COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS AND TAIWAN THROUGH 1955, AND COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST REACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A006300030018-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2013
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: March 16, 1955
• Content Type: NIE

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NIE 100-4-55
16 March 1955
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTI/vtcktE
NUMBER 100-4-55
COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS
WITH RESPECT TO THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS
AND TAIWAN THROUGH 1955, AND
COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST
REACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 16 March 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval
Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; and the Atomic
Energy Commissrion Representative to the IAC. The Assistant
to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained,
the subject being outside of its jurisdiction.
MOO a=
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS,/
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 11
AUTH: HR 702
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DATE: C 1ff- 81 REVIEWcR? 0 c 7.156
219
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COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT
TO THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS AND TAIWAN THROUGH
1955, AND COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST RE-
ACTIONS' WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFENSE OF
TAIWAN'
THE PROBLEM
)
(a) To estimate Communist, particularly Chinese Communist, capabilities and
probable courses of action with respect to territory occupied by the Republic
of China;
(b) To estimate Communist reaction to possible US courses of action in defense
of territory occupied by the Republic of China; and
(c) To estimate actions or reactions of the principal non-Communist powers
with respect to possible future developments' in the Taiwan-offshore island
situation.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The Chinese Communist regime ap-
pears firmly committed to the seizure
("liberation" as they call it) of the off-
shore islands and Taiwan. It regards as
basic and continuing national objectives
the final destruction of the Chinese Na-
tional Government as a 'symbol of resist-
ance to the Chinese regime, and the elim-
ination of Taiwan as a potential base of
-attack against the mainland. The Chi-
nese Communists almost certainly regard
the eventual attainment of these objec-
tives as essential. (Para. 14)
2. In view of the US commitment, the
Chinese Communists do not have the
capability to seize Taiwan, and will almost
certainly not attempt an invasion in
1955. However, the Chinese Communists
have the capability for air strikes and
might undertake- air raids against Tai-
wan either on their own initiative or in
retaliation to militaky action elsewhere.
(Para. 37)
Wherever Taiwan appears in the text it should
be taken as reference to Taiwan and the Pen-
ghus (Pescadores) .
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3. We believe that the Chinese ,Commu-
nists with the forces now in place or read-
ily available in the east China area have
the capability to seize the Quemoy and
Matsu groups2 assuming that these
islands were defended by the Nationalists
alone and the Chinese Communists were
willing to risk heavy casualties. Timely
warning might not be available that final
preparations for an assault on either
Matsu or Quemoy had been completed.
We believe that the Nationalists cannot
absorb sufficient military end-items and
training during 1955 to change this esti-
mate of relative capabilities. (Paras. 22,23)
4. The Chinese Communists will probably
undertake air, naval, and artillery attacks
against the Quemoy and the Matsu
groups and will probably attempt to seize
lightly defended island outposts within
these groups. They will seek to erode
Nationalist ability and determination to
hold these islands, and, more importantly,
to probe US intentions.. If the Chinese
Communists should become convinced
that the US was determined to prevent
the seizure and retention of these islands,
taking whatever military action was
necessary, including, if required, all-out
- attacks on any part of China, they would
probably be deterred from attempting an
outright seizure during 1955. However,
2In the context of this estimate the term "MATSU
GROUP" or "MATSUS" denotes those Chinese
Nationalist-held islands lying essentially between
25 and 27 degrees north latitude and consisting
of Tung-yin Shan, Lang Tao, Kao-teng Hsu,
Pei-kan Tang, Matsu Shan, Pal-chuan and Lieh
Tao (White Dogs) , Wu-chiu, and Hsia Wu-chiu.
"MATSU" used singly applies only to Matsu-
Shan proper.
Similarly, "CHINMEN GROUP" or "QUEMOY
,GROUP" denotes those Chinese Nationalist-held
islands lying between 24 and 25 degrees north
latitude and consisting of Chinmen Tao (Que-
moy) , Lieh Hsu (Little Quemoy) , Ta-tan Tao,
Erh-tan Tao, and Tung-ting Hsu. "QUEMOY"
used singly applies only to Chinmen-Tao.
2
they would make every effort to render
the Chinese Nationalist position on the
offshore islands untenable by bombard-
ment, interdiction of supplies, and sub-
version.' (Para. 38)
5. It may not be possible for the Chinese
Communists, as a result of their probing
actions alone, to ascertain the full extent
of a possible US counteraction to an at-
tempt at seizure of an offshore island.
If the US did not respond to initial prob-
ing actions, the Chinese Communists
might estimate that the US would not in
fact commit its own forces to the defense
of the island. Or, even though there was
some US military reaction to a probing
attack, the Chinese Communists might
still estimate that US counteraction to
an actual invasion of offshore islands
would remain limited and localized. Or,
the Chinese Communists might estimate
that they could overrun , an offshore
island before effective US counteraction
could be brought to bear and that the US
would not subsequently initiate major
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of
the Army, believes that this paragraph under-
estimates the willingness of the Chinese Com-
munists, supported by the USSR, to assume the-
risks of war to attain their objectives and would
substitute for paragraphs 4 and 5 the following
text:
"The Chinese Communists will intensify air
and artillery attacks and possibly minor naval
operations against Quemoy and the Matsus.
They will seek to erode Nationalist ability and
determination to hold these islands, and to
probe US intentions. If the Chinese Commu-
nists should not. be_ able to ascertain the full
extent of a possible US counteraction to an
attempt at seizure, they might consider that
they could overrun either, or both, of these
island groups in spite of local US counter-
action and that the US would not subsequently
initiate major hostilities in order tp regain the
captured territory. Even though the Chinese
Communists were convinced that the US is de-
termined to prevent the seizure of these off-
shore islands, it is believed they. will attempt
to seize them, although not necessarily during
1955."
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hostilities in order to regain the captured
territory. In any of these circumstances,
we believe the Chinese Communists would
probably attempt to seize or complete the
seizure of the offshore islands.' (Para. 39)
6. If the US and Chinese Communist
forces became engaged in hostilities, the
Chinese Communists, while taking de-
fensive measures which might include
attacks on US and Chinese Nationalist
forces and bases directly involved, would
attempt to prevent the expansion of hos-
tilities. Initially the USSR would almost
certainly give the Chinese Communists
political and military support but without
open military intervention. (Paras. 42-
45)
7. Ultimately, if Moscow and Peiping had
come to believe that US military actions
were gravely threatening the existence of
the Chinese Communist regime, we be-
lieve that the USSR would openly inter-
vene in the war in the Far East, but would
still try to confine hostilities to that area.4
(Para. 47)
8. The reaction of most non-Communist
governments to US defense of Taiwan
8 See footnote 3 on previous page.
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, and the Director of Naval Intelligence be-
lieve that this paragraph should read as follows:
"Should the conflict progress so far that
the Communists believed the existence of
the Chinese Communist regime was gravely
threatened, we believe that the Soviet lead-
ers would recognize that open interven-
tion on their part against US forces sufficient
to save the Chinese regime would involve grave
risk of general war with the US. Their de-
cision would probably be based on existing
military, - political, and economic strengths,
with particular emphasis on the current dis-
parities in nuclear stockpiles and delivery
capabilities. We believe that the Soviet lead-
ers would probably conclude that if they inter-
vened the conflict could not be confined to the
Far East, and that Soviet strengths were in-
sufficient to risk their own regime in ;this
manner."
would in general be favorable. The reac-
tion of most non-Communist govern-
ments to US action in defense of the off-
shore islands, or to US attacks on Chi-
nese Communist military concentrations
prior to a Communist attack, would be
unfavorable. If the US bombed military
targets throughout east China, non-Com-
munist reactions would be considerably
more unfavorable, reflecting a fear of the
immediacy of general war. Even in these
circumstances, however, and despite in-
creased strains between the US and its
allies, we believe existing US alliances
would remain intact. However, if the US
became involved in defense of the off-
shore islands before the ratification of the
Paris agreements, the ratification might
be jeopardized. (Paras. 48-56, 58-60)
9. If the US used nuclear weapons against
Communist China, the predominant
world reaction would be one of shock.
