PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A007900030001-3
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 13, 1956
• Content Type: NIE

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6 5 NIE 5 2 ? 5 6
13 November 1956
atithOOF
N? 253
NATIONAL INTELL IGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 52-56
(Supersedes N1E 52-55)
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTAN
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 13 November 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of
Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and
the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The
Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained,
the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
ft t1.3.a)A-?".
DOC'JMENT NO. 1
NO CHANGE 1;1 CLASS. I
/7? DECL
CLASS. C, !"? 10: TS S C
________ NEXT 17,EV"_ ,!
ALJT)-1: Firl 73 2
DATE: REVIEWER: 00 71
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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The title of this estimate, when used separately from the text, should be classified:
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
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M.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM 1
CONCLUSIONS 1
DISCUSSION 2
POLITICAL 2
The "One-Unit" Plan and the Constitution 4
Recent Crises 4
Probable Developments 4
The Communist Party 7
ECONOMIC 8
Present Situation 8
Probable Developments 10
MILITARY 12
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 14
Relations with the West 14
Relations with the Bloc 15
Relations with India and Afghanistan 15
Pakistan as an Ally 16
APPENDIX
Summary Conclusions 18
Chart of Political Alignments in Pakistan following 18
Political Parties and Groupings in Pakistan 19
Map of Pakistan following 20
itpeoPt4Plftwkk
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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTANI
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the present situation and probable developments in Pakistan with
particular emphasis on the period through 1957.
CONCLUSIONS
1. At least over the next few years, Paki-
stan will remain basically unstable,
plagued by serious differences of interest
and outlook between the two parts of the
country, by a dearth of responsible lead-
ers, by weak political institutions, and by
widespread frustration and discontent,
particularly in East Pakistan. (Paras.
10-20)
2. President Mirza will probably continue
for the next few years to exercise a dom-
inant influence over the government, thus
assuring a modicum of stability. Despite
the difficulties which Mirza and Prime
Minister Suhrawardy will experience in
working with one another, their present
alliance will probably continue at least
for the next six months or so and pos-
sibly past the general elections contem-
plated for late 1957 or early 1958. (Paras.
21-26)
' Supersedes NIE 52-55, "Probable Developments
in Pakistan," 15 March 1955.
For Summary Conclusions see Appendix page 18.
3. If Mirza cannot preserve his domin-
ance over the government by ordinary
means, he would almost certainly exer-
cise his emergency powers to rule by de-
cree. Such action would widen the ex-
isting gap between the government and
the people and would probably entail
more pervasive and sustained use of au-
thoritarian methods than has hitherto
been required. Such action would also
create additional discontent in East Paki-
stan and increase tensions between the
two wings of the country. (Paras. 27-28)
4. Despite probable delays and difficulties
in finalizing and putting into effect the
proposed five year development program
for 1955-1960, there will probably be an
acceleration of development activities
and expenditures in 1959 and 1960, and by
the latter year the rate of growth of the
national income may approach a level of
somewhat over three percent a year.
However, Pakistan will almost certainly
fail to realize a substantial part of the
P614ilioNZ. 1
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folimOWIT
plan goals by 1960 and, despite probable
progress in raising food grain production
levels, will probably remain subject to
food shortages resulting from floods and
droughts. (Paras. 40-43)
5. With Pakistan's foreign exchange
earnings likely to hold up at approxi-
mately present levels and economic de-
velopment expenditures likely to lag, Pak-
istan will probably require a lower annual
level of economic assistance (exclusive of
military aid) in FY 1957 and 1958 than
was provided by the US in FY 1956. How-
ever, in the period following 1958, the
probable rising expenditures for the de-
velopment program and the increase in
annual costs of an enlarged military es-
tablishment are likely to require a sub-
stantial increase in US economic assist-
ance. It is likely that Pakistan will be
dependent on larger-scale economic as-
sistance by FY 1960 than was granted by
the US in FY 1956. (Paras. 43-44)
6. Pakistan will probably continue to
make heavy expenditures on its military
establishment. However, maintenance
of that establishment will require con-
tinuing US materiel and direct forces
support, not only through the expected
completion of the present military aid
program in 1959 or 1960, but probably for
an indeterminate period. (Paras. 46, 53)
7. Present strains in Pakistan's relations
with India will probably continue sub-
I. POLITICAL
2
stantially unchanged. There may be
some improvement in Afghan-Pakistan
relations. (Paras. 63-64)
8. Despite the strain placed on Pakistan's
relations with the UK by the crisis arising
out of the Anglo-French intervention in
Egypt, we believe it unlikely that the Pak-
istan government presently plans to leave
the Commonwealth, the Baghdad Pact, or
SEATO. However, it is still possible that
the crisis may develop so as to cause Paki-
stan's withdrawal from the Common-
wealth and these organizations. (Para.
60)
9. At best, the Pakistan government will
be under increasing popular pressure to
de-emphasize its ties with the West and
demonstrate its independence of "West-
ern domination." It will probably take
a less active interest in regional defense
matters, at least in the absence of greatly
increased US support. It would probably
be unwilling to grant military bases to
the US in peacetime, and almost certain-
ly remain unwilling to commit more than
token forces for use under SEATO or the
Baghdad Pact outside Pakistan. It will
probably be increasingly receptive to of-
fers of trade and friendship by Commu-
nist China, the USSR, and other members
of the Bloc. These trends would be ac-
celerated if US military and economic
aid were reduced. (Paras. 58-62, 65-66)
DISCUSSION
10. Despite its success in coping with the
weighty problems which confronted it at the
outset, Pakistan 3 after nine years of inde-
pendent existence still lacks many of the
basic ingredients of national unity and stabil-
ity. The eastern and western parts of the
For map of Pakistan see Appendix, following
page 20.
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country, separated by about a thousand miles
of Indian territory, represent two widely dis-
parate cultural groups, differing from each
other in language, social and economic struc-
ture, and outlook. These differences lie at
the root of the continuing political tug of war
between the Bengali leaders of East Pakistan,
whose province contains 45 million of Paki-
stan's 80 million population, and the Punjab
and Pathan elements of West Pakistan who
still predominate in the army, the civil service,
and the higher offices of the government. Is-
lam is now less of a force for national unity
than it was at the inception of Pakistan and
has increasingly become a source of funda-
mentalist opposition to the development of a
modern secular state. The Muslim League,
which Pakistan's original leaders used as a
vehicle of political control, has steadily de-
generated, and no effective rival organiza-
tions have emerged to take its place. Al-
though much of the Pakistani population re-
mains ignorant and apathetic about political
matters, chronic political instability, recur-
rent economic crises, and continuing frus-
tration over relations with its neighbors, par-
ticularly India, have all contributed to grow-
ing popular dissatisfaction with the present
state of affairs.
11. During the past few years, ultimate po-
litical authority in Pakistan has been in the
hands of a small circle of Western-oriented
senior administrators headed by the late Gov-
ernor General Ghulam Mohammed and his
successor (now provisional president of Paki-
stan) Iskander Mirza. This group, entirely
composed of West Pakistanis, first asserted
its authority in early 1953, when Ghulam Mo-
hammed summarily dismissed the inept Nazi-
muddin Cabinet without reference to the Con-
stituent Assembly, which also served as a pro-
visional legislature. In September 1954 a
number of disgruntled members of the Con-
stituent Assembly, mostly from East Pakistan,
challenged the power of the group by pushing
through a bill curtailing the powers of the
Governor General. As a countermove, he dis-
missed the Constituent Assembly and brought
about a cabinet reshuffle in which Mirza and
Army Commander in Chief Ayub, who had
3
worked closely with Ghulam Mohammed, took
over the key portfolios of Interior and Defense
respectively. After a High Court verdict
against the continuation of executive rule,
Ghulam Mohammed was persuaded to yield
to the Court's decision and in June 1955 he
had the provincial legislatures select repre-
sentatives to a new Constituent Assembly.
