates the receipt of fairly
substantial economic and technical assistance
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from Bloc countries. The most significant
achievement was the restoration in only four
months of the 150 mile Hanoi-Dong Dang
narrow-gauge railroad line which connects
with the Chinese Communist rail net. Re-
habilitation of the Hanoi-Lao Kay and Hanoi-
Nam Dinh lines, now underway and scheduled
for completion in 1955, will further facilitate
the distribution of military and economic sup-
plies received from Communist China. If the
relatively rapid rehabilitation of irrigation fa-
cilities is sustained, food output should be
substantially raised within a few years.
29. The DRV has instituted a series of eco-
nomic measures designed to enhance its over-
all control. To increase peasant support for
the regime, the DRV has pressed its program
of land confiscation and rent reductions.
Nevertheless, paddy taxes have not been
lowered and continue to absorb about 40 per-
cent of the output. Heavy new sales and in-
ventory taxes have been levied on merchants.
The scope of private trade has also been
diminished through the establishment of
wholesale and retail outlets operated by the
regime, and further limitations are in pros-
pect.
30. The DRV probably will continue to make
gradual economic progress during the period
of this estimate. With continued assistance
from the Sino-Soviet Bloc, which will almost
certainly be forthcoming the DRV will prob-
ably be able to meet minimum requirements
for foodstuffs and cloth. They will also be
able to rehabilitate further their transporta-
tion and industrial facilities. Therefore, we
believe that economic deficiencies will not
seriously threaten the stability of the DRV
during the period of this estimate.
Trends in Military Strength
31. Since Geneva, the Viet Minh army has
undergone considerable reorganization and its
firepower has been greatly increased. The
regular army is estimated to total 240,000
troops, the bulk of which are organized into
10 infantry divisions, 2 artillery divisions, 1
AAA groupment, and 25 infantry regiments.
Of these at least 4 infantry divisions, 1
artillery division, and 15 infantry regiments
have been activated since the summer of 1954.
Although regular army strength has increased
some 60,000 over the total of a year ago, the
over-all strength of the armed forces remains
about the same, since the regular forces were
built up by drawing men from Regional and
Popular units. Regional and Popular troop
strengths are estimated to be 37,000 and 75,000
respectively, a decline of some 35 percent from
pre-Geneva strengths of each organization.
32. The substantial increase in firepower and
mobility of DRV units is primarily the result
of large-scale shipments of new arms, am-
munition, and other military equipment from
Communist China. The volume of these ship-
ments increased markedly in May 1954 and
continued at a high rate until last November.
Little information is available on the flow of
supplies since November. Since July 1954,
many of the shipments have violated the
Geneva Agreements. There is no firm evi-
dence that the Viet Minh have received
armored vehicles.
33. There is no evidence that the DRV has
developed a navy or an air force. At present,
the DRV "navy" consists of some 100 men
with 3 to 5 motorboats operating as a com-
ponent of the army. There are unconfirmed
reports that the Chinese Communists are
training DRV personnel preliminary to the
creation of a DRV air force, but we have no
evidence that the DRV possesses any aircraft
or air organization.
34. Since the cessation of hostilities, the DRV
has embarked on an extensive training pro-
gram designed to improve the military effec-
tiveness of units and individuals, and to assure
their loyalty to the regime. Although there
have been occasional desertions and defec-
tions, these have not assumed significant pro-
portions.
35. DRV armed forces currently are capable
of maintaining control over the area north
of the 17th Parallel, and of defeating the mili-
tary forces, including the French, now located
south of the 17th Parallel. They are also
capable of overrunning Laos in a conventional
military operation or of providing sufficient
logistic support and guerrilla units to enable
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the Communist military forces in Laos to con-
trol the northern provinces and other parts
of the country remote from main lines of
communication.
36. The DRV almost certainly will maintain
the superiority of its armed forces in Indo-
china during the period of this estimate.
There will probably be no significant increase
in DRV armed numerical strength during the
next 12 months, but continuation of the re-
organization and training program will in-
crease its over-all military potential.
37. We believe that there may be as many as
10,000 armed Viet Minh personnel remaining
in South Vietnam. They are probably organ-
ized as cadres and skeletal units. The effec-
tiveness of these units and their ability to
expand through local recruitment will depend
in large measure on the political appeal of
Diem and the effectiveness of his government.
III. EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND POLICIES
38. Since the 1954 Geneva Conference, the
DRV's foreign policy appears to have had
the following major objectives: (a) increas-
ing the international stature of the DRV;
(b) strengthening ties with the World Com-
munist Bloc; (c) accomplishing the unifica-
tion of South and North Vietnam; (d) retain-
ing the Pathet Lao strongholds in two Laotian
provinces, and expanding Communist influ-
ence in both Laos and Cambodia with the
eventual aim of absorbing both these coun-
tries into the Communist Bloc; and (e) estab-
lishing friendly relations with the Asian "neu-
tralist" nations on the basis of the "Five
Principles" of peaceful coexistence.
39. In the past few months, the DRV has in-
creased its international stature in the non-
Communist world. Three non-Communist
nations ? India, Indonesia, and Pakistan ?
have granted it de facto diplomatic recogni-
tion. In addition, since mid-1954, the French
have maintained Jean Sainteny as "special
representative" to the DRV, and India and
Great Britain have established consulates in
Hanoi. Prime Minister Nehru of India made
a goodwill stop in Hanoi in October 1954, and
Vice President Pham Van Dong of the DRV
returned Nehru's visit in April 1955. In late
November 1954, Prime Minister U Nu of
Burma made a goodwill trip to the DRV.
DRV participation in the Bandung Conference
was further evidence of its status as an inde-
pendent state.
Relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc
40. We believe that the DAV is firmly com-
mitted to the policies of the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
even to the extent of subordinating or post-
poning the pursuit of its local or regional ob-
jectives in the interest of over-all Bloc tactics
and strategy. The attitude of DRV leader-
ship follows from its Communist world out-
look and from the fact that DRV objectives
can only be realized with Sino-Soviet Bloc
support.
41. To date both Peiping and Moscow have
participated in formulating DRV policies.
The DRV has publicly acknowledged that the
Soviet Union is the leading power in the inter-
national Communist movement. Official dec-
larations have also acknowledged dependence
on the Chinese Communists in the fields of
ideology and military strategy. Important
DRV legislation such as the basic agrarian
reform law is modeled closely after early Chi-
nese Communist measures. DRV leaders
have frequently compared their own progress
with various stages in Communist China's
development.
42. Contacts between the DRV and the Chi-
nese Communists have become significant
only since the Communist Chinese troops
reached the Indochinese border in December
1949. Beginning in 1950, the Chinese Com-
munists assisted the Viet Minh by furnishing
military supplies in increasing quantities,
training thousands of military personnel in
South China, and providing advisors on mili-
tary, political, and economic matters. At the
present time, large numbers of Chinese Com-
munist technicians are in North Vietnam to
assist the DRV in improving transportation
and communication facilities. It is probable
that economic assistance from both the Soviet
Union and Communist China will be main-
tained and perhaps increased.
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43. Despite its close ties with and dependence
on Peiping and Moscow, the DRV appears to
have greater latitude in its actions than the
European Satellites. A number of considera-
tions account for this special status. The Viet
Minh fought its own fight against French
colonialism. The DRV possesses an army and
security organization developed independently
of Sino-Soviet material assistance prior to
1950. Finally, the DRV can play an impor-
tant role in furthering Bloc interests in SEA,
particularly if permitted the appearance of
independence.
Policies Toward Vietnam
44. Since the Geneva Agreement, DRV policy
toward South Vietnam has aimed primarily at
?
preventing the formation of an effective na-
tionalist Vietnamese government and at ex-
tending Communist control through "coali-
tion," elections, subversion, or other means
short of open invasion. The DRV is attempt-
ing to pose as the champion of Vietnamese in-
dependence and unification. It has made a
show of adhering to the Geneva Agreement,
and has attempted in various ways to insure
French support for the election provisions of
the Agreement. The DRV endorsed the ac-
tions of the Binh Xuyen-controlled "United
Front of the Sects" which the Viet Minh radio
blessed as "working with the people" for the
overthrow of Diem. In addition, the DRV
has called for the resumption of "normal and
peaceful" relations between the two zones of
Vietnam as rapidly as possible. This cam-
paign for normal relations, which the DRV
probably hope will lead to a coalition govern-
ment for the whole of Vietnam even prior to
elections in 1956, was intensified in March
and April with repeated concrete proposals to
the Vietnamese government for economic and
cultural exchanges.
