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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 25 APR 195',; NIE 10-58 4 March 1958 , 345 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 10-58 (Supersedes NIE 10-55) ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. Concurred in by the INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE on 4 March 1958. Concurring were The Director of Intelli- gence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelli- gence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction. Catiti46414-N0.. NO-.CHANG5 IN CLAW E.] EZCLA3S:FiEr3 CLASS. CHAN(.4r.:*: 0: TS- NE:KT r.E.koEV'' 111 FIEVIE.WER:_. 4 5 /4. r ? 1G-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE 1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per- sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments: a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State b. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Army c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation h. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or Agency 2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli- cable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrange- ment with the Office of Central Reference, CIA. 3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953. 4. The title of this estimate, when used separately from the text, should be classified: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY WARNING This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans- mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. DISTRIBUTION: White House National Security Council Department of State Department of Defense Operations Coordinating Board Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of Investigation Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC THE PROBLEM To appraise the intensity and scope of dissidence and resistance in the Sino- Soviet Bloc, and to estimate the resistance potential in times of peace and war. INTRODUCTORY NOTE Like its predecessor,' this estimate is a brief appraisal of the causes, nature, and extent of anti-regime dissidence and re- sistance within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. It is based upon eleven country studies pre- pared by the inter-agency Resistance In- telligence Committee established by the IAC. These studies, which analyze dissi- dence and resistance in each country of the Bloc, have been noted but not indi- vidually approved by the IAC; they are appended as annexes to the estimate itself. In the estimate and the annexes, the following terminology is used: Dissidence ? a state of mind involving discontent or disaffection with the regime. Resistance ? dissidence translated in- to action. Organized resistance?resistance which is carried out by a group of indi- viduals who have accepted a common 1 NIE 10-55, "Anti-Communist Resistance Poten- tial in the Sino-Soviet Bloc," 12 April 1955. purpose, agreed upon leadership, and worked out a communications system. Unorganized resistance ? resistance carried out by individuals or loosely asso- ciated groups which may have been formed spontaneously for certain limited objectives, without over-all plan or strategy. Passive resistance ? resistance, organ- ized or unorganized, which is conducted within the framework of the resister's normal life and duties, and involves de- liberate nonperformance or malperform- ance of acts which would benefit the regime, or deliberate nonconformity with standards of conduct established by the regime. Active resistance ? resistance, organ- ized or unorganized, which expresses itself in positive acts against the regime. It may or may not involve violence, and may be conducted openly or clandestinely. It may take such forms as intelligence collection, psychological warfare, sabo- tage, guerrilla warfare, assistance in SECRET 1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 2 escape and evasion, open defiance of authority, or preparatory activity for any of the above. With the progressive consolidation of Communist control, however, active re- sistance has in general tended to take less the forms mentioned above, and to be expressed more in such forms as strikes, demonstrations, and open manifestations of intellectual and other dissent. While in many cases these activities are not wholly motivated by anti-regime atti- tudes, they nevertheless have anti-regime connotations. ESTIMATE Scope and Intensity of Dissidence and Resistance 1. Dissidence continues to be widespread in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Improvements in living standards and such relaxation of regime con- trols as took place during the last three years have been, except perhaps in the USSR, in- sufficient to reduce substantially general dis- content. Save in semi-independent Poland, nationalist anti-regime feelings in Eastern Europe are as strong as ever. In addition to common grievances, various population ele- ments harbor special resentments, such as those of peasants towards collectivization, workers towards Communist labor discipline, intellectuals and students towards enforced ideological conformity, believers towards anti- religious measures. 2. The scope and intensity of dissidence, how- ever, varies widely from country to country. One of the most important distinctions in both peacetime and wartime resistance poten- tial is whether or not the regime is viewed as representing the national rather than an alien interest. Except among certain of its own national minorities, the Soviet regime has succeeded in identifying itself among its own population as a legitimate national gov- ernment. But Communist regimes in the Far East have made somewhat less progress in this respect, and those in Eastern Europe, again excepting Poland, have failed almost completely. In the divided countries, the existence of a functioning alternative gov- ernment exercises some attraction which operates to increase dissidence, but this ap- pears to be a major factor only in East Germany. Other variations in resistance potential arise from differences in national character, in historical traditions, in economic conditions, and in religious attitudes. 3. In the last few years most Bloc regimes have sought to reduce popular discontent and to narrow the rifts between the regimes and their peoples. The leashing of the Soviet secret police, the decollectivization of Polish agriculture, and efforts to improve living standards are cases in point. These policies have had some success. On the other hand, the very trend toward relaxation of controls and resulting confusion as to regime policies have given greater scope to overt manifesta- tions of discontent. Sharp criticism arose, for example, among Moscow writers and Chi- nese intellectuals when the regimes experi- mented with a looser application of controls. In Hungary and Poland, inhibitions upon the use of police terror and serious splits within the Communist parties permitted dissi- dence to swell into active resistance, in Hun- gary on a mass scale. In reaction, the Bloc regimes have tightened their controls, and in Hungary after the bloody suppression of the revolt the regime reverted to harsh repression. The Bloc leaders have striven to insure party unity, to circumscribe the range of permissi- ble criticism, and to provide various reminders of their physical power. As a result, organ- ized active resistance is negligible in the Bloc at the present time. Resistance Potential in Peacetime 4. During the next few years, conditions of life probably will not improve sufficiently to SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET reduce dissidence significantly in most coun- tries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This dissidence will probably continue to be expressed pri- marily in various forms of passive resist- ance ? noncompliance with regime orders, economic malingering, other low-risk ways of expressing individual opposition. So long as the regimes do not revert to all-out repression, there is also likely to be some continuation of those forms of active resistance ? strikes, demonstrations, open expressions of intellec- tual dissent ? which have characterized the past few years. In particular, such manifes- tations are likely in parts of Eastern Europe. In Communist China, some disturbances by peasants and ethnic minorities are also likely. 5. Moreover, many Bloc regimes recognize that the cultivation of popular support and the eliciting of broader initiative would re- quire not only economic betterment but some degree of liberalization of controls. However, they also recognize that such steps increase the difficulty of maintaining party unity and complete control over the populace. Thus they will probably accede to popular pressures only in those cases in which they regard it as relatively safe to do so. But any relaxation of controls will tend to give dissident elements opportunities to press their grievances in in- direct ways. 6. Further, each regime's problems may be increased and complicated by developments elsewhere in the Bloc and influences from the Free World. The repercussions of the USSR's de-Stalinization campaign and the events in Hungary and Poland have agitated dissidents throughout the Bloc, in some cases to the point of stimulating various forms of resist- ance. Intra-Bloc variations in ideology and policy have contributed to dissatisfaction and ferment among intellectuals and students. As contacts with non-Bloc countries increase, unfavorable comparisons will arise. In con- sequence, campaigns against dissidence, while primarily concerned with its domestic sources, must also contend with unsettling influences from abroad. 7. The difficulties of dealing with dissidence, various forms of resistance, and foreign influ- ences may lead to policy vacillations between "hard" and "soft" lines or to intra-party dis- putes. These developments might evoke greater resistance activity. This activity, however, would tend to be directed towards the elimination of specific grievances rather than to the overthrow of the existing regimes, since the latter course would seem highly un- promising unless there were a serious prior weakening of party and police. 8. For these reasons we regard major out- breaks of active resistance as unlikely, al- though these cannot be excluded in certain volatile situations in Eastern Europe. Spo- radic local outbreaks will probably recur, but they will almost certainly be within the capa- bilities of security forces to repress. The regime's counter-weapons ? primarily the monopoly of physical force (coupled with an evident willingness to use it) and a near- monopoly of means of communication ? will remain formidable. In Poland the regime has shown less reliance on these weapons, but a primary safeguard against violent resistance is the widespread recognition, to which the Catholic Church lends important support, that it would provoke Soviet intervention. Here, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt and the absence of Western assistance have under- lined the futility of violent resistance. 9. Emigre organizations of former Bloc na- tionals have, in general, lost effective contact with their homelands and are little known to Bloc populations. Virtually all of them have suffered from internal bickering, and many have been penetrated by Communist agents. Emigre groups do not significantly contribute to resistance potential, and with rare excep- tions their leaders would not be welcomed to positions of power after liberation. Resistance Potential in Event of General War 10. At the outset of a general war, patriotism would act to diminish sharply the resistance potential in most of the USSR and to some extent in Communist China, though in the latter case this would depend more on the nature of the conflict. In the Far Eastern satellites, any increase in resistance potential SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET probably would be only marginal. But in the satellite states of Eastern Europe, as well as in certain minority areas of the USSR and Com- munist China (e.g. the Baltic States, Georgia, Western Ukraine, Tibet) , the outbreak of war would rekindle hopes of liberation and immediately increase the resistance potential. This potential probably would be highest in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. We believe, however, that unless the tide of war ran sharply against the Bloc and its military and security forces were significantly weak- ened, resistance activities of a para-military nature could be prevented or at least confined to manageable -proportions. 11. While we conclude that resistance activi- ties probably would not be a major factor so long as the outcome of the main conflict re- mained dubious, resistance activity probably could be expected, especially in Eastern Eu- rope, in the form of intelligence collection and transmission, aid to Western personnel in escape and evasion operations, and minor sab- otage. The level of such activity would vary considerably, because of differences in resist- ance potential, and also as a result of the amount of outside assistance available and the location of battle lines. 12. Only conjectures can be made concerning the impact on resistance activity of the use of nuclear weapons. Much would depend on such factors as the extent and locale of the attacks, the types of weapons used, the dam- age caused, the extent to which regime con- trols were disrupted, etc. Among population 4 groups suffering direct losses, survivors prob- ably would first be stunned, then concentrate their energies exclusively on problems of per- sonal survival. In areas sufficiently distant from attack to be largely unaffected, resist- ance might increase as dissident elements found that Communist controls had been weakened; on the other hand, they might con- clude that nuclear weapons were so decisive that extensive resistance was irrelevant or un- necessary. Groups outside the attack area but sufficiently close to be caught in the re- sulting chaos would be subject to all these effects. It is possible that, in certain cases, attacks against selected targets might weaken the regime's anti-resistance capabilities more than they impaired resistance potential. 13. The question of responsibility for the in- itiation of general war probably would not substantially affect the will to resist the regimes in the Bloc countries. Nor would the nationality of attacking forces be likely, in the majority of cases, to have great bearing upon the cooperation offered by resistance ele- ments. Exceptions would be cases in which long-standing national antipathies might con- flict to an important degree with anti-regime feelings, e.g. (a) German forces in Czechoslo- vakia, Poland, and the USSR; (b) Yugoslav, Greek, and Turkish forces in Bulgaria; (c) Greek, Italian, and Yugoslav forces in Al- bania; and (d) Japanese forces in North Korea and Communist China. On the other hand, in the divided countries anti-regime re- sistance might increase if military forces of the non-Communist government were used. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 5 COUNTRY ANNEXES A. ALBANIA B. BULGARIA C. COMMUNIST CHINA D. CZECHOSLOVAKIA E. EAST GERMANY F. HUNGARY G. NORTH KOREA H. NORTH VIETNAM I. POLAND J. RUMANIA K. USSR These Annexes were prepared by the Resistance Intelligence Com- mittee of the IAC. They have been noted but not approved by the IAC. The cut-off date of the information contained in these Annexes is 1 January 1958. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 7 ANNEX A ? ALBANIA BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE 1. The continuing low standard of living in Albania since the Communist take-over in 1944 has been a major factor in the general dissidence prevalent among the great ma- jority of the population. The Communist take-over in Albania was greatly facilitated by the promises made by the Communist-domi- nated National Liberation Front during World War II of basic economic and political reforms which would grant the people "freedom, bread, and land." The program for political independence from foreign rule and for im- provement of social and economic conditions had a dynamic appeal, particularly among the intellectuals, youths, and poor peasants in central and southern Albania where living conditions were wretchedly poor and syste- matic exploitation by the local feudal land- owners was the rule. But after 13 years of rule the Communist regime not only has failed to fulfill its promises of providing the Albanians with a decent standard of living but has imposed an economic system of regi- mentation, oppression, and exploitation that was unheard of even in the period of the Otto- man Empire. The government has repeated- ly admitted that attempts to improve the availability of foodstuffs have met with little, if any, success, and that during certain periods of the year the food situation becomes very critical. 2. Politically, there are two basic factors which account for the widespread hostility the great majority of Albanians bear toward the present regime. First, the Communist ideology has for nearly all Albanians a defi- nite Slavic connotation and is therefore con- sidered wholly alien. It is, moreover, regarded as merely another instrument through which the Slays can dominate the country. Just as the Ottoman Empire was resisted for five cen- turies because of its alien traditions and political and social institutions, so today the Communist regime is opposed as equally alien even though its leaders are native Albanians. 3. The second factor is the ancient traditions of and beliefs in individual freedom and the hatred of central authority. No past govern- ment in Albania, either foreign or native, has been so ruthless as the present one in impos- ing its will on the mountaineers in the north and the peasantry in central and southern areas. Individual freedom has been com- pletely suppressed; the closely knit family pattern has been virtually destroyed; and vil- lage life, around which most social and politi- cal activities have evolved in the past, has now been placed under the control of local Com- munist functionaries whose chief task is not to serve the villagers but to carry out the unpopular program and policies of the regime. The greatest opposition to the regime has originated among mountaineers and villagers, who resent the inroads into their economic and family life by the central authorities. 4. Religion does not seem to have played a ma- jor role in the dissidence that has developed against the regime. There are two basic rea- sons for this situation. First, religion in Alba- nia has found it difficult to offer a united front to Communism because the population is di- vided into three denominations: Moslem, com- prising about 70 percent of the population; Or- thodox Christians, about 20 percent; and Ro- man Catholics, about 10 percent. The regime has fostered and exploited this division. Sec- ond, aside from the Catholic element, the Al- banians as a whole are not devoutly religious. Their religious sentiments are expressed pri- marily in ancient traditions and tribal cus- toms representing something essentially Al- banian, whereas the three existing denomina- tions have often been associated with spheres of foreign influence: the Ottoman Empire, the Greek Church (which dominated the SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 8 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET Albanian Orthodox Church until 1922) , and the Italian influence through the. Roman Catholic Church. The regime had little diffi- culty to convert the Moslem and Orthodox Churches into instruments of Communist rule. The Roman Catholics, however, having expressed somewhat deeper religious senti- ments and strong opposition to Communism, have been subject to severe persecution. In fact, the regime has destroyed the Catholic Church as an independent institution. 5. While the regime was able to eliminate or subdue the three principal religious institu- tions in Albania, it has not been able to eradi- cate the religious feelings, beliefs, and cus- toms of the Albanian people. Despite anti- religious propaganda and repressive measures, the Albanians continue to attend church serv- ices and maintain their customs and beliefs. The Albanian peasants in particular, compris- ing nearly 80 percent of the country's 1,400,- 000 population, not only refuse to work on religious holidays or wedding days, but have been known to slaughter hundreds of rams to be consumed on such holidays in violation of government restrictions. In some sections of the country where threats and pressure have failed, the regime has used force against what it considers an ancient practice damaging to the present economy. MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS 6. Dissidence toward the regime apparently remains strong among all classes. With the possible exception of the higher governmental and Party bureaucracy, the ranking army offi- cers, and a limited number of intellectuals there is no group which derives real benefit from the regime. The denigration of Stalin has had hardly any effect on the Albanian Communist leaders who continue their repres- sive rule without the benefits of "relaxation." Large numbers of the population are still in jails and labor camps. 7. The Peasantry. Albania is basically a country of peasants and villagers, who as a group comprise the largest and most formida- ble anti-Communist element in the country. As stated above, during the war the Commu- nist movement found considerable support in the south among the poor and landless peasants. This group profited by the so-called agrarian reforms of 1945-46 but shortly there- after became thoroughly disillusioned and dis- affected. The principal reasons for its dis- affection, as well as for that of nearly all the country's peasants, were the crushing taxes, the heavy obligatory delivery quotas, and the low prices paid by the government for agri- cultural products; the seizure of livestock; the imposition of "voluntary" (forced) labor; the imposition of the agricultural collective sys- tem; and the oppression and terror practiced by the Communist security police. The Al- banian peasant is a fierce individualist, proud of his past independence; he knows nothing of, and cares less for, the subtleties of the Communist ideology. However, despite their opposition to the regime, the peasants have been unable to stem the tide of total collecti- zation of agriculture that is presently being conducted by the regime. This deep peasant discontent accounts for much of the resist- ance potential in the armed forces, among the youth in the countryside, among peasants who have been drafted for work in industrial projects and mining, and among other groups of peasant origin still having contact with friends and relatives on the land. 8. Youth. Albanian youth, both rural and urban, began resisting the Italian occupiers immediately after the latter invaded the coun- try in 1939. Later the Communists, camou- flaging themselves in the National Liberation Front and using patriotic slogans, deceived large sections of the country's youth and drew them under its banner. Thus the youth be- came the backbone of the Communist move- ment in Albania during the war. However, disillusionment began to set in soon after the Communists took over the country and re- vealed their true political, social, and eco- nomic aims. By 1950 Communist propaganda had ceased to be effective among the great majority of the youth, especially in the coun- tryside, because of first-hand experience with "voluntary" labor and because of widespread economic want and inequality which youth saw in the villages. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 9. Industrial Workers and Civil Servants. Aside from a relatively small number of work- ers who have risen from the ranks to man- agerial positions in the nationalized indus- tries, the laboring class in Albania has gained nothing under the Communist regime. Wages are low; prices are generally high; and non- rationed goods are either in short supply or prohibitively expensive. There is constant pressure to meet the high work norms based on achievements of shockworkers and stak- hanovites; there are stringent restrictions on changing jobs and heavy penalties for tardi- ness or breaking of work discipline; some "vol- untary" (forced) work must be performed by all laborers; frequent political meetings after work are compulsory; various deductions for Communist publications and contributions are made, etc. Like most other Albanians, the workers have shown signs of disaffection and are looking forward to the day of libera- tion from the Communist regime. Among this class may be included the low-level office workers and civil servants, all of whom are subject to the same general restrictions and heavy obligations as the laboring class. 10. Intelligentsia and Clergy. The intelli- gentsia of pre-Communist Albania consisted of older elements who since the beginning of the century had worked for the creation of an independent country, and of younger people who were brought up during the period of national revival after World War I and were imbued with Western culture and ideas. Some of the younger intellectuals, mostly school teachers, government officials, army officers, and journalists, who in the period 1925-39 were disgusted with the behavior of King Zog and his ruling group and with the feudal land- owners, gradually tended to the left. During World War II they became the backbone of the national liberation movement through which the Communists managed to seize con- trol of the country. Other intellectuals, how- ever, opposed the rise of Communism and a number of them fought actively against the Communist-controlled Partisan formations. Balli Kombetar (National Front) , the strong- est anti-Communist organization during the war, was founded by nationalist democratic elements among intellectuals, both old and young, who had the vision to foresee the catas- trophe that would befall the country in the event of a Communist success. Although a large number of anti-Communist intellec- tuals were either driven out of the country or imprisoned or executed when the Communists assumed control, there are still strong ele- ments among those remaining who are thor- oughly dissatisfied with the regime and who look toward liberation. There is only a hand- ful of intellectuals in Albania today who could be relied upon completely by the regime. 11. As noted above, the Moslem and Orthodox clergymen have been cowed into submission by the Tirana regime and the Catholic clergy almost completely eliminated. However, smouldering hatred exists among most of the remaining clergymen, particularly the Cath- olic, and they represent a definite resistance potential. 12. Armed Forces. Morale in the Albanian Armed Forces is low and the majority of the men probably feel hostile toward the present Albanian regime. This hostility arises pri- marily from basic dislike of the present regime and from resistance of individual Albanian conscripts to military control. Moreover, the ranks in the armed forces derive chiefly from peasant families and as such have the same antagonism toward the regime as their elders in the villages. For this reason the army ranks appear to be considered by the regime as unreliable. This is indicated by the fact that units of the armed forces have never been employed to stamp out guerrilla bands. Most of the permanent commissioned and noncom- missioned officers, comprising perhaps one- third of the total armed forces strength, were selected because of their apparent loyalty to the regime. Nevertheless, during the past two years, there has been evidence of some dissi- dence among high-ranking officers, some of whom were dismissed. The demobilization late in 1955 and early in 1956 of a considerable number of officers considered unreliable by the regime not only embittered those affected but also had a demoralizing effect on others still in the service. This substantial dissi- dence potential, however, is not organized and has not been focused on a uniform objective. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 10 SECRET INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE 13. Reliable reports on the people's attitudes in Albania indicate that more than 90 percent of the country's population is disaffected with the Communist regime. The intensity of the anti-regime feeling ranges from a rather mild, chronic irritation on the part of disillusioned Communists and Party sympathizers to a vio- lent hatred on the part of those persons or groups who have been directly harmed by the regime. With the exception of the national and most local Party leaders, some members of the top bureaucracy, and the security forces, there is at present no group, including the Party rank-and-file, which escapes the police terror of the regime or derives material or other benefits from it. Nor does the popu- lation have hopes for a better future under Communist rule. There are many hidden enemies of the regime, despite the constant efforts of the secret police to root them out. The suppression of certain groups, which are considered by the regime as past redemption, and their internment in labor or concentra- tion camps, only adds to the widespread ill feeling. 14. Although there are signs of hostility toward the Soviet military and civilian experts in Albania, derived from their preferential treatment and higher wages, there is no evi- dence that the population holds the Soviet Union, whose armed forces played no part in imposing the Communist regime on them, pri- marily responsible for their present plight. Hostility appears to be directed chiefly against the native Communists. Even the more edu- cated people hold the central authorities re- sponsible for imposing an alien ideology on the country. There appear to be compara- tively few Albanians who are fully aware of controls and pressures exerted on the regime by the Kremlin. In the countryside hostility is directed almost wholly against local Com- munist and governmental functionaries who implement the regime's policies. It is signifi- cant that the vast majority of escapees from Albania are villagers, not former members of the bourgeois class or of the bureaucracy. The village escapees know little if anything about Communist ideology. TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953 15. The Soviet-Yugoslav declaration of June 2, 1955 recognizing the existence of "different roads to socialism" and the denigration of Stalin in the spring of 1956 gave rise to serious frictions within the Albanian Party's top lead- ership, but there is no evidence that the pop- ulation at large was affected in any measur- able way by these events. The Soviet- Yugoslav declaration encouraged nationalist- minded members of the Party's Central Com- mittee to request that the Party follow a more independent policy vis-a-vis Moscow and to advocate the liberalization and democratiza- tion of Party life and the establishment of friendly relations with the West as well as the East. These men were at once deprived of their army ranks and dismissed from their Party and government posts. 16. The denigration of Stalin also had serious repercussions in the Albanian Party and re- sulted in further purges in April?May 1956. In April a number of Party intellectuals, offi- cials, and army officers at a meeting of the Party Committee of Tirana pressed for the re- habilitation of all Party groups who had been purged prior to Stalin's death, requested that relations with Yugoslavia be normalized as soon as possible, attacked the top Party lead- ership for its rigid Stalinist views, belittled the economic "successes" of the regime, and asked that measures be taken at once to de- mocratize and liberalize Party and state life. Prompt and severe measures were taken against all dissenters, but difficulties within and outside the Party continued. 17. The anti-regime sentiments of intellec- tuals, both Communist and non-Communist, appear to have been fanned by the Soviet- Yugoslav rapprochement, the Polish rebellion and the Hungarian revolution. These events probably had some positive effects on the Al- banian resistance potential. But the defeat of the insurgents in Hungary resulted in dis- appointment among the Albanian national- ists and strengthened Communist morale, as the Free World, in the Albanian view, did not dare to oppose Soviet power. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 11 RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE 18. Although no general unrest and disturb- ance were reported in Albania immediately after the death of Stalin, special security measures were taken by the regime. Security pursuit battalions continued their punitive expeditions against those regions suspected of giving aid and comfort to resistance bands. The activities of the small, scattered, poorly- organized-and-equipped bands in the moun- tainous north began to diminish in 1953 and by 1955 had become virtually nonexistent. However, there have been reports of small, isolated guerrilla bands in areas near Tirana which in the past year have attacked head- quarters of local People's Councils and killed Party, government, and police officials. 19. No organized resistance group is known to exist today in Albania. Activities reported from time to time, such as assassinating local Party leaders and governmental officials, am- bushing army and state transport trucks and security units, setting fire to cooperative warehouses and state depots and factories, and committing sabotage, are probably ac- tions of local individuals or of persons tem- porarily infiltrated from abroad. 20. There are signs that some unorganized resistance, both active and passive, continues throughout the country. Open hostility toward the regime has been manifested chiefly in complaints about the cost of living and shortages of food. Riots reportedly occurred late in 1956 and early in 1957 in a number of cities protesting against economic depriva- tions, but these were easily suppressed by the security forces. In certain areas in the north the people are said to have pillaged grain depots of the cooperatives; workers at various mines and factories staged token demonstra- tions against shortages of food and low wages; students at some high schools distrib- uted tracts against the top rulers, and anti- Communist slogans and caricatures of Soviet and Albanian leaders were written or drawn on school walls. Workers show no interest in raising productivity. Peasants' resistance to collectivization consists mainly of failure to comply with the regime's measures to increase agricultural output or to meet quotas. All classes fail to pay, or try to avoid paying, taxes. Youth has largely resisted Communist indoctrination, and the people defiantly con- tinue to practice religion. The stagnation of the Albanian economy probably stems in part from this attitude of passive resistance. ROLE OF EMIGRES 21. Efforts by emigre groups to organize re- sistance within Albania have failed. No known lines of communication exist between these groups and the Albanian people. Politi- cal jealousies and bickering have weakened the various emigre parties and organizations. The aims of the National Committee for a Free Albania had been to guide and encourage resistance to Communist tyranny and to or- ganize Albanians abroad to give effective aid to the resistance. The committee, however, was dissolved in April 1956 as a result of its disunity and ineffectiveness. A new emigre organization, the Free Albania Committee, formed under the sponsorship of the Free Eu- rope Committee, shows no promise of greater effectiveness. However, there are definite signs that Greece and Yugoslavia, especially the latter, continue to infiltrate agents into Albania for purposes of subversion. There may also be some substance to the Albanian charges that in the spring and summer of 1956 the Yugoslays recruited former influen- tial Communists for the purpose of overthrow- ing the present Albanian leadership and re- placing it with pro-Yugoslav Communists. A plot of this kind was exposed by the Albanian authorities in September 1956. REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE 22. The Albanian Army has a strength of 30,000 and in addition, the regime has at its disposal 10,000 militarized security troops. Frontier Troop elements, distributed fairly uniformly along the Greek, Yugoslav, and coastal borders, constitute 6,000 of this figure. An estimated 4,000 men are organized into Interior Troop units which are stationed throughout the country, with the largest single concentration in the Tirana area. In addition to these militarized forces, the Corn- SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 12 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET munist Government controls an overt and covert policing apparatus totaling an addi- tional 10,000 men. Thus, the Albanian re- gime has a control ratio of one soldier, police- man, or agent (in addition to countless in- formants) for every 29 Albanian citizens. In addition, the regime has instituted the stand- ard police controls used in all Communist countries: identity cards for all citizens over 15 years of age, travel permits along border areas, as well as work and residence cards. Through these measures the regime has suc- ceeded in cowing the people and instilling in them a sense of insecurity and total fear. The effectiveness of these measures is attested by the fact that open organized resistance has been practically wiped out in the past few years and that passive resistance during the same period has been reduced. Albania, un- like most of the other satellites, took no meas- ures in the post-Stalin era to reduce police terror or relax internal tensions. To counter- act any attempts from outside the country to foster dissidence among the people, severe penalties are imposed on anyone implicated in aiding and abetting diversionists. These penalties also apply to anyone found listening to anti-regime radio broadcasts or possessing propaganda material received from outside the country. CAPABILITY TO SUPPRESS REVOLT 23. There is no likelihood, at present, of any spontaneous uprising in Albania such as oc- curred in Poland and Hungary in 1956. The Stalinist regime has taken rigid measures to nip in the bud any manifestations of faction- alism within the Party or of deviationism among intellectuals, students, or other groups. Moreover, Albania, unlike some of the other European satellites, has not tinkered with its security apparatus, which still follows the standard Stalinist methods of complete re- pression. However, should a revolt break out, the regime's security forces could probably suppress it, unless the population secured arms and the uprising spread generally throughout rural areas. The Albanian Army would be of doubtful loyalty in such a crisis, and a widespread popular revolt actively sup- ported by the army could not be suppressed without active military assistance from the Soviet Bloc countries. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE 24. Under present conditions, dissidence has no capability of developing into successful organized resistance. Should an attempt be made to establish organized resistance, the regime would take the severest countermeas- ures, and control over the whole country would be even more repressive. However, a number of external and internal developments could increase the level of the current unor- ganized resistance and dissidence. Economic and political successes in Yugoslavia and Po- land could have a telling effect on certain groups in Albania, especially intellectuals, professionals, some managerial elements, and students. Internally, the continuing eco- nomic deprivations and the acceleration of agricultural collectivization could increase the disaffection of the workers and peasants, espe- cially of the latter who are potentially the greatest threat to the Communist regime. 25. There were signs that resistance and dis- sidence in Albania decreased after the Geneva summit conference of 1955, but an upward swing was noted after the Hungarian revolt of 1956. Moreover, the denigration of Stalin and the Soviet-Polish difficulties encouraged certain factions within the Party to attack the Albanian Stalinist leadership and to de- mand liberalization of Party and government life. Such deviations were, however, quickly liquidated by the Tirana rulers. 26. A substantial improvement of the people's living conditions, which at present is not in sight, could lessen the will to resist among certain elements, especially the working class and the civil servants. Conversely, disaffec- tion could be expected to increase should the present very low living standards deteriorate further. 27. There are at present no signs of any relax- ation of security controls in Albania; in fact, the regime is callihg for increased strength- ening and perfecting of the security police ap- paratus in order to stamp out what little SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 13 resistance is left in the country. In the un- likely event of a relaxation of security controls and police terror, the people could be expected to seize the opportunity to give vent to their smouldering, pent-up hatred and might even attempt to organize open resistance against the regime. In the countryside, in particular, the peasants would begin at once to defy the local officials and refuse to fulfill quota obli- gations. 28. Any external assistance to potential re- sistance groups in Albania could be expected to increase their ranks and ability to fight, and to widen their popular support. Resist- ance bands in the country, particularly in the north, were strong in the period 1949-53 when moral and some material support were given them by neighboring Yugoslavia and other countries. Once this stopped, the bands' activities came to a virtual standstill. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR 29. All evidence indicates that the Albanians expect liberation only through the outbreak of a general war. Therefore, should such a war break out and internal controls be weak- ened, dissidence and unorganized resistance could be expected to increase, especially if re- sistance elements could be organized and re- ceived material support and tactical assist- ance from the West. The peasantry in par- ticular could be expected to become more recalcitrant about obeying the government's economic orders. 30. In the event of general war, the possibility of sporadic, but ineffectual, military action on the part of resistance elements exists. How- ever, effective military action could be under- taken only if substantial arms and direction were supplied from abroad and if substantial elements of the armed forces defected and took to the mountains. Without such assist- ance from abroad, any sustained military activities by organized resistance groups could not be expected to continue for long. How- ever, because of the terrain and the tradition of Albanians for guerrilla warfare, small bands could manage for an indefinite period to con- duct sabotage and harassing activities. Al- though poor communications and difficulties in coordinating activities of resistance bands would seriously impede large-scale escape and evasion operations, possibilities do exist for assisting individual and small group escapes. Also, intelligence collection could be arranged through the infiltration of small groups of well-trained officers to work closely with the guerrilla bands. 31. The reaction of Albanians to an invasion of their country by Western armies would al- most certainly depend upon the composition of these armies. Invasion by Italian, Greek, or Yugoslav armies would probably be met with general hostility because in the past such armies have destroyed Albania's independ- ence. However, the Albanian people probably would offer all possible assistance to invading forces under NATO command even if these forces included some nationals from tradi- tional enemy nations. In the event of such an invasion, it is likely that there would be considerable defection to the invading army from the Albanian Army (although probably not from the security forces) including offi- cers. Moreover, assurance from the West of the preservation of Albania's independence and territorial integrity could, in the event of an open East-West conflict, unite the vast majority of the people against the present Communist regime as they have never been united before. Only the hard-core Commu- nists would be likely to offer stiff resistance, especially in guerrilla warfare, in which they are pre-eminently qualified by their tempera- ment and wartime experience in rugged ter- rain. 32. The effect on Albanian resistance poten- tial of the use of nuclear weapons by attack- ing forces would depend on which side em- ployed them and the manner in which they are used. It is conceivable that a nuclear at- tack limited to Soviet shore bases, to tactical use during actual operations, and to the seats of power could be so designed as to eliminate the major military resources and control cen- ters of the regime without incurring popular hatred or destroying resistance potential. Such an attack could produce an opportunity for indigenous resistance groups to take over SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 14 SECRET control of the country if outside help were available.1 33. If non-Bloc forces sponsored lenient occu- pation policies in Albania, the people would cooperate with the occupiers ? especially if 1 The representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, U. S. Army, does not believe that the effect on resistance potential of the use of nuclear weapons in Albania would differ substantially from the effect on Bulgarian resist- ance potential of a nuclear attack on that coun- try. (See Annex B, para. 37.) Army would sub- stitute for this paragraph: "If Albania were the target of a nuclear attack, resistance potential probably would be adversely affected. The de- struction and demoralization resulting from such an attack probably would be such that the peo- ple would concentrate on survival." control were gradually turned over to local officials. As word of such liberal occupation policies spread to remote unoccupied areas, some Albanian tribal chieftains would or- ganize cooperation with the occupiers and harassment of Bloc forces. If supplied with arms and explosives, these bands could inter- fere significantly with the activities of Bloc troops. They could also collect some intelli- gence for non-Bloc forces and assist them in evasion and escape. 