NIE 80-57: POLITICAL STABILITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A010200030017-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2014
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: January 28, 1957
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
28 January 1.957
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, (OIR)
Lt. Col. E. T. Seaburn, USA (ACSI)
Captain W. S. Howell, USN. (ONI)
Co-Lonel W. B. Sawyer USAF (AFOIN 2132)
Colonel C. H. Dayhuff5 Jr., USA (JIG)
SUBJECT: NIE 83-57: POLITICAL STABILITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA
AND THE CARIB2EAN
The attached terms of reference were agreed on at the
meeting of the IA0 representatives on Fridays 25.January.
2. All agencies are invited to contribute to any section
within their competence to do so.
? 3. It is requested that contributions be received in
this office by the close of business on Monday, 25 February.
Distribution "B"
)
(WI P
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Deputy Assistut Director
National Estimates
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
January 1957
SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 80-57: POLITICAL STABILITY IN
CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
THE PROPLEM
To estimate probable developments in the Central American and
Caribbean Republichrough 1958 with particular teference to the prospects
for-stability throughout. the area.
NOTE
This estimate is intended to supersede NIE 80-54 of August 1954.
In addition to considering developments within and between the
Central American and Caribbean Republics, some reference to the situation
in Venezuela and in Mexico will be necessary to cover international
alignments exile activities, and Communism.
* Costa Rica, Cuba) Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Hondura4 Nicaragua, and Panama.
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QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
I. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE GENERAL STABILITY OF THE AREA
A. What are the general characteristics of the area from a political,
economic, and social standpoint (including the role of the
Church)? What basic factors make for permanent instability/
Contributors should review and update.. where necessary the
material contained in Sections II and VI of NIE 80-54.
What have been developments since mid-1954 in intra-regional
relationships (including ODECA)? To what extent have Central
American and Caribbean regimes intervened in one another's
affairs? How have Mexico and Venezuela contributed to unset-
tled political conditions in the area? Does the conflict
between "dictatorships" and "democracies" appaar to have
diminished, and why/ Whidicountries are more likely to dominate
the political developments of the area over the short term?
C. Have Central American and Caribbean exiles increased their revo-
lutionary activities since NIE 80-54? What are the centers of
revolutionary plotting, and why? What is Figueres' relationship
?to various exile groups? Has the Caribbean Legion been recon-
stituted, and if so, where, and in what form?
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D. Communism. Have Communist strength, influence, and/or capa-
bilities increased or decreased since mid-1954? (Include
particular references to Guatemala, Cuba, and Panama). Assess
the degree of Communist infiltration in government, the armed
forces, the educational system, and the labor movement. To
what extent can the Communists exploit nationalistic tendencies
and social discontent in the non-Communist population of the
area? Do they lend support to exile activities? What is the
extent and form of their international contacts? Has travel to
the Bloc increased since mid-195'4? What have been the attitudes
of the various governments toward Communism?
E. Armed forces. Analyze their capabilities, and the extent and
nature of their support and loyalty to their respective
governments.
F. What is the extent and role of US investment in the development
of the area, and what is :the attitude toward this investment?
Review and update material in Section VII and Annex III of
NIE
II. PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY WITHIN THE CENTRAL AMERICAN-CARIBBEAN
COUNTRIES*
A. Guatemala. Has Castillo consolidated his political position?
Has his government been successful in gaining the support of
* See f000tnote next page.
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labor, middle class elements, and landholding groups? To what .
extent does the military continue to back his regime? Has the
Castillo government in effect moved to the right since mid-1956?
If so, to what extent has it deviated from the objectives and
achievements of the Revolution of 1944, and what are the
implications of this with reference to its prospects for contin-
uance in power? Which elements now represent the greatest
potential threat to the regime? What is the likelihood of
attempted overthrcw by exile elements? Are Guatenialats claims
to British Honduras likely to cause friction on the inter-
national scene?
Panama. To what extent does the National Guard back the present
government? Could the friction between de la Guardia and Diaz
threaten the stability of the government? Has the unsolved
murder of Remon contributed to continuing political tension?
To what extent is de la Guardia likely to be successful in his
efforts to reduce corruption in the government? Is the Canal
issue likely to be used to divert popular attention from
internal problems, And what are probable consequences?