45. Throughout the period of this estimate
DRV policies with respect to South Vietnam
and national elections will be conditioned by
the requirements of Bloc strategy in Asia and
by DRV estimates of the prospects for peaceful
unification under a Communist-controlled re-
gime. The DRV probably still believes that
it could emerge from free nationwide elections
with control of all Vietnam. The DRV, with
Bloc support, has been insisting that con-
sultations concerning elections begin on 20
July as specified in the Geneva Agreement.
If the consultations get underway the DRV
will attempt to appear reasonable with respect
to election procedures. It will seek to develop
Indian, French, and UK pressures for holding
elections. The Communists almost certainly
would not agree to complex and elaborate safe-
guards and guarantees, including neutral su-
pervision over the movements of police and
military forces for a considerable time prior
to and after the elections. Nevertheless, they
probably would agree to some form of "free
elections" under "neutral" but not UN super-
vision. Their willingness to consent to some
guarantees for "free elections" would prob-
ably be reinforced by an estimate that such
controls would work to their advantage in the
South and, as manipulated, would not ad-
versely affect their position in the North.
46. The DRV's ostensibly peaceful role prob-
ably will not prevent continued efforts to in-
filtrate and subvert the Vietnamese govern-
ment, political organizations, and sects. The
Communists will seek to bring to power in
South Vietnam a government which would be
willing to join with the North in establishing
a national government prior to general elec-
tions. Failing this, they will seek to prevent
the development of a strong and effective
government in the South which could offer the
Vietnamese people an attractive nationalist
alternative to the Ho regime.
47. The Communists in their propaganda
have revealed sensitivity to the implication of
the Manila Pact which incorporated Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos in its area of protection.
We believe that concern for Western, and par-
ticularly US reactions, together with general
considerations arising from over-all Bloc poli-
cy, will prevent the DRV from openly invading
the South during the period of this estimate.
Similarly the resumption of widespread guer-
rilla activities appears unlikely prior to the
election deadline, unless the DRV should
come to the conclusion that South Vietnam
can be won only by force. Such a conclusion
would become more likely should the Diem
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government persist in refusing to enter the
election discussions, should election discuss-
ions not proceed favorably for the DRV, or
should the Diem government succeed with US
assistance, in consolidating its strength to the
point of becoming a nationalist alternative to
the Ho regime. Moreover, if during the period
of this estimate little progress is made towards
relaxing tensions, Peiping and Moscow might
permit the DRV greater freedom of action.
Should the DRV decide to use force short of
open invasion, it would probably attempt to
undermine the Saigon government by initiat-
ing a campaign of sabotage and terror, seeking
the formation of a new government more
amenable to demands for a national coalition.
These tactics are likely to include the activa-
tion of DRV guerrilla units now in South Viet-
nam and their reinforcement by the infiltra-
tion in small units of regulars from the North.
Policies Toward Laos
48. High on the list of DRV objectives is the
establishment of a Communist government in
Laos. Control of this area would 'greatly
facilitate Communist penetrations of South
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand. DRV
operations in Laos are facilitated by the pres-
ence of a Communist movement, the Pathet
Lao, which is largely the creation and puppet
of the Viet Minh. The DRV has covertly con-
tributed material and technical assistance to
the Pathet Lao "regime." It has supported
the Pathet Lao claim that the Geneva Agree-
ments granted it administrative control over
the Laotian provinces of Sam Neua and Phong
Saly. It has also supported the Pathet Lao
proposal for the establishment of a "joint con-
sultative council" composed of representatives
of the Royal Laotian government and of the
Pathet Lao "regime." Its objective probably
is the creation of a coalition government un-
der terms favorable to the Pathet Lao. At
the same time, the DRV has sought to con-
vince the Royal Laotian government that the
Pathet Lao is not a puppet of the Viet Minh.
To this end, DRV Foreign Minister Dong as-
sured the Laotian Prime Minister, while at
Bandung, that the DRV considered the Pathet
Lao an internal Laotian problem which should
be settled by the Laotians themselves.
9
49. During the period of this estimate, the
Viet Minh will probably continue their present
tactics of officially seeking to develop friendly
relations with the Royal Laotian government
while continuing their covert efforts to
strengthen the Pathet Lao. The DRV almost
certainly will not launch an attack with its
own forces to seize Laos, and it probably will
not initiate a major Pathet Lao guerrilla of-
fensive against the Laotian government.
