OUTLOOK FOR THE SYRIAN SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A007600040001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 16, 1956
• Content Type: SNIE

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?5NIE 36.7-56
16 November 1956
*NW'
6536
N2 214
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 36.7-56
OUTLOOK FOR THE SYRIAN SITUATION
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 16 November 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of
Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and
the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The
Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained,
the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANCiE IN CLASS
DECLASa7tED
CLASS. CHAGED TO: IS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: jjj REVIEWER:
C
Fid.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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June 1953.
The title of this estimate, when used separately from the text, should be classified:
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
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OUTLOOK FOR THE SYRIAN SITUATION
THE PROBLEM
To assess the situation in Syria with particular reference to possible moves by:
(a) the USSR; or (b) one or a combination of the following powers: the UK, France,
Israel, Iraq, Turkey.
DISCUSSION
Syria's Present Position
1. The highly unstable but strategically lo-
cated state of Syria has long been both a
major target and an active arena in the power
struggles in the Middle East. While previous-
ly Soviet influence in the area was exerted
chiefly through Egypt, the USSR is now focus-
ing direct attention on Syria as well. Soviet
efforts are enjoying a large measure of suc-
cess, primarily because the USSR is able to
cater to the desire of key elements in the army
and government, backed by widespread popu-
lar opinion, for support against Israel, Iraq,
and the West. Sentiment in Syria in this re-
spect has become even more intense as a result
of the attacks on Egypt by Israel, the UK, and
France.
2. The latter three powers, in turn, have long
been troubled ? not altogether for the same
reasons ? over Syrian trends; and the frus-
trations they have recently experienced in
the Middle East, taken with the USSR's cur-
ent forward policy in Syria, have added sub-
stantially to their concern. Their fears are
shared by Turkey and Iraq in particular. In
various ways, each of these interested parties
has in the past urged upon the US the need
for action to correct the situation in Syria, and
the quickening tempo of Middle East develop-
ments in the past two weeks has intensified
their fears. (e. g., Turkey has made urgent
representations to the US within the past few
days.)
The Present Internal Situation
3. Those Syrian groups which lean toward the
West were on the defensive even before the
British-French-Israeli action in Egypt, and
are now increasingly overshadowed by leftist-
oriented, extreme nationalist, anti-Western
politicians and their counterparts in the
Syrian army. The action in Egypt appears
to be solidifying control of the army ? the
locus of power ? in the hands of the pro-
Egyptian "little RCC" officer group led by Lt.
Colonel Sarraj, head of Syrian intelligence,
and the army followers of the leftist-oriented
Arab Socialist Resurrection Party (ASRP)
and the Communist Party. Despite dissen-
sion within the ASRP, the pro-Soviet elements
1
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are still in the ascendant and appear to be
moving toward consolidation of their control
over the government. The latter are now
using their power to maintain a strict censor-
ship of news media and to exclude all but ex-
treme nationalist and pro-Soviet propaganda.
A purge of antilef tists from positions of in-
fluence may be in the making.
4. The relatively pro-Western parties ? no-
tably the Populists and Nationalists ? are
divided, not well-organized, and plagued by
weak leadership. Although nominal conserva-
tives hold major offices in the government,
some of them, including the president and
prime minister, are currently riding the left-
ist wave. Others are intimidated by the ever
present threat of an army coup, of antigov-
ernment demonstrations and strikes by the
leftist-controlled "street" and labor unions,
and by the dangers of appearing to be agents
of the West or traitors to "Arabism." Right-
ist army elements are not well-organized and
their ranks have been weakened by dismissals,
imprisonment, and transfers from positions
of influence. However, a number have re-
cently been recalled to service in the face of
the Israeli threat. There are also certain re-
gional groups that are dissatisfied with the
present policies of the Syrian government,
particularly the Druze minority in southern
Syria which has been receiving arms from
Iraq.
5. Syria represents an extremely promising
target for Soviet efforts ? military, political,
and economic ? in the Arab world. A con-
tinuation of the present trend would give the
USSR a number of advantages, e. g.:
a. It would be in a position to encourage
and aid Syrian blackmail and boycott tactics
and further physical sabotage against West-
ern-owned oil pipelines transiting Syria from
Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Especially as long
as the Western Powers are denied passage
through the Suez Canal, this would be of
critical importance to the USSR as a strate-
gic and economic weapon against the West.
b. A more pro-Soviet government in Syria
would further weaken the military position of
the Baghdad Pact bountries and raise the pros-
pect of Turkey's being encircled.
c. Stronger Soviet influence in Syria would
open up greater political and subversive op-
portunities in the Arab world.
d. Further Soviet influence over Syria would
provide additional means of exacerbating
Arab-Israeli tensions which the USSR can
exploit in pursuing its pro-Arab, anti-Israeli,
and anti-Western policy.