However, preponderant power continued to
rest with the executive because of its control
of patronage, its broad emergency powers,
and the continuing support of the army. Be-
cause of the deteriorating health of Ghulam
Mohammed, this executive power was increas-
ingly assumed by Mirza, who finally took over
as acting Governor General in August 1955.
12. Although Mirza has continued to hold the
political ascendency, the 'restoration of par-
liamentary government has ushered in a pe-
riod of intense political jockeying for position
in which both Mirza's freedom of action and
over-all political stability in Pakistan have
declined. Possessing neither organized po-
litical support of his own nor sufficient pop-
ular backing to appeal to the country over
the heads of the politicians, Mirza has been
forced into a series of deals and compromises
in order to secure parliamentary backing for
a cabinet acceptable to him. This political
maneuvering has also encouraged some
strains within the Mirza group, whose prestige
and effectiveness had been weakened by the
disappearance from the political scene of Ghu-
lam Mohammed.
13. The ruling group initially sought to form
a coalition government based on an alliance
with the Muslim League, which despite its
debility remained the only major political
organization in West Pakistan and, with
strong government backing, was able to secure
most of the 40 West Pakistan seats in the new
80-man Constituent Assembly. 4 Although
neither the Muslim League nor the ruling
group had significant influence in East Paki-
stan, the lack of a unified political organiza-
tion there left the West Pakistan leaders in a
strong bargaining position. They finally took
For a listing of major political parties and
groupings in Pakistan see Appendix, page 19.
Seitiegfealifile"
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Fazlul Huq's loosely-knit United Front into
the coalition, leaving H. S. Suhrawardy's
Awami League, which had insisted on the
prime ministership for Suhrawardy as the
price of cooperation, in opposition. Shortly
before the new Constituent Assembly met in
September 1955, a new cabinet was set up in
which Mohammed Ali of Bogra, whom Mirza
had distrusted for some time, was replaced
as prime minister by Chaudri Mohammad Ali,
a career civil servant who had made a good
reputation as finance minister and was one
of Mirza's principal associates.
The "One-Unit" Plan and the Constitution
14. This arrangement with Huq's group in-
volved the acceptance of United Front rule in
East Pakistan, where the United Front's pre-
vious ineptness in office had resulted in the
imposition of direct administration by the
central authorities for more than a year. How-
ever, it left Mirza in a strong position at the
national level, where the United Front mem-
bers of the cabinet were effectively isolated
from real power. This arrangement also pro-
vided a basis for a final drive to push through
the "one-unit" scheme for integrating the
several provinces of West Pakistan into a
single unit. This regrouping, which was
finally effected in October 1955 after much
heavy and sometimes high-handed pressure
from Karachi, was designed to confirm the
political ascendency of the Punjabi elite, with
which Mirza and most of his friends were as-
sociated.
15. With the adoption of the "one-unit" plan,
the government promptly proceeded to push
through a constitution, which the old Con-
stituent Assembly had failed to agree upon
despite years of wrangling. This involved
some dissension within the Mirza group and
some concessions to outside pressures, notably
on the religious issue. Despite the objections
of Mirza and opposition leader Suhrawardy,
Prime Minister Chaudri Mohammad Ali
yielded to pressures within the assembly for
designation of the new state as an "Islamic
Republic," for a requirement that the presi-
dent be a Moslem, and for a vaguely worded
4
provision calling for appointment by the
president of an Islamic Commission to recom-
mend means of bringing the laws of Pakistan
into conformity with the Koran. The thorny
related issue of whether to have Hindus and
other religious minorities vote along with
the Moslems (as the secularists and Bengalis
wished) or in separate electorates for specially
designated minority seats was finally referred
to the provincial legislatures for advice. The
National Assembly has recently voted to have
joint electorates in East Pakistan and separate
electorates in West Pakistan.
16. By and large, however, Mirza got what he
wanted: a parliamentary form of government
with enough power concentrated in the exec-
utive to provide the "controlled democracy"
which he considered essential for stability at
Pakistan's present state of political develop-
ment. The constitution provides for govern-
ment through a prime minister and cabinet
having the confidence (and legislative sup-
port) of an elected National Assembly and for
a judiciary empowered to pass on constitution-
al questions. However, the president is in
many respects the actual as well as nominal
fountainhead of governmental authority. 5 In
exercising normal executive powers, including
the appointment of officials and the exercise
of the police functions, he is directed to act
in accordance with the "advice" of the cabinet.
If the view expressed by the former law
minister is to be accepted, however, he cannot
be held too strictly to account for failure to
accept such "advice." Moreover, he is allowed
to exercise discretion in determining whether
an individual commands sufficient confidence
within the National Assembly to be appointed
or retained as prime minister. In addition,
the president is specifically granted broad
discretionary powers, including a conditional
right of veto, the right to dismiss the national
and provincial assemblies, the right to pro-
Once general elections have been held, the presi-
dent will be elected for a five-year term by com-
bined majority vote of the National Assembly
and the two provincial assemblies, meeting con-
currently but separately. He can be removed
only by the vote of three-quarters of the Na-
tional Assembly.
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lasstag.
mulgate ordinances when the assembly is not
in session, and the right to institute executive
rule on the basis of a national or provincial
emergency. The two provincial governors,
appointed by the president, also have wide
powers within their respective spheres.
17. Adoption of the new constitution in early
1956 regularized the position of the Constit-
uent Assembly (which became the provisional
National Assembly) and of Mirza (who was
promptly named provisional president) , thus
removing some of the uncertainties which
had previously plagued Pakistan politics. It
also provided at least a provisional settlement
of the status of East Pakistan: Bengali was
designated a "state language" along with
Urdu, but East Pakistan was forced to accept
equal representation with less populous West
Pakistan in the National Assembly and the
continuation of effective concentration of
power in the central government.
Recent Crises
18. Any hopes that adoption of a constitution
would pave the way for rapid and orderly prog-
ress toward more stable and representative
government were soon dispelled. In West
Pakistan a full-scale political revolt developed
under the direction of Mian Mumtaz Daul-
tana, a prominent and wealthy Punjab pol-
itician, and other old-line Muslim Leaguers
who had long been unreconciled to the cen-
tralization of power in the Mirza group. Al-
though ostensibly directed against Dr. Khan
Sahib, a prominent North West Frontier Prov-
ince independent whom Mirza had had in-
stalled as provincial chief minister, it was
clearly aimed at undermining Mirza's posi-
tion in the central government. Meanwhile,
in East Pakistan, the poor administrative
showing of Mirza's United Front allies led to
a progressive deterioration of their political
position.
19. Mirza succeeded in surmounting the im-
mediate threat in West Pakistan by having
Khan Sahib and provincial Governor Gurmani
set up a new Republican Party in opposition
to the Muslim League. Strongly backed by
all the pressures at the Karachi government's
disposal, it was able to lure away enough
provincial deputies from Daultana and his
associates to secure (with some extra help
from the presiding officer) a vote of confidence
in the provincial assembly when it met in
May 1956. Similar switches at Karachi
turned the central government into a pre-
dominantly Republican-United Front coali-
tion.
