SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION THROUGH 1961

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• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: August 2, 1956
• Content Type: NIE

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-NIE 11-4-56
2 August 1956
IS # 033275
NATIONAL INTELLIGEATTSITAA A TE
NUMBER 11-4-56
(Supersedes NIE 11-3-55)
SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE
COURSES OF ACTION THROUGH 1961
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 2 August 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant, In-
telligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval
Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; and the Atomic
Energy Commission Representative to the IAC. The Assist-
ant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the
subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
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CON DEN11AL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM
1
CONCLUSIONS
1
DISCUSSION
6
Introduction: Soviet Developments in Perspective
6
I. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
7
"Collective Leadership"
7
Party Reform
8
Relaxation of Internal Tensions
8
The Anti-Stalin Campaign
9
II. THE USSR'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST
BLOC STATES
11
Sino-Soviet Relations
11
Soviet-Satellite Relations
11
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY
13
Economic Policy
13
Post-Stalin Policies
13
The Sixth Five-Year Plan
13
Economic Growth
13
Distribution of GNP
14
Developments in Industry
17
Investment
19
Labor Force
19
Productivity
19
Regional Distribution of Industry
20
Developments in Agriculture
20
Developments in Consumption
22
Developments in Foreign Trade
22
IV. SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
24
Scientific Resources and Policy
24
Scientific and Technical Developments of Economic and
Social Significance
25
Scientific and Technical Developments of Military
Significance
26
Nuclear Weapons
26
Guided Missiles
27
Electronics
28
Biological Warfare
29
Chemical Warfare
29
e
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TABLE OF CONTENTS?Continued
Page
V. SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTHS
30
Trends in Soviet Military Thinking
30
Trends in Strength and Effectiveness of Soviet Forces
31
Likelihood of Force Reductions
31
Effectiveness of Soviet Forces
33
Soviet Ground Forces
34
Soviet Air Forces
36
Soviet Naval Forces
38
VI. SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES
41
Soviet Strategy for the Initial Phase of a General War. .
41
Strategic Air Capabilities
43
Surface-to-Surface Guided Missile Capabilities
43
Air Defense Capabilities
44
Offensive Capabilities in Western Europe
45
Offensive Capabilities in the Far East
45
Airborne Capabilities
45
Naval Capabilities
46
VII. THE SOVIET ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION.
47
Ideological Factors
47
Internal Factors
47
External Factors
47
Future Trends
48
VIII. PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION
49
Present Soviet Objectives
49
General Aspects of Soviet Policy
49
War and "Coexistence"
49
Diplomacy and Propaganda
50
Communist Parties in the Free World
51
Trade and Economic Aid Policies
51
Disarmament
51
Courses of Action in Particular Areas
52
Europe
52
Asia
53
Middle East
54
Africa
55
Latin America
55
APPENDICES
A. Tables of Military Strength
56
B. Estimated Soviet Total Defense Expenditures, 1950-1961
75
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SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES
OF ACTION THROUGH 1961
THE PROBLEM
To examine the political, economic, scientific, and military strengths and weak-
nesses of the USSR and to estimate probable Soviet courses of action through 1961.
CONCLUSIONS
General
A. The changes in Soviet internal and ex-
ternal policies over the last three years
have resulted from the effort of the re-
gime to cope with problems ignored or
aggravated by Stalin's arbitrary personal
rule, and to develop tactics and methods
which the Soviet leaders deem better
suited to advancing Soviet interests in a
changing world situation. It is not clear
where this process of change will ulti-
mately lead; the current Soviet leaders
are probably capable of even more flexi-
bility than they have already demon-
strated. But they have shown no in-
clination to depart from the totalitarian
character of the Soviet state or to aban-
don their aim of expanding the Commu-
nist sphere of power and their ultimate
objective of achieving a Communist-
dominated world. (Paras. 1-3)
B. We believe that the principal objec-
tives of Soviet policy over the next several
years are: (1) to increase the economic
strength and military capabilities of the
Sino-Soviet Bloc; (2) to weaken the co-
hesion of the non-Communist world, and
particularly to disrupt NATO; (3) to
cause a retraction of Western power and
influence, and particularly to force with-
drawal of US military power from its
present deployment around the periphery
of the Bloc; and (4) to expand Soviet in-
fluence throughout the world by politi-
cal, economic, and subversive means.
(Para. 158)
Probable Courses of Action
C. In pursuing these objectives, the So-
viet leaders probably intend to maintain
for a considerable period the general
posture of "peaceful coexistence" with
the nbn-Communist world which they
have been developing, especially since the
spring of 1955. They will continue the
effort to identify Bloc policies with peace,
anticolonialism, and social and economic
progress, and to label the Western Powers,
especially the US, as opponents of these
causes. This effort is intended to end
the isolation of the USSR and the Com-
munist parties which resulted from So-
viet postwar policy, to facilitate Commu-
nist political action in popular fronts
with democratic groups, and thus to in-
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crease Soviet influence in the non-Com-
munist world. (Paras. 161, 165, 167)
D. The policy of peaceful coexistence re-
flects the Soviet leaders' awareness of the
dangers of nuclear war inherent in a
policy of aggression as well as their ap-
preciation of the political opportunities
opened up by their present policy in
many areas. Accordingly, we believe
that the USSR will try to avoid courses
of action which in its judgment would
involve serious risk of general war.
Nevertheless, insurrection or aggression
by local Communist forces might occur if
the Communists are presented with op-
portunities which seem to them to in-
volve minimal risk of large-scale conflict.
Such aggression might even become
probable if the Communists judge the po-
litical condition of the non-Communist
world to be such that local aggression
would promote confusions and divisions
rather than stimulate renewed vigilance
and determination. (Paras. 159; 161, 163)
E. The issues presented by the Chinese
offshore islands and by Indochina appear
at present to offer the greatest possibility
of a Communist resort to armed action.
On both issues the Communists might
hope to justify resort to military action
on grounds that would be accepted by
considerable elements of world public
opinion, and moreover might expect that
the US would be deterred from armed
intervention by the opposition of its allies
and by the fear of alienating some im-
portant states of Asia. For the present,
however, the USSR apparently intends
to curb tensions surrounding both issues,
while encouraging by diplomacy and
propaganda a gradual erosion of Western
resolve to oppose Communist expansion
in these areas. (Para. 178)
F. The underdeveloped countries have
emerged in the last year as particular
targets of the new Soviet policy. We be-
lieve that the USSR will vigorously pur-
sue its recently expanded efforts to estab-
lish wider economic as well as political
relations with these countries. Estimated
Soviet industrial production would per-
mit considerable increases in exports of
capital equipment and military end items
without appreciable adverse effect on in-
ternal Bloc programs, and even with
some economic advantage. (Paras. 31,
60-63, 165b-c, 167)
G. In particular, the USSR will almost
certainly persist in a vigorous effort to
displace Western influence in the Middle
Eastern and adjacent African states and
to align them with the Bloc. The USSR
is using the Suez controversy and the
Arab-Israeli conflict to enhance its influ-
ence in the Arab world. We believe, how-
ever, that the Soviet leaders recognize
that vital Western interests are so deep-
ly involved in the area that the USSR
would be courting major political and
possibly military risks if it supported the
Arabs in violent courses of action affect-
ing either issue. (Paras. 179-182)
H. In Europe, the USSR will not relax its
efforts to frustrate West German rearma-
ment and to weaken NATO ties and de-
fense efforts. On the central problem of
Germany, we believe that for at least
the next several years the USSR will in-
sist on maintaining the division of the
country. For some time to come the
Soviet leaders will probably consider that
even neutralization would not provide
sufficient assurance against a reunified
Germany's tacit alliance with the West.
(Paras. 172-174)
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Internal Political Developments
I. At least for the time being, the prob-
lem of providing a continuing effective
leadership in the Soviet state to replace
Stalin's one-man rule has apparently
been resolved. Despite the evident pri-
macy of Khrushchev, there seems to be
a collective participation in policy formu-
lation by at least the small group in the
Communist Party Presidium. A key
feature of this "collective leadership" is
the apparent denial of control over the
police power to any single leader. No
firm estimate can be made as to whether
the present apparent stability within the
top leadership will continue indefinitely
or whether one or another figure will
eventually emerge in something like the
absolute position held by Stalin. But
even if a struggle for power should occur,
we believe that it would be resolved with-
out open violence and without basically
weakening the regime's control. (Paras.
4-8)
J. The recent repudiation of Stalin marks
a new phase in the regime's attempt to
convince the Soviet people, and world
opinion as well, that it has departed from
the evils of Stalin's rule. By providing
greater security against police abuses,
permitting broader contact with the non-
Soviet world, and otherwise easing some-
what the conditions of life in the USSR,
the regime is attempting to cultivate more
favorable attitudes towards itself and its
goals. It is particularly interested in
soliciting initiative on the part of the
professional classes and party officials in
order to advance its current efforts for
greater economic efficiency and produc-
tivity. However, the attempt to strike a
new balance between. coercion and free-
dom has not involved any weakening of
the means of control, including the police
apparatus. We believe that the regime
could return to Stalin's harsher disci-
pline, though at the cost of some disillu-
sionment which would hamper it in the
achievement of its goals. (Paras. 11-19)
Soviet Military Strength and Capabilities
K. There will probably be a decrease in
the personnel strength of the USSR's
active military establishment. The an-
nounced reductions, which we believe
would affect principally the ground forces,
may reduce over-all active strength to
about three million men, and possibly
somewhat lower. However, the over-all
effectiveness of Soviet forces for modern
warfare will continue to increase, prima-
rily due to the improved weapons becom-
ing available in quantity, to changes in
organization, and to adaptation of doc-
trine and tactics designed to fit Soviet
forces for nuclear warfare. (Paras. 98-
101)
L. Current and prospective military pro-
grams are likely to result in the following
principal developments affecting Soviet
military strength during the next five
years:
_ 1. The USSR's nuclear stockpile, rang-
ing from very low-yield weapons to high-
yield thermonuclear weapons, will con-
tinue to grow rapidly. The upward re-
vision' of our estimates of Soviet fission-
able materials production and the Soviet
test of a multimegaton weapon lead us
to conclude that the USSR now has a
significant multimegaton capability and
will soon have a major one. (Paras. 76-
81)
See the footnote by the Director of Naval Intel-
ligence to Paragraph 76.
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2. We estimate that the USSR now has
about 1,300 aircraft in its Long-Range Air
Force, including 35 BISON jet heavy
bombers, 30 BEAR turbo-prop heavy
bombers, 475 BADGER jet medium bomb-
ers, and 760 BULL piston medium bomb-
ers. Based on a judgment as to what
Soviet planners probably estimate their
requirements to be, and on recent in-
creases in the number of air regiments,
we now estimate that the USSR is build-
ing toward a force of about 1,500 modern
bomber-type aircraft by mid-1960. We
also believe that in the light of probable
Soviet optimum requirements, including
those for attack on the continental US,
a likely composition of this force would be
about 800 jet and turbo-prop heavy
bombers and 700 jet medium bombers.'
Many unknown factors, for example the
degree of future Soviet success in the
guided missile field, could lead to Soviet
decisions which would alter both the
size of this force and the balance be-
tween types of aircraft. Long-Range
Aviation will probably acquire improved
base and staging facilities and a sub-
stantial inflight refueling capability.
By 1961, a new medium bomber with
"supersonic dash" capabilities may be in-
troduced. (Paras. 115-118)
3. At present, the USSR could have a
small number of ballistic missiles with
ranges up to 900 n.m. These could carry
small and medium-yield nuclear war-
heads, and in the period 1958-1959 could
be fitted with high-yield nuclear war-
heads. By 1958-1959, the USSR could
also have a small number of intermediate-
range ballistic missiles (1,600 n.m.) , and
2The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army, believes it unlikely that a
force of this magnitude and composition would
be developed. See his footnote to Paragraph 115.
by 1960-1961, a small number of inter-
continental ballistic missiles. (Para. 139)
4. The USSR will considerably strength-
en its air defense capability, including
by 1961 a fighter force more than 50 per-
cent equipped with all-weather types, im-
proved electronic equipment, and im-
proved guided missiles and warheads.
(Paras. 79, 113, 140-142)
5. A substantial increase will probably
take place in Soviet submarine strength,
which is now estimated at 445 vessels,
about half of them being medium and
long-range craft of postwar design. Sub-
marine building rates will probably con-
tinue to increase through 1957 but de-
crease in 1958 due in part to the impact
of the nuclear-powered submarine pro-
gram and the probable adaptation of
present submarines to missile weapons
systems. If the estimated 1958 rate were
maintained through the rest of the period,
this would result in a mid-1961 force of
approximately 900 submarines of all
types, including about 800 long and me-
dium-range boats of postwar design.
However, we have no intelligence to in-
dicate planned future Soviet submarine
strength. The Soviet Navy will probably
also acquire surface vessels equipped to
launch guided missiles. (Paras. 120, 122,
124)
6. Soviet Army ground forces are being
modernized to achieve improved fire-
power, mobility, and combat effectiveness
for both nuclear and non-nuclear war-
fare. They are being supplied with a
wide variety of new weapons and equip-
ment, and will probably acquire guided
missiles and tactical nuclear weapons.
(Paras. 103, 108)
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M. The size and composition of the
USSR's military establishment will be
subject to further modification as the
period advances and the Soviet leaders
reappraise their military requirements
and strategy in the light of the capa-
bilities of the new weapons, the world bal-
ance of military forces, and the inter-
national political situation. We believe,
however, that the Soviet leaders will con-
tinue to maintain formidable military
power as a basis for their policy and to
meet political and military contin-
gencies. They will almost certainly not
submit their military programs to the
constraints of a comprehensive system
of international inspection and control.
Soviet capabilities for nuclear or non-
nuclear warfare of large or small scale,
including direct attack on the US, will
increase considerably by 1961. (Paras.
94-95, 169)
Developments in the Soviet Economy
N. We now estimate that the present
high rate of Soviet economic growth will
decline only slightly by 1961, when it will
still exceed six percent per year. As a
result, Soviet gross national product
(GNP) in 1961 will be nearly 50 percent
above its 1955 level or about 45 percent
as large as the projected US GNP; in
1955 it was about 37 percent as large as
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army, does not concur in the
cost study upon which this conclusion is based.
He does not believe that there is sufficient in-
formation available to estimate the relative mili-
tary burden on the Soviet economy. See his
footnote to Appendix B.
See also the footnote by the Director of Naval
Intelligence, attached to Appendix B.
the actual US GNP. Since Soviet de-
,fense expenditures, despite the new
weapons programs in prospect, will prob-
ably increase less rapidly than GNP over
this period, the relative military burden
on the economy should decline slightly. 3
(Paras. 32-34, 37)
0. Present Soviet economic policy clearly
envisages continued high priority for
heavy industry, and we estimate that
such production will increase by 70 per-
cent or more during the next five years.
The probable reduction in military man-
power will facilitate this growth by pro-
viding additions to the labor force.
Agricultural production will grow more
slowly, probably increasing by about one
quarter; such growth would provide the
basis for a continued improvement in
Material welfare. (Paras. 27, 29, 40, 43,
53, 55)
P. Soviet scientific and technical capabil-
ities continue to expand rapidly. Soviet
industrial technology has demonstrated
that it is able to adapt and introduce the
most advanced methods of production,
although the average level of Soviet prac-
tices still lags considerably behind that
of the West. Moreover, the USSR almost
certainly has the scientific and techno-
logical capability necessary to develop
weapons and military equipment which
are generally equal to those of any other
nation, and in the technological race
there are times when in certain fields the
USSR may well be ahead of the US and
times when the US will outstrip the
USSR. (Paras. 64, 72, 75)
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DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION ? SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS
IN PERSPECTIVE
1. The three years since the death of Stalin
have seen much change on the Soviet scene.
The men who succeeded him have adopted
external policies which they deem to be better
calculated to advance Soviet world interests,
and internal policies which they consider more
adroit for maintaining the Communist Party's
control of the governmental machinery and
of the population. This development has re-
flected their awareness of a changing world
situation which had outmoded some of the
tactics and policies pursued in the postwar
period. In part, also, change in the USSR
has probably been a consequence of long-term
trends related to rapid industrialization, the
spread of general education, and the creation
of new social classes. The present leaders
have sought to release Soviet domestic and
foreign policy from the more rigid mold in
which Stalin had cast it. Their modifications
in his system have caused the Soviet scene to
lose some of the static character it had ac-
quired under the former dictator. It is not
yet clear where this new Soviet flexibility will
ultimately lead, but the fact of its emergence
has become evident. To assess the problems
confronting US policy it has become as im-
portant to focus on what is changing as on
what is constant in the Soviet challenge.
2. Stalin's successors were confronted with
the urgent problem of governing effectively a
totalitarian empire whose whole functioning
was based upon the absolute power of one
man. In addition, they were confronted with
a number of problems in both internal and
foreign policy which Stalin had either ignored
or aggravated. Though the resulting process
of review and adjustment is likely to con-
tinue, an important stage in that process was
reached at the Twentieth Party Congress of
the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956,
where the new leaders presented their policies
and programs in comprehensive fashion.
They also demonstrated their intention to
effect changes by their move to discredit many
aspects of Stalin's regime and to reduce dras-
tically his historical stature. As will be evi-
dent from the different sections of this paper
which follow, the effort to correct abuses and
errors in Stalin's system has affected almost
every aspect of Soviet internal and external
policy.
3. To date, however, the post-Stalin leaders
have shown no inclination to depart from the
totalitarian character of the Soviet state.
Rather they are seeking to organize and de-
velop the power of the system more effectively
and to adapt it to changing conditions. Nor
has the present leadership departed from the
Communist conviction that the struggle be-
tween the Communist and non-Communist
worlds will continue. It adheres to the fun-
damental Communist objectives of destroying
free states and expanding the Communist
sphere of power. Although the Soviet leaders
are now relying more upon political and eco-
nomic action than upon force or the explicit
threat of force, they are pursuing their goals
with undiminished vigor and apparently with
high confidence. None of the changes that
have come about on the Soviet scene since
Stalin's death, important as these have been,
suggest that the threat which Soviet and
Communist power and purposes pose to the
free world is likely to diminish during the
period of this estimate.
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I. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
"COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP"
4. Stalin's power had become so absolute that
all organs of party and state were subject to
his personal control. Upon his death, his
successors were confronted with the problem
of reconstituting the supreme authority in the
Soviet structure of power. The Presidium
of the Communist Party Central Committee
became the repository of the dictatorship.
This 11-man body continues to exercise abso-
lute power, and despite the more frequent
meetings of the 133-man Central Committee
and other Party bodies, the Presidium is clear-
ly the initiator of policy and the final focus of
decision.4
5. The Soviet leaders describe the arrange-
ments which obtain at the highest level of
power in the Presidium as "collective leader-
ship." We have little specific information on
the relationships among the highest Soviet
leaders, but it is clear that these men are not
of equal stature and authority. Khrushchev's
public prominence and his hold on the key
position of Party First Secretary, by means
of which he has apparently been able to as-
sign many of his proteges to important party
and state posts, suggest that he is the domi-
nant figure. For the present, however, wheth-
er as the result of a balance of forces among
the top leaders or of a voluntary agreement
among them, there do appear to be limits to
Khrushchev's power, and there is apparently
collective participation in policy formulation.
6. A key feature of the relationship among the
top leaders is the apparent subjection of the
police power to collective control. Such an
arrangement would be plausible, since it was
Stalin's manipulation of the police power
which enabled him to physically liquidate his
opponents and brought about the excesses of
the purge period. The present leaders, out of
concern for the continuity and stability of the
Soviet state itself, as well as for their indi-
4 An organizational chart of the Soviet Party and
Government appears on the following page.
vidual safety, would probably not wish to see
such a period return. The very great stress
given at the Twentieth Congress to the "col-
lective leadership" formula as the original and
correct party doctrine, which Stalin's "cult of
personality" had allowed to fall into neglect,
suggests that forces are at work to prevent
the re-emergence of one-man rule.
7. We cannot estimate with firmness whether
the present apparent stability within the top
leadership will continue or whether one or an-
other figure will emerge again in something
like the absolute position held by Stalin. Even
with collective control of the police power,
there will almost certainly continue to be
factional divisions, intrigues for position and
influence, and disputes over policy. "Collec-
tive leadership" might break down over a fun-
damental divergence of view on some issue
deemed crucial to the security or development
of the Soviet state, or as the result of an
attempt by one or a few members to acquire
supreme power. Even if a struggle for su-
preme power should occur, we believe that it
would be resolved (as in the elimination of
Beria and the demotion of Malenkov) without
open violence involving large-scale use of
police or military organs, and without weak-
ening the regime's control.
8. The members of the Presidium not only
appear to be sharing the policy-making power,
but apparently are trying to bring to bear on
their problems greater realism and more ex-
pert knowledge. They have apparently broad-
ened the circle of consultation, at least con-
cerning the technical and practical aspects of
policy. We believe that Soviet foreign policy,.
economic planning, and military programs
are now more strongly influenced than former-
ly by the advice of specialists in these fields.
This apparent freer participation and greater
responsibility of professionals and experts has
been one of the strengths of the post-Stalin
regime. This development has probably great-
ly improved the morale of higher officials in
the Party, government, and armed forces.
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UNCLASSIFIED
USSR
PARTY AND GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION
PARTY GOVERNMENT
PRESIDIUM SECRETARIAT
MEMBERS
BU LGANIN
VOROSHILOV? ?
KAGANOVICH
MIKOYAN
MOLOTOV-- --- ?
PERVUKHIN--
SA BU ROV ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
FIRST SECRETARY
KHRUSHCHEV ----Khrushchev ? -----
KIRICHENKO
SECRETARIES
MALENKOV
SUSWV? ?Suslov
CANDIDATES
Shvernik
Zhukov
Muldiitdinov
Brezhnev------Brezhnev
Shepilov? ?Shepilov
Fu rtseva? ? --- Furtseva
Aristov
Belyayev
Pospelov
-t.
Central Committee
Party Congress
25518 6.56
PRESIDIUM OF
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS SUPREME SOVIET
PRESIDIUM
CHAIRMAN
Bulganin
? ? --- ?
FIRST DEPUTY
CHAIRMEN
Kaganovich
Mikoyan
Molotov
Pervukhin
? Saburov
? DEPUTY CHAIRMEN
Malenkov
Kosygin
Malyshev
Tevosyan
Khrunichev
Kucherenko
Matskevich
Zavenyagin
48 Other ministers.
4 Other officials of
ministerial rank.
CHAIRMAN
(CHIEF OF STATE)
Voroshilov
16 DEPUTY CHAIRMEN
(The Chairmen of the
Sukreme Soviet Pre-
sidiums in the 16
Rekublics.)
SECRETARY
Pegov
MEMBERS
? ? Khrushchev
?Kirichenko
Shvernik
(In addition there
re-es1:fTer mem-
im'iortance?er
Supreme Soviet
ISoviet of the Union Soviet of Nationalities
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PARTY REFORM
9. Beyond the stabilization of power at the
very top level, one of the most important
objectives of the new leadership has been to
restore function and vitality to the whole
structure of the Communist Party itself. The
new leaders have apparently felt that Stalin's
personal absolutism was causing the Party to
degenerate into bureaucratic ineffectiveness.
They regarded a revival of Party activism as
necessary to make the Party a more effective
instrument of policy implementation and mass
persuasion, as well as to place themselves in
closer touch with popular attitudes. Accord-
ingly, the Central Committee and Party Con-
gress are meeting at intervals prescribed by
Party statutes. Local Party organizations are
required to meet regularly and to adopt the
"collective leadership" practiced at the top.
There is renewed emphasis on practical criti-
cism from below. The redefinition of Party
doctrines and tactics at the Twentieth Party
Congress in closer conformity with political
realities, internal and external, was probably
also designed to contribute to a revival of
Party spirit.
10. The drive to revitalize the Party has taken
place under the slogan of a return to "Lenin-
ist norms of Party life." The myth surround-
ing the name of Lenin, to which the new lead-
ers have particularly attached themselves,
probably in part to establish the legitimacy of
their succession and in part to justify the
changes being made in Stalin's system, has
come to include the assertion that there was
genuine "Party democracy" in Lenin's time.
There was in fact freer discussion within the
Party while Lenin lived and for a few years
thereafter. But even under Lenin "Party de-
mocracy" meant that debate and criticism was
combined with strict discipline from the top.
The new leadership, in dealing with the Len-
inist concept of "Party democracy," has indi-
cated that it will not permit criticism to im-
pair discipline.
RELAXATION OF INTERNAL TENSIONS
11. The claim of the leadership that it is
reviving Party democracy reflects an acute
awareness of one of the serious problems fac-
ing the regime. The new leaders evidently
believe that Stalin's policies of coercion and
unpredictable terror, even against the Party
itself, had done much to paralyze active par-
ticipation and initiative. This was true not
only within the Party but also within the
government and economic administration and
in the fields of art and science as well. Coer-
cion was no longer believed to be the best
way of achieving the regime's goals and Sta-
lin's death provided an opportunity to alter
his methods of obtaining compliance. The
size and complexity of the Soviet economy
and the problems of increasing productivity
and improving technology called for more re-
sponsibility and initiative on the part of man-
agers, bureaucrats, and Party officials, as well
as more cooperative attitudes on the part of
the general population.
12. Behind many of the regime's moves in the
post-Stalin period lies an attempt to strike a
new balance between coercion and initiative,
between discipline and freedom, more con-
ducive to the attainment of the goals of the
Soviet state. These moves have included the
amnesty of many persons sentenced to labor
camps, an easing in some degree of the forced
labor system, increased security of the citi-
zen against arbitrary arrest, broader cultural
exchanges with the West, and measures de-
signed to continue a gradual rise in standards
of living. Industrial managers, scientists, in-
tellectuals, and professional people of all kinds
have been the principal beneficiaries of these
developments. But there are also signs that
the Soviet people as a whole may be ac-
quiring a more favorable attitude toward the
regime as a result of slowly improving mate-
rial conditions and the increase in personal
security. There is apparently a widely held
opinion among the Soviet people that their
lot is improving. This probably represents a
considerable psychological gain for the re-
gime as compared with Stalin's last years, and
eases the task of the Soviet leaders in solving
their current internal problems.
13. On the other hand, the regime has not
lost freedom of action vis-a-vis the Soviet
people. It has control of the whole apparatus
of police power, although this apparatus has
been moved somewhat into the background.
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It has not made any irretrievable concessions
and could impose on the Soviet people any
course that it chose. But the mere fact that
the new Soviet leaders have made gestures
toward appeasing the Soviet people is a source
of possible future difficulty. While they would
not need to anticipate anything approaching
a loss of control over the Soviet people if they
returned to Stalin's harsher discipline, they
could do so only at the cost of a measure
of disillusionment and alienation which would
hamper them in the achievement of their
goals. The cost in these terms of such a
reversion would probably increase the longer
the present milder policy was continued.
THE ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN
14. The intention to reduce the Stalin myth
in some degree was manifest throughout the
three-year period following the dictator's
death. It was evidenced by emphasis on col-
lectivity in leadership, by efforts to rebuild
Lenin as the greater figure, and by growing
attacks on the "cult of personality." This
campaign led finally at the Twentieth Party
Congress to attacks on Stalin himself, both
implicit and explicit. We believe that this
was the result of a deliberate decision by the
leadership.
15. There were probably several motives be-
hind this decision. The Soviet leaders prob-
ably believed that the move would advance
their current foreign policy in many respects.
The attacks on Stalin were intended to blur
the image of aggression and subversion which
had become associated with Soviet policy, and
to give the Soviet regime an appearance of
respectability. The Soviet leaders probably
estimated that the effects would be felt not
only in neutralist countries but even in states
belonging to the Western alliance.
16. However, considerations relating to in-
ternal developments were almost certainly
primary. The new leaders wished to repudiate
Stalin's use of terror against the Soviet people
and especially against the Party, to set up
obstacles to a return to one-man rule, and to
confirm the ascendancy of the Party as an in-
stitution. Moreover, they apparently found
it desirable to eliminate the absolute authority
9
attached to Stalin's past pronouncements in
order to attain the desired flexibility in carry-
ing out their new programs. The leadership
probably hopes by these means to give the
regime continuity and stability, and to free it
from the hazards of a struggle for power to
which a totalitarian state is subject.
17. Beyond this, there were probably motives
which related to the attempt to improve the
relationship between the regime and the peo-
ple, by relying less on coercion and more on
a voluntary response to attain the regime's
goals. Probably the leaders felt that a dra-
matic demonstration such as the direct attack
on Stalin was necessary to win confidence in
the genuineness of their intention to solicit
initiative, eliminate the abuses of Stalin's sys-
tem of terror, and improve the material lot of
the Soviet people.
