STABILITY OF THE SOVIET SATELLITE STRUCTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A009200010016-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: February 19, 1957
• Content Type: NIE

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NIE 1 2 ? 5 7
19. 16 19 February 1957
1957
RET
NI 277
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 12-57
STABILITY OF THE
SOVIET SATELLITE STRUCTURE
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 19 February 1957. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of
Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and
the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The
Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained,
the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
S RET
CIOC-VMENT NO
NO CHANGE 04 CLASS. 1.3
1.! D.S.f."LASESED
CLAW). CHANGED TO: TS S C
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STABILITY OF THE SOVIET SATELLITE STRUCTURE
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the prospects for stability in the Soviet Satellite structure over the
next few years.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The long-latent conflict between Soviet
interests and Satellite aspirations ex-
ploded into crisis last fall as a result of
the progressive weakening of ideological
authority and loosening of police controls
following the death of Stalin. The Soviet
leaders are experiencing great difficulty
in formulating and putting into effect
policies which will reduce this crisis to
manageable proportions. (Paras. 8, 12)
2. We believe that the USSR will continue
to regard the Satellite area as vital to its
interests, and will not seriously enter-
tain, at least for the next several years,
the possibility of a general political or
military withdrawal, even in return for
a withdrawal of US forces from Europe.
To the Soviet leaders, loss of control over
Eastern Europe would constitute a severe
setback for Communism. They would
also view it as rendering them powerless
to prevent German reunification, and as
seriously impairing the USSR's strategic
position. (Paras. 11, 27)
3. We believe that the Soviet leaders have
concluded from the events of recent
months that although reforms in certain
fields were acceptable, concessions to na-
tionalist pressures involve hazards to So-
viet control. They apparently intend for
some time to come to put primary empha-
sis on the internal security of the Satel-
lite regimes and on Soviet control over
them. (Para. 29)
4. Poland's success in maintaining its
present limited degree of independence
is a key factor affecting the future po-
litical developments in Eastern Europe.
Should the USSR succeed in reimposing
its complete control over Poland, it could
more easily check dissident elements in
Ather Satellites, particularly disruptive
forces in the other Satellite Communist
parties. If the USSR does not achieve
its aim in Poland, its problems elsewhere
will probably worsen. (Para. 49)
5. We believe that the Soviet leaders will
try to undermine the special status which
the Gomulka regime in Poland has ac-
quired. However, the costs and risks of
a military intervention would be great.
Such action would almost certainly be
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resisted by the bulk of the Polish nation
and armed forces, and thus involve So-
viet forces in large-scale military opera-
tions, which could spread to East Ger-
many and thus provoke a major interna-
tional crisis. (Paras. 31-33)
6. Soviet success in repairing its losses
in Poland, however, would not remove
the underlying causes of disaffection
throughout the Satellites. Tensions be-
tween the Satellite populations and their
regimes during the next several years
probably will be higher than prior to the
events in Poland and Hungary, and the
unity of Satellite parties will be subjected
to greater strains. Soviet policy is not
likely to reduce these tensions in Eastern
Europe, or even to restore the degree of
acquiescence prevailing earlier. (Paras.
47-49)
DISCUSSION
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
7. The political stability of Communist re-
gimes in the Satellite area depends upon the
interplay of a variety of factors. The most
basic of these are the nature and degree of
the pressure applied by the USSR on behalf
of its interests in the area, and the degree of
success attained by the local regimes in either
controlling opposition forces or winning pop-
ular acceptance. Popular attitudes, in turn,
depend on the extent to which the regimes
can fulfill the strong popular aspirations for
greater political and economic freedoms, na-
tional independence, and improved standards
of living. Satellite expectations regarding
Western policy also play a part. All these
factors were at work in the crisis of recent
months, will continue to be present, and must
be taken into account in assessing the future
prospects for Satellite political stability.
SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE SATELLITES
8. Basically it was the conflict between Soviet
interests in the Satellites and the national
aspirations of the individual countries which
gave rise to the recent crisis in the Satellite
area. The immediate cause of the crisis was
the simultaneous weakening of ideological
authority and loosening of police controls fol-
lowing the death of Stalin. These moves gave
rein to opposition forces, the strength and
determination of which were apparently un-
derestimated by the Soviet leaders. The
downgrading of Stalin was probably under-
taken primarily with a view to internal Soviet
conditions. On the other hand, the rap-
prochement with Tito was designed, as was
the guarded endorsement of "separate roads
to socialism," for foreign policy aims outside
the Bloc. Insofar as the Soviet leaders con-
sidered the consequences of these moves with-
in the Satellites, they apparently believed that
these could be turned to their own advantage
or at least contained. Accompanying moves
to curb the excesses of police terrorism were
probably intended actually to broaden popu-
lar support for the Satellite regimes and to
stimulate initiative and productivity.