These reactions would be particularly ad-
verse if these weapons were used to de-
fend the offshore islands or destroy mili-
tary concentiations prior to an all-out
Communist Chinese attempt to take the
offshore islands. However, certain Asian
and European allies might condone the
US use of nuclear weapons to stop an
actual invasion of Taiwan." The gen-
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, believes that this sentence should read:
"Certain Asian and European allies would
probably condone US use of nuclear weapons,
particularly if used tactically, as firm evidence
of US determination to put a halt to further
Communist expansion wherever occurring."
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that
this sentence should read as follows:
"However, certain Asian and European allies
might condone the tactical use of nuclear
weapons by the US provided that they were
convinced such weapons were necessary to
stop an actual invasion to Taiwan and that
the US was exercising the utmost restraint
and attempting to spare civilians."
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eral reaction of non-Communist Asians
would be emotional and would be ex-
tremely critical of the US. In the case
of Japan, the Government would probably
attempt to steer a more neutral course.
(Paras. 62-66)
10. If, however, the US succeeded in curb-
ing Chinese Communist aggression in the
Taiwan area without becoming involved-
in protracted, full-scale hostilities, and
without employing nuclear weapons, US
prestige and the confidence of the non-
Communist world in US leadership would
be enhanced.' (Paras. 57, 61, 67)
11. In the event the Nationalists, with or
without US assistance or pressure, evac-
7 The Deputy Director of Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, believes that the following additional
sentence should be added to paragraph 10:
"Even though the US had used nuclear,
weapons to achieve the result noted above, the
non-Communist world's adverse reaction to
the use of nuclear weapons would in time be
modified."
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, and the Director of Naval Intelligence be-
lieve that the last three sentences should read:
"Such an evacuation would stimulate con-
cern in the Philippines, Thailand, Laos, Cam-
4
uated the Matsu and Quemoy Groups
prior to a large-scale Communist attack,
there would probably be a deterioration
of morale on Taiwan and great disap-
pointment in the ROK. In the Philip-
Ones such an evacuation would stimulate
concern that the US was not prepared to
commit its forces in forward areas. To
a lesser extent this reaction would occur
in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and South
Vietnam. However, the dominant reac-
tion among other interested non-Commu-
nist states would probably be one of relief
followed at least for some time by in-
creased support for US policies with re-
spect to the defense of Taiwan.' (Para.
50)
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bodia, and South Vietnam that the US would
in the future also withdraw from other for-
ward areas. Elsewhere in the non-Communist
world, the dominant reaction would probably
be one of relief that threatened hostilities had
not occurred, but with undercurrents of con-
cern of varying strength in different countries
at this further instance of Communist expan-
sion. Particularly in non-Communist Asia,
the net impression of an evacuation, whether
manifest or latent, would be one of further
growth of Chinese Communist prestige and
power, with a commensurate decrease in US
prestige."
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DISCUSSION
II. FACTORS AFFECTING COMMUNIST
COURSES OF ACTION
Chinese Communist Objectives
14. The Chinese Communist regime appears
firmly committed to the eventual seizure
("liberation" as they call it) of the offshore
islands and Taiwan. It regards as basic and
continuing national objectives the final de-
struction of the Chinese National Government
as a symbol of resistance to the Communist
regime, and the elimination of Taiwan as a
potential base of attack against the mainland.
The Chinese Communists almost certainly re-
gard the eventual attainment of these objec-
tives as essential. Consequently, they almost
certainly will not agree to any negotiated set-
tlement which in their opinion would preclude
the ultimate achievement of their objectives.
At the present time, the Communist Chinese
probably recognize that the seizure of Taiwan
is beyond their capabilities. However, they
are probably less clear concerning their capa-
bility to take the offshore islands because of
their uncertainties as to, US policy. In any
case, their policy is almost certainly to press
constantly toward their ultimate objective.n
15. The Chinese Communists probably con-
sider that constant psychological pressure on
Taiwan and military pressure on the offshore
islands tend to serve several of their sub-
I. INTRODUCTION
12. The Chinese Communists have been at-
tempting to complete the destruction of the
Nationalist government ever since it was
driven from the mainland in 1949. An un-
successful attack was made against Quemoy
in that year, and large-scale preparations for
an assault on Taiwan were well underway
when the Korean War began in 1950 and the
7th Fleet was given the mission of maintain-
ing the status quo in the Taiwan Straits.
Between 1950 and the summer of 1954, haras-
sing actions by both sides continued in the
Taiwan Straits area, and numerous small
islands changed hands. During this same
period, the Chinese Communists increased
their military capabilities by: (a) moderniz-
ing their armed forces; (b) gradually rede-
ploying combat-experienced forces from
Korea; and (c) restoring some of the lines of
communication.9 Following the Korean ar-
mistice, the Chinese Communists began the
rehabilitation of air bases in the east China
area," and intensified their efforts to improve
lines of communication.
13. Since the Geneva Conference, Peiping has
increased its military pressure against the
Nationalist-held offshore islands, has greatly
intensified its propaganda effort against the
Nationalist government and the US, and has
reaffirmed in categorical terms its determina-
tion to seize all Nationalist-held islands and
destroy the Nationalist government. Most
recently Peiping has hailed its conquest of
Ichiang and its occupation of the evacuated
Tachens and Nanchi as steps leading to the
armed liberation of Taiwan. It has also re-
jected proposed UN cease-fire discussions.
For Chinese Nationalist capabilities, see NIE
43-54, "Probable Developments in Taiwan
through Mid-1956," dated 14 September 1954.
" The "east China area" as used in this paper in-
cludes the area south of the Yangtze River and
east of the Hankow-Canton railroad.
5
n The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that
this entire paragraph overemphasizes the de-
gree of threat posed to the Chinese Commu-
nists by continued retention by the Chinese
Nationalists of Taiwan and the offshore islands.
The Chinese Communists undoubtedly seek to
gain control of all Chinese Nationalist-held ter-
ritory but not necessarily because the forces on
this territory are a grave military threat to the
security of Communist China. The Chinese
Communists almost certainly estimate that the
seizure of Taiwan is beyond their present capa-
bilities in view of US commitments to defend
Taiwan. While they are uncertain of US in-
tentions with respect to the offshore islands,
they probably believe that these islands could
be seized even if the US should assist in their
defense.
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sidiary objectives. They probably assume
that such pressures confront the US with the
dilemma of choosing between: (a) active
military intervention in defense of the off-
shore islands, probably at great cost in terms
of its relations with other important powers,
and (b) giving way, with a consequent lessen-
ing of US prestige. Peiping probably also be-
lieves that such pressures will undermine
Nationalist morale, thus making Taiwan
more vulnerable. The Taiwan issue serves to
rally internal support for the Peiping regime
and provides justification for continuing con-
trols and austerities. Finally, the regime
probably considers that as long as these pres-
sures stop short of large-scale fighting with
the US, the pursuit of its objectives in the
Taiwan area will not prejudice and may in
fact further such other Communist Chinese
objectives as: domestic industrialization,
world recognition as a great power, and crea-
tion of divisions within the non-Communist
world.12
16. We believe that the USSR shares in gen-
eral Peiping's objectives in the Taiwan area.
The USSR has supported its ally's military
and political activities in the belief that it
can use the Taiwan crisis to enhance its soli-
darity with Peiping and to isolate the US by
demonstrating US "aggressiveness" and ex-
acerbating differences between the US and its
allies. Moscow has expressed its "approval
and support" of Peiping's position and has
endorsed Chinese Communist statements on
the need to "liberate" Taiwan and other
islands and continues to provide Peiping with
materiel and military advice. We believe that
Moscow might see certain advantages in
clashes between Chinese Communist and US
forces, at least as long as it believed that the
clashes would be limited and localized.