18. There are clearly some risks for the re-
gime in the reduction of so authoritative a
myth as that surrounding Stalin. These arise
from the implication that Communist author-
ity, including that embodied in the present
leaders, lacks the integrity and omniscience
which it has always claimed for itself. The
present emphasis given to the Party as the
real embodiment of authority and wisdom is
intended to counter this danger. The essence
of Stalin's errors is said to be that he placed
himself above the Party. Among the popula-
tion generally and especially among youth
this rationalization has apparently failed to
carry complete conviction and there has been
some disillusionment, though this is probably
temporary. On the other hand, there are mil-
lions of ordinary Soviet people who have per-
sonal knowledge of the injustices practiced in
the Stalin era and who can be persuaded of
Stalin's responsibility even though many may
not absolve the present leaders of complicity.
Among elite groups such as higher Party
members, economic managers, government of-
ficials, and the professional military, the move
has apparently won approval, partly because
they have intimate knowledge of Stalin's
abuses, and partly because they welcome the
promise of greater professional opportunities
and enhanced security under the new leader-
ship.
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19. We believe that over the long run the
regime will continue to be confronted with
the problem of obtaining the benefits of a
greater measure of individual initiative and
responsibility within the framework of a totali-
tarian system. It will probably not be willing
to depart very far from the methods which
10
Stalin developed for the manipulation of pow-
er in the Soviet state. Probably the attempt
to strike a new balance between discipline and
initiative will either fall short of winning suf-
ficient response or it will evoke trends which
the regime will regard as unacceptable and
requiring new measures of coercion.
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II. THE USSR'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST BLOC STATES
20. The unique authority of Stalin as a "world
historical personality" was a factor in the close
integration of the Communist Bloc. His
death probably required some redefinition of
relations between the Bloc states on a less
personal basis, although this was certainly
less true of the USSR's relations with Com-
munist China than of its relations with the
East European regimes. We believe that
despite some friction and confusion, especially
in the European Satellites, the transition will
be completed without serious disruption.
Throughout the period of this estimate the
Sino-Soviet Bloc will probably maintain its
solidarity of interest and coordination of
policy.
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
21. The concert of action between the USSR
and Communist China has remained strong.
Close coordination has been evidenced in the
campaign for increasing friendship and eco-
nomic relations with non-Bloc nations. The
intensity of Communist China's campaign to
"liberate Taiwan" has been moderated, prob-
ably in accordance with Soviet tactics to "re-
duce international tensions." The Chinese
Communists have frequently not followed the
Soviet model on aspects of internal policy, but
we believe that these divergences will not im-
pair Sino-Soviet relations. The Chinese Com-
munists continue to acknowledge frankly
their dependence on Soviet aid and advice.
The Soviet commitment to aid China's high
priority program of industrialization was re-
cently extended well into China's Second Five-
Year Plan (1958-1962) at about the same an-
nual level that has prevailed for the last five
years.
22. We believe that the USSR and Communist
China will continue to be closely linked not
only by ideological bonds, but by common
hostility to the US, by an interdependence
involving Communist China's manpower and
strategic location and the USSR's industrial
and technical capabilities, and by the advan-
tages of concerted diplomatic and economic
activities. !There probably are and will con-
tinue to be points of friction in the relation-
ship, but not of such importance to either
party as to overbalance the joint interest in
maintaining it, or to permit outside influence
to affect it basically. Peiping's continued
dependence on Moscow for arms, industrial
resources, and technical assistance will prob-
ably give Moscow's views the greater weight
on major questions of global policy. But
Peiping's growing strength and prestige as an
Asian power will probably give it increasing
potential for influencing Moscow on Asian
issues.
SOVIET-SATELLITE RELATIONS
23. The current Soviet leaders apparently
believe that Stalin's policy of dictation from
Moscow of virtually all aspects of Satellite
affairs was not to the over-all advantage of the
USSR. They apparently blame the excessive
rigidity of Moscow's control under Stalin for
Yugoslavia's loss to the Bloc, although they
probably believe that no other Satellite would
be able to follow Yugoslavia's course. They
apparently feel that a somewhat looser rein
in internal matters which takes account of
national differences and local problems will
result in a sounder and more effective relation-
ship. At the ? same time, such actions as the
dissolution of the Cominform and the rehabili-
tation of Satellite leaders purged for nation-
alist deviation, which have the effect of depict-
ing the Satellite regimes in an apparently more
independent role, are useful steps in support
of the USSR's current tactics in foreign policy.
The appearance of a relaxation of Soviet con-
trol in the Satellites not only suits the general
"relaxation of tensions" theme, but it bears
directly on the campaign to bring Yugoslavia
back into the Bloc and on the effort to obtain
contact and ultimately a "popular front" al-
liance with Socialist parties throughout the
world.
24. The general direction in which the redef-
inition of the Soviet-Satellite relationship is
moving now appears somewhat more clearly.
There is apparently to be a much greater de-
gree of inter-Satellite cooperation, although
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inter-Satellite arrangements will still be under
Moscow's ultimate control. The Satellite
regimes are being permitted to expand eco-
nomic relations with the West, thus increas-
ing their own industrial and trading effec-
tiveness. Concessions are also being made to
Satellite national sentiment. They are no
longer obliged to sacrifice their own prestige
by applauding all things Soviet. Recent
changes in Satellite leadership, the new,
though discreet, emphasis on the existence of
"separate national roads to socialism," and
the withdrawal of the charges of deviation
against Yugoslavia are further steps in this
direction. The picture which emerges, if pres-
ent trends continue throughout the period of
the estimate, is one in which the Satellite
regimes will enjoy a real if limited autonomy
in domestic affairs, and one in which their
dependence on Moscow will be more effec-
tively masked.
25. There are some risks for the USSR in this
post-Stalin course, particularly in the pos-
sibility of exaggerated expectations in the
Satellites. By permitting an atmosphere of
expectant change to develop, Bloc leaders
will probably stimulate new nationalist and
reformist sentiment, even within the Satellite
parties themselves, which could exceed the
level that they anticipated or could safely
allow. In the course of reversing Stalinist
policies, particularly toward Yugoslavia, the
USSR has weakened and in some cases de-
stroyed the position of competent and de-
pendable leaders. On the other hand, by seek-
12
ing to maintain in power many of the leaders
who were identified with Stalinist policies,
the USSR risks disillusioning those who
believed in its promises of greater independ-
ence and respect for national differences.
Finally, the new policies will introduce a new
element of complexity in Soviet-Satellite re-
lations, with age-old controversies in Eastern
Europe and differences in national tradition
and temperament almost certainly increasing
in importance.
26. Nevertheless, the basic instruments of
Soviet domination ? a core of Communist
careerists whose first loyalty is to Moscow,
the functioning of Soviet advisers at key
points in the Satellite armies and police sys-
tems, the substantial economic dependence of
the Satellites on the USSR imposed by Soviet-
directed economic plans, and the presence or
proximity of Soviet armed force ? will re-
main. Dissatisfaction among the Satellite
populations will continue and, in the short
run, may even increase and dramatize itself
in sporadic protest movements. Over the
longer run, if the regimes find it possible to
combine somewhat less stringent economic
policies with effective discipline, an increas-
ingly resigned and accommodating attitude
may emerge among the Satellite populations.
However, if active opposition should increase,
we believe that the regimes would employ
whatever measures were necessary to main-
tain themselves in power, even at the cost of
abandoning their current effort to conciliate
the populations under their control.
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III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY
ECONOMIC POLICY
27. Soviet economic policy continues to be
directed toward the most rapid possible
growth of the economy. The aim, stated at
the 20th Party Congress, of overtaking the US
in production, underscores this policy and
projects it well beyond the period of this esti-
mate. The USSR conceives of this competi-
tion primarily in terms of heavy industrial
output. Thus other sectors of the economy
tend to be developed only to the extent that
they support or at least do not hamper the
growth of heavy industry.
28. Post-Stalin Policies. While in this most
basic respect the present leaders have not
altered Stalin's policy, they have apparently
decided that several aspects of this policy were
producing diminishing returns or even becom-
ing self-defeating. First, agricultural stag-
'nation in the face of general population
growth, and an even faster urban increase,
focused attention upon the future adequacy
of the food supply, upon the wasteful use of
human and other resources in agriculture,
and upon the need for a better diet. Secondly,
the decline which the Soviet leaders probably
anticipated in numbers of new industrial
workers called for strenuous efforts to increase
individual productivity if planned economic
growth was to be achieved. Policy innova-
tions since 1953 have concentrated upon re-
solving these problems in order to insure
further advances in heavy industry.
29. The Sixth Five-Year Plan. Soviet eco-
nomic policy for most of the period of this
estimate is outlined in the Sixth Five-Year
Plan (1956-1960) , which was announced in
January 1956 and approved by the 20th Party
Congress in February. This plan, like its
predecessors, stresses industrial growth, call-
ing for a 65 percent increase in industrial
output. A high rate of investment is to be
maintained, still directed primarily into
heavy industry. This overriding claim upon
Soviet resources, plus the requirements of the
defense program, means that the growth in
consumption, although it will probably be con-
siderable, will continue to lag behind the
growth in total output.
30. However, since future growth also depends
upon agricultural progress, the manifold at-
tack on the agricultural problem will continue,
involving the New Lands and corn schemes,
better farming practices, higher investment
priority, improved income incentives for col-
lective farms and farmers, and stronger poli-
tical controls. The increases in food and fiber
output likely to be achieved should assist in-
dustry by raising worker morale. However,
increases in consumption on the scale cur-
rently promised will not occur until the USSR
achieves much more substantial increases in
agricultural output than we now estimate to
be likely. Gains in industrial productivity
will be sought primarily through further
professional and worker training, new meth-
ods of organization and management, and in-
troduction of the latest foreign and domestic
technology, including some re-equipment.
31. The policy of expanding trade with under-
developed countries, facilitated by offers of
credit on easy terms, was accelerated sharply
in 1955, and the USSR clearly intends to press
this policy vigorously. The present level of
industrial output and that which we estimate
for the next five years will permit considerable
increases in the currently small Soviet exports
of capital equipment to countries outside the
Bloc without appreciably affecting domestic
programs. This factor, coupled with the
availability of obsolescent materiel as a result
of the Soviet re-equipment program, would
permit substantial increases in Soviet exports
of military end-items. By exporting capital
goods and military end-items, the USSR could
obtain foodstuffs and raw materials in short
supply or costly to produce at home, and thus
expect economic gains as well as political
advantages.
ECONOMIC GROWTH
32. The gross national product (GNP) of the
USSR grew by an estimated 41 percent during
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the five-year period 1951-1955, an average
annual increase of about 7 percent. 5 We
estimate that during the six-year period 1956-
1961 Soviet GNP will grow at nearly the same
annual rate and in 1961 will be almost 50 per-
cent higher than in 1955. This growth will
come chiefly from a further rise in the already
high rate of capital investment, rapid gains in
productivity, and substantial although slight-
ly diminishing additions to the labor force.
The rate of growth of industrial production
will slacken off somewhat, but agricultural
output will probably grow about twice as fast
as in the 1951-1955 period.
33. The growth rate estimated above is higher
than that projected in NIE 11-3-55 (published
17 May 55) . Whereas the previous estimate
foresaw an increase of GNP of 42 percent in
1960 over 1954, with the growth rate falling
to slightly less than 5 percent in the final
year, it now appears that the GNP in 1960 will
be about 50 percent above 1954, and that even
in 1961 the growth rate will still exceed 6 per-
cent. This revision is based upon the con-
siderable amount of new data which has be-
come available in recent months and which
has led us to revise upward our previous
estimates of the growth of consumption and
therefore of GNP for the Fifth Five-Year
Plan; upon the strong growth trends observed
during 1955; and, most importantly, upon an
analysis of the Sixth Five-Year Plan which
The task of estimating Soviet GNP is compli-
cated not only by incomplete data but by con-
ceptual difficulties as well. The present esti-
mates have benefitted from the increased statis-
tical data made available in recent Soviet an-
nouncements, although important gaps remain,
particularly in the military sector, as Appendix
B indicates. Of the conceptual problems, the
most important relates to the composition of
GNP by end use and arises from the absence of
rental payments and capital charges in Soviet
agriculture. This has been resolved by imputing
a value from analogous relationships in the US
economy. Since this rough procedure accounts
for about 26 percent of our base-year estimate of
Soviet consumption, the results can make no
claim to complete accuracy. Despite this and
other difficulties, however, we regard these esti-
mates as a reasonably correct statement of the
size, composition, and growth of the Soviet
economy.
TOP
persuades us that most of the major industrial
targets will be fulfilled. The planned reduc-
tion in the armed forces, if largely carried out,
will alleviate labor shortages, probably the
most serious hindrance to achievement of
these goals.
34. The growth rate of Soviet GNP is nearly
twice that experienced by the US economy
during the past five years and anticipated in
the coming period. As a result, the relative
size of the Soviet economy increased from
about one third of the US economy in 1950
to about 37 percent in 1955 and will probably
reach about 45 percent in 1961. However, the
absolute gap between the two economies will
continue to widen over this period. Roughly
similar relationships obtain between the total
outputs of the US and the NATO countries
on the one hand and the Sino-Soviet Bloc on
the other. (See Figure 1.) Based solely on
a projection of present trends, the absolute
gap between the Soviet and US GNPs would
reach its widest point in the second half of
the 1960's and would then begin to narrow.
Distribution of GNP
35. In utilizing its growing output, the USSR
will continue to increase the share devoted
to investment. We estimate that investment
allocations will rise from about 26 percent of
GNP in 1955 to about 31 percent in 1961. (See
Figure 2.) Because of the growth in GNP
over this period, investment will be about 78
percent larger in the later year. Consump-
tion will probably grow by about 40 percent,
in part because of continued urbanization,
though its relative share of GNP will fall from
about 57 to about 54 percent. (For prospec-
tive increases in per capita consumption, see
Paragraph 55.) In contrast, the US in 1955
devoted about 66 percent of its GNP to con-
sumption and 20 percent to investment.
36. In US prices, Soviet investment in 1955
was about $38 billion, or about 54 percent of
US investment, while consumption was about
$63 billion, or 24 percent of US consumption
and about one fifth on a per capita basis.
The dollar value of total defense expenditures
in 1955 was about $37 billion, or virtually 100
percent of US defense expenditures.
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180
China
35
Eu. Sats.
41
USSR
104
FIGURE 1
COMPARISON OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCTS
(in Billions of 1955 Dollars at Market Prices)
1950 1955
574
Other
NATO
252
US
322
258
China
56
Eu. Sats.
57
USSR
145
701
Other
NATO
314
US
387
SECRET
370
China
76
Eu. Sats.
79
USSR
215
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1961
876
Other
NATO
392
US
484
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FIGURE 2
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT OF THE USSR
(By End Use in Billion 1953 Rubles at Factor Cost)
1950 1955 1961
772
Consumption
451
Investment
178
Defense
110
Administration
32
58%
23%
14%
4%
1,086
Consumption
623
Investment
284
Defense
?
151
Administration
29
NOTE: Details do not add to total because of rounding.
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57%
26%
14%
3%
1,616
Consumption
876
Investment
505
Defense
204
Administration
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31%
13%
2%
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37. An estimate of the ruble costs of past and
projected military programs indicates that
total defense expenditures will probably rise
by about 37 percent between 1955 and 1961. 6
Since GNP will probably grow at an even
higher rate (about 50 percent) , the relative
military burden on the economy should de-
cline slightly over this period. The detailed
study of defense expenditures indicates that
in 1955 not only was the dollar value of total
Soviet defense expenditures approximately
equal to US expenditures, but also that the
dollar value of Soviet hard goods procurement
was about equal to that of similar goods pro-
cured by the US.
38. That the Soviet Union by expending 14
percent of its GNP in rubles can obtain defense
goods and services equal in dollar value to
those of the US, which is expending for the
same activities 10.6 percent of a GNP two
and one half times as large, is explained by
two important economic conditions. First,
the average level of real pay and subsistence
provided to Soviet servicemen, like the general
standard of living, is very much lower than in
the US. Secondly, the Soviet armament in-
dustry is one of the USSR's most efficient in-
dustries. The dollar and ruble comparisons
above do not mean that the Soviet armament
industry is more efficient than the US arma-
ment industry. On the contrary, it is likely
that productivity (production per man) in the
6This estimate is based upon an inter-agency
study, details of which appear in Appendix B.
As explained there, a reduction of 1.2 million
men in the armed forces would lower defense
expenditures in 1961 by some 13-18 billion rubles;
correspondingly, the increase in defense expend-
itures between 1955 and 1961 would fall to about
27-30 percent. On the other hand, expenditures
for the guided missile program have almost cer-
tainly been understated in the study. The com-
bined result of these two factors cannot be pre-
dicted, but it is clear that they will offset each
other to some extent.
Note: The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Army does not consider the
costs derived in the inter-agency study to be a
valid appraisal of the over-all costs of the Soviet
military effort and does not concur in the find-
ings of the study. (See footnote to Appendix
B, Paragraph 1.)
See also the footnote by the Director of Naval
Intelligence attached to Appendix B, Paragraph 1.
Soviet armament industry is lower than pro-
ductivity in the corresponding US industry.
However, the Soviet armament industry is
very much more efficient than Soviet agri-
culture and the consumer goods industries.
While productivity in Soviet armament in-
dustry approaches that of the US, Soviet pro-
ductivity in consumer goods is much lower
and agriculture is only about one-seventh
that in the US. Consequently a ruble will
buy only about seven cents worth of goods
and services when spent for consumption
goods and services but will purchase from 20
to 25 cents worth when spent for defense pur-
poses. Thus, for example, if each country
transfers a worker from agriculture to defense
industry, the Soviet worker will produce near-
ly as much armaments as the American work-
er, but the loss of his production in agricul-
ture is far less than the corresponding loss in
the US and the sacrifice involved is less.
DEVELOPMENTS IN INDUSTRY
39. Despite the present size of Soviet indus-
trial output, only a moderate decline in its
high growth rate is estimated in the coming
five years. The major factors sustaining a
continued high rate of growth, estimated at
over 10 percent per year during the period of
this estimate, will be continuing heavy capital
investment, increases in the number and pro-
ductivity of workers, and improvements in
managerial and technical efficiency. We
estimate that total industrial output will prob-
ably increase by 65 percent or more in the
Sixth Plan as compared with 77 percent in
the Fifth. Output in 1961 will probably be
83 percent or more above the 1955 level. (See
Table I for the estimated output of selected
industrial commodities.)
40. Of particular interest is the trend in the
output of heavy industry, which is basic to
future growth, military strength, and capa-
bility to export capital goods. In this sector,
the increase during the Sixth Plan period will
probably amount to 70 percent or more as
against 84 percent during the Fifth. The
rate of growth of heavy industry nevertheless
remains strikingly larger than that of the
US and will provide the USSR in 1960 with
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TABLE I
ESTIMATED OUTPUT OF SELECTED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
USSR 1950, 1955,
and 1961:
1950
USSR
US 1955
USSR
1955
US
1961 a
USSR
Electric Power (billion kwh)
90
170
655
363
Crude Petroleum (million tons) b
38
71
335
150
Coal (million tons)
261
391
450
633
Crude Steel (million tons)
27
45
106
73
Refined Copper (thousand tons)
302
462
1,052
746
Aluminum (thousand tons)
210
588
1,497
1,240
Cement (million tons)
10
22
51
63
Machine Tools (thousand units) '
79
105
80
200
Freight Cars (thousand 2-axle equivalent units)
102
69
71
100
Trucks (thousand units)
294
329
1,190
447
Synthetic Ammonia (thousand tons) d
520,
753
2,859
1,596
Cotton Fabrics (million meters)
3,900
5,904
8,950
7,500
Washing Machines (thousand units)
0.3
87
4,237
616
Meat (thousand tons, slaughter wgt.)
3,075
4,000
12,241
5,200
?The 1961 estimates, except in the case of meat, are a one-year projection from the official 1960 targets,
which we estimate will be substantially achieved.
b Figures in tons throughout the table are metric tons.
US production of machine tools fluctuates considerably from year to year. The recent high was 110,000
units in 1952 and the peak output was 307,000 units in 1942. Moreover, the proportion of heavy, com-
plex, and special purpose tools is higher in the US.
'Used mostly for nitrogenous fertilizer.
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an output equivalent to about 45 percent of
US heavy industrial production.
41. We estimate that most announced Soviet
targets for commodity output in 1960 will be
fulfilled, particularly in producer goods, and
that there will be a number of overfulfill-
ments of production goals for major products.
The most doubtful elements in heavy industry
are the target for installing new generating
capacity, which will probably not be met, and
the goals for production of non-ferrous metals,
which will be fulfilled only with considerable
difficulty. Fulfillment of the plan for large
increases in the production of machinery and
equipment may require more than the addi-
tional capital expenditures planned for this
industry. Failure to reach overambitious
agricultural goals will result in underfulfill-
ments in light industry.
42. Investment. Of the total investment
during the period 1955-1961, two-thirds will
be devoted to industry, the same share which
this sector received during the Fourth and
Fifth Five-Year Plans. The division of this
investment between heavy and light industry
will continue at a 10:1 ratio. Heavy capital
requirements for increasing output of electric
power, petroleum, chemicals, metals, especial-
ly non-ferrous, and construction materials,
will necessitate a reduction in the investment
priority previously accorded to the machine
building and metal-working sector, where in-
creases in output outstripped all others dur-
ing the 1951-1955 period. The proportion of
total investment devoted to transportation
will be approximately the same as under the
Fifth Five-Year Plan. Due to the emphasis
on investment to provide more efficient func-
tioning of all forms of transport, we believe
that the transport requirements of the Soviet
economy will be met.
43. Labor Force. Because the effect of low-
ered wartime birth rates will soon begin to
be felt in fewer entrants to the labor force,
the USSR can expect population growth to
provide fewer new workers, perhaps three
million less, during the Sixth Plan than dur-
ing the Fifth. Armed forces reductions of
the size announced, however, would help to
reduce this difference. The increase in the
industrial labor force, which grew by 23 per-
cent during the Fifth Plan, will fall to per-
haps 20 percent in the Sixth.7
44. Productivity. Despite probable increases
in the labor force resulting from a reduction
in the strength of the armed forces, produc-
tivity per worker will have to rise faster in the
new plan than in the old if output targets
are to be met and shorter working hours
granted. Although the USSR recognizes that
worker incentives influence productivity, im-
mediate hopes are placed upon supplying the
labor force with a larger volume of modern
equipment. This policy is reflected in the
investment program, which calls for greater
increases in expenditures for new capital
equipment than in expenditures for the con-
struction of new plants, though the latter will
still absorb the major share of investment
funds. A considerable share of this capital
equipment will be used to replace obsolescent
machinery in existing plants at a much more
rapid rate than heretofore.
45. Just as Soviet priorities have produced an
economic structure which appears lopsided
in contrast with consumer-oriented econo-
mies, so they have produced a pattern of
technological progress which has been quite
uneven in comparison to that of Western
nations. Military production has received
the most intensive development, and defense
and defense-related industries have reached
relatively advanced technological levels. In
the making of ordinary steels, the best Soviet
plants are fully comparable to US plants, al-
though the industry as a whole is not. In
The Sixth Five-Year Plan provides for an in-
crease of only 10 percent in the industrial labor
force. Planned increases in the industrial labor
force appear to be customarily kept low in an-
ticipation of gains in productivity to be made.
When these gains do not materialize, labor short-
ages are then relieved by above-plan allocations
of labor. Thus though the Fifth Plan also
called for only a 10 percent increase, in fact
some 1.5 million above-plan workers were as-
signed to industry during the course of the plan.
These were drawn largely from the collective
farms. Agriculture's higher priority probably
will not permit similar transfers during the
Sixth Plan, but armed force reductions would
serve as another source of industrial labor.
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metalcutting processes, the USSR is on a par
with or not far behind the US in machinery
design and process mechanization, but it has
only just begun the application of automated
control systems. Production processes are
less advanced in metalforming machinery,
electric power generation, coal mining, and
the chemicals industry; and they lag badly
in the low-priority consumer industries. On
an over-all basis, the USSR's smaller quantity
of modern equipment and lower level of tech-
nology are probably the major factors ac-
counting for a labor productivity in heavy
industry which is less than half that of the
US.
46. This lag is also a rough measure of the
USSR's potential for increasing industrial
productivity. The Sixth Five-Year Plan calls
for a 50 percent increase in productivity.
However the government has since promised
a reduction in working hours which would re-
quire a 71 percent increase in productivity
per man-hour if this goal is to be reached.
This we doubt can be achieved, but we esti-
mate that productivity will -increase during
the Sixth Five-Year Plan more than the 44
percent which we estimate was achieved dur-
ing the Fifth. Productivity gains will result
chiefly from modernization of plants and from
introduction of advanced domestic and for-
eign technology. The intensive efforts to im-
prove planning, restore order to the wage
system, and raise efficiency through greater
plant specialization and better interplant co-
operation ? problems which have received
little attention in the past ? are intended to
accomplish a comprehensive reform of Soviet
industry and to make an important contribu-
tion to productivity. Enlargement of the area
of managerial initiative may also contribute
to this result. On the other hand, a more
active party role in the operation of industry
may limit the importance of this factor.
47. In summary, we believe that the USSR
will meet its announced 1960 targets for total
industrial output and for most important
heavy industrial commodities. Sufficient
above-plan workers will probably be available
to compensate for any failures to meet pro-
ductivity goals, and the transition to a 41-
hour work week could be slowed down if
20
necessary. Major shortfalls are expected only
in some branches of light industry, where
plan fulfillment will be prevented by insuffi-
cient supplies of agricultural raw materials.
48. Regional Distribution of Industry. Soviet
industry will probably undergo a regional
shift of considerable importance during the
Sixth Five-Year Plan, although the bulk will
still be located in European Russia and the
Urals. About half of the new capital invest-
ment in 1956-1960 is scheduled to occur in the
Urals and eastward, and by 1961 this area is
to produce more iron and steel than did the
entire USSR in 1950 and more electric power
and cement than did the whole country in
1954. (See map on following page.) A large
share of the new plants built in the next five
years are to be located in this region, leaving
industry in European USSR to rely heavily on
re-equipment of existing plants and other im-
provements in achieving planned increases in
production. The construction of new rail
lines will also be concentrated east of the
Urals.
49. The development of this region is based
upon the harnessing of the Siberian rivers
with hydoelectric stations at Irkutsk, Novosi-
birsk, and Bratsk, the exploitation of large
iron and coal reserves, and development of the
large but mainly low-grade deposits of non-
ferrous metals in Kazakhstan. Movement to
the interior may be in part intended to reduce
the strategic vulnerability of Soviet industry,
but considerations of future economic growth
are probably of greater importance, since the
little-developed resources of this area offer
greater long-run potential than further de-
velopment of the maturer regions of the Euro-
pean USSR.
DEVELOPMENTS IN AGRICULTURE
50. Soviet agriculture in 1955 showed the first
significant response to the multiple programs
for expanding output which were launched
in the preceding two years. Good yields were
obtained in the Ukraine, and gains resulting
from a large expansion of acreage in the New
Lands area were only partially offset by
drought. These circumstances, in conjunc-
tion with the corn program, raised grain and
fodder production by about 15 percent over
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50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Krasnoufimsk
GI, SIBERIA
Kr noyarsk
ratsk
gnitogorsk
Stalinsk
Barnaul
Irkutsk
LakBnikcte
Usf-Buk tar a
KAZAKHSTAN
Aktogay
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USSR: PLANNED INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT IN KAZAKHSTAN AND
SIBERIA, 1956-60
Iron and steel
Lake
Bavata,h
Other metals
(I. chino)
Machinery
ft Tractors and agricultural
machinery
Q' Chemicals
11 Oil refinery
Planned railroad
Selected existing railroad
0 200 400 600 Miles
0 200 400 600 Kilometers
60
70 80
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1954. Potato output declined, however, and
technical crops showed a mixed pattern, sugar
beets and flax expanding rapidly but cotton
production falling. Livestock numbers in-
creased only slowly and meat production grew
scarcely at all, but improved fodder supplies
contributed to an increase of about 10 percent
in milk production.
51. Further growth in agricultural output will
almost certainly result from the higher prior-
ity accorded to agriculture since 1953 and
projected forward in the Sixth Five-Year Plan.
