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October 9, 1956
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Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 NIE 4 3 ? 5 6 9 October 1956 ----110111111E N? 221 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 43-56 (Supersedes NIE 43-55) THE PROSPECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. Concurred in by the INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE on 9 October 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction. DOCUMENT NO. NO CLASS. TO: TS S C VrE .8.1111./IIMMID AUP1: i0-2 DAIL:1(3701,RJ_ REVIEWER; 1 Flat 3 - ? 7474 ? ' MOW Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE 1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per- sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments: a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of State b. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Army c. Director of Naval Intelligence for the Department of the Navy d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation h. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or Agency 2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli- cable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrange- ment with the Office of Central Reference, CIA. 3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC?D-69/2, 22 June 1953. The title of this estimate, when used separately from the text, should be classified: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY WARNING This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans- mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. DISTRIBUTION: White House National Security Council Department of State Department of Defense Operations Coordinating Board Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of Investigation Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 3/4?4111 41' ? Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 '1"itger THE PROSPECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA THE PROBLEM To estimate the present strength and weakness of the Government of the Republic of China and its prospects. CONCLUSIONS 1. The Government of the Republic of China continues to exercise firm political control on Taiwan. With US assistance, an -expanding economy has been main- tained and the strength of the armed forces has been increased. At the same time, however, the international position of the National Government has declined, causing an increased feeling of insecurity and concern for the future. 2. So long as President Chiang remains in power no substantial change in National- ist policy is likely to occur. Should he die prior to the expiration of his present term of office in 1960, Vice President Ch'en Ch'eng would probably succeed to the presidency without provoking inter- nal disturbances. However, the difficul- ties that would confront the National Government internationally would be substantially increased and domestically Ch'en's authority would probably be in- creasingly contested by Chiang Ching- kuo, the elder son of President Chiang. 3. If present international trends persist, international acceptance of the National Government as the government of China and the prospects of realizing the objec- tive of a return to the mainland will al- most certainly continue to decline. Al- though the Chinese Nationalists almost certainly believe that the US will not as- sist them in an attempt to return to the mainland by force, the morale on Taiwan probably will not weaken critically so long as the people there remain confident of firm US support for the defense of Tai- wan. 4. In the longer run, it is likely that evi- dence of growing prestige and material progress on the part of the Chinese Com- munists will have a serious impact upon the attitude of the people on Taiwan. Were this situation compounded by in- creased uncertainty on Taiwan over con- tinued US support, the task of sustain- ing morale and loyalty might exceed the capabilities of Chiang or his eventual suc- cessor. 400811111M Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 Emigiaigrafr? 2 DISCUSSION I. OBJECTIVES OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 5. The fundamental objectives of the National Government continue to be: (a) the recovery of power on the mainland and the destruction of the Chinese Communist regime, and (b) the preservation of its position as the legal government of China. The domestic and for- eign policies of the National Government are strongly conditioned by these objectives and the Nationalist leadership continues to con- centrate on matters which it considers to be directly related to these policies. The Na- tional Government recognizes, however, that the achievement of these objectives, as well as its very existence, depends on US support and assistance. Moreover, Chiang and his govern- ment almost certainly believe that it is un- likely the US could be persuaded to support a return to the mainland by force unless other circumstances impel the US to engage Com- munist China or the Communist Bloc in a major war. 6. Until such time as the situation becomes favorable for an invasion of the mainland, the National Government will continue to con- centrate on the preservation of its position as