SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE CONTINENTAL US IN MID-1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A009000050001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Page Count: 53
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 15, 1957
• Content Type: SNIE

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CONP-IVENTIAL1
SNIE 1 1-6-5 7
, 1Z.i.lanuary 1957..
033573
N9 1.94
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-6-57
SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK
ON THE CONTINENTAL US IN MID-1960
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 15 January 1957. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of
Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the
Deputy Director for Intelligence, ,The Joint Staff; the Atomic
Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
CON
DocamENT NO.
NO CHANGE ;i4 CLASS.
DECLASSEFED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: H 7
ET
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per-
sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination
may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of
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b. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
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3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
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June 1953.
4. The title of this estimate, when used separately from the text, should be classified:
CONFIDENTIAL
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
DISTRIBUTION:
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM'
1
SCOPE
1
FOREWORD
1
CONCLUSIONS
2
DISCUSSION
3
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
3
Soviet Objectives
3
Implications of Soviet Efforts to Achieve Surprise
3
MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET CAPABILITIES
AGAINST THE CONTINENTAL US
4
II. AVAILABILITY OF MASS DESTRUCTION
WEAPONS
4
Nuclear Weapons
4
Radiological Warfare
4
Biological Warfare
5
Chemical Warfare
5
III. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS ? AIRCRAFT
5
Soviet Long-Range Aviation
5
Inflight Refueling
7
Base Areas
8
Other Factors Affecting Soviet Air Operations
9
Reconnaissance
9
Weather Forecasting
10
Navigation Aids
10
Electronic Countermeasures
10
Evasion of US Radar
10
Crew Training and Proficiency
10
Bombing Accuracy.
11
IV. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS ? GUIDED MISSILES.
11
Submarine-Launched Missiles
12
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
12
Air-Launched Missiles
12
NFID
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V. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS ? OTHER FORCES
Airborne and Amphibious Forces
Naval Forces
Page
. 12
12
12
PROBABLE SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES
AGAINST THE CONTINENTAL US
13
Methods of Attack
13
VI. ATTACKS BY AIRCRAFT
13
Base Areas
14
Staging
14
Weather
14
Scale of Pre-strike Preparations
15
Assumptions Underlying Estimated Intercontinental
Striking Forces
15
Maximum Strike Forces for Air Attack in Mid-1960 .
?
16
Allocation to ECM and Diversionary Tasks . .
?
16
VII. ATTACKS BY GUIDED MISSILES ..... . .
17
Submarine-Launched Missiles
17
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
17
Air-Launched Missiles
17
VIII. CLANDESTINE ATTACK
17
Clandestine Delivery of Nuclear Weapons
17
Clandestine Use of BW and CW Weapons
18
Conventional Sabotage
18
Annex A: Base Areas Suitable for Long-Range Bomber Operations
19
B: Maps and Summary Charts
22
C: Estimated Performance Characteristics of Soviet Long-
Range Bombers
23
D: Estimated Base Capacity for Staging Long-Range
Bombers (Limited Distribution Under Separate Cover)
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ICONMENT/AU
SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE
CONTINENTAL US IN MID-1960
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet gross capabilities for attack on the continental United States,
as of mid-1960. 1
SCOPE
This estimate is made for a special, limited purpose, as a direct contribution to
a study of Soviet net capabilities to attack the continental United States during the
initial, nuclear phase of a general war occurring in mid-1960. For this purpose,
Soviet initiation of general war with a nuclear attack on the continental US is as-
sumed. Moreover, this estimate does not set forth the maximum capabilities which
the USSR could acquire if it set a date for attack well in advance and determined
to maximize its capabilities for such an attack. The estimate is not intended to con-
sider all the aspects of a general war. In particular, it does not estimate the extent
to which the scale of attack on the continental US would be reduced by the alloca-
tion of Soviet resources to attack on targets in other areas. Similarly, although
reference is made to the suitability of various methods of attack in relation to the
achievement of surprise, no estimate is made of the precise extent to which the scale
of attack might be reduced if the USSR attempted to achieve surprise. 2
Because of its limited scope and special purpose, this estimate is designated a
Special National Intelligence Estimate for specially limited distribution.
FOREWORD
The problem of estimating Soviet capabilities three years or more in the future
cannot be treated exclusively in terms of present indications of how these capabil-
ities are developing. Current evidence is incomplete and sometimes even fragmen-
The term "gross capabilities" as used in this estimate means the maximum scale of attack by the
forces estimated to be available in mid-1960, taking into account operational factors but not consider-
ing combat attrition. This estimate does not set forth the maximum capabilities which the USSR
could acquire if it set a date for attack well in advance and determined to maximize its capabilities
for such an attack.
'For discussion of considerations bearing on the achievement of surprise, see paragraphs 2-4, and the
forthcoming NIE 11-3-57, "Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US through Mid-1960."
TiAt
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tary. Moreover, this estimate is more than usually difficult in that its terminal
date approximates the estimated date of emergence of a major Soviet threat in the
guided missile field. For these reasons, we are obliged to make our estimate of fu-
ture capabilities not only on the evidence at hand but also on the basis of judgments
of how Soviet leaders may assess their future general requirements.
The judgments which underlie our estimate of Soviet gross capabilities in mid-
1960 are: (a) that throughout the period of this estimate the Soviet rulers will
regard it as mandatory to strengthen their capabilities to attack the continental US,
but that they will not do so with the intention deliberately to initiate general war
at any specific date; (b) that while the Soviet rulers will consider that they will
acquire increasing guided missile capabilities throughout the period, they must rely
primarily on aircraft carrying nuclear weapons for long range attacks; and, conse-
quently, (c) that the Soviet rulers will devote a substantial effort to the production
of heavy bombers.
The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Army, the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Director of
Naval Intelligence, believe the following paragraph should be added to the FOREWORD:
While we believe these judgments provide the best basis for estimating Soviet gross capabilities in
mid-1960, the USSR might decide to devote less effort to its heavy bomber program than we have
estimated. Hence, we feel it necessary to emphasize that the gross capabilities described in this
paper are those which the USSR would have with the forces which we believe it is likely to acquire
by mid-1960, but we cannot say with confidence that these are the capabilities which it will have at
that date.
CONCLUSIONS
A. Capabilities for Air Attack. We be-
lieve that in mid-1960 the USSR would
place chief reliance in attacks on the con-
tinental US upon aircraft carrying nu-
clear weapons. In mid-1960 the USSR
will probably have about 1,500 long-range
bombers in operational units, including
about 700 BADGER jet medium bombers,
500 BISON jet heavy bombers, and 300
BEAR turboprop heavy bombers. It
will probably have developed a substantial
inflight refueling capability. Its most
powerful nuclear bombs could have yields
4 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army, believes it unlikely that
a force of this magnitude and composition will
be developed. See his footnotes to paragraph
14 of the DISCUSSION.
of at least 20 MT. Moreover, by mid-
1960, the capacity of the forward base
areas could have been increased suffi-
ciently to stage simultaneously the entire
long-range bomber and tanker force esti-
mated for that date. (Paras. 5, 14-20,
26-28, 48, 52)
B. Maximum Air Strike Force. Under
the circumstances outlined above, the
USSR in mid-1960 could launch from its
forward bases about 1,150 mission air-
craft in an initial attack, including 270
BISONS and 230 BEARS on two-way Un-
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army, does not concur in the
mid-1960 strike capabilities estimated in CON-
CLUSIONS B and C. See his footnotes to
paragraphs 14 and 62 of the DISCUSSION.
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refueled missions, 115 BISONS on two-
way refueled missions, and 535 BADG-
ERS on one-way missions. Of these
aircraft, about 910 could arrive in tar-
get areas, not considering combat losses.
(Paras. 58-62)
C. Should the USSR elect to employ
only heavy bombers in an initial strike
from forward bases, about 610 could be
launched, of which about 485 could ar-
rive in target areas. If heavy bombers
were launched from home bases, the num-
bers launched and arriving in target
areas could be about 720 and 570, re-
spectively. (Paras. 58-61, 63)
D. Guided Missile Attack. Missiles
launched from submarines probably
would be used in coordination with nu-
clear strikes by aircraft. In mid-1960,
the USSR may have available about 30
submarines equipped to launch guided
missiles, including about eight nuclear-
powered submarines. Their missiles could
probably carry high-yield nuclear war-
heads at supersonic speeds to ranges up
to 500 n.m. We believe that the earliest
possible date by which the USSR could
have a limited number of intercontinental
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
ballistic missiles (ICBM) available for
operational use is mid-1960. If available,
ICBMs would almost certainly be used
to augment attacks by manned aircraft.
Mission aircraft could employ supersonic
air-to-surface missiles of 55 n.m. range
to deliver high-yield nuclear warheads
against selected targets. (Paras. 39-43,
48, 65-68)
E. Clandestine Attack. The clandestine
delivery of nuclear and other weapons of
mass destruction might also be attempt-
ed, but we estimate that this form of at-
tack would probably be employed only
against a few selected targets. Sabotage
of certain key installations might occur
concurrently with or immediately follow-
ing the initial Soviet attacks. (Paras.
8-11, 48, 69-74)
F. The Surprise Factor. The USSR would
have to consider the advantages of the
maximum chance of surprise as against
the maximum weight of attack. An all-
out effort to maximize the chance of at-
taining surprise would force the USSR
to limit the size and type of effort it
employed in initial attacks. (Paras. 2,
63, 65, 71, 74)
DISCUSSION
Soviet Objectives
1. In conducting attacks against the conti-
nental US, the USSR would probably have
the following major military objectives:
a. To destroy or neutralize US capabilities
for nuclear retaliation; -
b. To deliver attacks on US military installa-
tions, forces, and communications in order to
prevent effective operational deployment of
US military forces; and
c. To deliver attacks on urban, industrial,
political, and psychological targets in the US
in order to reduce to the maximum extent
practicable the mobilization of US military
and industrial strengths.
Implications of Soviet Efforts to
Achieve Surprise
2. A maximum Soviet attack on the conti-
nental US, involving utilization of all or most
of the capabilities discussed in this estimate,
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would require such substantial preparations
as almost certainly to result in the loss of
surprise. If, however, the USSR attempted
to attack without warning it would probably
be forced to accept major restrictions with
respect to substantial mobilization, redeploy-
ment, or unusual movement of Soviet forces.6
Thus, the USSR would have to consider the
advantages of the maximum chance of sur-
prise as against the maximum weight of
attack.