State investment in this sector during 1956-
1960 is planned at twice the amount invested
in 1951-1955 and will require 12 percent of
total state investments as against only eight
percent in 1952. Further adjustments in
prices paid to collective farms and farmers
appear to be in prospect in the continuing
effort to provide the incentives which previous
policies had neglected. In contrast to the
period 1928-1952, when agriculture was called
upon to provide a continual flow of workers
to industry, agriculture will receive labor from
the urban areas or at least hold its own. Most
important of all, solution of agricultural prob-
lems has been defined as the major task of
the party membership.
52. Through local recruiting and transfers
from urban areas, the party has built up its
rural strength from 4.7 million members in
1947 to over three million in 1956. This re-
inforcement has greatly increased the leader-
ship's ability to execute its programs and may
permit greater flexibility in adapting these
programs to local conditions, a notably weak
point in earlier agricultural campaigns. It
has also made more feasible a resumption of
the drive against private farming, evidenced
in higher requirements for participation in
communal labor and a decree "recommend-
ing" that collectives "voluntarily" reduce
the private plots and livestock holdings
of their members. In contrast to Stalin's
crude attacks, the present campaign is lubri-
cated by higher incentives for communal
work and is based on thorough political prep-
arations. If it remains gradual, state con-
trols over agriculture will probably become
more effective, but any sudden acceleration
runs the danger of provoking peasant resist-
ance and a decline in output. The key ques-
tion in this program is whether the new in-
centive measures will elicit sufficient confi-
dence among the peasants to induce them to
regard the collective farm rather than their
private holdings as the means to a tolerable
and improving standard of living. A further
pressure on the private sector is reflected in
programs to increase state farm output, par-
ticularly of commodities competitive with
those sold by individual peasants in the free
market.
53. Prediction is particularly hazardous in
Soviet agriculture, but an increase of about
one-fourth in the total value of farm output
appears likely over the period 1955-1961 prin-
cipally because of an increase in quality prod-
ucts, such as meat, milk, and fibers. This
rate of growth is about double that achieved
during the Fifth Five-Year Plan but far be-
low the Sixth's official target of 70 percent.
Our estimate allows some success to the New
Lands and corn programs, despite climatic
dangers and high costs. Although some fur-
ther acreage expansions can be expected, most
of the gains in grain production will come
from the improved yields which should result
from a greater than two-fold increase in the
combine park for small grains and, in the
case of corn, from the use of hybrid seeds,
further machinery supplies, and an accumu-
lation of experience. We estimate that grain
output in 1961 will probably be about 116 mil-
lion tons against an estimated 1955 harvest
of 100 million tons and an official 1960 target
of 180 million.
54. Because current Soviet agricultural policy
focuses upon higher outputs of livestock prod-
ucts, two-thirds of this increase will be in
fodder grains, in which unripened corn har-
vested early in climatically inhospitable areas
will play a major role. This program has
already produced good results in the higher
milk yields of cows wintered on this feed in
1955-1956. Increases of 25-30 percent in meat
and milk production over the period 1955-
1961 are expected to result primarily from
higher productivity per animal rather than
from larger herds, although swine numbers
probably will grow significantly since they
do not compete seriously with cattle for the
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limited meadow and pasture areas. These
increases, while far below the official 1960
targets for a doubling of production, will
nevertheless represent important gains.
DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSUMPTION
55. Soviet per capita consumption rose at an
average rate of about five percent per year
during the Fifth Five-Year Plan and is ex-
pected to rise at about four percent per year
during the Sixth, raising the living standard
by over one-quarter between 1955 and 1961.
This is an appreciable improvement in mate-
rial welfare, even though part of it is more
apparent than real, reflecting merely the shift,
associated with urbanization, from the con-
sumption of goods made at home to purchase
in the market. Although this living standard
will still be low by Western criteria, it probably
will not be a cause of serious dissatisfaction,
since the Soviet citizen will almost certainly
continue to experience steady improvements
in material welfare. Neither will Soviet living
standards appear as a mark against the So-
viet system in the eyes of most Asians, Middle
Easterners, and Africans, accustomed to much
lower per capita levels of consumption.
56. The estimated gains in agricultural out-
put will be the major factor in improving the
living standard since agriculture provides the
basis for about three-quarters of Soviet con-
sumption. Per capita supplies of food and
clothing in 1961 are expected to be 24 and 43
percent, respectively, above 1955 levels.8 The
expansion of durable consumer goods output
will exceed these rates. However, production
will fall off from the high rates of 1953-1955,
total output will be modest, and these goods
will remain available only to upper-income
groups. Historically, consumer goods produc-
tion has suffered whenever industry has run
short of resources, producer goods having a
higher priority. An important improvement
will occur in urban housing, where the very
limited per capita space will rise by roughly
one-quarter.
'The rise in the value of per capita consumption
of agricultural products will run ahead of the in-
crease in total agricultural output because of
increases in the value added by processing and
packaging.
22
57. In the distribution of personal income,
the higher agricultural prices paid since 1953
have narrowed somewhat the gap between
rural and urban incomes and will continue
to do so during the coming five years. The
lowest pension and wage rates are to be raised,
and higher pension rates are to be cut. These
measures will tend to reduce somewhat the
extreme class differentiations which Stalin's
economic and social policies had produced.
DEVELOPMENTS IN FOREIGN TRADE
58. The expansion of Soviet foreign trade,
which has been fairly rapid in recent years,
leveled off in 1955 at about $6.3 billion,
due primarily to the fact that trade with
Sino-Soviet Bloc partners, which accounts for
about four-fifths of the total, remained vir-
tually unchanged. (See Table II.) New in-
creases in trade within the Bloc are expected
to result from Communist China's continuing
need for Soviet assistance in its industrializa-
tion program and the increasing coordination
of the Soviet and East European Satellite
economies.
TABLE II
INDEX OF VOLUME OF SOVIET
FOREIGN TRADE
(1951 = 100)
Year
Bloc
Non-Bloc
Total
1948
38
146
59
1949
55
110
66
1950
89
81
88
1951
100
100
100
1952
117
114
117
1953
141
120
136
1954
146
166
150
1955
148
172
152
59. In its trade with the Free World in 1955,
the USSR substantially increased its exports
as compared with 1954 and reduced its im-
ports, notably of foodstuffs, thus converting
a deficit into a rough balance of trade. West-
ern Europe's share of Soviet trade with the
Free World rose slightly to over four-fifths.
The share of manufactured goods in Soviet
exports continued to increase, and while the
USSR remains a large net importer of capital
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goods in its Free World trade, its own capital
exports are rising. We estimate that Soviet
trade with non-Bloc countries will rise during
the next five years, with developed countries
continuing to account for the major share.
60. The most important development in So-
viet foreign economic relations in 1955 was
the rapid acceleration of the USSR's cam-
paign to establish the claim that it can be
a major source of economic assistance to un-
derdeveloped countries, although the volume
of trade with these countries does not yet
loom large in total Soviet trade. The most
dramatic feature of this campaign, in which
Communist China and the European Satel-
lites are also participating, is Bloc offers of
capital equipment, military goods, and related
technical services. These offers include de-
ferred payment at low interest rates, fre-
quently in local currencies or exportable sur-
pluses which the underdeveloped countries
find unsalable in other markets at satisfac-
tory prices. Bloc offers of medium and long-
term credit now exceed one billion dollars,
and credit agreements totaling more than
$800 million have been reached with 12 coun-
tries, including Yugoslavia ($299 million) ,
India ($158 million), Egypt ($175 million) ,
and Afghanistan ($122 million).
61. During the coming five years, Soviet trade
with underdeveloped countries will probably
exceed the 1955 level of about $200 million
by several times, with a substantial share
financed by credit. In the 1930's the USSR,
seeking to industrialize rapidly, exchanged its
low-cost foodstuffs and raw materials for cap-,
ital equipment from Western Europe and the
US. A quarter century of industrial growth,
agricultural neglect, and exploitation of the
most high grade and accessible raw materials
has so reduced the cost of manufactured goods
relative to those of food and raw materials in
the Soviet Union that it is now economically
profitable to export capital equipment in re-
turn for the food and raw materials of other
countries now seeking to industrialize. In
addition to economic considerations, this stage
of development coincides with a period in
which the USSR can profit politically from
such trade. The USSR's success in industrial
development as against its poorer agricultural
23
record and prospects provides further motiva-
tion for this kind of trade policy.
62. Soviet economic capabilities are adequate
to support a considerable expansion of Soviet
trade and credit programs with underdevel-
oped countries in the next several years. So-
viet shipments of capital goods and arms to
all countries have more than doubled since
1950. Credit extensions by the USSR to non-
Bloc countries amount at present to less than
$500 million, or about one-third of one per-
cent of Soviet GNP. The USSR has a capabil-
ity for expanding exports of capital goods
which is large relative to the probable require-
ments of these countries, and the estimated
80 percent increase in production of machin-
ery and equipment during the Sixth Five-Year
Plan will further increase this capability. In
addition, central planning and a state monop-
oly of trade provide the USSR with an advan-
tage over capitalist countries in the coordina-
tion of internal and external policies, giving
it great freedom in directing its foreign trade
for maximum political as well as economic
advantage.
63. While past policy has severely limited for-
eign trade, historic Soviet fears of losing eco-
nomic independence through reliance on for-
eign sources appear to have been reduced by
the strength of the Soviet economy and by the
creation of the Bloc market. The Soviet lead-
ers apparently realize that a marginal degree
of reliance upon non-Bloc sources of supply,
especially for products of advanced technolo-
gy, for certain foods, and for some raw mate-
rials, is preferable to a more rigid policy of
autarky, since it offers the promise of more
rapid rates of economic growth. In addition,
they see opportunities in such trade programs
for promoting neutralism in the underdevel-
oped countries and encouraging political atti-
tudes favorable to the USSR and its economic
achievements under Communism. The fu-
ture size of the trade and credit program with
underdeveloped countries is likely to depend
as much on conditions in and the policies of
these countries as on Soviet willingness and
ability to expand these exchanges.?
9For a more detailed assessment, see NIE 100-3-
56, "Sino-Soviet Policy and Its Probable Effects
in Underdeveloped Areas" (24 April 1956) , espe-
cially Paragraphs 23-35.
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IV. SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY"
SCIENTIFIC RESOURCES AND POLICY
64. Soviet scientific and technical capabilities
continue to expand rapidly. Although total
Soviet scientific resources remain smaller
than those of the US, and assets of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc far smaller than those of the West,
the USSR has been able to achieve near parity
with the US in areas of critical military and
industrial significance. By increasing the
emphasis on science and technology and by
controlling the allocation of scientific man-
power and facilities, the Soviet regime has
developed from a small original base aug-
mented by past exploitation of Western
science enough competence to provide expert
scientific support for priority military and
economic programs.
65. Trained Manpower. We estimate that
the USSR as of mid-1956 has about 1,690,000
graduates of scientific and technical curricula
given at the university level; about 915,000
of these are post-World War II graduates.
The number of these graduates actually em-
ployed in scientific and technical fields in the
USSR (1,360,000) compares closely with that
in the US. However, the USSR is now grad-
uating substantially more trained scientists
and engineers annually than the US. If pres-
ent trends continue, by mid-1961 the USSR
will have more graduates employed in scien-
tific and technical fields than the US and
about 60 percent more in physical sciences
and engineering."
66. In the postwar period the quality of So-
viet scientific training has been generally
good and has approached and in some cases
surpassed US levels. However, the number
engaged in research and teaching in the
NIE 11-6-56, "Capabilities and Trends in Soviet
Science and Technology" is scheduled for early
publication.
11- Numerical estimates of Soviet scientific person-
nel are believed to be correct within plus or
minus 10 percent. For detailed comparison of
USSR and US scientific personnel, see graphics
on the following page.
physical sciences and engineering is substan-
tially smaller in the USSR than in the US. 12
Moreover, the practical and experimental
aspects of engineering training have been
traditionally weak, although efforts are being
made to overcome this. Weaknesses in scien-
tific training will not, however, affect Soviet
ability to achieve technological objectives to
which priority is attached.
67. Scientific Facilities. Financial support,
organizational direction, and the quality of
laboratories are generally adequate for the
effective utilization of scientific talent. Al-
though complex research instruments are
probably in shorter supply than in the US or
UK, we believe that present Soviet research
and development programs of major impor-
tance are hampered only slightly by shortages
or nonavailability of scientific instruments
and equipment. On the other hand, pro-
grams of lower priority are probably hampered
to a greater extent. We believe that by 1961
the USSR will have made further substantial
progress in research and development in elec-
tronics, which is basic to instrumentation, and
will have achieved near equality with the US
in research instruments.
68. Basic Research. The quality of Soviet
basic research in mathematics, and in many
fields of physics and chemistry is believed
about equal to that of the US. New evidence
indicates striking progress over the past few
years in such important fields as nuclear
physics, geophysics, high-speed digital com-
puters, high-temperature alloys, and the the-
ory of automation.
69. Ideological obstacles to scientific research
and development ? never of importance in
the major industrial or war-supporting fields
? will probably diminish in consequence of
the repudiation of both past doctrinal rigidity
and an outwardly contemptuous attitude to-
wards Western technology. Recognition of
See the category "Scientific Workers" in the
graphics on the following page.
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US AND USSR
COMPARISON OF MAJOR SCIENTIFIC GROUPS*
(In Thousands)
CONFIDENTIAL
GRADUATES EMPLOYED IN SCIENTIFIC FIELDS
Mid
1360
-1956
1240
Mid
1750
-1959
1435
Mid
2030
-1961
1590
Health Sciences
425
Health Sciences
395
Agricultural
Sciences
365
Health Sciences
570
Health Sciences
525
Health Sciences
350
Agricultural
Sciences
315
Health Sciences
470
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
1240
Agricultural
Sciences- 245
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
1040
Agricultural
Sciences -245
Agricultural
Sciences-215
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
765
Agricultural
Sciences-180
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
775
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
695
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
599
Soviet Union United States
Soviet Union United States Soviet Union
United States
"SCIENTIFIC WORKERS"
(Professional scientists in research institutions or
teaching in higher educational institutions)
Mid-1956
190
Health Sciences
60
Agricultural
Sciences- 40
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
90
280
Health Sciences
25
Agricultural
Sciences-30
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
225
Soviet Union United States
25530 6-56
SOVIET KANDIDATS AND
AMERICAN Ph.D.'s
IN SCIENTIFIC FIELDS**
Mid-1956
79
Health Sciences
23
Agricultural
Sciences
15
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
41
57
Health Sciences
9
Agricultural
Sciences
13
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
35
Soviet Union United States
* Numerical estimates of Soviet scientific personnel are believed to be correct to within plus or minus 10 percent.
** In the physical sciences, engineering and the health sciences, the quality of the kondidot degree is roughly equivalent to
Of slightly below that of the US Ph.D. In agricultural and biological sciences it is closer to that of a US masters degree.
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their retarding effects in certain phases of
biological and agricultural sciences was im-
plicit in the recent demotion of Lysenko and
in Soviet purchases of US hybrid corn. Weak-
ness in these fields (and in agricultural ma-
chinery) were probably caused, however, more
by official emphasis on other areas of research
and development than by ideological re-
straints, and will probably be partly remedied
by 1961. Agricultural research is now more
intelligently directed than in the past toward
solving the essential problems of increasing
per acre crop yields and livestock production.
There is an evident intention to profit from
US experience in such fields of current Soviet
emphasis as mineral fertilizers, chemicals to
control crop and livestock pests, and crop
breeding.
70. The Satellite scientific contribution to
Soviet technological development is largely in
optics, electronics, communication equipment,
synthetic fibers, and pharmaceuticals. Its
relative importance will probably diminish
during the next five years because of increas-
ing Soviet capabilities in these fields.
71. Nonprofessional technicians. The USSR
is not as well supplied with technicians, me-
chanics, and maintenance men as are the
Western industrial countries, where broader
sections of the population have acquired me-
chanical skills over a longer period. Stand-
ards of maintenance are also generally lower
than in these countries. However, Soviet en-
gineers have partly compensated for these
deficiencies by building machines and equip-
ment which are simple in design and easy to
maintain and repair. Considerable progress
has been made during the last decade in in-
creasing the supply of nonprofessional tech-
nical personnel, and the present emphasis on
specialized training after lower school should
significantly increase the number available by
1961. The 10-year lower school program of
the USSR, which is gradually replacing the
former seven-year curriculum, also includes a
high proportion of scientific and technical sub-
jects of use in training nonprofessional tec-
nicians.
25
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOP-
MENTS OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
SIGNIFICANCE
72. Soviet technology in heavy industry has
demonstrated a familiarity with the most ad-
vanced skills and a capability for adapting
and introducing modern techniques, whether
self-developed or borrowed, into their rapidly
expanding industrial base. However, Soviet
practices were initially backward, and the in-
troduction of new techniques has often been
slowed by reluctance to replace obsolete but
still workable equipment. Thus, while the
best Soviet practices in many industries can
be generally considered equivalent to those of
the West, the average level of Soviet practices
still lags considerably behind that of the West.
73. The USSR plans to increase greatly the
emphasis on automation in industrial tech-
nology during the current Five-Year Plan al-
though progress in this sphere will probably
be less than in simple mechanization and re-
equipment. In the technology of chemical
production the USSR generally lags well be-
hind US practice, but the USSR is now making
a major effort to develop new techniques in
petrochemistry. In the metals industry, ad-
vances in rolling and finishing technology
have lagged badly behind advances in most
other divisions, although further progress is
likely during the period of this estimate. So-
viet ability to design metal-cutting machinery
is believed to be comparable to that of the US,
and with respect to ceramic tools for high-
speed cutting the USSR is superior to the US.
74. Soviet medical science is generally ad-
vanced, but behind that of the major Western
countries in some areas of basic microbiologi-
cal research. Clinical research and practices
are nearly comparable to Western standards,
and Soviet work in biochemistry, hematology,
and physiology has been outstanding. Ac-
complishments in the latter field continue to
be applied to mental and physical condition-
ing, and there has been a partial rehabilita-
tion of the science of psychology from the
rigid doctrinal bonds of the Stalin era.
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SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOP-
MENTS OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE
75. The USSR almost certainly has the scien-
tific and technological capability necessary to
develop weapons and military equipment
which are generally equal to those of other na-
tions, and in the technological race there are
times when in certain fields the USSR may
well be ahead of the US, and times when the
US will outstrip the USSR. Though the
USSR probably cannot carry out parallel
programs simultaneously in all fields, its
scientific resources are adequate to press
vigorously programs in a variety of priority
areas.
Nuclear Weapons"
76. As a result of new evidence we have re-
vised upward by a factor of about four our
previous estimates of past and future Soviet
production of U-235. The element of un-
certainty in our current estimate of past pro-
duction is very large, but the error probably
does not exceed plus or minus 50 percent.14 15
Our estimate of future U-235 production is
subject to further variables, such production
being dependent primarily on Soviet plans
and decisions and is therefore less reliable
than the estimate of 1956 cumulative produc-
tion.
77. A highly significant development during
the past year was the airburst on 22 November
195E
This test, together with
the above revision in our fissionable materials
" See NIE 11-2-56, "The Soviet Atomic Energy
Program," 8 June 1956 (RESTRICTED DATA)
for fuller details and dissents.
" The Director of Naval Intelligence believes these
estimates of U-235 production to be too high. He
believes that for planning purposes a more prac-
tical magnitude would be in a range below that
of the minus 50 percent lower limit of this esti-
mate.
15 The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, believes that the new intelligence does not
adequately support the estimate of U-235 cumu-
lative production. A more practical figure for
planning would be one in the lower range of
uncertainty approaching the minus 50 percent
lower limit given for 1955.
estimate, leads us to estimate that the USSR
now has a significant multimegaton weapons
capability and will have a major capability in
the near future. The USSR could have be-
gun developing an emergency capability stock-
pile, and have perhaps 50X1
of the 22 November 1955 type by 1 July 1956
if it did not encounter fabrication difficulties.
About this time, it Could be in full-scale pro-
duction so that it could have converted a
major portion of its U-235 stockpile by about
1 January 1957.
78. The USSR is now capable of increasing
the yield of the 22 November 1955 type weap-
ons by further developmenta150X1
advances. Future developments will prob-
ably lead to increasing the nuclear efficiency,
yields, and deliverability of high-yield weap-
ons. We estimate that prototypes of high-
yield missile warheads (though with yields
will be5())(1
tested by 1957-1958.
79. Soviet interest in low-yield, small dimen-
sion weapons is well established by Soviet mili-
tary doctrine and by the large proportion of
low-yield weapons or devices detonated in the
test series of 1953-1958
any1
50X1
Improved
efficiencies, which will permit more wide-
spread use for air defense, are expected by
1959. 50X1
80. The USSR conducted its first under-50X1
water atomic test near Novaya Zemlya on 21
September 1955, which opens new vistas into
the development of atomic weapons for a
variety of naval uses, resulting in a significant
increase in the over-all Soviet nuclear war-
fare capability.
81. Available evidence indicates that the
USSR is presently stockpiling and will con-
tinue to stockpile a versatile family of nuclear
weapons, ranging from very low-yield war-
heads to high-yield thermonuclear weapons.
We cannot determine with any degree of
certainty the probable number of nuclear
weapons of each type since this will depend
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on strategic and other factors. However, in
order to provide an appreciation of Soviet
stockpile capabilities a few arbitrary illustra-
tive stockpiles under varying strategic as-
sumptions are given below. It is emphasized
that these are purely illustrative, as the USSR
can utilize its fissionable material in any
number of weapons combinations.16
Arbitrary Examples of Soviet Stockpile Alloca-
tions as of Mid-1956.
(a) Assuming overriding priority to high-
yield weapons for attack on allied retaliatory
strength and relatively less emphasis on vari-
ous types of medium and low-yield weapons:
High Yield
Medium Yield
Low Yield
(b) Assuming roughly equal priority to
high-yield and to various types of medium
and low-yield weapons:
High Yield
Medium Yleld

Low Yield I
Arbitrary Examples of Soviet Stockpile Alloca-
tions as of Mid-1961.
(a) Assuming close to maximum emphasis
on high-yield weapons; limited requirement
for medium-yield; considerable requirement
for low-yield weapons, primarily for air de-
fense:
(b)
high,
latter
High Yield I
Medium Ylci
Low Yield
Assuming roughly equal priority to
medium, and low-yield weapons, the
primarily for air defense:
High Yield
Medium Yield I
Low Yield I ,
82. Nuclear Power. The Soviets have dis-
played considerable progress in nuclear elec-
" For analysis of these various alternatives and
the reasoning behind them, as well as for meth-
ods of calculating other alternative stockpiles,
see NIE 11-2-56. It should be noted that the
dissents of the Director of Naval Intelligence
and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The
Joint Staff, also apply to these stockpile quan-
tities
27
tric power reactor development. We estimate
that it is capable of meeting the ambitious
goals of the Sixth Five-Year Plan for 2,000-
2,500 MW of installed capacity by the end of
1960, but this achievement will require a very
high priority effort.
83. Nuclear Propulsion. The state of Soviet
reactor technology also indicates that the
USSR is capable of developing propulsion ap-
plications. We estimate it could produce a
reactor suitable for submarine or surface ship
application by 1956-1957. The Soviet aircraft
propulsion program probably will not progress
beyond the research phase prior to 1958.
Guided Missiles 18 50X1
50X1
84. We believe that the strategic requirements 50)(1
of the USSR have dictated a major effort in
the field of guided missiles. From the evi-
dence of a large number of personalities and
activities associated with missile development, 50X1
recent statements of Soviet leaders, observed owvi
air defense sites around Moscow, and other 5UX1
material, we have concluded that the USSR is
engaged in an extensive guided missile pro-
gram on a high priority. The USSR has an
adequate economic base for a sizable produc-
tion program; and we are convinced ? from
our knowledge of Soviet exploitation of Ger-
man missile experience and evidence of Soviet
capabilities in related fields ? that the USSR
has the basic scientific and technical capabili-
ty to support a comprehensive research and bum
development program. We believe that the
USSR now has surface-to-air guided missiles
in at least limited operational status, and
could have guided missiles in limited opera-
tional status in the other three categories (air- 5OX1
to-surface, air-to-air, and surface-to-surface) .
50X1
Soviet missile capabilities will continue to
grow during the period of this estimate. How-
ever, we have little firm information on the
specific characteristics of the missile models
" For fuller discussion of Soviet guided missiles,
including estimates of the dates when various
types of missiles might appear in operational use,
see NIE 11-12-55, "Soviet Guided Missile Capa-
bilities and Probable Programs," published 20
December 1955. This will be superseded by NIE
11-5-56, "Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities and
Probable Programs," to be published in October 50X1
1956.
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the USSR is presently developing, or may now
have in operational use.19
Electronics
85. The magnitude, diversity, and past suc-
cess of the Soviet research and development
program in electronics indicate the probable
development of new and improved electronic
devices during the period of this estimate.
Soviet air defense capabilities will probably
be enhanced by continuing improvements in
detection, warning, interception, and data-
handling equipment. Air offensive capabili-
ties are likely to be improved by an increase
in accuracy of Soviet navigational equipment
and bombing radars, which will probably be
comparable in performance to Western equip-
ment. Soviet research on communication
theory will probably result in improvements
in communication techniques, radar, com-
puters, automatic guidance devices, and
telemetering, and could lead over the next
five years to development of a communication
network exceedingly difficult to intercept or
jam.
a. Early Warning Radar (EW). The
USSR has a large variety of EW radars in use,
including World War II sets, native sets based
on Western designs, and sets of purely native
design. Most of the older sets will probably
be replaced by the end of 1956. Soviet radar
coverage is estimated to be fairly reliable
against jet medium bombers at maximum
ranges from 125 miles (up to 60,000 feet
altitude) to 180 miles (up to 45,000 feet alti-
tude). By 1958 the USSR will probably have
developed one or more EW radars capable of
detecting jet medium bombers at 65,000 feet
up to a distance of about 200 miles, or under
certain circumstances to as much as 300.
The problem of low altitude coverage will still
exist, but probably will be greatly lessened
by the use of moving target indicators and
gap-filler radars.
b. Ground-Control Intercept Radar (GCI).
We estimate that by 1958 the USSR will have
GCI radars of new types as well as the follow-
ing types now in use: (1) the V-beam sets
1? For estimates of the capabilities of Soviet forces to
employ guided missiles, see Paragraphs 139-142.
28
which are probably capable of coverage on
jet medium bombers at maximum reliable
ranges of 75-110 nautical miles, and (2) the
paired combinations of long-range azimuth
indicating sets (GAGE) and height indicating
sets (PATTY CAKE) , which collectively can
provide GCI data. We believe that by 1961
GCI coverage will be increased to the order of
200 miles and perhaps beyond. Ranges of
this sort would require the use of transponder
beacons not now known to be installed in
interceptor aircraft. By 1959, reliable alti-
tude coverage will be achieved up to a maxi-
mum of 60,000 feet, though at less than maxi-
mum ranges.
c. Airborne Intercept Radar (Al). Air-
borne intercept radar is now in extensive use.
The best equipment expected to be available
during the next five years may have maxi-
mum ranges against medium bombers of
about 30 nautical miles for search and 20 for
tracking, with range accuracy of plus or
minus 25 yards and angular accuracy of plus
or minus one degree. The best of the equip-
ment currently available may approximate
this performance.
d. Blind Bombing and Navigational Radar.
The USSR has operational an X-band (three
centimeter) set, which will probably be im-
proved. By the end of 1957 we estimate that
the best Soviet blind bombing and navigation-
al radar will be capable of operating at alti-
tudes up to 60,000 feet, and will have a range
of about 125 nautical miles for navigation.
Bombing and navigation accuracies will be
about equivalent to those of Western equip-
ment. The use of frequencies higher than
X-band is unlikely for the present, but may
be achieved by mid-1960.
e. Fire Control Radar. The WHIFF radar,
the Soviet version of the SCR-584, will con-
tinue to be used in quantity, and a new set,
FIRE CAN, is coming into quantity use.
Radar sets with even greater accuracies, range
definitions, and reduced vulnerability to jam-
ming might appear at any time. The X-band
will probably be used for newly developed fire
control radars.
f. Electromagnetic Warfare. The USSR
presently has the capability of seriously dis-
rupting Western long-range radio communi-
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cations and electronic navigational systems.
Capabilities in related electronic fields indi-
cate that the USSR is probably capable of
electronic jamming at frequencies through
12,000 megacycles, and possibly considerably
higher. By 1960 the USSR may have jam-
ming equipment in operational use in fre-
quency ranges through 30,000 megacycles.