the legal government of China and on the development of its military strength. To these ends, the National Government will seek to retain membership in the UN and other international bodies to the exclusion of the Chinese Communist representatives, to per- petuate the US alliance and obtain a US com- mitment for the defense of the offshore is- lands, and to maintain internal security. II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS Political 7. There have been no recent significant changes in the domestic political scene on Tai- wan. Chiang Kai-shek remains vigorous and continues to be the dominant figure in the government both as President and as the leader of the Kuomintang. His term as Pres- ident- will expire in 1960, and thus far he has made no effort to have the constitution in- terpreted to make a third term legally possible. Even if Chiang should retire from the presi- dency it is unlikely that he will release ef- fective control of the government so long as he retains his vigor. 8. Vice President Ch'en Ch'eng is the con- stitutional successor to the office of President in the event of the death of the Generalissimo. In this event, Ch'en Ch'eng, who has a strong personal following in the Kuomintang and the army, would probably succeed to the presi- dency without internal disturbance. However, no possible successor is likely to command either the internal or international prestige and influence that Chiang Kai-shek has wielded. 9. Ch'en's chief rival for power is Chiang Ching-kuo. In addition to his status as the elder son of President Chiang, he has a strong following in the army, the KMT, the Youth Corps, and in particular in the secret police. Chiang Ching-kuo would probably not contest Ch'en's succession as he would probably have difficulty in enlisting support from other Na- tionalist leaders in an attempt which would seriously weaken the domestic and interna- tional position of the National Government. He will, however, enjoy increased personal prestige as the natural successor to some of his father's personal power. 10. The Taiwanese exercise no appreciable influence in the making or execution of gov- ernment policy and very few hold other than subordinate positions in the National Govern- ment or central KMT organization. With the countryside relatively prosperous and no spe- cific grievances to serve as an incitement, and because of efficient security measures, the Tai- wanese do not at present threaten internal security or the continued stability of the Na- tional Government. The induction of Tai- 411111111110IF Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 59111_1111:1;2LT 3 wanese youth into the army has not provoked serious discontent. Although through the process of education and living together, in- dividual relations between the Taiwanese and mainlanders have gradually improved, the development of active Taiwanese support for the National Government continues to be retarded by an emotional antipathy for main- lander control and by restrictions on Tai- wanese political opportunities. 11. Stringent security measures have pre- vented Communist subversion from developing as a threat to the stability of the government. Despite increased Chinese Communist prop- aganda efforts, during the past year known defectors to the mainland from Taiwan and the offshore islands have been few and gen- erally of low rank. 12. Although morale on Taiwan is reasonably good because of the internal stability of the government and a standard of living high in Asian terms, it is tempered by an underlying uncertainty with regard to the future. De- spite the National Government's continued public affirmation of its determination to re- turn to the mainland, many mainlanders, probably including high officials, have become pessimistic over the prospects for continued international acceptance of their position as the legal government of China and for their ultimate return to the mainland. In part, this has resulted from the erosion of the in- ternational position of the National Govern- ment and from uncertainty with regard to future US support which has been fostered by events such as the continuation of the Geneva talks and by Chinese Communist propaganda. Moreover, there are indications of growing discontent and anti-American feeling among lower grade officials, younger army officers, white collar workers, and the intellectuals, most of whom have felt an economic pinch resulting from low salaries and diminishing savings. A number of mainlanders have also been experiencing a growing frustration over the lack of opportunity to improve their pros- pects on Taiwan, leading some of them to contrast conditions on the island unfavorably with Communist achievements on the main- land. However, there are no indications that these factors have impaired the will of Na- tionalist leaders to resist Communism, or have reduced their ability to maintain firm control of Taiwan. 