20. Nevertheless, the government's political
position remained precarious. Although the
Republicans had won an initial victory in
West Pakistan, their majority was not a firm
one. Prime Minister Chaudri Mohammad
Ali's refusal to make a clean break with the
Muslim League in favor of the Republicans
added to political strains which had been
developing between him and Mirza. Most
importantly, the United Front, on which the
government relied to fill out its parliamentary
majority, came under increasingly heavy at-
tack in East Pakistan. Despite crude efforts
by provincial Governor Fazlul Huq to save
the United Front government in East Paki-
stan, it was finally supplanted by the Awami
League in September 1956. A brief effort was
made to continue the United Front in the cen-
tral government despite these events. How-
ever, when Chaudri, for a number of reasons,
resigned on 8 September, Mirza finally ac-
cepted H. S. Suhrawardy, whom he had long
recognized as his most important rival for
power in Pakistan, as prime minister. The
Awami League thereupon replaced the United
Front in the central government coalition. 6
Probable Developments
21. An extremely able politician and a capa-
ble administrator, Suhrawardy is the first
prime minister since the assassination of Lia-
quat Ali Khan in 1951 with any significant
degree of national prestige and appeal as a
political leader. His accession may thus help
to overcome the mixture of apathy and mis-
trust which have to date characterized popu-
lar attitudes toward the government. As an
For chart of present alignment of political groups
in the national and provincial assemblies see
Appendix, following page 18.
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,?Ii#Notior
accepted Bengali leader who will presumably
be alive to East Pakistan's problems, he may
make some progress in developing the support
from East Pakistan which the Karachi gov-
ernment has so conspicuously lacked in recent
years.
22. We believe that the present alliance be-
tween Mirza and Suhrawardy will probably re-
main in effect at least for the next six months
or so and possibly past the general elections
contemplated for late 1957 or early 1958.
Despite Suhrawardy's career in opposition,
he is far closer to Mirza in general outlook
than most other Pakistani politicians. He
shares Mirza's aspirations for development of
a strong Pakistan along secular, Westernized
lines, and over the last few months the two
men appear to have moved closer together
on many issues. In taking the premiership,
Suhrawardy specifically promised Mirza that
he would maintain Pakistan's Western ties,
refrain from interference with the military
establishment, and attempt to eliminate left-
ist elements from his party.
23. On a more practical plane, both men rec-
ognize their dependence on one another.
Suhrawardy realizes that he needs Mirza's
support to retain his present position, since
the latter not only has the power of the presi-
dency and the support of the army, but is now
also sponsor of the Republican Party. Suhra-
wardy, long ambitious for the premiership, will
probably not readily expose himself to losing
it. Mirza, for his part, probably recognizes
that Suhrawardy presently represents the only
practical alternative to suspension of parlia-
mentary government and rule by decree.
24. Mirza and Suhrawardy will, however, al-
most certainly experience some difficulty in
working with one another. Both are ambi-
tious men and differ in their fundamental
views regarding their respective roles. Bas-
ically mistrustful and contemptuous of poli-
ticians, Mirza is convinced that he, as presi-
dent, must retain essential control if stability
in Pakistan is to be maintained and he will
probably continue to express himself on spe-
cific matters with characteristic bluntness.
He will probably continue to suspect Suhra-
6
wardy on grounds of opportunism and to have
reservations about the presence of radical and
anti-Western elements in the Awami League.
Suhrawardy, on the other hand, is convinced
that the prime minister must be the active
political head of the government rather than
a mere executive agent for the president, and
will accordingly be jealous of his prerogatives.
Differences May arise over such questions as
what role Suhrawardy and the Awami League
are to play in West Pakistan politics and
when elections are to be held. There may
also be disagreement regarding foreign and
military policy; Suhrawardy has in the past
been critical of the government on these mat-
ters and in the present Middle East crisis he
may wish to take a stronger stand against
the UK and France than would Mirza. Final-
ly, basic social and regional conflicts of in-
terest between the Punjabi elite of landlords
and merchants with which Mirza is associated
and the more equalitarian political society of
East Pakistan will also complicate the Mirza-
Suhrawardy relationship. Any of these dif-
ferences, we believe, may bring these men to
a parting of the ways.
25. Pakistan will remain politically unstable,
particularly with the approach of the general
elections which the government is more or
less committed to holding within the next
12 to 18 months. In West Pakistan, it will
be difficult for Mirza to hold the Repub-
lican Party's slim majority intact in the face
of probable renewed efforts to undermine it
by Mirza's Muslim League antagonists, possi-
ble similar maneuvers by Suhrawardy's fol-
lowers, and factionalism within Republican
ranks. Resort to emergency powers by Mirza
or provincial Governor Gurmani will also re-
main a possibility. In East Pakistan the fall
of the United Front cabinet has given the
Awami League an opportunity to build up its
position, but its capacity to cope with the
chaotic administrative situation it has in-
herited is uncertain. The Awami League it-
self is also strained by personal and factional
differences between Suhrawardy and Maulana
Bashani, the head of the East Pakistan branch
of the party. The East Pakistan situation is
likely to be further complicated by deal-
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making between elements of the Awami
League and the United Front. At all govern-
ment levels preoccupation with political ma-
neuvering will continue to interfere with effec-
tive administration, thus encouraging a fur-
ther growth of popular discontent. In this
situation, opposition leaders, and many pro-
government politicians as well, will probably
be increasingly inclined to resort to dema-
gogic appeals on religious, economic, and for-
eign policy issues.
26. The struggle for political and popular sup-
port is likely to be especially chaotic in East
Pakistan, where a long history of political
agitation, the relatively limited political power
of the landlord class, and continuing popular
? grievances have made for a high degree of
popular responsiveness to political stimuli
without as yet producing any firm party loy-
alties. In West Pakistan the semifuedal char-
acter of society puts the big landlords and
other notables in a position to control elec-
tions and otherwise dominate political life
and has made for general cynicism and apa-
thy on the part of most of the general public.
Despite Mirza's probable inability to secure
a genuine popular mandate, he may there-
fore be able, by use of the considerable pres-
sures and inducements at his disposal, to
assure the continuance in office of men will-
ing to cooperate with him. However, popular
discontent is growing, and Mirza's Muslim
League rivals are in a favorable position to
capitalize on it, even though they themselves
suffer from a lack of real grass roots support.
27. At least in the period prior to general
elections, Mirza could and almost certainly
would exercise his emergency powers to rule
by decree if he were unable to preserve his
dominance over the government by ordinary
means. Such a crisis would probably be pre-
cipitated in the event of a split between
Suhral,vardy and Mirza.
28. A resort to emergency executive rule on
a nationwide basis could probably be carried
out effectively. Despite General Ayub's de-
sire to preserve the professional, nonpolitical
character of the armed forces and his own
withdrawal from active participation in politi-
cal affairs, he would probably provide full
army backing in an emergency. Mirza could
also depend on the civil machinery of govern-
ment, whose senior members generally share
his viewpoint. With both of these elements
lined up behind the president, the establish-
ment of executive rule could be accomplished
without significant resistance.
29. Nevertheless, a resort to nationwide exec-
utive rule would involve serious hazards both
for Mirza and for the country. By widening
the gap between the government and the
people and by sharpening the differences be-
tween Mirza and his parliamentary oppo-
nents, a resort to executive rule would create
an atmosphere in which a restoration of par-
liamentary government would involve the risk
of serious defeat for Mirza. In order to re-
tain power, he would probably feel compelled
to resort to considerably more pervasive and
sustained use of authoritarian methods than
has hitherto been required. Suspension of
parliamentary government would create addi-
tional discontent in East Pakistan and in-
crease tensions between the two wings of the
country.
30. Should general elections result in solid
majorities for forces strongly opposed to Mir-
za's policies and unwilling to accept his re-
election as president, Mirza would be strongly
tempted to dismiss the legislatures and insti-
tute executive rule. However, whether he took
such a step would depend on the extent to
which the army and civil service were solidly
behind him. This in turn would be condi-
tioned by the nature of the opposing majority.
If this majority clearly threatened the domi-
nance of the Punjabi elite, the senior army
and civil service officers would probably sup-
port and even encourage Mirza to institute
authoritarian rule.
