POLITICAL STABILITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN THROUGH 1958

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A010200030010-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2014
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: April 23, 1957
• Content Type: NIE

Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A010200030010-6
C.J '
NIE 80-57
23 April 1957
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 8 0 , 5 7
(Supersedes NIE 80-54)
POLITICAL STABILITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN THROUGH 1958
(Advance Conclusions)
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 23 April 1957. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of
Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and
the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The
Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained,
the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
SE
ET
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A010200030010-6
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A010200030010-6
POLITICAL STABILITY IN CENTRAL APERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN THROUGH 1958
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable developments in the Central American and
Caribbean Republics* through 1958 with particular reference to the
prospects for political stability throughout the area.
CONCLUSIONS
1. For the period of this estimate, the military, together with
the landed Gentry and wealthy merchants, are likely to dominate the
internal politics of all the Central American and Caribbean Republics
except Costa Rica. Reformist and popular elements, whose influence
has been checked for the past few years, are unlikely to upset the
status quo. However, palace revolutions may occur. (Para. 47)
Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, El Salvador,
Honduras) Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. The foreign possessions
in the Caribbean are not included.
2Ec?r
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A010200030010-6
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A010200030010-6
2. The Communists, whose influence has been declining over the past
few years, do not now constitute a serious threat to any regime in the
area. Communist capabilities are unlikely to increase except in Cuba,
and possibly in El Salvador. However, non-Communist subversion involving
exiled groups will continue to disturb the stability of the area. (Pares.
36-37, 48, 52)
3. Inasmuch as we do not believe that the Cuban government can
fully restore public order or check the emergence of new civilian
opposition elements, there is only an even .chance that the Batista regime
will survive the period of this estimate. A military-dominated junta would
be the most probable successor. Haiti is in serious political turmoil and
faces near economic collapse. So long as dissension exists among the
military, it is unlikely that a clear-cut solution will emerge. It is
probable that Haiti will seek emergency financial assistance from the
United States. Nothingis likely to endanger the government of the Dominican
Republic so long as Generalissimo Trujillo remains active. (Para 49)
4. Castillo Amos will probably continue his somewhat right-of-
center course in Guatemala. No opposition group is likely to pose a
serious threat to the stability of his regime. The Somozas and related
families will probably continue to dominate Nicaragua. The De in Guardia
-
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010200030010-6
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A010200030010-6
716
government in Panama and the Lemus regime in El Salvador, though less stable
than those in Nicaragua and Guatemala, will probably survive the period of
this estimate. In Honduras, the present military regime, with possible
shake-ups in the junta, is likely to continue in power through 1958. (Fara. 50)
5. In Costa Rica, because of a serious split in the administration
party, Figures will probably be unable to determine the outcome of the 1958
elections. It is likely that free elections will be held in Costa Rica,
approximately on schedule. We believe that the orientation of the newly
elected Costa Rican government will be somewhat more conservative than the
present one. (Para. 51)
6. Over the longer term, the pressures for reform and change will
continue to build up throughout the area.
The present military leadership
can provide no more than a braking action against pressures for change.
The growing size and importance of the educated professional and middle
classes will increasinLly threaten the position of the traditional ruling
groups. The eventual emergence of more broadly-based, reformist, nationalist
regimes, similar to that in Costa Rica, is probable, although for the
foreseeable future the great mass of the population will continue to have .an
inferior economic, social, and political status. This mass will be readily
exploited by demagogues. (Para. 53)
-
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A010200030010-6
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr2014/01/15:CIA-RDP79R01012A010200030010-6
7. For the period of this estimate, we believe that the relations
of the various states in the area with the US are likely to continue
favorable. The Panamanian government will probably continue to press
its demands for full implementation by the US of the 1955 Canal Treaty
and its related agreements. ,Stimulated by the Suez Canal situation,
Panama will also probably continue to agitate for further economic
benefits from Canal operations with the ultimate goal of operating the
Canal Company jointly with the US. However, we do not believe that it
will force any of these demands to the point of creating serious
friction between the US and Panama. (Para. 54)
- iv -
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/01/15: CIA-RDP79R01012A010200030010-6