34. Aspirations of individual factions for post- war leadership would probably not adversely affect resistance activities during the war and might indeed intensify them. But clashes among factions and leaders would almost cer- tainly develop after hostilities had ended. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 15 ANNEX B? BULGARIA BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE 1. Bulgaria has been traditionally more close- ly linked to Russia than any other Eastern European state, and consequently anti-Rus- sian feeling ? as distinguished from anti-So- viet?is not as widespread and intense as else- where. Although much of the legacy of good- will deriving from the Russian liberation of Bulgaria from Ottoman rule in 1878 and from German control in 1944 has been dissipated as a result of Soviet domination since World War II, traditional ties with Russia have tended to check the development of hatred of Russia and of its culture as such. This contrasts with the situation in nations such as Poland and Hungary, where national antagonism to- ward Russia has been traditional. Moreover, there are no Soviet troops in Bulgaria to ir- ritate national pride. Antagonism created by Soviet military and other advisors who are present is probably limited to the relatively few Bulgarian functionaries with whom they come into direct contact. Soviet advisors reportedly keep to themselves and do not as- sociate with Bulgarians. Soviet military per- sonnel wear civilian clothes. Nevertheless, the regime's economic policies and programs are regarded by the majority of the population as furthering the interests of the USSR rather than those of Bulgaria. 2. Serious economic problems have developed since Stalin's death. In September 1957 the regime admitted the existence of urban unem- ployment, estimated at 150-180,000 persons or some 15-18 percent of the nonagricultural labor force. An urban housing shortage has also become acute. Agricultural production, which remains the mainstay of the economy, is still below prewar levels, as evidenced by the fact that temporary bread rationing and a So- viet wheat loan were necessary to tide the Bul- garians over a bad harvest in 1956. The re- gime revealed in December 1956 that national income had declined and that planned invest- ments in 1957 would be considerably less than in 1956. 3. The population as a whole, however, ap- pears disposed to suffer the currently depressed standard of living and tends openly to express its dissatisfaction only when economic condi- tions become acutely unbearable. Realizing this, the regime has moved to allay economic discontent through a series of limited eco- nomic relief measures: family wage allow- ances have been tripled; compulsory deliveries of certain agricultural items have been abol- ished; and wage increases ranging from eight to 20 percent have been granted to industrial workers. In order to relieve urban unemploy- ment a series of make-work projects have been introduced with Soviet assistance, and about 15,000 young people have been sent to work in the USSR and Czechoslovakia. Recent re- ports by Western observers in Sofia claim that the regime's economic concessions re- sulted in a slight improvement in living stand- ards and an alleviation of economic discontent in the summer of 1957. Living conditions, however, are still below prewar levels and eco- nomic discontent remains a major source of dissidence. 4. Politically, dissatisfaction with totalitarian Communist rule is widespread. The popula- tion resents Communist control and regula- tion of all phases of life through the so-called "mass" social and cultural organizations. Bulgarians have long been accustomed to ty- rannical rule but never has such rule been so oppressive as under the present regime. The regime lacks popular support and maintains itself in power through police state methods and the ever-present threat of Soviet military intervention. 5. Although organized religion is a potential instrument for resistance, it is not, at this SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 16 SECRET time, an important source of dissidence in Bulgaria. Although regime efforts to convert younger people to atheism have embittered parents, the regime has refrained from any intensive religious persecution. Harassment of religious leaders has been limited to non- Orthodox faiths (Catholic and Protestant) , which represent an insignificant proportion of the population, and has been directed against alleged subversive ties of religious leaders with Western countries rather than against profession of religious faith. On the other hand, the regime has openly endorsed Eastern Orthodoxy ? to which some 90 per- cent of the population belongs ? as the na- tional faith. The regime was instrumental in healing the schism between the Bulgarian Exarchate and the Patriarch of Constantino- ple in 1945 and later raised the status of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church to the patriarchal level. Moreover, the hierarchy of the Bulgar- ian Orthodox Church completely cooperates with the regime. Members of the lower clergy, although believed to be largely anti-Commu- nist, have resigned themselves to Communist rule and refrain from making anti-regime statements. Currently Jewish, Moslem, Cath- olic, and Protestant religious leaders also co- operate with the regime. 6. Traditional hostility toward Yugoslavia has served to check the spread of Titoism in Bul- garia. Bulgarians would not welcome Tito as a liberator, in view of traditional suspicion of Yugoslav motives. Tito's national brand of Communism and other ideological innova- tions have had little influence among Bul- garian Communists. The regime's policy of close ties with Moscow enjoys the support of anti-Yugoslav elements in the Party who fear that rapprochement with Yugoslavia would result in territorial encroachments. Bulgar- ian Communists have not forgotten Yugoslav efforts, prior to the Tito-Cominform break, to secure control of Bulgarian Pirin Macedonia by incorporating it into the Yugoslav federal republic of Macedonia. MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS 7. Peasants. Bulgarian peasants, steeped in a tradition of individual farming, resent the regime's collectivization program. Compris- ing some 75 percent of the total population, the peasants are numerically an important dissident group and traditionally a source of political opposition. In 1951 a collectiviza- tion drive culminated in local outbreaks of armed peasant resistance. The regime's latest collectivization drive began in 1955 and aims at virtually complete collectivization in a few years (87 percent of total arable land is cur- rently in the socialized sector): Although there has been no open peasant resistance as in 1951, discontent in the countryside is still widespread. 8. In recent years the regime has gone to great lengths to persuade former agrarian op- position leaders to renounce their ties with the late Nikola Petkov, agrarian leader executed in 1947 for treason. It has had little success, however, and Dimitur Gichev, a former right- wing agrarian leader, has especially inspired the peasantry with his stubborn refusal to renounce his past opposition activities. Nev- ertheless, it remains a fact that the agrarian character of Bulgarian society serves to mili- tate against the organization of dissidence into an effective resistance movement. Re- sistance is difficult to organize among a popu- lation thinly distributed throughout the coun- tryside. The absence of large urban centers is also an important consideration, inasmuch as resistance has been traditionally organized by urban intellectuals and workers rather than by peasants. 9. Youth. The disillusionment and antipathy of young people probably represent the most serious failure of the regime to eliminate po- tential sources of resistance, since Commu- nism admittedly relies upon the indoctrination of the younger generation to assure the even- tual stability of its regime. Significantly, there is considerable dissatisfaction among students with courses on Marxism-Leninism. However, the government made it clear that it will resolutely oppose student demands for the abolition of these courses. Party and youth leaders were urged to re-educate young people who had come under the influence of bourgeois ideology and propaganda. 10. Intellectuals. Ferment among intellec- tuals, especially among writers and artists, SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 17 has been evident since Stalin's death. In December 1955, some two months prior to the denigration of Stalin, Stalinist leader Vulko Chervenkov severely castigated certain writers for attempting to undermine Party control over literature and urged that deviations from the Party literary line be "strangled in the embryonic stage." Bulgarian writers who be- gan openly to advocate removal of Party con- trols immediately following the 20th CPSU Congress were quickly rebuffed. In September 1956, Bulgarian writers, attracted by an earlier version of Mao's "100 flowers" theory, were told that Communist Chinese ideologists did not mean that "weeds and noxious plants" would be allowed to bloom among the "flow- ers" of socialist realism. However, despite repressive measures and warnings by the re- gime, restiveness among writers has contin- ued. 11. Party Members. There is evidence of dis- sidence among the Party rank and file, who apparently have been disillusioned by the re- gime's failure to democratize Party life. Dis- content among lower-echelon Party members is admitted by the Bulgarian press, which complains that disunity has existed in some lower Party organizations since the Hun- garian revolt. In early 1957 the regime launched a campaign to cleanse Party ranks of "careerist and alien" elements. Dissidence in the higher echelons of Party leadership (at the Politburo and Central Committee levels) takes the form of rivalry for power. The purge of a Politburo member and two Central Committee members in July 1957, for example, was indicative of such rivalry. Thus far, how- ever, top leaders have subordinated their dif- ferences for the sake of unity. 12. Armed Forces. Although in the summer of 1956 some 200 officers reportedly were purged from the army, apparently for nation- al-Communist tendencies, dissidence, at this time, is believed virtually nonexistent within the Bulgarian armed forces. Military per- sonnel, as a whole, are less prone to dissident attitudes than is the general population. The permanent cadre, constituting some 25 per- cent of the total military strength, consists of commissioned and noncommissioned officers who have demonstrated their reliability; many of these are Communist Party members. The conscripts, 35,000 of whom are inducted into the Army annually, reflect the attitudes of Bulgarian youth generally, although persons of demonstrated antipathy toward the regime are screened out or consigned to the labor troops. Once they are inducted, military discipline and persistent political indoctrina- tion militate against the intensification and spread of dissidence. The conditions of serv- ice life in Bulgaria, while extremely poor by Western standards, are in general acceptable to the typical recruit. 13. Industrial Workers. Industrial workers, officially the favored class of the regime, are disillusioned with low wages and poor work- ing conditions. It is unlikely that recent wage increases have significantly offset this atti- tude. Urban unemployment has further ag- gravated their discontent. Bulgarian workers resent political and economic regimentation by Communist-dominated trade unions, whose primary function is to enforce labor discipline rather than represent the interests of the workers. Frequent criticism in the Bulgar- ian press of the failure of trade unions to maintain close ties with the workers is in- dicative of the hostile attitude of workers to- ward Communist trade union officials. A trade union congress scheduled for the fall of 1956 was reportedly postponed because of demands by workers that they be allowed to elect their own union officials. INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953 14. Dissidence in Bulgaria has not significant- ly increased since Stalin's death. Rank and file Party members, writers and students open- ly expressed their discontent after the 20th CPSU Party Congress, but repressive measures by the regime effectively curbed such manifes- tations. During the Hungarian revolt some student demonstrations reportedly occurred but apparently failed to arouse other elements of the population. All available evidence indi- cates that the majority of the population still feels that armed rebellion against an efficient police state, backed up by Soviet military force, would be futile without effective mili- SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 18 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET tary support from outside. Unquestionably, the failure of the Hungarian revolt has served to strengthen this attitude. Only a signifi- cant worsening of economic conditions, ac- companied by a break-down of the authority of the central Party leadership and its secur- ity apparatus, could precipitate a general up- rising. If localized disturbances arising out of economic conditions assumed larger propor- tions and resulted in bloodshed, the current attitude of popular passivity could change to that of active resistance. Much would de- pend on the ability of the regime to curb ini- tial disturbances without exacerbating the hatred of the population. 15. The regime's relatively stable leadership has been instrumental in checking the spread of dissidence. No Bulgarian leader has shown any tendency to champion greater autonomy from Moscow ? as Gomulka did ? and top leaders appear agreed that essential internal controls should be maintained. Elements dis- satisfied with the regime's failure to liberalize internal life following the denigration of Sta- lin were unable to find a spokesman for their cause among the leaders. Certain journalists and writers who openly called for more drastic destalinization were sternly rebuked. 16. Nevertheless, the ordinary citizen report- edly began to enjoy relatively greater freedom. Arrests for minor political offenses ceased and Bulgarians became less afraid of expressing anti-regime opinions in public. Minor politi- cal offenders were released and forced labor camps began to close. In September 1956 a Central Committee decision promised ex- panded powers and responsibility for local governmental organs, more effective curbs on police abuses, and debate in the national parliament. The Central Committee de- cision also rehabilitated individuals previously purged from high places for Titoism. 17. The Polish and Hungarian upheavals, however, reversed this trend and the police state atmosphere of the Stalin era was rein- troduced. In early November 1956, shortly after the suppression of the Hungarian rebels, the regime carried out precautionary arrests of unreliable elements and began to reopen forced labor camps. The regime urged the population to report persons making anti- regime statements to the authorities, and po- lice patrols in Sofia and other cities increased. By July 1957 some 5,000 persons reportedly had been expelled from Sofia. 18. Popular dissidence in Bulgaria is directed toward both the native regime and Soviet domination. There is little likelihood that Bulgarians distinguish between Soviet dom- ination and local Communist rule. Bul- garian Communist leaders, who prior to World War II spent many years of their adult life in the Soviet Union and even acquired Soviet citizenship, are regarded as more Soviet than Bulgarian. Bulgarians appear to at- tribute their depressed standard of living both to Soviet domination and to the policies of the regime. Dissidence is also equally directed at Communism per se, since it is asso- ciated with the regime and Soviet domination. While some Party members and members of the intellectual class may feel that Soviet practice is a perversion of true Communism, the majority of Bulgarians are opposed to Communism in general. RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE 19. Generally, active resistance activities have declined since the death of Stalin even though there are indications of some increase of dissi- dence among the Party elite. There is no present available evidence of any organized resistance against the regime, either on a na- tional or on a local scale. Reports alleging activities of such organizations have remained unconfirmed. Whatever resistance there is, appears to be entirely limited to the passive and unorganized variety. 20. Passive resistance is found among the peasantry, workers, intellectuals, and youth. The clergy and members of the former middle class do not figure prominently in passive re- sistance. Peasant resistance is displayed by failure to meet agricultural delivery quotas set by the regime and neglect of collective farm machinery. Malfeasance by collective farm officials indicates an attitude of indif- ference, if not opposition. Occasional active resistance in the form of sabotage has been reported but such reports are difficult to SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 19 verify. Whatever sabotage there is appears to be spontaneous and not the work of any organized group. 21. In industry, workers resort to slowdowns and absenteeism, are careless with mainte- nance and handling of equipment, and fail to meet norms. While it is difficult to determine whether such acts are due to inefficiency or are manifestations of passive resistance, the fre- quency with which the Bulgarian press dis- cusses such matters would indicate the latter. 22. Passive resistance among youth is mani- fested by complete lack of interest in the ac- tivities of the Communist-sponsored Dimitrov youth organization, deliberate failure of courses in universities in order to avoid work assignments to unpleasant areas or jobs, and failure to attend Party meetings and other youth activities of the Fatherland Front. Young people also, on occasion, manifest re- ligious devoutness. 23. Bulgarian writers and journalists have been accused by the regime of deliberately avoiding writing about contemporary life in order to eschew political controversy. Writers occasionally get articles and short stories criti- cal of the regime published in the press. Judging from discussions of literary activities in the press, heated debates and differences of views take place at meetings of the Bulgarian Writers' Union. ROLE OF EMIGRES 24. Although Bulgarian emigre organizations have numerous contacts with persons in the homeland, there is no evidence that they are in a position to organize resistance activities. The Bulgarian emigre movement is divided by jealousies and opportunism, which have served to reduce its potential to inspire resistance in Bulgaria. There is a general feeling that emi- gres have been abroad too long to keep in touch with conditions and current aspirations in Bulgaria and consequently cannot provide post-liberation leadership. Recent regime propaganda against the emigre movement, spread by voluntary returnees, has probably served to further lower Bulgarian estimation of emigre organizations. 25. Dr. Georgi M. Dimitrov, representing the left wing Agrarians in exile, is the only emigre leader known to have seriously attempted to maintain contacts inside Bulgaria. His activ- ity, however, has been confined to keeping track of followers through sporadic refugee debriefings and personal correspondence. He has mounted about five cross-border opera- tions, with the assistance of Western intelli- gence services, to contact local Agrarian lead- ers, asking them to start organizing against the day when the Communist regime col- lapses. The Dimitrov organizational activity is oriented toward eventual assumption of power by his party rather than toward present or eventual resistance to the Communists. He has condemned the operations of other groups and intelligence agencies aimed at or- ganizing internal resistance. REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE 26. Following the 20th CPSU Congress, the Bulgarian regime refused to grant any signifi- cant concessions. Voicing its allegiance to the principle of "socialist legality," it resumed pre- ventive and arbitrary arrest and deportations. While calling for a new spirit in art, it in- sisted on conformance to "socialist realism." Requesting constructive criticism by Party members, it silenced or expelled all but the most platitudinous critics. Stalinist type oppression will probably continue to be effec- tive even though it will exacerbate already existing grievances. 27. The powers of the police have not been significantly restricted. During the suppres- sion of the Hungarian revolt, the regime open- ly appealed to the population to inform on individuals guilty of anti-regime statements and activities. Since March 1957, unreliable elements from Sofia and other large towns were expelled. Sofia citizens, marked for ex- pulsion to the countryside, were visited by the police after midnight and given two to four hours to leave the capital. Even Party func- tionaries and other persons formerly consid- ered reliable by the regime were among those expelled. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 20 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT 28. The regime could successfully suppress any localized revolt. The Bulgarian mili- tarized security forces consist of 30,000 well- trained, loyal men, evenly divided between Frontier Troops and Interior Troops. The overt and covert police organizations bring the total strength of the security apparatus, exclusive of the armed forces, to 80,000- 100,000 persons. This figure gives a control ratio of one trained operative, policeman, or militarized security force man to every 77 to 96 Bulgarian citizens, not taking into account the informer network. The efficiency and quality of the police system appears good and there is no indication of disloyalty in the police forces. Although certain elements of the ordinary police (such as the traffic police) were placed under local control in July 1957, there has been no major reform of the Bul- garian internal security apparatus which might lessen its effectiveness in suppressing local resistance. Frontier and Interior Troop strength is believed to have been cut, but these reductions are not believed to have seri- ously affected the efficiency of the state secu- rity apparatus. Moreover, the Bulgarian police system has not been discredited by ad- mittance of past "errors" as in the case of some other satellites. Following the April 1956 Plenum's restoration of "socialist legal- ity," and the quiet repudiation of the 1949- 1952 Party purge, the security apparatus suf- fered only a minimal loss of efficiency result- ing from confusion over the new line and the eclipse of a number of security officers impli- cated in the earlier extortion of false confes- sions and other malpractices. 29. In the highly unlikely event of a national uprising, however, the Bulgarian security ap- paratus would need the support of the Bul- garian Army and, if the conflict threatened to prolong itself, the support of Soviet forces. Top Bulgarian Army officers and commanders would remain loyal to the regime, and lower ranking officers and enlisted men would gen- erally maintain discipline and seek to suppress the rebels unless they were convinced that the 1-tter truly represented a nationwide popular movement. In the event that rebel efforts promised some success and some lower rank- ing officers and men turned over their arms or joined the revolt, Soviet intervention in force would be inevitable. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE 30. Assuming conditions of peace and barring widespread revolts in the Bloc, there is little real potential among any elements in Bul- garia for effective organized resistance to the regime. Unorganized and passive resistance will probably continue to manifest itself, but under present conditions the population will increasingly feel that their position is hope- less and that aid from the United States or any other Western power is unlikely. Local outbreaks of resistance born, of desperation with economic conditions, particularly among the peasants, might occur from time to time, but a general spontaneous revolt such as occurred in Hungary is unlikely, given present conditions and the temper of the population. 31. Whether or not passive and unorganized resistance activity will increase depends on the ability of the regime to cope with eco- nomic problems. Thus far it has shown a willingness to grant limited economic conces- sions, and the Soviet Union has shown itself ready to render assistance for the solution of economic problems, which would make it ap- pear unlikely that the economic situation will deteriorate sufficiently to bring about a marked increase in this type of resistance. 32. There seems to be little possibility of in- crease or change in resistance activity by the general population under foreseeable condi- tions of peace if no Party upheaval occurs. The principal opportunity for maintaining at least some resistance potential is through Western propaganda, transmitting a feeling of hope and a sense of direction among the people. This may prevent complete apathy and cynicism and encourage the expression of grievances and demands by every semi-legal method, so that a spirit of resistance can be maintained and molded into the strongest possible instrument of pressure upon the Com- munist regime. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 21 33. Although any marked increase in East- West tensions would have the effect of raising hopes of eventual liberation from the outside, Bulgarians would still not be disposed to un- dertake liberation by themselves. Ideological and factional disputes, whether in the Bul- garian leadership or in other Communist re- gimes, have had little impact on resistance in Bulgaria. Bulgarians undoubtedly envy the greater freedom of Poland from Moscow's domination but have shown no disposition to emulate that country. Possibly Bulgarians are still doubtful of the permanence of Po- land's status of greater autonomy. 34. To a certain degree, the easing of security measures would act as a safety valve. A sud- den relaxation of essential internal controls, however, might create a precarious situation unless it were accompanied by measures to remedy the basic causes of dissidence. It would be particularly dangerous, if, at the same time, an alternative political leader or faction emerged as a "liberal" force. Pres- sures for the abolition of all oppressive con- trols would mount, and it is doubtful that, under such circumstances, a strongly pro- Soviet regime could maintain itself in power without Soviet military support. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR 35. Under conditions of general warfare the resistance potential of the Bulgarian popula- tion would increase considerably. The ruling Communist minority would be under unceas- ing pressure from the antagonistic majority of Bulgarians, a situation which would prob- ably result in more forthright action on the part of elements now passive and would theaten the political stability of the govern- ment. Such instability would give rise to con- siderable doubts on the part of many individ- uals in the Party and state apparatus about the future of Communism, especially if Soviet defeat became apparent. Political opportu- nists would emerge, with the result that the potential for widespread effective action would be sharply enhanced. Nevertheless, anti-re- gime resistance activities could not be intensi- fied initially. Only if Western forces appeared to be winning, would the Bulgarians engage in espionage, sabotage, and other harassing activities ? but not to the extent that might be expected by the people of other satellites under similar circumstances. 36. During any type of war in the Balkan area, there would be almost no possibility of independent military action by anti-regime elements.' As in World War II, resistance groups ? if supplied with arms and explosives from the outside ? could tie down some Bloc forces through sabotage of rail lines and in- dustrial plants. Bands of guerrilla fighters might be developed, but they would be entire- ly dependent upon outside support. If ene- my forces consisted of such traditional ene- mies as Turks and Greeks, the Bulgarians would do very little to assist them. If the war were being fought by Western forces on, or adjacent to Bulgarian territory, the Bulgari- ans might aid enemy forces by supplying in- telligence, by destroying lines of communica- tion, and by sabotaging Soviet Bloc supplies and installations. As indicated above, the extent of such activities would depend on the nationality of the enemy and upon logistic support from outside. However, the populace would probably not participate in evasion and escape activities until enemy forces were close to Bulgaria, and even then would weigh the risks involved very carefully. If military ac- tion were taking place within Bulgaria or an area within the Bloc, Bulgarian resistance capabilities would be increased, and if the West appeared to be winning, there would be more anti-regime activities. If the Bloc coun- tries appeared to be winning, the Bulgarians would have less capability and less inclina- tion to help the West. 37. Use of tactical nuclear weapons would probably have little effect on Bulgarian re- The representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF would add the follow- ing: It is possible that resistance groups could carry out limited independent military opera- tions if the following three conditions prevailed: (a) disruption or diversion of the regime's means of internal control; (b) development in resist- ance groups of effective leadership and coordina- tion, and receipt of outside material support; and (c) assurance of early direct military sup- port and relief. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 22 SECRET sistance, unless Bulgaria was to be a target for a major nuclear attack. The human and material destruction and social dislocation re- sulting from a nuclear attack on Bulgaria would eliminate the population's potential for resistance.2 38. Resistance elements would make little ef- fort to assist Greek, Turkish, or Yugoslav military forces even if they were identified with the West, unless these nationals consti- tuted only a minority of a force under United 2 The representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF would add the follow- ing: It is conceivable that an air attack could be so designed as to eliminate the major sources of the military and control strength of the re- gime without incurring popular hatred or de- stroying resistance potential. Such an air at- tack could produce an opportunity for indigenous resistance groups to take over control of the country. States or other Western command. Further- more, assurance that forces of countries other than Bulgaria's traditional enemies would be assigned occupation duties in the country would be necessary. 39. Occupation policies of the attacking forces would have a crucial effect on all resistance capabilities. To be effective these policies would have to reflect the aspirations of the Bulgarian people for national sovereignty and the overthrow of communism. The aims of individual resistance factions for post-war leadership in Bulgaria probably would not seriously impede intelligence, evasion and escape, and military capabilities. However, political ambitions of some resistance leaders could affect political warfare operations, if the resistance leaders were supported by an in- fluential following. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 23 ANNEX C?COMMUNIST CHINA PREAMBLE 1. In the years following the Communist take-over in mainland China, the regime sup- pressed organized resistance. During this period, the regime failed to gain the positive support of large segments of the population and created widespread apathy and dissatis- faction. In the course of the past two years this situation has been aggravated. The vol- ume and intensity of dissidence has increased significantly, particularly among the peas- antry, the intellectuals, and some youth, most of whom were formerly inclined to accept the regime at least passively. Despite this in- crease, however, there has been no significant organized resistance or active resistance on other than a purely local level, with the im- portant exception of Tibet, where dissidence flared into armed rebellion in 1956, forcing important shifts in the Communist time-table for this area. BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE 2. Among the most important causes of dis- sidence are economic grievances. The re- gime's policies of rapid industrialization, mili- tary modernization, and socialization have required the diversion of substantial resources, which have been secured through demanding increased productivity while greatly restrict- ing the benefits accruing to the people. In consequence, workers and peasants have been frustrated in failing to achieve promised levels of real income and well-being, while land- owners and businessmen resent the loss of their properties to the state and the reduction in their income. Politically, the system of rigid regimentation and tight control over every aspect of life is generally resented, al- though in varying degrees among different groups. Finally, Communist efforts to change age-old social concepts, such as that of the family hierarchy, have created considerable ill will. In contrast to Eastern European satellites, however, resentment of close ties with the USSR is not a nation-wide factor although it does affect the attitude of some groups. 3. The Communist regime is now engaged in a gigantic effort to remake China's ancient society and create a modern, industrial state. This has involved a series of sweeping political, social, and economic changes, including at- tempts to reshape education and to revamp organizational media for controlling and in- doctrinating the populace. The innumerable pressures brought to bear by the regime and the disruption of traditional social pat- terns have produced a widespread tension and insecurity. Not all these "strains and stresses" are the result of, or can be attributed to, the Communist system. Large segments of the population have remained indifferent, how- ever; many others have adopted a wait-and- see attitude; still others are willing to accept the regime because they believe its accom- plishments and policies have improved their personal position or prospects. Considerable elements of the population feel they have gained rather than lost since the defeat of the Kuomintang. Thus anti-regime attitudes vary with differing conditions and among dif- fering groups as they are affected by specific programs. MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS 4. Peasantry. The land reform of 1950-1952 liquidated the landlords and redistributed land among the tenant, poor, and some mid- dle-income peasants. These beneficiaries con- stitute 75 percent of the total peasant popula- tion which, in turn, constitutes the bulk of Communist China's population. Many of these peasants probably believed that they benefited from reform, and dissidence did not ? appear to be widespread except at times of SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 24 SECRET agricultural crisis, such as the crop failure 01 1954. The regime's sudden rush into agri- cultural socialization, following Mao's speech in July 1955, was largely completed in 1956. During this process, there were only few re- ports of rural opposition, but by the end of 1956, peasant dissatisfaction was again devel- oping. The peasants resented the bureau- cratic and inefficient management of the co- operatives and/or collectives. They disliked having to increase their labor for the state, since this seriously affected the sideline occupations that traditionally contributed to their income. They were disillusioned be- cause the regime did not fulfill its promise of an immediate rise in income. 5. Reports on Chinese peasant dissidence are relatively convincing. Peiping has admitted widespread peasant withdrawals from collec- tives in some areas, and has reported minor peasant uprisings in several provinces. How- ever, an increase of peasant discontent will depend largely on whether the harvests are good or bad and on the willingness of the re- gime to let the peasants enjoy more of the fruits of their labor. There is no uniformity in the pattern of discontent, and regional con- ditions will continue to vary. 6. Intellectuals. At the time of its establish- ment, the regime enjoyed passive acceptance by, and in some cases the active support of, many of the country's intellectuals. However, despite continuous efforts to "reform" the in- tellectuals, their attitude toward the regime has steadily deteriorated, except during a brief period in 1956-57 when the regime tolerated some degree of intellectual diversity. How- ever, the effect of the "Hundred Flowers" policy has recently been negated by the "anti- rightist struggle," which has been directed more at the intellectuals than at any other group. Disaffection among intellectuals has centered on lack of freedom to undertake orig- inal research or creative activity not approved by the regime, on the Communist Party's domination of all significant aspects of public activity, and on inadequate material incen- tives and inappropriate employment. 7. Dissidence among the intellectuals is par- ticularly significant because their skills and experience are badly needed by the regime. Many of those who have been attacked as "rightists" have achieved relatively high ? if often nominal ? positions in such fields as government administration and education. The vehemence of the regime's attack against intellectuals during the latter half of 1957 testifies to the Communists' concern over the implications of opposition in this group. How successful the regime will be in its efforts to "reform" and "educate" the intellectuals is still uncertain. Recent events have prob- ably increased the level of dissidence among them. Of equal importance is the probability that these same events, by bringing about a strengthening of controls over the intellectu- als and curbing their influence, will greatly reduce their inclination and opportunities to translate dissidence into resistance. 8. Youth. Initially, youth, and especially students, included some of the most ardent supporters of the regime and it appeared that dissidence among them was minor. However, a definite decline in enthusiasm for the re- gime seems to have occurred. This is the result mainly of the regimentation, prosaic tasks and living conditions which face most youths during the present period of indus- trialization in contrast to the expectations created by the establishment of a "New China," the Korean hostilities, the spread of Chinese Communist influence in the Asian- African area, and the socialization period of 1955-56. Dissatisfaction with their strictly controlled curriculum and their prospects for further education and for suitable employ- ment has been evident. Generally being sen- sitive to ideological matters, youth was also influenced to some extent by de-Stalinization and the Hungarian uprising. Such disaffec- tion has in several cases erupted into stu- dent riots. Although dissidence among youth may not be widespread at present, it remains a serious problem because it opens to question the fundamental Communist emphasis on the early molding of opinion. 9. Former Businessmen. When the bulk of remaining private commerce and industry was socialized in 1956, there was virtually no overtly expressed opposition from the former SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 25 proprietors. However, it was clear in the "anti-rightist struggle" that the regime did not consider the "bourgeoisie" resigned to current conditions. Except in certain indus- trial-commercial centers such as Shanghai, and except for connections with other groups such as the intellectuals, the "bourgeoisie" now has negligible political or economic power. Dissidence among former private businessmen, while widespread, is thus significant only to the extent that it limits the regime's ability to utilize their technical and managerial skills. Former businessmen possess talents which cannot yet be matched by a new Communist trained generation, and their dissatisfaction with the regime, and the consequent distrust of them by the regime will be an adverse fac- tor of some but not crucial importance in the economic development of the country. 10. Armed Forces. In the active Chinese Com- munist military service there is virtually no dissidence and no likelihood of resistance. This is reflected in current low desertion rates and is the result of close Party control of all levels, careful selection of personnel for mili- tary service, constant indoctrination and sur- veillance of all military personnel, highly preferential treatment of military personnel, constant attention to officer-enlisted civilian relationships, and prompt action to ease or eradicate tensions and other problems. Ex- 'Nationalist defectors and other disloyal per- sonnel have been eliminated from the service; equipment, food, clothing, and shelter are available in generally satisfactory quantities by Chinese standards; the pay and leave situ- ation is improved; and terms of service are set by law. There is a close relationship between armed forces and the civilian component of the Peiping regime. The top military com- manders are all Party veterans and concur- rently hold high Party posts. The majority of the rank and file of the armed forces belong either to the Party or the Young Communist League. 11. Militia. There are several million mem- bers of the People's Militia ? a heterogeneous group whose functions, training, equipment, and social standing vary throughout the country. It is probable that there are Militia members who are dissatisfied with their role and resent having to give up their spare time to unrewarding work. The great majority of the Militia, however, probably are loyal to the regime. Dissidence among this group is more apt to reflect their status as peasants rather than their para-military position. 12. Veterans. The demobilization of over five million men from the armed forces since 1949 has created a sizable population group who face many problems. In at least one province demobilized servicemen have been blamed re- cently for trouble in rural areas. The vet- erans therefore constitute a group within which there are dissident feelings and within which there is probably a certain amount of potential resistance and possibly some actual resistance. Many veterans are disgruntled and unhappy because they have been forced to leave the comparative security and prestige of service life for the much more difficult life of a peasant. Additionally, numbers of them wanted to work in the cities after discharge but were forced to return to the rural areas where dissatisfaction has arisen over employ- ment, housing, and acceptance given them by the villagers. At present, dissidence among veterans is not intense and is not likely to develop into a serious security threat. Never- theless, the veterans, trained in the use of arms, experienced in guerrilla warfare, and bound together by a common background, constitute a potentially serious security prob- lem. 13. Communist Leadership. The Chinese Communist Party and regime has demon- strated unusual cohesiveness and unity at its highest levels. With virtually the sole excep- tion of the Kao-Jao affair in 1954-55, the regime has adjusted policy differences and other internal disputes without recourse to drastic purges and without evidencing dissi- dence among disgruntled leaders. When Mao dies or retires from active leadership, some diminution of party unity can be expected, with struggles for power among the senior party leaders who would probably collectively succeed Mao in his various functions. How- ever, it seems unlikely that even Mao's death would cause a serious leadership crisis that would critically affect the party's cohesiveness and effectiveness. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 26 SECRET 14. At lower levels of the Communist Party there appears to be a certain amount of dis- content, seldom intense enough to be called disidence. Rural cadres are particularly sus- ceptible to occasional misgivings. They are often forced to lead a peasant-level life; they miss the companionship and cultural activi- ties available in urban centers. Blame for a failure of the regime's policies is often laid to them directly. They find themselves caught between the millstones of Peiping's policies and the realities of their immediate environ- ment, and there is evidence that some of them occasionally identify themselves more directly with the peasants than with Party demands. Dissidence in the Party is likely to become significant only if the regime has major eco- nomic reverses or if dissidence within other major groups becomes acute. 