13. Although the National Government still maintains official relations with 41 countries and the Holy See (38 of which are UN mem- bers) the international position of the GRC suffered setbacks during the past year.' Since mid-1955, Egypt has withdrawn recognition of Nationalist China and together with Nepal, Syria, and Yemen, which had not established diplomatic relations with Nationalist China, has recognized the Peiping regime. This brings the total number of UN member states which recognize Communist China to 25 (of which eight are Communist states) . Further- more, there has been a considerable increase in the exchange of official and unofficial dele- gations between Communist China and many of the nations with which she does not have diplomatic ties. Moreover, support for the National Government among the overseas Chinese has, on balance, probably declined, in part because of lack of an effective, coordi- nated program to counter the large scale and energetically promoted Communist campaign to gain the support of the overseas Chinese. During the next few years, the Chinese Com- munists, at the expense of the Nationalists, will probably be recognized by additional countries and will probably gain further sup- port from overseas Chinese. The Taiwan Economy 14. The economy of Taiwan has expanded by 62 percent over the five year period since 1951 when US economic aid began being extended on a large scale. Taiwan's GNP in 1956 will probably rise by about eight percent over 1955, to US $1.2 billion of which 89 percent will be domestic output and 11 percent US economic aid. 2 1 See Appendix A for a list of the countries recog- nizing Nationalist China and Communist China. 2 In addition, the Nationalists received in FY 1956 under the MDAP Program military equipment valued at approximately $200 million. Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 L. Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 ZOIMMOPwr 4 ECONOMIC INDICATORS Category 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 Agricultural pro- duction index 100 122 119 120 120 Industrial pro- duction index 100 124 152 168 189 GNP in 1955 prices (millions of US dollars) 764 905 958 1,079 1,144 Per capita GNP (US dollars) 81 93 96 105 109 Wholesale price index 100 122 133 135 155 1956 Esti- mate 129 209 1,236 114 173 b Sharp changes in the exchange rate during 1955 to correct the overvaluation of the Taiwan dollar have led to a reconsideration and a lowering of the US dollar values from those used in the eco- nomic indicators in NIE 43-55. " The wholesale price index has leveled off since December 1955, with the index for specific months moving as follows: 1955 1956 January 140 January 171 April 149 April 173 ? July 150 July 171 October 159 December 176 4, 15. Although a severe spring drought in 1955 held farm output to the 1954 level, production in 1956 is expected to rise by seven percent, led by a 13 percent increase in rice. Indus- trial output in 1955 rose by 12.2 percent over 1954 and is expected to rise at a similar rate in 1956. Electric power availability is cur- rently a limiting factor, but the shortage is being alleviated by the increase in installed capacity during 1955 from 392,000 KW to 493,000 KW, and the planned increase during 1956 and 1957 to 630,000 KW. In the past year there was little or no advance either in fertilizer or aluminum output owing to power restrictions, or in sugar and cotton textiles owing to lack of markets, but considerable progress was registered in petroleum refining, cement, pineapple canning, beverages, and to- bacco products. Industrial output became more diversified with the inauguration of pro- duction of such products as window glass, high octane gasoline, fluorescent lamps, ma- rine diesel engines, and aluminum foil. 16. Over the past five years Taiwan's exports have been little more than half of its imports, and its imports 3 could not be greatly reduced without risking the disruption of domestic production. In 1955, owing to the depletion of foreign exchange reserves, it was necessary to impose stricter import controls and expand exports with special sales from rice stocks. With a record farm output in prospect, ex- ports are being maintained in 1956, and with exchange reserves restored, a higher level of imports is in prospect. TAIWAN'S EXTERNAL ACCOUNTS a (in millions of US dollars) 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956" (Jan- May) Exports, f.o.b. 90 119 125 94 131 57 Imports, c.i.f. 150 217 200 211 193 99 Trade balance ?60 ?98 ?75 ?117 ?62 ?42 Balance on current account ?60 ?98 ?85 ?119 ?71 n a Grants from the US +61 +92 +83 +85 +91 n a Changes in gold ?11 and foreign exchange reserves (increase) ?4 ?17 +23 ?25 2 e Other trans- actions d +10 +10 +19 +11 +5 n a NOTE: From exchange settlement statistics ad- justed to include aid imports. Calendar year data. Sharp changes in the exchange rate during 1955 to correct the overvaluation of the Taiwan dollar have led to a reconsideration and a lowering of the US dollar values from those used in the eco- nomic indicators in NIE 43-55. "Unadjusted data as reported by Chinese govern- ment agencies to ICA. January-April. d Including all capital transactions and errors and omissions. 