VALIDITY STUDY AND POST MORTEM ON NIE 11-4-57: MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES 1957-1962

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A008800010003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 16, 1958
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
16 Jantiary 1958
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELtIGENCE ADVISORY CONaTTEE
SUBJECT: Validity Study and Post Mortem on NIE 11-4-57:
MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES
1957-1962
1. The attached draft post mortem and validity
study have been approved by the Board of National Estimates
pursuant to consideration by the IAC representatives.
2. .These documents have been. placed on the agenda of
the IAC meeting scheduled for 10015 Tuesday, 21 January.
Distribution "A"
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_WILLIAM Pi BUND
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates
ci
STAT
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
16 January 1958
SUBJECT; POST MORTEM ON NIE: 11-4-.57'
1. In VIE 11-4-57 no in its' predecessor, NIE 11-4-56, most of
the major issues lay in the military field. The chief bone of con-
tention was the current strength and future development of the Soviet
heavy bomber and tanker force, together with the degree to which
its size and composition would be influenced by the advent of other
advanced weapon systems. Some differences of view were also en-
countered on political and economic matters.
I. FINDINGS
24 General. Our intelligence on the USSR continues to improve
gradually. The quantity of available overt information is in-
creasing as the Soviet leaders adopt a more open attitude towards
their own people on various topics, as Western contacts with both
leaders and populace increase, as the scope of statistical secrecy
is narrowed, and as the USSR achieves successes which it considers
worth bragging about. It continues to be difficult to keep abreast
of the relatively rapid pace of change, but we have at least become
accustomed to the fact of rapid change and are allowing for it in
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our analyses. Despite all this, however, the problem of intelligence
on the USSR continues to be extremely difficult because many of the
normal sources of information :are Severely restricted by continuing
strict security controla..
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5. Our estimates of Soviet foreign policy intentions continue
to depend largely on deductions from the general Soviet posture. It
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is difficult to anticipate particular maneuvers of Soviet policy
without greater knowledge of Soviet plans, and it perhaps could not
be done not even then because 'of the flexibility of current Soviet
policy. Information on Soviet relations with the European Satellites
is more plentiful, although freqUently contradictory.
6. Economic intelligence. While certain progress has been
made in the study of Soviet military expenditures, we could still
use much more information on the prices the military establishment
pays for goods and on detailed production rates, particularly for
military end items. Furthermore, a re-examination of the concepts
and techniques employed in the cost analysis is desirable. The
scope of Soviet budgetary aCcounts and the reconciliation of estimated
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military outlays with these and other Soviet material accounts also
require further information and analysis. In ?asses6ing the economic
impact of Soviet defense expenditures, we tend to use primarily a
highly aggregative measure -- the ratio of total defense expenditures
to gross national product; this should be supploraented by other
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techniques which might disclose important specific impacts. Also,
further effort should be made to refine our dollar comparison of
Soviet and US defense outlays.
7. While the new industrial organization was introduced too
recently to be evaluated fully in this estimate, its economic
effects and possible political consequences will be a major intel.,
ligence target during the coming year. In this field collection
efforts and analysis of Soviet press sources should be intensified.
8. Military intelligence. Though our data on the Soviet
waparmorg. 4cer.
military establishment remain inadequate, intelligence on current
military strengths and capabilities has improved somewhat during
the past year, both through the exploitation of new sources and the
cumulative analysis of information from continuing sources,
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9. Scientific Intelligence.
There continues to be a general
improvement and refinement of our evidence on Soviet scientific
subjects, which has been aided considerably by more frequent
Western contact with Soviet scientists and the greater' availability
of published Soviet scientific and technical reports and data. On
the whole, evidence on Soviet research and development in scientific
fields of? military significance remains fragmentary. However, in the
important fields a nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles it is
somewhat better.
II. ACTION
10. The IAC agencies are requested to:
a. Take appropriate action to overcome the intelligence
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deficiencies discussed above4
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b. Niake a speri Al effort to improve our intelligence on
Soviet research and development, production, and de-
ployment of advanced weapons systems.
c. Improve and refine our analysis of the cost and economic
impact of the Soviet military establishment, and of com-
parative US-Soviet defense outlays, in anticipation of
HIE 11-4-58.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT: VALIDITY STUDY: NIE 11-4-56
1. Since this estimate covered five year period, it is premature
to assess the validity of many of its judgpents. Viewed in an eighteen
month perspective, however, the estimate's major judgments concerning
Soviet capabilities and policies appear to have been sound. In particulat,
it correctly stressed even more than the preceding Soviet estimates, the
flexibility of the post-Stalin regime and the broad lines of Soviet
external policy. On the other hand, some of its specific appraisals
have had to be revised in producing NIE 11-4-57, and other possible
developments were insufficiently emphasized or not anticipated.