15. Government Bureaucracy. While key positions in the bureaucracy are held by Party members, there are a substantial number of nonmembers in it who are rewarded less gen- erously both in a material and psychological sense, and who accordingly are more prone to be dissatisfied with the regime. Criticisms of the regime by non-Party persons in mid-1957 revealed a considerable degree of resentment in the bureaucracy over the preferential posi- tion of Party members and the Party's unwill- ingness to grant authority to nonmembers. At the same time, many such persons have a vested interest in the regime which may par- tially negate any dissident tendencies. In the future, the level of dissidence in this group will be largely determined by the Party's will- ingness to improve its methods of working with the group. 16. Religious Groups. Organized religious groups have been significant sources of dissi- dence chiefly in minority-inhabited areas of Communist China, most notably in Tibet and in some Hui (Moslem) areas. In China proper organized religion is not of great numerical importance because the great majority of Chi- nese take an informal, eclectic view of religion, adopting elements of a number of religions without formal adherence to any. Despite their relatively small membership some of the organized religious groups in China proper are nevertheless significant as sources of dissi- dence and passive resistance. In some cases the regime's moves against religious groups or adherents has aroused resentment. Members of a number of religious groups continue pas- sive resistance against the regime despite con- certed drives against some religious groups (particularly Catholics) and Communist ef- forts to organize religious adherents into front organizations that are susceptible to Commu- nist control and that support the regime's pro- gram (fronts for Buddhists, Moslems, Protes- tants, Catholics, and Taoists have been or- ganized). 17. Superstitious Sects. In addition to the above, certain semi-religious sects, including such secret societies as the I-kuan-tao, have figured in Communist admissions of unrest and local rebellion. These sects with an ideology based on elements of various religions and superstitions have been subjected to con- tinuous Communist suppression efforts, but probably continue to exist on a local level in many rural parts of China, where they appar- ently succeed from time to time in organizing minor peasant rebellions through appeals to magic and superstition and through exploita- tion of various peasant grievances. None of these sects, however, appears to have retained an effective national or even regional organi- zation or following. 18. Minorities. The ethnic minorities in China traditionally have resisted the expan- sionist tendencies of the predominant Han Chinese. In actual practice the Communist regime has continued the engulfment of the minorities by the Han Chinese. This pre- sumably has led to dissatisfaction among the minorities which, in turn, has produced cor- rective efforts to curb "great Han chau- vinism." Aside from Tibet ? a special case where the dissidence has flared into active resistance ? the extent of disaffection among minorities is not known, but the fre- quent reference to the regime's corrective for "great Han chauvinism" indicates that some exists. 19. Former Overseas Chinese. There are ap- proximately 12,000,000 persons in mainland China, concentrated largely in Kwangtung and Fukien provinces, who are considered SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 27 "Overseas Chinese" by virtue of previous resi- dence abroad or as "Overseas Chinese de- pendents" because they have relatives abroad. Members of this group have been treated with greater leniency than the rest of the popula- tion; they have received preferential rations, and have occasionally been excluded from some of the most onerous consequences of the 1955-56 socialist transformation. Neverthe- less, some dissidence probably exists in this group; accustomed in the past to an above- average standard of living and more knowl- edgeable about the outside world, they proba- bly resent various aspects of Chinese Commu- nist policies. 20. Urban Workers. The urban workers are cultivated as the mass base of the regime. Despite preferential treatment since 1949, dis- affection has developed among urban workers in some areas and, in several cases, has resulted in strikes. While many factory workers now have more job security and material rewards than in pre-Communist days, there is resentment of the psy- chological pressures, such as high work norms, and dissatisfaction that living stand- ards have not improved more rapidly. How- ever, dissidence among urban workers does not appear to be widespread nor intense. As in the case of youth, however, dissidence among workers is regarded with the utmost concern by the regime on ideological grounds. 21. Former National Government Officials. Of the National government officials who did not escape to Taiwan, a small number are col- laborating with the Peiping. regime, more are probably still in prison or in labor camps, and still more are retired or not fully active. The collaborators work for the regime either be- cause of a timely shift of allegiance to the Communists before or when the regime was established or because their valuable technical skills have earned them a special position. Some of this group probably resent the dom- ination of the Communist Party and may be dissatisfied with conditions. But they would be cautious about exposing their dissatisfac- tion because of their own past history. The noncollaborators in many cases have been branded as enemies of the regime from the beginning. They unquestionably are dissatis- fied with their present condition, but to an even greater extent than the collaborating group, must suppress their feelings. 22. Tibetans. The Tibetans for centuries have used every means at their disposal to resist the imposition of political, military, eco- nomic, or cultural controls by whatever Chi- nese government has been in power. Proba- bly a majority of them has continued to resist all efforts of the Chinese Communist regime to bring Tibet under the centralized control of Peiping. This has been true not only of the Tibetans living in what the Chinese Commu- nists refer to as the "Tibet region," but equal- ly so of the seminomadic Tibetan tribes who live in Tibetan areas now included in the provinces of Tsinghai, Kansu, and Szechwan. Among the causes of Tibetan resistance have been resentment at Chinese interference with Tibetan religious activities, Communist indoc- trination of Tibetan youth, attempts to "re- form" Tibetan society, food shortages and in- flation, and Peiping's failure to honor a promise to release certain imprisoned Tibetan leaders. INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE 23. While it may be possible, on the basis of the preceding analyses, to make an assess- ment in general terms of the major sources and areas of ill will, the intensity of dissidence in Communist China and the degree to which it may be transformed into actual resistance remain largely matters of conjecture. It is logical to conclude that some degree of dissi- dence exists at almost every level of Commu- nist Chinese society. However, this does not mean that such dissidence can develop into resistance unless the control capabilities of the regime were greatly weakened. 24. The regime's policies and practices, de- spite the "rectification campaign," have ac- centuated a number of factors causing ill will. At the same time, the regime has developed and exploited the growing pride of the Chi- nese people in their country's achievements, particularly their military strength and their new international prestige. As in the USSR, Communism was imposed on the people by indigenous elements in the face of seemingly SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 28 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET overwhelming odds rather than by a foreign power. These points are recognized, mainly by members of the "intelligentsia." The bulk of the people are illiterate peasants and know little of and care less about ideology and na- tional policies. They are preoccupied with local affairs. They judge a regime by the extent to which it exploits them. However, in the vast majority of cases, dissidence is not translated into organized, active resistance. Sometimes it has led, and may lead in the future, to unorganized passive resistance which is more difficult to detect and to sup- press but has far less potential than has the revolutionary mood in some Eastern Euro- pean satellites. TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953 25. Events following Stalin's death and the uprisings in Poland and Hungary in 1956 had relatively little influence on the level of re- sistance in Communist China. Peiping's unique status in the Communist world, its geographic location, its different problems and the newness of its revolutionary experi- ment precluded any necessity to follow the Kremlin line. However, events since the So- viet 20th Party Congress in February 1956 did have some impact even though the Chinese Communists successfully minimized the shock of Stalin's denigration. Whatever confusion existed apparently contributed only slightly to dissidence or resistance and was to some extent alleviated by official explanations and by claims that the Chinese Communist lead- ers had avoided the pitfalls into which the USSR had slipped. 26. Between 1954 and 1957, there were two peaks of resistance activity in mainland China. The first, in late 1954 and early 1955, was occasioned primarily by the poor harvests of 1954 and led to the drive against "counter- revolutionaries" personally ordered by Mao Tse-tung in the spring of 1955. The drive did not reach the proportions of earlier similar drives, even though 360,000 cases of subver- sion and "economic sabotage" were admitted- ly dealt with in 1954 and early 1955. It was credited by the Communists with creating the preconditions necessary for popular accept- ance of the wholesale collectivization and so- cialization campaign inaugurated by Mao Tse- tung in mid-1955. The second peak of resist- ance in 1956-57, was occasioned by poor crops, food shortages, and disappointing economic conditions following collectivization and so- cialization. It has not occasioned a formal drive against "counterrevolutionaries," but appears to be one of the underlying causes of the current "rectification" drive. In addition, the period was marked by considerable resist- ance activity by the Tibetans, culminating in serious but somewhat localized rebellion in 1956. 27. The upheavals in Poland and Hungary also had some effect, as the Peiping regime itself admitted. As a result, the Communist leaders, in order to forestall possible popular unrest, granted that "contradictions" existed and accelerated the "rectification" campaign. This experiment partially backfired and the Party was forced to revert to its long-used methods of controlling public opinion, which undoubtedly contributed to discontent in the minds of some non-Party people. Moreover, the shifting of policies may also have gener- ated considerable disagreement among Party leaders. But the main significance of these recent developments on the question of dissi- dence and resistance lies in the probability that the Chinese Communist leaders now have a better appreciation of the extent of discon- tent and a strengthened determination to crush, by forceful means if necessary, any sig- nificant overt manifestations of this discon- tent. RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE 28. As already intimated, resistance in Com- munist China was not appreciably affected by the death of Stalin and subsequent events. Rather, the course of such resistance was de- termined by local conditions. Except among certain tribal minorities it is estimated that virtually no organized resistance of a signifi- cant scale existed in Communist China at the time of Stalin's death. In some areas organ- ized groups may have survived from the time of the Communist takeover, but they were almost certainly few and small. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 29 (a) Organized Resistance 29. A few incidents of active, organized resist- ance on a purely local basis have occurred. For example, it is probable that uprisings against local authorities occurred in South- west Sinkiang in 1954 and 1956. Seemingly, there was considerable popular participation in these incidents, and arms were reportedly used against government authorities and troops. Additionally, during 1956 there were reliable reports, some of which were admitted by the Peiping regime, of revolts in western Szechwan, an area outside of Tibet, but popu- lated by Tibetans. Persistent reports have also been received of the spread of these upris- ings to Tibet proper, and of the use of military aircraft by the Communists to quell the dis- turbances. At least one revolt was reliably reported during 1956 in the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Chou, an area populated by the Yi minority rather than Tibetans, in what is now western Szechwan. 30. An organized resistance group in Tibet, the Mimang, presumably had its origin at the time of the Communist occupation in late 1951, but did not come to the fore until about 1956. The numerical strength of this group is not known. The Mimang probably does not engage in specific training, the effectiveness of the group depending on the natural in- clination of these people towards guerrilla- type warfare. The group's appeal stems from the antipathy Tibetans feel toward Han Chi- nese and their loyalty to Lamaism which binds them together in opposition to both the Han and fellow Tibetans who have cooperated with the Communists. Except for supplies cap- tured from the Chinese Communist military forces, the weapons of the Mimang are prob- ably limited to ancient rifles and homemade weapons. They probably operate in fairly small groups largely against targets of con- venience. 31. Another organized anti-Communist Chi- nese resistance group consists mainly of emi- gres in Indian border towns. It is believed that the Dalai Lama's brother, Gyalo Thon- dup, is connected with the group. This group may be supporting some of the resistance activities in Tibet. (b) Unorganized Resistance 32. Unorganized resistance on the China mainland has appeared sporadically but there is no indication of a definite pattern of such activities or of a concerted effort on the part of the population against the regime. Peri- odic, spontaneous acts of resistance have taken place but remain localized, limited to certain social, minority, and religious groups. They have never presented a serious threat to the regime although it has at times led the regime significantly to alter some of its policies. 33. Resentment of the peasants against the compulsory cooperative system has expressed itself in such forms of passive resistance as withholding taxes, refusing to participate in government-sponsored programs to increase agricultural and livestock production, and to withdrawals from cooperatives. In 1956, a considerable number of provinces failed to meet their tax quotas. During 1957, 307 co- operatives in Kiangsu Province alone distrib- uted grain to their members without allotting any for the public tax. 34. General dissatisfaction among urban workers over unsatisfactory working condi- tions (such as the speed-up system and exces- sive required overtime) and against unsatis- factory living conditions (such as poor hous- ing and lack of consumer goods) has taken the form of strikes and passive resistance, in- cluding slowdowns, absenteeism and extensive use of "sick-leave." Unorganized active resist- ance is illustrated in a People's Daily report of 23 July 1957 of 253 cases of sabotage or sus- pected sabotage in factories and enterprises in Canton. 35. Unorganized resistance among students has taken the form of sporadic strikes and riots. In the early autumn of 1956 only 40 out of 4,000 students at a Peiping University attended what was supposed to be a compul- sory discussion of the "Political Current Events Report." 36. Dissidence among intellectuals was ex- pressed by intensive criticism of the Commu- nist regime during the "bloom and contend" SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 30 SECRET period (not classified as "counterrevolution" by the Communists) , and by occasional defec- tions to Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the intel- lectuals who make up the "democratic" minor parties that collaborate with the Peiping re- gime have in those parties unique instruments for maintaining contact with one another, even though they have no mass following and are limited to major cities. Some individual intellectuals have apparently utilized these parties and other contacts to build up small personal followings. However, it appears that in almost all cases, dissident intellectuals hoped to use such contacts not to overthrow the regime but to exercise a "moderating" or "restraining" influence on it. 37. One of the most persistent problems for the regime is resistance to the Communist program by many of the non-Han Chinese minorities, particularly in the border areas. In addition to resistance by the Tibetans, the Communists have admitted uprisings also among the Turki peoples of Sinkiang in De- cember 1954 and in March 1956, and resist- ance among the Hui (Moslems) of Kansu at unspecified periods. Minority areas include some of the most remote and inaccessible parts of China, areas from which even rumors are slow to leak to the outside world. Peiping's concern with minority dissidence is reflected in the general moderation of Com- munist policies in minority areas, and in the continuing warnings in Chinese Communist propaganda against the error of "great Han chauvinism." The most significant fact con- cerning resistance in minority areas is not so much the occasional outburst of rebellion, but rather the fact that the Communists have established effective control in some areas which for centuries have been breeding grounds for rebellion against Chinese author- ity. In the past few years the traditionally troublesome area of Sinkiang has been ex- hibited regularly to visiting dignitaries from Moslem countries, indicating that whatever rebellious activity may persist is at most local in extent. 38. Except for the secret sects, the Hui (Mos- lems) , and the Tibetan Buddhists, there has been no recent significant, active resistance to the regime by religious groups. However, the basic divergence between Communism and re- ligious adherence manifests itself in passive resistance by many of the religious communi- cants throughout mainland China, reflected in continuing arrests of religious figures and in the restrictions imposed on such groups as Catholics. The regime has attempted to deal with this passive resistance by organizing Communist-front organizations of Moslems, Buddhists, Protestants, and most recently, Catholics and Taoists. While these attempts have been partially successful, some passive resistance continues among these groups. 39. The "rectification" campaign which spread throughout China as a consequence of Mao Tse-tung's speech on contradictions in February 1957, indicates that the Communist Party has taken serious cognizance of the existence of widespread antagonism toward the regime although the Communist leaders appear to have initially underestimated this antagonism. Peiping is fully capable of main- taining internal security, however, and pros- pects for an uprising along the Hungarian lines are unlikely to develop in the forseeable future. The fact that the regime has made minor concessions to counteract dissidence, such as the recent withdrawals of Chinese civilian cadres from Tibet and the relaxation of some policies in the face of peasant unrest, does not mean the regime is incapable of con- trolling the masses. In the overall picture, resistance in its various overt forms appears to be of minor significance ? not accurately reflecting the large extent of underlying dis- sidence. That dissidence expresses itself in apathy and lack of positive response to the regime's programs however, and constitutes one of Peiping's chief problems. The principal significance of such dissidence and resistance as presently exist or is predictable in Commu- nist China lies not in any revolutionary threat to the regime itself but rather in the evolu- tionary effect it may have on the regime's policies. Lack of popular cooperation may delay the achievement of some of the Chinese Communists' objectives, particularly in the economic field, and may force the leaders to modify some policies. In particular, peasant dissidence may reduce agricultural production SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 31 and hamper the regime's efforts to collect agricultural surplus. This in turn, by its effect on food supplies, would increase dissi- dence in urban groups. ROLE OF EMIGRES 40. There is a small group of Tibetans, in Kalimpong, India, composed of persons who have fled from Tibet since 1951. Some mem- bers of this emigre group are former high- ranking officials, and others were members of the Dalai Lama's retinue on his trip to India in the winter of 1956-1957. This group has reportedly tried to obtain aid from the Indian government, both in removing the Chinese Communists from Tibet and in granting asy- lum to the Dalai Lama. These attempts have been unsuccessful, although there is a possi- bility that the recent Chinese Communist de- cision to postpone the socialization of Tibet may have been somewhat influenced by rep- resentations from India and other "neutral" countries. 41. The more than 12 million Overseas Chi- nese who inhabit the various countries of Southeast Asia do not seem to be playing a significant part in guiding or aiding resistance activities in the homeland. There is a contin- uing bond between the Overseas Chinese and their ancestral land, and undoubtedly they are proud of the emergence of China as a world power, even though they may be opposed to Communism. These Chinese abroad continue to send back regular monetary contributions to their families on the mainland, and until recently there was a substantial flow of young Chinese back to the mainland for their educa- tion. This flow has declined during 1957. There is no evidence of Overseas Chinese con- tact with, or aid to, any resistance group in Communist China. CHINESE NATIONALIST ACTIVITIES 42. The Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan is the most important group of Chinese outside of the China Mainland and has a limited potential to guide and assist resistance groups on the mainland. They have well organized and equipped military units numbering over 600,000 including all services. Although these forces pose no real threat to the existence of the Chinese Com- munist regime, they are able, with outside support, to maintain a certain amount of mili- tary pressure along the central east China coast. Although the Nationalists conduct small-scale ground actions, propaganda mis- sions and other air operations, and harass the Communists by artillery and naval patrol activity, they are not capable under present circumstances of maintaining major military operations on the mainland or of providing significant military support to other dissident or resistance elements on the mainland. 43. The most persistent category of "counter- revolutionary" activity to appear in Commu- nist news and propaganda is that of Nation- alist subversion, infiltration, espionage, and sabotage. Most of this activity is reported to be concentrated in the coastal region of Com- munist China, particularly in the area op- posite the Nationalist-held offshore islands. Communist charges concerning Nationalist activities almost invariably deal with single agents or small groups of a half dozen or less, who are usually said to have surrendered or been apprehended almost immediately after being landed. The Communists have avoided implying that a widespread Nationalist net- work may exist on the mainland or that the Nationalists have organizational or communi- cations lines to resistance groups that may be active, and there is little information avail- able to determine the extent of popular sym- pathy toward Nationalist efforts on the main- land. 44. In northern Burma, and also in Laos and Thailand, former Chinese Nationalist irregu- lars numbering approximately 4,000-6,000 continue to exist. Although Taiwan has offi- cially severed all ties with these elements, it is believed that the Chinese Nationalists still maintain contact with and provide limited support for these units. While these ex-Na- tionalist troops possess limited capabilities and presently confine their activities to main- taining their existence, they must, neverthe- less, be considered as a potential resistance group. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 32 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE 45. The characteristic response of the Peiping regime to dissidence has been to combat it with the propaganda and administrative re- sources of the vast interlocking state-party apparatus. It also has been characteristic to alternate pressure and relaxation and to make concessions when expedient. Resist- ance, on the other hand, almost invariably has been dealt with by uncompromising sup- pression by the machinery of the police state. In addition to an extensive police network and the armed forces, the repressive machin- ery of the regime has been extended into all spheres by a system of occupational organiza- tions, urban residence committees, and rural collectives. The existence of this tremendous security apparatus, the incessant program of indoctrination and propaganda, the strictness of travel controls, the rigid control of press, publications and radio, and the unceasing regimentation of people in every walk of life, explain the disappearance of earlier resistance groups and the lack of present organized re- sistance. CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT 46. Communist China is a police state, and it is difficult to draw clear distinctions between its military forces and its security forces. The powerful People's Liberation Army (PLA) , numerically the largest army in the world, with an estimated strength of two and one half million men, has a strong political back- ground dating back to the days when the army and the Party were one. The People's Armed Policy (PAP) numbers more than 500,000. 47. A part of the stated mission of the PLA is the maintenance of internal security. The nature of PLA organization, and the organiza- tion of the PAP under the Ministry of Public Security imply that the detection and sup- pression of dissidence and minor resistance activity is a function primarily of the PAP, while only major, well-organized resistance requiring relatively extensive military opera- tions in the field would become a target for PLA activity. To accomplish such missions the PLA has Public Security regiments and divisions as well as its regularly organized ground, air, and naval forces. The Public Security units are small, lightly armed ver- sions of their regular counterparts and have served in regular military operations. They are, however, well suited for operations in the field against irregular forces such as might be organized by resistance movements. The effectiveness of the PLA in maintaining in- ternal security in China has been outstanding. 48. In addition to the PLA and the PAP, the People's Militia appears to have an internal security role in rural areas. Its members are subject to part-time duty, and most are poorly armed and trained. The effectiveness of the militia in suppressing resistance activity is probably very low. However, it undoubtedly serves as a fairly useful group in maintaining surveillance over the peasantry and reporting possible dissidence or other suspicious activity to local Communist authorities. 49. Moreover, the security forces have a very close relationship with the mass organizations which link the formal government and Party agencies with the various social groups in the population. These organizations, with a membership of many millions, extend the gov- ernment's control down to the lowliest local neighborhood organization in the towns and to the cooperative level in the rural areas. Street and Lane Committees function as ex- tensions of the police apparatus in urban areas. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE 50. In peacetime, organized resistance to the Peiping regime has virtually no chance of developing on a significant scale. With the possible exception of the Tibetan revolts, re- sistance in Communist China in recent years arose in reaction to specific local grievances. Effective internal security controls will con- tinue to prevent potential resistance elements from organizing. The same strict controls will confine unorganized resistance to certain limited types of action largely of a passive character. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 51. Resistance activity is handicapped by a number of key factors. The Party, army, and police are loyal to the regime. Dissident ele- ments, although widespread throughout the population, with few exceptions, lack organi- zation or communication with one another and generally lack the necessary appreciation of each other's problems and grievances to co- operate in active resistance on a wider scale. There is thus no presently identifiable basis for an anti-Communist front known to exist in Communist China. Dissident students and intellectuals who might conceivably provide leadership for a resistance movement, as they have in past periods in Chinese history, are disillusioned and demoralized. The "Hun- dred Flowers" period probably brought forth the maximum effort and even that effort al- most certainly cannot be repeated in view of stringent measures. 52. The main factor that might affect the re- sistance potential in China is the state of the economy. Improvements in economic condi- tions sufficient to permit more liberal eco- nomic incentives would decrease popular ill will, while a deterioration of economic condi- tions would increase resistance activity. A general economic crisis could conceivably cre- ate conditions under which organized resist- ance on a larger scale could develop and unor- ganized resistance be considerably intensified. Even in such a case, however, it could not be assumed that a revolt would be possible on more than limited local levels, where the re- gime could suppress it with dispatch. In the special case of Tibetan resistance there ap- pears to have been at least some degree of organization, motivated not solely by local grievances but also by a revulsion against Communism and a hatred of the Chinese invaders. 53. If there is little potential for active re- sistance in Communist China at present, there is nevertheless a substantial potential for dis- sidence. The Communist program of maxi- mum investment in heavy industry will con- tinue to lead to a great measure of dissatis- faction and disillusionment throughout the population and particularly among the peas- ants. However, Communist countermeasures 33 and devices for persuasion and force are suffi- ciently well developed to enable Peiping, if it continues to demonstrate the flexibility of policy it has exhibited to date, to confine dis- sidence to manageable levels and to prevent outbreaks of resistance in other than isolated, local instances. Nevertheless, dissidence will probably continue to be a limiting faetor for the regime's program. The significance of dissidence lies not in a revolutionary threat to the regime, but rather in the effect it may have on the evolution of the regime's policies and the country's future development. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR 54. The extent of resistance in Communist China would depend on the nature and for- tunes of the war. If the regime's military operations were successful, or the Communists could make it appear that it was, Peiping probably could rally many dissident elements to its side by an appeal to Chinese nationalism and xenophobia. In this case, dissidence would probably remain inactive and covert, as it did during the Korean war. If the regime suffered military setbacks, it is still doubtful whether resistance forces would be capable of strong and effective independent guerrilla action, even with help from abroad, unless Peiping security controls and propaganda facilities were seriously weakened. Under cir- cumstances of fairly impressive non-Commu- nist military successes, anti-regime operations in Communist-controlled territory would probably still be difficult, with the population generally avoiding the risks involved in organizing for or engaging in outright rebellion, or in assisting non-Communist intelligence or escape and evasion efforts. If the tide seemed to be clearly turn- ing against the Communists, major defections from the Communist cause might be expected, and isolated and individual resistance activi- ties would increase. But even under these conditions most types of resistance activities behind the Communist lines requiring an organizational effort would probably be a minor factor at least initially because of the time required to organize and train the re- sistance elements. If the war were a pro- SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 34 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET longed one, passive peasant resistance might become particularly significant by affecting the regime's food supply. 55. If a situation develops in which resistance elements could emerge, they would face a number of basic difficulties in developing a capability to harass the regime through guer- rilla and political warfare activities, including sabotage. To provide any resistance efforts of military significance, groups would require effective leadership, coordination and material support. Moreover, the effort to develop such an organization would take place in a country where the bulk of the population is not prone to political action but rather tends to adopt a "wait and see" policy. Because of this tradi- tional attitude, it is believed that lodgements in such strength as to assure early direct mili- tary support and relief would be required. By the same token, however, the average Chi- nese does not want to offend those who may succeed in taking over control of his country, an attitude that may under some circum- stances assist in escape and evasion opera- tions and intelligence collection efforts. 56. The nationality of the attacking forces would make some difference; Chinese forces from Taiwan would probably meet with a fair amount of popular acceptance, while Japanese forces would probably arouse the traditional antipathy against Japan, particularly in those parts of China with a tradition of guerrilla resistance against the Japanese. American participation would enable the Communist regime to appeal for popular support on the basis of Chinese nationalism and xenophobia, but would not be likely to antagonize potential active resistance elements. Furthermore, US participation might create the impression that the attack is likely to be successful. The nationality of other Asian or non-Asian forces would not be of major psychological signifi- cance. The really decisive psychological fac- tor would not be the nationality of the forces engaged, but the prospect of military success or failure. 57. The use of nuclear weapons in an attack against the Chinese mainland which severely crippled the regime's control mechanisms would create an opportunity for some indig- enous resistance. Initially at least, as indi- cated earlier, resistance efforts would be handicapped by lack of organization, and in this case, the disruptive nature of the attack would almost ensure that any actions would be localized. Moreover, it seems probable that the regime's local control agencies will rally to maintain their position and will pose a threat to the establishment of a strong re- sistance organization. To the extent that nuclear weapons were used for more tactical purposes than total destruction of the re- gime's control mechanisms, the problems in organizing effective resistance described above would obtain.1 58. Existence under stringent Communist control has created among the masses of Chi- nese a great tolerance to harsh authority. It is probable that a relatively strict occupation policy would, by comparison, seem preferable to regimentation under Communism so long as no heavy demands were placed on the local economy for food, clothing, and shelter. How- ever, a liberal occupation policy, especially one which provided for the relief of the needy, would undoubtedly tend to foster increased resistance activities in unconquered areas. 59. It is doubtful that the attitudes and ac- tions of either regimes or resistance groups in other Sino-Soviet Bloc countries, with the pos- sible exception of Soviet actions, would have any strong effect on resistance potential. Basic contributing factors to this are the lack of an efficient resistance organization in China, the isolation of resistance groups Since this study has repeatedly demonstrated the existence of widespread dissident elements throughout the population and because a vast reservoir of emergent resistance leadership prob- ably exists among former business leaders, intel- lectuals, and elements of the 5,000,000 veterans discharged from the army since 1949, the repre- sentative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intel- ligence, USAF, believes the conclusion is justi- fied that the elimination of selected targets im- portant to the military and control strengths of Communist China and the widespread resultant disruption would greatly promote effective action on the part of dissident elements rather than discourage such action. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 35 within China, and the lack of communication with groups in other countries. In the case of European bloc nations, the isolation result- ing from distance and terrain and racial and cultural differences add to the unlikelihood that cooperation of any sort would eventuate. 60. Responsibility for the initiation of hostili- ties would not materially affect, either at the outset of hostilities or subsequently, the atti- tudes and consequently the capabilities of in- dividuals and groups willing to engage in re- sistance activities. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 37 ANNEX D ? CZECHOSLOVAKIA BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE 1. Even though the old Czechoslovak Republic had a more vigorous democratic tradition than any other Eastern European country and was strongly Western-oriented, Communist strength was greater in Czechoslovakia than in the other present satellites. In the last free elections in 1946, Communist candidates got 38 percent of the votes. Since the 1948 coup, however, the Communists' drastic re- shaping of Czechoslovak political and eco- nomic life has alienated many one-time sym- pathizers and even many Party members. Today, despite a surface appearance of calm and stability, the Czechoslovak pop- ulation harbors considerable ? though sup- pressed ? dissatisfaction with the regime and with the USSR of which the regime is one of the most faithful servants. This dissatisfac- tion has been accumulating and becoming more apparent since the death of Stalin in 1953. 2. Among the factors that have tended to create ill will are the following: The regime's subservience to the USSR and the resulting subordination of CSR interests to those of the USSR; the efforts of the regime to reshape CSR society in the Soviet image with the con- comitant adulation and copying of everything Soviet, falsification of history, repudiation of native traditions and severing historic and cultural links with the West; the belief that the CSR is being economically exploited by the USSR even though the living standard is somewhat higher than in other satellite states; loss of civil liberties and excessive interference with the citizens' lives; the persecution of church leaders as well as the harassment of believers; the detention of large numbers of political prisoners in jails and forced labor camps; and the all-pervading atmosphere of coercion, lawlessness and hypocrisy which characterize the regime's activities. 3. The one significant non-Czech minority, the Slovaks, resent what seems to them an undue monopoly of power and privileges by the Czechs, especially the concentration of au- thority in Prague and the dispatch of Czech officials and technicians to Slovakia. Al- though this is a grievance of long standing, antedating the Communist era, the apparent failure of the regime to remedy this situation after the liquidation of the "bourgeois" gov- ernment aggravated the already existing ill will on the part of the Slovaks. The Slovaks blame the Czechs for having allowed the Com- munists to seize power, and the Slovak Com- munists have always been weaker numerically and in actual influence in Slovakia than the Czech Communists. MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS 4. Intellectuals and students. Writers, who have been restive under rigid Party controls on literary expression, are among the most dissatisfied of the social groups. They par- ticularly resent the lack of liberalization after Stalin's death. Regime controls were openly challenged at the Writers' Congress in April 1956, and some writers, especially in Slovakia, have not capitulated to the Party's demand for conformity and obedience. University students drew up an extensive list of political demands in May 1956 which were ignored by the regime. While there has been no student trouble since that event, this group almost cer- tainly harbors anti-regime views. Like many young people in Czechoslovakia, they resent the excessive regimentation of life under Com- munism, and may on occasion be disinclined to caution and passive acceptance of the Com- munist regime. 5. Youth. The average young person in Czechoslovakia has assumed a protective col- oration which enables him to live relatively comfortably under the present regime and to SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 38 SECRET escape more than minimum interference in his daily life by the Communist authorities. There is, however, a sizeable element of young people who resist all efforts at regimentation and besides adopting exaggerated imitations of Western dress and other external signs of disaffection will on occasion engage in riots and scuffles with the police. The regime has recently cracked down on this group in what was probably a nervous reaction magnified by last year's Hungarian events. This rest- lessness and lack of discipline of youth result- ing from the Stalinist system prevailing in Czechoslovakia has been a problem for years. These elements are made up of less educated young people and are essentially negative in their motivation. Although they would prob- ably be quick to join in any disturbances such as clashes between student demonstrators and police as in Hungary in October 1956 or be- tween strikers and police as at Poznan, they are not a primary danger to the regime. 6. Professional people, managers. Middle- ranking civil servants, professional men, eco- nomic managers and engineers, are dissatis- fied not only with the working of the regime as it affects them in their careers but also with the general nature of the regime, par- ticularly its subordination of national inter- ests to those of the USSR, its bias in favor of political reliability rather than efficiency, its general crudity, dishonesty, and lawlessness. Though this dislike of the very nature of the regime is found in all segments of the popula- tion, the professional group seems to be most sensitive to it. Yet there is perhaps more willingness in this group than in most others (except industrial workers) to accept a Com- munist regime provided it were cleaned up at various levels, committed to a humane and national-minded socialist program, and acted more independently of the USSR. Since this is not the case, disillusionment increasingly engenders dissidence. 7. Peasantry. The farming population ob- jects to compulsory delivery quotas. But its resistance is characterized by apathy in plant- ing and a slowdown in the required deliveries. The accelerated tempo of collectivization over recent years is chiefly the result of increased regime pressuie which has overcome peasant resistance. This weakening resistance has been exacerbated by the rapid aging of the rural population. Very few young people are staying on the farms, drifting into industrial jobs instead. 8. Industrial workers complain about long work hours, low real wages, poor housing facilities, and shortage in and high prices of consumer goods. They dislike the stringent labor discipline. There have been reports of scattered strikes in heavy industry and min- ing but none apparently serious. Despite their complaints, industrial workers have not been openly rebellious and, under present cir- cumstances, are not likely to engage in active resistance. 9. Armed Forces. The permanent cadre of commissioned and noncommissioned officers gives continuing support to the regime, some from conviction and others from opportun- istic motives. The approximately 90,000 con- scripts inducted annually represent a cross section of Czechoslovak youth and probably reflect the general popular dissatisfaction with Communist rule. However, obviously unreli- able individuals are not inducted into the Armed Forces, and conditions of military life and stringent political controls prevent the expression and dissemination of dissaffection among the troops. Personal dissatisfaction with military service may be expressed not only in terms of the soldier's usual grievances, but also by a dislike of Soviet type of training and political indoctrination. However, al- though this discontent seldom overrides the normal military obedience to authority and there are no known instances of group defi- ance of military orders, the reliability of the Armed Forces in case of emergency is open to question. The militarized security, forces (Frontier and Interior Guard), because of their very close screening of recruits, prob- ably constitute the most reliable elements of the Armed Forces. On balance, it is highly unlikely that military personnel would offer active resistance to the regime under present conditions. 