Evidence indicates that the USSR is now
training in the use of "chaff."
g. Microwave Communications. Microwave
communication equipment is in wide use in
East Germany, and we believe that existing
fixed networks in the Soviet Union and some
other Bloc areas are expanding. A recent
marked decrease in Soviet orders for micro-
wave relay sets from the Satellites probably
indicates that Soviet expansion of microwave
communications will be accomplished largely
with Soviet equipment. By 1960, the esti-
mated minimum channel capacity for long
distance civil circuits will be 24, and the equip-
ment will be suitable for relaying a signal
many times without serious degradation. So-
viet research in semiconductors indicates that
by 1960 transistors will be used extensively in
communication equipment, which will thus
be much lighter and less power-consuming
than present-day counterparts.
Biological Warfare
86. The USSR has the technical knowledge,
trained personnel, and facilities necessary for
conducting an extensive program in BW re-
search and development. Accumulated evi-
dence indicates that the USSR is almost cer-
tainly engaged in such a program, probably
including antipersonnel, antilivestock, and
possibly anticrop agents. The scope and
magnitude of the program cannot be judged
from the information available, but the
organisms of at least four human diseases
29
(anthrax, tularemia, plague, and brucellosis)
and two animal diseases (foot-mouth and
rinderpest) are believed to have been inves-
tigated as BW agents.
87. The USSR also has the facilities, person-
nel, and materials needed for the large-scale
production of BW agents, although we have
no evidence of such production at present.
We believe that it has a current capability for
clandestine BW operations against person-
nel, livestock, and certain crops, and a BW
defensive capability generally comparable
with that of Western countries. Soviet capa-
bilities for clandestine and possibly for overt
employment of BW agents will probably con-
tinue to be expanded, and defensive capa-
bilities improved.
Chemical Warfare
88. During World War II, the USSR produced
most of the standard chemical agents and
auxiliary equipment for chemical warfare.
The USSR is believed to have maintained some
of its wartime toxic munitions stockpiles and
continued some peacetime production of toxic
CW agents. While present production figures
are not known, the USSR has the materials
and skills available to produce some 40,000
to 60,000 tons of toxic agents per year. These
agents would consist primarily of mustard
gas and such nerve gases as GA (Tabun) and,
in small quantity, GB (Sarin) . Soviet CW
armament reserves are believed sufficient to
sustain large-scale operations for several
months. Soviet defensive capabilities are
believed comparable to those of Western
countries. During the period of this estimate,
the USSR will probably conduct research on
new types of toxic agents, including the "V"
agents and possibly certain psychogenic
agents.
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V. SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTHS
TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY THINKING
89. In the last few years Soviet strategic con-
cepts and the Soviet military establishment
have been undergoing a process of evolution,
dictated both by the advent of nuclear weap-
ons and advanced delivery systems and by the
fact that the USSR's chief potential enemy,
the US, lay beyond the reach of traditional
Soviet military power. Whereas formerly So-
viet forces were designed almost exclusively
for massive land battles on the Eurasian con-
tinent, they now include substantial long-
range air and submarine forces designed pri-
marily for the contingency of a conflict with
the US which would not be limited to Eurasia.
90. Soviet military thinking through the end
of World War II emphasized traditional Rus-
sian/Soviet territorial objectives, Stalinist
concepts of "permanently operating factors"
determining the outcome of a war, and battle-
tested methods of employing the various ele-
ments of military power. In the immediate
postwar period, the Soviet continental base
position and the strengths and weaknesses of
existing Soviet military, political, technologi-
cal, and economic assets dictated an essen-
tially "Eurasian" strategic concept. In assess-
ing the world balance of military forces Soviet
planners apparently recognized that their
only significant military advantage lay in the
preponderant Soviet capability for land oper-
ations on the Eurasian continent. Soviet of-
fensive planning probably reflected the belief
that in the event of war it would be necessary
to overrun rapidly as much of the Eurasian
land mass as possible, particularly the strong
economic and military base in Western
Europe.
91. The USSR has probably continued to
recognize in its military thinking the great
importance of the Eurasian area for Soviet
strategic interests and has therefore contin-
ued to maintain and modernize large ground
and tactical air forces. At the same time, the
USSR evidently came to appreciate that the
primary military threat which it faced was
from growing US nuclear striking power.
Consequently, emphasis was first given to the
strengthening of Soviet air defenses, includ-
ing the early production of jet interceptors
and the creation of an early warning screen
extending to the borders of the newly acquired
Satellites. The USSR also undertook a pro-
gram for strengthening and increasing the
range of the Soviet submarine fleet in order
to interdict overseas reinforcement of Eura-
sian areas in event of war. Concurrently, the
USSR embarked on an intensive research and
development program for the production of
new weapons systems in order to overtake
and surpass Western technological achieve-
ments and to acquire a capability for direct
attack on the US. High priority was given to
developing nuclear weapons, improved elec-
tronic equipment, long-range bombers, and
various types of guided missiles.
92. There is additional evidence of change in
Soviet military thinking. It was only after
World War II that the USSR began seriously
to develop a strategic air capability. More-
over, the formulation of new concepts was
probably given freer rein by the emergence
after Stalin's death in 1953 of an atmosphere
more conducive to an objective re-examina-
tion of strategic questions, and there has been
considerable discussion of the significance of
strategic surprise on the outcome of war, a
factor which Stalin's pronouncements tended
to play down. The nature of operations in
the initial stage of a war, including surprise
nuclear attacks, has been closely examined.
93. The concentrated effort given to the devel-
opment of nuclear capabilities demonstrates
that the Soviet leaders have for some time
been aware of the significance of the new
weapons. They have probably recognized that
the US nuclear capability remains superior to
that of the USSR, despite strenuous efforts
made to build up the latter. This assessment,
together with the great relative geographic
advantage derived by the US from its deploy-
ment of nuclear forces around the periphery
of the Bloc, as well as on the more remote
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bases in the continental US, has probably led
the Soviet leaders to conclude that at present
the USSR, even if it launched a surprise at-
tack, would receive unacceptable damage in
a nuclear exchange with the US. Therefore,
the Soviet leaders have almost certainly con-
cluded that their principal efforts must be
directed toward countering Western strate-
gic nuclear capabilities. Aside from employ-
ing political means to this end (such as at-
tempting to disrupt the alliances which pro-
vide bases for deployment of US strategic air
power) the Soviet leaders are attempting to
counterbalance and surpass Western nuclear
strength by developing as rapidly as possible
their own strategic nuclear capability and
their air defense. Nevertheless, they probably
believe that,, at least during the period while
the manned bomber remains the primary de-
livery vehicle and while the US network of
overseas bases is maintained, they will have to
contend with a geographic disadvantage in
the application of strategic air power.
94. Despite the formidable military strengths
developed by the USSR, the Soviet leaders
probably do not regard the deliberate initia-
tion of general war as a presently admissible
course of action. Moreover, they probably
cannot now foresee whether military develop-
ments over the next five years, including
planned advances in their own offensive and
defensive capabilities, will so affect the rela-
tive balance of military power as to alter their
view in this respect. They almost certainly
expect that the continued existence of power-
ful Western nuclear striking forces, and the
likelihood that the West would use these forces
in the event of general war, will make delib-
erate Soviet initiation of general war a course
of action involving unacceptable risks." At
20 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army, believes that, possibly by
late 1958 or early 1959, the Soviet leaders may
come to believe that their own nuclear capabili-
ties have reached the point where the US would
be inhibited from launching nuclear attacks, even
in response to deliberate Soviet initiation of gen-
eral non-nuclear war. Accordingly, he believes
that the USSR might then adopt a strategy of
undertaking such a war, and that the likelihood
of this contingency is considerably greater than
indicated in the text of Paragraph 94.
31
the same time, the Soviet leaders almost cer-
tainly believe that the development of their
own nuclear capabilities has reached a stage
at which the West is also deterred from de-
liberate initiation of general war. In our
view, therefore, the USSR is maintaining,
strengthening, and further developing its
armed forces primarily for three purposes:
(a) to deter the US from initiating war against
the Bloc; (b) to support Soviet diplomacy and
other forms of political warfare against the
West; and (c) to provide a capability for fight-
ing a general war successfully if it occurs,
and also for engaging in, or supporting, lim-
ited or localized wars.
TRENDS IN STRENGTH AND EFFECTIVENESS
OF SOVIET FORCES
95. In the course of the Soviet leaders' re-
examination of their military situation, the
roles of the various types of Soviet military
forces, as well as the optimum balance among
these forces, have clearly been under review.
While the concept of maintaining balanced
forces of all types has been evident in recent
Soviet doctrihe and in pronouncements by
Soviet military leaders, their statements and
Soviet weapons programs have shown that
long-range air and naval striking power is
now given much more weight in this balance
than it was at the end of World War II. At
the same time, published Soviet materials on
strategy and tactical doctrine, as well as the
announced Soviet intention to reduce the size
of the military establishment, point to main-
tenance of smaller, more mobile, better-
equipped field forces. A re-evaluation of force
requirements in the light of the present world
balance of power may have contributed to a
Soviet decision to adjust the size of its active
military forces to a lower level than that
maintained heretofore.
Likelihood of Force Reductions
96. Our last estimate in this series (NIE 11-
3-55, dated 17 May 1955) , as well as earlier
ones, gave the personnel strength of Soviet
military forces, excluding security forces, as
about four million men. There are indica-
tions, however, that our estimates of Soviet
military personnel strength have not reflected
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certain changes in Soviet force levels.21 We
now believe it probable that these levels were
substantially higher during the Korean War
than we estimated, that a gradual reduction
in force levels began in 1953, but that these
levels as of May 1955 were probably somewhat
higher than we then estimated.22 Moreover,
we have added to our current strength esti-
mate approximately 300,000 men ? including
air defense control and warning, AAA, and
surface-to-air missile personnel, as well as per-
sonnel serving or training to serve surf ace-
to-surf ace missiles. Therefore, Soviet mili-
tary personnel strength for mid-1956 is esti-
mated at about 4.3 million,23 including about
2.6 million army ground force personnel, about
825,000 air forces personnel, about 725,000
naval personnel, and up to 150,000 personnel
whose subordination by service is not defi-
nitely established.24
97. In August 1955, the USSR announced that
by the end of that year it would reduce its
armed forces by 640,000 men. In May 1956,
the USSR announced that by May 1957 it
would carry out a further reduction of 1.2
million men. The nature of our information
on Soviet military personnel strengths is such
that we can expect no firm, quantitative
confirmation of these announced reductions.
There has been evidence of selective weeding
out in the Soviet forces during the past three
" The reasons for this are given in the Note on
Methodology accompanying Table 1, Appendix A.
22 That the actual personnel strength of the Soviet
armed forces increased by an indeterminate
amount just prior to and during the Korean War
is indicated by: evidence that beginning in 1949,
a number of Soviet cadre divisions in East Ger-
many and the USSR were increased to normal
peacetime strength; that a comparable increase
occurred in total Soviet military personnel
strength in Germany; that in 1951 two conscript
classes were called up and a number of Soviet
reserve officers were recalled to active duty; and
that Soviet overt military expenditures increased
sharply during the Korean War.
2a For detailed personnel strength estimates of
Soviet and other Bloc military forces in mid-
1956, see Appendix A, Table 1.
24 There is some reason to believe that the total
number of personnel in the last category may be
as low as 85,000. For an explanation of this cate-
gory, see Appendix A, Table 1, footnote 4.
32
years, apparently as part of an effort to
economize and to improve personnel stand-
ards. Fragmentary reports suggested the
skeletonizing of some Soviet ground force
units prior to 1955. More recently, the USSR
has announced reductions in the terms of
service for air, naval, and coast defense con-
scripts. These actions may have been related
to the Soviet announcement of August 1955,
but we cannot confirm that 640,000 men have
actually been released, and there is as yet no
evidence that first-line combat units of any
arm of service have been reduced in strength.
98. In spite of the lack of evidence on actual
reductions, we believe there are factors which
make force reductions logical from the Soviet
point of view. We estimate, therefore, that a
personnel reduction on the order of 640,000
men from the uncertain Korean War peak has
probably been carried out, that the Soviet
forces will probably be further reduced sub-
stantially, and that the additional cut might
be on the order of 1,200,000 men in accordance
with the recent Soviet announcement. A per-
sonnel reduction of the magnitude announced
would ease the present manpower shortage
caused by Soviet efforts to expand industry
and agriculture simultaneously at a time
when the lower birth rate of the war years is
beginning to reduce the annual increment to
the labor force. In addition, the USSR almost
certainly saw various political advantages in
such a move, as supporting its new policy line
and demonstrating Soviet interest in disarma-
ment without the USSR's becoming involved
in a disarmament agreement or being required
to disclose its force levels. The increasing cost
of new weapons, which, if Soviet forces were
maintained at present strength and equip-
ment levels, would involve an increasing budg-
etary burden, has probably argued for reduc-
ing the size of a military force which together
with other Bloc forces already enjoyed marked
superiority in manpower over potential enemy
forces. Finally, based on probable current
Soviet strategic concepts, the effectiveness of
new Soviet weapons systems, and the apparent
Soviet belief that the likelihood of general war
has diminished, it is reasonable to suppose
that the Soviet leaders concluded that their
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very large active forces exceeded their require-
ments.
99. The mid-1957 order of magnitude of the
Soviet armed forces,25 assuming full imple-
mentation of the recently announced reduc-
tion of 1.2 million men, would be approximate-
ly three million. As indicated in Paragraph
97, we are not able to determine the extent
and timing of the reductions announced in
August 1955. It may be, therefore, that the
three million total should be reduced by at
least a portion of the announced 640,000
figure.
100. We have no direct evidence as to how
the USSR would apportion personnel reduc-
tions among the various services.26 We be-
lieve, however, that the Soviet leaders would
allocate the bulk of the cuts to the ground
forces and the remainder between the naval
and air forces.27 We estimate that during the
period of this estimate, Soviet Long-Range
Aviation, air defense forces, and modern sub-
marine forces will suffer no personnel reduc-
tions. These.elements, together with elements
employing guided missiles, will probably re-
ceive an increasingly large proportionate share
of total Soviet military personnel. Neverthe-
less, the Soviet leaders will probably continue
to aim for balanced military forces capable of
undertaking nuclear or non-nuclear warfare
on either a large or small scale.
25 See the Note on Methodology accompanying Ap-
pendix A, Table 1.
"The Soviet announcement throws little light on
this question, stating that it was intended "to
demobilize 63 divisions and separate brigades, of
which three air divisions and other military
units, numbering more than 30,000 men, are lo-
cated on the territory of the German Democratic
Republic; to disband a number of military schools
of the Soviet Army; and to put into reserve 375
warships of the Soviet Navy."
"The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that
the trend in the Soviet Air Force is toward an
increase in military personnel requirements, as
exemplified by rapid modernization of the force
and by the recent significant increase in the
number of Long-Range air regiments. In the
absence of evidence of decreases in other air
elements, he considers it highly unlikely that the
Soviet Air Force will undergo personnel reduc-
tions during the period of this estimate.
33
Effectiveness of Soviet Forces
101. During the period of this estimate, the
effectiveness of Soviet forces for modern war-
fare will almost certainly continue to increase,
primarily due to the improved weapons be-
coming available in quantity, to changes in
organization, and to adaptation of doctrine
and tactics to fit Soviet forces for nuclear
warfare. There will be increases in numbers
and types of nuclear weapons, aircraft (espe-
cially bombers and all-weather fighters) , long-
range submarines, and guided missiles. There
will also be progressive modernization of ex-
isting weapons and equipment, particularly
those incorporating electronic guidance and
control.
102. Limitations on the effectiveness of the
Soviet armed forces during the period of this
estimate will derive from deficiencies in the
air defense system, together with lack of capa-
bility for long-range amphibious and long-
range surface naval operations. Logistical
problems will continue to place a considerable
limitation upon the Soviet capability to wage
intensive warfare over an extended period.
These problems are due to the vast size of
the USSR, the great distances from interior
sources of supply to several main operational
areas, the relatively inadequate road and rail
network, and the acute shortage of Bloc-
registered shipping. 28 In order to offset
these disadvantages the USSR has maintained
large forces and military stockpiles in forward
areas. Stockpiles of ammunition and of other
types of supplies that are consumed at a
relatively constant rate are probably sufficient
to maintain a force of 300 line divisions to-
gether with air and naval forces in Europe
and Asia for an extended period (i. e., up to
six months depending upon the scale of con-
flict) ; POL stocks are probably sufficient for a
somewhat shorter period. During the period
of this estimate the Soviet logistical situation
will probably improve as a result of continued
stockpiling and the development of a more
flexible and versatile transport system. How-
ever, even in the absence of nuclear attack
on the USSR, logistical problems will continue
" For a breakdown of the Sino-Soviet Bloc mer-
chant fleet, see Appendix A, Table 16.
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to place a considerable limitation upon capa-
bilities for extended offensive operations, espe-
cially in the Far East.
SOVIET GROUND FORCES 29
103. The Soviet Army ground forces have been
reorganized and modernized since the end
of World War II, and for the past three years
their unit organization has been undergoing
further changes to meet the requirements of
modern warfare, nuclear or non-nuclear.
Among the most significant recent changes in
Soviet line divisions are: increases in the
number of organic tanks, assault guns, anti-
aircraft artillery, wheeled vehicles, and radios;
introduction of improved models of such key
items of equipment as medium and heavy
tanks, antiaircraft and field artillery, mortars,
rocket-launchers and small arms; a general
increase in the caliber of artillery of all types;
the introduction into units of certain new
types of equipment such as armored and
amphibian personnel and cargo carriers, am-
phibious tanks and recoilless weapons; and
increases in the authorized divisional person-
nel strength. These changes are intended to
increase mobility and fire power, and to pro-
vide a capability for Soviet line divisions to
disperse and concentrate rapidly without loss
of command control.
104. During the past three years the Soviet
Army ground forces have expanded their tac-
tical doctrine and training to include training
in the tactical employment of, and defense
against, nuclear weapons. Small-unit train-
ing has emphasized defense against nuclear
attack. There is also evidence that Soviet
offensive and defensive tactics envisage the
use of tactical nuclear weapons in support of
Soviet ground forces. Revised Soviet tactical
doctrine emphasizes mobility and maneuver-
ability, greater initiative, dispersion, deeper
objectives, reconnaissance, and individual pro-
tective measures. Soviet offensive doctrine
emphasizes allocation of a substantial num-
ber of nuclear weapons for use against enemy
defensive positions, air facilities, reserves, nu-
" See Appendix A, Tables 1 and 2 for detailed esti-
mates of the strength and composition of Soviet
and other Bloc ground forces.
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clear capabilities, and encircled enemy units.
The assault following a nuclear attack would
employ tanks and armored infantry in order
to develop a maximum speed of exploitation.
Doctrine for the defense emphasizes deep
revetted trenches and other protective con-
struction, dispersion in width and depth, and
larger and more mobile reserves. However,
the Soviet Army appears to regard nuclear
weapons and tactics as supplemental to, and
not replacements for, standard ground force
weapons and tactics.
105. The present unit strength of Soviet Army
ground forces is estimated at 175 line divi-
sions plus 20 supporting artillery divisions,
70 AAA divisions, and 95 independent bri-
gades.30 Our information on the strength
and equipment of Soviet units in certain bor-
der and peripheral areas is adequate, but only
fragmentary information is available concern-
ing units in the interior of the USSR. Soviet
divisions in Eastern Europe have for several
years been maintained at a peacetime estab-
lishment of about 70 percent of authorized
personnel strength, but at a high degree of
combat readiness. The strength and combat
readiness of line divisions in the Soviet in-
terior are probably lower than those of Soviet
divisions in Eastern Europe and Soviet border
areas. Any reduced strength Soviet line divi-
sions, however, probably have full equipment
readily available and could be made combat
ready in a very short period of time.
106. We believe the manpower strength of the
Soviet Army ground forces has probably been
reduced within the past several years and
will probably be cut further within the next
year. The effect of reductions to date on unit
strength levels has probably been mainly in
administrative and supporting elements; fur-
ther reductions would probably result in the
inactivation or skeletonizing of divisions,
mainly in the interior of the USSR. Were the
Soviet ground forces reduced by as much as
a million men, and the present ratio between
line and supporting units maintained, this
would permit the retention of about 100 line
divisions at 70 percent of authorized strength.
" See Note on Methodology accompanying Table 1,
Appendix A.
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Based on previous Soviet practice, we believe
it more likely that a larger number of units
would be maintained, with some of them
skeletonized at full officer and equipment
strengths and about 25 percent of over-all
complement. On this basis, a possible force
structure would be 140 line divisions, half at
70 percent strength and half skeletonized.
107. The gross mobilization potential of the
Soviet Army ground forces will probably be
affected relatively little by a reduction in
strength-in-being. We estimate that there
are at present sufficient trained reserves and
stockpiled equipment to expand the Soviet
Army ground forces to a total strength of 8.4
million men, including about 300 line divisions
at the new tables of organization, by M+30
days, although there would probably be a con-
siderable variation in combat readiness and
effectiveness.31 Discharges into the reserves
accompanying personnel cuts would corre-
spondingly increase the trained manpower re-
serve, but the time required for achieving com-
bat readiness of the total reserve force would
be lengthened.
108. During the period of this estimate, the
fire power, mobility, and combat-effectiveness
of Soviet Army field forces will continue to
increase as their reorganization and re-equip-
ment progresses. We estimate that major
ground force equipment is being produced at
10-15 percent of the capacity of those facilities
presently engaged wholly or partly in the pro-
duction of ground force equipment, and that
production will continue at about this rate.32
We believe the Soviet program to develop
ground force equipment will continue to re-
flect the demands of tactical operations under
both nuclear and non-nuclear warfare con-
ditions. By 1961 the Soviet Army ground
forces will probably have available new self-
propelled artillery weapons, a variety of full-
tracked carriers and amphibians, improved
medium and heavy tanks, additional models
si For detailed estimates of Soviet and other Bloc
trained reserves and ground mobilization poten-
tial, see Appendix A, Table 3.
82 For detailed estimates of current and future So-
viet production of major ground force equip-
ment, see Appendix A, Table 11.
of rocket-launchers and recoilless weapons,
and improved fire control and communica-
tions equipment. It is also probable that
during the period guided missiles will be
added to the equipment of Soviet line units,
and that some types of tactical nuclear weap-
ons will become part of the Soviet ground
force arsenal.
109. Airborne Forces. The USSR has sizable
airborne forces in being, estimated to com-
prise 10 divisions and a total strength of
about 100,000 men. Soviet airborne capa-
bilities are being increased through improve-
ments in equipment and techniques, as well
as by intensive small unit training. Im-
proved personnel and cargo parachutes have
been developed. Since 1953 the USSR has
displayed two new assault-type helicopters,
one with a normal payload estimated at 3,500
pounds (16 men with combat equipment) , and
the other with a normal payload estimated
at 8,800 pounds (40 men with combat equip-
ment) . By 1961, the USSR could develop
helicopters with payloads up to about 30,000
pounds. Approximately 500 CAB and COACH
twin-engine piston transports are currently
included in the Aviation of Airborne Troops.
A new medium jet transport, the CAMEL, and
a new twin-engine turbo-prop combat cargo
aircraft which may be an assault transport
have appeared. The USSR could convert
BULL bombers retired from long-range avia-
tion to troop and cargo carriers, and within
the period will probably have substantial num-
bers of transport aircraft with improved range
and capacity.
110. Security Forces. Soviet internal security
forces, controlled by the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, number about 400,000. These troops
are a select group, well trained and equipped,
and provide a significant increment to Soviet
military strength-in-being. However, their
primary responsibility for maintaining in-
ternal control would probably prevent their
becoming available for combat operations out-
side the USSR. About 150,000 are border
troops, disposed along all accessible land and
sea frontiers. The remaining 250,000 include
troops responsible for suppressing any resist-
ance in the country, for guarding labor camps
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and shipments of prisoners and strategic
cargoes, and for maintaining the security of
high-level government and military communi-
cations.
SOVIET AIR FORCES "
111. Although in World War II the USSR em-
ployed its air forces" primarily in the ground
support role, increasing emphasis has since
been given to the development of the inter-
ceptor and long-range bombing arms. In
addition, statements by Soviet military leaders
over the past several years have reflected their
growing appreciation of air power. We esti-
mate the over-all actual aircraft strength of
Soviet military air units in mid-1956 at nearly
17,500. This is probably about 85 percent of
authorized strength. Continued replacement
of piston medium bombers by jet medium and
jet and turbo-prop heavy bomber types and
an increase in numbers of jet all-weather
fighters will probably constitute the most
significant improvements in Soviet Air Force
strength during the period of this estimate.
We estimate that over-all actual aircraft
strength in Soviet operational units will re-
main about the same during the period,
reaching approximately 18,500 aircraft by
mid-1961.
112. The Soviet aircraft industry has account-
ed for about 95 percent of total Bloc aircraft
production of fighter and bomber aircraft.34
We estimate that about 8,500 aircraft were
produced by the USSR during 1955, of which
about 5,000 were bombers and fighters. We
estimate that during 1954 and 1955 the So-
viet aircraft industry was operating at about)
25 percent of capacity. Production through
1961 is not expected to vary substantially
from the 1954-1955 rate, although fluctua-
tions are expected as new models are intro-
duced.35
113. Soviet Fighter Aviation of Air Defense
will be strengthened considerably during the
83 For detailed estimates of the aircraft strength of
Soviet and other Bloc air forces during the period
of this estimate, see Appendix A, Tables 4, 5, 6,
and 7.
" For comparisons of Soviet Bloc-NATO and USSR-
US aircraft production, 1946-1955, see Appendix
A, Tables 12 and 13.
period of this estimate by the introduction of
new fighters with improved performance, in-
creases in numbers of fighters equipped with
airborne intercept radar,, and the probable
addition of air-to-air guided missiles to the
armament of some fighters. Although the
FRESCO day fighter is now the principal
equipment of Soviet Fighter Aviation of Air
Defense, the transonic FARMER day fighter
and the FLASHLIGHT all-weather fighter are
rapidly being phased into operational units.
We estimate that an improved supersonic day
fighter based on the FARMER will be in oper-
ational use in 1957 and that a supersonic day
and all-weather fighter will be introduced in
1959. By 1961, all-weather fighters will prob-
ably comprise more than 50 percent of the
total Soviet fighter force; we estimate that at
present this force numbers about 9,300 jet
fighters, including about 1,000 all-weather
fighters, and that in mid-1961 total Soviet
fighter strength will be about the same, but
will include 4,800 all-weather fighters.36
114. We estimate that the Soviet leaders, in
order to acquire a greater capability for stra-
tegic air operations, have committed them-
selves to a further build-up and moderniza-
tion of Soviet Long-Range Aviation over the
next few years. The BULL piston medium
bomber, which is now obsolescent, is being re-
placed by the BADGER jet medium bomber
and the BISON jet and BEAR turbo-prop
heavy bombers. The assignment of BADGER
aircraft to operational units, which began in
1954, has proceeded more rapidly than pre-
viously estimated, and will probably bring
BADGER units to their full complement by
mid-1957. The assignment of BISON and
BEAR aircraft to operational units is believed
to have begun in 1955 but has apparently
proceeded more slowly than previously esti-
mated.
115. Based on a judgment as to what Soviet
planners probably estimate their requirements
to be, and on recent increases in theriiimber
of air regiments, we noNir-e-aixTiiie-1-17-1-at the
USSR?i-g?aiilding toward a force of about
" For estimated Soviet and Bloc aircraft produc-
tion, 1955-1961, see Appendix A, Table 14.
" For estimated performance characteristics of So-
viet fighters see Appendix A, Table 8.
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?
1,500 modern bomber-type aircraft in Long-
Range Aviation by mid-1960. We also believe
that, in the light of probable Soviet optimum
requirements, including those for attack on
the continental US, a likely composition of
this force by type would be about 800
heavy bombers (500 BISON and 300 BEAR)
and about 700 BADGER medium bomb-
ers. Soviet aircraft production facilities are
more than adequate to meet this require-
ment, although the proportion of aircraft pro-
duction facilities assigned to heavy bomber
production would have to be increased. Many
unknown factors, including the degree of
future Soviet success in the guided missile
field, could lead to Soviet decisions which
would alter both the size of this force and
the balance between types of aircraft. More-
over, the introduction of aircraft designed
v.1. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army, does not concur in the
estimate of heavy bomber strength contained
herein, except in the case of those listed for
mid-1956.
2. The force total of 1,500 bomber aircraft, and
the distribution of these figures between the
various types involved, is based almost entirely
upon what US planners consider to be a near
optimum requirement for an attack on the
United States. There is no evidence that Soviet
leaders have established a requirement on this
order as a goal. Neither is there evidence that
the Soviet leaders have established mid-1960 as
the date by which this, or any other goal, is to
be achieved.