9. Instead, the deterioration of Soviet au-
thority and security controls in the Satellites
weakened the prestige and the cohesiveness
of some of the Satellite ruling groups and
encouraged the emergence of nationalist, anti-
Stalinist, and reformist tendencies within cer-
tain elements of the Satellite Communist par-
ties. Intellectuals, workers, youth, and other
discontented groups among the population
felt it possible to speak out more openly
against regimentation, economic burdens, and
other grievances. These forces led to uneasi-
ness throughout the Satellite area, to a break-
down of party unity and open expression of
anti-Russian feeling in Poland and Hungary,
and, in the latter, to outright rebellion against
the Communist system.
10. The upheavals in two Satellites and rum-
blings in others were not the result of organ-
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ized resistance, which had become virtually
impossible under Satellite police-state rule.
Varying degrees of relaxation permitted by
the, regimes and their moderation of certain
previous police-state practices led to a more
open and spontaneous expression of reformist
and even of some anti-Soviet sentiment, espe-
cially after the Soviet downgrading of Stalin.
Even then, this occurred primarily among
Communist party members; only in Poland
and Hungary did wide segments of the basi-
cally anti-Communist population eventually
become involved. With the probable excep-
tion of Hungary, there is at present no known
widespread organization of antiregime forces
in the Satellites; articulate opposition has
been largely confined to reformist elements
within the Communist parties, the state bu-
reaucracy, and semiofficial organized groups
such as journalists, artists, students, and trade
unionists. So long as the Satellite leaderships
remain united, maintain police controls, and
stay closely aligned to Moscow, reformist sen-
timent can only express itself in cautious
advocacy of the need for national variations
from the Soviet pattern, and cannot openly
attack Communist institutions as such. De-
velopments in Poland and Hungary showed
that when a Communist regime permits the
public expression of nationalist points of view,
the resulting agitation can rapidly transform
itself into political demands which are essen-
tially anti-Communist, especially if the re-
gime is divided and indecisive.
11. We believe that the Soviet leaders are
determined to maintain their domination of
the Satellite area. This determination con-
tinues despite their awareness of the poten-
tial strength of opposition forces and their
reappraisal of the costs, especially in interna-
tional prestige, of maintaining control forci-
bly, particularly in situations of open revolt.
In the Soviet view, there are probably three
main considerations which make control of
the area vital:
a. The USSR's political and ideological in-
vestment in the myth of Communism's suc-
cessful world advance is so great that defec-
tion from the "socialist camp" of any Satel-
lite (except possibly Albania) would represent
a severe setback for the world Communist
movement. Such a defeat, especially if fol-
lowed by uprisings in other Satellites, would
not only impose severe handicaps on Soviet
foreign policy everywhere, but would arouse
Soviet fears of Western moves to exploit the
situation. Even worse, it would probably give
rise to unrest in the USSR itself which might
lead to a challenge to the authority of the
Soviet regime.
b. The Satellite area must continue to be
available for Soviet military uses. Even if
the Soviet leaders came in time to believe
that they no longer needed to maintain large
Soviet forces there to oppose a ground inva-
sion or to mount offensive action, they would
still insist on use of the area for Soviet air
defense. They would almost certainly be-
lieve that they could not count upon the
availability of the area as a forward or buffer
zone if they permitted independent govern-
ments to replace the present Soviet-controlled
regimes.
c. Loss of control over the Satellite area
would make it impossible for the USSR to
prevent unification of Germany or to exert
major influence over the future policy of a
reunited Germany. This would represent
abandonment of one of the principal goals of
Soviet postwar policy in Europe.
12. Confronted with the conflict between So-
viet interests and Satellite aspirations, the
Soviet leaders have found it difficult to formu-
late policies which reduce this conflict to
manageable proportions. For a time they at-
tempted a policy of lessening direct Soviet
controls and permitting, and in some cases
encouraging, local regimes to make conces-
sions to popular sentiment. The upheavals
in Poland and Hungary have demonstrated to
the Soviet leaders the dangers of such a
course. They can return to a policy of rigid
police terror by directly controlled local re-
gimes in an effort to prevent the development
of situations where resort to military force
becomes unavoidable. But this course would
give no hope of overcoming the problems
which were inherited from Stalin, and would
now in fact increase popular dissidence, fur-
ther retard economic activity, and again dam-
age the USSR's propaganda position.