10. Religion. Religious believers resent the regime's policy of interning church leaders and doing everything possible to hamper the SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET normal functioning of the churches, to impede religious education, and to harass the faithful. In itself, this resentment does not pose a serious threat to the regime, but in combina- tion with other factors helps to keep dissidence at a high level, especially in Slovakia. 11. Slovaks, being predominantly Catholic, historically at odds with the more advanced Czechs, individualistic and nationalistic, have always represented a special problem to the Communist regime. Not only is there in Slo- vakia a stronger anti-Soviet sentiment but also there has remained the traditional anti- Czech feeling. As a result, Communism has had considerably less success establishing firm roots in Slovakia than in the Czech lands, and it continues to have difficulties in organizing loyal Communists on the grass roots level as well as in obtaining faithful adherence by Party members to central directives. Many of the unconfirmed but plausible reports of unorganized and modestly organized resist- ance relate to Slovakia. Thus, a considerable potential for resistance exists in Slovakia, but its apparent lack of organization and focus against the centers of Communist power re- stricts its actual effectiveness. INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE 12. Although dissidence is more pronounced in Slovakia than in Bohemia-Moravia, there is little evidence of active resistance in either area. Communist security controls have not changed significantly since the death of Stalin; they are still so pervasive that people are afraid to voice criticism of regime, let alone engage in open resistance. Moreover, the events in Hungary have only deepened the conviction that Soviet troops, while not at present "stationed in Czechoslovakia, would come to the assistance of the regime to put down any revolt that could not be handled locally and that there is no hope of Western help. As a result, the population at no time was in the reckless revolutionary mood which characterized Poland and Hungary in 1956. Isolated expressions of dissidence found no active popular response. The regime has not wavered since in its firm attitude, and the population has refrained from overt expres- 39 sion of hostility other than grumbling about restrictive policies, extensive government con- trol, and living conditions in general. 13. It is true that dissatisfaction with the regime is found in all segments of the Czecho- slovak population, even among Party mem- bers. But dissidence is not translated into widespread strikes, riots and public disturb- ances, except for occasional trouble with young "hooligan" elements. It is confined largely to verbal criticism of the regime and fairly mild demand for change on the part of certain educated and articulate segments of the population, notably writers, university students, and some Party groups in govern- ment ministries. These dissident groups ap- pear for the moment to be biding their time, waiting for more opportune external and in- ternal conditions. 14. In general, the Czechoslovak population as a whole is not in a mood to defy the regime and press for revolutionary changes. There is a deep-seated fear of the risks involved in a change on the part of those who have lived through the upheavals caused by the German occupation and the imposition of the Commu- nist regime in its place, and who have experi- enced the absence of Western intervention in Eastern Europe. These people fear not only the painful loss of life and property in a Hun- garian-style uprising but also the possible loss of jobs and various social benefits, and an- other prolonged period of uncertainty and political upheaval. TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953 15. Despite the surface appearance of calm and stability, dissatisfaction of the Czecho- slovak people has been accumulating and in- creasing since the death of Stalin, mainly be- cause the regime did not move toward greater liberalization. There were a few concessions, such as a slight relaxation of police pressure and an improvement of the standard of living. But by mid-1956, it had become clear that the Communist leaders did not intend to grant any basic concessions, either internally by permitting greater freedom, or externally by moving towards a more independent position vis-a-vis the USSR. The population is dissatis- SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 40 SECRET fled with this unyielding attitude on the part of the regime, but appears unwilling to do any- thing about it. Some open expressions of dis- sidence in May 1956 were quickly countered, and, at the Party Conference in June 1956, it was firmly stated that no further conces- sions would be made in response to demands for political liberalization. 16. The regime has been able to cope suc- cessfully with dissidence largely because un- rest has been confined to small groups and has been kept from spreading to broad segments of the population. There has been a closing of ranks under pressure of events among the leadership and hence no opening which could be exploited by dissident elements. Nor is there any weakening of the authority and effectiveness of Party and police controls of the kind which permitted similar beginnings of dissidence in Poland and Hungary to grow bolder, stronger and more widespread. So far as the Communist Party itself is concerned, the sustained campaign against "revisionism" and the efforts made to deny the applicability of Mao's theories on socialism to Czechoslo- vakia show that the leaders continue to have good reason to doubt the loyalty and ortho- doxy of the mass of Party members. Thus the regime strives to maintain strict ideologi- cal orthodoxy as the official policy. This pol- icy evidently receives full support from the hard core members of the Party apparatus, and hence the regime has been able to sup- press the kind of deviationist thinking which cropped up immediately after the Twentieth Congress. RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE 17. There are no known organized resistance groups in Czechoslovakia, nor have there been any for many years. There is, however, a certain amount of passive, unorganized resist- ance, mostly in the form of attempts to evade labor discipline, non-attendance at political meetings, failure to pay dues to Communist organizations, and similar derelictions. The motives are not always political. There are occasional cases of active resistance by in- dividuals, largely in the form of violent assault on and even murder of Communist function- aries by one or more aggrieved individuals, and sometimes in the form of support by individ- uals for Western intelligence. ROLE OF EMIGRES 18. Since the death of Stalin, material sup- port by emigres to internal Czechoslovakia resistance has been non-existent, as has that from any other external source. No regular channels exist at present for getting such sup- port into Czechoslovakia. Emigre guidance for internal resistance has been equally lack- ing, except to the extent that one or another political grouping of the Czechoslovak emigra- tion has succeeded in gaining acceptance for its views by some Western propaganda agency, which has then incorporated such a "line" into its efforts to reach the Czechoslovak pop- ulation. A considerable body of evidence in- dicates that Western broadcasts are widely heard in Czechoslovakia and that propaganda in pamphlet form does receive some attention. There are also indications that Western broad- casts have both adherents and critics among the population. REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE 19. The regime has maintained intact its com- prehensive security controls. The threat of these organs to the people is being kept alive by repeated announcements of the arrest of "enemy agents," reminding would-be conspir- ators that their activities are doomed to fail- ure. Apart from the regular armed forces, the regime's security apparatus consists of highly centralized units, all under the com- mand of the Ministry of the Interior. Its total strength is estimated at from 110,000 to 140,- 000. This strength figure does not include some 160,000 to 200,000 personnel who serve part time in various civilian militia groups. In addition, many thousands of people assist as paid and unpaid agents and informers and as such make a considerable contribution to the mission of maintaining the security of the regime. Under the Ministry of Interior are the following major components: (1) The Frontier Guard (PS) and Interior Guard (VS) , with a total strength of 45,000 men or- ganized into military units; (2) the secret police (StB) , with an estimated strength of SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 41 only 5,000 but controlling a widespread net of agents and informers; and, (3) the Public Security Corps (VB), with a strength of 60,- 000 to 90,000 which includes as its largest com- ponent the regular police. This apparatus is supplemented and supported by an elaborate system of population registration and docu- mentary control. 20. The Czechoslovak regime conducts con- tinuous propaganda by press, radio and per- sonal agitation for the purposes of indoctrina- tion, vilification of Western objectives, label- ing faith in Western "promises" as futile self- delusion, etc. The regime eagerly exploits all evidence of refugee activity which may be con- strued as advocating that the only alternative to the post-war economic and social system is a return to conditions of 1938, conditions that may no longer be satisfactory to what is prob- ably a majority of the population. Moreover, the regime plays up the continuing Czech dis- like and fear of the Germans, claiming that the end of Communism in Czechoslovakia will mean the return of German domination. While exploitation of these themes falls far short of the regime's objectives of winning over the population to enthusiastic support, nevertheless they help to keep alive Czech disillusionment with the West and the pain- ful period of German occupation and to this extent may contribute to the many other factors inhibiting resistance. Moreover, the people in Czechoslovakia are undoubtedly aware that their standard of living, while low, is higher than that of neighboring satellites. CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT 21. The Czechoslovak security forces are fully capable of preventing an expansion or in- crease of resistance activity by any local anti- regime elements, organized or unorganized. But even if security controls were relaxed, and the people were less cautious in voicing their opinions of the regime, they probably would not increase their resistance activities, at least not in the Czech lands. Traditionally, the Czechs are a cautious people, and it is believed that they would be more inclined to wait for liberation by external powers than to fight for it themselves. However, the Slovaks are of a different temperament, and it is possible that some of them would renew their partisan activities against the regime in the event of a security relaxation. 22. However, in the unlikely event of a wide- spread popular revolt, the regime would al- most certainly be incapable of successful counter-action without Soviet help. In such a situation, the regular armed forces probably would not be considered reliable, and the re- gime would ask for help from the Soviet Army, substantial units of which are available in adjacent areas of the Soviet Union and in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE 23. So long as Soviet power remains un- changed, the regime's security controls un- altered, and the present standard of living unimpaired, organized resistance has virtually no potential. Unless a significant deteriora- tion of internal controls occurred and possible Soviet intervention were precluded by a major internal crisis within the USSR or heavy So- viet involvement elsewhere, the prospects for organized resistance remain poor. The re- gime's effectiveness in eliminating all signifi- cant organized underground and partisan re- sistance groups, the prevailing view that lib- eration cannot be achieved without direct Western assistance, and the regime's pervasive controls serve to inhibit the evolution of a popular resistance movement. 24. Passive resistance along lines already in- dicated could assume greater proportions and extend to frequent acts of economic sabotage if the regime were forced to revise drastically downward its present level of efforts to in- crease housing, consumer goods, and food stocks. Further political or military crises in other Bloc countries might then act as a catalyst for spontaneous disturbances in Czechoslovakia. Unorganized passive resist- ance will probably continue but within rather narrow limits. Isolated instances of unrest, such as occurred in June 1953 and in May 1956, are possible but of no long-range significance. Neither are the limited capabilities of intel- SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 42 SECRET lectuals and students to pressure the regime for liberalization because the Communist leadership is quite able to suppress such ac- tivities or keep them within easily manage- able proportions. There is a bare possibility that the intellectual ferment might affect the Communist Party bureaucracy, but the ap- parent lack of a leader of the Gomulka type will almost certainly leave Czechoslovak for- tunes in the hands of the unrelenting "Stalin- ists." Thus present evidence does not pro- vide a basis for expectation that unorganized resistance will become anything more than an irritant to the regime. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR 25. In the event of war between Bloc and non- Bloc states, the Czechoslovak regime would immediately intensify its security measures. This would initially restrict the populace from participating in resistance activities. It would also give them time to observe the progress of the struggle so that they could place them- selves in a more favorable position with the prospective victor. It is not likely that resist- ance would develop if it were apparent that Soviet forces were generally gaining and would continue to control Czechoslovakia and the areas adjacent to it, and that there was no immediate prospect of the arrival of Western troops. It is likely that in case of war the Czechoslovak security police would immediate- ly take drastic precautionary measures, prob- ably interning or even deporting to the USSR thousands of known or suspected anti-Com- munists. In these circumstances only a small number of courageous people could be found who would be willing to risk serious resistance activity, such as sheltering Western airmen or escaped prisoners, mainly in rural areas and Slovakia. 26. On the other hand, were it apparent that Soviet forces were generally losing and that a retreat of Soviet power from Czechoslovakia and adjacent areas was imminent, there would be an increase in resistance activity accom- panied by a breakdown of Communist police controls as Communists fled or simply failed to carry out orders. Resistance elements would engage in industrial and agricultural sabotage activities; with outside help, they would undertake intelligence collection, es- cape and evasion operations and other ac- tivities that would be detrimental to the Bloc. At the same time, skeleton underground clan- destine organizations and guerrilla bands might begin to operate. Good possibilities for guerrilla type operations appear to exist in the mountainous areas of Slovakia. In ad- dition, there is a limited basis for cooperation between Slovak, Polish and Ukrainian anti- Communist groups by virtue of their common access to the Carpathian mountain ranges, past cooperation among them, and bonds of ethnic kinship. Since Soviet troops would be deployed in Czechoslovakia in the event of war, an effective partisan movement probably could not develop unless substantial Western assistance was made available, and their ac- tivities coordinated with Western military op- erations. 27. In case of a major breakdown of Soviet military power in the area, it is possible that elements of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces might switch sides, even undertaking guer- rilla action against the retreating Soviet forces. More likely, however, would be a gen- eral breakdown of military organization as Communists and non-Communists fought each other, deserted or simply stood by idly till Western forces arrived. 28. The nationality of attacking forces would probably make little difference, provided it was made clear that Czechoslovakia would re- tain its present frontiers and be restored to full independence. The presence of a sub- stantial number of Germans among the at- tacking forces is likely to have noticeable neg- ative psychological effects at least in the Czech lands. Most of the people of Czechoslovakia probably would not be concerned with the responsibility for initiating hostilities because they look upon war as the only means of na- tional liberation. 29. The extensive use of large nuclear weap- ons on Czechoslovak territory would greatly antagonize the people, and the survivors would concentrate their efforts on self-preservation rather than assisting either side in the strug- gle. Such adverse reactions might be reduced SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET but by no means eliminated if tactical nu- clear attacks were limited primarily to mili- tary and government control targets, isolated from larger populated areas. In the latter case the will to resist might be increased since such attacks could diffuse and lessen the con- trol strengths of the Czechoslovakian regime. 30. Occupation policies formulated by the ad- vancing Western powers, designed to guaran- tee the territorial integrity and national inde- 43 pendence of Czechoslovakia, would almost certainly enlist Czechoslovak cooperation and stimulate resistance in areas still under Com- munist control. 31. No individual resistance factions for post- war leadership are known to exist in Czecho- slovakia. Certain emigre groups may desire to establish leadership, but their unpopularity among their countrymen would make such a goal unattainable. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 45 ANNEX E - EAST GERMANY BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE 1. Popular opposition to the East German regime continues to be widespread. It is sus- tained by resentment of the regime's police state methods which, though changed in the employment of outright cruelty since the death of Stalin, have remained essentially the same in repressing political freedom. It is further aggravated by economic regimenta- tion and the failure to raise the standard of living to a level comparable to that of West Germany. Most of all, dissidence is directed against a regime which is regarded as the tool of an alien power, representing the interests of the USSR and dependent on Soviet support for its continued existence. This was clearly demonstrated when only the intervention of Soviet occupation forces prevented the East German regime from disintegrating during the June 1953 uprisings. 2. The character of popular disaffection in the "German Democratic Republic" (GDR) is shaped, to a considerable extent, by the cir- cumstance that contacts between the people of the GDR and those in the West are much more free and frequent than are contacts be- tween the populations of other satellites and the West. Moreover, the East Germans are tied to West Germany by common bonds of national identity and by the hope that even- tual unification will mean liberation from Soviet-Communist rule. As a result, nearly all East Germans do not identify themselves with the GDR as a separate country and do not look upon the GDR as permanent. 3. Soviet occupation of East Germany cannot be disguised. It underlines the puppet re- gime's complete dependence on the USSR and thus prevents it from permitting any modifi- cation of the system not approved by the Kremlin. Furthermore, traditional disdain of the Slays, combined with experience of Soviet brutality, tends to equate Communist meth- ods ? rather than Marxist philosophy ? with Soviet overlordship. Meanwhile, the existence of a much larger prosperous West German state confronts the GDR regime with the obvi- ous rebuttal to any claim of representing the interests of the German people as a whole. As a result, the leaders of the Communist SED (Socialist Unity Party) and the government are generally hated and detested. 4. Economic privations, even though lessened by concessions made after Stalin's death, con- tinue to affect nearly every East German, with the exception of the Party elite, high govern- ment officials and leading intellectuals. These deprivations ? in the face of West German abundance ? are made particularly unpalat- able by the regime's compulsory ideological indoctrination and by its attempts to orient German culture eastward. The East Ger- mans consider themselves as belonging to the West and in fact believe their culture to be superior to that of the East. The regime's anti-Church activities have also contributed to popular dissatisfaction. 5. In the wake of Soviet political gyrations, East German dissidence has fluctuated be- tween resignation and the desire for revolu- tionary action. The events of 1956 1 caused considerable unrest, compelling the regime to take extensive precautionary measures. These measures, coupled with subsequent So- viet efforts to stabilize the position of the USSR and International Communism and the successes, real or apparent, of this campaign have probably cautioned East German resist- ance elements. Nevertheless, the potential remains very great, not only among the dis- The 20th CPSU Congress, CPSU statements in June and October, the emergence of Gomulka in Poland, the Hungarian revolution, and the 29 December statement of the Chinese Commu- nist Party. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 46 SECRET affected groups listed below but also among many rank and file members of the Party and its mass organizations, the government bu- reaucracy, white collar workers and the intel- ligentsia. It has been estimated that not more than 10 percent of the population ac- tually support the regime, and it is almost cer- tain that such support is confined to people who have a personal stake in its continuation. Since late 1949, when the refugee registration program was initiated in West Germany and West Berlin, at least two million persons have fled to the West, about half of them under 25 years of age. MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS 6. Industrial Workers. Disaffection and re- sistance in the GDR are endemic in the indus- trial centers. More than one-third of the wage and salary earners in the GDR are in- dustrial workers. About 70 percent of them are employed in the nationalized industries. Soviet hopes that these workers would become the ideological and social foundation of Com- munist authority in the GDR have not mate- rialized. After 1945, the sharp trend of Ger- man labor toward Communism during the Weimar Republic moved back toward the tra- ditional social-democratic channels which are tied to strong but free trade unions. German social-democracy has been evolutionary (re- visionist) rather than revolutionary and, therefore, has been traditionally the target of intense Bolshevik hostility. Since the tradi- tion of free trade unionism is still very strong, the fact that under the GDR the unions have become 'instruments of government control has greatly contributed to the workers' dis- affection. Furthermore, the workers are dis- gruntled over low wages, high work norms, substandard living conditions, insufficient food supplies, lack of consumer goods, ever- present ideological propaganda, forced at- tendance at political rallies, and imposition of alien Soviet labor methods. 7. Youth, from which the regime had ex- pected to obtain strong support, has proved to be as disappointing as labor. More than one-third of the East German population, about seven million persons, are under 25 years of age, a generation disillusioned by Nazism and therefore thought to be ready for the acceptance of Communism. But there is evidence that the majority of youth is indif- ferent or hostile to the regime. The influence of parents, Church affiliations, older workers and non-Communist teachers, and the near- ness of the West still militate against the success of the Communist youth program. Nevertheless, although the majority of East German youth almost certainly are not loyal to the Communist regime, they, like their elders, have been unable to organize their opposition to the regime. Youth has shown opposition primarily in individual actions, especially flight and nonconformity. Most outspoken in their opposition probably were students who demanded ? in vain ? the abo- lition of compulsory instruction in the Rus- sian language and in Communist ideology, the right to organize freely, and easier access to the West. Whether there will eventually emerge a small leader group of more mature young people constituting a more effective re- sistance potential, or whether resistance will remain limited to passive expressions of dis- content, will depend on the stability of Com- munist leadership. 8. Armed Forces. There is considerably less evidence of dissidence in the East German Army than in the population as a whose. Dig- content is strongest among those who "vol- unteered" for service under any of the various forms of duress commonly employed by the regime. There is undoubtedly less disaffec- tion in the permanent cadre of commissioned and non-commissioned officers ? constituting some 20 percent of the 100,000-man force ? than among the two-year "volun- teers." Most of the latter, however, are former members of Communist youth organi- zations who have been specially selected by Party boards throughout the country because of their presumed reliability ? or at least the absence of any evidence of disloyalty on their part. Military organization and discipline and constant surveillance make any spread of dissidence within the force difficult. More- over, since the physical conditions of service life have improved, they no longer serve as primary sources of resentment toward the SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 47 present Communist government. In general, these same considerations apply to the mili- tarized security forces (Border Police and In- terior Troops). There is believed to be less dissidence in these forces than in the Army, however, because of more careful screening before induction. 9. No actual organized resistance has been noted within the Army or militarized security forces. Morale and discipline within the Army are only fair, however, and instances of inattention to duty and individual acts of in- subordination are frequent. Forceful opposi- tion to military and governmental authority probably would not occur on a significant scale except in extraordinary circumstances, such as widespread domestic revolt or a war in which Western forces (particularly if these included West German contingents) were about to invade East Germany. In less dra- matic situations, such as local disorders, the East German Army probably would give no more than nominal support to the present regime. 10. Businessmen. From the outset of the So- viet occupation of East Germany, it has been Communist policy to eliminate the middle class as an independent political factor. This policy has been applied most ruthlessly to the economically stronger elements of the popu- lation; it has been considerably modified, how- ever, when applied to those groups which the regime needed for political or technological reasons. Although there is still some private enterprise left,2 businessmen almost certainly realize that they have only a temporary re- prieve and will be eliminated in due time. While the outlook of these elements is neces- sarily anti-regime, they are almost certainly bound to remain cautious, inclined to passive resistance only if they see no risk. 11. Professionals and Intellectuals. With the exception of some artists and scientists who Private industry produced 11.6 percent of the East German total by the end of 1956. The turnover of private retail trade in the GDR amounted to a slightly less than 29 percent of total retail trade turnover in 1956. In the whole- sale business, the share of private enterprise had sunk to less than 4 percent by the end of 1956. have been offered and have accepted a highly favored social and economic position and who thus have a stake in the continuance of the regime, the vast majority of the intellectuals have remained anti-regime. Many of them have withdrawn from professional life and others have become noticeably less productive. Quite a few have escaped to the West, but others have remained in East Germany in an effort to maintain German cultural traditions without surrendering to the ideological de- mands of Communism. In view of the respect and influence which intellectuals and artists generally enjoy in Europe and particularly in Germany, their resistance potential is consid- erable though largely intangible. This does not mean that all those who oppose the re- gime are also anti-Communist; the case of Wolfgang Harich is representative of persons who hate the regime and detest Soviet over- lordship although they would go along with a national Communist type of government. Nevertheless, in spite of the advantages offered to those intellectuals who are willing to collaborate with the regime, most of them will remain opposed to Communist methods and many will, as the occasion arises, express this opposition directly or indirectly through their media, or, alternatively, either by with- drawal ("inner emigration") or by flight. 12. Churches. Of the 17.6 million inhabitants of the Soviet Zone and the Soviet Sector of Berlin, about 15 million are Lutheran/Evan- gelical and two million Catholics. Both church groups have resisted Communist athe- ism and immorality, each according to its own institutions and its own traditional attitudes to the state and to governments. Generally speaking, however, the ideological and insti- tutional struggle of the SED regime against the churches has not been as intense as that of the regimes in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. The SED regime has not wished to attack excessively the Lutheran/Evangeli- cal churches in the Soviet Zone because of the impact such a policy of total persecution would have on their own coreligionists (24.5 millions) in the Federal Republic. Secondly, the Lutheran/Evangelical churches are ad- ministratively decentralized within the Soviet Zone and therefore do not present a cohesive SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 48 SECRET institutional challenge to the policies of the SED regime. This coincidence of SED policy goals and traditional Lutheran/Evangelical attitudes of cooperation with existing authori- ty has resulted in a difficult but tolerable truce between the two in which each tries to erode rather than explode the powers of the other. For its part, the Catholic Church is too small to have much influence in the Soviet Zone. 13. Party and Government Functionaries. Al- though the regime has strenuously attempted to maintain ideological conformity among its supporters, there is evidence of a cleavage be- tween the working level in government and Party and the central authorities. Particu- larly those persons who were more recently drawn into the Communist apparatus have had difficulties in adjusting themselves to the conflicting pressures imposed on the one hand by the rigorous demands of the central au- thorities and on the other hand by the pop- ular rejection of the regime. This conflict has affected not only persons sensitive to popular feeling but also those influenced by idealistic elements in Marxist doctrine, who have be- come disillusioned or frustrated by the im- possibility of achieving anything consistent with their concepts of the general welfare. Some dissatisfaction has appeared among the lower ranks of functionaries and others on whom the regime relies. This has been re- flected in numerous defections of party offi- cials, police, local government officers, and active as well as former members of the secu- rity and military forces who have fled to West Germany. However, the treatment accorded in Hungary to security officers and other Com- munist functionaries during the 1956 revolt by the populace has tended to make Commu- nist functionaries in East Germany close ranks behind the regime. INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE 14. Despite the great extent of disaffection in the GDR, dissidence, with the single excep- tion of the 17 June 1953 uprisings, has ex- pressed itself only in defection, transmission of intelligence, passive resistance (without significant risk) , and anti-regime propaganda activities. In the second half of 1956, initially under the growing impact of "de-Staliniza- tion" and later as a response to developments in Poland and Hungary, considerable discon- tent manifested itself, especially among intel- lectuals, students, and workers in the larger industrial enterprises. This dis- content reached its peak during the early suc- cesses of the Hungarian revolution. With the suppression of the Hungarian revolt, however, the intensity of discontent and of resistance became progressively dissipated until, by mid- 1957, when communal elections were held throughout the GDR without major incidents, the regime had demonstrated again its hold over the population. 15. However, the ease of access to the GDR from West Berlin and West Germany has facilitated the organization of some resistance groups operating from these areas. These groups encourage cautious covert resistance; their main objects are anti-regime propa- ganda, keeping files of persons in Communist prisons and assisting families of the prisoners, keeping track of crimes committed by the Communists, keeping alive the spirit of resist- ance, and gathering as much information as possible. They discourage, however, overt ac- tive resistance which stands little chance of escaping harsh retaliation. TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE STALIN'S DEATH 16. The only conspicuous resistance in East Germany since the death of Stalin was the June 1953 uprising. Although there does not appear to have been any central guidance to the uprisings, they followed the same pattern everywhere, thus showing the uniformity of anti-regime feeling and producing a solidarity of action among East Germans not observed previously or since. Caught unprepared by the extent of the disorder, the East German government could not contain the uprisings and was forced to call on Russian forces to quell them. The readiness of the Soviets to respond to the regime's call for help provided an object lesson which the East Germans took to heart. While there is no reason to believe that anti-regime feelings in East Germany has abated in the slightest since June 1953, the prevailing temper since that time has been one of restraint. The population is apparent- SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 49 ly resigned to the fact that the Communist regime is there for some time to come and that any active resistance to it is foolhardy as long as Russian troops remain in occupation. Con- sequently, except for individual acts of resist- ance, occasional small-scale strikes, and a few student demonstrations, resistance since 1953 has been limited to the passive variety, with flight to the West ? still regarded by many as a measure of last resort ? serving as an essential safety valve. 17. Some dissidence has arisen in university and Party intellectual circles since the 20th CPSU Congress and the ensuing de-Staliniza- tion program. The temporary ideological dis- orientation and the anti-Party trends which resulted from the Stalin denigration caused confusion in Party thinking, an outbreak of "deviationism," and widespread ferment among intellectuals. SED spokesmen indi- cated that they were determined not to per- mit events in East Germany to proceed as they did in Poland or Hungary. Large-scale precautionary measures were taken to pre- vent any outbreaks. These measures were almost certainly helped by efforts in West Germany to stave off any hopeless revolt. 18. It is improbable that the intellectual op- position to Ulbricht and present SED policies holds any real danger for the regime as long as Ulbricht retains the support of the Soviet Union. It is to be noted, however, that de- spite the regime's measures, the intellectuals, though they may have been intimidated and silenced, have not been reconciled, as is evi- denced by the flight to West Germany on 22 August 1957 of Professor Alfred Kantorowicz, a dedicated Communist since 1931 and one of the GDR's leading intellectual figures. RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE 19. NO organized resistance groups of any significance are known to exist today in East Germany. Anti-Communist groups based in West Germany are active in the GDR and command the cooperation both of individ- uals and of small numbers of politically con- scious East Germans who meet regularly to exchange news. But organized resistance groups of the type which that term usually denotes ? partisan or guerrilla bands ? are believed entirely lacking. 20. There are indications from almost all areas of East Germany of unorganized resist- ance, largely passive in nature. While all segments of the population appear to manifest passive resistance in one form or another, the stimulus to resist appears to come primarily from student, intellectual and upper working class strata. Dissidence also has been noted within the Party and Party-affiliated groups, though on a lesser scale. At times of inter- national unrest (e.g., the Hungarian revolt) and major policy changes (e.g., the advent of de-Stalinization), there is a definite and perceptible increase in widespread passive resistance, as well as an appearance of local- ized, sporadic overt opposition. 21. The present SED regime is universally detested by the East German population, of which it is estimated that less than 10 percent would vote Communist in a free election. The people generally resent the government's police state methods and high-pressure in- doctrination, its economic regimentation and failure to sufficiently raise the standard of living, its alien character and subservience to the Soviet Union, and its position as a major obstacle to German reunification. One of the most obvious indications of the general dislike of the regime which exists among all cate- gories of East Germans is the persistent flight of East Germans to West Germany and West Berlin. From 1949 until the end of 1957, it is estimated that 2,275,000 persons ? equal to almost 13 percent of the present popula- tion of the GDR ? have expressed their op- position by flight. ROLE OF EMIGRES 22. Germany being a divided country, Ger- man emigre groups do not exist in the sense that they do in relation to other orbit coun- tries. However, passive resistance in East Germany is stimulated, and to an extent guided, by anti-Communist groups based in West Germany or West Berlin, such as the Eastern Bureaus (Ostburo) of West German political parties, especially the Social Demo- cratic Party, the Investigating Committee of SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 50 SECRET Free Jurists (Untersuchungsausschuss Freier Juristen), and the Fighting Group Against Inhumanity (Kampfgruppe gegen Unmen- schlichkeit). In West Germany and West Berlin, their activities are largely based on direct contacts with individuals and involve providing information, advice and material support. Their activities in East Germany consist chiefly of large-scale clandestine dis- tribution of various kinds of literature, in- cluding their own publications, and the col- lection of information on events in the GDR. 23. These organizations strive more to main- tain the spirit of resistance than to sponsor acts of sabotage or other forms of active resist- ance. They generally take the line that active resistance at this time is futile although pas- sive resistance is possible. This accords with official West German and NATO policy which forbids the incitement of the East German population to revolt. This policy was fol- lowed even during the height of earlier Hun- garian successes in 1956 when these groups, the Bonn government and individual West Germans with contacts in the GDR warned that on no account should active resistance against the regime be undertaken since it would produce no useful results and could only bring renewed disaster to Germany. 24. There is no evidence of non-German groups or individuals offering guidance or ma- terial aid for resistance activity apart from the limited efforts of the ICFTU (working through West German trade unions) and several Russian emigre groups based in West Germany, such as NTS (National Solidarists) and TSOPE (Central Association of Political Immigrants from the USSR) . REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE 25. The East German security apparatus is directed by the Ministry for State Security (MfS) and the Ministry of Interior. The MfS controls the covert organization for combat- ting and negating resistance and dissidence, whether organized or unorganized. It main- tains an extensive and elaborate system of informants and surveillance, and uses pene- tration and provocation as primary means for detecting, combatting, and forestalling anti- regime activities. The MfS also conducts campaigns to discredit the West German anti- Communist organizations with East Germans and to harass them in West Germany. The MfS also attempts to penetrate these Western organizations and to subvert their members. 26. The role of the Ministry of Interior has varied as a result of the continuous reorgani- zation of the East German security apparatus. Already in control of the civil police, it ac- quired further security responsibilities in Feb- ruary 1957, when the militarized security forces were subordinated to it. 27. In addition to standard devices of censor- ship, travel controls and informer nets, the regime uses such measures as the employment of a special party militia to help suppress op- position in factories; discriminatory taxation; the transfer of suspect workers and employees; and the arbitrary classification of failures to meet assigned production quotas, regardless of cause, as economic sabotage. The occa- sional practice of imposing severe penalties for the most minor infractions is another effective means used by the regime. 28. The primary deterrents to uprisings in East Germany are approximately 400,000 So- viet armed forces, stationed throughout the country. The regime itself controls some 240,000 trained uniformed men, equally di- vided between military and police forces, whose very existence tends to inhibit resist- ance activities. In addition, the Kampfgrup- pen (Auxiliary Shop and Factory Guards) , organized following the June 1953 riots to prevent such disturbances from recurring, is being strengthened and intensively trained. It has held ostentatious antiriot exercises in various cities, with the obvious intent of in- timidating the people. CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT 29. Although capable of suppressing unco- ordinated local uprisings, the East German re- gime, without the aid of Soviet forces, would be unable to suppress a major revolt. While the government probably could depend on a dedicated minority in the MfS in case of trou- SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 51 ble, none of its military and police forces are considered completely reliable. Some mem- bers would probably be reluctant to fight against their own countrymen, and in case of widespread revolt, might well defect to the side of those in opposition to the regime, de- pending on the exact conditions which pre- vailed. However, the 22 Soviet line divisions stationed in East Germany would be available for swift intervention to suppress any large- scale revolt. But barring an unforeseen change in the temper of the East German population, which remembers the Soviet ac- tion in June 1953 and more recently in Hun- gary, no revolt is likely to occur as long as these Soviet forces remain in East Germany. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE 30. There are no known organized resistance groups in East Germany. However, unor- ganized resistance is still rampant. It ex- presses itself primarily through flight to the West, the eruptions from time to time of minor strikes and slowdowns, student demon- strations, or other incidents. Dissidence with- in the Party and intellectual circles may con- tinue, but the regime's demonstrated inten- tion of dealing vigorously with such devia- tions, as well as Ulbricht's firm control of the Party apparatus and his explicit Soviet back- ing, will probably prevent such intellectual ferment from becoming any real danger to the regime. 31. Capabilities of anti-Communist groups based in West Germany and West Berlin con- sist mainly of widespread distribution, either by balloon or by mail and hand-to-hand methods, of anti-Communist, anti-regime lit- erature. Under given circumstances, appeals by these Western-based groups to the East German population calling for active resist- ance might be heeded. This, however, would presuppose a major change in Western strat- egy, for West German and NATO policy now forbids incitement of East Germans to vio- lence, and these groups adhere rigidly to that policy. 