3. The estimate that Soviet leaders will attempt
to achieve such an optimum capability by mid-
1960 is not supported by the conclusion that
Soviet policy will emphasize political and eco-
nomic penetration, as expressed in Paragraphs
B and C of the conclusions of this estimate, and
in Paragraphs 158, 159, and 161 of the discussion.
Neither is the development of such a force in
consonance with the conclusions expressed in
Paragraph 94 that the USSR will regard the risks
involved in the deliberate initiation of general
war as unacceptable.
4. Unless the USSR intends to initiate a general
nuclear war in the period 1960-1961, it appears
unlikely that the resources required to develop
an optimum capability would be committed. The
useful life of such a force would be limited, since
it would face early obsolescence with the advent
of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, and even
in the interim period would be highly vulner-
able to improved US air defenses. It, therefore,
seems more likely, in the absence of a decision
primarily for tanker rol or the presence
in operational units of sone bombers in al-
ternative tank r-bomber riles could affect the
size and comp6sition of /soviet Long-Range
Aviation. Thu, the foil, wing table of esti-
mated number of bombers in operational
iation through the
an be made at this
ncertainty are con-
units of Long-ange A
period is the It that
time, but the fa tors of
siderably greater during
BULL
BADGER
BISON
BEAR
mid-
1956
756
475
35
30
4
the later years: 3 7
id- id- mid-
957 1958
700 710
mid- mid-
1959
1960
1961
700
700
700
(400
500
500
300
300
300
This represents a considerable downward re-
vision from our previous estimates of the num-
ber of heavy bombers in operational units
to initiate general war, that the USSR would
establish something less than an optimum force
as a goal for the purpose of deterrence, and
would not produce the numbers of heavy bomb-
ers cited herein.
5. Other factors militating against the accept-
ance of the estimates of bomber strength includ-
ed herein, are:
a. There is no evidence that facilities current-
ly producing BISONS are increasing produc-
tion, or that the additional facilities required
to meet this program are being converted to
BISON production.
b. Despite firm evidence that both BISON and
BEAR production over the past year has fallen
far short of that estimated just over a year
ago (NIE 11-3-55), the BISON forecast for
mid-1960 included herein represents an in-
crease of 25 percent over the end strength
estimated in NIE 11-3-55, and the BEAR fore-
cast for mid-1958 and thereafter is unchanged.
c. Adequate consideration has not been given
to the plant capacity required to produce com-
patible tankers and jet transports to meet
probable requirements.
6. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army, therefore, concludes:
a. That it is probably within the capability of
the USSR to produce the aircraft estimated
herein if Soviet leaders have already decided
to do so, and have initiated steps, not now
evident, to expand production.
b. That it is unlikely that the force described
herein will be developed.
c. That there is insufficient evidence to war-
rant a conclusion as to the future strength of
Soviet Long-Range Aviation.
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in the period to mid-1958.38 This results from
new evidence which indicates that, probably
at least in part because of production difficul-
ties, BISON and BEAR production during the
past year has been at a considerably lower
rate than previously estimated, with a total
of only about 40 aircraft of each type pro-
duced to 1 July 1956.
116. Soviet Long-Range Aviation will probably
continue with its present aircraft types, ex-
cept the BULL, throughout the period." Im-
proved models of both the BADGER and the
BISON will probably have appeared by the
end of 1957. The USSR is capable of pro-
ducing by 1961 a new medium bomber with
"supersonic dash" capabilities, and such an
aircraft may appear in units at about that
time. We have no intelligence on Soviet de-
velopment of a nuclear-powered bomber; we
believe that such an aircraft will not be in
operational units during the period of this
estimate.
117. We now have evidence that the USSR is
developing an inflight refueling system, and
we believe that during the next few years it
will achieve a substantial inflight refueling
capability. We have no evidence of the exist-
ence of a Soviet aircraft type designed pri-
marily for tanker use. The BULL, BADGER,
or CAMEL could be modified for use in the
tanker role. Both BISON and BEAR aircraft
could have been constructed to permit con-
version within a matter of hours from a bomb-
er to a tanker role, and vice versa. However,
of known Soviet aircraft, only tanker versions
of the BISON or the BEAR would be fully
compatible with the BISON bomber. On the
other hand, the USSR may elect to develop
a new aircraft primarily for the tanker role.
In any case, we estimate that in order to sup-
port a heavy bomber striking force of the
magnitude estimated for the 1960-1961 period,
NIE 11-3-55, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable
Courses of Action Through 1960" (17 May 1955),
Paragraph 116, and NIE 11-56, "Soviet Gross
Capabilities for Attack on the US and Key Over-
seas Installations and Forces Through Mid-1959"
(6 March 1956), Paragraph 20.
" For estimated performance characteristics of
Soviet bombers, see Appendix A, Table 9.
38
the USSR would probably require on the order
of 350-400 aircraft employed in the tanker
role.
118. Airfield construction in the USSR and
the Satellites during the postwar period has
kept pace with demands created by the in-
troduction of high performance aircraft.
Approximately 1,600 airfields are in use in
the Soviet Bloc, of which about 285 (165 in
the USSR and 120 in the Satellites) have
hard surfaced runways of 5,000 feet or longer.
Many of the military airfields now being built
have runways at least 7,000 feet long, and
some are 8,000 feet or more. Many airfields
in the Satellites are being equipped with night
lighting, radio navigation aids, radar, in-
creased POL facilities, and improved struc-
tures. We believe that similar improvements
are being made on airfields in the USSR, and
that the growing network of modern, well-
equipped air facilities will keep pace with So-
viet Bloc air capabilities during this period.
We also believe that airfield construction will
continue to be pressed in the Far East and in
Soviet Arctic areas.
119. Combat effectiveness of Soviet military
aviation is, on the whole, below that of the
US. The chief limiting factors have been
lower average crew proficiency, lower stand-
ards of maintenance and training, and lack
of certain aircraft types. During this period
the increasing numbers of new or improved
fighter and bomber types, together with train-
ing appropriate to these types, will lead to a
significant increase in combat effectiveness.
With cumulative improvements in the capa-
bilities of career personnel, over-all combat
proficiency will almost certainly reach a high
level during the period of this estimate. De-
ficiencies in long-range, night and all-weather
operations will continue to be reduced.
SOVIET NAVAL FORCES "
120. During recent years the Soviet Navy has
been greatly strengthened by an intense and
rapid building program, concentrated on light
" For detailed estimates of the strength, composi-
sition, and dispositions of the Soviet and other
Bloc naval forces in mid-1956 and mid-1961, see
Appendix A, Table 10.
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cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The
Soviet submarine fleet is now the largest in
the world and is still growing; over half its
strength consists of long-range craft of which
a significant and increasing proportion are
modern types. We estimate the main strength
of the Soviet Navy in mid-1956 at 28 cruisers,
213 destroyer types, and 445 submarines.
These totals include vessels Of pigtwar desien
numbering 15 light cruisers, 95 fleet de-
stroyers, 65 destroyer escorts, 202 long-range,
and 22 medium-range submarines. During
the past year, net destroyer strength has in-
creased by approximately 70 and net sub-
marine strength by approximately 70.
121. At the present time, the Soviet Navy is
also estimated to include nearly 1,700 minor
war vessels and a number of "overage" major
war vessels. Fourteen major surface vessels,
including battleships, light cruisers, and de-
stroyers, are more than 20 years old, and 106
submarines are 15-20 years old. We believe
the Soviet Navy's share of the announced force
reductions would be taken largely from among
these "overage" vessels, and from minor craft.
However, we estimate that any decommis-
sioned units the USSR chose to keep in re-
serve status could again be ready for service
by M+180.
122. Soviet naval construction is currently
estimated at about 200,000 standard displace-
ment tons, which represents slightly more
than one-third of the capacity of Soviet ship-
yards and one-fifth of total Bloc capacity.4'
The USSR will probably continue to place
primary emphasis on the construction of long-
range submarines, although the construction
of conventional cruisers and destroyers may
also continue through the earlier years of the
period. Battleships and carriers could be
built in all fleet areas except the Far East,
but there is no evidence of a Soviet intention
to construct these types. It is probable that
toward the end of the period, guided missiles
and rockets will be adapted for naval use as
surface-to-surface and surface-to-air weapons,
" For detailed estimates of current and future
Soviet naval vessel construction, see Appendix
A, Table 15.
39
and unconventional vessel designs may appear
as these weapons become available.
123. The Soviet Navy is now concentrating on
the construction of two long-range submarine
types, developed since World War II and
equipped with snorkel. The "W" class has
an operating radius under combat conditions
of about 4,700 n.m.; the "Z" class about 6,700
n.m. By early 1956, an estimated 165 "W"
and 18 "Z" class submarines had joined the
fleets, as well as 13 postwar-designed, medium-
range "Q" class boats. The building rate for
1956 is estimated at 82 "W", 8 "Z", and 18
"Q" class boats.
124. In view of the rate at which Soviet sub-
marine construction facilities have been ex-
panded in recent years, a substantial increase
in the current submarine order of battle will
probably take place over the next several
years. Since estimated annual Soviet sub-
marine building capacity is about 160 long
and medium-range boats, the USSR could
build about 800 over the next five years. How-
ever, we estimate that actual production will
be about 130 submarines in 1957, and that it
will be reduced to about 105 boats in 1958,
due to the impact of the estimated nuclear-
powered submarine program. If production
continued at the estimated 1958 rate for the
remainder of the period, cumulative produc-
tion to mid-1961, taken in conjunction with
such factors as the phasing out of older types
and the probable adaptation of present sub-
marines to newer weapons systems, would re-
sult in a force of approximately 900 boats of
all types, including about 800 long and
medium-range boats of postwar design. How-
ever, we have no intelligence to indicate that
the USSR will in fact produce this number
of submarines or to indicate the planned
future strength of the Soviet submarine force.
125. The operating efficiency of the Soviet
Navy, while still below that of the US Navy
in some fields, is quite high and will continue
to improve during this period. Little is known
of the operating efficiency of the submarine
force, although in recent years training has
been intensified, particularly in long-range
operations.
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126. Several important developments in the
Soviet Navy are likely during the period of
this estimate. One is the probable appear-
ance of some nuclear-powered submarines.
The USSR also has the technical capability to
construct or modify long-range submarines
for launching guided missiles, and may al-
ready have done so. We expect that an im-
proved wakeless torpedo with acoustic homing
device and influence exploder will probably
be available around the middle of the period;
we expect the appearance of an offensive sea
mine employing acoustic, magnetic, and pres-
sure-influence firing mechanisms in combina-
tion; and we believe the USSR is at present
capable of adapting nuclear warheads to
mines and torpedoes. We estimate that early
in the period Soviet antisubmarine forces
will have improved sonar detection gear in
association with attack computers for use
with depth-charge throwers.
127. The principal weakness of the Soviet
Navy derives from the wide separation of the
sea frontiers of the USSR, and from its in-
ability to control the sea routes between these
areas. The USSR is thus deprived of the
strategic mobility traditionally enjoyed by
naval powers, and is compelled to maintain
four separate fleets together with their sup-
porting facilities. The inland waterway sys-
tem connecting the White and Baltic Seas
now permits the interchange of vessels up to
the size of small destroyers and including all
current submarine types. During this period,
possibly by 1957, improvements in inland
waterway systems will extend this interchange
capability to reach the Black Sea. However,
parts of these waterway systems are open
40
only on an average of five months a year be-
cause of weather conditions. Increased use
of the Northern Sea Route, which is open for
a six to eight-week period in the summer, may
also improve the situation. The lack of ade-
quate supply lines to the Northern and Far
Eastern areas is an additional handicap.
Limitations on sustained offensive operations
derive from the land-locked position of the
fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas (contain-
ing roughly 60 percent of Soviet naval
strength) , the exits from which are controlled
by the NATO Powers, and from the lack of
advanced bases. Other current limitations
are the lack of auxiliary vessels suitable for
underway logistic support, the paucity of ex-
perience in long-range operations, and the
apparent lack of long-range reconnaissance
aircraft.
128. Naval Aviation. Soviet naval aviation,
comprising nearly 20 percent of total Soviet
air strength, has increased in stature within
the military establishment, and is now the
second largest naval air force in the world.
It receives a relatively high priority in the
allocation of new aircraft, equipment, and
weapons. Soviet naval aviation is engaged
in a concentrated training program which
stresses offensive operations against enemy
naval forces and the air defense of naval bases
and forces. During the period of this esti-
mate, Soviet naval aviation is expected to re-
main at approximately constant numerical
strength, while continuing its modernization
program. Improved jet light bombers and
all-weather fighters will probably be intro-
duced, and possibly long-range bombers for
attack and reconnaissance.
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I.
TOP SECRET 41
VI. SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES
129. The military strength of the Soviet Bloc
is far superior to that of all other states on
or near the Eurasian continent. These states
could be defeated, separately or in combina-
tion, unless US armed forces joined in their
defense. However, the Soviet leaders could
never be sure that the US would not join in
the defense of these states or that it would
confine its military intervention to a strictly
localized area. Indeed, they probably esti-
mate that, at least in certain areas, the US
would not so confine its military action. Con-
sequently, they must take into account the
possibility that any localized or limited war
would develop into general war.
130. It would be impossible, within the scope
of this paper, to analyze the capabilities of
the USSR and of the Bloc generally for lim-
ited or localized war in various areas and in-
volving various degrees of US military par-
ticipation. In this section, therefore, we dis-
cuss only Soviet military capabilities for gen-
eral war and we consider them in the light
of our estimate of probable Soviet strategy
for the initial phase of such a war.42
SOVIET STRATEGY FOR THE INITIAL
PHASE OF A GENERAL WAR
131. In view of the transition which is taking
place in the Soviet military establishment, it
is probable that the Soviet strategic concepts
which would govern how the USSR would
fight a general war are also in flux. However,
the USSR must appreciate that US nuclear
capabilities would be the principal element
in the Western military threat to Soviet secu-
rity in the event of general war. Consequent-
ly, Soviet military strategy almost certainly
places first emphasis on forestalling or at least
neutralizing any US nuclear attack.
132. In planning for the contingency of gen-
eral war, the Soviet leaders might hope that
through their political action prior to the
42 It should be emphasized that we estimate (Para-
graph 94) that the Soviet leaders probably do
not regard the deliberate initiation of general
war as a presently admissible course of action.
time war broke out, the USSR would have
imposed such inhibitions on the US as to
prevent the latter from initiating the use of
nuclear weapons. Such a development would
be greatly to the Soviet advantage, especially
while the US retains a substantial nuclear
superiority, including a favorable geographical
deployment of its nuclear strength vis-a-vis
the USSR. More likely, however, the Soviet
leaders would believe that the prospects for
excluding US use of nuclear weapons would
be too slight to risk the possibility that the
US would deliver the first nuclear blow.
Therefore, we believe Soviet war plans would
provide that, given a decision to launch gen-
eral war, it would be initiated by strategic
nuclear attacks."
" 1. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army, does not concur in the
estimate that, given a decision to launch general
war, it would be initiated by strategic nuclear
attacks.
2. Since, as has been estimated in Paragraph 94,
Soviet leaders probably do not now regard the
deliberate initiation of general war as a pres-
ently admissible course of action, such a war
occurring during the period would probably re-
sult from the enlargement of a limited or local-
ized war. The enlargement would at some point
reach a scale of war between the US and the
USSR which would then be called general war.
In this chain of events general war is not a ques-
tion of decision, but one of definition.
3. The decision as to the initiation of strategic
nuclear attacks, however, is one which must be
made during the progress of enlargement. We
believe that, in view of the mutual destruction
inherent in such attacks, the USSR would avoid
initiation of them by every means possible and
seek instead to achieve its objectives through lim-
ited warfare.
4. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army, believes that Soviet stra-
tegic concepts emphasize maximum flexibility,
and that war plans have probably been devel-
oped to meet a number of contingencies rang-
ing from a non-nuclear war through various de-
grees of limitation on nuclear weapons to the
extreme of an all-out nuclear exchange. That
the latter is not the primary element of their
strategy is indicated by the following facts:
(Footnote continued on page 42)
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133. The necessity of forestalling or neutraliz-
ing a US attack would also make surprise
in the initial nuclear attack a vital ingredient
of Soviet strategy. In the Soviet view, sur-
prise would be essential in order to reduce as
much as possible the nuclear retaliation
which could be launched against the USSR
by Western forces deployed around the Soviet
periphery and in the continental US. Con-
sequently, we believe that preparations and
redeployment of forces which could give warn-
ing of the decision to proceed to general war
would be held to a minimum in order to avoid
compromising the initial air strikes. In coast-
al areas, missiles launched from submarines
could be an important supplement to nuclear
attacks by aircraft, but limitations on target
coverage and the risk of premature disclosure
of intent would probably inhibit their large-
scale use in an initial surprise attack.
134. The Soviet leaders would probably regard
an attack by ground and tactical air forces
against NATO forces in Western Europe at
an early stage as essential to prevent NATO
deployment and mobilization, and to disrupt
action by NATO's tactical air forces. At pres-
ent, the USSR has large ground and tactical
air forces deployed in Germany which would
not require reinforcement by additional units
(Footnote continued from page 41)
a. Soviet ground forces have been extensively
modernized and re-equipped so as to improve
their capability for mobile land warfare.
b. The Soviet naval program, with its concen-
tration on submarines, has been aimed pri-
marily at developing a capability to interdict
US reinforcement of Eurasia.
c. There has been little or no evidence of
extensive Soviet effort to develop the carrier
task forces, or long-range amphibious forces
essential to a strategy envisaging direct attack
on the United States.
d. The development of long-range airborne
forces has apparently been accorded low pri-
ority.
e. The apparently low priority accorded the
development of an inflight refueling capability.
f. Low-yield nuclear weapons and devices have
been predominant in the Soviet nuclear test
program.
g. There is substantial evidence of a major
Soviet effort in the field of short and medium
range surface-to-surface missiles.
42
in advance of offensive action. We believe
that the USSR would plan to commit these
forces to an offensive against NATO disposi-
tions in West Germany as soon as possible,
consistent with maintaining surprise for the
initial air assault against the US and its
overseas bases. Under the most favorable
circumstances from the Soviet point of view,
advances by these forces could be undertaken
as soon as the West had obtained warning of
the Soviet strategic air attack. However, dur-
ing some phases of the annual training cycle,
a period of several days might be required
to deploy these forces for attack. Large num-
bers of Soviet submarines would probably
move to interdict US reinforcement of over-
seas forces and in particular to isolate the
European theater.
135. We believe that, in its planning for the
initial phase of a general war, the USSR would
not assign the same priority to campaigns
in the Middle and Far East. Appropriate
targets in these areas would, of course, be
embraced in the Soviet plan of initial air
attack, but campaigns by Soviet ground, am-
phibious, or surface naval forces would prob-
ably be delayed. The USSR might regard an
attack to seize the Turkish Straits as of early
high priority, but we believe that other major
campaigns would be held up until the USSR
could assess the results of the initial nuclear
exchange.
136. In summary, we believe that Soviet plans
for the initial phase of general war would be
directed toward the following military objec-
tives:
a. To destroy or neutralize Western nuclear
capabilities, wherever deployed, by massive
nuclear attacks.
b. To bring the USSR out of the initial
exchange in the better relative position, by
making a maximum air defense effort against
Western nuclear air attacks.
c. To destroy as much as possible of the
ready NATO forces deployed in Western Eu-
rope and to prevent mobilization of NATO's
full potential.
d. To interdict US reinforcement of over-
seas forces and in particular to isolate the
European theater.
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TOP SECRET 43
STRATEGIC AIR CAPABILITIES "
137. The USSR is now capable of undertaking
concurrent air attacks with nuclear weapons
against targets in the US, the UK, continental
Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Japan,
Alaska, and the Asiatic island chain. This
capability will improve during the period of
the estimate, as the Soviet nuclear weapons
stockpile and the number of high perform-
ance, long-range bombers continue to grow.
Present Soviet capabilities for attack on conti-
nental US are restricted by the relatively small
numbers of operational BISON and BEAR
bombers, the limited availability of megaton-
yield weapons, the limited capacity of forward
bases, and the probable lack of a substantial
operational infiight refueling capability. We
estimate, however, that Soviet capabilities for
air attack on continental US will increase
substantially as the period advances. During
the period of this estimate, the capacity of
the forward staging areas and the Leningrad
base complex could be increased sufficiently
to permit the simultaneous launching of the
entire long-range bomber force from these
areas. Moreover, we believe that the USSR
is now acquiring an inflight refueling capabil-
ity adequate to permit the launching of a
substantial number of jet heavy bombers from
interior bases on two-way missions against
the US. Toward the end of the period, high-
yield nuclear weapons could be available for
most of the Soviet long-range bombers.
138. We are unable to estimate what propor-
tion of the available force of Soviet bomber
aircraft might be launched against the US
and what proportion against overseas targets.
The Soviet planners would attempt to dis-
tribute these initial attacks in such a way
as to insure the optimum combination of
weight and surprise against all areas where
US and UK retaliatory capability was de-
ployed. Nearly all of the heavy bomber force
would almost certainly be used against the
continental US in an attempt to destroy as
much of US war-making potential as possible
" For a fuller discussion of this subject, see NIE
11-56, "Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on
the US and Key Overseas Installations and Forces
Through Mid-1959," published 6 March 1956.
consistent with the assignment of first priority
to US retaliatory capabilities. The scale of
attack with bomber aircraft would also de-
pend upon the availability and effectiveness
of other forms of delivery which could appear
as the period progresses.
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE GUIDED
MISSILE CAPABILITIES "
139. We estimate that in view of the extensive
Soviet guided missile program and the stage
of development estimated to have been
reached, Soviet missile capabilities will grow
rapidly during the period. If the USSR in
fact develops the surface-to-surface guided
missiles which we have estimated to be within
its capabilities, the following possibilities for
attack would exist during the period, and
missiles might replace or supplement bomber
aircraft for attack against some areas:
a. Short and Medium-Range Missiles (up to ?
900 n.m.). In 1956, the USSR could have a
small number of ballistic missiles able to
reach, from launching sites within the USSR,
all of Western Europe (except the Iberian
peninsula) , the UK, and the Middle East ex-
cept the southern part of the Arabian penin-
sula. In the Far East, these weapons could
reach targets in Japan and Alaska. If the
USSR elected to employ launching sites on
the periphery of the Bloc, these ranges could
be extended to cover Ireland, much of Spain,
the Tunisian, Libyan, and Egyptian coasts,
much of the Southeast Asian peninsula, Lu-
zon, Taiwan, and the Ryukyus. These mis-
siles could carry small and medium-yield
nuclear warheads, and in the period 1958-
1959 could be fitted with high-yield nuclear
warheads. At present, it would also be tech-
nically feasible for the USSR to attack targets
within the US with missiles launched from
submarines, and the USSR could have for this
purpose a subsonic guided missile with a
nuclear warhead and a range of 500 nautical
miles.
4.5 Material in this section is based on NIE 11-6-54,
published 5 October 1954, and NIE 11-12-55,
published 20 December 1955. A new estimate
on Soviet guided missile developments, NIE 11-
5-56, will appear in October 1956.
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b. Intermediate Range Missiles (1600 n.m.).
In 1958-1959,46 the USSR could have a small
number of ballistic missiles, able to reach,
from launching sites within the USSR, tar-
gets in Greenland, Iceland, Europe, North
Africa, the Middle East, most of India, Luzon,
Taiwan, the Ryukyus, Japan, Alaska, and
part of Canada. The use of launching sites
on the periphery of the Bloc would extend
these ranges to include all of continental Asia
and the Philippines. These missiles probably
could be equipped with large-yield nuclear
warheads.
c. Intercontinental Missiles ( 5500 n.m.). In
1960-1961,46 the USSR could have a small
number of ballistic missiles equipped with
large-yield nuclear warheads able to reach,
from launching sites within the USSR, the
major target areas of the western world in-
cluding all of the US.
AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
140. The Soviet leaders probably believe that
the defense of the USSR against nuclear at-
tack would depend in large measure upon the
success of an initial Soviet assault on Western
retaliatory capabilities. But the USSR has
large air defense forces whose task would
be to reduce the effectiveness of counterattack
by Western forces which escaped destruc-
tion in the initial Soviet attacks. The air
defense system of the USSR provides for the
employment of the 3,350 aircraft in the Soviet
Aviation of Air Defense and for the poten-
tial employment of the remaining 7,700 Soviet
and Satellite fighters. In addition, the Chi-
nese Communists and North Koreans have
about 1,800 fighters which could make some
contribution to the defense of the Soviet Far
East. We believe that the air defense role
" These dates are estimated to be the earliest
probable dates by which the several missile types
could have been operationally tested and be
ready for series production. By these dates,
small quantities of missiles could have been pro-
duced and placed in the hands of trained per-
sonnel of one operational unit, thus constituting
a limited capability for operational employment.
However, an additional period, which would vary
according to missile type, would be required be-
fore missiles could be produced in quantity and
additional units trained and deployed.
44
of the fighters of Tactical and Naval Aviation
would be given priority in the early stages of
a general war. We estimate that Soviet PVO
and field forces now possess a total of over
17,000 antiaircraft artillery pieces, and that
significant developments in both high and
low altitude weapons have been made over
the last several years. The USSR still relies
heavily upon radar-directed antiaircraft ar-
tillery, but guided missiles are now being
added to the air defenses of Moscow and prob-
ably to other areas of key strategic impor-
tance in the USSR. By the end of the period,
we estimate that surface-to-air missiles will
have largely replaced heavy antiaircraft artil-
lery in the static defense of the more import-
ant strategic targets. Even earlier, the air-
to-air missile will probably have enhanced the
capabilities of fighter defense forces.
141. We estimate that Soviet air defense capa-
bilities in areas of dense air defense concen-
tration (European USSR, Eastern Europe, and
the Maritime-South Manchuria area of the
Far East) are as indicated below. Capabili-
ties in other areas are probably considerably
less.
a. Against bombers between 5,000 and
35,000 feet in daylight and clear weather, we
believe the air defense system is capable of
inflicting severe losses on high-speed jet
bombers. At higher altitudes this capability
would begin to diminish, and above 45,000
feet would fall off markedly. Against bomb-
ers penetrating peripheral areas at high speed
and minimal altitude the effectiveness of the
defenses would be very low.
b. Against multiple-pronged penetrations
utilizing altitude stacking, diversionary tac-
tics, and electronic countermeasures, we be-
lieve the air defense system is subject to dis-
ruption and saturation, which would progres-
sively reduce its effectiveness.
c. Against air attacks conducted under poor
visibility conditions, we believe the air defense
system is at present capable of offering only
limited resistance, owing to the inadequacy of
equipment and training for all-weather opera-
tions. The rapid introduction of all-weather
fighters into operational units and the advent
of surface-to-air missiles are, however, giving
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the USSR an increasing capability in this
field.
142. During the period of this estimate, Sovief
air defense capabilities will almost certainly
be substantially increased, due to greater
operational experience and the introduction
into the defensive forces of additional super-
sonic and all-weather fighters, new fighter
types, improved early warning and GCI equip-
ment, electronic countermeasures, additional
guided missiles, and improved missile types.
Despite these improvements, however, we esti-
mate that Soviet air defenses will still be vul-
nerable to exploitation by penetration forces.
OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES IN WESTERN
EUROPE
143. We have estimated above that, should
the USSR seek to initiate a surprise nuclear
attack against Western retaliatory capabili-
ties, the USSR would plan to defer mobili-
zation or redeployment of major forces for
other campaigns until after the initial as-
sault. Once the initial nuclear attacks were
launched, the highest priority would probably
be given to a ground, air, and naval offensive
against Western Europe in order to destroy
the bases and forces concentrated there, to
prevent a NATO build-up, and to isolate the
area. The forces in East Germany and ad-
jacent areas would under present conditions
probably be regarded by the Soviet command-
ers as adequate to initiate such an offensive.
These forces are capable of rapid movement
and the tactical employment of nuclear
weapons.
144. Air support of Bloc offensive operations
in Western Europe could come from the ap-
proximately 5,200 aircraft presently stationed
in East Germany and the Satellites, with re-
inforcements available from the nearly 4,900
aircraft stationed in the Western USSR.
However, a large proportion of these aircraft
are fighter interceptor types in units which
currently have an air defense responsibility
as well as a tactical support role. This re-
sponsibility would probably to some degree
limit the availability of fighter aircraft for
tactical support in the initial phase of the
land campaign. The estimated increase in
Satellite air defense capabilities during this
period will probably reduce this limitation.
Even at present, however, the USSR and the
Satellites have about 1,600 jet light bombers
available in East Europe and Western USSR
for use against targets in Europe.
OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES IN THE FAR EAST
145. Soviet capabilities for long-continued
full-scale war in the Far East are consider-
ably limited by the capacity of the Trans-
Siberian railway, the only route by which
supplies in large amounts could be brought
from other parts of the USSR. The USSR
has about 30 divisions in the Far East, to-
gether with nearly 4,000 aircraft and a
sizeable naval force, and with stockpiles of
supplies sufficient for a considerable period
of combat. These Soviet forces could, alone
or in conjunction with Chinese Communist
forces, renew hostilities in Korea. They could
probably launch an invasion of Japan with
an initial airborne assault of one division and
an initial amphibious assault of up to three
divisions, with a follow-up waterborne force
of five or six divisions. The same amphibious
lift could be employed in other areas of the
Far East within range of land-based aircraft.
Airborne and amphibious attacks on a smaller
scale could also be launched against Alaska.
AIRBORNE CAPABILITIES
146. Utilizing only those transports subordi-
nate to the Aviation of Airborne Troops, the
USSR could lift about 9,000 airborne troops
with one drop on D-Day, or about 14,000 with
two drops, within a radius of 500 n.m. In a
five-day operation approximately 23,000 to
25,000 troops could be lifted. This lift capac-
ity could be increased by about 1,800 troops
for every 100 aircraft made available from the
3,000 transports of Soviet Civil Aviation and
other components of military aviation, and
could be further augmented by the use of the
100 large helicopters of the Aviation of Air-
borne troops. We estimate that Soviet air-
lift capabilities will probably increase through
1961, but at least during the early part of
the period most airborne troops would have
to be carried by the low-performance CAB
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transport (with characteristics approximat-
ing the C-47), and this would place a limita-
tion on the effectiveness of airborne opera-
tions. The allocation to airborne use of BULL
aircraft converted for transport purposes
could increase the Soviet capability to trans-
port troops by air by an additional 5,000 to
6,000 troops per 100 aircraft converted.
NAVAL CAPABILITIES
147. At the present time, the principal of-
fensive capabilities of the Soviet Navy are in
submarine warfare, operations of cruiser-
destroyer task forces, air operations utilizing
shore-based naval aircraft, and mine warfare.
These capabilities will continue to improve
throughout the period due to the building
program, technological development, and in-
tensive training. The Soviet Navy will re-
main capable of mounting short-haul am-
phibious lifts of considerable strength, but
will have little or no significant long-haul
amphibious capability during the period of
this estimate.
a. The Soviet submarine force will greatly
increase its capability to undertake offensive
patrols and mining operations along most of
the world's strategically situated sea lanes,
and possibly to launch guided missile attacks
against land targets.
b. Major Soviet surface units and support-
ing shore-based naval aircraft will probably
continue to increase their capability to un-
dertake offensive operations in Bloc coastal
areas, especially in the Baltic and Black Seas,
and to protect the seaward flank of ground
campaigns. The advent of ship-launched
guided missiles, as well as air-to-surface
guided missiles, would further enhance these
capabilities.
c. From existing airfields, Bloc jet light
bombers coukl range over the entire North
Sea and the English Channel; seaport areas
of France, the UK, and Scandinavia; all but
the western end of the Mediterranean; and
the Pacific Ocean area embracing Japan, Oki-
nawa, and central Luzon.
d. The USSR has an extensive capability to
employ mine warfare, possibly including nu-
clear mines, to interfere seriously with allied
sea communications. In the European area,
this effort could include all the ports and ap-
proaches of the UK and Western Europe. In
the Far East, most of the vital allied port
areas and sea lanes around the perimeter of
the Bloc could similarly be attacked.
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VII. THE SOVIET ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION
IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS
148. The Soviet leaders' view of the world sit-
uation is strongly influenced by Communist
ideological conceptions and these remain
basically intact. This predisposes them to
view Western actions and developments in
terms of an irreconcilable struggle between
the Communist and non-Communist worlds.
While this conception in part determines So-
viet long-term objectives, it does not impose
rigidity in choice of tactical objectives and
methods. Stalin's successors have demon-
strated an ability to respond realistically to
the actual play of political forces in the world.
They have made it a principal point of criti-
cism of Stalin's leadership that he was too
narrow and inflexible in his tactics. A more
practical appraisal of the world situation
seems to characterize the present Soviet
leadership, even though the world is still
viewed in terms of the historical forecasts
contained in official Communist ideology.
INTERNAL FACTORS
149. In the preceding sections of this estimate
we have considered political, economic, and
military factors in the Soviet situation which
will affect the USSR's position and capabilities
vis-a-vis the non-Communist world over the
next several years. The Soviet leaders' own
weighing of these factors appears to convince
them of the general strength of their position.
They apparently believe that they are able
to cope effectively with the internal political
problems Stalin left them, that they can over-
come weaknesses which might slow the growth
of the Soviet economy, and that the USSR's
industrial strength is now such as to permit
them a freer hand in domestic and foreign
policy. They probably also believe that the
Soviet military establishment is adequate,
now that the USSR has acquired a nuclear
capability, at least to deter resort to major
military action by the Western Powers. Con-
sequently, the Soviet leaders are likely to
approach foreign policy decisions during the
course of this estimate with a sense of confi-
dence in the strength and potentialities of the
Soviet system.
EXTERNAL FACTORS
150. Paramount in Soviet calculations regard-
ing the non-Communist world is almost cer-
tainly the enormous physical strength and
potential of the US as the principal restraint
upon Soviet freedom of action in the inter-
national sphere. References to the US in the
speeches of the Soviet leaders at the 20th
Party Congress revealed a continuing aware-
ness of the great gap which still separates So-
viet industrial capacity from that of the US.
In the military sphere, the Soviet leaders,
despite the gains they have made in advanced
weapons, almost certainly believe that at pres-
ent the USSR should not deliberately incur
the hazards of general war with the US.
Moreover, they probably consider that thus far
the ability of the Western alliance to main-
tain a common purpose toward the USSR in
the face of distractions and Soviet divisive
maneuvers, though weakened, has not been
fundamentally shaken.
151. Consequently, taking presently existing
power factors alone into consideration, the
Soviet leaders must see formidable obstacles
to their ambitions and certain potential haz-
ards in the international situation. While
they probably believe that the current leaders
of the US realize the dangers of nuclear war,
and would exercise caution to avoid such a
war, they recognize that the US remains firm-
ly committed to resist the expansion of Com-
munist power. Moreover, their stated fear of
the influence of "aggressive-minded" leaders
in the US may be in some degree real. They
probably feel therefore that there is a back-
ground of latent danger against which they
must calculate, in each instance, the particu-
lar risks attending the policy decisions they
make. In particular, they will try to weigh
the gains which they hope to achieve against
the dangers of setting in train a course of
events which could lead to general war.
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FUTURE TRENDS
152. While factors of physical power almost
certainly occupy a central position in their
estimate of the world situation, the Soviet
leaders are also sensitive to other factors
which weigh in the balance of forces between
the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the West. They are
peculiarly disposed by their Marxist training
to view the world as in an historically deter-
mined process of change. Consequently, they
are likely to give particular weight to what
they believe to be the emergent forces which
are transforming the present situation. In
this perspective of change, the prospects prob-
ably appear more favorable to them than the
power situation, in its present aspect, would
alone lead them to conclude.
153. Soviet expectations for change appear to
be fixed particularly upon the quickening im-
pulse toward nationalism in the countries of
Africa and Asia. The Soviet leaders appear to
believe that domination of this area would,
over the longer term, tip the balance of world
power in their favor. Over the shorter term,
they almost certainly believe that native na-
tionalist and anticolonial movements can be
manipulated to damage Western interests,
some of which are of critical economic and
strategic importance, and to encourage differ-
ences among the Western states themselves.
154. The Soviet leaders appear to believe also
that there are forces at work within the West-
ern alliance system itself which, if assisted by
their own actions, could lead to a decline in
its vigor and unity. They have probably rec-
ognized that aggressive actions by the Sino-
Soviet Bloc tended to increase the willingness
of non-Communist nations to follow US
leadership. They probably now believe that
the more amicable posture displayed by the
USSR over the last year, including apparent
willingness to negotiate some issues, offers of
mutually advantageous trade, and greatly
broadened cultural exchanges, have gone far
toward dispelling the image of Soviet aggres-
sive intentions which has been the principal
motivation for the Western alliance. They
may calculate that the steps which they have
recently taken to repudiate Stalin will further
diminish anti-Communist feelings in the non-
Communist world and complicate the efforts
of the Western powers to maintain a common
front against Soviet policies. They probably
regard France as particularly vulnerable, ex-
pecting that the absence of an evident Soviet
military threat, combined with the revival of
German power and the continuing diversion
of French resources to colonial problems, will
make it increasingly difficult to maintain a
parliamentary combination strongly commit-
ted to NATO.
155. The Soviet leaders have recently adopted
a more realistic appraisal both of the ability
of capitalist countries to achieve further in-
dustrial growth and of the Soviet need to
learn from the West. Nevertheless, they still
maintain that long-term trends point to
eventual economic crisis in capitalist coun-
tries. The view that state intervention in
economic activity could avert capitalist de-
terioration was again repudiated at the 20th
Party Congress. Instead it was affirmed that
only such artificial stimulants as rearmament
and the temporary absence of Germany and
Japan from world markets had sustained
capitalist economic activity over the last
several years, and that with these stimulants
becoming exhausted, capitalism's general de-
generatory trend would continue.
156. In sum, the Soviet leaders probably esti-
mate that they are entering a period in their
relationship with the non-Communist world
in which the tide of events is running in their
favor. They probably believe that Western
power and unity are becoming increasingly
vulnerable to Soviet political action, and that
many Asian and African governments and
peoples will become more and more susceptible
to the political and economic allurements
which the Bloc can provide. While the Soviet
leaders may not expect major defections from
the non-Communist world during the course
of this estimate, they probably believe that
more and more states will move toward some
closer degree of cooperation with the Sino-
Soviet Bloc. In short, the Soviet leaders prob-
ably believe that a more fluid situation is de-
veloping in the political alignments of the
world, and that additional opportunities for
the expansion of Soviet influence will appear.
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VIII. PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION
PRESENT SOVIET OBJECTIVES
157. We believe that the developments within
the USSR and the Soviet estimate of the world
situation which have been discussed in the
foregoing sections have led the Soviet leaders
to assess their over-all situation somewhat as
follows: The balance of military power in the
world, including the possession of large nu-
clear capabilities by both sides, is rapidly be-
coming such that neither side could emerge
from a general war without grave -destruction;
likewise, neither side is capable of applying
sufficient pressure to the other side to force
it to make vital concessions. On the other
hand, as a result of the more amicable posture
assumed by the USSR over the last year, the
lines dividing the Communist and non-Com-
munist worlds have tended to blur, many un-
committed states are entering into closer re-
lations with the Bloc, and there are some
prospects of division within the Western alli-
ance itself. Finally, the Soviet economy is
continuing its rapid growth, and gives prom-
ise of sustaining the expanding range of com-
mitments the regime has undertaken.
158. We believe that Soviet policy during the
course of this estimate will be conditioned by
these considerations. At the same time, we
believe that the Soviet leaders remain com-
mitted to the view that the struggle between
the Communist and non-Communist worlds
is irreconcilable and that the relationship be-
tween the two can never remain in a balance
which is stable and mutually advantageous.
Consequently, we believe that the Soviet lead-
ers will push forward during the course of this
estimate to achieve the following general ob-
jectives:
a. To increase the economic strength and
military capabilities of the Sino-Soviet Bloc;
b. To weaken the cohesion of the non-Com-
munist world, and particularly to disrupt
NATO;
c. To cause a retraction of Western power
and influence, and particularly to force with-
drawal of US military power from its present
deployment around the periphery of the Bloc;
d. To expand Soviet influence throughout
the world by political, economic, and subver-
sive means.
GENERAL ASPECTS OF SOVIET POLICY
War and "Coexistence"
159. As we have indicated above, we believe
that the USSR, largely because of the deter-
rent of nuclear destruction, will attempt to
avoid during the period of this estimate
courses of action which in its judgment would
involve serious risk of general war. The So-
viet leaders would almost certainly regard
open attacks across recognized state frontiers
by Soviet, Communist Chinese, or European
Satellite forces as involving such risk. More-
over, for the next few years, the political gains
the Communists hope to make by dissociat-
ing themselves from aggression and violence
would seem to argue against actions which
would compromise their general posture.
160. There is a possibility that, as- Soviet nu-
clear capabilities more nearly approach those
of the US, the Soviet leaders might come to
estimate that the US would no longer be will-
ing to accept the risk of employing nuclear
weapons against the USSR except in retalia-
tion to a Soviet nuclear attack. Under these
circumstances the USSR might be willing, to-
ward the end of the 1956-1961 period, while
refraining from nuclear attack on the US, to
undertake major attacks with conventional
forces and weapons to overrun key areas on
the Eurasian continent. However, we regard
this possibility as a remote one.47
161. We believe it much more likely that the
Soviet leaders intend to maintain for a con-
siderable period the general posture of peace-
ful coexistence with the non-Communist world
47 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army, considers this possibility
to be considerably more likely than is indicated
in the text. See his footnote to Paragraph 132.
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which they have been developing for some
years but with particular effort since the
spring of 1955. A principal object of the 20th
Party Congress was apparently to validate and
affirm this policy, to bolster it with theoretical
justifications, and to clear away remaining
obstacles to its further development. The
modifications of tactical doctrine made at
the Congress ? favoring cooperation with So-
cialists and other "progressive" forces, deny-
ing the inevitability of war, and acknowledg-
ing the possibility of revolution by peaceful
and parliamentary means ? suggest that the
Soviet leaders think of their present policy as
designed for a fairly long period. They have
internal problems which could be eased during
a period of relaxed international tension.
Moreover, both the deterrents to a policy of
aggression arising from the threat of nuclear
war as well as the political opportunities open
in many areas to a "coexistence" policy would
seem to argue for continuance of the present
policy for at least some years.
162. On the other hand, the Soviet leaders ap-
pear to believe that the element of threat
should not be eliminated from their policy.
They evidently consider that fear as well as
persuasion can advance their objectives in
some areas. Moreover, the Soviet leaders
probably believe that a "soft" line contains
some dangers to the Communist movement
itself. Their warnings against ideological re-
laxation indicate that they realize that the
discipline and spirit of Communist parties
may suffer in an atmosphere of reduced
tensions. Restiveness in the Soviet popula-
tion or in the Satellites could develop as a re-
sult of the anti-Stalin campaign and might
lead the Soviet leaders again to emphasize an
alleged external threat as a control device.
In sum, while we believe that it is the present
intention of the Soviet leaders to maintain an
atmosphere of detente for a considerable peri-
od, contingencies could arise internally or ex-
ternally which would lead them to revert to a
policy involving greater tensions and risks.
163. It is possible that, at any time during the
period of this estimate, armed outbreaks under
Communist sponsorship or aggression by local
Communist armed forces could occur, espe-
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cially if the Communists are presented with
opportunities which seem to them to involve
minimal risk of large-scale conflict. Local
aggression might even become probable if the
Communists judge the political condition of
the non-Communist world to be such that
local aggression would promote confusion and
divisions rather than stimulate renewed vigil-
ance and determination.
Diplomacy and Propaganda
164. The USSR's current policies call for
heavy reliance upon more conventional meth-
ods of diplomacy. Attempts to influence gov-
ernments by establishing an identity of inter-
ests between them and the USSR is the hall-
mark of the present policy. Thus "bourgeois"
governments in former colonial areas which
were once described as "lackeys of imperial-
ism" now qualify as "progressive" if they re-
ject Western defense support or follow a neu-
tralist foreign policy. The Bloc's trade and
credit program provides inducements for
them to do so, even though resulting economic
gains may in some cases strengthen govern-
ments with anti-Communist domestic policies.
Similarly, the government of West Germany,
once characterized as "fascist," is now con-
ceded respectability and recognition. These
tactical shifts indicate that the USSR, in the
pursuit of its foreign policy objectives, is now
relying upon its ability to influence govern-
ments directly, largely through bilateral dip-
lomatic approaches, rather than upon sub-
versive actions against those governments.
At the same time Soviet propaganda is sup-
porting these diplomatic tactics by attempting
to raise popular pressures for cooperation with
the USSR.
165. A number of themes have emerged in So-
viet propaganda, diplomacy, and political ac-
tion which are likely to continue to receive
principal emphasis. They are intended to
end the political isolation of the Communists
which resulted from the USSR's postwar poli-
cy, and to lay the groundwork for an increase
of Communist political influence in the non-
Communist world.
a. Peace. Recognizing that the desire to
avoid nuclear war constitutes an increasingly
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0
powerful political motivation throughout the
world, the USSR will continue the effort to
represent itself as the foremost protagonist of
peace and to associate the US with war dan-
ger. At the same time, it will emphasize its
desire for good relations with the US. It will
thus seek to give the impression that US?
Soviet relations are becoming less tense and
to reduce the sense of urgency throughout the
world for defensive arrangements directed
against the Bloc.
b. Anticolonialism. The USSR will con-
tinue its effort to ride the wave of nationalist
feeling and colonial revolt in Asia, the Middle
East, and Africa, and to identify the US with
colonialism. The immediate aim is to deny
certain critical areas to Western influence and
bases, and in some cases to sap the economic
and military strength of certain Western
powers.
c. Social and Economic Progress. The Com-
munists are making a special effort, particu-
larly in underdeveloped countries, to convince
Socialists and other political elements inter-
ested in social change and economic develop-
ment that Communist methods insure the
most rapid economic growth and the surest
road to realization of social justice.
d. The Popular Front. The Communists
are also trying to convince various non-Com-
munist groups that joint action with Commu-
nists on democratic principles is possible.
Their immediate aim is to narrow the base of
popular support in a number of key countries
for pro-Western foreign policies. Ultimately
they hope to acquire control of such mass
movements by infiltration.
Communist Parties in the Free World
166. The Communist parties in the free world
are adapting their tactics to current changes
in Soviet foreign policy. The present Soviet
leaders are permitting greater flexibility of
political maneuver and a larger degree of na-
tional autonomy than did Stalin; the Soviet
leaders evidently believe that in this new re-
lationship the Communist parties will be a
more useful adjunct to Soviet political war-
fare against the free world. These tactical
shifts and in particular the denigration of
51
Stalin have evidently caused some confusion
in the Communist parties. We believe, how-
ever, that for some time to come they will
continue to accept Moscow's leadership and to
adapt themselves to the main lines of Soviet
foreign policy, with only minor variations.
We believe that the present Stalinist genera-
tion of Communist Party leaders would be
likely to do this on purely ideological grounds,
even should Moscow conclude that it no longer
needed direct control and could rely merely
on the influence it exercises as the fountain-
head of Communist doctrine. It is possible
that ultimately, though we think not in any
short period, new leadership in these parties
might conclude that their aspirations to power
in their respective countries would be better
served if they acquired a genuinely independ-
ent national character.
Trade and Economic Aid Policies
167. The USSR will almost certainly continue
to emphasize trade and economic assistance
programs as means to further its foreign
policy goals. During the last year, the USSR
has greatly increased efforts to develop eco-
nomic ties with underdeveloped countries of
Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and has also
pressed for an expansion of trade with West-
ern Europe. It aims to displace Western in-
fluence in underdeveloped countries in order
to bring them into closer relationship with
the USSR and where possible into economic
dependence upon it. More generally, the
USSR wishes to portray itself as a respectable
and business-like member of the world com-
munity as a step toward breaking down trade
and other barriers between the Communist
and non-Communist worlds. The doctrinal
rationalization for broader economic relations
with the non-Communist world, the policy
statements of the Soviet leaders, and the
terms and amounts of credit which have al-
ready been offered all indicate that the USSR
has undertaken an important shift in foreign
economic policy which is intended to continue
for a number of years at least.
Disarmament
168. We believe that the USSR considers the
disarmament issue to be one of the most im-
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portant areas of propaganda and diplomatic
maneuver in support of its current policy. It
gives the USSR opportunities to document
its efforts for "peace" and to probe potential
divisions within the free world. Consequent-
ly, we believe that the USSR will continue the
effort begun in 1955 to give the appearance of
a constructive and flexible attitude on this
issue.
169. Nevertheless, the USSR will almost cer-
tainly continue to reject Western proposals
for a comprehensive disarmament scheme in-
volving effective inspection and control. The
Soviet leaders are not likely to repose the
confidence in Western intentions which would
be necessary for them to agree to set up such
a system. In any case, they would not wish to
deny themselves the option of resort to mili-
tary action or to abandon the element of
threat which is always present in their policy,
even in its current phase. Moreover, the So-
viet leaders almost certainly regard the kind
and scale of inspection procedures required
by the Western Powers not only as dangerous
to their security, but as conflicting with their
desire to maintain a controlled society.
170. What Soviet policy has aimed at is a
loosely-drawn pledge of mutual disarmament
without significant inspection features. The
Soviet leaders have probably had two princi-
pal motives. First, they hoped that the effect
of such an agreement would be to encourage
an atmosphere of relaxation in the West
which would tend to undermine NATO poli-
cies, cause a rapid degeneration of Western
military effort, and create a climate inhibiting
the possible use of nuclear weapons by the
West. Secondly, they wished to obtain cer-
tain important economic advantages for the
USSR. A reduction in the size of the Soviet
military establishment would assist them to
absorb the high cost of current programs for
the introduction of new weapons and would
make available an important increment of
manpower to ease their current labor short-
age. A further relaxation of tensions would
also enable them more easily to carry costly
new weapons programs.
171. The Soviet leaders have evidently now
concluded that a disarmament agreement
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with the Western Powers cannot be obtained
because of two Western conditions the USSR
could not accept. These were the insistence
on comprehensive inspection and control and
the idea that, beyond a certain minimum re-
duction of forces, political settlements, par-
ticularly in Germany, must be included. The
Soviet leaders have therefore decided to take
unilateral measures of reduction which they
probably believe will place the Western gov-
ernments under pressure from their public
opinion and parliaments to follow the Soviet
example. We believe that the USSR, for the
economic and political reasons mentioned in
the preceding paragraph, in fact wishes to
reduce the pace of armaments competition,
but without necessarily impeding its own de-
velopment of advanced weapons, and is aim-
ing at a political atmosphere conducive to
such a result. The Soviet leaders may also
hope that, in the longer run, the reduction of
armament effort would be carried further in
Western countries than in the USSR, and
would gradually lead toward a position of
Soviet military superiority.
COURSES OF ACTION IN PARTICULAR
AREAS
Europe
172. The USSR's recently increased activity in
the underdeveloped areas of Asia and the
Middle East does not mean that it intends
to neglect Europe as a principal area of Soviet
political ambitions and diplomatic activity.
The failure of the USSR to prevent the ratifi-
cation of the Paris Agreements in the spring
of 1955 brought about a reorientation of Soviet
policy in Europe. Recognizing that West Ger-
man rearmament could no longer be delayed
by threats or the pretense of Soviet willing-
ness to negotiate German reunification with
the Western Powers, the USSR sought to
shelve Four Power negotiations on the German
question, and to rely instead upon the effect
of its shift to a generally conciliatory posture
to obtain both a delay in German rearmament
and a weakening of NATO ties and effort.
173. The diplomatic and propaganda cam-
paign against NATO under the slogan of
"peaceful coexistence" employs several gam-
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bits. A European security pact to supersede
both NATO and the Warsaw Pact is one
which the USSR is likely to continue to pro-
mote. The Soviet leaders will probably prefer
for the present to work through bilateral con-
tacts rather than by further great power con-
ferences. The weaker or more remotely placed
members of NATO ? such as Iceland, Greece,
or Turkey ? which may have regional or local
interests difficult to reconcile within NATO,
are likely to be special targets of Soviet propa-
ganda and diplomatic activity. The USSR
probably believes that the withdrawal of its
cooperation even by a small state would have
effects on NATO morale and unity far ex-
ceeding the loss of strength involved. Finally,
the Soviet leaders hope that the popular front
alignments promoted by Communist parties
or the USSR's own cultivation of Socialist
parties can bring about changes in the poli-
cies of key NATO states. France is clearly a
principal target in this connection.
174. Germany. We believe that no departure
from the policy on Germany to which the
USSR adhered in the 1955 Geneva meetings,
and which amounted to an insistence upon
maintaining the present division of the coun-
try, is likely during the next several years.
The Soviet leaders almost certainly believe
that the alignment of a reunited Germany
with the West would seriously impair the
USSR's military position in Europe, diminish
its ability to influence European developments
in the future, and complicate the mainte-
nance of Soviet authority in the Eastern Euro-
pean Satellites. For some time to come they
are unlikely to consider that any formula
for neutralization would provide assurance
against a reunified Germany's tacit alliance
with the West. Consequently, the Soviet
leaders probably believe that they have at
present no alternative to the policy they have
been following in Germany, which is to con-
solidate the Communist regime in East Ger-
many while insisting that reunification is now
a problem for the two German regimes them-
selves. In view of the complexities of the
German problem, they probably have not
clearly formulated the course which they will
follow beyond the next year or two. They
probably believe that eventually the West Ger-
mans can be induced to make independent
approaches to Moscow which would greatly
complicate the relations of the West German
government with its NATO partners.
175. Yugoslavia. The restoration of good re-
lations with Yugoslavia has been a principal
feature of the USSR's post-Stalin policy in
Europe. While the Soviet leaders probably
regarded a renewed alignment of the Tito
regime with the Bloc as a maximum objective,
they probably also considered that a number
of lesser purposes justified the sharp and in
some respects awkward turn in policy. At a
minimum, they aimed to arrest the develop-
ment of Yugoslav ties with the Western Pow-
ers, and to disrupt Yugoslavia's pact with
Greece and Turkey, at least insofar as it rep-
resented an adjunct to NATO. They probably
also hope that Tito's willingness to cooper-
ate with the USSR will encourage neutralist
tendencies in uncommitted states of the Mid-
dle East and South Asia, and will ease the
way to useful contacts with Socialist circles
in Western Europe. The Soviet leaders will
probably continue their efforts to woo Yugo-
slavia by a favorable trade and credit policy,
by possible sacrifice of other anti-Titoist per-
sonalities in the Satellites, and by emphasiz-
ing Yugoslavia's independence and equality.
However, they would almost certainly regard
the granting of an equal measure of inde-
pendence to the Satellites as too high a price
to pay for Yugoslavia's complete realignment
with the Bloc.
Asia
176. In Northeast Asia the principal objective
of Soviet policy remains to detach Japan from
the sphere of US influence, although as long
as Japan does not become an important power
factor in Asia, the USSR is unlikely to make
significant concessions to achieve this objec-
tive. In concert with Communist China, the
USSR will almost certainly continue efforts
to "normalize relations" with Japan as a step
toward broader official and unofficial contacts.
The USSR will probably not greatly enlarge
the limited concessions it has already prof-
fered Japan in current negotiations, since the
Soviet leaders are unlikely to have a very high
opinion of the present or prospective strength
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of Japan's bargaining position. They prob-
ably believe that there is potential political
instability in Japan on which both Soviet
foreign policy and the Japanese Communist
Party, especially through its influence in other
political organizations, can work gradually
but effectively. Most importantly, in the So-
viet view, Japan's critical need for markets
and for raw materials will in the long run
make Communist trade solicitations increas-
ingly more attractive, and create frictions be-
tween Japan and the West. Probably the
Soviet leaders expect that over a period of
several years forces in Japan favoring a more
independent and nationalist course in foreign
policy and trade will become increasingly in-
fluential, and that the effect will be, at a
minimum, to move Japan away from close ties
with the US.
177. In South and Southeast Asia the USSR
will continue the intensified effort launched
with the Khrushchev-Bulganin trip to India,
Burma, and Afghanistan to extend Soviet in-
fluence on the government-to-government
level, and to build up popular support for pro-
Soviet policies. In these states the USSR has
a number of assets which it will try to build
upon to encourage increasingly anti-Western
policies, and a closer economic orientation
toward the Bloc. In many of these states
there exist real or imagined grievances against
the Western Powers and distrust of their poli-
cies, key and influential figures who have been
impressed by Communist achievements in eco-
nomic development, territorial claims which
could be supported by the USSR to win favor
among popular and official elements, student
groups under Communist influence, and eco-
nomic pressures which the USSR is in a posi-
tion to alleviate. The propaganda image the
USSR will seek to convey will be that of a
stable government in possession of irresistibly
growing power, abjuring violence and dedi-
cated to the broadening of the "zone of peace"
in the interest of human welfare. It is in this
area that the USSR will give particular scope
to "competitive coexistence" with the West,
on the level of trade and economic aid and of
political ideas as well. The Soviet leaders
apparently regard India as a key target in
the area.