17. At the same time, we believe that Moscow
almost certainly does not regard the Taiwan
question as directly involving its vital na-
'2 The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, believes that this sentence is incomplete
without mention that an essential objective for
the Chinese Communists which these pressures
also serve is the eventual elimination of US
influence from the Far East.
tional interests. Soviet spokesmen have
avoided statements on Taiwan that might be
taken as military commitments under the
Sino-Soviet alliance. Moscow has - appeared
more ready than Peiping to suggest interna-
tional discussions on Taiwan, but has thus
far been prepared to discuss only Communist
terms and has not hinted at any solution that
would prejudice Peiping's aspirations in the
area. We believe that the USSR will continue
to support Peiping's activities, but will seek to
prevent a situation from arising which in its
view would carry grave risks of major hostili-
ties between the US and Communist China.
Chinese Communist Strengths and Capa-
bilities for Operations in the Taiwan
Area
Chinese Communist Forces Available in the
Taiwan Area 13
18. Ground Forces. The Chinese Commu-
nists- have at least 487,000 ground troops in
the area between Shanghai and Canton, or-
ganized in 8 armies, 5 artillery divisions, and
miscellaneous units. (See Map at end of text
facing Annex "A".) Four of the armies
served in Korea, and the others are also con-
sidered to be first-class units. Portions of
most of these armies have undergone elemen-
tary amphibious training but, with the excep-
tion of the regiment that assaulted Ichiang
Island, these units have not engaged in com-
bined operations. We believe the Chinese
Communists have two and possibly three
parachute divisions. We believe that approx-
imately 30,000 troops have undergone rudi-
mentary paratroop training; they probably
do not as yet possess a capability for more
than small unit operations. In any case,
available Chinese Communist air lift would
limit a single operation to about 2,600 men.
See annexes for more detailed information of:
(A) Chinese Communist aircraft performance;
(B) Chinese Communist aircraft strength;
(C) Estimated CCAF and CNAF sortie rates;
(D) Nationalist Chinese artillery on offshore
island groups; (E) Chinese Communist artillery
strength in the Matsu and Quemoy areas; (F)
Chinese Communist naval strength; (G) Ca-
pacity of ports of embarkation; and (11)
Weather conditions in the Taiwan Straits.
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19. Naval forces. We estimate the Chinese
Communist Navy operates the following ves-
sels: 2 destroyers, 5 submarines, 23 large pa-
trol vessels, 55 motor torpedo boats, 13 mine
vessels, 56 landing craft (LST, LSM, LSIL),14
and some 250 small patrol craft, about half
of which are believed to be armed junks.
Some elements of the navy, particularly the
motor torpedo boats and the amphibious
forces employed at Ichiang, have demon-
strated a high degree of effectiveness. The
tactical doctrine in that operation was sound
and the employment of joint sea-air-land
forces excellent. It is probable, however, that
this degree of competency does not exist
throughout the entire navy.
20. Air Forces. The total actual strength of
the Chinese Communist Air and Naval Air
Forces is currently estimated to be about 1,600
tactical aircraft, approximately 60 percent of
which are jet types. There are 11 operational
jet airfields in the area between Shanghai
and Canton. With one exception (Chu-
hsien) , all are at or slightly beyond extreme
MIG-15 combat radius from Taiwan but all
are within light bomber combat radius. In
the same area there are at least 11 additional
airfields, six of which are within 160 miles
of Amoy. (See Map.) The absence of rail-
roads and the inadequacy of roads in this
area would limit- the speed with which these
additional fields could be stocked and made
suitable for sustained conventional or jet
operations. However, such preparations
could probably be completed on some of these
fields within a few weeks and on all by the
end of 1955. Use of these airfields would in-
crease greatly the time over target of all types
of CCAF planes in the Quemoy and Taiwan
area.
21. The Chinese Communist air defense sys-
tem utilizes the fighter aircraft described
above, Soviet and old Japanese antiaircraft
artillery concentrated around key cities and
industrial areas, and old and inefficient early-
warning radar sited along the entire coast.
The air defense system is probably inade-
" In addition there are some 25 landing craft of
these types operating in the Chinese Commu-
nist merchant marine.
quate to provide an integrated and coordi-
nated defense against strong attacks by mod-
ern aircraft.
Chinese Communist Capabilities for Opera-
tions in the Taiwan Area Against Nation-
alist Forces Alone 15
22. Communist Capabilities for Action against
the Offshore Islands. The Chinese Commu-
nists now have sufficient ground forces in the
Foochow area (estimated at 57,000) for an
assault on Matsu. Little redeployment of
existing air and naval forces would be re-
quired to support such an assault. An as-
sault on Quemoy would probably require a
minimum of 150,000 troops. There are now
about 60,000 troops in the Amoy area opposite
Quemoy, and an additional 110,000 troops
could be moved in within four days. Consid-
erable artillery to provide cover for an assault
is already emplaced. No aircraft redeploy-
ment would be necessary to provide jet high
cover. Extensive redeployment would be
necessary to provide jet close support. Suffi-
cient amphibious lift can readily be assem-
bled for either operation. The Chinese Com-
munist air and naval forces and artillery
could make the resupply of any of the off-
shore islands by the Nationalists difficult and
costly. Timely warning might not be avail-
able that final preparations for an assault on
either Matsu or Quemoy had been completed.
Should the Communists achieve local air
superiority timely warning would be even less
likely.
23. We believe that the Chinese Communists
with the forces now in place or readily avail-
able in the east China area have the capa-
bility to seize the Quemoy and Matsu Groups
assuming that these islands were defended by
the Nationalists alone and the Chinese Com-
munists were willing to risk heavy casualties.
We believe that the Nationalists cannot ab-
sorb sufficient military end-items and training
during 1955 to change this estimate of relative
capabilities.
" It is assumed that the Nationalists are contin-
uing to receive US military supplies on Taiwan.
However, the Nationalists are assumed to have
the sole responsibility for the delivery of sup-
plies and reinforcements to the offshore islands
and for their actual defense.
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- 24. Communist Capabilities for an Assault
against Taiwan Assuming Taiwan is Defended
only by Chinese Nationalists. The Chinese
Communists, during the period of this esti-
mate, can achieve the capability to launch
and support logistically a large-scale joint
assault against Taiwan. Before undertaking
this operation, however, the Communists
would have to stockpile additional quantities
of materiel, provide for the deployment of
additional troops to east China, and concen-
trate most of the required troops in the imme-
diate vicinity of embarkation points. They
would also have to complete the improvement
of additional airfields in east China and con-
centrate their entire naval and amphibious
strength in the area from Shanghai to Can-
ton. In addition, they would probably feel it
necessary to conduct intensive amphibious
training and perhaps to gain additional ex-
, perience through smaller operations against
defended positions. A Communist invasion
of Taiwan would be facilitated if the ports of
Amoy and Foochow were available for staging
and supply purposes. These ports, however,
are not essential for such an operation.16 The
final preparations for a major assault on Tai-
wan probably could not be concealed.
25. At the present time the Chinese Commu-
nist Navy has available conventional landing
craft with a lift capacity of 40,000-70,000
troops. In addition, they have merchant ves-
sels available to carry up to 200,000 fully
armed troops plus supplies. However, consid-
ering the special problems of phasing, coordi-
nation, control, and protection of forces pe-
culiar to an amphibious operation, the neces-
sity for logistic resupply, and the impractica-
bility of allocating the entire merchant marine
for invasion purposes, we estimate that the
Chinese Communist initial assault force would
be limited to about 100,000 troops and equip-
" The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, and the Director of Naval Intelligence be-
lieve that the two preceding sentences should
read:
"Finally, seizure or neutralization of both
Quemoy and Matsu would be a logical pre-
liminary step from the military point of view,
since free use of Amoy and Foochow as assem-
bly and staging areas would greatly facilitate
an assault on Taiwan."
ment. Up to 900,000 reinforcements and re-
serves could also be made available.