The Communist Party
31. The Communist Party of Pakistan as such
is unlikely to figure importantly in the Paki-
stan political situation, over the next year or
two at least. A small party estimated to num-
ber approximately 1,500, with perhaps twice
as many fellow travellers, it is beset by fac-
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tional disputes and a lack of effective leader-
ship or adequate funds. Banned since 1954,
the party is subjected to reasonably effective
(though not always firm and consistent) gov-
ernment surveillance and repression. The
more important East Pakistan branch of the
party, which has close links with the Commu-
nist Party of India, is not closely tied in with
the West Pakistan branch. There are an esti-
mated three or four Communists or pro-Com-
munists in the 80-man National Assembly and
perhaps as many as 25 members in the 309-
man East Pakistan legislature.
32. Despite their numerical weakness, the
Communists are in a position to encourage
and exploit anti-Western, neutralist, and anti-
regime sentiment. The pro-Communist bias
of the wealthy Mian If tikharuddin, who con-
trols three of Pakistan's leading newspapers,
the English-language Pakistan Times and the
Urdu journal Imroz (which has separate La-
hore and Karachi editions) provides a power-
ful propaganda medium for the dissemination
of pro-Communist and anti-American themes
in West Pakistan. In East Pakistan, where
the growth potential of the Communist Party
is greatest, the Communists have achieved
some success in infiltrating the Awami League
and other groups. The League's provincial
Chairman, Maulana Bashani, is a fellow trav-
eller who mouthes Communist doctrine,
though like other leftists in the party who
adopt various portions of the Communist line
he is probably motivated less by ideological
conviction than by opportunism. The only
clearly identifiable Communist-front par-
ties ? both small ? are the Azad Pakistan
Party, If tikharuddin's personal political ve-
hicle and largely confined to the Punjab, and
the Ganatantri Dal of East Pakistan, which
elected an admitted Communist to the Na-
tional Assembly and has an estimated 11
members in the East Pakistan legislature.
One Ganatantri Dal member, possibly a Com-
munist, is a member of the provincial cabinet.
Communist efforts to organize popular fronts
have been generally unsuccessful, and while
the party is reportedly still heavily represent-
ed in student groups in East Pakistan, its
effectiveness in West Pakistan and at the na-
tional level is now small.
II. ECONOMIC
Present Situation
8
33. Pakistan's principal economic asset is ag-
riculture, which provides 60 percent of total
production, most of its foreign exchange earn-
ings, and (in a good year) a precarious self-
sufficiency in food at a low standard of living
for its large and growing population. It has
a national income of less than $6 billion or
about $70 per capita for a population of some
80 million. Pakistan is dependent on imports
to satisfy nearly all its capital goods require-
ments and much of its fuel requirements. It
imports a wide array of manufactured con-
sumer goods and in most years has been a
marginal importer of food grains. To pay
for these items it depends primarily on for-
eign sales of cotton and jute, which provide
85 percent of Pakistan's export earnings. In
recent years it has also relied on US develop-
mental and emergency aid.
34. High export earning during the Korean
war boom, coupled with good food harvests,
encouraged the government to proceed with
an ambitious development program. The sub-
sequent sharp decline in world commodity
prices for cotton and jute and the accom-
panying drop in export earnings led to severe
strains on the economy. The difficulties were
compounded by food deficits as a result of
severe drought in 1952 and 1953 and wide-
spread flood damage in the three following
years. Inflation threatened political stability.
In spite of these developments, Pakistan has
made progress in certain fields of industrial
development during the past five years
through a sharp curtailment of consumer
goods imports and the support of foreign
assistance and external borrowing, about 95
percent of which has come from the US.
Emergency US shipments of food and raw
materials eased the critical shortages which
had been developing, particularly in East
Pakistan.
35. Within the last two years the situation
has improved in certain respects. Since mid-
1955 the downward trend in foreign exchange
earnings was reversed and Pakistan's balance
of payments on current account went from a
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surplus of under $1.1 million in 1954-1955 to
one of about $80.5 million in 1955-1956.7 The
favorable turn in exports was due largely to
substantially increased production of jute and
to the improved competitive position of Paki-
stan's jute and cotton as a result of the de-
valuation of the Pakistan rupee on 1 August
1955. Export earnings were also increased by
the growth of Pakistan's new textile and jute
processing industries, which by late 1955 were
not only largely meeting domestic demand but
also producing surpluses in some categories
for sale abroad. Despite the upward turn in
foreign exchange earnings there has only in
the last few months been any relaxation of
the restrictive import policy maintained
through the last four years. The expansion
of domestic consumer good industries - par-
ticularly textiles and to a lesser extent
sugar - has, however, reduced Pakistan's de-
pendence on foreign sources of supply and
thus relieved considerably the initial pres-
sure on the economy resulting from the re-
striction of imports. For example, textiles,
which averaged a quarter of total purchases
9
abroad during the period 1949-1952, are now
almost entirely supplied domestically.
36. Currently, Pakistan is meeting its essen-
tial import requirements as well as a good
part of the imports which can be presently
absorbed by its development program. In the
18 months ending June 1956, the new turn
in Pakistan's foreign trade resulted in a bal-
ance-of-payments surplus, and in net addition
to foreign exchange holdings of about $120
million. Delivered US economic aid in this
period accounted for $120 million of the total
imports. The equivalent of the US economic
aid program during the past year has there-
fore gone to build up the foreign exchange
reserves of the economy.
37. Total development expenditures in Paki-
stan during the five year period through FY
1956 amounted to about $1.4 billion, or about
five percent of national income. Public de-
velopment expenditures in Pakistan in this
period were slightly over one billion dollars,
rising from $125 million in FY 1952 to $244
million in FY 1955. In FY 1956 they fell
Pakistan's balance of payments position for 1954-1955 and its gold and foreign exchange holdings since
1951 are shown in the following tables:
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF PAKISTAN
(millions of dollars)'
1954
1955
1st half
1956
Goods, services, and capital (total)
-36.1
16.4
-9.0
Exports
347.0
402.8
210.0
Imports
-389.2
-364.7
-214.0
Services (net)
-25.5
-30.3
-20.0
Movement of capital b (net)
31.6
8.6
15.0
Errors and omission
-10.7
-8.7
US Government grants and loans
11.7
61.9
60.0
Change in foreign exchange holdings
-35.1
69.6
51.0
a. Exchange rate conversion from rupees to dollars was accomplished by using $0.302 for 1954 through July
1955 and $0.210 for the last five months of 1955 and first half of 1956.
b. Excludes US Government loans.
(
GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS OF PAKISTAN
(millions of dollars as of end of period)
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1st half 1956
447.5
183.0
208.3
173.2
242.8
293.8
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slightly to about $220 million. These expend-
itures have been largely directed to industry,
power, and transportation. Private invest-
ment in the five year period, estimated at
roughly $430 million, was concentrated in the
fields of textile manufacturing and urban
housing.
38. Starting from a negligible base there has
been rapid though somewhat unbalanced
progress in the establishment of new indus-
trial plants 8 and the expansion of supporting
power and transportation. In agriculture,
while production of major commercial crops
expanded, food grain production has made no
appreciable progress and on a per capita basis
has been declining since 1949. Despite this
lag in food grain production, national income
in this period has increased at an estimated
average rate of between 2.5 and 3 percent per
year and on a per capita basis between 1 and
11/2 percent per year. Although capable of
feeding itself in good crop ,years, Pakistan has
experienced food shortages in six of the last
nine years as a result of drought or flood.
These shortages have resulted in local food
crises, particularly in East Paki?tan, because
of poor marketing and storage facilities and
inept administration.