32. In the absence of organized resistance groups, any increase or change in resistance potential must come from the unorganized dissident elements in the population. The June 1953 uprisings showed what the East Germans are capable of when sufficiently aroused. But as long as the stability of the regime remains unshaken and Soviet troops remain in East Germany, any attempted new form of, or increase in, the level of resistance activity runs the grave risk of counteraction and suppression by the regime's security apparatus. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR 33. In case of warfare between Bloc and non- Bloc countries on East German territory, large numbers of Soviet troops would be re- quired to retain control of the GDR, thereby tying down units which could otherwise be used against attacking forces. As a result, initially, there would be little change in re- sistance activities other than a probable in- crease in acts of sabotage and attacks on local Communist functionaries. There would prob- ably also be attempts at espionage, subversion, factory slowdowns, failure to cooperate on agricultural projects and, in isolated cases where topography permitted, small guerrilla warfare against the Soviet Army. Neverthe- less, it would take time, outside support and the emergence of strong leadership capable of organizing and directing a centrally co- ordinated resistance force before opposition groups could become effective. The forma- tion of such groups would be a hazardous task while the Soviet Bloc remained in power. If and when the Communists appeared to be weakening, the East Germans would intensify their efforts to sabotage supplies and materiel, to disrupt lines of communications, and to collect and disseminate intelligence to the non-Bloc countries involved in the encounter. On the other hand, Western defeats would immediately lead to a reduction in East Ger- man resistance activities. 34. The nationality of attacking Western forces would be immaterial to the East Ger- mans since these forces would be regarded as liberators. For example, the employment of French and Italian troops would not adversely affect resistance capabilities. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 52 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 35. If the military action took place in East Germany, the attitudes and actions of regimes and resistance groups in other Bloc countries would be of little significance. If the military action took place elsewhere within the Bloc, the East Germans could expect little coopera- tion from resistance groups in other countries, chiefly because resistance groups of other satellites would probably be preoccupied with their own national objectives. Nevertheless, in spite of distrust or fear of the Germans, the possibility of some resistance cooperation between elements in East Germany and other Soviet satellite countries cannot be entirely discounted if liberation from the Soviet yoke is at stake. 36. East Germans probably would not favor nuclear weapon attacks even though their hatred for the Soviets and the regime is in- tense. If use were made of major nuclear weapons, the resulting mass destruction and dislocation would virtually eliminate any effective forms of resistance activity. On the other hand, if circumstances permit use of tactical nuclear weapons, East Germans prob- ably would accept their effects on the popula- tion as an unavoidable cost of liberation. Under these conditions resistance capabilities outside of areas immediately involved would not necessarily be adversely affected, and, in- The representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, would add the follow- ing: "It is conceivable that a nuclear air attack could be so designed as to eliminate the major resources of the military and control strengths supporting the regime without incurring popular hatred or destroying resistance potential. Such an attack could produce an opportunity for the East Germans to take over control of the coun- try." deed, the opportunities for Western-assisted resistance groups to seize local control would be materially increased.3 4 37. The Soviet occupation of East Germany has prejudiced the people permanently against the Soviets. More liberal occupation policies by the Soviets during a war would be regarded simply as an opportunity for resist- ance. However, occupation of some parts of East Germany by NATO forces would encour- age anti-Soviet resistance activities in unlib- erated areas. 38. There is no information available on indi- vidual resistance factions in East Germany which might aspire to post-liberation leader- ship. 4 The representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, US Army, notes the presence in East Germany of six Soviet armies, including 22 line divisions, whose neutralization would re- quire extensive use of nuclear weapons, and therefore thinks this paragraph should read as follows: "The East Germans would not favor the use of nuclear weapons on targets in East Germany. Initially, after a nuclear attack of any scale, active and effective assistance to the West would not materialize because of the con- fusion and uncertainty of the populace and the absence of pre-organized, strongly disciplined local resistance groups. Subsequently, resist- ance potential would be determined by the in- tensity of the attack, the emergence of native resistance leadership and organizations, the ex- tent of material support from the West, and the unpredictable ultimate reaction of the popu- lace to the use of nuclear weapons. If demorali- zation and physical destruction were not wide- spread, and if resistance organizations could be developed and given substantial assistance by the West, an opportunity could arise for East German groups to engage in anti-Soviet ac- tivity." SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 53 ANNEX F - HUNGARY BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE 1. The Hungarians have always considered themselves the last eastern outpost of the West and an integral part of Western civiliza- tion. Culturally, the eastern Hungarian eth- nic frontier has been the traditional dividing line between German and Latin culture on the one hand and Slavic culture on the other. From the viewpoint of religion, Hungary rep- resents the farthest outpost of Roman Cathol- icism in Southeast Europe. Politically, the organization of parliamentary assemblies under a constitution preceded by several cen- turies the establishment of similar Western- type governmental institutions and parties in Eastern Europe. Being non-Slavic, non- Orthodox, and highly individualistic, the Hungarians are predisposed to side with any adversary of Soviet power. This predisposi- tion, firm even before World War II, became particularly intense in 1945 under the excesses of Soviet military occupation, and even more so after 1947-48, when a non-representative Hungarian Communist minority was imposed upon the anti-Communist masses and com- plete isolation from the West set in. 2. Among the factors which created, and will for an indefinite period of time continue to create, popular hostility toward the regime is a historically anti-Russian attitude stemming from 1848-49. At that time, Hungary's greatest self-liberating effort was frustrated by invading Russian armies. Significantly, many of the slogans of the 1956 revolt alluded to that earlier uprising, and many of the actions of the rebels were patterned after steps taken at that time. Still another element is rooted in the fact that for two decades pre- ceding World War II, the climate of Hun- garian opinion was dominated by a collective sense of frustration created by the huge losses which the country had suffered under the post-World War I peace treaty. It lost rough- ly 64 percent of its territory and 58 percent of its population to Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Hostility against neighbor- ing beneficiaries of those losses continues to exist despite official Communist claims of close friendship among the People's De- mocracies. 3. Further contributing to the deep-rooted difficulties of the Communists are distasteful popular recollections of the country's earlier (1919) sanguinary Communist dictatorship, a fairly strong social democratic tradition among the working class, a persistent short- age of new leadership potential because of indifference toward Communist indoctrina- tion on the part of youth and shaky military morale of conscripts of anti-Communist peasant parentage. 4. Of at least equal importance is the inade- quate standard of living. Work norms are high, wages are low, housing is poor, and food is scarce. Soviet exploitation of the Hun- garian economy was bitterly resented. Since the revolution shattered many segments of the Hungarian economy and since there are no real indications of economic liberalization, the economic factor of dissidence remains strong. 5. Thus the attitude of the overwhelming ma- jority of the population ? some 95 percent, if the recent general uprising is a guide ? to- ward the regime ranges from hatred to apathy. The characteristics and attitudes cited above are buttressed by opposition to agricultural collectivization, stress on heavy industry to the detriment of consumers' goods production, cultural and psychological Soviet- ization, anti-religious policies, regimentation of workers and the use of forced or quasi- forced labor, and the thwarting of various aims of a nationalistic coloration. The Hun- garian revolution of 1956 furnished a full- scale demonstration of the degree and kind of anti-Communist and anti-Soviet potential of the Hungarian people. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 54 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS 6. The majority of industrial workers, some of whom were among the few original supporters of Communism, constitute a major dissident element. They were foremost among the forces battling the Communist suppressors in the days of the revolution. Along with lack of national independence and personal free- dom, they resent the limited attempts, if not the outright refusal on the part of the regime to satisfy the desire for more consumer goods and a higher living standard, the perversion of labor unions, the lack of safeguards against "speed-up" work without adequate incentives, unsafe and unsanitary working conditions, arbitrary penalties, activities of labor inform- ers, harsh work discipline and exhausting work methods. 7. The intellectuals who have sparked the up- risings against the regime, continue to con- stitute a resistance potential out of propor- tion to their small numbers. They resent the suppression of freedom of expression, the iso- lation from the West to which they feel cul- turally bound, the intellectual deterioration behind a facade of educational and cultural pretensions, and the generally low level of Hungary's intellectual life within the imposed framework of an alien and inferior pattern. 8. Youth. One of the most conspicuous fail- ures of the regime has been its inability to secure the support of youth. Communist youth organizations have been plagued for years by a general apathy toward Party work. The participation of numerous youths in the uprising was impressive; even teen-age chil- dren battled the Soviet forces with unbeliev- able heroism. Youth resents the Party- imposed discipline, the compulsion to absorb an alien philosophy (Marxism-Leninism) and to learn the Russian language and the im- possibility of gaining access to the Western culture complex. 9. The peasantry, although probably as anti- Communist a group as any in Hungary, can hardly be counted on to furnish active organ- ized resistance. The best key to the role they are likely to play in the future may be their behavior during the recent revolt, when peas- ants spontaneously supported the insurgents by delivering food supplies, but did not enter the fighting to any extent. While their senti- ments are doubtless basically unchanged, and while their resentment of government inter- ference continues, it is possible that some of the opposition has been blunted by regime concessions, such as the deemphasis of collec- tivization. 10. Armed Forces. Before the 1956 revolu- tion, considerable resistance potential was be- lieved to exist within the Hungarian armed forces. Indeed, the Hungarian armed forces all but disintegrated during the uprising. A considerable portion of the military, officers as well as enlisted personnel, either refused to take action against the rebels or sided with the anti-regime forces to whom they gave weapons and with whom they fought side by side. As a result, a careful screening of mili- tary personnel was initiated by the Kadar regime. Only those were to be retained who were considered unlikely to foment trouble and who were not known to have participated in the revolt against the Communists. The same criteria were applied to the new con- scripts inducted in April 1957 (and undoubt- edly to the additional class scheduled for in- duction in the fall of 1957) and to the Fron- tier Guard organization which has been newly created. Nevertheless, in spite of all precau- tions and the strictest surveillance, it would be impossible for the regime at this time to organize any forces that are free of dissidence even though, as a result of careful screening, there is probably now somewhat less disaffec- tion in the military establishment than in other elements of the population. 11. The clergy, while it continues to exert con- siderable influence among the people, has been showing signs of decreasing willingness to sharpen, or even discuss, outstanding issues in the Church-State relationship. The Cath- olic Bench of Bishops, particularly adroit in pre-revolt times in applying between-the-lines techniques in sermons and statements, seems to have decided to exercise the utmost caution for the time being. The resistance potential on the Church leadership level generally, both Catholic and Protestant, appears to be at its lowest ebb in years. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 55 INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE 12. Even before the 1956 revolution, there was strong resentment against Soviet control and influence, but the effectiveness of the security system limited Hungarian resistance to pas- sive, unorganized manifestations. Other fac- tors, such as physically and psychologically exhausting work norms, material want, com- pulsory political activities and unfavorable topography further discouraged active re- sistance. On the other hand, passive resist- ance in Hungary appeared to have been more widespread than elsewhere in the satellites. The 1956 revolution was almost certainly a spontaneous explosion which was as unex- pected, even by Hungarians, as it was unor- ganized. It demonstrated the intensity of anti-regime and anti-Soviet feeling in the face of overwhelming odds. But it cannot be re- garded as a precedent. Its inevitable outcome served as a warning to active resisters every- where that except under extraordinary condi- tions, such ventures are bound to end in dis- aster. It did show, however, the depth of hatred of Soviet and native Communist rule. 13. The regime's awareness of the continuing validity of the basic reasons for dissidence is indicated by the intensive drives of repression which it carries on with the announced intent of eliminating "all vestiges" of the revolt. In the violent and sanguinary uprising, the peo- ple showed themselves to be almost entirely united in their hatred of the Communist sys- tem, the Soviet overlordship, and its local rep- resentation. The Kremlin and the Hungarian regime are now, even more than before, facing a hostile population in Hungary, and the time when this hostility may subside is not in sight. TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953 14. Profoundly dissatisfied under the Commu- nist regime during the Stalin era, the Hun- garian people expected major improvements after Stalin's death. However, the liberaliza- tion program adopted in 1953, ameliorated only a few of the conditions at the root of the widespread dissidence. Relaxation of police terror and mitigation of peasant regimenta- tion appeared to heighten popular demands rather than reconcile the population to the regime. 15. Initially, liberalization seems to have had little effect on resistance. Passive resistance continued, as did isolated instances of indi- vidual active resistance. There was no evi- dence of anti-Communist organization and there were no instances of mass anti-regime action such as in East Germany and Czecho- slovakia in 1953, in Poznan in the summer of 1956, or even the Czech student demonstra- tions in May 1956. However, there is abun- dant evidence that after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, parts of the population, especially workers, perhaps encouraged by the example of the "revolting" Party intellectuals, vigor- ously and uninhibitedly criticized Party lead- ers and local functionaries in group meetings at the local level. But there is no substantial evidence that violent resistance was then con- templated by any significant group. 16. A very important manifestation of dissi- dence on a mass scale, though unorganized, was the spontaneous turnout of many thou- sands of Hungarians on the occasion of Rajk's reinterment early in October, 1956. As a prel- ude to the nationwide uprising that took place some three weeks later, this demonstra- tion was significant in that the Hungarian people, at least in Budapest, at one stroke be- came conscious that their sentiments were fundamentally the same. Years of suffering at the hands of undercover security police, agents provocateurs, and informers had frag- mented the Hungarians so that no one felt he could trust any other individual. The demon- stration made them aware that untold thou- sands of individuals shared the same senti- ments upon which they were willing to act, even against the wishes of the regime. 17. Within certain sectors of the Party, the comparatively liberal policies of the Nagy re- gime in 1953 gave rise to a belief (expressed by the writers and other intellectuals) that modification of Communism toward greater freedom and humaneness was not only desir- able but feasible. The Nagy experiment stim- ulated the beginning of organized opposition by the intellectuals in late 1954. This opposi- tion became increasingly vocal and far-reach- SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 56 SECRET ing in its demands, especially after the 20th Congress. It is unclear to what extent the opposition of Communist intellectuals and their collaborators to the Rakosi-Gero regime can be construed as resistance against the Communist system. It is unlikely that any substantial group of these avowed Commu- nists contemplated the overthrow of the re- gime or plotted violence. In fact, the intellec- tuals' maximum program had more in com- mon with political concepts of Western social democracy than with Communism. Accept- ance of their program would have meant the end of Hungarian Communism as a one-party dictatorship subservient to the Soviet Union. The fact that the intellectuals approved the prospects of a non-Communist Hungary while the revolution was successful, does not neces- sarily mean that they had consciously striven for these objectives in the preceding months. The evidence suggests rather that their orig- inal and more consistent aims were limited to freedom of creation, i.e. freedom from Party press censorship, and did not extend to the destruction of the Communist system. 18. This intellectual "revolt" established a unique link between an important body of the Communist Party and the population at large. For the first time people began to read the Communist press voluntarily and with gen- uine interest. The grievances and hopes of the writers struck a responsive chord within the population, and hope arose that changes for the better could take place, particularly since influential Party members were agitat- ing for them. 19. Ferment within the Party, caused by the factionalism between Rakosi-Gero tradition- alists and new liberalizers (adherents of the Nagy-type Communist program) can hardly be classified as resistance. Neither faction was anti-Communist in the sense that it envisaged the end of Marxist-Leninist system, though nationalistic impulses, explicitly or implicitly anti-Soviet, presumably motivated many of the liberals. However, as in the case of the dissension represented by the opposition of the intellectuals to the upper hierarchy, the split in the Politburo indirectly stimulated the pop- ular resistance potential by the confusion it created. It must have been evident to the population that the Party could no longer claim monolithic unity. The confusion which the vagueness and zig-zagging of the Party line bred throughout the lower levels of the Party emboldened ever larger sectors of the population to challenge and defy Party direc- tives and to hope for and demand far-reaching changes in the direction of humaneness, in- ternal freedom, independence, and improved living conditions. POST-REVOLUTIONARY RESISTANCE 20. Even though its translatability into action is undoubtedly far more limited than before, resistance potential may well be considered to be nearly as high as it was in the months pre- ceding the uprising. Popular distaste for the regime and the entire Communist system is evidenced in various ways. Workers engage in slowdowns, absenteeism, and poor quality production, despite the regime's application of incentives on the one hand and punitive meas- ures on the other. Party and government functions are poorly attended, and the Party, now reduced to 400,000 members, has had to admit the prevalence of skepticism and indif- ference among its own members. 21. Reports of organized resistance have been received continually since the Soviet suppres- sion of the Hungarian revolt in November 1956. Some of the reports received shortly after the revolt, have been verified and can be taken as evidence of organized resistance in the early months of 1957. Since that time, however, reliable information has been re- placed more and more by reports of dubious validity. The evidence suggests a decline in the extent of organized resistance. This de- cline is probably due to the increasing effec- tiveness of government countermeasures and, to some extent, to loss of hope for immediate success in these activities. Moreover, in the generally flat terrain of Hungary, major armed resistance could not long survive. Neverthe- less, the hiding of arms, one of the major reasons given by the Kadar regime in jus- tifying many arrests, has been reported by several sources who claimed that a consid- erable part of the small arms, given by Hungarian Army elements to revolutionary groups, were still missing. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 57 22. Another form of organized post-revolt re- sistance was the general strike late in 1956. When workers finally returned to the facto- ries, they continued a virtual sabotage in the form of an evidently well-planned display of inactivity. As late as February 1957, this organized opposition apparently circulated such slogans as "Long Live Free Hungary, Long Live Imre Nagy!" 23. During November, December and Janu- ary, a strong organization of Workers' Coun- cils was a major source of active opposition to the Kadar regime. Although the regime dissolved the central and regional councils in December 1956 and the local councils in No- vember 1957, there was firm evidence during January 1957 that their spirit of resistance and a professional awareness of the importance of organization remained high. Members of these councils have volunteered the informa- tion that they were changing tactics from overt to covert opposition. Early in January, they claimed a hidden radio transmitter for use in emergencies, facilities for printing a newspaper, a cache of arms, and an under- ground network embracing the whole coun- try. Later in the same month, they also claimed to be supported by a network of political parties and an organization of writers. 24. The majority of the writers, grouped in the Hungarian Writers' Federation, showed signs of organized opposition up to the spring of 1957, drafting resolutions and voicing de- mands on the Kadar government. This op- position forced the regime to "suspend" the Federation's activities on 18 January and to dissolve it on 21 April. Arrests of writers have been announced from time to time. Many of the leading writers appear to have gone on a "silence strike," refusing to write for the Communist-approved publications. Although in the autumn of 1957, this "strike" showed signs of weakening ? such as the forced signing of the 13 September manifesto protesting the UN debate on Hungary its base still warrants consideration as a factor of potential resistance. 25. Under these circumstances, considering the general exhaustion and frustration of the people, as a result of the unsuccessful revol- ution and in view of the strong security measures of the Soviet-sponsored regime, no organized resistance can be expected in the near future. For the time being, at least, the simplest and safest method by which the citizen can resist is by carrying out his work in a superficial manner and only externally complying with regulations, consistent with self-preservation and personal security. ROLE OF EMIGRES 26. The existence of a sizeable anti-Commu- nist emigration has been a source of discom- fort for Communist Hungary in the period since World War II. A vigorous repatriation campaign is being conducted to alleviate this situation. Emigre efforts to broadcast anti- Communist material from the West have found some response in Hungary and have assisted in strengthening the morale of the numerous dissidents there. In general, how- ever, Hungarians have tended to ignore emigre activities or to be critical of their leaders. Although some insurgents in late October 1956 called for the return of certain emigre leaders, especially pre-Communist Premier Ferenc Nagy, their absence during long years of national plight was generally resented. The manifest inability of pre-revolutionary emigres to exert any influence on the upris- ing has dealt a blow to their organizations in the Free World and it is not likely to be forgotten in their homeland. 27. The Hungarian Veterans Comradeship Society (Magyar Harcosok Baj tarsi Kozos- sege ? MHBK) an emigre organization of Fascist leanings under General Andras Zako, was considered for some years as militantly favoring Hungarian liberation from Commu- nist rule. That it gave actual assistance to resistance groups inside Hungary, however, is doubtful. In 1953, the MHBK was thought to be disintegrating. An attempt to activate the group by proposing to stage an invasion was made, by General Zako, soon after the October 1956 revolt, but the proposal was not taken seriously by the West. The MHBK is not believed to have adherents capable of staging a resistance effort inside Hungary to- day. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 58 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 28. Pre- and post-revolutionary emigre groups, though acting mainly outside Hungary and not yet effectively united, have plans which may have the effect of strengthening the over- all resistance potential in Hungary. Also, numerous individual members of the pre-rev- olutionary emigre group in the Hungarian National Council, as well as the newer emigres in the Hungarian Freedom Federation, claim to maintain potentially useful contacts in Hungary. However, it remains doubtful that the present basic disposition of the Hungarian people toward resistance could be substantial- ly influenced by emigre organizations. 29. Of the emigres identified with Hungarian political parties, the Social Democrats, repre- sented abroad by Anna Kethly, a member of Imre Nagy's coalition cabinet during the rev- olution, are believed to have the strongest political resistance assets in Hungary today. She probably has retained most of her large personal following as a respected political leader. It is also probable that late in 1956 the Social Democrats and other political parties, including the Smallholders, took steps to institute dual leadership at home and abroad to prepare for underground work. REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE 30. In order to obliterate the liberal trends and nationalist spirit of 1956, the Kadar re- gime made a determined and apparently suc- cessful effort to eliminate all discernible focal points of resistance. Repression has proven effective, insofar as it has reduced or thwarted the danger of any renewal of overt resistance, but it has failed to eradicate passive resistance and recalcitrance. During the immediate post-revolt period, and again in July and Au- gust 1957, the regime resorted to domestic deportations. Until recently it has made spe- cial efforts to publicize the trials and the harsh sentences of a large number of "counterrev- olutionaries" in order to impress the people with its strength. The old AVH (Secret Police) has been reconstituted; now called BACs (State Security Group) , it operates ruthlessly and with apparent efficiency under the Ministry of Interior. The Central Work- ers' Council, almost the equivalent of a peo- ple's government during the early phase of the uprising, was outlawed on December 9, 1956; the Writers' Union was banned in April 1957. By April, the leaders of the Protestant churches were forced to reaffirm their support of the Kadar regime; on May 24 the Hun- garian Catholic Church not only announced its adherence to the regime by joining the Na- tional Peace Council but also formed an aux- iliary peace movement ("Opus Pacis") within the Church itself, and on August 30 issued a purely political statement, first of its kind, in support of the regime (attacking the UN de- bate on the Hungarian uprising) . CAPABILITIES OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT 31. The Armed Forces which disintegrated during the revolution, have been gradually reconstituted. They appear to remain, de- spite recurrent screenings, technically weak and of doubtful reliability. The present strength is estimated at 100,000. In addi- tion, there are 35,000 militarized Security Forces, about 20,000 of whom are Frontier Guards. Morale of the armed forces is be- lieved to be low but the Security Forces are probably somewhat less disaffected than the Army. Furthermore, in February 1957, a Party-directed Workers Guard, probably mod- elled after the East German Kampfgruppen, was formed in order to prevent outbreaks against the regime in the industrial establish- ments. It is not known how well organized or trained these elements are but it can be as- sumed that the regime has selected for this role only those it considers to be the least susceptible to dissidence. 32. The Hungarian security forces have made progress in re-establishing their pre-revolu- tionary efficiency and organization. However, it will undoubtedly take some time before these security forces approach the level of or- ganization and training achieved before the revolt. And it will be a long time before the organization responsible for functions for- merly assigned to the State Security Authori- ty (AVH) achieves the reliability of that ap- paratus. The security police have had some difficulty in restoring its extensive informer system, which in fact probably hinders the attainment of its pre-revolutionary effective- SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 59 ness. They cannot be expected, and never were considered able, to suppress a revolt of any significant proportions, since this exceeds the normal function of the organization. The present regime could not suppress an outburst of any significant proportions with the indig- enous machinery now available to it. The re- gime owes its continued existence to the ma- jor elements of six Soviet line divisions which are stationed in Hungary. MODIFICATION IN THE SECURITY APPARATUS 33. As a result of the uprising, many agents were killed; many others left the country, and still others were unwilling to continue serving. At first two former AVH officers reconstituted the AVH as the "R Unit," and early in No- vember 1956, three new officer regiments were reported as consisting largely of former AVH men in officer uniforms. That local armed forces were principally composed of former AVH members and Party functionaries was also reported in mid-December 1956. The or- ganizing program seems to have proceeded rapidly in the following months with the re- instatement of policy-level personnel belong- ing to the Rakosi wing reported again in late May 1957. Also by May and probably earlier, the informer system, backbone of the AVH system, had been reorganized to some extent, and attempts were being made to recruit for- mer rebels as spies and informers. The des- ignation "R Unit" was not heard again. The new secret police, at first referred to as In- terior Ministry Security Police, or Special Police Establishment, soon developed into the present BACs (State Security Group). The widespread and growing volume of arrests of "counter-revolutionaries" up to the summer of 1957, may indicate the increasing efficiency of the secret police. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE 34. Under peacetime conditions, passive re- sistance would undoubtedly increase if there were a substantial relaxation of police meas- ures. Such circumstances might even render an eventual crystallization of some organized resistance possible. However, no such relaxa- tion appears likely in the foreseeable future. Even if it did occur, tangible developments would materialize only after an initial period of undeterminable length, during which the population could convince itself that the re- laxation was not a tactical device camouflag- ing a trap. Strong police control, Soviet occu- pation, disillusionment over the lasting effec- tiveness of open resistance in the light of the recent experiences, and the absence of visible prospects of outside assistance will limit re- sistance efforts in Hungary, for the foresee- able future, to minor and sporadic acts of de- fiance and sabotage. The regime may be in- creasingly successful in neutralizing all focal points of organized resistance; in the absence of war, even without sizeable additions to its ranks, a Soviet-supported apparatus seems quite adequate to prevent the development and spread of any important organized re- sistance. 35. Nevertheless, there probably still exist some resistance nuclei which have been in- genious enough to evade detection. They may be able for some time to maintain contact security, and to cache arms and other equip- ment. Similarly, they could accomplish a small number of acts of sabotage and produce propaganda leaflets. Their possibilities for spearheading a renewed uprising seem re- mote, given the general attitude and psy- chological condition of the majority of the population and the systematic efforts on the part of the regime to destroy any remnants of expectation and hope which prevailed before the October uprising. 36. More difficult for the regime to cope with is the resistance potential of the intelligentsia. Evidence suggests the possibility of some form of organization among anti-regime students and intellectuals. The latter have displayed a form of passive resistance in that they do not produce for the regime's propaganda pub- lications. Their capabilities probably do not extend beyond this form of resistance, since the regime-sponsored publications do not per- mit expression of their real views openly or by "Aesopian" devices which they used success- fully before the revolution. Students will SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 60 SECRET probably continue to defy the regime by vari- ous ingenious nuisance devices. Neither group seems to have the opportunity, which existed before the revolution, to forge a link between their own aims and aspirations and those of the population at large. 37. Unorganized active resistanoe, possibly making use of arms hidden during and after the revolution, may occur from time to time but is unlikely to be of more than local sig- nificance. Unorganized passive resistance, however, will continue to be widespread. It is capable of sabotaging or slowing down in- dustrial and agricultural production and, in covertly disregarding the regime's orders, it may remain a source of embarrassment for Hungarian as well as other Eastern European Communist leaders. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR 38. Under conditions of open warfare, a con- tinuing lack of massive popular support would undoubtedly act as a great hindrance to the regime and to its Soviet mentors even in the performance of the relatively minor tasks the regime could expect to be assigned. In the initial stages of a war, the Hungarian regime would increase its security measures, and it would be difficult for the people to engage in effective resistance activities. The populace would attempt to slow down both industrial and agricultural production. It would try to disrupt transportation and communications, and would probably manage to publish propa- ganda against the Soviet war effort. Some men anticipating induction into the Armed Forces would hide in an attempt to avoid service. Most Hungarians would watch for opportunities to aid the forces opposing the Bloc more actively and many would bide their time, awaiting a chance to go over to the enemy. However, large-scale desertions and organized resistance activities would not take place until basic Soviet weaknesses in the field became manifest or at least one major mili- tary defeat was inflicted upon Soviet forces. 39. The regime has tried to recover all arms and other supplies hidden by Hungarians dur- ing and after the 1956 revolt, but there still remain considerable quantities of hidden small arms scattered throughout the country. They are almost certainly insufficient, how- ever, to permit large-scale or effective armed resistance. Thus, the capability of the Hungarians for anti-Bloc military activity and ? to a large extent ? for sabotage would be largely dependent upon supplies of arms, munitions, and explosives from outside. 40. In the initial stages of war, the major con- tribution of dissident elements of the Hun- garian populace to the Bloc's enemies would be acts of sabotage and intelligence collection. There would probably be little opportunity to assist in evasion and escape measures, but if channels for transmission could be estab- lished, non-Bloc forces could expect to be sup- plied with complete descriptions of Soviet activities inside Hungary. 41. If actual fighting were taking place on or near Hungarian territory, Hungarian resist- ance elements would intensify their efforts. It would not matter to them which side ap- peared to be winning; their efforts would be concentrated on assistance to the enemies of the Soviets. As the actual conflict drew closer to Hungary, opportunities to assist in evasion and escape efforts would be multiplied. Familiarity with the topographic features of their own country and with Soviet search techniques would enable the Hungarians to facilitate the escape of enemy soldiers. Prox- imity to the scene of battle would make it easier to pass intelligence to the enemy. If supplied with radios, the Hungarians would probably provide intelligence information more rapidly than non-Bloc forces could ex- ploit it. If supplied with arms and special equipment, the Hungarians could be expected to organize guerrilla bands which, through hit-and-run tactics, would be able to tie down significant numbers of Bloc troops and also deprive the USSR of some of its forward oper- ations based in Hungary. In the event of sub- stantial Soviet reverses in war, all major fac- tors and forces of the recent revolt could be expected to come into play on a scale and with an intensity probably even larger than that of last fall's explosion. The validity of this assumption is made secure by the continuing existence of every major factor from which SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 61 popular opposition to Soviet occupation and Soviet-sponsored Communist rule stems in Hungary. 42. The nationality of attacking forces would not be a factor adversely influencing the de- gree and extent of resistance operations and capabilities. The attitudes and actions of re- sistance groups in other Bloc countries would probably strongly influence the Hungarians. Cooperation with resistance groups in other Bloc countries would develop after the initial uprising and particularly if other resistance groups could help supply the Hungarians with arms and equipment. Also, circumstances surrounding the initiation of hostilities would not affect resistance capabilities. The Hun- garians probably would approve the initiation of hostilities since they regard a war as pro- viding the best means of liberation. 43. Hungarian hatred of the Soviets is so in- tense that the people probably would accept the use of any instrument of war, including nuclear weapons, against Soviet forces in Hungary. However, the physical destruction and social dislocation resulting from a large scale nuclear attack on Hungary could be ex- pected to virtually destroy Hungarian capa- bilities for resistance. If a nuclear air attack could be so designed as to eliminate the major resources of the governmental and political strengths of the regime, Hungarian resistance capabilities would not necessarily be adversely affected. Thus, an opportunity would emerge for Hungarian resistance groups to take over control of the country if the following addi- tional conditions should prevail: (a) develop- ment of effective leadership and coordination in resistance groups; (b) provision of material support; and (c) assurance of early direct military support. 44. Occupation policies of Western forces would not be a crucial factor affecting resist- ance potential and capabilities so long as these policies were pronounced to respect and aid in the accomplishment of Hungarian aspi- rations for freedom, independence and the end to Soviet domination. Thus, enlightened occupation by non-Bloc forces would intensify the Hungarian desire to be helpful. Hun- garian capabilities for assisting the occupying power in areas of the country which were not yet taken would be enhanced by a cooperative attitude on the part of the occupier. 45. Questions of a future regime and of the specific character of agencies to be instru- mental in the liberation are likely to be re- garded by the people as secondary in relation to liberation itself. The question of German rearmament, a key item in Communist propa- ganda, is to be viewed in this light. Although many fundamental and even irreconcilable differences exist between the German and Hungarian mentality and character, the cul- tural affinities of the two peoples are based on a common Western heritage. Also, in con- tradistinction to the situation vis-a-vis Czech- oslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia as re- ferred to in paragraph 2, Hungary has no ter- ritorial claims against Germany. However, if armed units of countries toward which Hun- garians are now hostile, participated in efforts to liberate Hungary, it may be assumed that such units would be welcomed. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 63 ANNEX G?NORTH KOREA BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE 1. The principal sources of in North Korea are the regime's drastic industrial re- construction and expansion effort and the agricultural collectivization program, which, following the extreme suffering and demands made during the hostilities, have placed an extraordinarily heavy burden on the North Korean people. Additional factors tending to create or stimulate dissidence are: (1) the ex- istence of a rival Korean government in the South offering an alternative focus of loyalty; (2) the continued presence of large numbers of foreign troops within the country; (3) past and potential future factional rivalries in the North Korean ruling hierarchy between the dominant pro-Soviet elements and the minor- ity "Yenan" faction, and (4) the latent clash of interests and competition between the So- viet Union and Communist China for control of North Korea which these factional rivalries reflect. In most other respects the objectives, overall approach, and systems of control of the North Korean rulers are the same as those of Communist regimes elsewhere, and most of the specific factors creating are the same. However, because of the cultural and intellectual backwardness of the predomi- nantly agricultural North Korean society, the North Koreans' extreme isolation from the outside world and their complete inexperience with free, modern, and independent govern- ment before 1945, their resistance, present and potential, to Communist domination is less intense than among the satellites with experience and contacts in the modern world. 2. A further important reason for dissidence has been the imposition by the regime of oppressive burdens on the populace, such as heavy taxes, forced contributions to political and social organizations, forced labor, direct or indirect pressures to turn farmers into in- dustrial laborers, farm collectivization, short- ages of consumer goods, high production quotas for industrial and farm workers, and military conscription. During the hostilities, loss of life and property and other direct and indirect suffering brought the populace to a state of almost complete exhaustion. Though more than four years have passed since the hostilities ended and North Korea has received aid from the Sino-Soviet Bloc, the war dam- age, the reconstruction program, and the maintenance of a military force exceeding that at the beginning of the hostilities exacts heavier contributions from the reduced popu- lation than those required before the hos- tilities. 