26. Communist capabilities to support an in-
vasion will increase somewhat during the year
as roads and railroads in east China are im-
proved. Communist naval strength could be
increased by the transfer of some vessels from
the USSR. Several more airfields within
range of Taiwan will probably be made opera-
tional during 1955.
27. Chinese Communist Capabilities for Sub-
version and Infiltration. There are indica-
tions of limited Chinese Communist efforts to
carry out subversion and infiltration in the
offshore islands, which efforts are facilitated
by the island's proximity to the mainland.
The effectiveness of Communist efforts would
almost certainly increase, however, if the
troops and civilians on these islands came to
believe that they would not continue to re-
ceive adequate support from Taiwan and
ultimately from the US. Although there is
probably some Chinese Communist covert
activity on Taiwan, there is little likelihood
of extensive Communist subversion and ? infil-
tration during 1955 because of the extensive
internal security and counter-espionage ef-
forts of the Nationalist government, and
because of the strong anti-Communist senti-
ments of the population. However, if pros-
pects for an eventual return to the mainland
were further reduced by military or political
developments during 1955, Nationalist morale,
especially that of the leaders, would probably
decline, with a consequent prospect for an
increase in Communist subversive capabilities.
Communist Estimate of US Intentions
28. We believe that the principal determinant
of Chinese Communist courses of action in
the Taiwan Straits area is Peiping's estimate
of US capabilities and intentions." Moscow
and Peiping almost certainly consider that the
17 The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that
the Chinese Communist over-all policy is the
principal determinant of Chinese Communist
courses of action and would have this sentence
read as follows:
"We believe that a current determinant of
Chinese Communist courses of action with re-
gard to the Taiwan area is Peiping's esti-
mate of US capabilities and intentions."
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US will not withdraw its support of the Na-
tionalist government, at least for the next
several years, and that the US will fight,
alone if need be, to defend Taiwan. They
probably believe that US counteraction in this
case would include attacks on mainland
China, possibly with nuclear weapons.
29. We believe Moscow and Peiping are much
less sure concerning US intentions with re-
spect to the offshore islands. They almost
certainly consider that an attempted seizure
of the offshore islands would involve a risk
of provoking US military action. They also
may believe that a threatening military con-
centration in the east China area would in-
volve some risk. But we believe the Commu-
nists are uncertain as to which, if any, of the
offshore islands the US would defend with its
own forces, the circumstances under which
the US would defend them, or the extent to
which the defense would be carried.
Communist Estimate of the Nationalist
Position
30. The Chinese Communists probably esti-
mate that the Chinese Nationalist armed
forces have a low capability and that Chinese
Communist forces could seize during 1955 any
position which was defended by the Nation-
alists alone.
31. The Chinese Communists probably esti-
mate that the Nationalist government, over
the long term, will be beset with serious prob-
lems: continuing US disinclination to under-
write Nationalist aspirations in full; increas-
ing frictions in US-Nationalist relations; de-
creasing world support for the Nationalist
government as the legitimate ruler and UN
representative of China; maintenance of sta-
bility when Chiang Kai-shek retires from the
scene; and a general deterioration in Nation-
alist morale. Peiping is probably confident
that in time it can induce considerable Na-
tionalist defections at all levels. Neverthe-
less, the Communists probably consider that
so long as the US supports Nationalist China,
the final collapse of the Nationalist position
cannot be achieved by subversion alone.
Communist Estimate of ? Non-Communist
Attitudes other than those of the US and
Nationalist China
32. Peiping and Moscow probably believe in
the short term that the views of other non-
Communist countries will not greatly influ-
ence the US policy of defending and support-
ing the Nationalist government. Peiping and
Moscow probably believe, however, that non-
Communist pressure may have substantial in-
fluence on US intentions with respect to de-
fending the offshore islands. Over the long
run, they probably believe that the influence -
of allied and other non-Communist states is
likely to reduce' present US determination to
support and defend the Nationalist govern-
ment.
III. PROBABLE COMMUNIST COURSES OF
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THE TAI-
WAN ISSUE THROUGH 1955
General Courses
33. We believe the Chinese Communists will
continue their present pattern of pressure
against Taiwan and the offshore islands. The
Chinese Communists may undertake Military
courses of action during 1955 involving some-
what greater risks of war with the US than
they have hitherto chanced, but they will al-
most certainly continue to refrain from
courses which they estimate would result in
widespread and heavy attack by US air and
naval forces against the Chinese mainland."
18
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that
paragraph 33 underestimates the willingness of
the Chinese Communists to assume risk of war
to obtain their objectives and believes it should
read as follows:
"The Chinese Communists probably will not
attempt to invade Taiwan during 1955. We
believe that any considerations favoring such
an assault are outweighed in the Chinese
Communist mind by their doubt as to their
capability to succeed in such an attack, and
the very great losses they would suffer in na-
tional and international prestige coupled with
the losses sustained in counterattacks on the
mainland. However, the Chinese Communists
may undertake air raids against Nationalist-
held territory and may assault the offshore
islands."
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34. Peiping will almost certainly continue to
refuse to participate in UN discussions as long
as Nationalist China retains its Security
Council seat, or to enter into any formal nego-
tiations outside the UN in which the Nation-
alists would participate as equals. However,
Peiping appears to be willing to continue
informal discussions through the agency of
third parties. In such discussions, Peiping
would almost certainly not agree to a settle-
ment which established "two Chinas." Even-
tually, however, and particularly if the Chi-
nese Communists had come to believe that
further pursuit of their objectives would re-
sult in widespread and heavy attack by US
air and naval forces, they might acquiesce in
a cease-fire, providing that they believed such
an arrangement did not preclude their ulti-
mate acquisition of Taiwan." 20
35. In any case Peiping will continue its at-
tempts to reduce international support for
Nationalist China, to embarrass and discredit
the Nationalist government, to demonstrate
that US aggression is responsible for the Tai-
wan crisis, and to widen existing differences
between the US and other non-Communist
countries. It will continue efforts at infiltra-
tion and subversion.
19
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that
the last sentence of paragraph 34 underesti-
mates the willingness of the Chinese Commu-
nists to assume risks of war to attain their
objectives and gives the impression that the
Communists are more amenable to negotiations
than the G-2 would estimate. For complete
discussion of this see G-2 footnote to para-
graph 42.
The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department
of State, believes that this paragraph gives the
impression that the Communists are more
amenable to negotiations than appears to be the
case. Substitute for the last three sentences of
the paragraph the following:
"However, Peiping appears to be willing to
continue informal discussions through the
agency of third parties, probably designed to
suggest that Peiping is willing to negotiate.
In any event, Peiping would almost certainly
not agree to a settlement which established
"two Chinas," but might temporarily desist
from offensive military operations in the Tai-
wan Straits, providing that they believed this
would not preclude their ultimate acquisition
of Taiwan."
36. The USSR would almost certainly sup-
port the Chinese Communists in the above
courses of action through diplomacy and
propaganda and provide Peiping with military
materiel and advice. The USSR would at-
tempt to limit and localize any hostilities that
might develop between Communist China and
the US. If hostilities threatened to expand,
the USSR would probably exert diplomatic
efforts to obtain a cease-fire.
Specific Courses
37. In view of the US commitment the Chi-
nese Communists do not have the capability
to seize Taiwan, and will almost certainly not
attempt an invasion in 1955. However, the
Chinese Communists have the capability for
air strikes and might undertake air raids
against Taiwan either on their own initiative
or in retaliation to military action elsewhere.