2. Internal Political Developments. NIE 11-4-56 was properly
sceptical of the stability of the top leadership., It did not anticipate
that aspect of the power struggle which involved the Party's reassertion
of its ascendancy over other elite groups, but it did point to continuing
factional diviaions personal intrigues, and policy disputes. The con-
elusion that any struggle for power would be resolved without violence
or a weakening of regime control also appears validated by the outcome
of the 1957 purges.
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3. Most of the judgments concerning other internal political
matters till appear to be sound. The estimate did not stress, however,
the growth of critical thinkin gand disaffection among Soviet students
and the intelligentsia, which more recent evidence indicates has been
taking place.
? 4. Economic Developments. Primarily because the tardets of the.
Sixth Five-Year Plan were generally regarded as feasible, NIE 11-4-56
revised, upward the rate of economic growth foreseen in its predecessor,
NIE 11-3-55, In the light of the abandonment of the Sixth Five-Year
Plan and the relatively modest goals set for 1957 and 1958 this upward
revision appears to have been too high, as was also the projection of
industrial growth. NIE 11-456 also failed to predict that a *onewhat
higher priority Would be given to consunption programs..
5. Bloc Developments. The estimate clearly erred in predicting
that the transition to a new post,etalin policy in Eastern Europe could
be completed "without serious disruption." This mistake arose primarily
from a failure to appreciate the growth and significance of disunity and
conflicting loyalties within the Polish and Hungarian Communist parties.
The aims of post-Stalin Satellite policy, however, were correctly
appreciated, as was Communist willingness to abandm liberalization
if it produced a fundamental challenge to the Connunist regimes. While
the basic unifying facto= in the Sino-Soviet.allinnce were properly
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appraised, little attention was paid to the increasing statute of Com-
munist China within the Bloc; on this point NIE 11-3-55 was a more useful
estimate.
6. Foreign Policy. The judgment that "peaceful coexistence"
would continue to characterize the Soviet approach to foreign affairs
appears to have been a valid one. The estimate correctly described the
use of the pence and anti-colonialism campaigns and of traditional
methods of diplomacy, and Soviet stress on the underdeveloped and uncom-
mitted areas. Its judgments of the Soviet position on Germany and
disarmament have been borne out. NEE 11-4-56 did not, however, fully
anticipate Soviet concentration upon the Middle East in 1957, and too great
a weight May have been given to Soviet respect for the vital nature of
Western interests in that area. Finally, NIE 11-4-56 did not foresee the
extent to which Soviet technological achievements would bolster Soviet
self-confidence and perhaps lead to more venturesome policies.
7. Military and Scientific. The validity of many of the estimates
made in the military chapters of NIE 11-4-56 cannot be adequately
tested at this time. The broad picture of Soviet military strengths
and capabilities Presented in NIE 11-4-56 appears to have been generally
valid. However, on the 7,0cloisof. evidence accumulated over the intervening
months, several important projections appear to have been in error:
(a) NIE 11-!i--56 projected a more rapid Soviet buildup in heavy bombers
than we now believe has actually occurred, and somewhat underestimated
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the number of jet medium bombers the USSR would add to its forces;
(b) the estimate predicted a much higher rate of long-range conven-
tional submarine construction for 1957 and after than actually occurred;
(c) subsequent evidence indicates that the preformance characteristics
of certain Soviet long-range bomber types were somewhat overestimated; and
and (d) new evidence leads to the conclusion that the USSR is probably
developing an IM of somewhat shorter range than estimated in NIE 11-4-56,
an that it as well as the first Soviet operational ICBM probably
will be available earlier than previously estimated. So far as concerns
manpower strengths, we now tend to believe that the bulk of the
reductions from Korean War peaks probably largely preceded rather
than followed the announcements of 1955 and 1956. In any event, we
believe that Soviet military manpower strnngths have over the past
decade varied considerably more than indicated in previous estinntes.
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