3. In planning initial attacks on continental
US targets, the timing and strength of the
Soviet effort would be determined largely by
recognition of the need for neutralizing the
most immediate threat to Soviet security ? a
nuclear attack by US forces and Allied forces,
wherever disposed. The Soviet timetable
would almost certainly call for virtually simul-
taneous assaults on other target systems.
4. Since Soviet attacks on the continental US
would be tantamount to general war, the
USSR would have to prepare at the same
time to commit military forces against tar-
gets and areas overseas. While Soviet capa-
bilities for attacking overseas bases, forces,
and areas are outside the scope of this esti-
mate, it is pertinent that Soviet requirements
for such attacks would not only affect the
size and weight of the forces the USSR would
actually commit against the continental US,
but also the degree to which surprise could
be achieved in attacking the continental US.
In mid-1960, the USSR probably could not
count upon being able to achieve surprise
against both the continental US and US and
Allied bases and forces elsewhere.
MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET CAPABILITIES
AGAINST THE CONTINENTAL US
II. AVAILABILITY OF MASS DESTRUCTION
WEAPONS
Nuclear Weapons'
5. The USSR is continuing to give high pri-
ority to the development and production of
nuclear weapons. We estimate that the USSR
could now have nuclear bombs with yields
ranging from 0.5 KT to 10 MT. We also esti-
mate that by 1957-1958, the USSR could in-
crease the yield of its most powerful nuclear
bombs to at least 20 MT, and by mid-1960
could further increase the economy of use of
nuclear materials in these very large-yield
weapons. In addition, warheads with yields
of 500 KT or greater could be provided for
use in submarine-launched surface-to-surface
missiles and in air-to-surface missiles by 1957-
1958, and for use in ICBMs as they become
available. (For the yields of particular war-
heads, see NIE 11-2-56.)
6. Available evidence is inadequate to justify
a calculation of the probable Soviet stockpile
of nuclear weapons of various types and yields.
Within the limits of nuclear weapons tech-
nology and of fissionable materials availa-
bility, the actual stockpile developed during
the period of this estimate will be determined
by Soviet military requirements, as currently
visualized by Soviet planners and as revised
during the period.8
7. Radiological Warfare. During the period
of this estimate, it is most unlikely that the
USSR will be able to stockpile militarily sig-
nificant quantities of radioactive materials
for use in radiological warfare weapons. How-
ever, the USSR will possess nuclear weapons
For extended discussion of the problem of achiev-
ing surprise, see NIE 11-6-55, "Probable Intelli-
gence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US
Through Mid-1958," published 1 July 1955. This
paper will be superseded by the forthcoming
NIE 11-3-57, covering the period through mid-
1960.
For details, see NIE 11-2-56, "The Soviet Atomic
Energy Program," published 8 June 1956 (Limited
Distribution) . This paper will be superseded in
early 1957 by NIE 11-2-57.
Arbitrary future stockpiles based on various
assumptions are presented in NIE 11-2-56.
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capable of producing widespread radioactive
fall-out, and these weapons could be used pri-
marily for that purpose.
Biological Warfare
8. Relatively little is known about the nature
and magnitude of the Soviet BW program)
particularly its offensive aspects. However,
accumulated evidence shows that the USSR
almost certainly has an active BW research
and development program encompassing anti-
personnel, antilivestock, and possibly anti-
crop agents. The causative organisms of at
least four human diseases (anthrax, tulare-
mia, plague, brucellosis) and of two animal
diseases (foot-and-mouth disease, rinder-
pest) are believed to be under consideration as
BW agents.
9. Based on a general appreciation of Soviet
capabilities in this field, we estimate that in
mid-1960 the USSR could be prepared to dis-
seminate BW agents both covertly and overt-
ly. The USSR already has the capability for
clandestine BW attack against personnel in
buildings or concentrated in relatively small
areas, and for such attack against livestock
and certain crops. The small amounts of BW
agents required could be introduced into the
US clandestinely or, in some cases, produced
near the sites of their planned employment.
They could be employed by saboteurs using a
wide variety of disseminating devices, some of
which could be procured locally. We believe
covert BW attack could be highly effective
against livestock and moderately effective
against humans and crops. With regard to
overt delivery, relatively large quantities of
BW agents would probably be required. So-
viet capabilities for this means of attack
would therefore be limited by the infeasibility
of stockpiling large quantities of most BW
agents in prolonged storage.
Chemical Warfare
10. The USSR has a well-established CW re-
search and development program, which we
believe emphasizes the development of nerve
agents. In addition to agents of the tabun
and sarin types, the USSR is believed to be
working on the more persistent, extremely
lethal nerve agents of the "V" series as well
as agents having psychogenic effects.
11. The Soviet stockpile of standard CW
agents, in bulk and in munitions, is esti-
mated to have been 140,000 metric tons at
the end of World War II. Although there is
no direct evidence that the USSR is current-
ly engaged in large-scale production of CW
agents, a stockpile of a similar magnitude
probably represents the minimum which the
USSR maintains in peacetime. Losses caused
by deterioration and in reloading into newer
- munitions in the intervening period have prob-
ably been made up with nerve gases. By 1960,
the Soviet CW stockpile will probably consist
mainly of nerve gases, including limited quan-
tities of "V" agents.
12. We have no firm evidence of Soviet CW
munitions development since World War II,
when the USSR had munitions suitable for
delivery by both ground weapons and aircraft
flying at speeds up to about 250 knots. The
USSR is probably developing spray tanks,
bombs, and unfuzed containers for use by
higher speed aircraft. We believe the USSR
is technically capable of modifying its present
bomb and warhead designs to permit the
delivery of CW agents by jet aircraft and by
certain guided missiles.
III. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS ?
AIRCRAFT
Soviet Long-Range Aviation
13. As of 1 October 1956, Soviet Long-Range
Aviation is estimated to have been composed
of 61 bomber regiments with an actual
strength of 1,405 bomber aircraft in operation-
al units: i. e., 745 BULL piston medium bomb-
ers, 585 BADGER jet medium bombers, 40
BISON jet heavy bombers, and 35 BEAR turbo-
prop heavy bombers.9 We have no evidence
'The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army, does not believe that the
available evidence warrants the above estimate
of the number of BULL bombers (745), the
total number of bombers (1,405) , or the num-
ber of regiments (61) , in Soviet Long-Range
Aviation.
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of any tanker aircraft in operational units at
present." All Long-Range Aviation units are
based in the European USSR except the Third
Long-Range Air Army, which is in the Soviet
Far East and has an estimated actual strength
of 220 BULLS and 25 BADGERS.
14. We estimate that in mid-1960 Soviet Long-
Range Aviation will -probably comprise 56
bomber regiments and a tanker force possibly
equivalent to 15 regiments.1112 The bomber
force will probably consist of some 1,500 air-
craft, including 700 BADGERS, 500 BISONS,
and 300 BEARS.13 Evidence in support of
this estimate is found in: (a) the rapid in-
crease in the number of Long-Range Aviation
regiments from 48 in January 1956 to 61 in
October 1956; (b) the trend toward replace-
ment of BULLS by more modern aircraft
since 1954; (c) the apparent intent to build
up a heavy bomber force implicit in the devel-
opment of BISON and BEAR aircraft and
their introduction into operational units, now
in an early stage; and (d) current indications
of the development of an inflight refueling
capability.
15. The foregoing estimate of the size and
composition of Soviet Long-Range Aviation
10
12
51 Discussion of tanker strength will be found in
paragraphs 18-21.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army, does not concur in the
numbers of regiments shown in this sentence.
While some tanker regiments or their equivalent
in smaller units will probably be included in
Soviet Long-Range Aviation by mid-1960, there
is in his opinion no adequate evidence to in-
dicate that the total of bomber and tanker
regiments will be in excess of previously esti-
mated bomber regiments. Some or all of the
bomber regiments which may have been formed
in addition to the 48 held as of 1 January 1956
may be destined to become tanker regiments.
In this case, many of the tanker regiments
estimated to be in existence in mid-1960 would
be included in a 56 regiment level. It would not
seem justifiable to estimate an additional 15
regiments, over and above recent increases
which may represent the initial phases of the
formation of tanker regiments.
" The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army, does not concur in the
estimate of the mid-1960 heavy bomber strength
(500 BISON and 300 BEAR) presented in this
is subject to all the uncertainties implicit in
any estimate of a situation to be expected
three years in the future. However, it is con-
sistent, not only with the considerations enu-
merated in the preceding paragraph, but also
with estimated Soviet strategic requirements
for high-performance, long-range bombers in
the event of general war, including require-
ments for nuclear air attack on the continen-
tal US. It is also within estimated Soviet air-
craft production capabilities, although the
proportion of aircraft production facilities as-
signed to heavy bomber production would
have to be increased. We believe it unlikely
that the USSR will curtail its heavy bomber
force at least until it has achieved a substan-
tial operational capability with an intercon-
tinental ballistic missile. Such a capability
almost certainly will not be achieved during
the period of this estimate.
16. Soviet Long-Range Aviation will probably
continue with its present aircraft types
throughout the period. An improved model
of the BISON is probably now becoming avail-
able, and improved versions of both the BEAR
sentence. The presently estimated 1 October
1956 force level of 40 BISON would have to be
increased at an average rate of more than 10
per month to achieve this level while present
evidence indicates that production is continuing
at about two to three per month, a rate which
has remained roughly constant for some time.
Achievement of the above force level would
require that additional facilities presently pro-
ducing other aircraft would have to be devoted
to BISON production in the near future and that
all factories achieve optimum or near optimum
production rates. An increase in the produc-
tion rate of BEAR aircraft would also have to
be achieved since continuation of the present
production rate would not achieve this force
level. While it is possible that some increase
in production may be planned and achieved,
?a more realistic estimate of the mid-1960 heavy
bomber force level should be somewhat lower.
To properly reflect the uncertainties inherent
in this estimate heavy bomber strength should
be stated as a bracket between the force which
a continuation of present production would
achieve and the optimum force level shown in
paragraph 14. Such a bracket would indicate
the following mid-1960 heavy bomber force level:
BISON: from 180 to 500
BEAR : from 240 to 300
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and the BADGER will probably appear in
1957.'4 At current rates of introduction into
operational units, Long-Range Aviation will
have achieved its full estimated complement
of BADGERS by mid-1957; continued produc-
tion at present rates could provide an appre-
ciable reserve of BADGERS by the end of the
period. BULLS will probably have been en-
tirely phased out of long-range bomber units
by mid-1959; serviceable BULLS surplus to
the needs of Long-Range Aviation will be
available for some time for a variety of uses.