* We propose the preparation of an appendix on the armed forces in
the area, to include their strengths and equipment. Please update
Annex II of NIE 80-54. We also propose the preparation of a map
showing the location of US military facilities in the area.
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C. Cuba. Has Batista further lost popular support since NIE 80-54?
What is the extent of Batista's political and military support,
and is he likely to retain this support? In the event partial
and/or national elections are postponed, would Batista be able
to stay in power? What are the implications of the recent
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abortive Fidel Castro-led insurrection with regard to further
opposition activity? What would be the most likely type of
successor government to the Batista regime?
D. Haiti. Analyze briefly recent events in Haiti which led to
Magloire's ouster. Has political tension increased since his
ouster, and why? How has the deteriorating economic situation
contributed to political instabilityr and to what extent is it
likely to continue to do so? What is the present and likely
future role of the army in the political process? Are national
elections likely in the spring of 1957, and if so, what is
the probable outcome?
E. Nicaragua. Are the February 1957 election results likely to
contribute to the pacification of the country? What are the
capabilities of the civilian opposition? To that extent does
the National Guard back the present regime, and under what
circumstances might it split and/er withdraw its support? Is
it likely Somoza will introduce more liberal policies than those
of his late father? Do exile groups represent a significant
threat to Somozals continuance in power? Has Anastasio's death
reduced the prospects of Nicaraguan participation in the pattern
of subversion in the area?
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F. Honduras. How do preSent economic problems affect the present
political situation in Honduras? How much civilian support
does the three-man military junta enjoy? To what extent has
it succeeded in dissipating political tension in Honduras?
What are the chances cf the military remaining united in support
of the junta and its objectives? What divisiveness exists
within the junta? What is the li%elihood of early elections?
What are the probable consequences if they are held? If they
are not held?
G. ?Dominican Republic? What are the political situation and
probable ? developments? What is the nature and extent of
Trujillo's role in the current subversive pattern of the area?
H. Costa Rica. Has Figueres maintained popular support? To what
extent has he moderated his position and activities as the
self-styled champion of democratic forces on the Central
American-Caribbean scene? Has this lessened the likelihood
of attmpts to oust him by exiled opposition. 437:tents and/or
other. regimes? How significant is the split :L ',he National
. Liberen Party with reference to opposition ,.eepabthties and
the probable -outcome of the 1958 presidential eleoi;iens? What
are the prospects for -a fair and orderly election?
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I. El Salvador. What are the political situation and probable
developments? What are the capabilities of the Lemus governmebt
for remaining aloof from the subversive activities involving
Its neighbors?
J. In Ithich of the Central American-Caribbean Republics are sudden
unpredictable political changes resulting from political
turmoil, government seizure, and/or assassination the more likely
to occur, and why?
III. INTERNATIONAL ILaLTIONS
A. With the :S
10 Is the basic analysis contained in paras. 71-72, NIE 80-54/
concerning attitudes toward and cooperation with the US,
still valid?
2. What have been the principal developments since. mid-I954
and what are likely trends with respect to political,
(includingilemisphere defense)
economic, and military cooperation/with the US?
What are the present policy and likely long-range
intentions of Panama with regard to the Canal .Zone,
particularly in the light of the Suez Crisis?
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Are
Are problems arising out of the Canal issue likely to cause
serious friction between the US and Panama? between the US
and the Caribbean Republics?
B. With the Soviet Bloc. What is the nature of diplomatic and
commercial ties between the Republics and the Soviet Bloc?
What are probable developments?
C. With neir;hborjng republics. What are likely developments in
relations among the Central Ametican-Caribbean countries and
neighboring republics? To what extent are Mexico and
Venezuela likely to increase their influence in the area?
IV. LONGER-TERM. PROSPECTS FOR THE AREA
A. Is the outlook one of continued political instability, and why/
8. Is it likely that in general, the forces resistant to change
will maintain political power for the foreseeable future? What
does this mean in terms of cooperation with the US?
C. What is the likelihood of violent social upheaval within the
area as pressures for economic and political change increase?
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V. VALIDITY STUDY OF NIE 8O-54
Please attach to your contribution a brief over-all critique of
NIE 8o-54.
VI. POST.MORTEM
Please also attach a resume of the principal intelligence
deficiencies noted during the preparation of Your contribution.
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