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13. The case of Poland brings into sharp focus
the continuing conflict between Soviet inter-
ests and security requirements on the one
hand, and Polish nationalist aspirations and
popular demands on the other. The success
of Gomulka in the inner party struggle in
October was due mainly to his pledges to
abandon Poland's slavish adherence to Mos-
cow, a position which commanded extensive
popular support. In fact, the new leadership
gained power by what was in effect a coup
d'etat against pro-Soviet elements and against
the Soviet power apparatus in Poland. Not
only do the Soviet leaders mistrust Gomulka
and his colleagues because of the experiences
of October, but they must doubt the will and
ability of many of the elements associated
with him to maintain a regime acceptable to
the USSR, especially in view of the involve-
ment of almost the entire population in the
open expression of anti-Soviet sentiments.
Even in October, the Soviet leaders considered
and came within an ace of actually under-
taking the outright use of military force.
They probably continue to be uneasy over
the degree of independence which the cur-
rent Polish leadership apparently intends to
exercise.
ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE SATELLITES
14. Underlying the general crisis in the Euro-
pean Satellites are economic difficulties which
stem directly from the imposition of Soviet
methods and policies. Although most Satel-
lites are poorly endowed with the variety of
resources needed for industrialization on the
Soviet pattern, all have been required to imi-
tate the USSR in giving first priority to heavy
industry. This policy has resulted in rapid
industrial growth, particularly in engineering
industries, but at the expense of other sectors.
Even in industry, production is high in cost,
low in quality, and plagued by chronic short-
ages of raw materials. Soviet economic de-
mands have imposed a further burden. These
difficulties, coupled with poor planning and
management, have subjected the Satellite eco-
nomies to strains which now are increased by
the pressure to raise living standards sig-
nificantly.
15. The past high rate of defense outlays and
investment in heavy industry was made pos-
sible by maintaining depressed living stand-
ards involving neglect of production of con-
sumer goods and housing. The accompanying
inflationary pressures required heavy taxes,
forced saving, price controls, and in some in-
stances outright rationing, all of which ag-
gravated popular discontents and seriously
reduced worker incentives.
16. Because of the neglect of agriculture in
favor of industry and the effects of collectiv-
ization, the area has moved from a food sur-
plus to a food deficit position. Dependence
on imports of food, difficulties in grain col-
lection, and poor distribution in urban centers
have created food stringencies and in many
instances real hardship.
17. Economic difficulties have been aggra-
vated by disruption of traditional trading re-
lationships. Prewar exports of food products
and industrial raw materials have given way
to imports. Meanwhile, the consumer goods
industries which formerly provided foreign
earnings have been neglected in order to ex-
pand the engineering industries, which com-
pete much less successfully in Western mar-
kets. Reorientation of Satellite trade towards
dependence on the USSR, although it partial-
ly fulfilled Satellite needs for raw materials
and markets, occurred on terms unfavorable
to the Satellites. Trade difficulties were in-
creased by the Satellite obligation to service
debts incurred by their forced purchase from
the USSR of so-called German assets in their
territories which the USSR seized at the end
of World War II. This combination of cir-
cumstances has further drained the Satellites
of domestically produced goods and has weak-
ened their foreign exchange position.
18. Since 1953 the Satellites have sought to
revise national plans so as to reduce dispro-
portions (a) between raw material availability
and production capacity, (b) between indus-
trial output of producer and consumer goods,
and (c) between agricultural and industrial
production. These efforts have been ham-
pered by popular distrust and by the resist-
ance of doctrinaire leaders intent upon adher-
ing to the Soviet economic pattern. These
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revisions, which include an attempt to accel-
erate the integration of the Bloc economies,
have now been overtaken by the disruptive po-
litical events in Poland and Hungary. The
inability of these two countries to meet their
commitments has probably invalidated exist-
ing economic plans in greater or lesser degree
in all the Satellites. For the moment, the
Satellites have been driven to rely upon So-
viet credits and emergency bilateral trade
agreements with the USSR to rescue their eco-
nomies from critical raw material bottlenecks
and at the same time to provide stop gap
markets for machinery.
INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE
VARIOUS SATELLITES
19. Poland. The Polish leadership is facing
serious internal problems. Although the re-
gime has maintained the substantial degree
of internal autonomy it won from the USSR
last October, the initial enthusiasm it aroused
has probably been restrained by the neces-
sity to emphasize solidarity with the USSR, to
accept the continued presence of Soviet troops
in Poland, and to halt political reforms short
of the hopes aroused in October. The popular
support given the regime in the recent elections
rested mainly on the widespread belief that it
is the only government which can make some
defense of Polish national interests and still
not provoke Soviet military intervention. The
regime appears to have made considerable
progress in bringing the military and security
organs under its effective control and in oust-
ing many members of the pro-Soviet faction
from party positions. Nevertheless, it still
has far to go in rebuilding a loyal party and
administrative apparatus at the local level,
and there are still many middle-level and po-
litburo-level party figures who might be will-
ing to support Soviet efforts to undermine
Gomulka's position. His recent election suc-
cess, however, has placed him in a stronger
position to deal with opponents within his
party.