Inflight Refueling
17. We now have good evidence that the USSR
is developing an inflight refueling system, and
we believe that during the period of this esti-
mate it will achieve a substantial inflight re-
fueling capability. Soviet planners have al-
most certainly recognized the potentiality of
inflight refueling to overcome to some extent
the geographic disadvantage they face in the
application of their strategic air power against
the continental US. On the basis of compara-
tive speed and altitude capabilities of Soviet
long-range aircraft, and of their comparative
capabilities to reach US targets on refueled
and unrefueled missions from Soviet bases,
we believe Soviet planners will seek to provide
a refueling capability primarily for BISON air-
craft. One refueling by a compatible tank-
er 15 could approximately double the area of
the continental US that could be reached by
an improved BISON on a two-way mission
from Chukotski. The BEAR's greater combat
radius would make refueling less essential to
its operations, although its capabilities to
reach targets in continental US from interior
Soviet bases could be increased substantially
by this means. Refueling would increase
BADGER' capabilities to reach targets in the
" For estimated performance characteristic of So-
viet long-range bombers, see Annex C.
" As used in this estimate, "compatible" means
having characteristics of speed and altitude
suitable to the bomber employed, and a transfer
capability sufficient to add 35 percent to the
range of the refueled bomber.
" For refueled and unrefueled coverage of con-
tinental US, see Annex B, Maps and Summary
Charts.
continental US, but against most targets
would still not make two-way BADGER opera-
tions possible."6
18. We therefore believe that during the
period of this estimate the USSR's chief re-
quirement for tanker aircraft would stem
from the desirability of refueling a substan-
tial number of its BISONS. To provide rea-
sonably flexible support for a force of 500
BISON bombers, some 350 compatible tank-
ers would be required. To meet this require-
ment, the USSR could employ one or a com-
bination of the following alternatives: (a) pro-
duce BISON tankers; (b) produce BEAR tank-
ers; (c) develop and produce a new heavy air-
craft designed specifically as a tanker. BI-
SONS and BEARS could be used as converti-
ble tanker-bombers by employing bomb-bay
tanks, but such tankers would not be fully
compatible insofar as range extension is con-
cerned.
19. We know of no tanker production or tank-
ers in operational units in the USSR at pres-
ent. By mid-1960, the USSR could acquire
350 heavy tankers as well as a bomber force
of the size estimated in paragraph 14. How-
ever, in order to do so, it would in the
near future have either to increase production
rates at facilities which we estimate will be
in the heavy bomber program, or to open
additional production facilities. We doubt
that the USSR will produce as many as 350
heavy tankers during the period of this esti-
mate, in view of the probability that the
bomber program will have priority over the
tanker program, and the fact that to produce
the estimated number of heavy bombers will
itself require an early increase in the facili-
ties allocated to the heavy bomber production
program (see paragraph 15) .17
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army, considers that aircraft
production programs in the USSR are probably
geared to the achievement of an inflight refuel-
ing capability compatible with its bomber force
by 1960, and that the requirement for tankers
is one of a number of factors which would
militate against the production of a bomber
force of 500 BISONS and 300 BEARS as fore-
cast in paragraph 14. The size of the tanker
force, therefore, is subject to the same elements
of uncertainty which attend bomber strength
(see his footnote to paragraph 14) .
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20. Therefore, we estimate that in mid-1960
the USSR will be building toward, but will
probably not have achieved, a force of 350
heavy tankers. We believe that, without in-
terfering with currently estimated Soviet
bomber production programs, the USSR could,
by mid-1960, have a force of some 150 heavy
tankers. This could be accomplished by con-
tinuing the production of BEAR type aircraft
at existing facilities.17
(See footnote, page 7.)
21. The USSR could develop a BADGER tank-
er force as an interim measure, for the. pur-
pose of increasing the range of some BISON
bombers for which compatible tankers were
not available. Refueling by a BADGER tank-
er could increase the radius of a BISON by
some 500 n.m., and the range by some 1,000
n.m., although the net gain in radius/range
in any particular operation would be limited
by the route flown and refueling point em-
ployed. In addition, BADGER tankers could
be employed as compatible tankers for BADG-
ER bombers.
Base Areas
22. We estimate that there are some 525 oper-
ational airfields in the Sino-Soviet Bloc with
permanent surfaced runways of 5,000 'feet or
longer. They are distributed as follows:
(Minimum Runway Length (feet)
9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
Total
USSR
9
39
19
167
44
278
European
Satellites
2
47
45
36
1
131
Asiatic Commu-
nist Countries
7
7
23
54
32
116
11
93
87
257
77
525
23. Given standard conditions," we estimate
take-off distances for Soviet long-range bomb-
ers as follows:
18 Normal take-off technique and take-off engine
power, no wind, sea level elevation, temperature
59 degrees F., permanent surfaced runway. At
0 degrees F., ground run requirements for take-
off of jet bombers would be about 25 percent
less than under standard conditions. Ground
run requirements for propeller-driven bombers
would also be reduced, but the difference would
not be as great as for jet bombers.
Take-off
Weight
Type (lbs.)
BULL 140,000
BULL
(modified) 135,750
BADGER 150,000
BADGER
(improved) 170,000
BISON 365,000
BISON
(improved) 365,000
BEAR 300,000
BEAR
(improved)
Ground Ground Run
Run to Clear 50-ft.
(ft.) Obstacle (ft.)
5,230 7,825
4,800 7,125
4,200 6,300
4,800 7,100
6,400 9,100
5,300 8,200
6,000 9,000
no data
available
24. There are approximately 27 airfields in
the USSR believed to be home bases for oper-
ational Long-Range Aviation bomber units,
three in the Far East, and the remainder in
the European USSR. In addition, a number
of airfields associated with command and/or
training units, factory production and deliv-
ery, and testing and development are in effect
an integral part of the base structure of Soviet
Long-Range Aviation. As indicated by the
table in paragraph 22, many other airfields
in the Sino-Soviet Bloc have runways suitable
for medium bomber operations and some have
runways suitable for heavy bombers. These
airfields could be used as auxiliary airfields to
insure maximum aircraft dispersal away from
home bases, but the actual designation of
such auxiliary fields within the Soviet Long-
Range Aviation base structure cannot be veri-
fied. Physical limitations on dispersal, and
probable requirements for limiting ground
stay to a minimum, would make dispersal and
revetment at forward staging bases in the
Arctic unlikely.
25. We estimate that Soviet planners are now
developing air facilities to meet their antici-
pated requirements for the next 10 years
or more. Progressive extension of runways at
Long-Range Aviation home bases from cur-
rent 8,200-foot lengths to 9,000 feet or more
is believed to be under way. In the case of
new runway construction at bases, it is esti-
mated that weight-bearing capacities are be-
ing made adequate for heavy bombers of all
types programmed, and that runway lengths
will generally exceed 11,000 feet.
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26. Because of the range limitations of avail-
able Soviet bombers, the launching of strikes
against the continental US at present would
probably involve staging through one or more
of five base areas within the USSR ? the Chu-
kotski Peninsula, the Kamchatka Peninsula,
the Central Arctic area, the Kola Peninsula,
and the Leningrad area. (If overflight of
Scandinavia were to be avoided in an initial
strike from Leningrad, a dog-leg route over
the Kola area would be necessary.) For pur-
poses of this estimate, these five potential
staging areas are designated "forward" base
areas.19 In each of these areas, airfields suit-
able for long-range bombers exist, although
the Leningrad area is the only one of the
five now occupied by units of Long-Range
Aviation. Bases in East Germany and Poland
could also be used, but because of the likeli-
hood that surprise would be sacrificed by the
necessity of overflying West Europe, as well
as the lower security of preparations in the
Satellites and vulnerability to NATO forces,
this area would not be a likely choice for stag-
ing initial strikes against the continental US.
27. Air base development over the past few
years in the forward base areas has improved
the capability of these areas for supporting
long-range bomber staging operations. In
the Kamchatka, Kola, Chukotski, and Central
Arctic areas, there are now 29 airfields with
runways long enough to accommodate Soviet
long-range bombers.29 Information is incom-
plete concerning load-bearing capacity, air-
craft servicing, maintenance, storage, and per-
sonnel facilities at almost all of these airfields,
but we estimate that 10 could stage either
medium or heavy bombers, and that 19 others
could stage medium bombers. In addition,
there are at least 23 airfields in the Leningrad
area capable of staging medium bombers, of
which three are present home bases of Long-
Range Aviation, capable of staging heavy
bombers. In summary, we estimate that, for
" Annex A and D (the latter in limited distribu-
tion under separate cover) cover air facilities,
weather conditions, and airfield capacities in
these base areas.
"In addition, there are eight airfields whose run-
way characteristics indicate a marginal capa-
bility for long-range bomber operations.
purposes of Long-Range Aviation operations
against the continental US, there are avail-
able in the five forward base areas 52 airfields
capable of staging medium bombers, of which
13 are also capable of staging heavy bombers.
28. There are indications that airfield devel-
opment in the forward base areas is contin-
uing, and it is within Soviet capabilities to
have developed adequate facilities for sus-
tained long-range bomber operations in any
of these areas by 1960. We believe that run-
ways are being developed with length, sur-
face, and weight-bearing standards similar to
those at Soviet Long-Range Aviation home
bases. We estimate that by 1960, with the
construction facilities and personnel now in
the area concerned, three new airfields suit-
able for heavy bomber staging operations
could be developed in the Kola area, three in
the Leningrad area, and two each in the Chu-
kotski, Central Arctic, and Kamchatka areas.
Improvement of support facilities at existing
potential staging bases in these areas could
be carried out concurrently without major
interference with the construction effort.
29. In each of the forward areas there are
bases, in addition to those considered suit-
able for staging long-range bombers, which
could be utilized for the fighter aircraft which
the USSR would also require in any opera-
tion conducted from these areas. In certain
forward areas there are only a few such addi-
tional bases at present. If necessary, by mid-
1960 the USSR could provide additional facili-
ties for fighter protection of its long-range
bomber staging bases, and for surface-to-air
missile defenses.
Other Factors Affecting Soviet
Air Operations
30. Reconnaissance. The USSR is not known
to have developed long-range reconnaissance
aircraft as such. It is possible that during
the interval between now and mid-1960 the
USSR, employing existing long-range bomber
types, might build up a pattern of activity
along the early warning lines of the North
American continent, not only to determine
their location, capabilities, and vulnerabili-
ties, but also to increase the problem of recog-
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nizing the approach of an actual attack. It
is unlikely that the USSR would jeopardize
surprise by unusual reconnaissance activity
immediately preceding an actual attack.