38. Offshore Islands. The Chinese Commu-
nists will probably undertake air, naval, and
artillery attacks against the Quemoy and the
Matsu Groups and will probably attempt to
seize lightly defended island outposts within
these Groups. They will seek to erode Na-
tionalist ability and determination to hold
these islands, and, more importantly, to probe
US intentions. If the Chinese Communists
should become convinced that the US was
determined to prevent the seizure and reten-
tion of these islands taking whatever military
action was necessary, including, if required,
all-out attacks on any part of China, they
would probably be deterred from attempting
an outright seizure during 1955. However,
they would make every effort to render the
Chinese Nationalist position on the offshore
islands untenable by bombardment, interdic-
tion of supplies, and subversion.2,
21 The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that
this paragraph underestimates the willingness
of the Chinese Communists, supported by the
USSR, to assume the risks of war to attain their
objectives and would substitute for paragraphs
38 and 39 the following text:
"Offshore Islands. The Chinese Commu-
nists will intensify air and artillery attacks
and possibly minor naval operations against
Quemoy and the? Matsus. They will seek to
erode Nationalist ability and determination
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39. It may not be possible for the Chinese
Communists, as a result of their probing
actions alone, to ascertain the full extent of
a possible US counteraction to an attempt
at seizure of an offshore island. If the US
did not respond to initial probing actions, the
Chinese Communists might estimate that the
US would not in fact commit its own forces
to the defense of the island. Or, even though
there was some US military, reaction to a
probing attack, the Chinese Communists
might still estimate that US counteraction to
an actual invasion of offshore islands would
remain limited and localized. Or, the Chi-
nese Communists might estimate that they
could overrun an offshore island before effec-
tive US counteraction could be brought to
bear and that the US would not subsequently
initiate major hostilities in order to regain the
captured territory. In any of these circum-
stances, we believe the Chinese Communists
would probably attempt to seize or complete
the seizure of the offshore islands.21
40. Beyond the period of this estimate, as their
capabilities increase, and especially if world
and US opinion appears unfavorable to strong
US counteraction, the Chinese Communists
will probably become increasingly impatient
to acquire the offshore islands and less cau-
tious in their actions.
Contingent Developments
41. Evacuation of Offshore Islands. We be-
lieve it is unlikely that the Communists would
deliberately attack US forces engaged in the
evacuation of Nationalist garrisons from the
21See footnote 21 on previous page.
Footnote continued from Page 10
to hold these islands, and to probe US inten-
tions. If the Chinese Communists should not
be able to ascertain the full extent of a pos-
sible US counteraction to an attempt at
seizure, they might consider that they could
overrun either, or both, of these island groups
in spite of local US counteraction and that
the US would not subsequently initiate major
hostilities in order to regain the captured
territory. Even though the Chinese Commu-
nists were convinced that the US is deter-
mined to prevent the seizure of these offshore
Islands, it is believed they will attempt to seize
them although not necessarily during 1955."
11
Quemoy and the Matsu Groups in circum-
stances similar to the Tachen evacuation, but
the possibility of a serious incident cannot be
excluded.
42. In the event the US attacked the local
areas from which the Chinese Communists
had initiated military aggression, the Chinese
Communists would attempt to defend the area
under fire and would probably attempt to
attack US bases. If the Communists esti-
mated that the US did not intend to expand
the area or scale of its attacks, Peiping would
probably continue efforts to gain its local
military objective but would seek to keep hos-
tilities from spreading. On the other hand,-
if the Communists estimated that the US was
prepared to engage in an unrestricted effort
to halt Communist aggression, Peiping would
probably desist in its military efforts to gain
its local objective and would seek to end the
hostilities.22
22 The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that
the conclusions in paragraphs 42-46 underesti-
mate the willingness of the Chinese Commu-
nists, supported by the USSR, to assume risks
of war to obtain their objectives. They also
underestimate their determination, once hostili-
ties have been initiated, to retaliate to the full
extent of their capabilities against US and Na-
tionalist forces in the Taiwan-Okinawa area.
Attacks against Chinese Communist territory
will almost certainly evoke positive reaction.
The degree of risk of provoking a large-scale
war will increase as the area and nature of the
attacks is enlarged. It is believed that the con-
ditions outlined in paragraph 42 involve the
least degree of risk, but that attacks as out-
lined in paragraphs 43, 44, and 46 greatly in-
crease the risk of full-scale war in the Far East.
The Chinese Communists would not remain
passive if the US bombed concentrations of
armed forces prior to initiation of a Commu-
nist, attack and certainly would not take the
initiative to obtain a cease-fire under such con-
ditions but, would immediately take action to
brand the US as an aggressor. If the US at-
tacked military targets throughout east China,
the Communists would almost certainly accept -
such acts as a casus belli. Any cease-fire that
might later develop as a result of such attacks
would not result from Chinese Communist in-
itiative. It is possible that a nuclear attack
would be met in kind and that if nuclear war-
fare developed, full-scale warfare in the Far
East would soon follow. G-2 believes that the
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43. In the event the US bombed menacing
concentrations of armed forces on the east
coast of China prior to the imminent initia-
tion of a Communist attack, Communist
China would initially seek to defend its terri-
tory to the full extent of its capabilities but
would limit its retaliatory attacks to actions
estimated not to result in widespread and
heavy attacks by US air and naval forces
against the Chinese mainland. It would seek,
and probably gain Soviet support, on the
Korean model, for the air defense of China.
It would seek with Soviet support to gain the
maximum possible advantage throughout
the world from this example of US "unpro-
voked aggression." At the same time, Com-
munist China would probably either take the
initiative to obtain a cease-fire or accept the
intercession of third powers to this end pro-
vided they could do so without appearing to
succumb to intimidation.23
44. If at any stage of the hostilities US forces
attacked military targets throughout the east
China area, Peiping would probably be seri-
ously concerned with regard to ultimate US
intentions. It would seek to defend itself to
the full extent of its remaining capabilities,
including, if possible, attacks upon US and
Nationalist targets in the Taiwan-Okinawa
area. It would probably seek to obtain in-
creased Soviet assistance and participation.
The USSR and Communist China would prob-
ably attempt to obtain a cease-fire. If these
efforts failed, Peiping would take such mili-
tary and political actions as it thought might
best cause the US to cease its attacks. Such
actions might include the renewal of hostili-
ties in Indochina and possibly in Korea.23
Footnote continued from page 11.
Chinese Communists, assisted by the Soviets,
are not bluffing and that they are willing to
accept the risks involved in seizing the offshore
islands.
23 The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that
this paragraph underestimates the willingness
of the Chinese Communists to assume risks of
war to attain their objectives and gives the
impression that the Communists would be more
amenable than would be the case. See G-2
footnote to paragraph 42.
12
45. In the event of US attacks on military
targets as noted in paragraph 42, the USSR
would probably commit increased forces to the
defense of Communist China, but, at least
initially, would probably restrict the area of
their counteraction to Chinese territory and
adjacent waters, and would not acknowledge
its participation. Meanwhile it would prob-
ably make all possible efforts to promote a
cease-fire and prevent the US-Chinese hostili-
ties from expanding into general war.
46. While there is? a slight chance that the
Communists would counter with nuclear
weapons if the US were to employ such weap-
ons against Communist China, we believe they
probably would not. In any event, before re-
taliating in kind the Communists would first
violently condemn the US action and exploit
its adverse effects world-wide. In any event,
we believe the Communists would intensify
their political efforts to end hostilities.23 24
47. Ultimately, if all efforts to end the war
had failed, and if Moscow and Peiping had
come to believe that US military actions were
gravely threatening the existence of the Chi-
nese Communists regime, we believe that the
USSR would openly intervene in the war in
the Far East, but would still try to confine
hostilities to that area."
" The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, believes that this paragraph should read
as follows:
"Should the US employ nuclear weapons in
any of the above circumstances, we believe
that the USSR would estimate that response
with similar weapons would at once broaden
the hostilities, precipitate unacceptable puni-
tive action by the US, and create grave risk of
general war. In view of existing disparities
in nuclear stockpiles and delivery capabilities,
we believe the USSR would estimate it could
not take the risks. We therefore believe that
the Communists would not reply with nuclear
weapons in response to their use by the US."