17. Despite certain gains, the Taiwan econ- omy continues to be under substantial strain primarily as a result of the large Nationalist military establishment. Inflationary pres- sures exist, in large part because of the diver- sion of nearly 40 percent of the gross national product to investment, military expenditures, and other government expenditures. The gov- ernment's fiscal and credit controls have con- tinued to improve, however, enabling the gov- ernment to contain the sharp increase in price levels which occurred in 1955. a This does not refer to imports financed under MDAP. ?ONMEneir Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 Si=On? 5 18. Government expenditures increased sharp- ly in the past year, but the government, with US prodding, has taken measures to expand its revenues, and with increased US counter- part aid, has kept the budget substantially in balance. During FY 1956 national and pro- vincial expenditures increased by 32 percent over FY 1955, with military costs rising 46 percent and constituting 63 percent of the total. However, revenues rose 29 percent as the government increased tax rates, strength- ened tax collection procedures, and developed new sources of revenue. The initial FY 1957 budget contemplates increased expenditures but provides for additional revenues, and it appears that the government is in a stronger fiscal position than it was a year ago. 19. Taiwan's inability to finance its import requirements from its own resources will con- tinue to be the fundamental weakness of the Taiwan economy. Prospects for an increase in the traditional agricultural exports are limited for the near future. Moreover, while the industrialization program aims at replac- ing certain import requirements, the needs of a growing population and a rising standard of living will continue to keep the import demand high. Furthermore, the economic drain of the large modern military establish- ment places such an additional burden as to preclude the possibility of the economy be- coming self-sustaining. The high rate of eco- nomic expansion maintained in the past five years stemmed in large part from rehabilita- tion measures and the drawing of idle capac- ity into production. Future increases in out- put are likely to be more expensive in terms of required investments. In this situation, the National Government can probably sus- tain an annual growth rate of four-five per- cent (the annual population growth rate is 2.75 percent) over the next few years but only if US economic and military assistance is maintained at approximately present levels, the total investment continues at about the present rate, and inflationary pressures are effectively contained. Military Progress 20. The personnel strength of the Chinese Na- tionalist army is now 416,000.4 It is organized into two field armies, six corps headquarters, 21 infantry divisions, two light armored divi- sions, and miscellaneous units. 21. The army has continued to improve its capabilities. In the spring and summer of 1956 the army for the first time conducted two combined arms exercises at corps level. Army morale appears to be good generally and is not a limiting factor to army combat capabilities. A new conscription and retire- ment program is relieving the problem of over- age and ineffective soldiers. Approximately 34,000 ineffectives have been retired or re- moved from the army rolls, and an additional 36,000 ineffectives are due for retirement. Un- der the new program, conscripts will serve two years in the army and five years in a reserve division. 22. The military leaders realize the difficul- ties which might arise from increased use of Taiwanese in their forces, and have given spe- cial attention to problems caused by the in- crease in the ratio of Taiwanese to mainland troops. Taiwanese recruits have been treated fairly and considerable efforts have been made to eliminate differences between them and the mainlanders. 23. The Chinese Nationalist air force has about 750 aircraft, the principal combat com- ponent being 270 jet aircraft (F86F fighters and F84G fighter-bombers) organized into five fighter-bomber groups, one light-bomber pa- trol group, two transport groups, one tactical reconnaissance squadron and one air-sea res- cue squadron. The personnel strength is about 80,000, including about 1,560 pilots.5 Chinese Nationalist airfields and other facili- ties are capable of supporting any operations of the CNAF as presently constituted. 4 This is an increase of 91,000 over the figure for 1955. This increase is largely due to a reduction of the Combined Service Forces and their trans- fer into the regular army and to the activation of the Reserve Command. 5 This number is a decrease of 340 from the num- ber of pilots accepted in 1955, due to reclassifi- tion by a USAF personnel evaluation team. 19111:111100N- Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 24. Steady progress continues to be made to- ward the development of a small but well- trained modern air force. The capabilities of the jet fighter units are improving rapidly, as indicated by CNAF performance in recent combat operations with Chinese Communist fighters. The CNAF photo reconnaissance capability is excellent within a radius of about 400 nautical miles for the RF86F and about 800 nautical miles for the RF84F and the strength of the photo reconnaissance element is increasing. Nationalist radar capability has been extended to provide full search, height-finding, and tracking coverage of Tai- wan and the Penghus, with supplementary search and surveillance of adjacent parts of the mainland from offshore islands. All phases of air defense have been integrated under the direct control of the Joint Opera- tions Center which, in turn, is closely super- vised by the US 13th Air Task Force (Provi- sional) . The CNAF's capability and effective- ness for air support of amphibious operations, while recently improved, is still unsatisfactory. 