20. The regime has not been able to overcome
the effects of a deteriorating economic situa-
tion, which is characterized by a decrease in
exports attendant on a decline in coal produc-
5
tion, difficulties in collecting food from the
peasants, and a partial industrial disorganiza-
tion resulting from the weakening of central
authority and the spontaneous establishment
of workers' councils. Thus the regime has
been faced with a weakened economy at a time
when it is pledged to gratify long-contained
popular desires for better standards of living.
21. Hungary. Most of the active resistance
in Hungary has been weakened by attrition
and suppressed by increasingly firm Soviet-
sponsored security measures. Popular bitter-
ness, however, remains undiminished and pas-
sive resistance and economic noncooperation
have abated only slightly. There is evidence
that most government employees are not loyal
to the regime and that organized antiregime
groups continue to exist and to maintain com-
munication with each other. In its recent
declaration of policy, the Kadar regime con-
firmed its complete puppet status and thus
further reduced its chances of winning new
adherents. The regime's main difficulty at
present is in reconstituting dependable in-
digenous party cadres able to maintain its au-
thority throughout the country without the
presence or proximity of substantial Soviet
armed strength. Its problems are compli-
cated by severe economic dislocation in the
wake of the almost complete breakdown in
production discipline in mines and factories
during the past few months. It has felt com-
pelled to scrap the scheduled five-year plan
altogether, and to concentrate its efforts on
re-establishing a minimum level of economic
activity.
22. East Germany. Popular disaffection in
East Germany continues at a high level and
has increased in the wake of developments
in Poland and Hungary. Some unrest con-
tinues among the large urban working class,
and increased antiregime agitation among
students and intellectuals has led recently
to stern countermeasures. The regime's prob-
lems are increased by the failure to expand
food supplies in the face of a promised end to
rationing and by the decline in imports of
Polish coal. Nevertheless, pressures for vio-
lent change in East Germany are still held in
check by the presence of 22 Soviet divisions.
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Although there are probably differences of
opinion in the leadership of the East German
party on questions of economic policy and
First Secretary Ulbricht's dictatorial role in
the party, most party officials appear to have
rallied around the leadership in response to
the need for solidarity vis-a-vis a basically
anti-Communist populace. Solidarity between
Moscow and the Stalin-installed East German
leadership has been reaffirmed in the recent
Soviet-East German communique. The pop-
ulace at present appears disinclined to risk
revolutionary action in view of the harsh So-
viet repression of the June 1953 uprising and
the more recent Soviet action in Hungary.
23. Czechoslovakia. Although there was some
open agitation for liberalization and greater
independence last spring, in recent months
the only overt indications of unrest have been
some cautiously stated criticism of the leader-
ship in literary journals and some ferment
in Slovak party organizations. The demands
of local party organizations for a party con-
gress and of students and intellectuals for
greater freedom were rejected by the regime
during the summer. Traditions of caution
and accommodation to the existing authority
as well as a relatively prosperous economic
situation apparently dissuaded the populace
from attempting any action against the re-
gime in the wake of the Polish and Hungarian
crises. Anti-Soviet elements exist within the
Czech party, but presently lack leadership on
the national level. The absence of any impor-
tant opposition political or religious figure to
serve as a symbolic rallying point has aided
the regime in fragmenting and dissipating
popular opposition.
24. Rumania. While popular disaffection is
only a little less widespread in Rumania than
in Poland and Hungary, it appears to have no
effective means of opposing the orthodox pro-
Soviet regime of Gheorghiu-Dej. Sympathy
for the Hungarian rebels was widespread,
especially among the Hungarian minority.
Agitation for change was vigorous among Ru-
manian students in the late autumn, and the
chronic discontent of the predominantly peas-
ant population was increased by poor crop
returns. However, the lack of aggressive na-
6
tionalistic traditions in Rumania, together
with the uncompromising severity of the
leadership and the intimidating presence of
Soviet troops, has prevented the formation of
effective pressures for change.
25. Bulgaria.. Since Bulgaria traditionally has
been closely linked to Russia, anti-Soviet feel-
ing, while widespread, has tended to be less
intense than in other Eastern European states.
Nevertheless, popular dissatisfaction with the
Communist regime has remained strong dur-
ing the past year, and there appears to be
some factionalism within the party leadership
and discontent among prominent military fig-
ures. In the face of these developments, the
top Bulgarian leaders appear to have subor-
dinated their differences for fear that disunity
at the top would undermine them collectively.