2' The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, and the Director of Naval Intelligence be-
lieve that this paragraph should read as follows:
"Should the conflict progress so far that
the Communists believed the existence of
the Chinese Communist regime was gravely
- threatened, we believe that the Soviet
leaders would recognize that open inter-
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IV. NON-COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO US
AND COMMUNIST POLICIES WITH RE-
SPECT TO THE TAIWAN AREA
48. The attitudes of most non-Communist
states with an interest in the Far East are
strongly conditioned both by fear of war and
by a belief that the offshore islands belong
rightfully to Peiping and are not essential to
the defense of Taiwan. Many of these gov-
ernments, despite their lack of respect for the
Nationalists, are sympathetic to the US com-
mitment to defend Taiwan because they feel
it is necessary to limit Communist expansion.
However, these governments are uncertain as
to US intentions with respect to the defense
of the offshore islands and fear that full-scale
war in the' Far East may develop if the Com-
munists launch attacks. Many of these na-
tions would welcome an arrangement for the
evacuation of these islands, particularly if a
modus vivendi over the future status of Tai-
wan could be reached.
49. On the other hand, the ROK 'and Nation-
alist China desire that the US exploit every
opportunity to engage and reduce Communist
power, and are concerned over any indication
that the US is willing to withdraw from any
position. The Philippine government sup-
ports US policy in the Taiwan area. Both ap-
proval and concern have been evident in the
governments of Thailand, Australia, and New
Zealand, with approval apparently predomi-
nating.
50. In the event the Nationalists, with or
without US assistance or pressure, evacuated
the Matsu and Quemoy Groups prior to a
large-scale Communist attack, there would
Footnote continued from page 12.
vention on their part against US forces suffi-
cient to save the Chinese regime would in-
volve grave risk of general war with the US.
Their decision would probably be based on
existing military, political, and economic
strengths, with particular emphasis on the
current disparities in nuclear stockpiles and
delivery capabilities. We believe that the
Soviet leaders would probably conclude that
if they intervened, the conflict could not be
confined to the Far East, and that Soviet
strengths were insufficient to risk their own
regime in this manner."
13
be a deterioration of morale on Taiwan and
great disappointment in the ROK. In the
Philippines such an evacuation would stimu-
late concern that the US was not prepared to
commit its forces in forward areas. To a les-
ser extent this reaction would occur in Thai-
land, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.
However, the dominant reaction among other
interested non-Communist states would prob-
ably be one of relief followed at least for some
time by increased support for US policies
with respect to the defense of Taiwan."
51. If the US did not counter Communist at-
tempts to invade and seize the Matsu and
Quemoy Groups while large Nationalist forces
remained on these islands, there would be a
serious deterioration, in Nationalist morale.
Most interested non-Communist governments
would probably condemn Communist China
for the use of force. They would be relieved
that the US had not become involved in hos-
tilities with Communist China over the off-
shore islands. Asian governments allied with
or friendly to the US while sharing these
sentiments, would nevertheless be seriously
concerned over the failure of the US to defend
friendly forces, and might prove less willing
to take strongly anti-Communist stands in
the future. US prestige would decline and
Peiping's prestige would rise, especially in
Asia, where this development would be inter-
preted as a successful defiance of US power.
2? The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, and the Director of Naval Intelligence
believe that the last three sentences should
read:
"Such an evacuation would stimulate con-
cern in the Philippines, Thailand, Laos, Cam-
bodia, and South Vietnam that the US would
in the future also withdraw from other for-
ward areas. Elsewhere in the non-Commu-
nist world, the dominant reaction would prob-
ably be one of relief that threatened hostili-
ties had not occurred, but with undercurrents
of concern of varying strength in different
countries at this further instance of Com-
munist expansion. Particularly in non-Com-
munist Asia, the net impression of an evac-
uation, whether manifest or latent, would be
one of further growth of Chinese Communist
prestige and power, with a commensurate de-
crease in US prestige."
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52. In the event of a Chinese Communist at-
tack against Taiwan, the non-Communist
countries would in general condemn Commu-
nist China as the aggressor and would ap-
prove US defense of Taiwan. Certain of
these countries would seek through diplo-
matic channels and the UN to end or at least
to restrict the area of fighting. Although the
Government of India might publicly criticize
the Chinese Communists it would not aban-
don its neutralist position.
53. Non-Communist reaction to the employ-
ment of US air and naval forces in the de-
fense of the offshore islands still occupied by
Nationalist forces, would vary greatly. The
ROK and Nationalist China would welcome
US defense of the offshore islands. They
would hope that US action against China
would lead to the destruction of the Commu-
nist regimes in China and North Korea. The
Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New
Zealand probably would approve the US de-
cision to defend the offshore islands but would
be apprehensive that the hostilities would ex-
pand.
54. The reactions of India, Indonesia, and
Burma would be influenced by the circum-
stances in which the hostilities developed.
Should the Chinese Communist attack at a
time when these countries considered the US
to be seriously seeking a peaceful solution,
and should the US military reaction be re-
stricted to the immediate area of the islands
attacked, they would probably deplore both
the Communist attack and the US defense of
the offshore islands. US attacks against the
mainland in reaction to Communist attacks
against the offshore islands would be con-
demned as provocative and aggressive. One
or more of the neutralist states might intro-
duce a resolution into the UN charging that
the US action was a threat to the peace.
55. Predominant opinion in Japan would be
strongly critical of the US action, based on a
belief that the offshore islands were not of
sufficient importance to justify US measures
which could involve Japan in general war.
56. Elsewhere in the non-Communist world,
the reaction to a US defense of an offshore
island against a Chinese Communist attack
would be mixed. If the US reaction were re-
stricted to- the immediate area of the island
attacked, most non-Communist governments,
although gravely concerned over the increased
danger of war in the Far East, would not de-
nounce the US action but would condemn the
Chinese Communists for aggressive acts.
57. In any case, if the US had succeeded in
halting Communist military moves without
becoming involved in protracted or expanded
hostilities with Communist China, adverse re-
actions to US action in defense of the offshore
islands would probably be moderated in time,
and US prestige would probably be enhanced
in most non-Communist countries.
58. If the US should attack menacing ccmcen-
trations af Chinese Communist military forces
prior to an imminent initiation of a Commu-
nist attack most major non-Communist coun-
tries would deplore such action. India and
the other Asian neutrals would believe that a
major war had already begun and would prob-
ably introduce a resolution in the UN de-
nouncing the US as an aggressor. Japan
would be extremely critical, and would seek
so far as possible to dissociate itself from the
US action. The UK and some other non-
Communist states would probably bring
strong pressure against the US to end its at-
tacks. Although the general attitude within
the NATO countries would be strongly critical
of the US, the NATO governments would prob-
ably not support a UN resolution which con-
demned the US as an aggressor. The UK
and India in particular would seek through
diplomatic channels to end the fighting.
59. Should the US at any stage of hostilities
attack military targets throughout the east
China area, many governments would proba-
bly estimate that US policy was changing
from defense of Taiwan to destruction of the
Communist regime in China. In this case,
with the exception of the ROK and Nation-
alist China, the reactions of most govern-
ments would reflect a fear of the immediacy
of general war.
60. If it appeared that the above action would
result in protracted or expanded war, the con-
fidence of most non-Communist states in US
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SECRET 15
leadership would decline. A major shift in
Japanese opinion against the US would prob-
ably occur, ancl the Japanese government
would probably attempt to steer a more neu-
tralist course. The USSR, by threats and in-
ducements, might be able to exploit fears of
general war to weaken the NATO alliance.
Public pressure within the NATO countries
might lead to changes in some of their gov-
ernments and their replacement by govern-
ments of more neutralist persuasion, but we
believe these governments would remain allied
with the US even though they disapproved
of its actions.