39. The Pakistan government now has under
consideration a draft Five Year Development
Plan (1955-1960) . The plan envisions total
development expenditures (public and pri-
vate) of over $2.4 billion, as compared to
about $1.4 billion in the previous five years,
almost 70 percent of which is to be provided
by the government. The emphasis is on de-
veloping agriculture, power, and transport
and on consolidating the gains already made
The growth of industrial production in selected
industries between 1951 and 1955 is shown in the
following table:
1951
1955
Cotton cloth (million yards)
127.7
453.2
Jute goods (thousand long tons)
1.4
61.2
Sugar (thousand long tons)
42.8
95.1
Cement (thousand long tons)
499.0
682.0
Electric power
(million kilowatt hours)
225.1
607.3
Gasoline (refined from imported
crude oil)
(million imperial gallons)
11.1
19.4
Rubber tires and tubes
(thousand units)
620.5
2,034.8
10
in industry. The plan aims at raising na-
tional income by an average of four percent
a year over the plan period. An important
theme of the plan is an attempt to rectify the
past neglected development of East Pakistan.
Approximately 40 percent of planned govern-
ment expenditures has been earmarked for
East Pakistan, although it is recognized that
the lower level of technical and administrative
competence in the region will greatly inhibit
its ability to utilize the full sum.
Probable Developments'
40. The draft plan with some revision will
probably be adopted by the government by the
end of 1956 or early 1957. Although some
projects included in the plan have already
been initiated, progress on the implementation
of the plan as a whole will involve major de-
lays and difficulties. Some progress will have
to be made in resolving current political and
administrative problems within the govern-
ment. Only then will the necessary lines of
authority within the central government and
between the central government and the pro-
vincial governments be sufficiently established
to permit a faster implementation of the de-
velopment program. Furthermore, as a result
of the shift in emphasis to agricultural devel-
opment, several years lead time will probably
be required to train the necessary technical
and administrative personnel.
41. In view of these delays Pakistan will fail
to realize a substantial part of the plan goals
by 1960. It is almost certain that adminis-
trative difficulties in implementing projects
will prevent development expenditures from
rising much above last year's level in the next
two years. This lag will be particularly pro-
nounced in East Pakistan. Consequently the
feeling in East Pakistan that it is not getting
a "proper share" of development funds is
likely to persist.
42. There probably will be an acceleration of
development activities and expenditures in
P There will be some adverse effects to the Paki-
stan economy as a result of the dislocations in
international trade arising from the blocking of
the Suez Canal. We cannot now estimate the
extent of these adverse effects.
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1959 and 1960. Some progress in the field
or agriculture is likely, and therefore the de-
clining trend in per capita food grain produc-
tion which has characterized the period since
1949 will probably be arrested. Recurrent
food shortages, however, will probably still
result from floods and droughts. Moreover,
localized food crises remain likely unless the
government presses on with planned improve-
ments in the storage and distribution of food
grains. The degree of agricultural develop-
ment in West Pakistan will depend upon the
outcome of the present canal water dispute
with India. Although optimum development
of Pakistan's agricultural resources in the
area is contingent on an early and favorable
settlement of the dispute, significant agri-
cultural progress could be made even without
a settlement as long as India does not curtail
the water supplies now available to Pakistan.
43. By 1960 the rate of growth of national in-
come may approach a level somewhat over
11
three percent a year. This should permit a
slight improvement in consumption standards
despite the rapid increase in population. Pak-
istan will still be facing formidable problems
but a firmer foundation for further balanced
economic growth will have been established.
44. Pakistan's present development plan is
predicated on a continuation of substantial
foreign aid over the entire plan period. The
Pakistan government has estimated that the
foreign exchange gap to be met through for-
eign aid totals $800 million for the implemen-
tation of the complete five year program. With
Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings likely
to hold up at approximately present levels
and economic development expenditures
likely to lag, Pakistan will probably require a
lower annual level of economic assistance
(exclusive of military aid) in FY 1957 and FY
1958 than was provided in FY 1956.10 How-
ever, in the period following 1958 the rising
" US economic aid to Pakistan is summarized in the following tables:
US ECONOMIC AID OBLIGATED TO PAKISTAN
Fiscal Years 1952-1957
(millions of dollars)
MSA Economic Assistance
Famine and other urgent relief
FY
1952
10.0
FY FY FY FY FY
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
Total Obligated 10.0
10.8 22.7
68.0 a
71.8 107.7
38.0 b 49.5 b
78.8 22.7 109.8 157.2
Est.
88.0
47.0"
Est.
135.0
a. PL 77
b. PL 480
c. as of 4 August 1956
US ECONOMIC AID DELIVERED TO PAKISTAN
1952-1956
(millions of dollars)
1st
half
2nd
half
1st
half
1952
1953
1954
1955
1955
1956
MSA Economic Assistance (grants and loans)
8.0
24.6
10.3
18.9
34.4
30.0
Famine and other urgent relief
66.5
1.4
2.1
7.8
30.0'
Total Expenditure
8.0
91.1
11.7
21.0
42.2
60.0
a. Mostly PL 480 shipment
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expenditures for the development program
Are likely to require a substantial increase in
US aid. The need for economic assistance
after FY 1958 will be further increased as a
result of the increased recurring costs to Paki-
stan of the enlarged military establishment.
The national income will not rise significantly
during this period. It is likely, therefore,
that the increasing requirements of the de-
velopment and military programs will find
Pakistan dependent on larger-scale economic
assistance by FY 1960 than was granted by
the US in FY 1956.
45. Over the last two years Pakistan's trade
with the Bloc has represented about nine
percent of its exports but little more than one
percent of its imports. Over 80 percent of this
trade has been with Communist China (prin-
cipally in cotton exports) . Pakistan has in-
dicated its willingness to increase imports
from the Bloc in return for an expanded mar-
ket for its exports by recently concluding,
for the first time since 1952, trade agreements
with the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary. While over the next few years
trade with the European Bloc will probably
expand somewhat, over-all trade with the Bloc
will probably remain about the same or may
even decline, since the estimated expansion
of cotton production in China may reduce its
need for Pakistani cotton. Only in the unlike-
ly event of a sharp decline in free world de-
mand for Pakistan exports would the Soviet
Bloc be in a position to move significantly
into the Pakistan market. There have been
no firm Soviet Bloc offers to help Pakistan
with its development program. In any event,
Pakistan is not likely to accept Bloc offers
of aid on a scale which might in the govern-
ment's opinion jeopardize economic and mil-
itary assistance from the US.
III. MILITARY
46. The Pakistan government continues to
place heavy emphasis on maintaining and
improving its armed forces, primarily to at-
tain a strong military posture vis-a-vis India
and to secure the Afghan border. In recent
years, the military establishment has also
been important as a pillar of state power and
prestige and as an instrument of internal
control. Pakistan has participated in SEATO
and the Baghdad Pact with the primary ob-
jective, from a military standpoint, of acquir-
ing increased military aid and strengthening
its position vis-a-vis India and to a lesser ex-
tent Afghanistan. Pakistan entered an MDAP
agreement with the United States in May
1954 under which it is receiving substantial
quantities of military end items and direct
forces support. However, Pakistan itself has
also continued to spend heavily on the mili-
tary establishment. Defense expenditures
for 1956-1957 are estimated at about $200
million, or about one-third of the total na-
tional budget. These expenditures constitute
an unusually heavy drain on current revenues,
consuming approximately two-thirds of these
funds in the 1956-1957 budget.