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178. While we believe that it is the present
intention of the USSR to avoid confronting
the free world with an armed challenge, po-
tentially critical issues such as the Chinese
offshore islands and Indochina could develop
in such a way as to bring about such a chal-
lenge. On both issues the Communists might
hope to justify resort to military action on
grounds that would be accepted by consider-
able elements of world public opinion, and
moreover might expect that the US would be
deterred from armed intervention by the op-
position of its allies and by the fear of alienat-
ing some important states of Asia. For the
present, however, the USSR apparently in-
tends to curb tensions surrounding both is-
sues, while encouraging by diplomacy and
propaganda a gradual erosion of Western
resolve to oppose Communist expansion in
these areas. We believe that Communist
China now shares this view. But there can
be no assurance that Peiping would always
accept Soviet guidance concerning what it
considers its vital interests in Taiwan and the
offshore islands, should the USSR counsel
restraint. On balance, however, we think
Communist China would not undertake ma-
jor risks without Soviet assent and assurance
of support.
Middle East
179. A concurrence of developments over the
past year ? the conclusion of the Baghdad
Pact, rising tensions over the Arab-Israeli is-
sue, and the growing ambitions of Nasser to
assert Egyptian hegemony over the Arab
world ? combined to provide the USSR an
opportunity to inject its influence forcefully
into the Middle East by offering arms to cer-
tain Arab states. The USSR's immediate ob-
jective was to prevent an extension and con-
solidation of the Western military position.
This makes disruption of the Baghdad Pact
a primary target, and to this end the USSR is
encouraging the nationalist impulses against
the West already present. Moreover, it is
seeking to improve relations with key mem-
bers of the Baghdad Pact, such as Turkey and
Iran, by removing long-standing sources of
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irritation on the diplomatic level, encourag-
ing closer official contacts, and expanding
trade relations.
180. The USSR is using the Arab-Israeli con-
flict and the Suez controversy to enhance its
influence in the Arab world. We believe, how-
ever, that the Soviet leaders recognize that
vital Western interests are so deeply involved
in the area that the USSR would be courting
major political and possibly military risks if
it supported the Arabs in violent courses of
action affecting either issue. Soviet policy
probably aims, therefore, at achieving recog-
nition for the USSR as a major interested
power participating equally with the three
Western Powers in regulating the affairs of
the area. Although the USSR will not want
to jeopardize its posture as an advocate of
peace it will try to appear as a supporter of
Arab nationalism both within and outside
the UN.
181. The USSR's ultimate aim is to replace
Western influence in the area, and to deprive
Western states of the economic advantages
they have enjoyed through exclusive arrange-
ments affecting the exploitation and distribu-
tion of oil. The Soviet leaders may not en-
visage the adherence of Middle Eastern states
to the Communist sphere in the next few
years, but they probably believe that these
states can be persuaded to align themselves
increasingly with the USSR on international
issues. Moreover, they probably believe that
the sympathy which the USSR is winning
as a result of its current policies will enhance
the influence of donlestic Communist forces
in some Arab states.
Africa
182. The USSR's increased activity in the
Middle East has been accompanied by a more
active policy in those areas of Africa open
to Soviet influence by diplomacy or propa-
ganda. In North Africa, the USSR has re-
frained from open support of Arab national-
ist revolt in order not to compromise its effort
to influence developments in France to the
detriment of NATO. However, the USSR's
presently enhanced influence in Cairo ? long
the headquarters of emigre nationalist groups
from Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco ? may
permit it to exploit unrest in French North
Africa more effectively by encouraging and
supporting the propaganda and subversive
activities of these groups. At the same time,
the USSR will probably continue to employ
direct approaches to native governments, such
as Libya and the Sudan, to establish and ex-
pand a diplomatic and economic foothold in
the area. There are indications that the
Soviet leaders intend to devote increasing at-
tention to all of Africa as an area for Soviet
penetration and subversion in the future.
Latin America
183. The USSR will almost certainly attempt
through broadened economic, diplomatic, and
cultural exchanges with Latin American coun-
tries to extend its influence into the Western
hemisphere and to encourage frictions among
the American states. Toward this end the
USSR will attempt to exploit existing resent-
ments in Latin America against US import
barriers and US competition in world mar-
kets, and will present itself as a trading part-
ner willing and able to accept Latin American
raw material exports and to act as a source
of supply for capital equipment. Bloc trade
with Latin America remains at low levels, but
it has increased by a substantial percentage
in the last year or two, largely due to an
expansion of Satellite trading contacts. In
addition to the economic and diplomatic of-
fensive, the USSR will almost certainly con-
tinue its efforts through local Communist
parties and front groups, appealing particu-
larly to labor, students, and intellectuals, to
promote anti-US sentiment, to embarrass US
business interests, to obstruct economic and
military cooperation of Latin American gov-
ernments with the US, and to encourage the
formation of governments amenable to Com-
munist influence.
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APPENDIX A
Tables of Military Strength
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TABLE 1
ESTIMATED ACTUAL STRENGTH OF BLOC ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL, MID-1956
ARMY
GROUND
FORCES
AIR
FORCES
NAVAL
FORCES
SUBORDI-
NATION
UNKNOWN
SECURITY
TOTALS
(Not including
Security)
USSR (total)
2,600,000
825,000 2
725,0008
up to 150,000 7
400,000
4,300,000
EE Satellites (total)
1,085,000
102,600
37,100
326,000
1,224,700
Albania
30,000
300
800
10,000
Bulgaila
170,000
17,000
5,100
45,000
Czechoslovakia
170,000
22,000
45,000
East Germany
100,000
7,000
11,000
45,000
Hungary
150,000
11,500
38,000
Poland
250,000
32,8008
11,000
65,000
Rumania
215,000
12,000
9,200
78,000
Communist Asia (total)
3,138,000
98,200
47,300
541,000
3,283,500
Communist China
2,531,000
80,7000
40,300
500,000
North Korea
350,000
17,500
7,000
Viet Minh
257,000
41,000 7
Bloc Totals
6,823,000
1,025,800
809,400
up to 150,000
1,267,000
8,808,200
Figures based primarily on order-of-battle, and do not take into account announced Soviet and Satel-
lite reductions. For methodology, see accompanying note. For estimate of mid-1957 Soviet armed
forces personnel strength, assuming full implementation of announced reductions, see paragraph 99.
For purposes of this table, an estimated 108,200 naval aviation personnel are included in the total of
Soviet air forces personnel.
Does not include MVD naval forces, which for purposes of this table are carried in Soviet Security
Forces total.
Air defense control and warning personnel and personnel serving or training to serve surface-to-air
and surface-to-surface missiles. The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes this total includes 51,000
air defense control and warning personnel, 55,000 surface-to-air missile personnel, and 43,000 surface-
to-surface missile personnel, all of whom are air forces personnel. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intel-
ligence, Department of the Army, believes the total should be only about 86,000, including 51,000 air
defense control and warning personnel, 35,000 surface-to-air missile personnel, and a small number
of surface-to-surface missile personnel, all of whom are ground forces personnel.
Including naval aviation personnel.
'Including naval aviation personnel.
Regional troops, organized in 35 regional battalions.
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TABLE 1 (continued)
Note on Methodology ?
1. Figures on over-all military personnel
strengths are based essentially on unit order
of battle. To this base, estimative factors are
applied for average personnel strength per
unit and average number of administrative
and supporting personnel per unit or area.
Soviet ground units are estimated at about
70 percent of T/O strength; most Soviet air
and naval units are estimated at full T/O
strength. The resulting over-all personnel
strength estimates are subject to a consider-
able margin of error. In addition, personnel
strength estimates based on order of battle can
lag considerably behind actual changes in
strength, since the basic unit identifications
are accumulated over relatively long periods.
Of the 190 Soviet line divisions identified since
postwar demobilization in mid-1947, 163 have
been reidentified since 1 January 1953, by in-
telligence establishing the existence of division
headquarters or one or more subordinate divi-
sional elements, or by observation of the con-
tinued presence of ground elements at the
locations of previously identified units. The
total identified in any one year is much small-
er, however, and there can be no certainty
that a given division or other unit last identi-
fied during 1953 is still operational in 1956.
2. Because of these limitations, we consider
that our over-all personnel strength figures
58
represent order-of-magnitude rather than pre-
cise measures of actual strength at given
dates. Thus, while there is evidence to sug-
gest that increases in the personnel strength
of the Soviet armed forces occurred in 1949-
1952, and that reductions occurred after 1953,
in the absence of quantitative confirmation
our strength estimates have not reflected these
fluctuations. For this reason, our estimates
of Soviet armed forces personnel strength
prior to the reductions are more likely to have
erred on the low side than on the high side.
3. The principal usefulness of this method
of analysis is to provide a basis for judging
the approximate present strength of Soviet
forces. Except for providing a point of de-
parture and being suggestive of Soviet prac-
tice, it does not provide a firm basis for future
estimates of over-all strength. Other consid-
erations, such as probable future requirements
or changes in Soviet policy based on political
and economic factors, must be taken into
account in making estimates for the future.
At present, we believe it probable that future
reductions in over-all Soviet military person-
nel strength will occur and that the cut might
be on the order of 1,200,000 men, in accord-
ance with announced Soviet intentions. Since
we are unable at this time to make more than
a tentative estimate of the size and composi-
tion of Soviet forces following such a reduc-
tion, detailed future personnel strength esti-
mates have been omitted from Table 1.
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TABLE 2 ?O)
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ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF BLOC GROUND FORCES IN LINE DIVISIONS, MID-1956t
Country
Rifle Divisions
Mechanized Divisions
Tank Divisions
Cavalry Divisions
Airborne Divisions
Total
Divs.
No.
T/O
Actual
No.
T/O
Actual
No.
T/0
Actual
No.
T/O
Actual
No.
T/O
Actual
USSR'
95
13,050
9,000
45
15,400
10,000
20
13,660
9,500
5
5,000
3,500
10
9,000
7,000
175'
Communist
China
119
18,213
15,000
3
7,852
4,500
3
5,938
4,000
125
East
Germany
4
11,500
9,000
3
14,000
11,000
7
Poland
12
11,500
9,000
5
14,000
11,000
17
Bulgaria
12
11,500
8,500
12
Czecho-
rn
t11
slovakia
8
11,500
8,000
4
14,000
10,000
2
11,500
7,500
14
CD
tzi
A
Hungary
9
11,500
8,000
1
14,000
9,000
1
11,500
8,000
t
11
A
W
tzl
Rumania
North
12'
11,500
8,000
1
14,000
8,500
1
11,500
9,000
14
Pi
tli
I-3
Korea
18
10,600
9,000
18
H
Viet
Minh
14
11,000
11,000
14
Total
303
59
27
8
10
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'Does not take into account announced Soviet and Satellite reductions. For estimate of possible Soviet divisional structure following reduc-
tions, see paragraph 106. -,i
=Actual strengths of Soviet divisions vary. The figures shown are based on units at about 70 percent of T/O strength.
'Estimated dispositions of Soviet line divisions: Occupied Europe, 28; Northwest USSR, 14; Western USSR, 48; Southwestern USSR, 18;
Southern USSR, 27; Central USSR, 10; Soviet Far East, 30.
'Including two Mountain Divisions.
'Estimated break-down by major groupings: USSR, 175; Communist China, 125; European Satellites, 75; North Korea and Viet Minh, 32.
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?.
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED BLOC TRAINED RESERVES, MID-1956 AND MID-1961,
AND GROUND MOBILIZATION CAPACITY, MID-1956
COUNTRY TRAINED RESERVES
GROUND MOBILIZATION CAPACITY - MID-1956
Mid-1956 Mid-1958
Mid-1961
M+30 Days
Personnel Div.
M+80 Days
Personnel Div.
M+360 Days
Personnel Div.
USSR 6,900,000 7,700,000
8,900,000
8,400,000
300
17,000,000
500'
Satellites 3,325,000 4,035,000
5,060,000
2,905,000
123
4,800,000
195 2
Albania 65,000 85,000
110,000
80,000
4
100,000
6
Bulgaria 575,000 675,000
800,000
500,000
20
700,000
28
Czecho-
slovakia 625,000 725,000
850,000
500,000
25
1,000,000
40
East Germany 85,000 125,000
300,000
225,000
9
300,000
14
Hungary 475,000 575,000
700,000
400,000
18
700,000
28
Poland 825,000 1,000,000
1,250,000
650,000
25
1,100,000
44
Rumania 675,000 850,000
1,050,000
550,000
22
900,000
35
Communist China 1,000,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
125
5,000,000
155
North Korea Negligible
327,000
18
360,000
24
Viet Minh Negligible
300,000
16
300,000
20
It is estimated that 200 divisions will be utilized to provide replacement units or individual replace-
ments for combat losses.
Units in excess of this number could be provided but would lack equipment unless provided by the
USSR.
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TABLE 4
ESTIMATED ACTUAL AIRCRAFT STRENGTH OF BLOC AIR UNITS
MID-1956 - MID-19611
61
MID-56
MID-57
MID-58
MID-59
MID-60
MID-61
'USSR
EE
SAT
CCAF/
NKAF
USSR
USSR
EE CCAF/
SAT NKAF
USSR
USSR
EE CCAF/
USSR SAT NKAF
FIGHTER
Jet (Day)
8,257
1,600
1,580
7,628
6,953
2,120
1,750
6,020
5,248
4,506
1,880
1,435
Jet (A/W)
1,046
55
30
1,707
2,382
100
200
3,316
4,087
4,829
790
645
Piston
-
50
180
-
-
-
100
-
-
-
-
90
ATTACK
Jet
416
-
90
567
680
395
290
945
945
945
710
360
Piston
523
866
190
416
265
495
40
-
-
-
-
-
LIGHT
BOMBER
Jet
2,938
165
401
3,168
3,168
385
700
3,168
3,168
3,168
660
780
Piston
-
60
260
-
-
20
-
-
-
-
-
-
MEDIUM
BOMBER 8.
Jet
475
-
-
700
700
-
-
700
700
700
-
20
Piston
769
-
20
380
190
-
40
-
-
-
-
30
HEAVY
BOMBER 8
Jet
35
-
-
90
220
-
-
400
500
500
-
-
Turbo-prop
30
-
-
130
250
-
-
300
300
300
-
-
TRANSPORT
Medium
-
-
-
29
98
-
-
141
255
330
-
25
Light
1,681
115
140
1,656
1,586
145
210
1,544
1,428
1,354
165
185
HELICOPTERS
Large
235
15
-
350
450
85
40
550
600
600
115
80
RECONNAIS-
SANCE
Jet Fighters
77
-
40
115
115
110
50
115
115
115
145
56
Jet Light Bmrs 506
-
-
605
605
60
50
605
605
605
140
56
Piston
162
85
10
172
172
-
10
172
- 172
172
-
10
UTILITY/Liaison
Jet
54
-
-
115
115
-
-
115
115
115
-
-
Piston
109
210
40
115
115
130
55
115
115
115
-
60
TANKERS 4
TOTALS
17,313
3,221
2,981
17,943
18,064
4,045
3,535
18,206
18,353
18,354
4,605
3,832
BLOC TOTAL
23,515
25,644
26,791
'Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7 do not take into account the possible effect on the air forces of the announced
Soviet force reductions.
2 At present this force consists of fighters only. We estimate that a jet attack type will be introduced.
8 For a discussion of the factors which may affect the present medium and heavy bomber estimates,
especially in the later years, see paragraph 115.
'Tankers are not shown in specific numbers since they have not been identified in operational units.
For a discussion of Soviet inflight refueling capabilities and probable tanker requirements, see para-
graph 117.
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TABLE 5
ESTIMATED GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET ACTUAL AIRCRAFT STRENGTH BY TYPE
MID-1956
AIRCRAFT EASTERN
TYPE EUROPE 1
NORTH-
WESTERN
USSR 2
WESTERN
USSR 3
W.
CENTRAL
USSR 4
CAUCASUS
USSR 5
E.
CENTRAL
USSR 6
FAR
EAST 7
TOTAL
FIGHTER
Jet (Day)
1,020
1,249
1,941
1,010
1,067
418
1,552
8,257
Jet (A/W)
75
184
269
204
131
37
146
1,046
TOTAL
1,095
1,433
2,210
1,214
1,198
455
1,698
9,303
ATTACK
Jet
114
?
?
?
75
?
227
416
Piston
184
?
113
?
?
113
113
523
TOTAL
298
?
113
?
75
113
340
939
LIGHT
BOMBER
Jet
330
400
1,039
136
245
54
734
2,938
MEDIUM
BOMBER
Jet
?
63
355
42
?
?
15
475
Piston
?
83
328
83
55
?
220
769
TOTAL
?
146
683
125
55
?
235
1,244
HEAVY
BOMBER
Jet
?
8
27
?
?
?
?
35
Turbo-prop
?
?
30
?
?
?
30
4
TOTAL
?
8
57
?
?
?
?
65
TRANSPORT
Medium
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Light
115
155
438
381
61
58
473
1,681
TOTAL
115
155
438
381
61
58
473
1,681
HELICOPTERS
Large
5
45
85
60
5
?
35
235
RECONNAIS-
SANCE
Jet Fighter
51
?
26
?
?
?
?
77
Jet Light
Bomber
68
74
185
22
45
22
90
506
Piston
?
51
8
?
26
?
77
162
TOTAL
119
125
219
22
71
22
167
745
UTILITY/Ln
Jet Light
Bomber
?
18
18
? '
?
?
18
54
Piston (Misc.)
14
8
29
?
?
?
58
109
TOTAL
14
26
47
76
163
1,976
2,338
4,891
1,938
1,710
702
3,758
17,313
'4.
1 East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Rumania.
Northern, Leningrad, and White Sea Military Districts.
Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Kiev, Odessa, and Tauric Military Districts.
4 Moscow, South Ural, Volga, Voronezh, and Ural Military Districts.
North Caucasus and Transcaucasus Military Districts.
East Siberian, Turkestan, and West Siberian Military Districts.
Far East and Transbaikal Military Districts.
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.15
SECRET 63
TABLE 6
ESTIMATED SOVIET ACTUAL AIRCRAFT STRENGTH BY ROLE WITHIN MAJOR COMPONENTS
MID-1956
TYPE AIRCRAFT
TACTICAL
(FRONTAL)
AVIATION
FTR. AVIATION
OF
AIR DEFENSE
LONG-
RANGE
AVIATION
NAVAL
AVIATION
AVIATION
OF ABN.
TROOPS
TOTALS
FIGHTER
Day
3,949 2,834
?
1,474
8,257
A/W
396 418
?
232
?
1,046
TOTAL
4,345 3,252
?
1,706
?
9,303
ATTACK
Jet
416 ?
?
?
?
416
Piston
447 ?
?
76
?
523
TOTAL
863
76
939
LIGHT BOMBER
Jet
2,285
653
2,938
MEDIUM BOMBER
Jet
? ?
475
?
475
Piston
? ?
756
13
769
TOTAL
1,231
13
1,244
HEAVY BOMBER
Jet
? ?
35
?
?
35
Turbo-prop
? ?
30
?
?
30
TOTAL
65
65
TRANSPORT
Medium
? ?
?
?
Light
713 94
214
162
498
1,681
TOTAL
713 94
214
162
498
1,681
HELICOPTERS
Large
50
85
100
235
RECONNAISSANCE
Jet Fighter
77 ?
?
?
?
77
Jet Light Bomber
396 ?
?
110
?
506
Piston
? ?
?
162
?
162
TOTAL
473
272
745
UTILITY/Ln
Jet
?
?
54
?
54
Piston
100 ?
?
9
?
109
TOTAL
100
63
163
8,829 3,346
1,510
3,030
598
17,313
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TABLE 7
ESTIMATED SOVIET ACTUAL AIRCRAFT STRENGTHS BY ROLE WITHIN MAJOR COMPONENTS
MID-1961
64
FTR.
TACTICAL
AVIATION
LONG-
AVIATION
(FRONTAL)
OF
RANGE
NAVAL
OF
TYPE AIRCRAFT AVIATION
AIR DEFENSE
AVIATION
AVIATION
ABN. TROOPS
TOTALS
FIGHTER
Day
2,158
1,448
900
4,506
A/W
2,154
1,899
776
4,829
TOTAL
4,312
3,347
1,676
9,335
ATTACK
Jet
869
76
945
Piston
TOTAL
869
76
945
LIGHT BOMBER
Jet
2,419
749
3,168
MEDIUM BOMBER
Jet
?
?
'700
?
?
700
Piston
?
?
?
?
?
?
TOTAL
700
700
HEAVY BOMBER
dr
Jet
?
?
500
?
?
500
Turbo-prop
?
?
300
?
?
300
TOTAL
800
800
TRANSPORT
Medium Jet
58
17
25
?
?
100
Medium Piston
57
?
?
29
144
230
Light Piston
605
'75
185
144
345
1,354
TOTAL
720
92
210
173
489
1,684
HELICOPTERS
Large
125
125
350
600
RECONNAISSANCE
Jet Fighter
115
?
?
?
115
Jet Light Bomber
490
?
?
115
?
605
Piston
?
?
?
172
?
172
TOTAL
605
287
892
UTILITY/Ln
fti
Jet
58
?
?
57
?
115
Piston
86
?
?
29
?
115
TOTAL
144
86
230
9,194
3,439
1,710
3,172
839
18,354
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SECRET 65
TABLE 8
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
Year Into
AIRCRAFT
Operational
Combat
Combat
Use
Maximum Speed
Ceiling
Radius
naut.
Sea Level 35,000 ft.
40,000 ft.
ft.
miles
DAY FIGHTERS
FRESCO A & B
Current
620 555 552
53,900
610
FRESCO C
Current
635 570 569
57,900
500
FARMER
Current
695 745 605
61,400
180 1
FARMER (Improved)
1957
700 850 800
62,000
400
DF-59
1959
740 1,050 1,000
65,000
400
ALL-WEATHER FIGHTERS
FRESCO D
Current
635 570 569
57,700
500
FLASHLIGHT A
Current
615 545 540
50,300
420
FLASHLIGHT C
1957
620 560 555
51,800
465
AWF-59
1959
740 1,050 1,000
65,000
400
'Internal fuel only.
gm.
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TABLE 9
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT
(Calculated in accordance with US Mil-C-5011A Spec)
>
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71
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1-3
CONDITIONS
BULL
MODIFIED
BULL
BADGER
1957 2
BADGER
BISON
1956 2
BISON
1961 3
BISON
BEAR
Combat Radius/Range
(naut. miles)
2200/4300
3000/5800
2450/4800
3300/6500
2550/5000
3450/6800
540/
1497,0500
/
41,500
43,600
2500/4700
3400/6400
2750/5300
3700/7200
2800/5600
3800/7600
540/
19,000
475/
44,500
46,500
3000/5600
4100/7600
3200/6300
4300/8500
3300/6500
4400/8700
145947,0050/
0
/
46,200
49,000
3500/6600
4750
3900/7600
5300
4100/8200
5600
495/
2 500
413,4
/
40,000
40,700
a. 25,000 lb. bomb load
one refuel 1
b. 10,000 lb. bomb load
one refuel
c. 3,500 lb. bomb load
one refuel
Speed/Alt. (kn./ft.)
1700/3100
2300/4200
1950/3500
2650/4700
350/
30,000
310/
30,000
36,500
2000/3600
2700/4900
2300/4100
3100/5500
360/
0,00
33400 /
35,000
37,500
1500/2900
2050/3900
1700/3400
2300/4600
545/
12,500
475/
41,000
45,000
1900/3700
2550/5000
2100/4200
2850/5700
550/
1427,5000
/
43,000
46,000
a. Max. speed/
optimum alt.
b. Target speed/
alt.
Combat Ceiling (ft.)
1Refueling estimates based on the assumption that the USSR develops and produces compatible tankers which will provide approximately
35 percent increase in radius/range.
2 Improvements include the replacement of the 18,000 lb. thrust engines with those having a thrust of 20,500 lbs.
3 Improvements include higher thrust engines and a higher gross weight.
O r i 0
7 J a 7 j 0
T1 ? w T1 w
CO a) CO a)
71 0_ 71 0_
.
o5 o5'
_. _.
oo
TABLE 9 - continued
> ,- > ,-
0 ' 0'
0 0-) ESTIMATED SOVIET LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE UNDER OPTIMUM MISSION PROFILE 0 (/)
O)) 0) a)
CD D (Calculated in accordance with US Mil-C-5011A Spec except that fuel reserves are 0) D
0 7,:
reduced to permit a maximum of 30 minutes loiter at sea level, and aircraft o Rj?
o (DN operate at altitudes permitting maximum radius/range) o a)
0 0 a-
0
-1
-1
.
0
01961
`<
>
P
P
Es)
<
a)
a
ah
-,
70
a)
(T)
a)
cn
(I)
l)
?01
_e
-.
N.)
o
o
co
o
--,i
w
n
0
Pi
tii
q
00
-1 0
N..) p
>
P
P
Es)
<
a)
a
(3:
70
a)
(T)
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cn
tli a)
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N.)
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o
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CONDITIONS
BULL
MODIFIED
BULL
BADGER
1957 2
BADGER
BISON
1956 2
BISON
1961 8
BISON
BEAR
4
MEDIUM
BOMBER
Combat Radius/Range
(naut. miles)
2500/4800
3400/6500
2800/5400
3800/7300
2900/5700
3900/7700
540/
1497,050/0
42,400
44,600
52,600
53,200
54,600
2800/5300
3800/7200
3100/6100
4200/8200
3200/6400
4300/8600
540/
1497'050/0
45,500
47,500
55,200
56,000
57,000
3200/6100
4300/8200
3500/6800
4700/9100
3600/7000
4954000;9400
1497,050/0
47,000
50,000
56,000
57,500
58,500
3800/7200
5100/-
4250/8300
5750/-
4500/8900
6419050:-
241,1600/0
42,100
41,300
48,200
50,200
51,200
a. 25,000 lb. bomb load
one refuel'
b. 10,000 lb. bomb load
one refuel
c. 3,500 lb. bomb load
one refuel
Speed/Alt. (kn./ft.)
1800/3300
2400/4500
2050/3700
2750/5000
350/
30,000
310/
30,000
36,500
2150/4000
2900/5400
2450/4600
3350/6200
360/
30,000
340/
35,000
37,500
1600/3100
2200/4200
1850/3700
2500/5000
545/
1427,550/0
41,500
45,500
2050/4000
2750/5400
2300/4500
3100/6100
550/
12,500
470/
43,500
46,500
1950/4000
2200/4600
1085/
35,000
a. Max. speed/
optimum alt.
b. Target speed/
alt.
Combat ceiling (ft.)
57,500
Terminal Target
Altitude (ft.) 5
a. 25,000 lb. bomb load
b. 10,000 lb. bomb load
c. 3,500 lb. bomb load
41,500
42,000
42,500
43,000
49,500
51,000
51,500
53,000
61,000
62,500
" (See footnotes on preceding page.)
4 it is estimated that in 1961 the USSR will introduce a new medium bomber with supersonic dash capabilities (Mach 1.2-1.5).
5Service ceiling at maximum power with one hour fuel reserves plus bomb load aboard. No range figure is associated with this altitude.
lialIDHS clO,L
TABLE 10
ESTIMATED BLOC NAVAL FORCES, MID-1956, MID-1961
MODERN VESSELS 2
FLEET
BALTIC
NORTHERN
BLACK SEA
PACIFIC
TOTALS
BLOC
TOTAL
COUNTRY
USSR
Satellites
USSR
USSR
Satellites
USSR
Communist
China'
USSR
Communist
China
Satellites &
Ships
'56 '61
'56 '61
'56 '61
'56 '61
'56 '61
'56 '61
'56 '61
'56 '61
'56 '61
'56 '61
s)
MAJOR SURFACE
VESSELS
(D
Heavy Cruisers
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
6
2
Light Cruisers
8
10
0
0
5
9
5
8
0
0
2
7
1
0
20
34
1
0
21
34
0
2
cn
Destroyers
51
45
1
0
29
42
28
36
1
1
33
49
4
4
141
172
6
5
147
177
Escort Destroyers
14
16
0
6
11
20
14
31
0
0
26
34
0
0
65
101
0
6
65
107
Li
TOTAL (MAJOR
VESSELS)
75
71
1
6
45
71
49
75
1
1
63
92
5
4
232
309
7
11
239
320
CI
(S1
'
1-3
18
MINOR SURFACE
VESSELS
TOTAL
903
1,000
90
169
198
225
194
215
66
66
386
400
204
204
1,681
1,840
360
439
2,041
2,279
co
SUBMARINES'
Long Range'
40
150
0
0
85
270
55
103
0
0
22
120
0
0
202
643
0
0
202
643
Long Range
11
0
0
0
13
0
1
0
0
0
7
0
4
0
32
0
4
0
36
0
Medium Range'
3
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
22'
162'
0
0
22
162
Medium Range
9
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
10
4
0
0
10
4
Short Range
31
21
6
6
0
0
14
3
0
0
28
18
4
4
73
42
10
10
83
52
TOTAL (SUB-
MARINES)
94
178
6
6
98
270
70
106
0
0
58
138
8
4
339
851
14
10
353
861
(See footnotes on following page.)