31. Weather Forecasting. The USSR has for
years devoted considerable effort, with a high
degree of success, to both short-period and
long-period meteorological forecasting. We
believe that it has the forecasting capability
to support long-range air operations. This
capability plus extensive experience in me-
teorological research in the extreme northern
latitudes, weather reporting facilities in Si-
beria and on ice floes in the Central Arctic
basin, and constant access to regularly broad-
cast North American weather reports and
forecasts should enable the USSR to predict
both route and target weather with reasonable
accuracy.
32. Navigation Aids. The USSR has available
through open sources virtually complete tar-
get and navigation data on North America
and its approach routes. It is probable that
in the event of a surprise attack certain West-
ern electronic navigational aids would be
available during at least part of the flight.
For example, meteorological reports are regu-
larly broadcast in the United States and Can-
ada. It is also possible that clandestinely-
placed navigational beacons might be used
for aircraft homing. We estimate that Soviet
navigational radar equipment is capable of
better performance than the US World War II
equipment which the USSR acquired.
33. Electronic Countermeasures (ECM)
a. Soviet Offensive Capabilities. Soviet
ECM development is rapidly approaching, if
it has not already reached, the point at which
ECM will constitute a major threat to US air
defense capabilities. Within the past year or
so the USSR has entered actively into devel-
oping techniques for the tactical employment
of CHAFF. We have evidence that CHAFF
has been used in training exercises against
Soviet ground-based radars, and we estimate
that CHAFF would be widely used in a Soviet
air attack. In addition, we estimate that
Soviet capabilities for airborne jamming of
both communications facilities and radar will
materially increase during the period. The
USSR has conducted some jamming training
exercises against its own airborne radars, and
we believe that active airborne jamming would
be used against US radar, communications,
and navigation facilities in the event of Soviet
attacks in mid-1960. However, even in 1960
Soviet active airborne jammers for use against
radars at frequencies above the X-band will
probably be limited in quantity. We have no
evidence of Soviet use of decoys, or of the
modification of aircraft specifically for ECM
use, although we consider both to be within
Soviet capabilities.
b. Vulnerabilities. The concentration of all
known Soviet blind-bombing and Al radars
in the narrow frequency band 9,250-9,500
Mc/s increases the vulnerability of this equip-
ment to ECM. The circuits of the only Soviet
microwave radar studied in detail, the ship-
borne NEPTUNE, indicate that it is vulnerable
to ECM and interference. Although such vul-
nerability may not extend to all airborne
radars, it probably applies to at least some
earlier sets, especially the MUSHROOM. Pas-
sive ECM receivers and radiation control are
probably in use as anti-ECM techniques at
present, but we believe the vulnerabilities out-
lined above will continue to exist for some
time. However, Soviet airborne radar will
eventually employ greater frequency spread-
ing, and antijamming techniques employing
the switch-tuning of magnetrons and klys-
trons to effect rapid changes in frequency
may be under development.
34. Evasion of US Radar. The USSR almost
certainly knows at least the general capabili-
ties of US early warning radar equipment,
coverage provided by the network, and weak
and strong points of the system. With such
knowledge it might expect that properly
planned attacks could reduce the chance of
detection by US radar. However, the use of
some evasion techniques, particularly low
altitude penetration, would require acceptance
of reduced range or bomb load.
35. Crew Training and Proficiency. Flight
training for Long-Range Aviation crews has
increased in both intensity and scope during
the past five years, especially since 1954, when
jet bombers began to be introduced into the
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long-range bomber force. At present, we esti-
mate that long-range bomber crews average
at least 15-20 hours of flying time per month.
The regular training program emphasizes the
attainment of navigational and bombing pro-
ficiency during the hours of darkness and in
bad weather. A 1955 manual for Soviet navi-
gator-bombardiers indicates that they are re-
quired to achieve proficiency in the use of
magnetic compass, pilotage, radio, celestial,
and radar navigation techniques. They also
probably receive extensive training in the utili-
zation of ground-based electronic navigation
aids, such as Shoran, direction-finding and
distance-measuring equipment, and hyper-
bolic navigation systems. We estimate that
the capabilities of Long-Range Aviation crews
for landing and take-off under instrument
flight conditions compare favorably with those
achieved in the USAF.
36. The current trend in Long-Range Aviation
training is believed to be toward larger-scale
operations and longer-range flights out of
home base areas, including bomber operations
into and over the Arctic areas as well as simu-
lated attacks on major Soviet cities. Last
summer a large-scale temporary deployment
of medium and heavy bombers was apparent-
ly conducted into the Satellites, probably to
test the capabilities of the units involved to
stage into and operate from forward areas.
Considerable over-water flying has been un-
dertaken during the past five years.
37. The current state of training in Soviet
Long-Range Aviation leads us to estimate
that at present the mounting of an initial
attack against the continental US utilizing
the bulk of the long-range bomber force would
require several months of intensive prepara-
tory training. However, a reduced scale of
attack, still sufficient to deliver a devastating
blow upon the US, could currently be mounted
with a minimum of pre-strike preparatory
activity. The current training program points
to continuing improvement in air crew pro-
ficiency. Moreover, past Soviet personnel
practices, which insure relatively little turn-
over in personnel over the years, indicate that
improvements in proficiency will be cumu-
lative during the period of this estimate.
TOP
Therefore, the over-all proficiency of Long-
Range Aviation crews will almost certainly be
much higher by mid-1960.
38. Bombing Accuracy. By mid-1960, most
Soviet long-range bomber crews will probably
have achieved the following levels of bombing
proficiency:
Altitude
(ft.)
Visual
Bombing
CEP Radar Bombing
(ft.) CEP (ft.)
Well-
defined
targets
Poorly-
defined
targets
50,000
2,900
2,400
3,100
40,000
2,100
2,000
2,700
30,000
1,400
1,700
2,300
20,000
900
1,400
2,100
10,000
400
900
1,600
5,000
800
1,400
IV. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS ?
GUIDED MISSILES 21
39. We have no firm evidence that the USSR
now has any offensive guided missiles avail-
able for operational employment against the
continental US, although we believe that em-
ployment of missiles launched from aircraft
or submarines is within present Soviet capa-
bilities. We estimate that for some time after
a particular missile system becomes opera-
tional, its system reliability 22 will probably
be about 40-60 percent. By 1960 the reliabili-
ties of earlier Soviet missile systems will al-
most certainly have been improved. In mid-
1960 the USSR will probably have operational
stockpiles of several types of missiles with
nuclear warheads suitable for launching from
submarines or aircraft in an attack on the
continental US.
" For a detailed study see the forthcoming NIE
11-5-57, "Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities and
Probable Programs."
22 System reliability refers to the percentage of
missiles which will function according to speci-
fications from the launching area to detonation
in the target area.
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Submarine-Launched Missiles
40. We estimate that any of the present Soviet
long-range submarine types could be equipped
to carry one to two guided missiles in topside
stowage. The USSR could construct nuclear-
powered submarines or conventional-powered
submarines, about the size of the present Z
class, to accommodate internally four missiles
each of the size and weight of the Regulus I.
41. We estimate that Soviet turbojet missiles
of the Regulus I type could have been avail-
able for launching from submarines since
1955. These missiles could have a maximum
range of 500 n.m., with a high subsonic speed
capability. A supersonic version could be
available in 1957. Low-yield nuclear warheads
could be employed at present and high-yield
warheads beginning in 1957-1958. At pres-
ent, with radar track-radio command guid-
ance, a CEP of 0.5 n.m. could be achieved by
employing a guidance submarine within 100
n.m. of the target, and a CEP of 1.0 n.m. could
be achieved with a guidance submarine up to
200 n.m. from the target, assuming accurate
positioning of the submarine. We estimate
that by 1960 a CEP of 1-2 n.m. could be
achieved at maximum missile range by em-
ploying an inertial guidance system supple-
mented by radar map-matching. By mid-
1960, the USSR could have sufficient super-
sonic 500 n.m. turbojet missiles to equip the
number of missile-launching submarines esti-
mated in paragraph 45. We do not believe
that the USSR is capable of developing sig-
nificantly advanced submarine-launched mis-
sile systems, such as a submarine-launched
IRBM, during the period of this estimate.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)
42. We estimate that at some time in the
period 1960-1961 the USSR could achieve an
initial operational capability with an ICBM
with a 5,500 n.m. maximum range, a high-
yield nuclear warhead, and a CEP of 5 n.m.
We believe that the high priority the USSR
would almost certainly assign to this missile
system would dictate equipping the first oper-
ational unit with prototype weapons simul-
taneously with the decision to initiate series
production. If the USSR succeeded in achiev-
ing an initial operational capability at the
earliest time estimated (i. e., the beginning of
the 1960-1961 time period) , and simultaneous-
ly initiated series production, we believe that
in mid-1960 it could have a stockpile of up to
25 ICBMs.
Air-Launched Missiles
43. The USSR is now technically capable of
attacking targets with rocket-propelled glide
bombs of 20 n.m. maximum range, launched
from long-range aircraft and fitted with low-
yield nuclear warheads. We estimate that
air-to-surface missiles capable of carrying
nuclear warheads to a maximum range of 55
n.m. could be placed in operation as follows:
a subsonic interim version in 1956-1957 and
a supersonic version in 1958. This missile
would probably be equipped with semiactive
homing guidance, and achieve a CEP of about
150 feet against ships or other well-defined
radar targets. Beginning in 1957-1958, high-
yield nuclear warheads could be employed.
By mid-1960 the USSR could have a sufficient
number of supersonic air-to-surface missiles
of 55 n.m. range to meet the requirements of
the attack described in paragraph 62.
V. WEAPONS DELIVERY SYSTEMS ?
OTHER FORCES
Airborne and Amphibious Forces
44. The USSR has considerable airborne and
amphibious forces which could be used to
attack certain US overseas bases and Alaska.
Its capabilities for both these types of opera-
tion are insufficient to make them a threat
against continental US.
Naval Forces
45. The USSR's large surface naval force,
lacking aircraft carriers, is unsuited for
transoceanic naval operations on any sig-
nificant scale. On the other hand, the large
and increasing Soviet submarine force is capa-
ble of carrying out large-scale operations off
the US coasts. However, only those subma-
rines capable of launching guided missiles
could attack targets within the continental
US. Although the evidence pointing to the
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existence of Soviet guided missile submarines
is not conclusive, we believe that the USSR
intends to produce submarines of this type
during the period. However, we have no evi-
dence to indicate how many it plans to con-
struct or convert by mid-1960. We estimate
that the USSR could now have about 10
guided missile submarines, all of which would
probably be converted boats with topside stow-
age. We believe that by mid-1960, the USSR
may have an additional 20 guided missile
submarines with internal stowage, of which
about eight could be nuclear-powered.