47. Pakistan's regular military establishment
(exclusive of Azad Kashmir and quasi-mili-
tary security forces) consists of approximately
180,000 men.11 The dominant service is the
Army, whose major units currently comprise
six infantry divisions; an armored division
still in the formative stage; an infantry bri-
gade group; two separate infantry brigades;
and an antiaircraft brigade. Almost all of
those units are understrength and only partly
equipped. Army strength probably is slightly
in excess of 161,000, estimated as of 30 June
1956. The Army is supplemented by and
controls a 20,000-man Azad-Kashmir State
Force, raised and stationed in Pakistani-con-
trolled portions of Kashmir. Quasi-military
security forces totalling some 53,000 also aug-
ment Army strength in an emergency. The
Navy, with a personnel strength of 6,100, has
four destroyers, two patrol escorts, and five
minesweepers. The Air Force of 12,500 men
has a total of 350 aircraft, of which, however,
only 75 (about half fighters or fighter-bomb-
ers) are in operational units. F-86F's are
now being introduced into operational units.
48. Pakistan's armed forces, which are out-
growths of the military establishment of form-
This figure excludes civilian employees, which
total: Army, 23,500; Navy, 700; and Air Force,
8,000.
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er British India, have good leadership and
training standards and excellent discipline
and morale. All personnel except doctors are
volunteers, many coming from families in
which military service is traditional, and high
professional standards have been maintained
in the officer corps. However, the dearth of
technicians and the low literacy rate of the
population create continuing operating and
maintenance problems.
49. The US military assistance program for
the Pakistan Army aims at streamlining,
equipping, and filling out with manpower
four of the existing six infantry divisions and
increasing armored strength from one bri-
gade to one and a half divisions. Two corps
headquarters and units of supporting corps
troops would also be established to take over
administrative and operational command
functions which are now performed by GHQ,
thus assuring greater flexibility and efficiency.
Under the existing program, these goals prob-
ably will not be attained before 1960. Pro-
vision is also made for a modest program of
spare parts replacement, training ammuni-
tion, and a war reserve. Materiel shipments to
date have been concentrated mainly on al-
leviating critical deficiencies in artillery,
light armor, signal equipment, and motor
transport. New TO&E's are being developed
in order to improve the over-all efficiency of
tactical units and to bring them in line with
US counterparts. Selected Pakistan officers
and enlisted men are being trained in US
staff and branch schools and with US units in
Europe. Some use is still being made of
British advisers and training facilities. To
date, the capabilities of the Pakistan Army
have improved only slightly but the rate of
improvement will increase as the program
nears completion. Even when the present
military assistance program is completed,
however, the Army will still be handicapped
by a critical shortage of motor transport, and
by 1960 will face the need of a major replace-
ment of tanks.
50. The Navy, most of whose present vessels
are obsolescent, is scheduled to receive one
light cruiser and four destroyers from the UK
in the next year, as well as three additional
13
minesweepers from the US under the military
assistance program. In addition, three of
Pakistan's present destroyers are to undergo
conversion and modernization under the pro-
gram, which will improve Pakistan's capability
for defense of Karachi and lines of com-
munication in the Arabian Sea. Over-all
effectiveness is low, but is slowly improving.
51. The Pakistan Air Force, though still weak,
especially in jet aircraft, should improve con-
siderably in the next few years. It has an
excellent pilot training program, and is sched-
uled to receive 120 F-86F's by late 1957. When
these aircraft have been received and neces-
sary training carried out, the Pakistan Air
Force should be able to give a good account of
itself. Present weaknesses in airfields are
also scheduled to be overcome before 1960
under the military assistance construction
program.
52. Despite the improvements being effected
in the Pakistan armed forces, their capabilities
will remain limited. The military establish-
ment as a whole faces tremendous logistical,
security, and defense problems inherent in
the geographical division of the nation into
two parts separated by 1,000 miles of Indian
territory. At the end of the present military
aid program, Pakistan's capabilities will still
be inferior to those of India in view of the
latter's determined efforts to maintain its
margin of superiority and in view of its
stronger economy. With regard to Afghani-
stan, Pakistan will probably retain its military
superiority and its ability to maintain security
in the border area for a considerable time
despite the flow of Soviet military aid into Af-
ghanistan. However, Pakistan can be ex-
pected to press for increased US military as-
sistance to offset possible Afghan gains. Since
it is primarily concerned with its defenses
against India, Pakistan has demonstrated no
firm interest in sending in an emergency
more than a token force to the defense of the
SEATO and Baghdad Pact countries. Paki-
stani commitments to regional defense ar-
rangements would depend heavily upon US
military assistance and the development of
armed forces considerably in excess of those
presently planned.
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53. Pakistan's ability to achieve and main-
tain a strong military posture will continue
to depend on large scale foreign military and
budgetary assistance not only up through the
completion of the present military aid pro-
gram but also for many years thereafter.
Pakistan will remain dependent on outside
sources of supply for most items of equipment.
Recurring costs of maintaining the re-
equipped and expanded armed forces at the
levels called for by the present aid program
will be substantially greater than they now
are.
54. Although General Ayub will seek to pre-
serve the integrity of the armed forces as a
professional body removed from politics and
to keep his own involvement in political mat-
ters to a minimum, he will almost certainly
continue to regard the military establishment
as the mainstay of the state, not only against
external attack but also against threats of
internal disintegration. With Mirza's sup-
port, Ayub will almost certainly put up vig-
orous opposition to a repetition of past efforts
by Chaudri Mohammad Ali, Suhrawardy, and
others to make substantial reductions in the
military budget; he will also resist any shift
in foreign policy which might jeopardize US
military assistance.
IV. FOREIGN AFFAIRS
55. After entering into a US military aid
agreement in May 1954, Pakistan pursued a
pro-Western and in particular pro-US policy.
It joined with Turkey in the initial moves
leading to the formation of the Baghdad
Pact grouping, which it joined in the fall of
1955, and is also a member of the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization, to which it played
host in March 1956. Pakistan was actively
associated with the pro-Western group at the
Bandung Afro-Asian Conference in April 1955,
and its leaders have on numerous other oc-
casions reaffirmed their opposition to Com-
munism and their rejection of neutralism.
Pakistan is a member of the Commonwealth.
56. Within the last year and a half, however,
Pakistani enthusiasm for the present pro-
Western policy has cooled. Early disappoint-
men ts over the size and timing of US military
aid shipments, coupled with increased skep-
ticism about US willingness to give active sup-
port to the Baghdad Pact organization, have
led to some disenchantment. Having adopted
a pro-US policy in the hope of achieving ad-
ditional prestige and more favored Western
treatment vis-a-vis India and Afghanistan,
the Pakistanis have been disappointed to find
that while their acceptance of military ties
with the West has provided India with a new
excuse for its intransigence on Kashmir, it
has not produced any compensating increase
in support for Pakistan from the US and the
other members of SEATO or the Baghdad
Pact. They are also resentful of the fact that
India's neutralism has not impeded its con-
tinued receipt of large-scale economic aid
from the US.
57. Skillful Soviet use of carrot-and-stick
tactics ? on the one hand supporting India
and Afghanistan in their controversies with
Pakistan, and on the other discreetly hinting
that Pakistan might be eligible for special
favors if it were not linked with the West ?
have stimulated second thoughts about Paki-
stan's present policy. Finally, all of these
factors have underlined the lack of real sup-
port for the government's pro-Western policy.
As in other Arab-Asian countries, much of the
press and articulate public has from the out-
set been strongly influenced against a pro-
Western policy by anticolonialist suspicions
of the West, a sense of loyalty to other Islamic
and Asian countries, a preoccupation with
national independence and equality, and a
desire to remain aloof from the struggle be-
tween the West and the USSR.
Relations with the West
58. President Mirza, General Ayub, and cer-
tain other key members of the administrative
hierarchy are predisposed toward the West by
both inclination and self-interest and will
almost certainly seek to maintain Western
ties. Prime Minister Suhrawardy may be
somewhat more responsive to popular neu-
tralist sentiment, but he is unlikely to press
for any drastic reorientation of Pakistan's
foreign policy. Almost all of its leaders rec-
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ognize Pakistan's continuing dependence on
Western economic and military aid. Most of
them probably also appreciate that Pakistan
as a neutral would probably be at even greater
disadvantage vis-a-vis India in attempting to
compete for world attention and support.