Solidarity with the USSR has been vigorously
reaffirmed, and tightened security measures
have been invoked, including some rearrests
of party figures pardoned of alleged Titoism.
Thus, although Bulgaria has a national tradi-
tion which could serve as a basis for a nation-
al Communism movement, the top leadership
appears to have united behind a policy of con-
tinued submission to the will of Moscow.
Moreover, a common border with potentially
hostile neighbors serves to some extent to
balance desires for greater independence with
interest in the protection afforded by the
USSR.
26. Albania. Faced with a disaffected and
economically depressed population and sur-
rounded by unfriendly states, the Albanian
Communist regime sustains itself by clinging
to the ideological rigidity and police methods
of the Stalin era. It is the only Satellite which
has never recanted its anti-Titoist trials, and
it seized upon recent Yugoslav-Soviet differ-
ences to renew direct attacks on Yugoslavia.
The regime actively opposes internal liberali-
zation or any greater autonomy, fearing that
such tendencies would undermine the present
leadership and lead to encroachments by
Yugoslavia, Greece, or Italy. There is no
known opposition within the party capable of
effectively challenging the current leadership.
However, the consistently harsh tone of the
Albanian press since the Twentieth Party Con-
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gress and reports of some recent arrests and
executions probably indicate apprehension
about the extent of unrest in Albania and the
firmness of Soviet protective guarantees.
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS
Soviet Policy
27. Because the Satellites will almost certain-
ly continue to represent interests which the
USSR considers vital to its security (see para-
graph 11), we believe that Soviet policy will
continue to be directed toward the mainte-
nance of effective control over the area. Spe-
cifically, we believe that the Soviet leaders
will not, at least during the next several years,
seriously entertain the idea of a general po-
litical or military withdrawal from Eastern
Europe, even in return for a withdrawal of
US forces from Europe. It is possible, how-
ever, that there could eventually be some
reduction or even complete withdrawal of
Soviet troops stationed in one or another Sat-
ellite country if the USSR came to believe
that the local regime was reliable and secure
without such support.
28. Despite the firmness of the present Soviet
attitude on control of Eastern Europe, con-
tingencies could arise in which the USSR
might be confronted with such serious alter-
natives that it would feel compelled to enter-
tain the possibility of withdrawal. For ex-
ample, in the unlikely event that the Soviet
leaders believed themselves to be confronted
with a choice between general war or with-
drawal, it is possible that they would endeavor
to negotiate the best possible terms for with-
drawal. It is also conceivable that if the po-
litical and economic costs of maintaining
control continue to rise, the USSR might
eventually, given circumstances in which
there was no immediate challenge to its pres-
tige, consider withdrawal in return for sub-
stantial Western concessions with respect to
European security, the German question, and
the withdrawal of US forces. However, we
do not believe that either these or any other
combinations of circumstances which would
alter the Soviet determination to retain con-
trol of Eastern Europe is likely to occur in the
next several years.
7
29. We believe that the Soviet leaders have
concluded from the events of recent months
that allowing even limited concessions to
nationalist pressures was unwise, and that
they intend for some time to come to put pri-
mary emphasis on the internal security of
the Satellite regimes and on Soviet control
over them. This is indicated by the themes
now being emphasized in Soviet propaganda:
vigilance against reactionaries both at home
and abroad, continuation of the class strug-
gle, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and,
above all, the unity of the socialist camp. Ac-
cordingly, there will probably be a further
tightening of police controls and a renewed
insistence upon Moscow's ideological author-
ity. This renewed emphasis on repressive
measures will probably be applied discreetly,
however, with appropriate consideration for
local requirements. A systematic, uniform,
and provocative policy of repression would
probably be regarded by the Communist lead-
ers as disadvantageous, and possibly even
dangerous in the wake of the Polish and Hun-
garian events. Nevertheless, the security of
Communist regimes will clearly have priority
in Soviet thinking, and all policies affecting
the Satellites will be judged primarily for their
effects on the security of those regimes.
30. The need to win broader popular accept-
ance for the Satellite regimes will continue
to be felt, however, by both Satellite and
Soviet leaders. They cannot achieve lasting
stability for the regimes or make the desired
progress toward their political and economic
goals so long as the bulk of the populations
remains disaffected. Nevertheless, for some
time they will seek to avoid political conces-
sions which would stimulate opposition. How-
ever, the Communist leaders evidently now
believe that they can make some economic
concessions without running this risk, and
they will probably continue to make such
concessions even at the cost of sacrificing
earlier production goals.
