NIE 43-56: THE PROSPECTS OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT - TERMS OF REFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A007800030011-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 24, 1956
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
24 May 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr? Allan Evans (OIR)
Colonel H. J. Lemley, Jr., USA (AC/SI)
Captain W. S. Howell, USN (ONI)
Colonel W. B. Sawyer, USAF (AFOIN-2B2)
Colonel C. H. Dayhuff, Jr.,, USA (JIG)
SUBJECT: NIE 43-56: THE PROSPECTS OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST
GOVERNMENT - Terms of Reference
1, The attached terms of reference were agreed on at the
meeting of the IAC representatives on Thursday, 24 May,
2. All agencies are invited to contribute to any section
within their competence to do so.
3. It is requested that contributions be received in this
office by the close of business on Monday, 6 August 1956.
STAT
Distribution "B"
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
24 May 1956
SUBJECT: TLRMS OF REF ,RENCE: NIB 43756: THE PROSPECTS OF THE CH-MESE
NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the. present strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese
Nationalist government and its shott and long term prospects.
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The contributions to NIB 43-54 and NIB 43-55 examined in some
detail the basic political, economic, and military situation on Taiwan.
We see no requirement at this time to re-work this material except to the
extent necessary to take account of recent developments and to test the
validity of statements made in NTE 43-55. Aside from the general review
and updating of NIB 43-55, we should concentrate in this paper on the
problem of the staying powerof the. Nationalist regime in the light of
the new Communist tactics, and the growing acceptance of the Chinese
Communist regime in the international community.
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I. THE POLITICAL SITUATION
A. Political
1. Have the objectives of Nationalist China as defined in
LL 43-55 been altered over the past year?
2. Has the nature of the Nationalist Government .changed in
any significant ways? Have the relativepositions of
the leaders been altered?- Have the character and the
conduct of its officials changed significantly? Have
opportunities for Taiwanese participation in the
government improved? Has there been any further evidence
of a, revival of discrimination against officials with close
American associations?
3. Have there been any significant developments during the
past year in the support of the mainlanders and the
Taiwanese for the Nationalist governnent?
a. Has significant disaffection developed among the
Taiwanese? Among the mainlanders on the island?
To what. extent has such disaffection been provoked
by policies and actions of the Nationalist government?
Been inspired by Communist propaganda and subversion?
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1) What are the principal themes of Communist
propaganda directed at Taiwan?. What groups
-
and what portion of the population and armed
forces are reached by Communist propaganda?
2) Is there evidence of increased
subversive activity on Taiwan?
groups do Communist subversive
concentrate?
Communist
On what
efforts
b. To What extent has disaffection developed into active
covert or overt opposition to the government? To what
extent have the Communists been Successful in developing
an underground organization on Taiwan?
To what extent
has disaffection resulted in defections to the mainland
of government personnel, of military personnel, of
civilian mainlanders?
c. What measures has the Nationalist government taken to
increase popular support among the mainlanders? Among
the Taiwanese?
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Has the Nationalist government's ability to control Taiwan
changed significantly? What trends are evident in
government security measures? In their effectiveness?
B. Economic
1. Project the ',Economic Indicators', chart on page 6 of
NIE 43755 through 1957-
2. Has the Nationalist government made any change in its
policy of subordinating the long term investment needs
of the economy of the island to military expansion and
social welfare?. Do the economic policies of the
Nationalists continue to reflect their concentration
on the objectives of an early return to the mainland?
C. Military
Have there been any significant changes in the military
capabilities of the Nationalist Chinese? Hays there been
any apparent chanes in the morale of the military?
What is the ratio of Taiwanese to mainlandersin the various
military- services? What have been the effects of increased numbers
of Taiwanese in the military service.
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p. International Position
What changes have taken place in the international position and
stature of the Chinese Nationalists since the publication of
NIE 43-55, especially with respect to;
1. Recognition by other governments?
2. Position in the UN and its affiliated agencies?
3. Acceptance of its attempts to interdict the foreign
trade of Communist China?
Lt. Influence over and support. from OVerseas Chinese?
5. P.lations with and Support from the US?
6. Relations with Japan and the Philippines?
To what extent has the position of the ChineseNationalist.
in third countries been affected by Chinese Communist
diplomatic, propaganda and subversive activities?
II. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
A. What trends are probable in the nature of the Nationalist
government in the short term? In the longer run? What
changes in the relative positions of power and influence
among the leaders are likely to take place? What effect
would the death of Chiang Kai-shek have on the power and
local support of the Nationalist government on Taiwan?
In international circles? Who would be likely to succeed
Chiang?
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B. What trends are probable in popu1.-r support for the
Nationalist government am-mc,. the Taiwanese and the
mainlanders in the short run? in the longer run?
What are the prospects for an increase in the number
of defections to the mainland?
C. lithat trends are probable in the ability of the Nationalist
government to maintain internal security? To minimize
Communist covert activities? To counter effectively
Communist propaganda?
D. What are the prospects for the development of a viable
economy on Taiwan?
E. What trends arc likely in Chinese Nationalist military
capabilities in the short-term and in the longer run?
Under what circumstances might the Chinese Nationalist
capability and will to defend the Offshore Islands or
Taiwan be significantly changed?
F. What trends are likely with respect to the willingness of
Chinese Nationalist leadership to accept US advice?
G. In what manner would the morale of the various seg:lents of
the population on Taiwan, the policies of the Nationalist
government, and the international position of the Chinese
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Nationalists be affected by such contingent developments
as the following:
1. A growing trend towards general recognition of
Communist China and the seatim, of the Communist
Chinese in the UN as the government of China,
despite the US efforts to prevent such
developments?
2. A growing trend in non-CommuniSt Asia toward closer
political and economic ties with Communist China?
3. General support of non-Communist countries for a settle-
ment of the Taiwan issue on a basis of "two Chinas"?
What further effects would result if this solution
were to be accepted by the Communist Chinese?or.if
the latter continued to flatly reject such a solution?
To what extent would the Taiwanese -support such a
solution? Support Taiwan becoming -a trusteeship under,
the UN? .
4. A Chinese Communist seizure of one r more of the
lightly held Offshore Islands? To what extent would
the reactions to this development be modified if the
US did not participate in the defense of these
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islands? If the US assisted but unsuccessfully?
If the US subsequently committed itself to the
defense of the principal Offshore Islands? If it
remained silent? If it sought to encourac:e the
Nationalists to withdraw from the Offshore Islands
then retaining in their hands?
5,1 A Chinese Communidt attack avainst one or more of
the principal Offshore Islands which: (a) succeeded
in the absence of US participation in their defense;
or (b) failed because of US military intervention.
H-. Is there any possibility that the Chinese. Nationalists
leaders might give up their objective of regaining control
of the mainland? Under what circumstances?
I. In general what are the prospects of the Chinese Nationalist
government in the next few
rears? Over a longer Period?
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