C7)
00
LallOaS c10,1,
TABLE 10 ? Continued
ESTIMATED BLOC NAVAL FORCES, MID-1956, MID-19611
OVERAGE VESSELS 2
FLEET
BALTIC
NORTHERN
BLACK SEA
..
PACIFIC
TOTALS
BLOC
TOTAL
COUNTRY
USSR Satellites
USSR
USSR Satellites
Communist
USSR China 4
Satellites &
China
USSR Communist
Ships
'56 '61 '56 '61
'56 '61
'56 '61 '56 '61
'56 '61 '56 '61
'56 '61 '56 '61
'56 '61
OVERAGE MAJOR
SURFACE VESSELS
Battleships/Monitors 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 4 4
Heavy Cruisers 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4
Light Cruisers 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 1 2 3
Destroyers 1 15 1 2 3 7 2 7 5 4 2 11 0 0 8 40 6 6 14 46
TOTAL (OVERAGE
MAJOR VESSELS) 4 20 1 2 3 7 5 12 5 4 2 11 0 1 14 50 6 7 20 57
OVERAGE SUBMARINES
Long Range 8 11 0 0 16 17 10 2 0 0 9 3 0 4 43 33 0 4 43 37
Medium Range 3 6 3 1 0 0 8 1 3 2 18 0 4 4 29 7 10 7 39 14
Short Range 11 10 0 0 5 , 3 10 11 3 3 8 0 1 0 34 24 4 3 38 27
TOTAL (OVERAGE
SUBMARINES) 22 27 3 1 21 20 28 14 6 5 35 3 5 8 106 64 14 14 120 78
1Does not take into account the possible effect on the naval forces of the announced Soviet force reductions. See paragraph 121.
2 Modern vessels include surface ships 20 years of age and less (from date of completion), and submarines 14 years of age and less. Over-
age vessels include surface ships more than 20 years of age, and submarines 15-20 years of age. Submarines are excluded entirely from-
the estimated future order of battle at 20 years. Surface vessels are not excluded because of age. These are included until it becomes
apparent that they are no longer fulfilling type assignments, at which time they are assigned to the Miscellaneous Auxiliary (AG) cate-
gory.
3 Construction rates of minor combatant vessels are uncertain and probably will be limited to only slightly more vessels than will be needed
to fulfill replacement needs.
4 There is no reliable information upon which to estimate future augmentation to the Chinese Communist Navy. The Chinese Communists
do have a significant shipbuilding capacity and this factor should be considered when analyzing mid-1961 estimates.
1 For a discussion of the factors which may affect future Soviet submarine strength, see paragraph 124.
Includes 19 unassigned in 1956.
' Includes 159 unassigned in 1961.
'Postwar design and construction.
laHoas clOI
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TABLE 11
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF MAJOR GROUND FORCE WEAPONS
1956-1961
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
Medium Tanks
4,000
4,000
2,5001
3,500
4,000
4,000
Heavy Tanks
800
800
800
800
3001
500
Assault Guns
SU - 85
300
450
450
450
600
600
SU - 122
600
600
800
800
800
800
SU - 152
400
400
200
0
0
0
Amphibious Tanks
150
300
300
0
0
0
Light Tanks
100
250
350
350
300
300
57-mm AA
1,500
1,500
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
85-mm AA
0
0
0
0
0
0
100-mm AA-
1,000
1,000
500
250
250
250
122-mm AA
150
150
150
100
100
100
57-mm Self-propelled Anti-Tank
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
85-mm M 1945
2,000
1,000
500
500
500
500
85-mm Self-propelled Anti-Tank
500
750
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
100-mm M 1955
2,000
4,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
122-mm M 1954
500
500
500
500
500
500
122-mm M 1955
200
300
500
500
500
500
122-mm Howitzer 2
500
200
200
200
200
200
152-mm Howitzer M 1955
100
200
500
500
500
500
152-mm Gun-howitzer 2
0
0
0
0
0
0
203-mm Howitzer
0
0
0
0
0
0
203-mm Gun-howitzer M 1955
100
150
200
200
100
100
Mortars
82-mm
2,000
1,000
500
500
500
500
120-mm
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
160-mm (new)
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
240-mm
250
300
300
300
300
300
'Indicates estimated introduction of a new model.
'Probably will be replaced by a new model of approximately same caliber. If so, production will be in-
creased in later portion of period.
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TABLE 12
AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION IN SOVIET BLOC
AND NATO COUNTRIES
1946-1955
1946-
1951
1952-
1955
POST-
WAR
TOTAL
SOVIET BLOC
Fighters (Units)
20,371
18,630
39,001
Bombers (Units)
8,432
5,941
14,373
All Others (Units)
28,190
16,261
44,451
Total Aircraft Production
311
304
615
Wt. (million pounds)
NATO
Fighters (Units)
14,746
22,302
37,048
Bombers (Units)
3,431
5,954
9,385
All Others (Units)
85,429
38,928
124,357
Total Aircraft Production
337
629
966
Wt. (million pounds)
TABLE 13
AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION IN USSR AND US
1946-1955
1946-1951
1952-1955
Postwar Total
Units
Weight 1
Units
Weight1
Units
Weight
USSR
Fighters
19,872
83,411
. 16,776
97,778
36,648
181,189
Bombers
8,432
138,391
5,198
121,721
13,630
260,112
All Others
26,000
84,265
13,553
46,895
39,553
131,160
US
Fighters
8,116
53,057
15,245
144,435
23,361
197,492
Bombers
2,626
64,497
5,168
145,085
7,794
209,582
All Others
73,464
117,594
31,097
240,012
104,561
357,606
? 'Airframe weight is in thousands of pounds.
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?
g?
?
Bombers
SECRET 72
TABLE 14
ESTIMATED SOVIET BLOC AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION
1955 THROUGH 1961
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
USSR
1,239 1,153 857 1,412 1,278 876 739
Heavy 31 114 292 351 188 167 172
Medium 381 499 180 180 180 177 20
Lt/Attack 827 540 385 881 910 532 547
Fighters 3,800 3,509 4,059 4,447 3,383 3,133 4,327
All Others
Fighters
All Others
Bombers
3,597 3,425 3,580 3,658 3,658 3,583 3,583
SATELLITES
659 402 - 450 823 960 960 960
1,100 1,146 1,295 1,390 1,404 1,416 1,416
TOTAL SOVIET BLOC
1,239 1,153 857 1,412 1,278 876 '739
Heavy 31 114 292 351 188 167 172
Medium 381 499 180 180 180 177 20
Lt/Attack 827 540 385 881 910 532 547
Fighters 4,459 3,911 4,509 5,270 4,343 4,093 5,287
All Others
4,697 4,571 4,875 5,048 5,062 4,999 4,999
TABLE 15
ESTIMATED TOTAL USSR NAVAL VESSEL CONSTRUCTION, 1956-1961
Major Surface Vessels
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
Cruisers 3 3 2 2 2 2
Destroyers 16 16 8 8 8 8
Escort Destroyers 10 10 6 6 6 6
Minor Surface Vessels 1 20+ 20+ 20+ 20+ 20+ 20+
Submarines (Long Range)
90 105 75 75 75 75
(Medium Range) 18 26 30 30 30 30
I It is unrealistic to estimate exactly the future building rate of minor surface vessels, but it will be ade-
quate to replace existing units as they become obsolete or are transferred to the Satellites or to Com-
munist China. Building activity in the smaller yards is constant and indicates a gradual build-up of
minor surface vessels in the Soviet Navy. This gradual build-up is represented in round figures in
Table 10.
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TABLE 16
ESTIMATED COMPOSITION OF BLOC MERCHANT FLEETS
MID-1956 - MID-1961
(Ocean-going vessels, 1,000 G.R.T. and up)
NORTHERN FLEET
Mid-1956
USSR
SATELLITE
TOTAL
Non-Tanker
No.
GRT
87
Tanker
No.
GRT
6
Total
No.
GRT
93
Non-Tanker
No.
GRT
Tanker
No.
GRT
Total
No.
GRT
Non-Tanker
No.
GRT
87
Tanker
No.
GRT
6
Total
No.
GRT
93
233,375
7,485
240,860
233,375
7,485
240,860
Mid-1957
107
6
113
107
6
113
291,436
7,485
298,921
291,436
7,485
298,921
Mid-1958
117
6
123
117
6
123
336,246
7,485
343,731
336,246
7,485
343,731
Mid-1959
119
6
125
119
6
125
cI
343,246
7,485
350,731
343,246
7,485
350,731
CD
Mid-1960
121
6
127
121
6
127
tmj
CD
350,246
7,485
357,731
350,246
7,485
357,731
n
Mid-1961
123
6
129
123
6
129
W
357,246
7,485
364,731
357,246
7,485
364,731
Li
1-3
1-3
BALTIC FLEET
USSR
SATELLITE 1
TOTAL
Non-Tanker
Tanker
Total
Non-Tanker
Tanker
Total
Non-Tanker
Tanker
Total
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
GRT
GRT
GRT
GRT
GRT
GRT
GRT
GRT
GRT
Mid-1956
157
11
168
82
2
84
239
13
252
479,389
16,733
496,122
318,958
12,462
331,420
798,347
29,195
827,542,
Mid-1957
166
11
177
96
2
98
262
13
275
511,235
16,733
527,968
388,515
12,462
400,977
899,750
29,195
928,945
Mid-1958
170
11
181
106
2
108
276
13
289
528,591
16,733
545,324
430,190
12,462
442,652
958,781
29,195
987,976
Mid-1959
173
11
184
118
2
120
291
13
304
538,147
16,733
554,880
482,181
12,462
494,643
1,020,328
29,195
1,049,523
Mid-1960
176
11
187
129
2
131
305
13
318
547,703
16,733
564,436
530,356
12,462
542,818
1,078,059
29,195
1,107,254
Mid-1961
179
11
190
140
2
142
319
13
332
557,259
16,733
573,992
581,007
12,462
593,469
1,138,266
29,195
1,167,461
1 Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia
C+3
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t'll
0
P:1
tri
1-3
USSR
TABLE 16 - Continued
BLACK SEA FLEET
TOTAL
w
Lzi
0
W
tli
1-3
-0
CI
0)
0 (III
o 0
o
CD
CD_
7:1
CD
CT)
(1)
CD
01
_10)
CO
SATELLITE a
Non-Tanker
No.
GRT
Mid-1956 111
385,911
Mid-1957 116
397,981
Mid-1958 119
405,651
Mid-1959 122
433,238
Mid-1960 124
438,708
Mid-1961 126
444,178
Tanker
No.
GRT
43
288,223
47
320,223
53
380,223
59
440,223
65
500,223
71
560,223
Total
No.
GRT
154
674,134
163
718,204
172
785,874
181
873,461
189
938,931
197
1,004,401
Non-Tanker Tanker
No. No.
GRT GRT
17
50,008
Total
No.
GRT
17
50,008
19
54,208
21
58,408
23
62,608
25
66,808
26
68,008
Non-Tanker
No.
GRT
128
435,919
135
452,189
140
464,059
145
495,846
149 .
505,516
152
512,186
Tanker
No.
GRT
43
288,223
47
320,223
53
380,223
59
440,223
65
500,223
71
560,223
Total
No.
GRT
171
724,142
182
772,412
193
844,282
204
936,069
214
1,005,739
223
1,072,409
19
54,208
21
58,408
23
62,608
25
66,808
26
68,008
2 Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania
USSR ,
FAR EAST FLEET
TOTAL
COMMUNIST CHINA
Non-Tanker
No.
GRT
Tanker
No.
GRT
Total
No.
GRT
Non-Tanker Tanker
No. No.
GRT GRT
Total
No.
GRT
Non-Tanker
No.
GRT
Tanker
No.
GRT
Total
No.
GRT
Mid-1956 348 19 367 108 10 118 456 29 485
1,180,354 63,805 1,244,159 280,678 13,834 294,512 1,461,032 77,639 1,538,671
Mid-1957 372 19 391 118 13 131 490 32 522
1,256,174 63,805 1,319,979 305,148 23,084 328,232 1,561,322 86,889 1,648,211
Mid-1958 381 19 400 125 14 139 506 33 539
1,283,674 63,805 1,347,479 325,980 25,934 351,914 1,609,654 89,739 1,699,393
Mid-1959 386 19 405 128 15 143 514 34 548
1,289,674 63,805 1,353,479 332,480 28,784 361,264 1,622,154 92,589 1,714,743
Mid-1960 391 19 410 131 16 147 522 35 557
1,295,674 63,805 1,359,479 338,980 31,634 370,614 1,634,654 95,439 1,730,093
Mid-1961 396 19 415 134 17 151 530 36 566
1,301,674 63,805 1,365,479 345,480 34,484 379,964 1,647,154 98,289 1,745,443
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APPENDIX B
ESTIMATED SOVIET TOTAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, 1950-1961
1. The estimates of Soviet total defense ex-
penditures contained in Paragraph 37 are
based on a study conducted by the IAC Ad
Hoc Military Cost Study Committee., 2 This
study has been undertaken for three major
purposes. The first is to measure over time
the economic burden placed on the USSR by
its defense establishment through calculation
of a ruble total which can be compared with
gross national product. The second is to
examine these expenditures in detail in order
to permit closer analysis of the composition
and trends within this total. The third is to
measure the dollar value of Soviet defense
"The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army, does not consider the
costs derived in the interagency study to be a
valid appraisal of the over-all costs of the Soviet
military effort and does not concur in the find-
ings of the study. He believes that its basic
weakness is a lack of sufficient information,
pointing out that few current prices are avail-
able for items procured by the Soviet armed
forces and arguing that the derivation of prices
by the indirect methods employed is too inaccu-
rate. He further believes that the evidence as
to whether the armed forces do or do not pay
the turn-over tax is not conclusive. Lastly, he
regards the information available on costs of
such important programs as guided missiles,
atomic energy, and research and development as
almost nil.
2 The Director of Naval Intelligence believes that
although the text states: (a) the results of this
analysis are tentative and subject to error, (b)
important gaps remain in statistical data avail-
able, particularly in the military sector, and
(c) the comparison of the value of defense ex-
penditures in the USSR and the US may be a
crude one, the discussion as a whole gives an
impression of reliability which is more favor-
able than the methods and information used can
justify. Because of the tenuous nature of much
of the evidence used and other important defi-
ciencies in intelligence, he believes that conclu-
sions drawn from this study may not be valid,
and that comparisons between USSR and US de-
fense expenditures should be used with caution.
75
expenditures in order to obtain some com-
parison, albeit a crude one, of the value of
defense expenditures in the USSR and the US.
2. The estimates presented here include all
known Soviet defense expenditures, irrespec-
tive of whether these expenditures are made
from the announced military budget or from
other sources. For purposes of this study,
total expenditures have been categorized as
follows:
a. Major programs, consisting of tanks,
artillery, weapons, ammunition, construction
and refitting of naval vessels, mines, torpe-
does, military aircraft, aerial bombs, ground
radar, guided missiles, atomic energy, military
research and development, communication
facilities and equipment, and associated initial
and operating spare parts;
b. Support, consisting of a variety of main-
tenance, operating and training expenses,
such as for POL, purchased transportation,
construction for the maintenance and replace-
ment of facilities (including barracks) , a
variety of heterogeneous equipment, civilian
pay, medical supplies, printing and publish-
ing, retirement pay, personnel costs for cer-
tain KGB personnel, and the support of
DOSAAF (paramilitary activities) ; and
c. Military personnel, consisting of the pay
and allowances, food, clothing and miscellane-
ous personnel supplies for the active uni-
formed personnel of the Ministry of Defense,
the militarized components of the MVD, and
the reserve program.
3. Because the analysis was conducted in far
greater detail than previous work in this field
and took into account many factors not pre-
viously examined, we believe that the results
are considerably better grounded than our
earlier estimates. Nevertheless, they remain
tentative and subject to error. While a pre-
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cise margin of error cannot be determined, it
is unlikely that it exceeds 25 percent in either
direction for total expenditures or the major
subtotals. Furthermore, several compensat-
ing tendencies serve to reduce the margin of
error associated with total expenditures, per-
haps to as low as plus or minus 10 percent.
4. The ruble totals are the sums of individual
estimates of the value of as complete a list
of defense goods and services as possible.
These individual estimates are in turn, with
some exceptions, the result of applying ruble
prices obtained directly or derived in a num-
ber of ways to physical estimates of goods and
services devoted to defense purposes. The re-
liability of the results is therefore affected by
the reliability both of the estimates of the
physical quantities and the prices applied to
them. On the first count, there is some evi-
dence to suggest that physical estimates of
end-item procurement have tended to be high
but that military manpower may have been
understated in recent years (see Paragraph
96 of estimate). On the second count, the
four basic valuation procedures employed,
listed in descending order of reliability, are
as follows:
a. Application of ruble prices obtained di-
rectly from Soviet sources. The major items
valued in this fashion are personnel pay, sub-
sistence, and clothing; automotive equipment
and tractors; petroleum products; transporta-
tion; construction; some miscellaneous sup-
plies and services; civilian wages; pensions;
reserves; MVD-KGB personnel costs; and
some research and development.
b. Use of a small sample of ruble prices to
obtain ruble/dollar ratios which were then
used to convert dollar prices of other items
back into rubles. For example, if comparable
medium tanks cost 225,000 rubles in the
USSR and 50,000 dollars in the US, the re-
sulting 4.5/1 ruble/dollar ratio was applied to
the US heavy tank price of 105,000 dollars to
obtain a value of 472,500 rubles for the com-
parable Soviet heavy tank. This procedure
was used in the valuation of aircraft, ship-
building, and armored vehicles.
c. The third procedure is actually a sub-
category of the second but is distinguished
here because the smaller price samples avail-
able probably result in lower reliability. Items
in this category are communications equip-
ment and installations, ammunition, elec-
tronics, and certain weapons (principally
towed artillery, small arms, and mortars).
d. In those cases in which physical esti-
mates were not available or for which prices
could not be obtained, values were estimated
by the use of partial Soviet data and modified
US values or factors, which were converted to
rubles by estimated ruble/dollar ratios. This
procedure was used to value atomic energy,
guided missiles, some research and develop-
ment, some equipment spares, and other mis-
cellaneous items.
5. Table I shows the share of estimated total
defense expenditures accounted for by each
of these four types of valuation procedures in
1950, 1955, and 1961. It will be evident that,
apart from the effect of possible errors in
physical estimates, which become more likely
for future years, the reliability of the final
result also declines over the period because
items which must be valued by less reliable
procedures acquire increasing importance in
total expenditures.
TABLE I
Share of Estimated Total Defense Expenditures
Obtained by Various Valuation Procedures
1950
1955
1961
Type 1
60
48
41
Type 2
22
27
31
Type 3
7
8
6
Type 4
11
17
22
Total
100
100
100
6. In order to permit comparison with gross
national product, total defense expenditures
originally calculated in 1951 rubles (see Table
II) have to be expressed in terms of 1953
rubles at factor cost 3 and adjusted slightly
The valuation basis for the original derivation
of the various series was 1951 market prices.
These series were then converted to 1953 factor
costs by two adjustments. The first of these,
to obtain 1953 market prices, was accomplished
by applying the following indexes (1951 = 100) :
(a) For military pay, MVD-KGB pay, and
pensions ? none.
(Footnote continued on page 77)
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over time to account for the changes in rela-
tive prices which are considered in the calcu-
lation of GNP growth. The results of this
computation are 110 billion rubles in 1950,
151 billion in 1955, and 204 billion in 1961,
indicating that defense expenditures absorbed
about 14 percent of GNP in 1950 and the same
share in 1955 and will take about 13 percent
in 1961.
7. In Table II, total defense expenditures in
1951 rubles are broken down into categories
which show the cost of various types of mili-
tary activities and variations in the relative
importance of these activities over time.
8. The series reflects an over-all 37 percent in-
crease between 1955 and 1961 with a sharply
rising trend for the years 1955 through 1958,
when the total cost reaches 204 billion 1951
rubles. Beginning with 1958 the series re-
mains relatively constant at about 200 billion
rubles for two years until 1960, when another
sharp .rise begins, reaching about 230 billion
rubles in 1961.
9. Over the period, procurement (including
spare parts) for major programs increases
more rapidly than the total. In 1955 this
category accounts for 90 billion rubles, or 54
percent of the total. By 1961 this same cate-
gory increases to 143 billion rubles, or 62 per-
cent of total defense expenditure. Among the
major programs, ground equipment expendi-
tures display relative constancy through the
period 1955-1961, reflecting the continuing
modernization of forces which have already
(Footnote continued from page 76)
(b) For food ? a retail food price index of 78.
(c) For clothing ? a retail price index of 95.
(d) For reserve pay ? a money wage index
of 106.
(e) For all other categories (including mili-
tary hard goods) ? an investment cost
index of 95.
The second adjustment, 1953 market prices into
1953 factor costs, was made by reducing the per-
tinent categories ? food, clothing, and POL ?
by 18 percent. The values of these categories
are first reduced by 50 percent to remove the
turnover tax. The result is then increased by
two-thirds to account for imputed factor re-
turns. Since wholesale prices were used for
these goods in this study, the appropriate de-
duction is slightly larger.
77
attained considerable size. The fairly level
trend for the naval program is due primarily
to growing expenditures on submarines coun-
terbalanced by declining expenditures on sur-
face vessels. During the same period the air
equipment and the "other" category (which
includes guided missiles, atomic energy, and
research and development) show significant
increases, 101 percent and 81 percent respec-
tively. Support expenditures increase 26 per-
cent during the period, from 23 billion rubles
in 1955 to 29 billion rubles in 1961, and ac-
count for a relatively constant share of 13
percent of total defense expenditures. Per-
sonnel expenditures show only a modest eight
percent increase and therefore decline as a
share of total expenditures from 32 percent in
1955 to 25 percent in 1961.
10. As was mentioned in Paragraph 3 above,
the strength estimates which were used as the
basis for personnel costs in Table II for the
years 1951-1954 were probably too low. Fur-
thermore, at least some portion of the an-
nounced Soviet personnel cut of 640,000 men
probably took place during 1955. It also ap-
pears that military end-item procurement
may have been overestimated for the 1954-
1956 period.
11. In addition, the calculations in Table II
are incomplete in two other respects, the
effects of the reduction in military manpower
discussed in Paragraphs 97-100 and the esti-
mated costs of the guided missile program.
At minimum, the announced reduction of 1.2
million men, if carried out, would lead to a
reduction in direct personnel costs (pay, food,
clothing, etc.). Depending on whether the
cut were made on a slice or largely on a cadre
basis, the result would be an ultimate reduc-
tion in annual expenditures of from 11.5 to
9.5 billion 1951 rubles. To this should prob-
ably be added a reduction in operating costs
and probably some decrease in procurement.
However, in the absence of information con-
cerning the details of the reduction, these
amounts cannot be estimated with any pre-
cision. Again depending on various assump-
tions as to how the cut would be made, the
reduction in annual expenditures for other
than for personnel might range between 5.5
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TABLE II
COMPOSITION OF ESTIMATED TOTAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
1950-1961
(Billion 1951 Rubles)
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
MAJOR PROGRAMS
53.5
61.1
63.2
67.2
75.2
90.2
100.8
111.1
119.7
122.2
134.9
142.6
Ground
12.7
13.4
14.9
15.3
15.3
15.2
15.2
14.6
14.7
14.9
14.8
15.0
Naval
10.9
10.5
9.0
10.6
13.4
15.4
15.9
17.2
13.8
14.0
14.2
14.5
Air
14.5
19.9
19.0
18.8
20.2
26.1
30.0
39.6
45.1
40.0
47.0
52.4
Other
15.4
17.3
20.3
22.5
26.3
33.5
39.7
39.7
46.1
53.3
58.9
60.7
SUPPORT
18.6
19.5
20.6
21.8
22.5
23.0
24.6
25.9
26.8
27.8
28.3
29.0
MILITARY PERSONNEL
50.2
51.5
52.2
52.5
53.8
54.2
55.9
56.6
57.2
57.6
58.1
58.3
Pay
25.1
25.9
26.3
26.4
27.2
27.4
28.6
29.1
29.5
29.8
30.0
30.1
Other
25.1
25.6
25.9
26.1
26.6
26.8
27.3
27.5
27.7
27.8
28.1
28.2
TOTAL"
122.3
132.1
136.0
141.5
151.5
167.4
181.3
193.6
203.7
207.6
221.3
229.9
a See Paragraph 2 above for definitions of categories.
'The calculations made in the basic study and presented in this table were obtained in terms of 1951
prices. Since comparison with gross national product required conversion to 1953 factor costs, the
total in this table differs from the total expenditures-given in connection with GNP in Paragraph 6
above.
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and 8.5 billion 1951 rubles for a total range
of from 15 to 20 billion 1951 rubles. 4
12. Recent unofficial Soviet statements have
associated a 15 percent cut in budgeted mili-
tary expenditures with the recent announce-
ment of manpower reductions. This amount,
15.3 billion 1956 rubles, falls roughly in the
center of the range given above, which is from
13 to 17 billion rubles when converted from
1951 to 1956 rubles.
13. We believe that something like 17 billion
1951 rubles is a better estimate of the ulti-
mate annual savings from the reductions con-
sequent upon a manpower cut of 1.2 million
than the smaller amount based on personnel
costs alone. If, then, these reductions are
carried out on schedule, the projection in
Table II should be lowered by this amount an-
nually in 1958-1961 and by smaller amounts
in 1956 and 1957.
14. On the other hand, an increase in the
estimated costs of the guided missiles program
is likely in the near future. The present esti-
mates are taken from NIE 11-6-54 (5 October
1954) and NIE 11-5-55 (12 July 1955) and
run from 2.0 billion 1951 rubles in 1954 and 4.3
billion in 1955, to 13.0 billion in 1960, and
9.0 billion in 1961. New estimates, however,
are currently being developed for NIE 11-5-
56, and preliminary results suggest that sub-
stantial upward revisions may occur.
15. The combined result of these two factors
cannot be predicted, but it is clear that they
will offset each other to some extent. For
this reason, we do not feel that the error in
estimated total expenditures which results
from the omission of these two factors vitiates
the usefulness of the result. Introduction of
these factors into Table II would, of course,
significantly alter the pattern of costs shown
there, particularly as between major programs
and military personnel.
16. For purposes of comparison with the US,
estimated Soviet defense expenditures have
been converted to dollars and presented in
The range in the footnote to Paragraph 37, 13-
18 billion rubles, expresses these same amounts
in 1953 factor costs in order to achieve com-
parability with the GNP calculations.
79
Table III in order to indicate the costs which
the US would incur in reproducing the Soviet
defense effort. The results show that the
dollar value of total Soviet expenditures was
93 percent above US defense expenditures in
1950, that US rearmament closed this gap and
put US expenditures 35 percent above the So-
viet estimate in 1952, that the continued
growth of Soviet expenditures and a decline
in US expenditures produced virtual equality
in 1955, and that the dollar value of estimated
Soviet expenditures will rise to $48 billion in
1961.
TABLE III
Dollar Value of US and Estimated USSR Defense
Expenditures, 1950-1961
Billion 1955 Dollars
Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
US USSR
15
22
42
48
44
38
36
38
29
31
31
33
35
37
40
41
43
44
46
48
17. In Table IV, Soviet and US defense ex-
penditures in 1955 for major programs, sup-
port, and military personnel are compared in
dollar terms. Expenditures for major pro-
grams, consisting mainly of hard goods pro-
curement, are virtually equal, although pro-
curement has a considerably different prod-
uct composition in the two countries. The
lower Soviet value for support reflects pri-
marily the lower civilian wage bill resulting
from estimates of less extensive maintenance
and operating practices in the USSR as well
as the extra costs incurred by the US by virtue
of its overseas bases. Since Soviet military
manpower exceeded US manpower in 1955,
application of US costs per man in both coun-
tries results in a higher dollar value for Soviet
military personnel costs.
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TABLE IV
Dollar Value of
US and Estimated USSR Defense Expenditures
in 1955 "
Billion
1955 Dollars
US
USSR
Major Programs
17.4
16.4
Support
9.7
4.4
Military Personnel
10.7
16.6
Total
37.8
37.4
See Paragraph 2 above for definitions of cate-
gories. US data have been arranged in as com-
parable a fashion as possible.
Or
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