However, if the Royal Laotian government
should undertake military action which seri-
ously threatened the position of the Pathet
Lao in the two northern provinces the DRV
would probably infiltrate Viet Minh units to
assist the Pathet Lao.
Policies Toward Cambodia
50. Pending the achievement of objectives in
Vietnam and Laos and pending the develop-
ment of a stronger Communist organization
in CaMbodia, the Viet Minh will probably con-
centrate on fostering Cambodian neutrality.
The DRV has professed friendship for the
Royal Cambodian government, and has
claimed to have withdrawn all DRV armed
forces from Cambodia. It has ceased its prop-
aganda attacks against the Royal government,
and apparently has sought a mutual declara-
tion of support of the "Five Principles" by the.
two governments. Nevertheless, the DRV is
probably continuing its efforts to develop Com-
munist strength in Cambodia, although to
date it appears to have made little progress.
Relations with France
51. DRV policy towards France has apparently
been designed to encourage the French to give
full support for holding elections in 1956, to
reduce French support for a non-Communist
government in Vietnam, and to create con-
flicts between French and US policy. The
DRV, while almost certainly aiming at the
eventual elimination of French influence in
all of Vietnam, has played upon the French
desire to retain an economic and cultural role
in that area.
52. The Communist apparently impressed
the French at the Geneva Conference by
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154B4344.EKI
their moderation. In an exchange of letters
between Viet Minh Prime Minister Pham Van
Dong and Premier Mendes-France, the DRV
indicated agreement in principle to the main-
tenance of French economic and cultural es-
tablishments north of the 17th Parallel.
Many French believed that the DRV, because
of its difficult economic situation and its sup-
posed reluctance to rely solely on China, might
be sincere in its desire to see the French main-
tain their economic and cultural institutions
in the country. Some French officials also
believed that a conciliatory policy would lead
the Viet Minh to loosen its ties with the Sino-
Soviet Bloc.
53. However, the French have had little suc-
cess in retaining their economic position in
North Vietnam and there are no indications
of any significant expansion of trade between
France and North Vietnam. French business
enterprises were reluctant to maintain their
capital investment in the area without guar-
antees from their government. Sainteny and
his government endeavored to push through
a plan for the establishment of jointly owned
companies in which the French government
would provide capital and control of manage-
ment. This plan was subsequently abandoned
because of strong US opposition and probably
because of the DRV's refusal to leave manage-
ment in French hands. As a result, the
Charbonnages du Tonkin, which was being
used as a test case, was sold to the DRV for one
million tons of coal, (presently worth about 5
billion francs) payable over 15 years by annual
allocations. The French, moreover, agreed to
maintain 30 or 40 technicians in the DRV-
owned company to assist production.
54. The French now appear aware that there
is little possibility of maintaining investments
and cultural establishments in North Vietnam.
The French government has expressed disap-
pointment with the results of the Sainteny
mission and have hinted that it will be dis-
continued in the event that Sainteny himself
10
should relinquish the assignment. Neverthe-
less, it has felt compelled to continue negotia-
tions with the DRV because of domestic polit-
ical pressures and because it believes that such
a course offers additional guarantees against
the recurrence of hostilities while the French
Expeditionary Forces are still in Indochina.
55. However, in their dealings with the DRV,
the French have been careful to avoid giving
the appearance of political support to the
regime. They appear to have resisted DRV
attempts to accredit a delegate-general to
Paris. They have worked to facilitate the
emigration of non-Communist elements to
South Vietnam and have supported requests
for an extension of the time limit allowed for
North Vietnam refugees to move to the South.
Finally, they have been careful to avoid al-
ienating the US and in such matters as the
removal of US equipment from the Char-
bonnages du Tonkin and abandonment of
plans for government participation in mixed
companies, and they have placed greater em-
phasis on maintaining their ties with the US
than on supporting their economic ambitions
in North Vietnam.
56. The DRV almost certainly will be willing
to continue to negotiate with France, hoping
thereby to exacerbate US-French relations
and to prevent all-out French support for the
non-Communist Vietnamese government in
the South. However, the DRV almost cer-
tainly will be unwilling to make any agree-
ment which in fact would permit the French
to retain an economic and cultural position in
North Vietnam.
57. In regard to elections, the primary concern
of the French government will be to avoid the
development of an impasse that would result
in renewed hostilities and the involvement of
its forces. It will probably insist that elections
be held as scheduled but is likely to strive for '
arrangements that will at least delay direct
DRV control over the South.
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