59. Nevertheless, Pakistan will almost cer-
tainly give less support to the West than in
the past. Its leaders are being increasingly
impelled to de-emphasize their ties with the
West, including the US, by their growing rec-
ognition of the limits on Western willingness
and ability to aid Pakistan and by the need
to deal with vocal popular and political senti-
ment ? to some extent shared by Suhrawardy
and other members of the government ? for
a demonstrably more independent stand.
60. These tendencies have been greatly in-
creased by the Anglo-French military inter-
vention in Egypt, which has severely strained
Pakistan's Commonwealth tie and has com-
plicated relations with the Baghdad Pact.
The strong pro-Egyptian, anticolonial popu-
lar reaction common to most Asian nations
in this crisis has been intensified in Pakistan
by the religious factor ? the Pakistanis' emo-
tional identification with their Moslem "broth-
ers" in Egypt. Despite the strain placed on
Pakistan's relations with the UK by the crisis
arising out of the Anglo-French intervention
in Egypt, we believe it unlikely that the Paki-
stan government presently plans to leave the
Commonwealth, the Baghdad Pact, or SEATO.
However, it is still possible that the crisis may
develop so as to cause Pakistan's withdrawal
from the Commonwealth and these organi-
zations.
Relations with the Bloc
61. Although Pakistan's ties with the West
will probably continue to place important lim-
itations on Pakistani relations with the Bloc,
the Karachi government already has a variety
of contacts with the Communist countries and
is likely to become more receptive to Commu-
nist offers of trade and friendship as time
goes on.12 This tendency would be intensified
12 See paragraph 45 above for discussion of eco-
nomic relations with the Bloc.
15
should Mirza's control of the government be
weakened.
62. Pakistan has thus far treated Soviet diplo-
matic overtures somewhat gingerly. How-
ever, it welcomed Mikoyan's presence at the
Independence Day ceremonies in March 1956,
and later sent a parliamentary delegation to
the USSR, partly in the hope that Moscow
might be induced to change its mind on Kash-
mir once it heard Pakistan's side of the case
and partly in order to demonstrate that its
commitments to the West did not restrict its
independence. Relations have gone further
with Communist China, with which a number
of reciprocal visits by various kinds of delega-
tions have been arranged since the Bandung
Conference. In October 1956 Prime Minister
Suhrawardy honored a twice-postponed com-
mitment by his predecessor to visit Commu-
nist China, and Chou En-lai is scheduled to
visit Pakistan in December. The Pakistanis
are especially interested in developing rela-
tions with Communist China because of the
latter's role as a rival of India for leadership
in Asia. Various of them also hope that Paki-
stan might at least in part supplant India as
a channel between Communist China and the
West. While Pakistan will probably continue
for the immediate future to cooperate with
US efforts to bar Communist China from the
UN, it will be increasingly difficult to hold in
line as time goes on.
Relations with India and Afghanistan
63. Pakistan's relations with India will almost
certainly continue to be a source of frustra-
tion to the Pakistanis, thus contributing to
internal dissatisfaction and to Pakistani mis-
givings about relations with the West. In the
wake of Pakistan's military aid deal with the
US in 1954 and the backing given India by
Bulganin and Khrushchev during their visit
to India in December 1955, the latter's atti-
tude on the all-important Kashmir issue be-
came more forthright. A number of border
incidents took place which India exploited (if
it did not actually instigate) as indications
of an increased military threat from Pakistan.
When the latter sought to regain the initia-
tive by getting the SEATO council to endorse
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194114010/011 16
settlement of the dispute by plebiscite or nego-
tiation, Nehru retaliated with a blunt state-
ment in effect repudiating India's prior com-
mitments to a plebiscite on the ground that
circumstances had changed as a result of
Pakistan's membership in the Baghdad Pact
and SEATO. Pakistan's plans to reintroduce
the matter at the UN are likely to result only
in further exacerbation of Indo-Pakistan rela-
tions, and in further demonstration of West-
ern unwillingness to take effective action
against India and of Pakistan's impotence.
There is little likelihood that any solution of
the Kashmir issue satisfactory to Pakistan Will
emerge in the foreseeable future. Moreover,
the canal waters discussions being conducted
by the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development are still stalled, and various
lesser disputes between the two parties con-
tinue. However, war between the two coun-
tries remains highly unlikely.
64. Pakistan's relations with its smaller neigh-
bor, Afghanistan, have also been highly un-
satisfactory. In the spring of 1955 Pakistan
attempted to discipline Afghanistan for con-
tinued agitation of the Pushtunistan issue 13
and for other affronts by imposing a de facto
embargo on the approximately three-fourths
of Afghan foreign trade which hitherto had
passed through Pakistan. However, Afghani-
stan promptly turned to alternate supply
routes through the USSR and, with the Bul-
ganin-Khrushchev visit of December 1955 and
the acceptance of heavy Bloc credits, in effect
accepted the USSR as a protector. In recent
months there have been moves by both sides
toward a rapprochement, culminating in a
visit by Mirza to Kabul in August 1956. There
now appears to be some chance that Afghani-
stan would be willing to reinsure itself against
" Afghanistan has persisted in agitation and
propaganda for the granting of autonomy to
Pakistan's approximately five million Pathans
(Pushtu-speaking peoples) , who are related to
the dominant Afghan tribal group. Pakistan in-
sists ? and available evidence supports the as-
sertion ? that the Pathans in Pakistan evince
little or no desire for the creation of Pushtuni-
stan. Pakistan has refused to discuss the ques-
tion with Afghanistan on the grounds that Pak-
istan's territorial integrity is involved.
overdependence on the Bloc by building up
trade and transit facilities with Pakistan, par-
ticularly if necessary construction were fi-
nanced by the US. Mirza is also hopeful that
some way can be found for persuading the
Afghans to moderate their attitude on the
Pushtunistan question.
Pakistan as an Ally
65. Pakistan will almost certainly wish to
maintain close ties with the US and to con-
tinue the US military aid program. How-
ever, the present Middle East crisis has caused
many Pakistanis to question the desirability
of continued formal association with the West
through SEATO and the Baghdad Pact and
in fact has made it uncertain whether the
latter grouping can continue in its present
form. At best, it appears likely, that Pakistan
will continue to regard SEATO as a purely
nominal organization, and will take a less
active interest in Baghdad Pact matters, at
least in the absence of US adherence and
greatly increased US support. It will almost
certainly remain unwilling to commit more
than token Pakistani military forces for use
under these treaties outside Pakistan. In
view of the present precarious domestic politi-
cal situation and the increased strength of
neutralist elements in Pakistan, it would prob-
ably be unwilling to grant military bases to
the US in peacetime.
66. Greater US political support and substan-
tially increased economic aid, which were
clearly tied to the SEATO or the Baghdad
Pact, would probably encourage greater gov-
ernmental interest in regional defense activi-
ties. Such support and aid would also give
the present regime a talking point in defend-
ing its pro-Western policies before public opin-
ion. However, unless US political support in-
cluded strong backing on the Kashmir issue,
it would be unlikely to counter effectively cur-
rent popular neutralist pressures. A sharp
reduction in US aid, on the other hand, would
probably accelerate the drift away from the
West since it would strike at the prestige of
the military and civilian leaders who have
advocated a pro-Western policy. Even if US
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aid were sharply reduced, however, most Paki-
stani leaders would probably wish to maintain
connections with the West at least as counter-
17
weights against India and as a means of in-
creasing Pakistan's bargaining power vis-a-vis
the Bloc.