46. Although we have no firm evidence that
the USSR has a nuclear-powered submarine,
there is reason to believe that a program for
development of such a submarine has reached
an advanced stage. The state of power reactor
developments in the USSR is such that an
atomic submarine could be in operation well
before 1960. We estimate that by mid-1960
the USSR could have up to 10 atomic reactors
installed in submarines if it is willing to adopt
a relatively simple, standardized design. If
13
emphasis were placed on improving designs,
it is probable that no more than five atomic
reactors for submarines would be built dur-
ing the period. Nuclear-powered submarines
would probably be capable of surfaced and
submerged speeds of about 18 and 24 knots
respectively, submerged endurance of 30 days
or more, and cruising ranges at full speed in
excess of 25,000 nautical miles.
47. The capability of the Soviet submarine
force will probably be improved by a limited
modernization of older types, including the
installation of snorkel. Intelligence is lack-
ing on a number of other factors essential to
the development of an effective submarine
force, such as mobile and permanent logistical
support and the operating efficiency of the
force, which is probably still inferior to that
of US and German forces in World War II.
There is, however, evidence of increased long-
range patrolling activity, and intensified
training of this and other types will probably
raise performance standards during the period
of this estimate.
PROBABLE SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES AGAINST
THE CONTINENTAL US
Methods of Attack
48. We believe that in mid-1960 the USSR
would place chief reliance in attacks on the
continental US upon aircraft carrying nuclear
weapons. ICBMs, if available in mid-1960,
would almost certainly be used to augment
attacks by manned aircraft, but not to replace
any mission aircraft. Missiles launched from
submarines probably would be used in coordi-
nation with nuclear strikes by aircraft. Clan-
destine delivery of nuclear and other weapons
of mass destruction might also be attempted,
but we estimate that this form of attack
would probably be employed only against a
few selected targets. Sabotage of certain key
installations might occur concurrently with
or immediately following the initial attacks.
VI. ATTACKS BY AIRCRAFT
49. Present Soviet capabilities for air attack
on the continental US are restricted by the
relatively small numbers of operational heavy
bombers, the limited availability of megaton-
yield nuclear weapons, the status of support
facilities at Arctic bases, and the probable
lack of a substantial inflight refueling capa-
bility. Improved aircrew proficiency, further
improvement of Arctic bases, development of
a substantial operational inflight refueling
capability, and production of larger numbers
of megaton-yield weapons and heavy bombers,
all of which we believe will be realized, would
result in a considerable increase in Soviet
capabilities for attack on the continental US
by mid-1960.
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50. During the early part of the period of
this estimate, the BULL and the BADGER
would be the principal aircraft available for
attack on the continental US. In the latter
part of the period, the USSR would almost
certainly place chief reliance on the BISON
and the BEAR for such attacks, with the
BADGER playing a secondary role.
51. Without inflight refueling the BULL
(maps 1-4) 23 would be unable to reach tar-
gets in the US on two-way missions even
from forward bases unless it were modified, 24
in which case it could reach the Seattle area.
The modified BULL could, without inflight re-
fueling, reach all of the US on a one-way mis-
sion from Chukotski. The current BADGER
would require inflight refueling in order to
cover most of the important target areas in
the US, even on one-way missions from for-
ward bases, but an improved BADGER (see
maps 5-8) , which we estimate will be avail-
able in 1957, could carry out these one-way
missions without inflight refueling. Two-way
BADGER operations would be limited to
northwestern US targets, even with refuel-
ing. In order to reach all targets in the US
with the BISON (see maps 9-12, 17, 18) , the
USSR would have to employ one-way mis-
sions. However, on two-way refueled mis-
sions from forward bases, the improved BISON
could reach targets in much of the western
and northern portions of the US. The BEAR
(see maps 13-16, 19, 20) , if launched from
the Chukotski Peninsula, could reach almost
all of the US on two-way unrefueled mis-
sions, but from interior bases could reach
only a small portion of the US. On two-way
refueled missions, the BEAR could cover the
entire US from forward bases and most of
the US from interior bases.
Base Areas
52. We estimate that there are now 52 air-
fields in the forward base areas capable of
staging long-range bombers, and that the
USSR will continue to improve its forward
base structure during the period of this esti-
mate. By mid-1960, the capacity of the for-
ward base areas could have been increased
sufficiently to stage simultaneously the entire
long-range bomber and tanker force estimated
for that date.
53. Staging. About a 10-hour flight would
be required to move BULL aircraft from Far
East home bases to Chukotski area bases, and
about three to five hours from Western USSR
bases to the Kola Peninsula. Flying times
for BADGER, BISON, and BEAR aircraft
would be about half as long. The USSR is
fully capable of developing servicing and fuel
storage and transfer facilities at its forward
bases, if these facilities are not already avail-
able. For example, we believe the USSR has
a fuel truck with a capacity of 6,000 gallons
and a pumping rate of 240 gallons per minute.
We estimate that, when BISON and BEAR
bombers appear in service in large numbers,
the USSR will have ground refueling equip-
ment more compatible with the requirements
of these aircraft. In order to service large
numbers of long-range bomber aircraft at
staging bases in forward areas, it would prob-
ably be necessary to increase present stocks
of POL and servicing equipment and to estab-
lish or increase weapons stockpiles at these
bases.
54. Weather. Weather and climatic condi-
tions in the far northern staging areas would
have a considerable impact on the timing and
magnitude of attacks on the US.25 During
cold weather, requirements for high-speed
refueling and heated shelter space for mainte-
nance are among the critical problems which
would be magnified as the numbers and size
of aircraft increased. Moreover, the coordi-
nated launching of a large-scale strike force
comprising elements from widely separated
base areas would probably be further compli-
cated by varying weather conditions at the
different bases. Cold weather problems would,
however, be less critical with jet than with
piston aircraft.
23 The maps and summary charts in Annex B
show ranges of which the various Soviet air-
craft operating from various bases would be
capable in attacks against continental US.
E. g., stripped and altered for longer range in
a manner similar to the US B 29B.
2" See Annex A for an account of weather condi-
tions in the various base areas.
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55. The USSR has demonstrated that it can
effectively operate aircraft under extreme cold
weather conditions. In addition, aircraft per-
formance is improved by low ground temper-
atures in Arctic areas, since the higher den-
sity of cold air increases engine thrust and
airfoil lift so that take-off distance may be
reduced or maximum gross take-off weights
increased. For example, at 0 degrees F. the
ground run requirement for take-off of jet
bombers would be about 25 percent less than
under standard conditions (see paragraph
23) . Ground run requirements for the BULL
and the BEAR would also be reduced, but the
difference would not be as great as for jet
bombers.
56. The low temperatures of the Arctic region
pose some special problems in the handling
of nuclear weapons. However, virtually all of
the components of nuclear weapons are better
able to resist the effects of cold weather than
are the delivery aircraft, and provision of ade-
quate shelters and equipment to overcome the
undesirable effects of cold weather on the
bombs is a much simpler problem. We esti-
mate that the USSR can successfully store
and assemble nuclear weapons for use at
Arctic bases under any weather conditions
which will permit the operation of bombers.
57. Scale of pre-strike preparations. At pres-
ent the preparations necessary for launching
a maximum-scale attack from likely staging
areas would probably require several months.
We estimate that the USSR will continue to
improve its base facilities and the training,
logistics, and equipment of its Long-Range
Aviation throughout this period, so that the
time required for preparations for attack
would be considerably reduced.
Assumptions Underlying Estimated
Intercontinental Striking Forces
58. Although the variety in methods of em-
ployment and attack patterns open to the
USSR makes it difficult to estimate which air-
fields the USSR might employ in an initial
attack, sufficient intelligence is available to
make a logical selection as to which of the
forward airfields will be most suitable for
staging bomber operations. Therefore, we be-
lieve that the most likely Soviet choices of base
areas for an initial air attack against the con-
tinental US would be the Chukotski, Kam-
chatka, Central Arctic, Kola, and Leningrad
areas. In addition, some BEAR aircraft could
be launched from interior bases.
59. In order to determine the general order
of magnitude of Soviet capabilities for an
initial attack against the US in mid-1960,
we have considered the available intelligence
on runway lengths, POL, maintenance, other
base facilities, and accessibility for supply
purposes, and have arrived at an estimate of
a probable maximum capacity of each of the
forward bases for staging bomber aircraft.
All bases that we have selected for the staging
of heavy bombers have runway lengths of at
least 7,900 feet and are considered to have
an average maximum staging capacity of 30
heavy or 60 medium bombers. Those selected
for staging medium bombers only have gener-
ally fewer base facilities, but have runways
estimated to be at least 6,000 feet in length.
Their maximum staging capacities are consid-
ered as varying from 30 to 60 medium bomb-
ers, depending on the facilities at each base. 26
Although usable on the basis of estimated
aircraft performance figures, existing runways
at many of these airfields are considerably
below the standards normally associated with
Soviet long-range bomber bases.
60. The following planning factors, based on
US experience and estimated Soviet capabil-
ities, have been assumed:
a. 90 percent of aircraft at home base in
commission after stand-down;
b. 85 percent of those aircraft departing
home bases can be launched from staging
bases (includes attrition enroute to and while
at staging bases) ;
c. 80 percent of those bomber aircraft
launched on unfueled missions will arrive in
target area (excluding combat attrition) ;
d. 75 percent of those bomber aircraft
launched on missions utilizing inflight refuel-
ing will arrive in target areas (excluding com-
bat attrition) ; and
For estimated staging capacities of individual
bases in each of the forward areas, see Annex
D (limited distribution under separate cover) .
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e. An allowance of one tanker aircraft pro-
vided for each bomber refueled in flight (com-
patible tanker assumed) .
Maximum Strike Forces for Air Attack
in Mid-1960
61. For the purposes of this estimate, the only
factors used in determining the maximum
bomber force the USSR could launch against
the continental US in mid-1960 are the esti-
mated strength of Soviet Long-Range Avia-
tion, the estimated capacity of the forward
staging areas, and the operational planning
factors given in paragraph 60. Among the
factors specifically excluded from the calcula-
tions are Soviet requirements for attack on
areas outside the continental US, and for re-
attack after the initial strikes. These factors
would reduce the number of bombers actually
committed to an initial attack on the con-
tinental US.