31. A special Soviet policy is required in Po-
land, where the USSR no longer possesses
direct control over Polish internal policy. The
Soviet leaders are trying to regain this con-
trol, but the pro-Moscow faction in the Polish
Communist party is not now strong enough
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to obtain compliance with Soviet views. The
use of force by the USSR against the Gomulka
regime would almost certainly be resisted by
the bulk of the Polish nation and armed
forces. The result would probably be the in-
volvement of Soviet forces in large-scale mili-
tary operations which could spread to East
Germany and thus provoke a major inter-
national crisis.
32. Even though the costs and risks of mili-
tary intervention are sufficiently high to con-
vince the Soviet leaders that they must con-
tain their dissatisfaction with Polish internal
developments, the threat of such interven-
tion nevertheless remains real enough to de-
ter the Gomulka regime from encroaching on
essential Soviet security interests. The re-
gime will therefore continue to make its ter-
ritory available for Soviet military uses, in
particular a secure line of communications
to East Germany, and to refrain from openly
opposing the USSR and other Communist
states on international issues. The Soviet
leaders will probably accept this arrangement
for the time being, since it meets their mini-
mum security requirements and insures the
continued existence of a Communist regime
in Poland.
33. In our judgment, this arrangement will
not, however, represent a long-run solution
satisfactory to the Soviet leaders. It is pos-
sible that, at any time, they will conclude
that their prospects for reimposing full au-
thority by limited means are diminishing, and
that developments in Poland are becoming in-
creasingly dangerous to the Bloc. They might
then decide to apply major political and eco-
nomic pressures, and might eventually pro-
ceed to military measures. We believe it more
likely that they will proceed more deliber-
ately, hoping that, by taking advantage of
Gomulka's economic and political difficulties
and playing upon his dependence on the
USSR for military supplies and economic help,
they can rebuild the pro-Soviet faction within
the Polish party and armed forces and restore
a more reliable Communist regime. As a part
of this effort, other Communist parties have
been employed to put ideological pressure on
the Gomulka regime.
34. A major problem for the Soviet leaders,
if the present more nationalist leadership in
Poland consolidates its position, will be to
prevent Polish deviationist tendencies from
spreading to other Satellites. In many re-
spects ? press freedom, relations with the
church, the role of trade unions and factory
worker councils, agricultural collectivization
and procurement policies, political activity by
non-Party groups, the allocation of produc-
tion to consumer needs ? the Polish regime
is already heretic in terms of some of the
doctrines and practices which prevail else-
where in the Bloc. The question which the So-
viet leaders as well as the leaders of other Sat-
ellites must ask themselves is whether these
departures from the hitherto imposed uni-
formity of Communist policy can be safely tol-
erated. Both groups of leaders must see the
danger that the Polish experiments, if they
succeed, will set afoot further factionalism
within other Satellite parties. The Soviet
leaders probably fear that acceptance of the
innovations introduced in Poland could lead to
variations of doctrine and practice elsewhere
which would ultimately be very difficult for the
authoritarian Communist creed to contain.
Not least of all, the Soviet leaders would be
concerned that the liberalizing heresy could
spread rapidly to the USSR itself. Therefore,
they will maintain a steady pressure on the
Polish regime to keep its reformist tendencies
within an acceptable margin of conformity.
35. It is this same concern with the danger
of ideological deviation which has led the
USSR to drop for the time being its effort
to associate Yugoslavia more closely with the
Bloc. The Soviet leaders probably believe that
Yugoslavia's influence, while not a primary
cause, contributed to the troubles in Warsaw
and Budapest. They probably also believe that
their willingness to receive Tito with high
honors and their eager efforts to re-establish
party relations encouraged the belief in the
Satellite parties that the USSR was willing
to tolerate independent nationalist tenden-
cies. The polemics with Belgrade since the
Hungarian events make it clear that the
Soviet leaders intend to repair their previous
error. They probably feel that it is essential
to resume the ideological isolation of Titoism,
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but in order to avoid strengthening Yugoslav
ties with the West and alienating neutralist
opinion they will probably seek to avoid a new
break in state relations.
36. The attitude of Communist China will also
be an important factor affecting Soviet policy
toward the Satellites. The unprecedented
involvement of Communist China in Eastern
European affairs through Chou En-lai's recent
trip reflects the importance that Communist
China attaches to Bloc stability as well as
the seriousness of Soviet difficulties. This in-
volvement has placed Communist China in a
position to exert greater influence over Soviet
policy. Because of ideological affinity and
military and economic dependence, the Chi-
nese Communists have given strong support
to Soviet policy toward the Bloc. Concerned,
however, with both their own independence
from Moscow and Communism's image in
neutralist Asia, they have stressed the dangers
of "great power chauvinism" and the impor-
tance of "national peculiarities." While en-
dorsing repression in Hungary, Communist
China has not joined in Soviet criticisms of
the Polish press, and there is some evidence
of Sino-Soviet differences on the issue of
Poland. The Soviet leaders' freedom of action
in Eastern Europe may be limited by the de-
sire to maintain the approval and cooperation
of Communist China.