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APPENDIX
SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS
A. Over the next few years, Pakistan will
remain politically unstable. However, Presi-
dent Mirza will probably continue to exercise
the dominant influence in government. The
present Mirza-Suhrawardy coalition govern-
ment will probably continue at least for the
next six months and possibly past the next
general election.
B. Pakistan will probably require a lower
annual level of economic assistance (exclusive
of military aid) in FY 1957 and 1958 than was
provided by the US in FY 1956. However,
thereafter it will probably require a substan-
tial increase and by FY 1960 be dependent on
- larger scale assistance than was granted in
FY 1956.
C. Pakistan will require continuing US
materiel and direct forces support through
the expected completion of the present mili-
tary aid program about 1959 and probably
for an indeterminate period thereafter.
D. Pakistan will almost certainly fail to
realize a substantial part of the planned de-
velopment goals by 1960 and, despite probable
18
progress in raising food grain production lev-
els, will probably remain subject to food short-
ages resulting from floods and droughts. By
1960 the annual rate of growth of the national
income may exceed three percent.
E. Despite the strain placed on Pakistan's
relations with the UK by the crisis arising
out of the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt,
we believe it unlikely that the Pakistan gov-
ernment presently plans to leave the Common-
wealth, the Baghdad Pact, or SEATO. How-
ever, it is still possible that the crisis may
develop so as to cause Pakistan's withdrawal
from the Commonwealth and these organiza-
tions.
F. At best, the Pakistan government will be
under increasing popular pressure to de-
emphasize its ties with the West; it would
probably be unwilling to grant military bases
to the US in peacetime. It will probably be in-
creasingly receptive to offers of trade and
friendship by members of the Bloc. These
trends would be accelerated if US aid were
reduced.
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POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS IN PAKISTAN
AS OF 6 NOVEMBER 1956*
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
PRESIDENT?ISKANDAR MIRZA
PRIME MINISTER?H. S. SUHRAWARDY
AWAMI LEAGUE REPUBLICAN
COALITION CABINET
VOTING STRENGTH IN
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
AWAMI
LEAGUE
16%
UNITED FRONT
19%
WEST PAKISTAN
GOVERNOR MUSHTAQ GURMANI
CHIEF MINISTER?DR KHAN SAHIB
REPUBLICAN CABINET
VOTING STRENGTH IN
PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY
310 SEATS
(5 vacant)
25681 11-56
MUSLIM
LEAGUE
15%
REPUBLICAN
PARTY
35%
HINDUS AND
INDEPENDENTS
15%
80 SEATS
(none vacant)
*These alignments orelopproximate
at best and ore subject to frequent,
often unpredictable changes.
EAST PAKISTAN
GOVERNOR?FAZLUL HUQ
CHIEF MINISTER?ATAUR RAHMAN
AWAMI LEAGUE COALITION CABINET
VOTING STRENGTH IN
PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY
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309 SEATS
(12 vacant)
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a
*
""';?4
RET
POLITICAL PARTIES AND GROUPINGS IN PAKISTAN
Pakistan lacks a well-developed and stable
party system. For the first few years of its
? existence, the Pakistani political scene was
dominated by the Muslim League, which Mo-
hammed Ali Jinnah had organized in pre-
partition days as the vehicle for the advance-
ment of Moslem interests. Other organized
groups were small and often specialized in
character; e. g., the various small groupings
representing Hindu interests in East Pakistan.
Over the course of time, other parties emerged,
notably in East Pakistan, where the corrupt
and inept Muslim League machine was sound-
ly thrashed at the polls in March 1954. Al-
though the successor parties there have had
some real grass roots support, they have re-
mained loosely organized and unstable alli-
ances of political leaders which have relied
more on the depth of popular discontent than
on the development of strong political organi-
zation to win support. The West Pakistan
political organizations are for the most part
factional groupings rather than real political
parties in the Western sense.
Brief characterizations of the more impor-
tant political parties and groupings in Paki-
stan follow.
Muslim League. For many years the gov-
ernment party ? the Muslim League still con-
tains a high proportion of Pakistan's old-line
professional politicians. Suhrawardy is the
first prime minister who has not been at least
nominally a member of this party. Since its
crushing defeat in the East Pakistan elections
of 1954, the Muslim League has become little
more than a West Pakistan party, though it
has made some efforts to make a comeback
in East Pakistan and holds 11 of the 303 seats
in the provincial assembly. Drawn from and
supported by locally entrenched conservative
interests, its present leadership has frequently
acted as spokesman for religious reactionary
elements and will probably seek to capitalize
on Moslem fanaticism on future occasions.
19
Principal leaders are Abdur Rab Nishtar, its
president, and Mian Mumtaz Daultana.
Republican Party. Founded in early 1956
by West Pakistan Chief Minister Khan Sahib,
with encouragement from provincial Gover-
nor Gurmani and President Mirza, to provide
a label under which those willing to back
these men against the Muslim League could
be rallied. Mainly made up of Muslim League
defectors and other provincial and central
government legislators who for one reason or
another were persuaded to support the Mirza
faction, it thus far lacks any real program or
organizational machinery.
United Front. A loose grouping of East
Pakistan political elements which banded to-
gether under the leadership of the octogenar-
ian Fazlul Huq, a chief minister of Bengal
before partition, to oppose the Muslim League
in the 1954 provincial elections. Since its
overwhelming electoral victory, the magni-
tude of which reflected the breadth of oppo-
sition to the Muslim League rather than
solid support for the United Front, it has had
continuing difficulties owing to its adminis-
trative ineptitude and its lack of real cohesive-
ness: a notable defection was that of the
Awami League. However, Huq (now provin-
cial governor) and other leaders still have
considerable popular appeal. The principal
United Front Components at present are:
Krishak Sramik (Workers and Peasants)
Party, Huq's own organization, and the
largest element in the United Front, with
about 70 seats in the provincial assembly.
Nizam-e-Islam Party, a reactionary group
which vigorously opposed the creation of
joint electorates in East Pakistan. Some
members have defected from the United
Front because of what they regarded as
violation of Islamic principles.
Awami League. Led by H. S. Suhrawardy,
a former chief minister of prepartition Ben-
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gal and now prime minister of Pakistan, it
has some branches in West Pakistan but is
still primarily a Bengali party. Until its as-
sumption of power in East Pakistan and
Suhrawardy's elevation to the premiership in
1956, it had been perennially in opposition.
The East Pakistan wing of the party, led by
Maulana Bashani, contains a strong leftist
element including some Communists.
Hindu Parties. The Hindu minority in East
Pakistan is represented by three parties, the
Congress Party, the Scheduled Castes Federa-
tion, and the United Progressive Party, with
a combined representation in the provincial
assembly of about 20 percent of the total.
These parties, which stand together on most
matters, are thus in a strategic position so
long as the Moslem vote is divided. Their
importance will probably decline with the
adoption of joint electorates.
20
Communist Front Parties. With the Com-
munist Party outlawed, the Ganatantri Dal
has become a principal refuge for Commu-
nists in East Pakistan. The small Azad Paki-
stan Party of the wealthy publisher Mian If-
tikharuddin is the only noteworthy front or-
ganization in West Pakistan.
Jamaat-e-Islami, the "mullah's party," is
more a pressure group than a political party.
It has no representatives in either the provin-
cial or central legislatures. However, it still
exercises considerable political influence. Its
aim is the creation of a "truly" Islamic state.
Khudai Khidmatgar (the Red Shirts) is an
organization centered in the old North West
Frontier Province which had long agitated for
greater autonomy for that area. It is now
banned. Its leader, Khan Abdul Ghaffer
Khan, is the brother of West Pakistan Chief
Minister Khan Sahib.
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