Probable Soviet Policy Toward Syria
6. The USSR probably regards present trends
in Syria as favorable for the development of its
policy in the Middle East. Any open demon-
stration by the USSR of control over the Syr-
ian government would entail several serious
disadvantages for the USSR. It would tend to
demonstrate that the USSR was playing its
own selfish ends in the area and to discredit
its pose as defender of the Arab cause against
the Western Powers and Israel. It would
alarm many non-Communist elements in the
Arab world, even within the Nasser govern-
ment. It might precipitate an Israeli attack,
in which the Soviets would find it difficult to
intervene effectively in support of the Syrian
regime. Above all, the Soviets might estimate
that it would lead the US, in renewed concert
with its allies, to initiate a counterstroke
which might very quickly develop into a gen-
eral crisis.
7. The USSR will continue to provide diplo-
matic, propaganda, and military assistance to
the pro-Soviet elements now in the ascendancy
in Syria. Such support will almost certainly
include additional military equipment, tech-
nicians, and .some "volunteers." 7 Particularly
if the British, French, and Israelis appear to
be defying the UN, the USSR might send "vol-
unteers" in larger numbers.
8. In the event that Britain, France, Iraq,
Israel, or Turkey ? singly or in some combi-
nation ? attempted to intervene forcibly to
alter the present Syrian regime, the USSR
would probably give what aid it could to sup-
port its adherents in Syria, though probably
not to the extent of committing regular Soviet
units. The USSR would align itself with UN
action against aggression, and seek to play
the same role it did in the case of the attack
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on Egypt, in the hope of reaping similar bene-
fits in the Arab world.
9. The USSR would probably estimate tha
open and forceful intervention by the anti-
Communist powers in Syria would offer dis-
advantages to the parties involved: to Britain,
France, and Israel by increasing their isola-
tion in world opinion and marking them more
clearly as aggressors; and to the Nuri regime
by further isolating it from the Arab world
and probably increasing its internal problems.
The USSR, on the other hand, would be in a
position to increase still further the number
of its adherents in Arab countries.
10. Aircraft and armor have been furnished
by the Bloc to the Syrian government.' We
have no firm evidence to support reports that
large quantities of Soviet air and armored
equipment and personnel have arrived in
Syria. In fact, no significant quantities of as-
sembled aircraft had been introduced by as
late as 12 November. However, deliveries of
unidentified military equipment are con-
tinuing.
Probable Action of Other Interested
Parties
11. There is a greater likelihood of drastic
overt moves to influence the Syrian situation
by one or more of the directly interested
powers other than the USSR. For varying
reasons, the UK, France, Turkey, Israel, and
Iraq all have strong incentives to intervene
to retrieve the situation in Syria. While all
of them would welcome US participation and
support in strong measures to check or coun-
ter the leftward trends in Syria, they might,
individually or in some combination, seek to
deal with the problem by themselves if US
support for a solution does not appear to be
in prospect. In such an event, there might
again be efforts to conceal essential prepara-
tions from the US and other nonparticipants.
These include an estimated 20-25 MIG-15 fight-
ers ? delivered in Egypt; 130 T 34 tanks; and
more than 200 armored personnel carriers.
3
12. Whether or not one or more of these states
intervenes in Syria will depend in part on:
(a) the shifting judgment and moods of the
various national leaders (and of their respec-
tive public opinions) in a still highly fluid
situation; (b) the feasibility of less drastic
courses of action; (c) their estimates of the
probable reaction of the US and the USSR;
and (d) the degree of success obtained in
organizing and holding together the disparate
Syrian elements whose support would be
needed. In general, we see the following as
the principal possibilities of major non-Soviet
intervention in Syria:
a. The Nuri government in Iraq, with covert
support of the UK, might seek to organize
the overthrow of the present leadership in the
Syrian government and army, perhaps using
Iraqi troops to support an ostensibly indige-
nous coup. France, acting through Shishakli,
might lend covert support to this action. In
such an event, Turkey would probably exert
military pressure along Syria's northern fron-
tiers but would probably not intervene overt-
ly. We think it unlikely that such a coup
could succeed.
b. Israel, with French encouragement,
might attack Syria on its own. However, in
their present state of international isolation,
the Israelis probably feel it best for the time
being to avoid acts which would bring re-
newed pressures from the USSR, the US, and
the UN.
c. Syrian noncooperation with respect to
repair and future use of the oil pipelines might
eventually cause the UK, Iraq, and France
to employ force as a last resort, but they are
unlikely to do so at this stage.
d. In the event of a serious Soviet military
buildup in Syria, the UK, France, Israel, Iraq,
and Turkey might, in some combination, at-
tack. Under such circumstances, the powers
concerned would almost certainly seek and
expect to obtain US support.
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