3. Another factor contributing to dissension in North Korea is the close supervision and control exercised by the regime over all facets of personal life. However, Stalinist-type per- secution is no longer needed except for occa- sional purges of Party members and govern- ment functionaries. Agricultural landlords, Christians, middle class elements, and other anti-Communists who did not flee to South Korea in the early years of Communist control generally are being controlled through Com- munist-dominated "social" organizations and "punishment" is being meted out by discrim- inatory treatment and surveillance rather than through persecution. Also discrimi- nated against and under close surveillance is the large minority of the population who col- laborated with the UN forces during their occupation of North Korea, or who are closely related to members of any of these suspect groups. 4. The existence of a rival Korean govern- ment asserting jurisdiction and seeking con- trol of the Korean peninsula also has a bear- ing on dissidence. The appeal of the ROK to North Koreans has been minimized to some extent by the antagonisms inevitably engen- dered by the war, by North Korean propa- ganda, vilifying the Republic and contrasting the situation in the north and south to the SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 64 SECRET disadvantage of the ROK, and by a lack of sympathy for the Rhee government. Never- theless, there exists considerable sentiment for the ROK in North Korea even though few North Koreans in the present situation would be willing to assume the risks involved in actively supporting the ROK. MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS 5. Dissidence, unhappiness and hopelessness exist to varying degrees in almost every ele- ment of North Korean society. However, the extent of such feelings in terms of resistance potential is difficult to estimate. It can al- most certainly be presumed that dissidence is limited to relatively small numbers in the various social groups, a phenomenon which is partly attributable to the fact that more than two million persons who might have strength- ened the resistance potential, have fled to South Korea since World War II. 6. Dissidence is intense among the small rem- nants of the Christian and former middle- class groups and in the suspect elements of the populace that are kept under surveillance and are treated in discriminatory fashion be- cause of their relationship to anti-Commu- nists. The farmers remain basically out of sympathy with the objectives of the regime. As recently as September 1957, the regime listed as one of its major tasks in the agricul- tural field the "socialist transformation" of the peasants' thinking, which it characterized as "lagging far behind their socialist environ- ment." Two post-armistice policies are par- ticularly important causes of among the farmers: wage increases and other pref- erential treatment granted to industrial laborers and the government's program of agricultural "cooperativization," now nearly completed. The industrial laborers, too, prob- ably are generally unhappy and frustrated, but on a lesser scale than the farmers. They are treated as a privileged group in contrast to the farmers, but are subjected to oppressive labor requirements. Army morale is proba- bly only fair despite indoctrination, though dissidence is probably mild in the Air Force and the Navy which are much smaller and more select services. 7. As industrialization proceeds the regime will become increasingly dependent on the middle ranks of the government bureaucracy and in- dustrial technicians. Faced with a shortage of such personnel and without adequate facil- ities for training them at home, the regime has sent several thousand students to the So- viet Union and Eastern Europe for further education. The inevitable comparisons made by these young people between conditions in North Korea and in other parts of the world based on personal observation and increased access to information have profoundly shocked some and have undoubtedly affected all. Several North Korean students who de- fected to the West commented that Eastern Europe appeared to be a paradise in compari- son with their homeland. Korean students in Hungary joined the revolutionary forces in October and November 1956 and have since been returned to North Korea. These young technicians might also serve as a channel for introducing into North Korea the ideological ferment which has swept the Soviet bloc since the 20th Congress of the CPSU but which apparently has as yet had little effect on North Korea. INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE 8. Despite widespread dissidence the North Koreans are inclined toward hopelessness and apathy rather than active resistance. More- over, as prospects for reestablishment of non- Communist control over the area have de- clined, the will to resist appears to have dimin- ished. Dissidence is seldom voiced and even less frequently acted upon since the regime provides severe punishment for any infraction of its laws and regulations. Although there are geographic areas, particularly in the rugged, mountainous terrain of North-central Korea, in which dissidence could be mani- fested by guerrilla activity, there are no known guerrilla groups in existence. Pres- ently, dissidence is of such a low intensity as to preclude a popular movement. Only if the Communist control apparatuses were weak- ened and the regime seemed on the verge of crumbling under outside pressures, would a substantial minority probably be willing to participate in resistance activities with any SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET prospect of success. But in the present situ- ation actual resistance on any significant scale is unlikely and in fact virtually im- possible. 9. Such resistance as does occur in North Korea is primarily directed not at Commu- nism per se or at Soviet domination but at the North Korean regime itself. Ideological con- siderations are not a major contributing fac- tor in creating dissension in North Korea, and, except for the small remnant of the Christian community in North Korea, apparently few people strongly oppose Communism as a sys- tem. Nor is there much opposition to Soviet domination which is exercised through an ostensibly "native Korean" regime. However, there is at least some opposition to those North Korean policies which appear to favor the USSR over the needs and desires of the North Koreans themselves. This opposition is almost certainly stimulated by the strong na- tional consciousness of the Korean people and their long history of resistance to external domination. Although the presence of nearly 300,000 Chinese Communist troops in North Korea has undoubtedly aroused some resent- ment and nationalist sentiment, it does not appear to have caused widespread discontent among the population at large. TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953 10. North Korea does not appear to have been affected directly by the events which followed the death of Stalin. Rather, it has been struggling with its reconstruction program following the cessation of hostilities. Changes in the regime's policies were the result of in- ternal rather than external developments. Even in relation to developments elsewhere in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, North Korea has re- mained surprisingly isolated. 11. The regime has not relaxed its rehabilita- tion and development programs and has not altered the policy of giving priority to the development of heavy industry. Neither the Soviet criticism of the "cult of personality" nor the Chinese Communist "hundred flow- ers" policy have been echoed in North Korea. The Hungarian revolt was not extensively re- ported in the North Korean press, and the 65 scale and character of the outbreak were mini- mized and distorted. Its effect on the possi- bility of rebellion in North Korea has probably been minimal, although the return of students sent to Eastern Europe may inject an intel- lectual ferment previously lacking. RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE 12. Guerrilla activity in North Korea, which was extensive in 1951 immediately following the withdrawal of UN forces from the area, steadily declined during the remainder of the hostilities as the battle line stabilized. At the time of Stalin's death, which preceded the signing of the Korean armistice by less than five months, virtually all guerrilla bands, which had been most numerous in central Hwanghae Province just north of the present demilitarized zone, had been driven onto the off-shore islands, where they presumably have since been liquidated. Guerrilla activity in the latter stages of the hostilities appears to have been sustained only where it was linked with the UN command; aside from such groups, resistance activities after the Commu- nists regained control were minor. 13. Since the conclusion of the armistice, guerrilla and other resistance activity appears to have declined almost to the vanishing point. Some small guerrilla groups were re- ported to have been holding out in the moun- tainous areas of Hwanghae and North P'yon- gan Provinces as recently as early 1956, but their continued survival is doubtful. Active resistance appears to be limited to the occa- sional distribution of leaflets and mutilation of Communist posters, some intelligence col- lection, and rare instances of sabotage and assassination of members of the North Korean armed forces, apparently on an unorganized basis. No organized resistance groups are known to be in existence at the present time. 14. Unorganized passive resistance is probably fairly widespread in North Korea, particularly among the farmers, whose failure to identify themselves with the official policies and aims has been acknowledged by the regime. Such passive resistance, however, is probably char- acterized more by apathy and unwillingness to expend effort in accomplishing the tasks set SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 66 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET by the regime than by a deliberate effort to obstruct those tasks through a slowdown. Student elements probably retain the best resistance potential as do relatives of persons adversely affected by regime policies. Never- theless, so long as the present regime remains in power, even unorganized resistance has only dim prospects. ROLE OF REFUGEES 15. The presence in South Korea of large numbers of North Korean refugees constitutes a strong attraction for their compatriots still in the North and represents a potential source of leadership and guidance in the event that effective resistance in the North should be- come feasible. However, although there is some contact between the members of fam- ilies split between the North and the South, this relationship appears to have little politi- cal significance. The ROK is known to have penetrations into North Korea, but there is no evidence that there has been contact with potential resistance groups in the North, much less any support to them. REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE 16. The North Korean security apparatus, under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, com- prises, in addition to its administrative per- sonnel, political police, security guards, border and railroad constabulary police, and regular constabulary police. Through strict controls on speech, press and radio listening, and through constant local surveillance, the re- gime keeps alert to any indication of dissen- sion. Travel controls are very thorough, espe- cially in Kaesong and the rest of the area adjacent to the Demilitarized Zone. Rela- tives of persons who have gone to South Korea are particularly watched and discriminated against. There has been considerable reloca- tion of persons resident in Kaesong and other areas of unrest. Families of medical students who participated in the Hungarian uprising are reported to have been imprisoned. CAPABILITY OF THE REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT 17. Although the majority of North Koreans probably dislike the regime and respond apathetically to its demands and appeals, they are effectively controlled by the Soviet-trained security apparatus and by the omnipresent cadres of the Korean Labor Party. There is every reason to believe that the regime would be capable of suppressing opposition from any internal quarter without Soviet or Chinese Communist aid. 18. Security controls which had been intensi- fied at the time of the Armistice in July 1953 were made more rigid at the time of the Hun- garian revolt. The number of security guard forces has been sizably increased, particularly in the border and port areas, in the interests of even stricter travel control. No popular reaction has been reported, though there prob- ably is a greater feeling of intimidation. In addition there has been an increase of marine patrolling of the coast during the last year. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE 19. Assuming continuation of the armistice, resistance in North Korea is unlikely to be of much significance. At best it may provide a limited source of intelligence. Organized re- sistance groups apparently have been unable to sustain operations against the regime and have little prospect of greater success in the future. Unorganized passive resistance may increase in the future if the economic burden on individual North Koreans increases or if security controls are relaxed. A substantial improvement in the standard of living throughout North Korea would probably re- duce dissension significantly. Barring re- sumption of hostilities in Korea, however, dis- sension is generally unlikely to be translated into active resistance. 20. Prolonged and open unrest within the USSR, presaging a weakening in the Soviet system, would undoubtedly have a profound effect on North Korea, should such events become known by any sizeable number of peo- ple. Moreover, the existence of anti-Soviet, pro-Communist Chinese elements has been confirmed, and the historical evidence of Korean inclination toward China is strong enough to suggest that a switch from policies supporting the USSR to those favoring Corn- SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 67 munist China might occur. Such an event however, would probably not mean a very marked departure from the present state of affairs and it is highly unlikely that any pro- ROK or US group would be able to exert any significant influence. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR 21. Under conditions of open war, North Korean resistance potential would probably increase somewhat but would still be limited to isolated instances of sabotage, some passive resistance defections, assistance to anti-Com- munist personnel in escape and evasion opera- tions, and some intelligence collection. Mili- tary action by resistance elements without external support would be virtually impossi- ble. Increased domestic security measures and external bloc support for the regime would make organized resistance highly un- likely except immediately in front of advanc- ing non-Communist forces. Nor could North Korean troops be counted on to defect since they are considered politically reliable. 22. The circumstances surrounding the initi- ation of hostilities would have little effect on resistance potential. The same is true of the use of tactical nuclear weapons against selected targets. However, if large-scale nu- clear warfare were used, the possibilities of effective resistance would be negligible. 23. The nationality of any Free World forces would not matter provided that no Japanese forces were employed. If a US-type military government were instituted by occupation forces, staffed by ROK personnel and receiv- ing Western support and guidance, most North Koreans would probably accept it and resistance in areas still under Communist control might be stimulated. 24. The aspirations of individual resistance factions for post-war leadership probably would not be of great significance. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 69 ANNEX H?NORTH VIETNAM BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE 1. Economic pressures are probably a major factor in creating dissidence in the Commu- nist "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" (DRV, North Vietnam). The levies, regulations, and controls of the regime impose a heavy burden on the population, especially when compared with economic measures in South Vietnam. Agricultural taxes, principally a levy of about 40 percent of paddy yields, deprive peasants of almost all surplus output, while local mer- chants face stiff taxes calculated to prevent the accumulation of wealth. In addition, the dearth of trained technicians of all kinds, bureaucratic unwieldiness, and the disruption of normal trade channels have tended to hamper economic growth. Living standards although slightly improved since the signing of the Geneva Agreements are still low; rice yields are poor; and population pressures are great. Other important factors in the crea- tion of resentment are the regime's rigid police-state restrictions; the bloodshed and personal hardships in the rural areas, caused by the regime's agrarian reform policies dur- ing the past three years; its continued use of terroristic methods; its persecution of cer- tain socio-economic, minority, and religious groups; its disruption of the traditionally strong family ties of the Vietnamese; and the influence in the DRV of the Chinese, who have long been feared and disliked in Vietnam. 2. Generally, the popular appeal of the re- gime, following the military victory over the French and the 1954 Geneva Agreements, has diminished in recent years largely for the rea- sons mentioned above. The inherently re- pressive nature of the Communist regime has become increasingly clear to the Vietnamese public since Geneva, and this revelation prob- ably has shaken the allegiance of many of its supporters. The steady consolidation of Pres- ident Ngo Dinh Diem's anti-Communist gov- ernment in South Vietnam, where levies, reg- ulations, and controls are less stringent than in the North, has provided an irritating con- trast to the North Vietnamese regime for the allegiance of its citizens. To combat this com- petition, the DRV seeks to direct popular re- sentment against Diem's government, which it portrays as an American puppet, and against the United States itself, which it claims has taken over France's colonialist aspirations in the area, is perpetuating the division of the country, and is responsible for most of the area's economic difficulties. MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS 3. Catholics. The estimated 700,000 Cath- olics in the DRV (roughly six percent of the population) probably constitute the largest single concentration of actual or potential dissidents in the country. The general hos- tility of Vietnamese Catholics to Communist rule has been demonstrated on several occa- sions. Soon after the division of Vietnam in mid-1954, for example, about 700,000 Catho- lics from North Vietnam sought refuge in South Vietnam. More recently, the fact that the November 1956 uprisings in Nghe An Province occurred in primarily Catholic vil- lages indicates that those who remained be- hind ar'e far from reconciled to the DRV re- gime. Catholic dissatisfaction with the DRV's treatment of the church has been stimulated by the contrast with the favored position the church occupies in South Vietnam, where Diem and many other leaders are devout Catholics. Nevertheless, church leaders in the north have not encouraged overt resistance to the regime, evidently an effort to ensure the church's survival. Although they have re- sisted DRV encroachments upon the church's prerogatives, they apparently have sought to avoid openly hostile acts that presumably would result in even more stringent DRV con- trol measures. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 70 SECRET 4. Tribal Minorities. The Vietnamese have traditionally disdained the tribal minorities who, for their part, fear and dislike the Viet- namese. Approximately 900,000 tribal minor- ity peoples in North Vietnam are acknowl- edged by the regime to be a source of disaffec- tion. Made up of a variety of groups such as the Tho, Nung, White and Black Thai, Muong, Meo, and Man, they are located chiefly in up- land and mountainous regions in the northern part of North Vietnam and along the western boundary with Laos. DRV authorities have placed tight restrictions on entry into and egress from many of these areas, while they have sought to bring the tribes under control by a combination of force and persuasion. Communist cadres assigned to these areas have often increased tribal hostility, accord- ing to some reports, by disregarding tribal hierarchies and customs. The tribal peoples, however, are disunited, and lack modern weapons. 5. The Peasantry. Many of the peasants (who make up perhaps 90 percent of the pop- ulation) feel dissatisfied with the regime, par- ticularly as a result of the DRV's agrarian re- form program during the past three years. Since mid-1956 there has been extensive criti- cism in DRV media of the agrarian reform cadres for arousing popular resentment, im- pairing the Lao Dong Communist Party's foundations, and causing tension in the coun- tryside. Regime attempts to correct the mis- takes have generally not been successful, how- ever. While present resistance has occasion- ally taken the form of violence, apparently spontaneous and unorganized, in most cases rural dissidence seems to have been expressed by failure to respond to the regime's agrarian program or by general apathy. Fear and hopelessness appear to characterize the peas- ant's outlook, and deliberate efforts to sabo- tage DRV policies are rarely made. 6. Intellectuals. There are indications that some dissidence exists among intellectuals. in North Vietnam, especially those who were French-educated and French oriented. Dur- ing the latter half of 1956, the regime, copying the Soviet pattern of admitting errors and adopting a "liberalized" policy to correct the errors, somewhat relaxed its censorship and allowed criticism of DRV policy in various newspapers. These papers, non-Party but still supporters of the regime, quickly ex- ceeded the acceptable limits of criticism and were suspended in mid-December 1956. None- theless, the rapidity with which some intellec- tuals responded to this one opportunity to air their grievances is an indication that the re- gime's efforts to win over this group have not been wholly successful. 7. Landlords and Merchants constitute ele- ments of dissidence on an individual basis, but they have not been nor are they likely to become leaders of effective resistance. Mer- chants, reportedly engaged in extensive hoarding, speculation, and tax evasion, are contributing to the regime's poor economic situation. INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE 8. Although there have been widespread indi- cations of dissidence, the North Vietnamese generally do not seem to feel impelled to active resistance. Few have ever known anything other than marginal living standards, author- itarian government, and insecurity; they also are extremely war-weary following the years of fighting in the area. Accordingly they seem to possess a large capacity for enduring privation and repression, and many have be- come apathetic. Moreover, the strength of the regime's control apparatus and the gen- eral lack of a means for armed resistance pre- sumably make potential resistance elements even more discreet. Outbreaks of violence that have occurred appear to have been local- ized, unpremeditated and unorganized flare- ups. 9. Most dissidence in North Vietnam seems directed primarily at the DRV regime itself. Catholic dissidence and resistance activity probably is directed at Communism per se, although the distinction between the regime and the ruling ideology probably is not sharp- ly drawn. There have been no reports of any ill will directed specifically against Soviet or Chinese Communist influence, even though fear and dislike of the Chinese people prob- ably provides a supplementary motivation for resistance. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 71 10. There does not seem to have been any ma- terial change in the basis and intensity of dis- sidence in North Vietnam as a result of new Soviet policies adopted after Stalin's death. The 20th Soviet Party congress, the disorders in Poland and Hungary, and the appearance of ideological differences and factionalism within other Communist parties do not seem to have had any lasting impact on DRV Party and government circles. RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE 11. From the time of Stalin's death to the signing of the Geneva Agreements about 16 months later, most if not all organized resist- ance activity in North Vietnam involved groups associated with the French and Viet- namese forces engaged in hostilities with the Viet Minh. After the Geneva Agreements, however, most of these groups either withdrew from DRV territory or were rendered virtually impotent by DRV control measures. Fairly continuous but minor conflicts seem to have occurred between small groups of tribal minorities and DRV forces in the areas now known as the Thai-Meo Autonomous Zone, Viet Bac Autonomous Zone, and the North- east Zone. Vietnamese Catholics seem to have played a prominent role in numerous local anti-regime disturbances during the last half of 1956 and the first half of 1957. The most publicized and probably most severe outbreaks of resistance were those tliat occurred in Nghe An Province in November 1956. Although this uprising was followed later by scattered anti-regime disturbances in other localities, no general resistance movement evolved. 12. No reliable information is available con- cerning any organized resistance groups that may now be operating in North Vietnam. Presumably some members of Catholic lay organizations which existed in North and Central Vietnam prior to the Geneva Agree- ments have remained. These organizations, such as the Catholic Socialist Party (Dang Xa Hoi Cong Giao), the Youth Movement for Devotion to the Country (Thank Nien Phung Su Quoc Gia), and the Catholic militia, which prior to 1954 included about 11,000 members, might constitute a structural basis for organ- ized resistance activities among the Catholic minority. It is possible also that small rem- nants of several anti-DRV political parties and labor groups ? notably the Nationalist Party of Greater Vietnam (Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang), the Vietnam Nationalist Party (Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang), and the Vietnamese Confederation of Christian Workers ? which were active in North and north-central Viet- nam before 1954 probably are still located in those regions, and retain some subversive potential. 13. Potential resistance groups constitute less than ten percent of the DRV's total popu- lation, and clearly lack the capacity to initiate successful, organized, active resistance. Most unorganized resistance is of a passive char- acter extending from criticism of the regime by intellectuals to apathy and failure to ac- tively support the regime by peasants. Pas- sive resistance against the regime's agrarian policies will probably continue to impede Com- munist goals. There have been recent reports of expressions of discontent among industrial workers over low wages and excessively high work norms. Dissatisfaction also exists among all classes of the population with con- sumer goods shortages, the Communist eco- nomic control system, and the 30 days com- pulsory labor levy for all able bodied adults. ROLE OF EMIGRES 14. Despite the border controls of the regime and its efforts to patrol a rugged and sparsely populated border area, considerable numbers of persons cross the borders, including some who are allowed to smuggle certain needed goods. A steady trickle of refugees continues to reach the South from the Catholic areas in North and northern Central Vietnam, and it may be assumed there is considerable contact between the Catholic refugees in South Viet- nam and their families and compatriots in the North. There is no evidence, however, that guidance and assistance are at present being offered by Catholics in the South to any resistance groups in the North. There are known to be contacts by South Vietnamese government services with individuals in the denied areas in the North, but there is no evi- dence that aid or guidance is being given to resistance groups there. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 72 SECRET REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE 15. The DRV regime has foreseen most actual and potential centers of resistance, and has adjusted its counter-subversion tactics in or- der to meet the individual requirements of each resistance center. The "People's Army of Vietnam," one of the regime's major instru- ments for suppressing resistance, now con- sists of 268,000 well-organized and mobile reg- ular troops. In addition, forces designed spe- cifically for internal security, under the con- trol of the regular army, include 38,000 re- gional forces responsible for provincial secu- rity, and a local militia, numbering 75,000 responsible for local security. Border secu- rity regiments of the regular army along the Laotian border and along the demilitarized zone above the 17th parallel are known to have security responsibilities. 16. The DRV maintains strict controls over travel, documentation, press, radio and other media of expression. Party penetration of all mass organizations, social, and religious groups enables the regime to keep informed of the acts and attitudes of Vietnamese on all levels of society. With respect to the ethnic minorities, the DRV utilizes the system of penetration by Communist cadres of the same ethnic stock and background. There is some evidence to indicate that the regime has made use of Chinese Communist cadre-training cen- ters in the Kunming area in Communist China for its work among minority tribal groups. It has also established a large school in Hanoi for giving instruction and indoc- trination to promising members of ethnic minorities. An over-all literacy program has been started, both in tribal dialects and in Vietnamese, which incidentally make propa- ganda and organization controls more effec- tive. CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT 17. As long as the regime's leadership remains united and determined to check dissidence, it will be extremely difficult for future resistance to become organized and to grow in force and importance. Insofar as is known, actual or potential resistance groups are not united and have no background of common action against the Communists; their interests (except for their anti-regime outlook) do not coincide; and they have little power. Moreover, through its security and surveillance systems, the DRV is capable of effectively controlling whatever sporadic resistance activity arises in either Vietnamese or ethnic minority areas. Al- though some sympathy reportedly was shown by army troops to the resisting villagers at the time of the Nghe An uprising, the military forces are believed loyal to the regime. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE 18. At this time, it seems unlikely that organ- ized or unorganized resistance to the regime will attain sufficient magnitude or intensity to impede seriously the realization of its fore- most goals. The DRV has firm control of its security forces and can throttle any serious internal threat to its existence. Although some small and independent guerrilla bands may exist in the remote areas of North Viet- nam where control is extremely difficult, there is little likelihood that an amalgamation of the various dissident groups could result. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR 19. If hostilities were taking place outside Vietnam, the resistance potential within the DRV will probably increase, but only by minor proportions. It would probably be limited to annoying acts of sabotage, intelligence collec- tion, and assistance to anti-Communist per- sonnel in various forms. Independent mili- tary action without external support would probably be suicidal for anti-regime elements unless the DRV security apparatus were greatly weakened. 20. In the event of hostilities within North Vietnamese territory, resistance activity would probably assume more serious propor- tions, especially if external assistance and encouragement were provided. Assistance to attacking forces would most likely take the form of sporadic uprisings which, however, would have little chance of becoming nation- wide in scope because of the extremely poor communications. Aid in escape and evasion SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 73 operations could be expected throughout most of rural Vietnam. Assistance would be great- est in the southern areas, among indigenous Catholic groups, and among other minorities, particularly the Meos. Resistance forces, al- though small and un-coordinated, would still be able to disrupt and reduce the over-all strength of the regime. The intensity of active local resistance generally would depend on the success of local military action by attacking forces. 21. The nationality of attacking forces would probably influence the willingness of resist- ance groups to act. Tribal groups which have been helped by the French for many years would be most receptive to French invaders. Vietnamese would prefer to aid other Viet- namese the most and the French the least. Participation of Nationalist Chinese might seriously jeopardize resistance and create an- tagonism toward the occupation. 22. A military government administered by Vietnamese in ethnic Vietnamese areas would probably have a salutary effect on resistance activities. A French occupation would be dis- trusted by the majority of the Vietnamese peo- ple, and would adversely affect anti-Commu- nist partisan warfare. The occupation poli- cies of the attacking forces would affect con- tinued resistance capabilities. However, any occupation government of long duration, ad- ministered and controlled by other than Viet- namese, would probably be unpopular with the people of the occupied area. 23. The circumstances surrounding the initi- ation of hostilities would have little effect on resistance potential. The same is true of the use of tactical nuclear weapons against selected targets. However, in case of large- scale nuclear warfare, the possibilities of effec- tive resistance would be negligible. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 75 ANNEX I - POLAND PREAMBLE 1. Events of 1956 have made the pattern of dissidence and resistance in Poland far more complex than that in the other Eastern Euro- pean satellite nations. There are anti-Com- munists who do not oppose Gomulka; within the Party there are Communists who do. The population is basically anti-Communist and anti-Russian, yet it tolerates Gomulka be- cause other possibilities look even less attrac- tive. The Roman Catholic Church is basically anti-Communist, but Cardinal Wyszynski sup- ports Gomulka's appeals for sobriety, hard work, and the nationalist aspects of his poli- cies. Stalinist elements within the Party are die-hard orthodox Communists, yet they use every means to tear Party control away from Gomulka. "Revisionists" within the Party swear fealty to Marxism, but they resist Gomulka's narrow definition of the "Polish road to Socialism." In short, Poland is a con- geries of dissident elements held together by strong nationalist sentiments, bitter memories of Soviet destruction of Hungarian freedom, the Roman Catholic religion, and the strong personalities of Wladyslaw Gomulka and Cardinal Wyszynski. BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE 2. Despite Gomulka's successes in eliminat- ing many sources of dissidence, a number of factors still operate to build popular dissatis- faction. The most important of these is the failure of the regime to fulfill the hopes placed in it in October 1956. The population as a whole has been disappointed that there has been no automatic improvement in the stand- ard of living. Workers especially have been shaken by the cold realities of the post- October economic situation, and the more politically minded among them are dissatis- fied that workers' councils failed to become real instruments of worker control of industry. Writers, journalists, intellectuals, and stu- dents have been disillusioned to find the per- missible bounds of freedom of expression to be narrower than they had hoped. 3. The Gomulka regime's policies themselves have created additional sources of dissidence. The reduction of the governmental and Party bureaucracies has created a new source of dis- sidence among former bureaucrats who have been forced to make radical readjustments in their personal lives as a consequence of the loss of their economic and social position. Encouragement of private handicraft indus- tries as part of the program designed to ex- pand consumers' goods production and the encouragement of private shops in trade and services to supplement the existing socialist network have stimulated black marketing, profiteering, and speculation and corruption. This in turn has led to the growth of a class of "new rich," who have aroused the enmity of the authorities and of a considerable por- tion of the population. In the former Ger- man territories now under Polish control, re- gime suspicions toward and the previous regime's discrimination against the indig- enous population have created a considerable degree of resentment among the people who resided in these areas before World War II, as well as among the remnants of the former German population. 4. Given the basically anti-Communist and anti-Soviet attitude of the population, dissi- dence is to be found in every element in Polish society. Although Gomulka has considerable personal popularity, he has been unable to transfer this popularity to the Party he heads and the system he represents. MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS 5. Peasants, although appreciative of the gains they have made under Gomulka, remain hostile to the regime's long-term objective of SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 76 SECRET reconstructing agriculture on socialist lines, and also to the continuation of compulsory deliveries, no matter how low the delivery quotas. The influence of the Church is espe- cially strong in the countryside and helps to deepen the peasants' distrust of Communist policies and objectives. The revival of anti- Communist influences within the ranks of the United Peasant Party (ZSL) has become a matter of major concern both to the leader- ship of the ZSL and that of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party (PZPR). 6. Industrial workers have expressed dissi- dence in a series of strikes and threats to strike which have been a feature of Polish life ever since Gomulka's return to power. Al- though none of these labor conflicts has had the political implications of the pre-Gomulka outbreak in Poznan, they do represent an open expression of dissatisfaction with the regime's wage policy. The outbreaks against civil authority which have become character- istic of Polish life since Gomulka's return, seem to draw considerable strength from the ranks of young unskilled or semiskilled work- ers. These people find that a tangle with the police affords them an opportunity to express their amorphous protests against the regime in general as well as a chance to express their contempt for the police. Special groups of workers who have suffered loss of employment or loss of status as the result of Gomulka poli- cies are particularly agitated. 7. Among intellectuals, dissidence arises out of the regime's efforts to gradually but firmly reduce the limited freedom of expression which, for a short time, had been permitted to contribute materially to the 1956 changes in Polish politics. The increasing strictness of controls over the press has heightened dis- satisfaction among the writers and journalists who played an important role in the upheaval of 1956 and their aftermath and whose strong opposition to the USSR and the Soviet system of pre-Gomulka days was matched only by the Hungarian intellectuals. But while the latter have been suppressed, the Polish intellectuals continue, within increasingly narrow confines, to militate against the imposition of increas- ing limits on the freedom of expression. 8. Closely associated with this group are the students who broke from the Communist fold in October 1956 and are especially resentful of any attempt to force them back into it. The inability of the Gomulka regime to create a viable successor to the Polish Youth Union, which folded up under the impact of the events of October 1956, is a striking commen- tary on the regime's failure to command the confidence of Polish youth. Likewise, the riots in Warsaw at the beginning of October 1957, which started as a student protest against the suppression of the influential stu- dent paper Po Prostu, indicated how tenuous are the ties of loyalty which bind the students to the regime. 9. In addition to the Gomulka faction, there are elements in the Party which aspire to an even greater degree of independence from the Soviet Union than Gomulka has achieved and others which desire a return to sterner and more far-reaching Party control over all phases of Polish life. The first group ? the "revisionists" ? for the most part are intel- lectuals, while the latter group ? the "dog- matists" ? for the most part are old-line Party workers of long experience. The "revi- sionists" have no real organizational base but find their strength in a communion of ideas with the larger group of intellectuals, journal- ists, and students. The "dogmatists," on the other hand, have no popular support, but find strength in the cohesion which springs from long-term service in and familiarity with the Party organization. For a time after the re- turn of Gomulka they had the added material advantage (but popular disadvantage) of open Soviet support. 10. The Roman Catholic Church, although not a political organization, is entitled to con- sideration as the only organized anti-Com- munist resistance group in the country: its ideology and basic objectives are opposed to those espoused by the Party and it has broadly based popular support and a disciplined, trained organization. It is true that the modus vivendi of December 7, 1956 formally ended a long period of outright political war- fare and intimidation directed by the Party against the Church. The Church has in com- mon with the Party the aim of defending SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET Poland's national sovereignty and Poland's claim to former German territories now under its control. Nonetheless, Church-State rela- tions have continued to be marked by conflicts of interest, though for the most part these have been kept within negotiable limits and have been threshed out by a joint Church- government commission which meets regu- larly. 11. Armed Forces. The army generally re- flects the discontent pattern of the population, although on a lesser scale. The army's mo- rale and loyalty to the regime considerably ex- ceed those of the populace at large, and there is no evidence of any focus of anti-regime attitudes. On the other hand, there is in the Polish armed forces, as in any group of Poles, a significant potential for resistance. Under present conditions, this potential cannot be realized. In the first place, the military lead- ers are loyal to the regime; secondly, the orig- inal enthusiasm for Gomulka's "independ- ence" from the Kremlin has not entirely dis- sipated. Further, the military rank and file are better housed, clothed, and fed than their civilian counterparts and are kept busy with disciplined activity. Polish troops would prob- ably obey orders and a civil revolt against the present regime could not be expected to re- ceive much support from the army if such a revolt remained localized. If Soviet forces sided with Gomulka in quelling any type of general hostilities, the army would probably not fight in an effective unified manner on the side of the Gomulka regime. On the other hand, were the Gomulka regime to oppose Soviet military forces on any issue, the Polish military would side with the regime against the Soviets as an effective unified army. INTENSITY AND TARGETS OF DISSIDENCE 12. The high level of dissidence in Poland which gave rise to the Poznan riots of June 1956 and led to Gomulka's return to power in October has been considerably reduced by the regime's efforts to eliminate some of the prin- cipal sources of dissatisfaction, and by its ability to make common cause with dissident elements in appeals to Polish national feel- ings. In contrast to the pre-Gomulka period, when the dissidence of the Polish population 77 focused on the Communist regime, the ubiq- uitous symbols of Soviet oppression, and the hated secret police, there are no comparable focal points today. However, the poor eco- nomic conditions will probably persist in the foreseeable future and remain a source of deep-seated dissatisfaction which may give rise to acts of resistance. Unless the regime uses increasingly forceful measures of repres- sion, the intensity of dissidence is not now sufficiently high to provide a favorable setting for resistance activity. 