37. Soviet military policy toward the Satel-
lites will probably be changed somewhat as
a result of the Polish and Hungarian devel-
opments. The Polish army supported the
nationalist opposition and most Hungarian
soldiers either went over to the rebellion or
did not oppose it. The Soviet leaders prob-
ably now believe that for many purposes the
reliability of these forces cannot be counted
upon, and that, in circumstances where in-
ternal uprisings or foreign war raised hopes
of attaining national independence, they
might become an actual danger to Communist
regimes.
38. The USSR will probably not in the future
pursue a uniform policy of supporting main-
tenance of large Satellite armed force, but
will adapt its military programs to local con-
ditions. Intensive efforts will be undertaken
to improve security controls within the Satel-
lite forces, especially among higher officers.
Economic Plans and Prospects
39. General economic development in the Sat-
ellites for the next several years will probably
permit only small increases in living stand-
ards, even if there are no further outbreaks
of popular resistance. Improvements substan-
tial enough to alter political attitudes toward
the USSR and local regimes would require a
fundamental overhauling of some institutions
and policies. This would include such meas-
ures as a reduction in total investment and a
redirection of investment programs in favor
of housing, consumers goods, and agriculture;
abandonment of collectivization and state
trade channels; the revival of small private
industry; and some redirection of trade away
from Bloc partners to the West. Except in
Poland, sufficiently radical steps in these di-
rections will be very difficult for Soviet and
Satellite leaders to accept, and attempts to
undertake them would probably lead to fac-
tional disputes.
40. Nevertheless, while the regimes would
probably gain little politically from moder-
ate increases in consumer welfare, they have
much to lose if they aggravate discontent by
failing to achieve such increases or by per-
mitting declines. Thus grudging concessions
will be made, although they probably will not
be far-reaching enough to reduce significantly
the underlying disaffection of the population.
Other countries are likely to follow Poland,
Hungary, and Rumania in revising their long-
term economic plans to insure that some
gains for the consumer are in fact achieved.
Institutional changes will probably be adopted
in an effort to remove specific causes of fric-
tion, but administrative decentralization and
an active role for workers' councils in indus-
try cannot be carried very far without jeop-
ardizing political control and fulfillment of
plans. Wage and pension increases have
recently been instituted in most countries,
but these add to inflationary pressure at a
time when the supply of goods is inadequate.
Several Satellite regimes have declared their
intention to continue pressures for collectivi-
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zation, a policy which will negate much of the
effect of other concessions to the peasantry.
41. The general revision of Satellite plans, the
impending revision of the USSR's Sixth Five-
Year Plan, and the immediate economic dis-
locations caused by developments in Poland
and Hungary will force the Bloc to take up
again the difficult task of coordinating its
economies. Poland will probably seek to di-
rect a large share of its coal exports to West-
ern countries, despite the needs of its Bloc
trading partners. Other countries producing
commodities readily marketable for hard cur-
rencies (such as Rumanian oil and Hungarian
bauxite) might try to do the same, and sev-
eral Satellites may seek to avoid those aspects
of Bloc specialization which require them to
develop uneconomic industries or to be-
come unduly dependent upon their neighbors.
Thus the effort through CEMA to subordinate
national economic programs to an integration
of the separate Bloc economies will probably
be slowed.
42. Sufficient Soviet aid could, of course, help
the Satellites through a period of readjust-
ment. The USSR is waiving claims on many
Satellite economies and bolstering them with
hard currency loans and raw materials on
long-term credit, concessions which thus far
will cost it about $750,000,000 in 1957, and
may be increased later in the year. Except
for large grain shipments aimed at offsetting
1956 failures of Satellite harvests, these con-
cessions will not produce important immediate
results for Satellite peoples. The current re-
examination in the USSR of its own five-year
plan suggests that it would be reluctant to
raise its aid to the Satellites much more.
Thus, in addition to sanctioning or even sug-
gesting a moderation of the industrialization
effort in some Satellites, the Soviet leaders
probably would not prevent the Satellites
from expanding further their trade with the
free world, particularly with the underdevel-
oped countries.
43. The Polish economy is presently plagued
by general disorganization and low labor dis-
cipline. Provided these difficulties are re-
moved, Polish long-range economic prospects
will be somewhat better than those of most
other Satellites because of Poland's potential
for earning hard currency and its willingness
to introduce radical economic reforms. The
large majority of collective farms have al-
ready been dissolved, and many other meas-
ures of economic reform have been instituted
or are being discussed. At best, these re-
forms will take time to produce improvements
in living standards, and additional external
economic assistance would be necessary to
achieve prompt results. Poland has sought
long-term credits from the West, although
the Soviet leaders would almost certainly be
uneasy if agreements for such credits on a
large scale were made. Large-scale Western
assistance to Poland would tempt other Sat-
ellites to seek similar assistance and might
tend to undermine Bloc unity.