25. The personnel strength of the Nationalist naval establishment totals about 55,000 in- cluding approximately 25,000 marines. The navy has three destroyers (DD) , five escort vessels (DE), 28 other patrol-type craft, 10 mine vessels, 43 amphibious vessels, 17 auxili- aries, and 54 service craft. There is no naval air arm. 26. The GRC navy is primarily a defensive force with limited capabilities. Morale is rated only fair; discipline is weak. Over-all condi- tion of material is satisfactory. The reorgan- ization currently in progress should remove many of the past ills of the supply system. Both the ability to effect engineering, ord- nance, and electronic repairs, and the quality of work of the shipyards have shown steady improvement. Equipment modernization is proceeding smoothly according to orderly plan. Technical and professional competence are improving. Progress in the basic training program is deemed highly satisfactory, but the navy is only now developing the sorely needed more advanced specialist training. Operational training has and will probably continue to increase over-all effectiveness at 6 a steady moderate pace. Principal GRC navy accomplishments of the past year were in the areas of organization and training; principal shortcomings are still in the areas of person- nel management and in command. The ma- rine corps is capable of planning and success- fully executing an amphibious landing of full marine corps strength of one division and one brigade against light to moderate resist- ance, providing the necessary naval and air support could be provided. 27. The effectiveness of the GRC military establishment has been adversely affected by interference of political officers, and subordi- nation of military plans and objectives to political considerations. There has also been too great a degree of centralization of author- ity. As a result, many military commanders have proven unwilling to assume responsibil- ity for initiating action. 28. The Nationalist military establishment will probably continue to show some improve- ment during the next few years. While its present manpower levels will be maintained, there will be a considerable increase in the proportion of Taiwanese recruited for service, and a parity between Taiwanese and main- landers will probably be reached by 1965. The increasing number of Taiwanese will probably improve the quality of the armed forces in terms of age, physical fitness, and education. However, despite continued improvement in military capabilities the Nationalists will con- tinue to require US logistical, air, and naval support to successfully defend Taiwan and the Penghus. III. THE OUTLOOK FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 29. The prospects of the National Government depend vitally upon US foreign policy. Pro- vided the present US policy of support con- tinues and the international situation re- mains substantially unchanged, the National Government at least for the next few years will probably be able to maintain its position on Taiwan, prevent the development of serious internal discontent, and promote gradual development of the island's economy. However, even with US support, the interna- Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 7 tional position of the National Government will probably continue to deteriorate. 30. So long as President Chiang remains in power no substantial change in Nationalist policy is likely to occur. Should he die prior to the expiration of his present term of office in 1960, Vice President Ch'en Ch'eng would probably succeed to the presidency without provoking internal disturbances. As Ch'en does not possess Chiang's prestige, however, the difficulties that would confront the Na- tional Government internationally would be substantially increased and domestically Ch'en's authority would probably be increas- ingly contested by Chiang Ching-kuo. 31. With continued US aid at existing levels, the prospects appear good for sustaining a rate of economic growth of four to five percent an- nually, although the economy will continue under strain and will require effective man- agement to maintain stability. The popula- tion probably will increase by 30 percent over the next decade and Taiwan will become far more urbanized and industrialized, and in- creasingly concerned with its foreign economic relations. 32. Belief in the reliability and efficacy of the US guarantees of the military defense of Tai- wan against the Chinese Communists will continue to be basic to the will of the Na- tionalists to maintain their position on Tai- wan and to the maintenance of internal secu- rity. Morale, however, may fluctuate greatly depending primarily on international develop- ments. It would be seriously affected by the admission of Communist China to the UN, or a serious military defeat resulting from a suc- cessful Communist seizure of the major off- shore islands or to a lesser extent by a cease- fire in the Taiwan Strait imposed upon the Nationalists. Should one or more of these events occur, there would result serious dam- age to the prestige of the National Govern- ment and receptivity, particularly among the mainlanders, to Chinese Communist propa- ganda and the danger of disaffection would increase. In the short run, however, even the adverse effects of such developments would probably not destroy the will of the National- ists td maintain their position on Taiwan pro- vided Nationalist leaders do not lose faith in US guarantees. 