61. If, however, the US succeded in curbing
Chinese Communist aggression in the Taiwan
area without becoming involved in protracted,
full-scale hostilities, the adverse reactions of
the non-Communist nations described above
in paragraphs 58-60 would probably be mod-
erated in time.27
Nuclear Weapons
62. If in the course of reacting to Communist
moves, the US used nuclear weapons against
Communist military targets, we estimate that
the predominant world reaction would be one
of shock.
63. The reactions of most governments would
be particularly adverse if the US were to use
LI The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, believes that paragraph 61 should read as
follows:
"If, however, the US succeeded in curbing
Chinese Communist aggression in the Taiwan
area without becoming involved in protracted,
full-scale hostilities, US prestige and the con-
fidence of the non-Communist world in US
leadership would be greatly enhanced."
28 The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff believes that this paragraph should read
as follows:
"The reaction of world governments would
range from apathy to extreme criticism if the
US used such weapons to defend the offshore
islands or destroy Communis;t concentrations
such weapons to defend the offshore islands
or to destroy Communist concentrations prior
to a Communist amphibious 'assault on these
islands.28
64. It is possible that the governments of our
Western allies and of Thailand, the Philip-
pines, Pakistan, Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-
nam, would condone the tactical use of nu-
clear weapons by the US provided that they
were convinced that such weapons were nec-
essary to stop an actual Communist invasion
of Taiwan and if they were convinced that
the US was exercising the utmost restraint
and attempting to spare civilians.
65. The ROK and the government of National
China would almost certainly approve the use
of nuclear weapons, in any case.
66. The general reaction of non-Communist
Asians to the US action would be based on
emotional grounds and would probably be
extremely critical of, the US, no matter what
the circumstances or degree of provocation.
The Governments of India, Burma, and Indo-
nesia would almost certainly strongly con-
demn the US for again using nuclear weapons
against Asians. The Japanese government
would be under strong popular pressure to
denounce the action, and, if it felt that gen-
eral war was imminent, would almost certain-
ly attempt to move toward a neutral position.29
prior to attack on these islands. The pre-
dominant reaction would be adverse, but
there would be some who approved the US
action as a firm indication of US determina-
tion to halt Communist aggression wherever
occurring."
29 The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, and the Director of Intelligence, USAF, _
believe that a final paragraph should be in-
serted to read as follows:
"If the US military action involving the use
of nuclear weapons forced the Communists
to seek a cease-fire, and if fighting were
terminated short of full-scale or protracted
war in Asia, the adverse reaction of the non-
Communist world' toward the US action would
probably in time be moderated."
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TAIWAN AND THE EASTERN CHINA AREA
ARMED FORCES
AS1OF 15 MARCH 1955
? -
MINIMUM ?
CLASS SYMBOL ' ' RUNWAY LENGTH AIRFIELD CAPABILITIES
7000' ????????? Sustained HB-MB and jet LB Operations
2 ?*- - 6000, Limited HB-MB and sustained jet
tactical support fighters
Potential HB-MB and sustained jet
* 500?' interceptor fighters ,
?, 4000' Light transports, conventional fighters,' t
and limited jet fighters . ,
. *Under.construction; estimated will be ,
class 2 by July 19557 ' ?
STATUS OF AIRFIELDS
? , a
OPERATIONAL ?Airfields in red are known Or evaluated to be consistently used by
" . ?. civilian or military aircraft.
SERVICEABLE ?Airfields in green are known or evaluated to be capable of use.
LIMITED SERVICEABILITY?Airfields' in black are evaluated to be capable for limited
?, use by light transports and conventional fighters. ?
4 -
Selected Road Selected Railroad Proposed Railroad
SEC T ?
K1A.NGSU
122
A HSING?
?
CH'0,HSIE
KIANG
HAl-
68,000*
WENCHOW
?.PI SHAN
NG-YANG
PUBLIC '
TRO
SUICHIJAN
I E N
FOOCHOW
?
'NAN-CHI SHAN
&wooled 25 Fob. '55
,EAST CHINA
MA-TSU GROUP
14,200'
SEA
As of 15 February
ere were approximate
00 aircraft availabl
Erontated
12 F 6.15
2s-
2
HAN
AN
os
os'-+
PESCA.DORES
ISLANDS
353,000
TROOP
IWAN
Ii 9 other
cHim be made
conve
T'Al?NAJ?1 trans
KANGsHAN
rfields could
available for
anal fighter and
ort operations. '
-2HONG KONG
02,3 ?
01\
1?1'.40?. *Not additional to stated troop totals
?2*4
SOUTH
?1
1arn 3-55
KAO-HSIUNG
NG
CHINA SEA
Nautical Mites
50 1500 150
90 90 *90
Statute Miles
eibTatess
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Aircraft
Fighter
Jet MIG-15
Piston LA-9/11
Ground Attack
Piston IL-10
Light Bomber
Jet IL-28
Piston TU-2
Medium Bomber
Piston TU-4
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ANNEX "A"
Chinese Corrimunist Aircraft Performance
Mission
Escort
Escort
Maximum
Speed/ ?
Altitude
(knots-feet)
523/40,000 --
523/40,000
Ground Attack
w/bombs 582/sea level
Escort 335/25,000
Ground Attack 325/sea level
Ground Attack 270/5,000
1440/30,000
1440/30,000
460/15,000
450/sea level
High level
Ground Attack
Bomber
High level
Service
Ceiling
(feet)
Bomb
Load
(pounds)
16
Radius/
Range
? (nautical
miles)
52,000 None 360/940
(with external fuel)
52,000 None 225/670
not app. 2x250 105/200
33,000 ? None 440/950
not app. None 240/500
23,400
41,000
41,000
41,000
not app.
278/15,500
29,000
278/15,500
- 29,000
350/30,000
39,550
880 170/360
4,400 590/1,165
4,400 690/1,365
(with external fuel)
6,600 570/1,100
4,400 595/1,165
(with external fuel)
3,300 400/850
2,200 500/1,040
10,000 1,700/3,100
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SECRET 17
ANNEX "B"
Chinese Communist Aircraft Strength
Fighter
Chinese Communist
Air Force
Chinese Communist
Naval Air 'Force
Aircraft Not in
Operational Units
Estimated
TO&E
Estimated
Actual
Estimated
TO&E
Estimated
Actual
Military
Use
Civil
Use
Jet MIG-15 -
962 ,
'750
90
Piston LA-9/11
280
190
80
40
60
Ground Attack
200
150
S
30
"
Piston IL-10
Light Bomber
Jet IL-28
' 160
120
32
30
Piston TU-2
240
210
40
40
70
Medium Bomber
10
10
Piston TU-4
Transport
120
110
10
10
20
50
(C-47 type)
TOTAL
1,972
1,540
162
120
270
50
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.SECRET 18
ANNEX "C"
Estimated CCAF and CNAF Sortie Rates
(Combat Aircraft)
NOTE: The CCAF sortie rates given below represent the total gross capabilities
of the CCAF. It is unlikely that the CCAF will be so redeployed as to per-
mit the mounting of the total given in the area of the Taiwan Straits.
k!
Estimated
CCAF Actual Strength
Average Daily
Sorties
First 5-7 Days
Average Daily
Sorties
Sustained Combat
Fighter (Jet)
750
764
382
Fighter (Piston)
230
194
97
Ground Attack
150
152
76
Light Bomber (Jet)
150
126
63
Light Bomber (Piston)
250
212
106
Medium Bomber (Piston)
10
4
2 -
CNAF
,
Fighter (Jet)
117
118
59
Fighter (Piston)
231
196
98
Light Bomber (piston)
16
12
6
Medium Bomber (Piston)
46
18
Note: The figures for both air forces were calculated as follows:
(1) An 85 percent serviceability rate was used against the estimated actual
strength of each aircraft type.