13. Given the absence of a broad popular set- ting for resistance activity in Poland, it is not strange that the most effective organized re- sistance operating there today takes a some- what different form than that found else- where in Eastern Europe. The Roman Cath- olic Church expresses its resistance for the most part at the conference table of the joint Church-government commission. Its princi- pal target is the regime, from which it seeks constantly to obtain more concessions or better performance on concessions already granted. In these negotiations the Church has consistently played an aggressive role while the government has been defending its positions. Within the Party, the most syste- matic organized resistance has been offered by the Stalinists ("dogmatists") , who have consistently opposed the Gomulka program. Their target is Gomulka and their objective is to obtain control of the Party in order to return to Stalinist policies once again. The "revisionists" in the Party are opposed to a return to repressive measures characteristic of the Stalinist era. Consequently, they oppose primarily the Stalinists in the Party but they also oppose all evidence of Stalinism which they see in the Gomulka program. TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953 14. The death of Stalin in 1953, the fall of Beriya and the reorganization of the Polish police system in 1954 signaled the beginning of the "thaw." From 1954 to October 1956, dissidence became most marked among intel- lectuals in general and Party intellectuals in particular. The regime's rigidity in cultural matters and the continued suppression of civil liberties became the specific targets of open SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 78 SECRET criticism. Moreover, the Party's "central ac- tive," consisting of more than 200 of the most active political workers in the Party appa- ratus, showed signs of dissidence. Growing relaxation in Polish life served to increase rather than diminish dissidence among intel- lectuals and Party apparatchiks. The rever- berations of the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU further intensified dissidence within the Party, while a decrease of police terror per- mitted the open manifestation of popular opposition to regime policies in the Poznan uprisings of June 1956. The extent of dissi- dence by elements upon which the regime was supposedly based paralyzed its power of de- cision and prepared the ground for the funda- mental changes within the regime which took place in October 1956. 15. During his first year in power, Gomulka succeeded in reducing both the basis for and the intensity of dissidence in Poland. He did this by: (1) eliminating terror as an instru- ment of public policy and substantially reduc- ing the size and authority of the security police; (2) reducing the size of the govern- ment and Party bureaucracy; (3) ceasing political warfare against the Church and reaching a modus vivendi with it; (4) permit- ting the decollectivization of agriculture; (5) eliminating from political life those personali- ties like Marshal Rokossovsky who were the most glaring symbols of Soviet domination and reducing the influence of those Polish Communist leaders most subservient to the Soviet Union; (6) restoring to public life many persons who suffered from Soviet- imposed tyranny; (7) achieving Soviet recog- nition of Polish sovereignty and a degree of amelioration of Polish grievances; (8) recog- nizing the bankruptcy of the economic policy followed since 1950 and starting to rectify past errors. RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE (a) Organized 16. Although the existence of small, isolated resistance groups is acknowledged by the re- gime from time to time, there have been no known significant anti-Communist organized political resistance groups operating in Poland since the death of Stalin. In a number of cases such groups appear to be organized by people associated with World War II non- Communist and anti-Communist under- ground organizations. They are small and uncoordinated. While they have an anti- Communist orientation, their objectives can- not be precisely defined. Their activities ap- pear to consist largely of the printing and dis- tribution of anti-regime propaganda or the conducting of campaigns of intimidation di- rected against specific local Party function- aries. Many of these organizations appear to be on the borderline between organized and unorganized resistance and many are proba- bly no more than just criminal gangs. 17. Within the Party itself the Stalinist fac- tion has a sufficient degree of cohesiveness and community of purpose to be viewed as an organized resistance group in the sense that it is opposed to the Gomulka program. The revisionist "faction" has no organization, nor any clearly defined program, but it acts within the Party as a pressure group for fur- ther liberalization, currently opposing curtail- ment of liberties already conceded or granted. The basic conflict within the Party is not be- tween these two extremes but rather between the Stalinists who favor subservience to the USSR and the rest of the Party which favors Polish sovereignty. Among the elements favoring national sovereignty, the revisionists are those least concerned with its realistic limits, while the elements surrounding Go- mulka are most anxious not to exceed them. Gornulka's efforts to take this conflict out of the limelight ? where it has been since the Central Committee's Seventh Plenum (July 1956) ? first by appeals to Party unity and, more recently, by threats of expulsion, have so far failed. 18. Within the ranks of the regime-allied United Peasant Party (ZSL) there is a similar conflict between those who support the PZPR and those who wish the ZSL to pursue an in- dependent course responsive to peasant wishes. It is not clear whether the dissidents have enough organizational strength to con- stitute an organized resistance group. The scanty evidence available indicates that they SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET do control the local organization in some localities; but their activity appears to be along the lines of unorganized resistance which operates to lower the efficiency of the ZSL in cooperating with the PZPR. (b) Unorganized 19. There have been some manifestations of dissidence since Gomulka assumed power. Their significance in terms of resistance po- tential varies considerably. In most cases, it would be difficult to ascribe these disorders as indicators of political resistance. For exam- ple, the widespread existence in Poland of alcoholism, "hooliganism," bribery, stealing in industrial plants, and other forms of corrup- tion is for the most part not politically moti- vated, and it is questionable whether they can be regarded as indicators of dissidence even though they might unintentionally spark new disturbances. Even the riots following the suspension of the newspaper Po Prostu in early October 1957, though politically moti- vated, were not an impressive showing of stu- dent dissidence: only 3-4,000 of the 28,000 Warsaw students participated the first two nights, leaving the field to the police and rowdies the following nights. 20. The relaxation of restrictions on travel to the West has given Poles some opportunity to engage in unorganized resistance by collect- ing and transmitting intelligence material or by defecting to the West. Defection, with subsequent cooperation with foreign intelli- gence organizations, has been the most com- mon form of unorganized resistance utilized. Polish officials have seized the opportunity to defect while abroad on official business; Polish seamen and fishermen, air force members, and members of civilian flying clubs have utilized the opportunities open to them to defect; other Poles continue to leave Poland illegally by crossing into East Germany and thence in- to West Berlin; and, finally, slightly over one percent of Polish tourists who visited Western Europe during 1957 failed to return home. 21. General relaxation after years of police repression has served to increase greatly in- stances of localized, unorganized, and gener- 79 ally non-political attacks upon civil authori- ties. At the same time the marked improve- ment, mainly political in nature, on the Polish scene has decreased the intensity of dissidence and has deprived it of clear cut focuses with nationwide applicability. The surprising de- gree of realism recently shown by the Poles in judging their country's precarious position has served to blunt the stimulus for resist- ance. ROLE OF EMIGRES 22. Emigre groups have played no significant role in guiding or assisting resistance activi- ties in Poland. Although some emigre groups do encourage defection and resistance, there is no evidence by which their efficacy can be judged. Even prior to the reinstatement of Gomulka there was no known contact be- tween Polish emigre elements in the West and Polish resistance groups in Poland. Moreover, then as now, Poles in Poland reportedly feel that the majority of emigres are out of touch with them and neither know nor represent the true sentiment of the Polish people. Events since the Poznan uprising probably have rein- forced this conviction. Even anti-Commu- nists in Poland are believed to give little sup- port to the idea of a future government com- posed of present Polish emigre leaders. REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE 23. In the pre-Gomulka period the Commu- nist regime in Poland relied mainly upon the use of repression and terror to prevent resist- ance. Since the advent of Gomulka, the re- gime has sought to inhibit resistance by elim- inating or reducing some of the more impor- tant causes of dissidence and by handling grievances in such a way as to avoid provoking open political resistance. In handling civil disturbances, the regime has used whatever firmness has been necessary to maintain its authority without employing measures which would inflame the population. The security apparatus, although reduced in size and influ- ence and deprived of its resort to terror, still functions to inhibit the development of re- sistance activities. It is estimated at 160,000, including the ordinary police, the militarized SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 80 SECRET security forces, and the military security police, as well as 65,000 internal security agents. These forces are considered to be quite efficient. CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT 24. The regime has shown that it is capable of maintaining its authority in the face of civil disturbances uncomplicated by political over- tones, or in the face of disturbances in which political considerations are relatively minor. It could probably suppress a revolt if it were localized and could be dealt with decisively within a few days. Moreover, with the two Soviet line divisions in Poland and many more posed along the frontiers, Soviet intervention may be expected if the regime seemed to be unable to cope with a large-scale uprising. This very fact, of which most Poles are aware, would act as a powerful deterrent so that only in extraordinary circumstances, such as can- not now be foreseen, would large-scale upris- ings (throughout Poland) be expected. MODIFICATION OF SECURITY APPARATUS 25. A general realignment of security func- tions started shortly after the period marked by Stalin's death, Beriya's execution, and the disclosures of Jozef Swiatlo, a former Deputy Director of Department X of the defunct Min- istry of Public Security (MBP) . Since Go- mulka's return to power, the regime has made concessions to popular feelings through addi- tional changes in organization, personnel, and nomenclature within the security apparatus. The MBP was dissolved in late 1954. In No- vember of 1956 its successor, the Committee for Public Security (KBP) , was also dissolved and its duties of protecting the state from espionage and terrorist activities were as- signed to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW) . Departments of the former secret police (UB) which had been responsible for foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal activities, were probably transferred to the MSW. Other UB departments were dis- solved and many former UB employees were transferred to training programs designed to equip them for work in other fields. Local units of the People's Militia were given re- sponsibility for the few remaining functions of the secret police. 26. The overhauling of the security apparatus following the events of October 1956 consid- erably increased the possibility for the expres- sion of dissidence. Nevertheless, the arrest in 1957 of Poles serving as agents for British, French, and American intelligence indicates that the reformed security apparatus is active and efficient in its efforts to ferret out and apprehend individuals and groups seeking to take advantage of the new situation to engage in resistance activities. There is no evidence of any change in popular attitudes toward the police as a result of the reduction in size and authority of that arm of the regime. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE 27. So long as the regime continues its present policies, the power position of the USSR remains essentially unchanged, and the Polish-German frontier problem unsettled, the development of significant active organized resistance in Poland is unlikely. In the ab- sence of a Stalinist-type of repression, dissi- dence is more likely to express itself in politi- cal indifference than in organized resistance. Moreover, the regime's current unwillingness to engage in open warfare with the Catholic Church or with its intra-Party opponents makes it likely that the resistance of these groups will be conducted on a level that would exclude massive retaliation by the regime. Thus, under existing circumstances, it seems unlikely that there will be any expansion of the types of organized resistance activity now existing. It also seems unlikely that there will be any significant increase in the level of resistance activity by organized resistance groups ? i.e., the Church and Party faction- alists ? which are all operating within self- imposed limits. 28. The potential for unorganized resistance, active or passive, is considerably greater than it was prior to the substantial reduction in the forces of the security police and the curtail- ment of their authority. On the other hand, the incentives to engage in such resistance have been greatly reduced as the result of SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 81 Gomulka's reforms and by growing apolitism among all elements of the population. Unor- ganized resistance is not likely to take on new forms. Thus, if the regime remains unable to improve economic conditions, an increase in the level of intensity of unorganized resist- ance, in the form of strikes, poor work disci- pline, theft and corruption, and political non- conformism or apathy might be expected. If there were a further tightening of control measures, resistance activities would probably be impeded, but dissidence would rise. It should be noted, however, that current dissi- dence and the unorganized resistance poten- tial it represents have circumscribed Go- mulka's freedom of action in organizing Poland to serve Communist ends. The danger to the regime inherent in popular dissidence has prevented Gomulka from effectively stop- ping certain unorganized or informally organ- ized resistance activities, such as strikes, demonstrations, passing of intelligence infor- mation to the West, and overt but discreet anti-Communist propaganda in the press and by the Church. 29. The effect of an increase in East-West ten- sions on resistance would depend on the na- ture of the tensions and the regime's response to them. If the tensions led to the regime's acceptance, real or apparent, of a diminution of Polish independence and a greater degree of Soviet domination, it is likely that resistance activities would increase, particularly if com- bined with an increase of repressive measures and a return to pre-Gomulka policies. If, how- ever, the tensions were of such a nature that Poland's national existence would appear to depend upon loyalty to the regime, resistance activities would decline. A general increase in tensions would probably lead to increased ac- tivity on the part of the security forces, and, this, even without the imposition of repressive measures against the population as a whole, would probably result in a decline in active unorganized resistance. A marked decrease in tensions, on the other hand, achieved by mutual East-West accommodation, would probably give the regime greater opportunity to introduce more flexibility in its policies and afford greater opportunities for individual un- organized active resistance to the regime. At the same time, if a substantial decrease in ten- sions were accompanied by increasing trade opportunities and greater ease in obtaining foreign credits, it could enable the regime to offer the population some material benefits to sustain their hopes for a better future. All these factors would serve to reduce dissidence and resistance. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR 30. The anti-regime resistance potential in Poland in time of war would depend upon the nature of the war. Polish involvement in a war on the side of the Soviet Union against the West would be unpopular and would raise the level of dissidence, especially if the Soviet Union commenced hostilities and if Polish in- terests were not directly involved in the con- flict. However, if hostilities were not begun by the Soviet Union or if the war seemed to threaten Poland's independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity, the level of dissidence would in all likelihood decrease, if not cease altogether. The inclusion of a large number of German troops in invading forces would help the regime in that it could reduce dissi- dence and rally support by equating the Ger- man forces with Hitler's armies. 31. At the inception of hostilities between Bloc and non-Bloc states, the regime would intensify its security controls, but anti-Com- munists would probably still be able to com- mit acts of sabotage. Later, if the USSR were suffering reverses, Polish guerrillas would tie down some Bloc troops, destroy supply dumps, disrupt lines of communications, and sabo- tage industrial and agricultural output. Ef- forts would also be made to assist the enemy in evasion and escape activities, and to collect intelligence which would be useful to non- Bloc planners. Without outside encourage- ment, guidance, and material support, how- ever, they would constitute only a relatively minor nuisance to the regime. 32. Chances for organized anti-regime resist- ance would appear to be particularly favorable if military developments indicated the immi- nent collapse of Soviet power and the oppor- tunity were offered for real Polish independ- ence. Under those circumstances, organized resistance might consist of independent, local- SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 82 SECRET ized attempts to dislodge local Communist authorities. Efforts of this type would most likely be made first in villages and country towns where the authority of the Party is weakest, and in former German territories where Western forces might be looked upon as liberators by the indigenous population. Whether such resistance activities would lead to the appearance of a genuine liberation movement or whether they would merely re- sult in the total breakdown of law and order would depend upon the circumstances at the time. Organized, centrally directed resist- ance involving military action along the lines of World War II's Armia Krajowa (AK) is hardly conceivable unless it were preceded by a complete breakdown of Polish authority and a Soviet occupation. Although the actual for- mation of a centrally directed resistance ac- tion would seem to be possible only under special circumstances, the tradition of the AK would probably continue to be strong in Polish minds. However, various forms of unorgan- ized active or passive resistance would appear to be more likely than organized resistance. Given factors creating a high level of dissi- dence, a considerable amount of assistance to the West might be expected in the production and distribution of anti-regime propaganda, the harassment of some especially obnoxious local regime officials, help in evasion and escape operations and, to a lesser degree, in intelligence collection. 33. The Poles are sufficiently sophisticated militarily and politically to accept the use of nuclear weapons in future warfare as an in- evitable reality. If Poland were involved in a nuclear attack, the people's first reaction would be determined self-preservation. If use were made of major nuclear weapons, the re- sulting mass destruction and dislocation would virtually eliminate any effective forms of resistance activity. On the other hand, if a nuclear attack were so designed as to elim- inate the major resources of military and political control strengths, such an attack would probably be accepted as an unavoidable cost of liberation, would not necessarily de- stroy the will to resist, and could present anti- Communist Poles with an opportunity to take over control of the country., 34. Occupation policies of Western forces would not be a crucial factor affecting resist- ance potential and capabilities so long as these policies were pronounced and imple- mented to respect and aid in the accomplish- ment of Polish aspirations for freedom, na- tional independence, and the end of Soviet domination. Such enlightened occupation would intensify the Polish desire to be helpful and stimulate resistance activities in areas of the country still under Communist control. 35. Fear of Germany has traditionally played an important role in determining the atti- tudes of the Polish people. The Poles thus would be extremely apprehensive over the use of German forces in Polish territory, as well as over postwar territorial adjustments vis-a- vis Germany, and this factor might have a sig- nificant negative effect on the anti-Soviet re- sistance effort. However, this effect cannot be usefully measured at this time since it would depend on such presently unknown factors as the nature and degree of the German involve- ment, the announced war aims of the Western powers with respect to territorial settlements, and the over-all military situation. Other- wise, the nationality of attacking Free World forces would probably not influence the willingness of resistance groups to act, nor would the responsibility for initiation of hos- tilities greatly affect resistance potential. The representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Army, would substitute the following: "The Poles are sufficiently sophisticated mili- tarily and politically so that they accept the use of nuclear weapons in future warfare as an inevitable reality. If Poland were involved in a nuclear attack, the people's first reaction would be determined self-preservation. As coordinated groups were developed, they probably would take all possible steps to strengthen their native government and to eliminate any Stalinist or authoritarian remnants. Conditioned by their bitter experience in the 1944 Warsaw uprising and the immediate postwar resistance period, however, the Poles probably would not attempt to initiate independent anti-Soviet military ac- tion until their forces had received substantial commitments (in terms of materiel and person- nel as well as political support) from the West. The extent of their assistance in these circum- stances probably would be dependent on the amount of damage suffered in the nuclear strike." SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 83 ANNEX J - RUMANIA BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE 1. A basic cause underlying popular discon- tent in Rumania is the failure of the regime to improve the people's economic well being. Soviet economic exploitation in the postwar period, nationalization of industries, the de- struction of private trade, economic regimen- tation, and inefficiency of the state economic enterprises have reduced large sections of Ru- mania to a low level of subsistence. The peo- ple, including workmen in supposedly pros- perous towns, give every appearance of ex- treme poverty and gloom. A large part of the peasantry is dressed in rags. The popula- tion ascribes the shortages, particularly of food and fuel which before and even during World War II were in abundance, to exports required to meet obligations imposed by the Soviet Union and to poor planning by the government. Knowledge that food and fuel shortages in a country rich in oil, forests, and agriculture are due to government policy has further increased the people's resentment of both the regime and the Soviet Union. 2. The basic political factors in the anti- regime feelings of the Rumanians stem from their historical enmity toward Russia and Communism, their non-Slavic, traditionally Western orientation, and their disapproval of a governmental policy which seems counter to Rumanian aims of national independence, ter- ritorial integrity, and continuance of Western- oriented culture. Rumanians have not for- gotten that the USSR, after World War II, re- annexed Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, drove out the King, and delegated power to a puppet regime under absolute Soviet control. Regarding their country as a virtual Soviet colony, Rumanians have almost certainly identified Communism with their traditional fear of Russia. Moreover, individual liberties have been completely suppressed; the tradi- tional family patterns have been destroyed; and village life, around which most social and political activities evolved in the past, has now been placed under the control of local Com- munist functionaries whose chief task is not to serve the villagers but to carry out the un- popular program and policies of the regime. However, despite the strong anti-Communist feeling of the vast majority of the Rumanian people, they do not possess an active revolu- tionary tradition and are generally apathetic in the face of adversity. 3. The Rumanians have always been a devout people, considering religious institutions as playing a major role in their lives. The spir- itual needs of the people were satisfied by a large number of churches and monasteries. The various religious organizations functioned primarily for the benefit of their followers rather than of any special political or racial groupings, and their secular activities were generally incidental to the fulfillment of their spiritual aims. Therefore, the transformation in 1947-48 by the Communist regime of reli- gious organizations into instruments of sup- port for its program was a great blow to the population. Subsequent measures, such as the complete destruction of the Uniate Church, and the reduction to virtual inactiv- ity of the Roman Catholic Church by arrest- ing nearly all its leading clergy, had a de- pressing effect on the people. 4. Prior to the advent of the Communist re- gime in 1945, Rumanian education and cul- ture were oriented wholly toward the West. Speaking a predominantly Romance language and considering themselves modern repre- sentatives of Latin civilization, the Ruma- nians looked to the Western countries, partic- ularly to France, for political, cultural, and social guidance; the French language, along with Rumanian, was until the end of World War II compulsory in the Rumanian schools. French schools, operated either directly by the SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 84 SECRET French Government or by private and reli- gious institutions from France, were regarded as the best in the country. However, by 1948 the Rumanian Government had closed all French and other Western-operated schools and had taken stringent measures to elim- iate Western culture from the country, sub- stituting Soviet influences in their place. Through various measures the regime has transformed educational institutions into in- doctrination centers, designed to eliminate Western cultural patterns and to suppress freedom of thought and expressions. MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS 5. Peasants. Of all the groups in Rumania, the peasants, who compose over two-thirds of the country's population, constitute the great- est resistence potential. They have opposed the regime's agricultural policies, not only by widespread passive resistance, but on many occasions by hostile action as well. The bulk of the peasantry cannot reconcile its own in- terests with those of the regime and continues stubbornly to oppose the latter's agricultural policy. The traditional attachment of the peasant to the land, his deep-seated ambition to become a landowner and exercise a right which he regards as inalienable, his resent- ment over disruption of his simple way of life, and his traditional refusal to become organ- ized are in opposition to the entire agricul- tural policy of the Communists. The peasant has been difficult to discipline, and he has often openly protested against policies de- signed to regiment him. The various non- collectivized rural groups, are suffering most at the hand of the regime. The collectivized peasants, who have been drawn into a tight controlled network, would run great risks in active resistance; they can, however, resist passively with relatively little danger of detec- tion by the bureaucratic maze of collective administration. 6. Industrial Workers. In spite of the re- gime's past policy of favoring industry over agriculture, the industrial worker has not benefited much. In many ways his situation is inferior to that of the peasant who can at least evade deliveries to some extent and who has a local food and fuel supply. The indus- trial worker suffers from a depressed standard of living, poor housing, food shortages, and a fear of possible unemployment. He is forced to work hard for low wages, often under primi- tive conditions. Most workers are probably aware of the fact that the products of their labor are often destined for shipment to the Soviet Union. Consequently even those who initially supported the Communist regime have become disillusioned. Worker dissatis- faction is manifested in reluctance to join the Party. The Communists in theory derive their chief support from the working class, but the Rumanian Worker's Party has had little success in improving its "social composi- tion" by recruiting factory labor. The great- est discontent is to be found among the work- ers of the state railroad system; at one time these were the staunchest supporters of the Communists, furnishing the Party with such top leaders as Gheorghiu-Dej and Gheorghe Apostol, who were among the instigators of a bloody railroad strike in 1933. 7. Youth. Rumanian youth, particularly the 77,000 students of higher schools, are among the most outspoken opponents of the regime. Family tradition and the individualistic tend- encies of youth have encouraged opposition to the regimentation enforced by Commu- nist group control. Several important events ? the 1953 Bucharest Youth Festival, the 1956 Polish uprising and the Hungarian revolt ? have stirred young people to express open discontent, particularly the ethnic Hun- garians. Their demonstrations against Com- munism in general and Marxist-Leninist in- struction in particular brought comment even from Khrushchev. A number have defected from groups traveling abroad even though their political reliability had been strictly checked by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Party and its youth organization (Union of Working Youth) are seriously concerned over the continued interest of students in all things Western, and there is much criticism of youth in both agriculture and industry for absenteeism, thievery, immorality, laziness and failure to work toward the aims of the regime and the Communist ideology. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 85 8. Military. Soviet authorities have become increasingly careful, in the past several years, to refrain from flaunting their military forces and advisors in Rumania. Although some Rumanian soldiers may resent their presence and authority, it is probable that professional military personnel are not averse to accepting the modern weapons and equipment being supplied by the Soviets, even though they hardly believe the Communist-nourished legend of the historical bond between Rus- sians and Rumanians. Although Air Force personnel are presumably more carefully screened for political reliability than are Army personnel, dissident elements apparent- ly still persist. Most military deserters have been Air Force officers, and these have re- ported general discontent in their service branch. There seems to be little dissidence in the Army's permanent cadre, which includes approximately 25,000 well-indoctrinated offi- cers. Somewhat more dissatisfaction proba- bly exists among noncommissioned officers and those enlisted men who are held over for an extra year of service. The two conscript classes of about 80,000 men each, largely de- riving from the rural areas, are on the whole more disaffected than the rest of the Army, although the most obviously unreliable indi- viduals in each age class are not taken into the Army. 9. Among the forces of the Ministry of In- ternal Affairs, the state security police con- tain the most fanatical supporters of the re- gime. Personnel of other branches, such as the border guards, are for the most part not ardent Communists and are not devoted to the regime. Most of the members of these formations are conscripts and many of them, despite screening, share the anti-Communist feelings of the general population. Morale among the border guards is low. In the police force, attitudes ranging from tolerance of known anti-Communists to positive acts of disloyalty have been responsible for a series of purges. Nevertheless, while on the whole the loyalty of Rumanian armed forces is questionable, there has been no evidence of actual resistance within the Rumanian Army or the militarized security forces. Morale and discipline are not high. Apart from political resentment of Soviet control, Rumanians are not militaristically inclined and they gener- ally dislike the service as such. 10. Minorities. Ethnically Rumania is the most heterogeneous of the countries in the Satellite area, with minorities comprising 15 percent of the population. Groups of Hun- garians, Germans, Jews, and others, who for the most part form sizeable islands within Rumania, look to other countries for political and cultural inspiration, thus constituting a potential fifth column. In its desire to inte- grate these minorities, the regime has contrib- uted to their discontent by attempting to wipe out their distinctive cultures and by using minority institutions and languages as vehi- cles for the propagation of Communism. These minorities have probably become stronger in their ethnic group loyalty as a result of such inroads and of the anti-Com- munist attitudes manifested by their parent nationalities in West Germany, Hungary, and Israel. 11. Intellectuals. Rumanian intellectuals, particularly men of letters, have been restive under the Communist ideological yoke, but the Party has successfully stifled any open expression of opposition. The only major demonstration of open resistance to Party pressure ? in May 1956 when latent discon- tent finally erupted at a series of writers' and Party meetings ? was immediately sup- pressed. The intellectuals realize that they have little future unless they support the Communists or appear to do so. The lack of opportunity for advancement and creative freedom has motivated a number of engineers, professional men, artists, and dancers to de- fect on their visits to countries outside the Soviet Bloc. Other intellectuals, valuing pres- tige and material benefits, have accommo- dated themselves to the regime and have achieved leading positions, but for the most part they secretly harbor intense disaffection. 12. To a large extent, members of the govern- ment administration, factory officials, teach- ers, and engineers, who comprise the upper middle class, still retain a Western outlook. They are oppose.d to Communism but con- tinue to work for the government in order to SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 86 SECRET exist. They pay lip service to the Party, even though they would prefer a liberal govern- ment and a renewal of contacts with the Western world. As in the past, they have been able to adapt themselves to political upheavals and internal changes. In view of the small size of the Party when it came to power in Rumania, the Communists have had to employ many non-Communist opportunists in positions of importance. Despite their high rank, officials holding technical positions in the state administration and economic en- terprises, have little voice in policy and, for the present at least, are in no position to change the course of events in the country. 13. Religious Groups. The various religious organizations in Rumania do not at present engage in resistance but have been forced to cooperate with the regime in order to survive. Because of Rumania's history of foreign dom- ination, many of the churches long ago adopted an attitude of accommodation to the civil authority in order to ensure the con- tinuation of their activities. Religious faith in the country, however, is more vital than in the past. Churches of all denominations are heavily attended, and religious enthusiasm is markedly greater than before World War II, constituting a form of protest against the regime. People of all ages attend services, including even young men in military uni- form. ? 14. Rumanian Workers' Party. The Ruma- nian Workers' (Communist) Party probably has a relatively small percentage of convinced Communists among its members. Only those working as professionals in the Party ap- paratus and a small number of workers in special categories are sincerely attached to the Party and to the regime. Despite the purge of nearly 200,000 members in 1949-50 and the expulsion of an equal number in 1950-55, the Party (total membership today is about 600,000, including both regular and candidate members) still contains a large proportion of opportunists who are interested only in personal profit and advancement or even mere subsistence. Nevertheless, the large percentage of opportunists in its midst in no way endangers the Party's stability at the present time. The expulsions of the past years have even served in some measure to increase unity. There are no signs of nation- al deviationism among the top leaders and the extent of factional maneuvering in the Politburo is not serious. Party chief Gheor- ghiu-Dej has maintained his position and influence through the period of Communist rule, and since the purge of top leaders Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and Teohari Georgescu in 1952 no one of sufficient stature or influence remains to endanger his position. A purge of the intellectual faction of the Politburo in July 1957 in no way affected the status of Gheorghiu-Dej. INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE 15. Of all the disaffected groups and classes in Rumania the peasantry is the most im- portant. The Hungarian minority is poten- tially as dangerous to the regime, as are the students and intellectuals. Other groups with a subversive potential are the industrial workers, lower governmental officials and the "class enemies," that is, private tradesmen, former members of the professions, large land- owners and industrialists. Together these comprise some 90 percent of Rumania's total population of 17.6 million. The regime has been able to limit their ability to resist, but it has failed to win their cooperation, and their passive resistance has been effective in re- tarding achievement of the domestic objec- tives of the government. The Rumanians possess a native facility for passive resistance. They have not been misled by the intense propaganda of the regime, and have shown themselves particularly adept at bribery, graft, and black marketing in accommodating themselves to conditions created by the Com- munists. The intensive hatred of the Soviet and of the native Communist regime is such that under certain circumstances, such as a breakdown of internal security, open strife within the top leadership, or general revolts and disorders in the other satellites, a setting for actual resistance activity could be created, provided the risk did not appear too great. 16. The vast majority of the Rumanian peo- ple tend to hold both the Russians and the native regime responsible for their present plight. The most intense hatred is directed SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 87 against the former, since Soviet influence and control of every facet of life are more complete and immediate than anything expe- rienced before. The presence of Soviet armed forces in the country has served as an addi- tional irritant. TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953 17. In the past several years, there has been a noticeable decrease in the number of iso- lated guerrilla actions in Rumania, owing chiefly to attrition, to the increased efficiency of the security forces, and to the disinclination of the country's rulers after Stalin's death to relax the stringent Stalinist controls. There are no known resistance groups in Rumania today, but partisan activity throughout the whole chain of the Carpathian Mountains con- tinues to be reported. Some of the groups re- ferred to as resistance elements are probably nothing more than roving bandit groups, com- posed of escaped criminals and lawless ele- ments of the population. There are persistent reports, sometimes admitted by the regime, that security police and militia have been de- ployed against "terrorist bands" throughout the mountainous regions of Rumania. Other reports indicate that in some instances So- viet units in the area have been called upon for assistance. Nevertheless, there is evidence that partisan activity has been virtually wiped out during the past two years. 18. There has, however, been no noticeable decrease of unorganized and passive resistance expressed in the form of economic sabotage, occasional strikes, local disturbances, passive resistance against grain deliveries and general demands that the government provide im- proved living conditions. To some extent, the intellectual unrest of satellite neighbors has affected the Rumanian intelligentsia but never to the same degree as in Poland or even East Germany. 19. There is evidence that Stalin's denigra- tion engendered widespread confusion in the higher ranks of the Rumanian Party, includ- ing the Politburo. But First Secretary Ghe- orghiu-Dej and his close followers have from time to time intimidated individual Party functionaries, thus checking any effective re- sistance to the leadership. 20. The failure of the Hungarian revolt con- tinues to have a depressing influence on large segments of the Rumanian people. The feel- ing seems to have been created that the Com- munist regime is there to stay and that a fate similar to that of the Hungarians would befall Rumanians if they revolted. The peo- ple's hope for liberation seems to be at the lowest ebb. It is not, however, completely extinguished, as 'continued passive resistance demonstrates. Students continue passive re- sistance through such means as displaying intense interest in things Western and pre- ferring Western to Eastern or even native writers. Students and intellectuals devoted considerable attention to the theories of Chi- nese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung, but probably no longer regard him as a mentor in the quest for a greater measure of auton- omy. RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE 21. Active resistance since Stalin's death has been confined to a few isolated cases of work- ers demonstrations for higher wages and bet- ter living conditions and to student manifesta- tions in several universities during the Hun- garian revolt. The general pattern of these manifestations was uniform: inspired by news from Hungary, students demanded economic improvements and abolition or reduction of compulsory courses in Russian and Marxism- Leninism. When more basic anti-regime feel- ings were revealed in meetings between stu- dents and university Party officials, troops and police were summoned and some youths were arrested and subsequently tried. Isolated ex- amples of tension among workers at this time were also evident. There appears to have been unrest among railroad workers in Bucharest, who reportedly passed a resolution of sym- pathy for the Hungarian workers. 22. In recent years less and less has been heard of guerrilla activities even in the most inaccessible areas of the country, although elements of the former National Peasant Party and Iron Guard may still exist. Re- sistance activities are now largely limited to disorganized, small-scale, virtually futile acts of sabotage and other minor activities by in- dividuals driven to desperation. As in the SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 88 SECRET past, such open resistance activity could only take place in the Carpathian and Transylvan- ian ranges, which furnish the protection of rough terrain and which border on the areas inhabited by German and Hungarian minor- ities, largely peasants, who have in the past aided guerrilla bands. In the postwar period isolated guerrilla bands have been active chiefly in the Brasov-Zarnesti section, the Fagaras range, the Dorbruja wasteland along the Black Sea coast and the nearby Danube Delta swamps, the Bristita-Nasaud section, and the Bihor Mountains. 23. In the field of passive resistance, which is well suited to the Rumanian character, the people continue to take advantage of many opportunities. Their lack of discipline has been intensified; they have shown their dis- satisfaction by abenteeism, sloppiness and low productivity. Efforts by the regime to rem- edy these conditions are often counteracted through bribery of willing officials (an ancient Rumanian pastime) and by padding the re- ports of hours worked. Thus ingrained Ruma- nian inefficiency is compounded by deliberate carelessness or pretended ignorance. Per- sistent offenders cannot all be jailed; they are usually punished only by loss of salary on the basis of nonfulfillment of norms. Further- more, there are indications that Western in- formation media such as VOA, BBC and the French and West German radio stations con- tinue to be popular and to exert considerable influence in keeping alive the hope for even- tual liberation. The people are reported to have relied on Western information on the rebellions in Poland and Hungary and on official US statements, sometimes meeting clandestinely to discuss the contents of West- ern broadcasts. ROLE OF EMIGRES 24. Since the Communist regime came into power there have been three principal emigre groups which have claimed to represent the interests of the Rumanian people and to offer guidance and assistance to organized and un- organized resistance within the country. The tangible results of these groups especially dur- ing the past several years have been negligible or non-existent. Factional strife within the groups has completely vitiated them as a rallying point for any kind of resistance ac- tivities inside the country. 