33. The prospects of the National Government will in the future be increasingly affected by the image of Communist China and the life on the mainland that will develop on Taiwan. If Communist China continues its peaceful pose, avoids serious internal tensions, contin- ues to make substantial domestic economic progress, and attains increased international recognition, an increasing number of main- land Chinese on Taiwan will be conditioned to look more favorably upon the Communist regime and upon the possibility of reaching some accommodation with it, particularly should social and economic strains on Taiwan increase. In the longer run, this would fa- cilitate the growth of an organized subversive movement, which could severely test the Na- tional Government's security apparatus. 411ftwea. Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 8 APPENDIX A DIPLOMATIC STATUS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND OF COMMUNIST CHINA UN Members 1 Recognizing National Government Recognizing Communist China Argentina Iran Afghanistan Israel Australia Iraq Albania Nepal Belgium Italy Bulgaria Netherlands Bolivia Lebanon Burma Norway Brazil Luxembourg Ceylon Pakistan Cambodia Mexico Czechoslovakia Poland Canada New Zealand Egypt Rumania Chile Nicaragua Denmark Sweden Colombia Panama Finland Syria Costa Rica Peru Hungary United Kingdom 1 Cuba Philippines India USSR Dominican Republic Portugal Indonesia Yugoslavia Ecuador Saudi Arabia Yemen , El Salvador Spain 1 .). France Thailand I i Greece Turkey Guatemala Union of South Africa Haiti Venezuela Honduras United States UN Members not recognizing either country Austria Laos Byelorussia Liberia 2 Ethiopia Libya Iceland Paraguay Irish Republic Ukraine Jordan Uruguay ' Non-UN Members Recognizing National Government Recognizing Communist China ? Holy See East Germany Japan North Korea Korea North Vietnam Vietnam Outer Mongolia Switzerland Non-UN Members not recognizing either country German Federal Republic Morocco Sudan Tunisia 1 The UK maintains a consular post on Taiwan. 2 Liberia and the Republic of China signed a Treaty of Friendship in 1937 and have discussed an exchange of diplomatic representation, but this has never taken place. -411111111Fr Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/12: CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 a i lulBe ..fmchi....71 de Min?ch ing 0 ?:) ZN Le Z 4- z i f ' / 43)54 --, ?R?, 6"/P Lieochia g... Kuan?Co c4,. FOOCHOW ..,?? x , Am._ ------ - Ch'ang?lo i\__,s_._...._._ jurch'ing id \.---- * HSING.11141 WAN 0. ETCHOU 'TA ..-- FISTCH'OAN PETKANTANG jTSU SHAN Defense TAO Matsu Command L4500_Troops HSIN CHU "/". / ) ( sklG TAI CCW N7 -," T'Al?CHIJNG Chan ?hu ?,. -:-.- Yuan?lin Cla SUN MOON LAKE' (JIII-Y0elf rAN, ,s,_, ibu 1 y?,,.. 'AIW CH .1 ? i i/ I , 7i? ,'..a,no.a. ni:.hAs i son E.WYWOIR t?i? TAIWAN o 0 0 0 1-A-? YUAN aluan? 0 Taoluan Chung-li Lung?t'an* Kuan?hei , A f/ 1 .--- I r , STRAIT Jet airfield I Combat Secondary airfield i ground Naval base I ggmlb.a= 1 8.5? Naval stafion Selected AREA -26- radius of F?81 in support role from Z (HI/AR) rockets. Selected road ? . ? 25 ?- 24?- .. Army Command Troops 2 3?- 26 ?7 Yung?an % 1 1. 4 2+ 0 .q...V C .kaVing z Hua?an Ta-lien K c',./ / . /a? / / Yung?tai. I I ,sqa .e.--- / 2,i,),,,, i / ../ Te?hua N P'u?Cien / HSIENY1.1 ...._ ?ch'un / .??' txN V AN?CH'I ras' 4 sy,te , Hui?an V ? PAI-CHUAN LIEH (WHITE DOdS) TUNG-MOAN TAO TAO ? . HAI Ing-Fan it TAO ISN?CHU , ? TAN) TAO \SUNG Iis' '4Si17w 4 A si.0 Peirchian? ? i ((' ? CHIA 00,0- in I i 0 C a 1 1 1 r ? 9 -1-4- railroad,,.? Venn. ? q jhi-lung SHAN ,L. r/ TAI?PEI h'ing?t'un ? Hsin?fien hien Su?a ? (1 ualien - I /' 1 4 , P.ACI-F.fc ?I ) eneral Headquarters hing, i and Taiwan Deferise 307;000 lisinthiang -25------ / , / 4 4. / f / N Chiang-Kai / U v Hai?1 ch'eng / i / / I / Chang?piu I// pin?hsiao / 7 / CHIN?CH1A / . / , Thula-an I - EN s WU.CH'IU HS() WU in Area Defense Command (Navy) 7.,;,- c.,, 0 4 h, Penghu Command ,., Troops14. , PENGHU e? (PE SCADORES) ? MAKUNG? o ??? ., 'a V me CH1N.MEN TAO ? (QUEMOY) ,. ? E'"? 411 NSO\i,,, 4, 4 \-- iLE QUEMOY 11. ., thin men/KUAN TUNG.TING HS0Defense Command (CHAPEL I.) 78,500 Troops 2 l'9-11?- 1 1. , T'UNG.SHAN TAO ' i? IIPM.giuoh / I / I ? NAN.P'ENG CH'ON.TA0 ? r o Defense '?,: 18,000 -2 3 o 1 25 5,0 7.5 I 00 An.iiinn) rAl.NAN TAI NAN\ Ch'i?shan ' \ Kang h k \ g PING TUNG , ,i4, Tu.-Yin, 4 C' ring ?lung li KA0?11SIUN *,(... Tung?chian? 9 Hahlr'ou Wit 0 C E re.../,' Tai?tung SC? HUO.SHAO TAO , c"-cHUNG.T'OU HSO N 2 2? 9 25 NAUTICAL MILES 510 7.5 100 0 STATUTE MILES 2,5 5F. 10,0 . KILOMETERS 2 118? 119? 120? 121?122? 25651 9.56 SMEM Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4 ?ID --1113111P- =NKr Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030001-4