62. 27 We estimate that in mid-1960, Soviet
Long-Range Aviation will include an increased
number of bomber aircraft, a greater pro-
portion of heavy bombers, and a tanker fleet
adequate to support a portion of its heavy
bomber force. By that date, the capacity of
the forward staging areas could have been in-
creased to permit the launching of the entire
bomber force on a combination of refueled
and unrefueled missions. Under these cir-
cumstances, and assuming that all aircraft
were launched from staging bases rather than
home bases, the maximum mid-1960 Soviet
strike capability would be as follows:
Available
After
Stand-down
Launched
from
Staging
Bases
Arriving
in
Target
Areas
BADGER
630
535
428
BISON
450
382
300
BEAR
270
230
184
TANKER
135"
115"
Total
' 1,485
1,262
912
Not considering combat losses.
'These figures assume that all tankers employed
will be heavy tankers compatible with the BISON.
This does not take into account the fact that
BADGER tankers could be employed as an in-
terim measure to refuel BISONS or other BADG-
ERS. (See paragraph 21.)
16
We have assumed the following method of
employment:
Two-
Way
Un-
refueled
One-
Two- Way Total
Way Un- Bombers
Refueled refueled Launched
BADGER
535
535
BISON
267
115
382
BEAR
230
230
Total
497
115
535
1,147
63. If the USSR attempted to achieve sur-
prise, it could employ several alternative
methods of attack against the continental US
in mid-1960, at the cost of reducing the weight
of attack:
a. The USSR could elect to employ only
heavy bombers in an initial attack, launching
them from the forward staging bases. In this
case, as indicated in the table above, 612 could
be launched in a combination of refueled and
unrefueled two-way missions, and 484 could
arrive in targets areas, not considering com-
bat losses.
b. It could elect to employ only heavy bomb-
ers, launching them from home bases. In this
case 720 could be launched and 569 could ar-
rive in target areas, not considering combat
losses. This alternative would require that
all the BISONS be employed on one-way mis-
sions and that almost all the BEARS be re-
fueled if they were to be employed on two-way
missions.
c. It could elect to employ medium as well
as heavy bombers in various combinations
designed to achieve the maximum weight of
attack possible without jeopardizing surprise.
64. Allocation to ECM and Diversionary Tasks.
All attacking bombers would probably pos-
sess some ECM capability in mid-1960. It is
also possible that some portion of the aircraft
in the attacking force would be assigned ex-
clusively as specialized ECM aircraft for pur-
poses which might include diversion and de-
coy use. Such aircraft would probably be
employed to assist bombers in carrying out
" The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army, does not concur in the
maximum mid-1960 Soviet strike capabilities as
estimated in paragraphs 62 and 63. (See his
footnote to paragraph 14.)
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attacks against extremely important targets,
particularly those which would be involved in
US retaliatory action.
VII. ATTACKS BY GUIDED MISSILES
Submarine-Launched Missiles's
65. We believe that in mid-1960, submarine-
launched missiles probably would be used in
coordination with nuclear strikes by aircraft
in any Soviet plan of attack against the con-
tinental US. In mid-1960, the USSR may
have available about 30 submarine equipped
to launch guided missiles. If the USSR at-
tempted to achieve surprise in an initial at-
tack in mid-1960, we believe that it would
consider that the deployment of a relatively
small number of guided missile submarines
could be accomplished without jeopardizing
surprise. This risk would be minimal in the
case of nuclear-powered guided missile sub-
marines, but no more than eight of these are
likely to be operational in mid-1960.
66. Since the submarine must necessarily sur-
face and remain surfaced for about five to 10
minutes to launch a missile, it would be vul-
nerable to radar detection during that time.
If the submarine were operating at periscope
depth while actively guiding a missile it would
be vulnerable to both active radar and pas-
sive electronic intercept detection. Nuclear-
powered submarines are likely to be large and
would be just as vulnerable to active sonar
detection as conventional submarines of com-
parable size. Any antisonar coatings avail-
able to the USSR would be difficult and costly
to apply, would have a relatively short effec-
tive life, and would be ineffective at deep sub-
mergence because of distortion of the material
under hydrostatic pressure. Based on US ex-
perience, a submerged nuclear-powered boat
can be expected to be less noisy than a snor-
keling diesel submarine at speeds below 17
knots, and thus less susceptible to detection
by passive underwater intercept. However, at
speeds above 17 knots the nuclear-powered
boat would be at least as detectable. At sub-
merged speeds below nine kn'ots, the nuclear-
powered boat would be virtually undetectable
" For estimated range coverage of continental US,
see map 21, Annex B.
17
by LOFAR, and might even go undetected at
submerged speed as high as 15 knots.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)
67. As indicated in paragraph 42, we be-
lieve that in mid-1960 the USSR could em-
ploy only a few, if any, ICBMs against the
continental US. Because the system relia-
bility, accuracy, and nuclear warhead yield
of the ICBM are estimated to be considerably
lower than those of manned bombers in mid-
1960, we believe that any ICBMs available to
the USSR at that date would be used to aug-
ment bomber attacks, rather than to replace
any mission aircraft.
Air-Launched Missiles
68. A supersonic air-to-surface missile of 55
n.m. range could to some extent improve the
capabilities of Soviet medium and heavy
bombers to attack heavily-defended US tar-
gets. However, their warheads would have
lower yields than available nuclear bombs
and their guidance radar would restrict their
effectiveness to well-defined targets.
VIII. CLANDESTINE ATTACK
Clandestine Delivery of Nuclear
Weapons
69. We have no evidence as to any Soviet
plans or preparations for clandestine delivery
of nuclear weapons against the US. How-
ever, during the period of this estimate the
USSR will be capable of producing nuclear
weapons which could be smuggled into the
US either as complete assemblies or as com-
ponent parts of subassemblies. These could
range from small-yield weapons (five kilotons
or less) , weighing a few hundred pounds and
small enough to fit into the luggage compart-
ment of an automobile, up to the highest-
yield device the USSR was capable of produc-
ing. All of these weapons or devices could be
designed to break down into transportable
components. Those designed to give a rel-
atively low yield would not require much
labor or technical training for assembly. Con-
siderably more labor and training would be
required to assemble weapons designed to give
high yields, and, once assembled, they would
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be more difficult to transport. The size and
weight of any multimegaton device would tend
to limit its use other than as a fixed instal-
lation in the hold of a merchant vessel, in a
truck-trailer, or in premises with diplomatic
immunity.
70. Considering the known limitations of the
means of physical detection, the USSR could
probably introduce into the US and detonate
in place a considerable number of nuclear
weapons by clandestine means. A variety of
methods of clandestine delivery suggest them-
selves. Assembled weapons could be dropped
by apparently friendly aircraft, detonated in
the hold of a merchant ship, or sown as under-
water mines by submarines and possibly by
merchant ships. Either components or as-
sembled weapons could be brought in under
diplomatic immunity, smuggled across land or
sea frontiers, introduced through normal im-
port channels, or brought in as bonded mer-
chandise awaiting transshipment.
71. In introducing nuclear weapons clandes-
tinely into the US, the USSR would have to
take into account not only the estimated
chances of detection but also the conse-
quences of detection, including the loss of
surprise in any intended overt attack and the
possible provocation of US military action.
As the number of weapons clandestinely in-
troduced was increased, the risk of compro-
mise would grow. This increased risk would
be less a function of the physical means of
detection (the effectiveness of which is ex-
tremely limited) than of the possibilities of
US penetration of the Communist apparatus,
of the defection of a trusted agent, or of sheer
accident. The USSR could not be confident
that none of these mischances would occur.
We conclude that, although clandestine at-
tack with nuclear weapons might be made
against specially selected targets, as a sup-
plement to overt attacks, the use of large
numbers of such weapons would probably be
precluded by security considerations.
Clandestine Use of BW and
CW Weapons
72. We estimate that the USSR has a capa-
bility for the clandestine delivery of BW
agents against targets in the continental US.
Most BW agents are peculiarly adaptable to
clandestine utilization, since detection of their
intended use would be difficult. Even small-
scale employment of BW agents against live-
stock could be highly effective. BW attacks
against personnel concentrated in selected
buildings could also be effective. Anticrop
BW operations could be carried out clandes-
tinely, with possible damaging effects under
proper environmental conditions.
73. CW agents are not as suitable to clandes-
tine operations as BW agents. The effects are
more readily identifiable and a much greatet
effort would be necessary to deliver quantities
required for lethal concentrations over large
areas. Although it probably would not be
feasible to accumulate CW agents or dissem-
ination devices for more than limited attacks
against population centers in the US, CW at-
tacks against personnel in buildings could
be effective. In this connection, psycho-
chemical agents could be employed against
key personnel in buildings or select groups
in small areas.
Conventional Sabotage
74. The USSR is capable of subversion, espi-
onage, and widespread sabotage in the US
through the use of existing subversive ele-
ments and the placement of foreign agents.
Sabotage could not be undertaken on a large
scale prior to air attack without forfeiting
surprise. Attempts to sabotage US trans-
portation, industrial, and communications
facilities, as well as military installations,
could be expected concurrent with and im-
mediately following surprise attack by the
USSR. Communist Party members and ad-
herents are capable of organizing saboteur
units,, of varying sizes and equipped with
small' arms and other suitable material, which
could strike at specially selected and widely
separated targets simultaneously and with-
out warning. Whether these attacks would
be timed with a surprise military attack or
carried out after the initial attack would be
dependent upon the Soviet appraisal of the
relative advantages of such action.
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ANNEX A
BASE AREAS SUITABLE FOR LONG-RANGE BOMBER OPERATIONS
1. Chukotski Peninsula. As the result of run-
way construction believed to have been car-
ried out at several airfields within the past
three years, we believe that at least six air-
fields probably now have runways long enough
for staging medium bombers and that at least
five of these are suitable for heavy bomber
operations. Three other airfields have run-
ways whose characteristics indicate a mar-
ginal capability for medium bomber opera-
tions. Military air units are based on some
airfields in the Chukotski area, but none are
subordinate to Long-Range Aviation.
2. Air operations in this area are made diffi-
cult by several factors. Recent construction
of long, surfaced runways indicates that cli-
matic and logistical difficulties of this area
are being overcome. However, ice and com-
pacted snow runways are also still in use.
There are some indications that the USSR is
steadily improving its operational potential
through installation of modern radio naviga-
tion facilities. In addition, the USSR has
an ever-increasing fund of Arctic experience
which can be applied to staging operations in
this area.