(2) The result of (1) was multiplied by an established figure for sorties
per aircraft per month in sustained combat (18 for jet fighters and ground at-
tack; 15 for piston fighters and light bombers, jet and piston, and 7 for medium
bombers) .
(3) The result of (2) for each aircraft type was divided by 30 to obtain
the average daily sortie rate in sustained combat.
(4) The result of (3) for each aircraft type was doubled to obtain the
average daily sortie rate for the first-5-7 days (5 days for medium bombers only) .
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1[
SECRET
ANNEX "D"
Nationalist Chinese Artillery and AAA
on Offshore Island Groups
Units
1 Bn 75mm Pack How
3 Bn 105mm How
2 AAA Btrys
Matsu Group
Quemoy
Number of Weapons
12 ? 75mm Pack How
12? 105mm How (M-2)
24? 105mm How (M-3)
Group
4 ? 75mm AAA Gun (Jap)
5 ? 25mm AAA Gun (Jap)
4 Bn 75mm Pack How
3 Bn 105mm How (M-3)
3+Bn 105mm How (M-2)
1 Bn 155mm How
1 Btry 155mm Gun (GPF)
1 Btry 155mm Gun (M-2)
3 Btrys AAA
48? 75mm Pack How
36? 105mm, How (M-3)
41 ? 105mm How (M-2)
12 =- 155mm How (M-1)
, 5 ? 155mm Gun (GPF)
4 ? 155mm Gun (M-2)
1- ?
-SECRET
9? 20mm Gun (Foreign)
16? 40mm Gun (US)
19
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SECRET 20
ANNEX "E"
Chinese Communist Army Artillery Opposite
Chinese Nationalist-Held Offshore
Islands
QUEMOY GROUP
All of the islands in the Quemoy Group are
within range of Communist artillery. Shells
landing on the islands in the Quemoy Group
have been identified as 76.2, 122, and 152mm.
It is estimated that there are between 160
and 200 field artillery pieces in positions capa-
ble of firing on one or more of the Quemoy
Group. The 31st Army, accepted in that area
adjacent to the Quemoy Group, would have
144 artillery pieces as follows:
8 battalions of 12x75/76mm guns or howitzers
each
3 battalions (equivalent) of 12x70/75/76mm
howitzers each
? 1 battalion of 12x105mm howitzers
The presence of 122 and 152mm artillery in
the area opposite the Quemoy Group is ac-
cepted; however, the number of such weapons
is unknown. It is possible? that the 105mm
battalion of the 31st Army has been replaced
by the 122mm. It is also possible that 122mm
artillery is organic to the infantry divisions of
the 31st Army. Presence of the 152mm artil-
lery strongly indicates that at least one artil-
lery regiment (independent or subordinate to
an artillery division) containing 36x152mm,
or a combination of 122mm and 152mm, is in
the area.
It is estimated that a minimum of 72 me-
dium AAA and 108 AAAW pieces are located
adjacent to the Quemoys. The 521st AAA
Regiment, with an estimated 24x37mm AAAW
and 12x76/85mm AAA, is accepted on Amoy
Island. Elements of the 64th AAA Division,
with an estimated 108x76/85mm AAA and ,
possibly 36x37mxn AAAW, which is accepted
at Hui-an, Fukien, are possibly opposite Que-
moy. The 31st Army has four AAAW bat-
talions with a total of 48x37mrn AAAW.
MATSU GROUP
No artillery fire has been delivered on these
islands by the Communists; however Kao-
teng, Pei-kan Tang and Matsu Islands are
within artillery range of Peiling Peninsula.
Kao-teng Hsu is within range of the 76.2mm
gun, Pei-kan Tang within range of the 122mm
gun and 152mm gun/how, and Matsu within
range of the 122mm gun and the 152mm gun.
Four occupied artillery (type unknown) and
three AA positions have been reported on the
Peiling Peninsula. The 28th Chinese Com-
munist Army, located in the Foochow area, is
estimated to have the following artillery and
antiaircraft pieces:
8 battalions of 12x75/76mm guns of hows each
3 battalions (equivalent) of 12x70/75/76mm
hows
1 battalion of 12x105mm hows
4 battalions of 12x37mm AAAW each.
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SEClitET 21
ANNEX "F"
Chinese Communist Navy?Strength
1.
MAJOR COMBATANT VESSELS
Number
2
2
3
Destroyer (DD) (Note a)
Submarine
Ocean Patrol (Note b)
Short Range (Note a)
2.
PATROL VESSELS
Frigate/Gunboat (PF/PG)
17
Old Gunboat (OPG)
2-3
Motor Torpedo Boat (PT)
55-56
River Gunboat (PR)
14-15
Auxiliary Gunboats (AKL/PG)
4-5
3.
MINE VESSELS
Coastal Minelayers (CMC) (Note c)
Minesweeper (AM) (Note a)
2
Motor Minesweeper (AMS) (Note d)
4
Coastal Minesweeper (AMC)
7
4.
AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS (Numbers in parentheses
are additional
units in merchant
service)
Landing Ship Tank (LST)
20-22
(12)
Landing Ship Medium (LSM) (Note c)
13
(11)
Landing Ship Infantry, Large or Landing Ship
Support, Large (LSIL/LSSL) (Note
d)
16
(?)
Landing Craft Utility (LCU)
7
(?)
5.
SERVICE CRAFT
Patrol Craft (YP)
250-300
Motor Launches: 100-150 (Note e)
Armed Motor Junks: 150-200
(a) Two GORDIY Class DD, two T-43 Class AM, and two M-V Class short range
SS at Tsingtao since 12 October 1954. Of this group, only the two DD and
the two SS are accepted as having been transferred to the CCN; the AM
are probably still USSR units.
(b) Probable that a third USSR long-range SS has been or will shortly be trans-
ferred to the CCN.
(c) Eight LSM are fitted for minelaying.
(d) Five-six LSIL are fitted as minesweepers and additional ex-Japanese traw-
lers and other small craft may be fitted with minesweeping gear.
(e) Includes small landing craft (LCC, LCS), ex-Japanese auxiliary submarine
chasers and minesweepers, and newly constructed motor launch types (70-
90,50-70 tons) such as the "SC types."
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SECRET - 22
ANNEX "G"
Ports of Embarkation
The following Chinese mainland ports are considered suitable for stag-
ing an amphibious operation against,Taiwan.
PORT
'PORT CAPACITY
(LONG-TERM
20-HR. DAY)
LAO TAO (Lien-yun)
2,500
TSINGTAO
20,000
FOOCHOW
750
SHANGHAI
35,000
AMOY
2,700
SWATOW
600
CANTON
6,000
TOTAL ESTIMATED PORT CAPACITY
67,550
Some 16 additional minor ports might also be utilized. Their average
capacity is 300-400 LT/20-hr. day.
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PERIOD
October
thru
March
April
thru
June
. July
? thru
August
September
SECRET -
ANNEX "H"
Weather Conditions in the Taiwan Straits
GENERAL CONDITIONS
Strong northeast monsoons, currents setting
southwesterly through the Straits and
reaching maximum drift of 60 to 65 miles
per day in December and January.
Transition period between northeast and
southwest monsoon; variable winds light and
variable currents setting generally north-
east; high seas and swells observed 6-10
percent of time in April and May. Typhoon
may occur in June.
Southwest monsoon, average velocities low
and calms frequent; ,sea and surf moderate.
Typhoons move from the Pacific due west
across Taiwan into China.
Transitional period between southwest and
northeast monsoons; typhoons may occur,
winds are variable.
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23
FEASIBILITY ' OF LARGE-
SCALE SEA OPERATIONS
Weather unsuitable for large-
scale operations over open
sea.
April and May are best-
months for large-scale sea
operations; there is risk of
encountering typhoons in
June.
Average conditions, better
than in April and May, but -
danger of typhoons makes
this period less suitable.
Period from late September
through early October after
typhoon danger is over and
before strong northeast mon-
soon begins may not be too
unfavorable for sea opera-
tions.
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