Political Stability
44. Prospects for political stability in Poland,
although remaining uncertain, have been im-
proved by the recent elections. The degree
of internal liberalization and independence
from the USSR achieved thus far does not
satisfy many Poles, who submit to the rule
of native Communists only in order to avoid
Soviet military intervention. Gomulka's elec-
tion victory, however, has strengthened his
hand vis-a-vis the USSR and pro-Soviet ele-
ments in his own party and will probably
enable him to move further towards satisfy-
ing domestic aspirations. Nevertheless, the
balance between Soviet requirements and Po-
lish desires will remain susceptible to upset
by such factors as serious economic depriva-
tions, provocative Soviet acts, a renewal of
the open struggle within the Polish party,
or a flareup of violence elsewhere in the Bloc.
Political stability would be considerably en-
hanced by an early improvement in living
standards, but this depends upon completion
of extensive economic reforms, the restora-
tion of labor discipline, and probably on for-
eign assistance as well.
45. In Hungary, the reimposition of political
authority will continue to depend upon the
regime's use of force. Fear of encouraging
anotheg uprising will prevent the regime from
granting the kind of concessions likely to
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reduce the hatred of Soviet domination. This
hatred will be strengthened by the decline in
living standards which appears unavoidable
in 1957. The regime will continue to be no
more respected than its Stalinist predecessor,
and its demands will encounter widespread
apathy and evasion. However, exhaustion and
the continued presence of Soviet troops will
probably prevent another general uprising.
Because antiregime sentiment is so widely
and consciously shared, however, passive re-
sistance will probably continue and might at
any time flare up into a general strike or
other overt acts which could bring renewed
violence.
46. While discontent is high in all the other
Satellites, none seems likely to manifest that
combination of party disunity and popular
boldness which led to the Polish and Hun-
garian revolutions. A potential threat to
political stability currently exists in East
Germany, where a fuel shortage has caused
difficulties which may lead to serious eco-
nomic disruptions possibly followed by strikes,
riots, or both. We believe, however, that
Soviet forces there are sufficient to discourage
a general rising or to suppress it quickly
should it occur.
47. Over the next several years, tensions be-
tween the Satellite regimes and their popu-
lations are likely to be generally higher than
prior to the events in Poland and Hungary.
The intimidating effect of the repression in
Hungary probably will be overshadowed by
the disappointment of expectations for eco-
nomic improvement, by the inability to grant
meaningful political reforms without encour-
aging extreme demands, and by the continued
employment of strict censorship and at least
a modified form of police terror. While there
will continue to be some danger of revolt in
the Satellites during the next few years, we
believe it more likely that major violence will
be avoided and that, if it should break out,
the USSR will move forcefully to suppress it.
48. The willingness of the Hungarians to op-
pose Soviet military force and their success
in carrying out slowdowns and sitdown strikes
have forced a new appraisal of the effective-
ness of armed totalitarian power in intimi-
dating opposition. The political, economic,
and even military costs of armed interven-
tion will lead the USSR to make every effort
to prevent situations from arising in which
this is the only Soviet alternative. On the
other hand, the bloody reprisals in Hungary
will give pause to rebellious elements there
and in the other Satellites.
49. The success or failure of the Gomulka
regime in Poland will greatly influence the
future role of nationalist-oriented elements
which continue to exist in most of the Satel-
lite Communist parties. So long as Poland
maintains its present course, nationalists in
other Satellite Communist parties will be en-
couraged to seek substantial gains in autono-
my, while the USSR will try to suppress moves
in this direction. In these circumstances,
nationalist elements may act not only to
disrupt party unity but also, as in Hungary,
to stimulate general resistance within the
population, although the USSR would prob-
ably take whatever measures were necessary
to maintain its control. It is also possible,
however, that nationalist elements, for ex-
ample in Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria, may act
in less disruptive ways, and gradually achieve
control of party organizations in a manner
that would be difficult for the USSR to pre-
vent. The reimposition by the USSR of com-
plete control over Poland would probably not
extinguish the forces of nationalism in the
Satellite Communist parties, but these ele-
ments would be obliged to curtail their aspira-
tions considerably and would for some time
have to accept only such limited concessions
as the USSR was willing to grant. In any
case, we believe that the persistent causes of
popular disaffection in the Satellites will con-
tinue to be present.
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