3. Cold, wind, snow, and fog, which are preva-
lent throughout the area, tend to make opera-
tions difficult and hazardous. The most un-
favorable weather conditions occur during
November through March.' The most favor-
able conditions occur at all stations during
the spring and early summer. Weather in
1In order to estimate the seasonal suitability of
average weather conditions in potential staging
areas, the percentage frequency of occurrence of
those conditions which would handicap the mass
movement of aircraft into or out of staging areas
was computed. Two conditions were selected as
a basis for analysis: (1) ceiling/visibility less
than 300 feet/one mile; (2) temperature below
?20? F., although with adequate preparations
staging operations could be carried out success-
fully in temperatures below ?20? F.
the interior is highly favorable during the
summer months. Only those areas adjacent
to the Chuckchee Sea or which lie along the
Bering Sea coast have a relatively high inci-
dence of unfavorable conditions during the
midsummer months.
4. The status of base logistical support facili-
ties required to stage long-range strike oper-
ations from the Chukotski area is unknown.
The area is accessible only by air and by sea
during the ice-free season, and supply prob-
lems would be difficult. However, the USSR
is considered capable of stockpiling the nec-
essary supplies. Moreover, the area's stag-
ing potential could be markedly increased by
1960. By using construction elements already
available in the area the USSR could build
two additional concrete surfaced runways
suitable for staging heavy bombers by 1960.
5. Kola Peninsula. The Kola Peninsula has
at least 14 bases with runways long enough
for staging medium bombers. At least one
of these airfields would be suitable for heavy
bombers. Permanent-surfaced runways can
be constructed throughout the area without
difficulty as it is relatively free of permafrost.
6. Prevailing climatic conditions, while a re-
strictive factor on air operations, are rela-
tively more favorable than in other regions
of the Soviet Far North. In general, the most
favorable conditions occur in the late spring
and early summer. In late summer and early
autumn, conditions are favorable except at
bases adjacent to the cold waters of the White
Sea. However, during May through October
conditions are favorable at all locations over
90 percent of the time. In winter, conditions
are less favorable due to the more frequent
occurrence of low ceilings and poor visibili-
ties. Extremely cold temperatures are rela-
tively infrequent, and occur less than 10 per-
cent of the time at any base.
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7. The status of base logistical support facili-
ties required to conduct long-range bomber
strikes from airfields in this area is unknown,
but it is considered that logistics would not
be an important limiting factor. Supply
routes by rail and road are open to the Kola
Peninsula on a year-round basis, although
logistical support of large-scale air operations
would still pose difficulties under extreme
weather conditions. Moreover, the staging
potential of the area could be readily in-
creased. With construction elements already
in the area, three additional concrete-surfaced
runways suitable for heavy bombers could be
constructed by 1960.
8. Central Arctic. An airfield construction
and development program in this area has
been in progress since early 1949. The devel-
opment program was carried out for Polar Avi-
ation of the Northern Sea Route Administra-
tion, but at least seven airfields now in exist-
ence probably have runways of sufficient
length to handle the staging of medium bomb-
ers. Of these, three are probably suitable for
the staging of heavy bombers. Two other air-
fields in this area have runways with marginal
capabilities for medium bomber operations.
However, logistical support would be difficult,
probably requiring heavy stockpiling. Con-
struction elements in the area could build
two additional runways suitable for heavy
bombers by mid-1960.
9. The major handicap to air operations in
this area arises from the frequency and per-
sistence of extremely low temperatures. For
example, at Tiksi over 50 percent of all obser-
vations during January record temperatures
lower than ?20? F. Jet engines, however, are
less adversely affected by low temperatures
than piston engines and jet take-off require-
ments are considerably reduced. The summer
months are not very favorable due to the high
frequency of fog in the coastal belt.
10. Leningrad. This area contains at least
three home bases of Long-Range Aviation
units equipped with BULL and BADGER air-
craft. These bases probably have runways
of sufficient length for heavy bomber opera-
tions. Three additional runways suitable for
heavy bombers could be constructed by mid-
1960 by employing airfield construction units
now in the area. Improvement of existing
airfields would require only a minimum of
additional construction, as there are already
20 other airfields in the Leningrad area with
concrete runways long enough for medium
bomber operations. None of these additional
bases, however, are known to be associated
currently with Long-Range Aviation opera-
tions. Operations from this area by long-
range aircraft would offer the advantage of a
temperate climate and good logistical support.
11. The bases in this area have the most favor-
able weather during the late spring and sum-
mer, when about 97 to 99 percent of the time
is favorable for operations. Even during
autumn and winter 88 to 90 percent of the
weather is favorable at all bases. There ap-
pears to be little difference between night-
time and daytime weather except during Sep-
tember, October, and November. During these
months, reduced visibility sometimes occurs
during the early morning hours. Tempera-
tures below ?20? F. occur less than five per-
cent of the time at all bases.
12. Kamchatka-Sea of Okhotsk Area. Only
two airfields in this area are considered ade-
quate for medium bombers, and only one of
these is considered suitable for heavy bomb-
ers. Three other airfields have runways with
marginal capabilities for medium bomber op-
erations. Long-range staging capabilities
from this area are therefore estimated to be
extremely limited, but two additional run-
ways could be constructed to accommodate
' heavy bombers by 1960.
13. The weather in this area is relatively
favorable for air operations. Throughout the
year the weather on the east coast of Kam-
chatka Peninsula is the most favorable in the
entire area. In the Magadan area the best
weather occurs during the early spring and
autumn.
14. Baltic-East Germany. Poland and the So-
viet Zone of Germany have a total of at least
70 airfields from which medium and heavy
bomber operations could be mounted against
the US and US bases in Western Europe.
However, a disadvantage of this area as a
base for air attacks on North America is that
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Great Circle routes pass over nations friend-
ly to the US. In addition, it would be more
difficult than in other forward base areas to
maintain security of preparations, and the
area is more vulnerable to NATO attack.
However, climatic conditions are most favor-
able and there would be relatively few logisti-
cal problems. This base complex is served
adequately by all types of transportation.
15. The bases located in the Baltic coastal
area are most suitable for air operations dur-
ing April through August, when favorable
conditions occur about 97 percent of the time,
both day and night. The least favorable
period is December through March, when fre-
quency of favorable conditions drops to about
75 percent. However, the unfavorable condi-
tions occur most often during the night and
early morning hours. The mid-day hours are
favorable for operations about 85 percent of
the time. Very low temperatures are rare in
this area.
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ANNEX B
MAPS AND SUMMARY CHARTS
I. GENERAL
The following maps show estimated Soviet
long-range aircraft and submarine-launched
guided missile radius/range capabilities under
selected conditions against the continental
US through mid-1960. The maps depicting
the capabilities of the BISON (nos. 9-12) and
BADGER (nos. 5-8) are based on estimated
performance characteristics of improved ver-
sions of these aircraft estimated to be avail-
able in mid-1956 and in 1957, respectively.
The estimated capabilities of the standard
versions of these two aircraft types are shown
in boxes included on the appropriate maps.
The estimated capabilities of the modified
BULL and improved BEAR are shown in boxes
on the maps dealing with the standard ver-
sions of these aircraft.
Estimated range coverage under refueled
conditions is particularly difficult to depict
since many different routes and refuel points
could be used by Soviet strike forces. There-
fore, it should be noted that this coverage
assumes certain routes and refuel points, and
under different assumptions the indicated
coverage would be somewhat altered.
II. RANGE COMPUTATION
In all cases the estimated coverage is based
on ranges calculated in accordance with
standard US military mission profiles. For
estimating ranges under unre fueled conditions
it has been assumed that Great Circle routes
would be flown, although such flights would
have to transit major Western warning and
defense positions. For refueled flights, how-
ever, routes indicated show possible approach-
es intended to avoid overflight of major West-
ern defense and warning systems. Total
ranges indicated assume a Soviet refueling
capability permitting a range extension of
approximately 35 percent.
III. BASE MAP
The base used for all maps is a simplified
version of a US target system which Soviet
planners might seek to attack. It is intended
only to indicate the general geographical dis-
tribution of possible US targets, and should
not be considered as a definitive picture of
the US target complex. Moreover, it does not
reflect programmed changes or other changes
likely to occur between now and mid-1960.
IV. SUMMARY CHARTS
These charts are included for convenience
in comparing the radius/range capabilities of
all Soviet long-range bombers, if launched
from the Chukotski, Kola, or Moscow areas.
They are based on the same calculations and
assumptions used in preparing the maps.
TOP SECRET
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A009000050001-8
TOP SECRET
ANNEX C
TABLE I
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT
(Calculated in accordance with US Mil-.0-5011A (Spec))
Modified b
Improved
Improved
Improved d
CONDITIONS
BULL?
BULL
BADGER
BADGER
BISON
BISON
BEAR
BEAR
(1957)
(1956)
(1957)
Combat Radius/
Range (nm.)
2200/4300
2500/4700
3500/6600
3400/6300
a. 25,000-lb. bomb load
one refuel ?
3000/5800
3400/6400
4750
4600
b. 10,000-lb. bomb load
1700/3100
2000/3600
1500/2900
1900/3700
2450/4800
2750/5300
3900/7600
3800/7300
one refuel ?
2300/4200
2700/4900
2050/3900
2550/5000
3300/6500
3700/7200
5300
5100
c. 3,500-1b. bomb load
1950/3500
2300/4100
1700/3400
2100/4200
2550/5000
2800/5600
4100/8200
4000/7800
one refuel a
2650/4700
3100/5500
2300/4600
2850/5700
3450/6800
3800/7600
5600
5400
Speed/Altitude (kn./ft.)
350/30,000
310/30,000
360/30,000
340/35,000
545/12,500
475/41,000
550/12,500
470/43,000
535/18,800
475/41,500
540/19,000
475/44,500
495/21,400
435/40,000
510/21,400
440/42,900
a. Max. speed at
optimum alt.
b. Target speed/
Target alt.
Combat Ceiling (ft.)
36,500
37,500
45,000
46,000
43,600
46,500
40,700
45,400
'Refueling estimates based upon use of compatible tankers which will provide apprmdmately 35 percent increase in radius/range.
b Stripped and altered for longer range in a manner similar to the US B29B.
Improvements include the replacement of the 18,000-1b. thrust engines with those having a thrust of 20,500 lbs.
"Based on installation of engines with improved altitude rating.
TOP SECRET 23
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SECRET
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SOVIET AIRCRAFT RADIUS/RANGE CAPABILITIES SUMMARY
From the Chukotski Area
UNREFUELED
Not to Scale
10
APPROXIMATE
(In
20
percent
30
of iota!:
40
AREA
see maps
50
OF
I, 3,
60
U.S. COVERED
5, 7, 9,
70
//, /3, /5)
80
90
100
BULL (Std.)
BULL (Mod.)
BADGER (Std.)
BADGER (Imp.)
BISON (Std.)
4111ta
BISON (Imp.)
??0
BEAR
REFUELED
BULL (Std.)
BULL (Mod.)
BADGER (Std.)
BADGER (Imp.)
BISON (Std.)
BISON (Imp.)
BEAR
0
TWO-WAY
10,000
Bomb
?
lb.
Load
3,500 lb.
Bomb Load
?
25755 1-57
Declassified
0
ONE-WAY 10,000 lb. 3,500 lb.
and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: dIA-IkDP79R01-012A009000050001-8
CHART 1
Not to Scale
SECRET
SECRET
UNREFUELED
BULL (Std.)
BULL (Mod.)
BADGER (Std.)
BADGER (Imp.)
BISON (Std.)
BISON (Imp.)
BEAR
REFUELED
BULL (Std.)
BULL (Mod.)
BADGER (Std.)
BADGER (Imp.)
BISON (Std.)
BISON (Imp.)
BEAR
25756 1.57
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CHART 2
SOVIET AIRCRAFT RADIUS/RANGE CAPABILITIES SUMMARY
From the Kola Area
APPROXIMATE AREA OF U.S. COVERED
(In percent of total: see maps 2, 4, 6, 8, /0, 12, 14, /6)
Not to Scale 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Not to Scale
04101:3
?
10,000 lb. 3,500 lb.
1TWO-WAY Bomb Load ? Bomb Load
. 0
41o...............0
IONE-WAY 10,000 lb. 3,500 lb.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A009000050001-8
SECRET
SECRET
-
UN REFUELED
BULL (Std.)
BULL (Mod.)
BADGER (Std.)
BADGER (Imp.)
BISON (Std.)
BISON (Imp.)
BEAR
REFUELED
BULL (Std.)
BULL (Mod.)
BADGER (Std.)
BADGER (Imp.)
BISON (Std.)
BISON (Imp.)
BEAR
25757 1-57
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A009000050001-8
SOVIET AIRCRAFT RADIUS/RANGE CAPABILITIES SUMMARY
From the Moscow Area
APPROXIMATE AREA OF U.S. COVERED
(In percent of total: see maps 17 to 20)
Not to Scale 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
-0
CHART 3
80 90 100 Not to Scale
Ovaossommo0
TWO-WAY
10,000 lb.
Bomb Load
?
3,500 lb.
Bomb Load
? Imo ilmmeimisems imeam0
ONE-WAY 10,000 lb. 3,500 lb.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A009000050001-8
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A009000050001-8
CAPABILITY OF STANDARD BULL, UNREFUELED
From the Chukotski Area
SECRET
Note: MODIFIED BULL
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 2,000 NM
IWO-WAY, 3.500 lb. Bomb Load, 2.300 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 3,600 N
ONE-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 4,100 N
. Ma P 1
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 1,700 NM
TWO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 1,950 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 3,100 NM
ONE-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 3,500 NM
& Current SAC Base ? Major Target City
25239 1-56 Revised I-57
SECRET
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A009000050001-8
TOP SECRET
TABLE II
ESTIMATED SOVIET LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE UNDER AN OPTIMUM MISSION PROFILE
(Calculated in accordance with US Mil-C-5011A Spec except that fuel reserves
are reduced to permit a maximum of 30 minutes loiter at sea level, and
aircraft operate at altitudes permitting maximum radius/range)
Modified ? Improved d Improved d Improved
CONDITIONS BULL BULL BADGER BADGER BISON BISON BEAR BEAR
'Combat Radius/
Range (nm.)
a. 25,000-1b. bomb load
one refuel '
b. 10,000-1b. bomb load
one refuel '
c. 3,500-lb. bomb load '
one refuel " '
Speed/Altitude (kn./ft.)
a. Max. speed at
optimum alt.
b. Target speed/
Target alt.
Combat Ceiling (ft.)
Terminal Target
Altitude (ft.)"
a. 25,000-lb. bomb load
b. 10,000-lb. bomb load
c. 3,500-lb. bomb load
(1957)
(1956)
(1957)
-
-
-
-
2500/4800
2800/5300
3800/7200
3800/7100
3400/6500
3800/7200
5100
5100
1800/3300
2150/4000
1600/3100
2050/4000
2800/5400
3100/6100
4250/8300
'
4300/8300
2400/4500
2900/5400
2200/4200
2750/5400
3800/7300
4200/8200
5750
5800
,
2050/3700
2450/4600
1850/3700
2300/4500
2900/5700
3200/6400
4500/8900
4500/8900
2750/5000
3350/6200
2500/5000
3100/6100
3900/7700
4300/8600
6100
6050
350/30,000
360/30,000
545/12,500
550/12,500
535/18,800
540/19,000
495/21,600
505/21,000
310/30,000
340/35,000
475/41,500
470/43,500
475/42,400
475/45,500
410/42,100
430/44,900
36,500
37,500
45,500
46,500
44,600
47,500
41,300
46,000
d
-
-
-
-
52,600
55,200
48,200
50,100
41,500
42,500
49,500
51,600
53,200
56,000
50,200
52,100
42,000
43,000
51,000
53,000
54,600
57,000
51,200
53,100
'Refueling estimates based upon use of compatible tankers which will provide approximately 35 percent increase in radius/range.
b Service ceiling at maximum power with one hour fuel reserves plus bomb load aboard. No range figure is associated with this altitude.
?Stripped and altered for longer range in a manner similar to the US B29B.
a Improvements include the replacement of the 18,000-lb. thrust engines with those having a thrust of 20,500 lbs.
?Based on installation of engines with improved altitude rating.
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A009000050001-8
LAPABILI FY UI- SI ANUARL) BULL, UNREFUELLI)
From the Kola Area SECRET
Nam MODIFIED BULL
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 2,000 NM
TWO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 2,300 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 1600 N
OPE-WAY, 3,509 lb. Bomb Load, 4,100 N
Map 2
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 1,700 NM
TWO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 1,950 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 3,100 NM
ONE-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 3,500 NM
k. Current SAC Base ? Major Target City
SECRET
25240 1-56 (Revised 1-52)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A009000050001-8
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A009000050001-8
CAPABILI I Y UF S I AWARD BULL, REFUELEU
From the Chukotski Area
SECRET
Note: MODIFIED BULL
TWOMAY:10,000.1b. Bomb Load, 2,700 NM
TWO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 3,100 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 4,900 NM
,..,r
. ONE-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb load, 5,500 N
..
withhi.esemap illustrates.eoverage attain 'to
the many Rei possible open
flelgtheteernsi a e
Soviet p ers.
For detailel info "" n on radius/ ange
capabilities under van .sonditio see
Annex C.
Map 3
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 2,300 NM
= 'TWO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 2,650 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load,.4,200 NM
ONE-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 4,700 NM
Current SAC Base ? Major Target City
/ -
SECRET
r-1\
25241 1-56 (Revised 1-52)
SECRET
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A009000050001-8
LikriklilLI I Y J I HIIUHRU DULL, KLI-UtLtU
From the Kola Area SECRET
Note: MODIFIED :BULL
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 2;700 NM
TWO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 3,100 NM
0-NE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 4,900 NM
ONE-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 5,500'N
is map illustrates coverage ittaina ,e
with entn possible flight patterns am ng
the many OptiOns open to Soviet plan os.
For detailed idtocuiytion on radius/ nge.
capabilities under o3niou condition see
? Annex C. ?
? Map 4
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 2,300 NM
TWO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 2,650 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 4,200 NM
ONE-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 4,700 NM
Current SAC Base ? Major Target City
SECRET
25242 1.56 (Revised 1-57)
SECRET
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A009000050001-8
CAPABILITY OF IMPROVED BADGER, UNREFUELED
From the Chukotski Area
SECRET
TWO.WAY, 10,003 lb. Bomb Load, 1,500 NM
MO-WM% 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 1,700 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load. 2,900 N
0979007, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 3,400 N
Map 5
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 1,900 NM
.11NO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 2,100 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 3,700 NM
ONEWAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 4,200 NM
A Current SAC Base ? Major Target City
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A009000050001-8
CAPABILI I Y OF IMPROVED HAUbER, UNREFUELED
From the Kola Area SECRET
t.
Alakurtti>
Note, STANDARD BADGER
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load. 1,500 NM
TWO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load. 1,700 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 7,900 N
ONE-WAY, 3.500 lb. Bomb Load, 3,400 N
/
Map 6
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 1,900 NM
TWO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 2,100 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 3,700 NM
ONE-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 4,200 NM
A 'Current SAC Base ? Major Target City
1.)
2bt44 1-S6 (Revised 1-571
SECRET
SECRET
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A009000050001-8
CAPABILITY OF IMPROVED. BADGER, REFUELED
From the Chukotski Area SECRET
11\
ird -3
"7!
Note: STANDARD BADGER
1WO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load. 2,050 NM
TWO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 2,300 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 3,900 NM
ONE-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 4,600 NM
map illustrates coverage attain le
with cdttaiQpossiblo night patterns a ng
the many op1ioos open to Soviet pla em.
For detailed intoAnottyn on radius/ urge
capabilities under varicibs,conditio see
Annex C.
Map 7 ?
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 2,550 NM
TWO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 2,850 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 5,000 NM
ONE-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 5,700 NM
A Current SAC Base ? Major Target City
SECRET
(\\
25245 1-56 (Revised 1-57)
SECRET
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A009000050001-8
LAPAIIILI I Y INIFKUVEI) WALA3b1c REFUELtl)
From the Kola Area SECRET
TWOMAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 2,050 NM
PNO.WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 2,300 NM
ONE.WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb load, 3,900 NM
ONEMAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb toad, 4,600 N
map illustrates coverage attain
with cert3iv.yossible flight patterns a.
the many op open to Soviet plan
For detailed inlor hop on radius/
capabilities under yario-ds nditio
/inner C. .
Map.8
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 2,550 NM
TWO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 2,850 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 5,000 NM
ONE-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 5,700 NM
rts Current SAC Base ? Major Target City
25246 166 (Revised 1.57)
SECRET
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A009000050001-8
CAPABILITY OF IMPROVED BISON, UNIZEFUELED
FrOm the Chukotski Area
SECRET
Note: STANDARD BISON
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 2,450 NM
TWO-WAY. 3.500 lb. Bomb Load, 2$50 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Loin:1,4,800 N
ONE-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bom load, 5.000 N
Map 9
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 2,750 NM
TWO-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 2,800 NM
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. Bomb Load, 5,300 NM
ONE-WAY, 3,500 lb. Bomb Load, 5,600 NM
A Current SAC Base ? Major Target City
25247 1-56 (Revised 1-57)
SECRET
SECRET
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP79R01012A009000050001-8
LAFAIJILI I Y UF ININKUVEL) tiISUN, UNI