25. The Rumanian National Committee, which has the official blessing of former King Michael, is reduced to the role of maintaining liaison with other emigre groups, and of serv- ing as a waning symbol of royalist Rumania and as a potential channel for Western sup- port. The League of Free Rumanians, a splinter group of the Rumanian National Committee, maintains offices in many of the Western countries and also liaison with other emigre groups. The other major political exile group interested in promoting internal resist- ance is the militant Legionnaire, or Iron Guard, group. It has a long history of vio- lence and clandestine activity within Ruma- nia and stands compromised in the eyes of most Rumanians at home for its fascist, anti- parliamentarian, and anti-Semitic position. REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE 26. The regime's measures to frustrate any attempts by resistance groups to threaten its stability have been helped by a number of fac- tors which are typical of the Rumanian scene: lack of traditional revolutionary spirit; lack of potential leadership which could organize effective opposition; general popular fear of police terror; habits and attitudes ingrained under foreign domination for centuries; and reliance on foreign powers for liberation. Moreover, the people realize that the regime has at its disposal strong police and security forces and the support of Soviet troops and that it will not hesitate to take prompt and effective measures against Party and non- Party individuals who show the slightest sign of deviation or rebellion. 27. Following the Hungarian revolution, the Rumanian regime adopted a fluctuating pol- icy of appeasement and enforced controls. However, since the shake-up of the govern- ment hierarchy in July 1957, it has become apparent that the regime's agitation and propaganda agencies have increased their manipulation of group and individual fears and aspirations in order to keep the public SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 89 firmly under control. The objective of the regime appears to be to organize workers, peasants, intellectuals and students into re- sponsible, disciplined groups and to encour- age the public to believe not only that the regime will endure but that the Western coun- tries regard it as established and respectable. 28. The regime has passed new laws which make certain crimes, considered minor in the past (such as hooliganism, indecency, ped- dling without a license, short weight, pilfer- age in government) , punishable with prison terms rather than fines. New labor camps have been set up, and it is believed in Ruma- nia that individuals are being sentenced to these camps for one to three years. Uncon- firmed reports indicate that in the provinces violators are sometimes arrested and judged by security organs rather than by the regular police and courts; many have been tried, sen- tenced and transported to prison within sev- eral days. On the other hand, concessions have been made to alleviate such basic eco- nomic grievances as starvation wages, unreal- istic agricultural quotas and industrial norms. These have included raising of minimum wages, modifying delivery quotas, increasing children's bonuses and old age pensions. The morale of the Rumanian people is at a low ebb as a result of police arrests, higher food costs and persistent alarmist rumors. CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT 29. The Rumanian security apparatus under the Ministry of Internal Affairs has an over- all strength of 156,000, made up of the follow- ing components: State Security Police (uni- formed and plainclothes) , 43,000; Frontier Guard, 35,000; and Militia (including Fire- men) , 78,000. This apparatus is believed ade- quate to maintain the present regime in power and it will almost certainly continue to be capable of coping with any small scale anti- regime activity. However, it probably would not be able to deal with an uprising such as occurred in Hungary without the assistance of Soviet troops. The presence of two Soviet line divisions, which could be reinforced on short order, and the memory of the Soviet repression of the Hungarian revolt will be major factors enabling the Communist regime to maintain its hold on the country. With the exception of those higher officers who are good Communists, and have survived the purges, the reliability of the Rumanian Army (some 215,000 men) in case of uprisings is questionable. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE 30. Under present circumstances no level of resistance potential in Rumania has the capa- bility of developing into successful organized resistance. The regime and the Soviet forces in that country are capable of taking the severest countermeasures against any attempt to establish organized resistance. However, a number of internal and external develop- ments could increase the level of the current unorganized resistance and dissidence. In- ternally, the continuing economic depriva- tions and the acceleration of agricultural col- lectivization could increase the discontent of the workers and peasants. Also, any signs of friction within the top Party and government hierarchy or of relaxation of police controls would encourage certain segments of the pop- ulation to become more vocal against the re- gime. Externally, disturbances in the other orthodox satellites or political and economic successes in Poland and Yugoslavia could have a telling effect on some groups in Rumania, especially students and intellectuals. 31. From the 1955 Summit conference to the Hungarian revolt, it was evident in Rumania that the lessening of East-West tensions had adversely affected anti-regime resistance. Conversely, with the increase of these tensions after the Hungarian revolt, unrest increased considerably, including open demonstrations by students and by some workers and wide- spread confusion within the Party. There is also evidence that many Rumanian Party and government officials sympathized with the Hungarian revolutionaries and that the revolt had produced deep confusion in the Party. While the purge of Chisinevschi and Constan- tinescu in July 1957 did not affect the basic stability of the regime, it did create some un- certainty and confusion within the Party ranks. Additional ideological disputes in Ru- SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 90 SECRET mania and elsewhere in the orbit could be expected to increase confusion and uncer- tainty within the Party and to encourage the resistance of the more vocal anti-regime ele- ments, such as students, but in view of the general apathy of the Rumanian people in general, no build-up of popular demands which might result in widespread revolt is to be expected. 32. Only a further deterioration of the al- ready bad economic conditions, combined with a relaxation of security controls, could spark spontaneous unrest. Since such a re- laxation can hardly be expected, Rumanians will continue to be prevented from openly dis- playing their dissidence. Thus their discon- tent can only take the form of active or pas- sive clandestine opposition, ranging from acts of sabotage to listening to foreign broadcasts, from assaults on individual policemen or sol- diers to the voicing of popular grievances and from minor strikes to slow-downs in produc- tion. At best, such activities will retard the implementation of the regime's political and economic programs; at the least, they will have a nuisance value. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR 33. At the inception of war between Bloc and non-Bloc countries (local or general) the re- gime would impose more stringent security controls which would preclude anti-regime resistance activities. If the struggle became so intense that the Bloc nations had to divert their security forces to other tasks, or if West- ern forces were within the country and ap- peared to be winning, many Rumanians would engage in espionage, sabotage, and other harassing activities against the Communists. However, it would be almost impossible for anti-regime elements to undertake military action. Rumania's geographical location ad- joining the USSR, in addition to the national character and temperament of the people ? a lack of spirit to resist and the fear of reprisals and further loss of their limited free- dom ? would tend to restrict any independent action. The topography of the country, how- ever, would lend itself to guerrilla fighting, and small bands of partisans could retard the advance of Bloc forces by sabotage of lines of communications and industrial plants. How- ever, widespread, effective military action could be undertaken only if substantial ele- ments of the armed forces defected and took to the mountains. In such an event, peasants could be expected not only to assist the fighting forces but also to augment their num- bers considerably. Outside support, especially in war materiel, would be needed by the fight- ing groups in order to continue active for any length of time. Nevertheless, small guerrilla bands could manage to operate over an indefi- nite period in sabotage and harassment. 34. Possibilities exist in Rumania for substan- tial assistance to Western military forces in both the military and political fields, were they to invade that country. Desertion to the West of large segments of the Rumanian armed forces would in all probability occur, particularly if Western invading forces were initially successful; the anti-Communist pop- ulation could also be expected to engage in economic sabotage and other harassing ac- tions. Resistance elements in Rumania could facilitate the infiltration of agents by the West for intelligence collection and other operational activities. Successful escape and evasion of Western personnel in Rumania are possible but would depend largely on the for- tunes and area of the war. The fortunes of war could affect the degree of resistance, al- though most Rumanians could be expected to resist Soviet forces. 35. The Rumanians probably would make some distinction in the nationality of the Western forces. Their past political and cul- tural ties with France and Italy might make these countries more acceptable as allies, and, in turn, increase the Rumanians' will to resist. The attitude of Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece would have a definite effect on Ruma- nian resistance potential. If these countries joined in the conflict at its beginning, the Rumanian resistance groups would be encour- aged to take a more active part. A consider- able number of military units could be ex- pected to desert to Yugoslavia. Also, resist- ance to Soviet forces in neighboring Bloc countries would encourage opposition to those forces in Rumania. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 36. Although the people of Rumania would not approve the use of nuclear weapons on targets in Rumania, Western employment of nuclear weapons in that country could have a very significant psychological effect on the people and could influence their attitudes to- ward the attacking forces. Attacks on urban areas resulting in heavy civilian casualties would prejudice most Rumanians against the West. Such adverse reactions might be re- duced if nuclear attacks were limited to areas important to the Soviet war effort and were accompanied by a coordinated political war- 91 fare campaign. If nuclear attacks were made primarily on military targets isolated from larger populated areas, the will to resist might be increased since such attacks could diffuse and lessen the control strengths of the regime. 37. The Rumanians have a long history of accepting foreign domination. Therefore, it is almost certain that they will continue to en- dure virtually any type of occupation. Re- pressive occupation policies would undoubt- edly decrease their will to resist but would, on the whole, have little effect on their low resist- ance potential. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 93 ANNEX K -USSR PREAMBLE 1. Although dissatisfaction with various as- pects of the Soviet system is widespread, the gulf between such dissidence and resist- ance, except among certain national minori- ties, is greater in the USSR than in any other Bloc state. Such dissidence as exists in the USSR does not necessarily indicate opposition to Communist ideology or the Soviet system. It is rather a manifestation of discontent over the neglect or denial by the regime of popular needs or desires. Since the death of Stalin, dissidence in the Soviet Union appears to have decreased, except in some of the recently an- nexed areas. There has been grumbling and criticism, particularly following the 20th CPSU Congress in early 1956. But, on the whole, most of this criticism is not "counter- revolutionary" nor does it seem to envisage the overthrow of the Soviet state. On the contrary, there has unquestionably developed during the past four decades a widespread identification with the Soviet national state and many of its institutional features and the people have come to identify the Soviet state with the Marxist-Leninist ideology which has shaped its character. Moreover, the successes of the USSR during and after World War II, and particularly the security reforms, economic improvements and tech- nological achievements since 1953, have en- gendered a pride in the Soviet state and have almost certainly strengthened the loyalty of the population toward the regime, again ex- cepting the recently acquired Western terri- tories. Generally, Soviet citizens appear to feel that their lot has improved and is going to improve further. Therefore many of them, especially the hard-core followers of the Com- munist gospel, are probably quite willing to accept privations in the name of Soviet patri- otism. Such are the premises for an examina- tion of dissidence in the USSR. They do not rule out the existence of a resistance potential but they obviously put it on a level that dif- fers considerably from that of the other Sino- Soviet Bloc countries. BASIC FACTORS ,OF DISSIDENCE 2. The people of the USSR have had to endure extraordinary hardships for many years. Im- provements in their standards of living and the relaxation of political terror since 1953 have served to decrease the intensity of dissi- dence and considerably whittled down, if not eliminated for the time being, actual resist- ance potential. Thus, while the improvement of living standards has lagged far behind the over-all rates of economic growth, there is evi- dence that the Kremlin now favors such im- provement, mainly in order to increase labor productivity, to remove the stigma of poverty from Communism, and to generate more ac- tive support by Soviet citizens. Heavy indus- try, military requirements, and technological developments will continue to have priority but, barring unforeseen complications, the present regime's economic reforms and in- creased production will at least give the peo- ple the reassurance that something is being done for them. Many probably feel already that they are better off now than they have been for years. Discontent arising from eco- nomic causes is likely to diminish as consumer welfare improves over the next several years, although this effect will be partially offset if expectations which have been aroused by re- gime promises are disappointed and if famil- iarity with Western standards grows. How- ever, the spectacular successes of Soviet sci- ence have almost certainly strengthened the allegiance of the people to the regime and are probably attributed by many to the Soviet sys- tem itself. Therefore it should not necessarily be assumed that closer contacts with the West would inevitably generate more dissatisfaction SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 94 SECRET among the Soviet rank and file, which may have come to believe that the eventual supremacy of the USSR is certain and that ultimately the Russian people will be better off than the peoples in the free world. 3. There remain, however, some causes of dis- sidence that may continue to create difficul- ties for the regime. One is the agricultural collectivization policy. Russian peasants re- main overwhelmingly opposed to it, especially so the peasants in the newly acquired Western territories who have lived under Soviet rule only since 1944. Realizing this, the Kremlin has introduced reform measures that may pacify many peasants and at the same time raise their output. With the older generation dying out, the younger agricultural workers will probably not have as high a resistance potential, at least as long as the USSR re- mains generally successful in stabilizing and furthering its economic and politica position. Another problem is thought control. The party, more powerful than ever, continues to control virtually every facet of human thought. Adherence or at least lip service to the Party-sanctioned theories, laws, methods, and esthetic positions is required eventually of all. The loosening of intellectual strin- gency during the past few years has relieved a certain amount of pressure, but the Party has made it quite clear, after the "thaw" set in, that it will not tolerate deviations. Intel- lectuals are no longer liquidated, however, they are "persuaded" to return to the rightful path. While most of them return to con- formity, their public repentances appear ex- torted and they probably nourish their griev- ances in secret perhaps more intensely than before. 4. The most disgruntled elements are almost certainly the national minorities. The rein- troduction of the policy of russification which began in the thirties has created ill will to- ward the Russians, especially since some of the minorities were incorporated into or an- nexed by the USSR against their wishes. Al- though some of the more blatant forms of russification have been abandoned by the post-Stalin regime, the basic policy has been retained. Russification now involves the spread of the Russian language and culture throughout the Soviet Union, praise of the Russian people as the leading nationality in the USSR, and the imposition of Russian administrators and officials in key posts throughout minority areas. Anti-Semitism, though not as rampant as in the years just before Stalin's death, is still widespread and the regime not only does little to combat it but by its attacks on Zionism actually encour- ages it. (For a more detailed discussion of the more important minority areas, see the appendixes on the Baltic, Ukraine and Cau- casus.) MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS 5. Forced Labor and Exiles. There may still be as many as 2,500,000 forced laborers ? in- cluding both political and criminal ele- ments ? in prison camps and an indetermi- nate number of exiles who unquestionably constitute a group that harbors the strongest resistance potential. Although the number of political prisoners has been reduced and prison conditions ameliorated since 1953, the forced laborers still live under very harsh cir- cumstances, and the exiles are denied many rights and opportunities accorded ordinary Soviet citizens. Resistance potential is in- herent in these elements, as reflected in the Vorkuta and other labor camp strikes which, incidentally, were organized and led by the political prisoners. It is also possible that large numbers of the many millions of labor camp inmates who have been discharged have a strong hatred for a government that mis- treated them and might swell the ranks of potential resisters. 6. Peasants. Dissidence among peasants has traditionally been strong and has focussed upon collectivization and the low living stand- ards identified with it. These living stand- ards have risen substantially since 1953 be- cause of successive increases in the prices paid for compulsory state deliveries, but they gen- erally remain below what the peasant thinks he could obtain from a free market. In addi- tion, bureaucratic rigidities and frequent at- tempts to eliminate their private plots and personal livestock offend the peasants' sense of individuality and tend to alienate them SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 95 from the regime. Nevertheless, they have been relatively free from police terror in re- cent years, and while many peasants resent the anti-religious policy of the government, they probably care little about ideological preachings and thought control. 7. Intellectuals. The intelligentsia, in gen- eral, stands high in Soviet society in terms of income and prestige, and many of them, par- ticularly among the bureaucrats and engi- neers, have a vested interest in the regime. Most scientists, moreover, seem to enjoy both official support and relative freedom of pur- suit in their fields. The limited relaxation of controls following Stalin's denigration em- boldened intellectuals in many less favored fields to protest against party controls, though usually by implication only. These protests revealed that virtually all prominent writers, artists, composers, and scholars would wel- come more freedom of expression. Although the post-Stalin regime has somewhat relaxed the extremely stringent Stalinist conformism, it has basically maintained its doctrines, and merely enforces them with greater flexibility and leniency. Strictures on creative expres- sion remain tight enough to cause widespread dissidence among the more sensitive intellec- tuals. However, the dissidence of Soviet in- tellectuals is not necessarily one of hostility against the Soviet system but is often directed against the methods and interpretations of the Communist gospel by the Soviet leaders. 8. Students, Youth. There has been evidence of student dissidence, and there were demon- strations in 1956 and 1957 by young people against the discipline and the drabness of So- viet life. These demonstrations were all the more striking as youth has for years been con- sidered among the firmest supporters of the regime. Nevertheless, it appeared that as a result of a higher intellectual level achieved by improved Soviet education, of the atmos- phere of relaxation following the death of Sta- lin, the 20th CPSU Congress, and the Hun- garian revolution youth has turned a critical eye on the disparity between Communist theory and practice. But in spite of the fact that students at least are now better equipped to think for themselves and that the regime apparently allows for greater leniency in deal- ing with young deviationists, it would be in- correct to consider Soviet youth a generally disloyal group. Youths remain Soviet pa- triots even though their understanding of ideology may be superficial and their adher- ence to it perfunctory. The fact remains that they as yet know little outside the USSR and that their thinking is done through a filter of state-defined ideological premises. It is doubtful, therefore, that their dissidence con- stitutes a serious threat to the regime's fu- ture; it is much more likely to be directed to- wards gradual reform of the regime than its overthrow. 9. National minorities, constituting 45 per- cent of the Soviet population of 206,300,000,1 have for many years provided centers of re- sistance to Soviet Communism. Though the degree of dissidence has varied sharply among minority groups, no other groups inside the USSR have fought so grimly against over- whelming odds. In the first postwar years, a reported 200,000 partisans in the Ukraine and probably 100,000 in Lithuania battled So- viet troops. The process of russification and sovietization was carried out with determina- tion by Moscow; entire minorities were trans- planted from home areas and, in the process, more or less destroyed as groups. By 1949, the back of the resistance was broken, and follow- ing the death of Stalin, a policy of appease- ment was instituted. As will be seen in the appendices, the minorities which had been part of the Tsarist empire and thus become components of the USSR have calmed down and are not, at this time, believed to constitute a threat to the Moscow regime. However, the Western territories which were annexed during or after World War II, while forcibly pacified, still rank high in potential resistance groups. 10. Industrial workers' grievances stem main- ly from low pay, strict discipline, and bureau- cratic arbitrariness. Among the workers, the semi-skilled and unskilled ones, receiving 'Population estimate as of January 1, 1958, from "The 1958 Annual Estimates. Political and Demographic Composition of the Sino-Soviet Bloc," (SECRET), prepared by the Air Research Division, Library of Congress. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 96 SECRET much lower pay and fewer privileges than the highly skilled, are probably the more disaf- fected element. However, their living stand- ard has recently improved and there is now less emphasis on the harsh labor discipline that was once a chief factor of dissidence among workers during Stalin's rule. Gen- erally, the resistance potential of this social group cannot be presumed to be high and, with further economic improvements as well as over-all successes of the regime, may fur- ther decrease. 11. Armed Forces. There is no evidence of serious dissidence in the Soviet armed forces. The permanent cadre of officers and noncom- missioned officers (constituting about 20 per- cent of total strength) is composed of ap- parently reliable men who have been thor- oughly indoctrinated; most of the officers are Communist Party members. There is some dissatisfaction among the conscripts, much of which stems from the normal soldier's cus- tomary causes of discontent ? low pay, strict discipline, limited opportunities for social ac- tivities, etc. Further, the attitude of the con- scripts reflects the various causes of discon- tent among the populace at large, but no anti-regime activities have developed. The in- crease of party control following the removal of Marshal Zhukov has undoubtedly irritated some elements of the military but not enough to produce serious dissidence. Whether harsh military discipline and the wide cleavage be- tween the status of the officers and enlisted men, and again between the junior and senior officers, actually contributes to dissidence di- rected against the regime is doubtful. Al- though it may be true that soldiers do not like compulsory indoctrination, it is also true that at least some of it will sink into their con- sciousness and that they regard such exer- cises as an inevitable duty to their nation, of whose achievements they are proud. On the whole, it can be assumed that there is little if any resistance potential to be found in the Soviet armed forces. INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE 12. Dissidence exists on nearly every level of Soviet society, extending from simple grumbl- ing to the rejection of the regime and its ideo- logy. It is believed, however, that the latter extreme occurs most often among people who have suffered at the hands of the regime by ar- rest, imprisonment, or persecution, or those whose close relatives and friends have suffered. The overwhelming majority of the people, par- ticularly in the Russian component of the USSR, are complaining mainly about personal discomforts, which some, however, may well attribute to the faults of the system. Even before the Malenkov-Khrushchev innovations and reforms contributed to a general decline of dissidence, the regime had already estab- lished such pervasive authority that the peo- ple were forced to devote their energies to cop- ing with existing conditions rather than tak- ing steps to achieve an alternate solution. Although active resistance ceased by 1950, dis- sidence is still widespread. On the other hand, much of what appears to be passive resistance may be in large part nothing more than a demonstration of time-honored Rus- sian indifference or apathy. 13. Dissidence in many areas of the USSR is not a factor of real significance, and the gulf between dissidence and resistance is far wider than elsewhere in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. In the first place, the Soviet population has ex- perienced Communist rule for four decades and has, by and large, become accustomed to it. In the second place, this rule is exercised by compatriots, not by foreigners, and the grievances of Soviet peoples, particularly the Russians, are not reinforced by the emotional power of injured nationalism. Whether a crisis would change this attitude and create or stimulate a resistance potential, would de- pend on the type and duration of the crisis. In a war, the vast majority of the Soviet peo- ple could be expected to set aside their com- plaints and defend their homeland. If, as a result of a crisis, improvement of the living standard should decline, it is possible that, at least among some groups, minor types of dissidence could grow into more serious ones. In any event, opposition to the present re- gime or its methods does not imply a desire on the part of the people to reject all funda- mental concepts on which the Soviet state is built. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 97 TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953 14. Since the death of Stalin and the demise of Beria, a more relaxed political climate and a number of measures taken to alleviate the most serious causes of dissidence have con- tributed to a decrease in dissidence, particu- larly in the prewar territories of the USSR but perhaps even, to some degree, in the new- ly annexed territories. Among these meas- ures were efforts to raise the living standards, the easiing of arbitrary police state methods, a gradual decrease of the labor camp popula- tion, somewhat more freedom of expression combined with a less fear-laden atmosphere, and, though in a very limited way, increased contact with countries outside the Bloc. The 20th CPSU Congress constituted the climax of these developments and made all previous relaxation moves by the Kremlin leaders offi- cial. 15. However, some of the new methods proved to be counter-productive inasmuch as they stimulated questioning by Soviet citizens, who began to express their doubts about the work- ings of the Soviet system and its tactics. The events in Poland and Hungary caused con- siderable interest and questioning, particu- larly among the intelligentsia. These events among others hastened a certain retrench- ment by the regime, of which the theoretical bases were announced in the middle of 1956. Mao's "hundred flowers" doctrine, too, led to retrenchment in China, which must have been added evidence that, whatever the nature of their questioning and doubts, expression of dissent and dissidence would meet with re- gime counteraction. 16. Whether dissidence in the USSR will in- crease or decrease in the future is hard to predict. Continued improvements in living standards and further gains in Soviet prestige through technological or diplomatic successes will tend to diminish it, particularly among the majority which is largely unconcerned with ideological issues or abstract considera- tions of freedom. Students and intellectuals, whose ranks are growing, pose a greater prob- lem, since many of their questionings are more fundamental. The regime, while ready to re- trench from its more liberal policies when dis- sidence finds mounting expression, apparently still desires to refrain from total repression in this area lest it stifle the "positive" initiative which it is seeking to encourage. Thus an op- portunity has appeared for dissidence to grow so long as it remains quiescent and does not seem likely, in the regime's view, to assume ac- tive forms. If the current stabilization pro- gram should succeed, dissidence may peter out even in the new Western territories. If not, the security apparatus of the Soviet regime could easily keep such dissidence from grow- ing into resistance. RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE 17. Active and organized resistance was a seri- ous problem during and just after World War II. Thereafter, severe Stalinist repression prevented any active resistance of significance. Stalin's death gave new impetus to resistance as demonstrated by large-scale unrest in some Siberian prison camps. Again, some active re- sistance erupted in 1956, such as riots in Tbilisi, strike and work stoppages in Moscow's Kaganovich Ball-Bearing Plant, and national- ist demonstrations in Vilnyus and Kaunas in Lithuania. These outbreaks were spontane- ous and not necessarily subversive. Other- wise, no organized resistance groups are be- lieved to exist in the USSR, with the possible exception of such religious sects as the Jeho- vah's Witnesses, the Monashi, and others. The Witnesses have been most active in the western Ukraine and in Moldavia. The sect was accused of taking orders from its parent organization in Brooklyn, of preaching that the United States is a democratic country, of encouraging pacifism among draft-age youth, and having advised its members during the Hungarion revolution to fight against the So- viet government. The group apparently was able to survive as a tight-knit organization for several years because of the total dedica- tion of its members but its continued exist- ence as an organization is questionable. 18. Whatever resistance still exists in the USSR is almost certainly unorganized and passive. Much evidence of unorganized re- sistance to specific policies or ideological tenets has come to light during the past two years. It often has taken the form of public SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 98 SECRET criticism of policies or concepts, mostly as criticism of less basic matters; attempts by writers, artists, and scholars to break through official controls; insubordination toward offi- cial discipline, from refusal to attend propa- ganda lectures to hooliganism and crime; and nationalistic grumbling by minorities. Un- organized resistance is most likely to occur in intellectual and student circles and has as its object the greater liberalization of the So- viet regime toward individual freedom. 19. Unorganized resistance is hard to evalu- ate because it depends on the motivation of the person who performs a particular act. Much of what might be considered resistance probably consists of individual criminal acts, such as looting, robbing, and murder. The murder or beating up of police informants, tax collectors, and administrative officials may perhaps be unorganized resistance but it may also be an act of vengeance of an individual in reponse to a particular situation and not really pertinent to the question of unorganized resistance. Reports of acts of violence in the Soviet Union should be regarded cautiously before being considered indicative of unor- ganized resistance. Since the death of Sta- lin, the population of the labor camps has been tremendously reduced and various am- nesties, beginning with that of April 1953, released a large number of habitual criminals. That individuals of this sort turn to violence when released can be explained in too many other ways for their actions to be considered indicative of resistance potential. ROLE OF EMIGRES 20. Anti-Soviet emigres seem to have played a negligible role in directing or even inspir- ing recent resistance activity within the So- viet Union. The regime seems to have suc- ceeded in isolating potential leaders of resist- ance from foreign contacts. Most Soviet citi- zens seem to have little knowledge of emigre activities. Even if the Soviet public were bet- ter informed concerning emigres, it is doubt- ful that the latter could gain substantial sup- port inside the Soviet Union. The feeling is widespread that emigres have lost touch with Soviet reality and no longer understand the real problems facing the Soviet citizenry. Many, in addition, would resent what they consider the emigres flight to luxurious living while their compatriots at home languished in poverty. Some minorities, particularly the Baltic peoples, may have more sympathy for their emigres than the Russians do. REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE 21. The regime seeks to inhibit dissidence by a vast propaganda campaign designed to pop- ularize the Communist Party and the Soviet system and to discredit all Western countries in the eyes of the populace. The regime also maintains an ubiquitous secret police organi- zation under the control of the Committee of State Security (KGB) of the Council of Min- isters of the USSR, for the purpose of main- taining complete survelliance over the popu- lation and ferreting out any individuals or organizations exhibiting actual or potential anti-regime tendencies. An estimated 400,- 000 militarized security forces (most of them Border and Interior Troops) are kept in con- stant readiness to quell summarily any anti- regime uprisings. Punitive measures, includ- ing mass deportation and forced labor in re- mote areas of the USSR, serve both to remove active resistance elements and to discourage further resistance activity. Such measures have been applied with special force in the Baltic States, the western Ukraine, and the Caucasus. The effectiveness of the govern- ment's actions is reflected in the apparent stability of the regime. While the present trend in the Soviet Union appears to be to- ward a less stringent application of security controls than during the Stalin era, there is every indication that the security apparatus itself has lost none of its effectiveness. CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT 22. The regime has shown its ability to con- trol local and sporadic disturbances. In the event of a revolt in a national minority area, Soviet military units in the area, which usual- ly consist of cross sections of many Soviet nationalities, would hardly be vulnerable, as were the Hungarian and Polish forces, to any SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET nationalist appeal. In case of a simultaneous or rapidly spreading revolt in several heavily populated areas, the Soviet regime, due to its formidable security apparatus, would appear to be in a better position to defend itself than any other government in the world, un- less it were dangerously weakened. While even then it cannot be predicted that the en- tire Soviet control system would collapse, it is possible that the effectiveness of the securi- ty apparatus would be greatly weakened. MODIFICATION OF SECURITY APPARATUS 23. The Soviet security apparatus has under- gone some modification since the death of Stalin in 1953. That year the Ministry of State Security (MGB) was absorbed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and in 1954 the Committee of State Security (KGB) of the Council of Ministers was formed, al- though without some functions formerly held by the MGB. The MVD which inherited some of the regulatory apparatus from the MGB, including the militia (civil police) and the security troops, lost some of its functions, and control over local operations of some of its remaining functions was decentralized. While the ostensible purpose of these modifi- cations was to restore "socialist legality" to the police system and to increase the responsi- bility of local governments for law and order, Moscow is in a position to assert its direct control over all security and law enforcement agencies. 24. Modifications in the apparatus have been primarily undertaken with two aims in view: First, to deny to any given individual in the Soviet hierarchy total control over the organs of the secret police and to circumscribe to some degree their power in society. The sec- ond concern has been primarily one of allow- ing Soviet citizens to relax as a whole and to eliminate those secret police functions that seemed ineffective in their coercive aspects for the efficient operation of Soviet society. There has been no indication of a greater hesitation in undertaking investigation of significant causes of subversion and treason. The size of the security police apparatus was reduced significantly after Stalin's death, but in the 99 summer of 1957 these forces were increased. Available information does not indicate whether the reductions of 1953-1954 period exceeded the increase of the summer of 1957. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE 25. Present capabilities for organized resist- ance are virtually nonexistent. Even some- what liberalized security controls are probably more than adequate to stamp out any in- cipient organized attempt to resist. Unor- ganized resistance, chiefly passive, is likely to diminish as the USSR becomes militarily and economically stronger. With the exception of some national minorities, the maximum that can be expected from the overwhelming ma- jority of the Soviet people, and particularly the Russians, is dissidence of a type that is not necessarily directed against the system as such. On the other hand, in a monolithic state, opposition to a part of the system can be regarded as tantamount to opposition to the system as a whole; the Soviet leaders almost certainly so consider it. A steady improvement in the living standard would almost certainly reduce an important source of dissidence, but not that of intellectuals and students, for example. A deterioration in living conditions would add to other sources of dissidence and raise resistance potential in time of crisis. 26. The relation between the level of dissi- dence and a change in the degree of East-West tensions is difficult to predict. Major devel- opments in international relations will cer- tainly affect the level of dissidence, but whether it will increase or decrease depends on the specifics of any given case. Tensions attributable to Soviet foreign policy may well raise the level of dissidence while tensions re- sulting from moves generally considered to be Western provocation may lower the level of dissidence. A reduction in tension may re- duce the amount of dissidence or at least deepen the apathy of national minority groups, but on the other hand it is likely to stimulate further dissidence from intellec- tuals and artists and in other of the elite levels of Soviet society by turning their attention from external dangers to internal problems. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 100 SECRET 27. Whatever doubts in the regime and its ideology might have been aroused by the de- Stalinization campaign and the ensuing ide- ological controversy, the loyalty of the people to the Soviet state was not shaken. Further- more, some of the doubts now existing may be assuaged as the regime continues its stabili- zation drive. In any case, independent think- ing and a more objective approach to Marx- ism-Leninism could not be expected to strengthen resistance potential to the degree that it would endanger the Soviet state. The regime, while fostering a "creative," i.e., non- dogmatic, approach to these problems, will attempt to keep the arguments within a re- gime-approved framework and to restrict the scope and nature of the changes sought. The regime, however, will not hesitate to revert to harsher, oppressive measures to keep the peo- ple in line if it appears necessary. 28. Certain kinds of external support, notably those stimulating active, violent, and futile resistance to the Communist regime, would almost certainly be counter-productive in re- spect to nearly all dissident elements in the Soviet Union. However, support designed to serve more modest aims, such as continued lib- eralization, would be welcomed by disaffected individuals and groups. The acceptability and success of external support depend on many factors such as the kind of support, identity and source of support, the safety of the re- cipient, the nature of "resistance" asked for, the kind of reward involved, etc. General expressions of encouragement designed for the peaceful evolution of the system as are possible for radio broadcasts, may also be wel- come to some elements of the population, but be taken by other, more militant dissidents as abandonment by the West. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR 29. Anti-Communist or anti-regime resistance in the USSR in wartime would depend largely on the length, severity, and location of the war and on the course of its military operations. The mere initiation of hostilities would not ipso facto increase the resistance potential. It is almost certain that the regime's appeal to Soviet patriotism would not fall on deaf ears and that most of the Soviet peoples, with the exception of some national minorities, would work and fight for the defense of their homeland. Moreover, security control would undoubtedly be stepped up and dissidents would find it more difficult to organize and more dangerous to state their views than in peacetime. 30. If the war were prolonged and the USSR suffered major reverses, resistance potential would probably increase. In view of Soviet be- havior during World War II and considering the fact that since then the USSR has become far stronger and has acquired much more prestige, it cannot be assumed that popular suffering from great hardships, tensions, and tighter controls would in itself catalyze dissi- dence into resistance. Only if war damage were sufficient to cause a breakdown of central authority would organized resistance develop. Short of this contingency, even if the regime were weakened, anti-regime resistance would still be regarded as treason and enough secu- rity controls would remain to render organi- zation or resistance very difficult. 31. Active resistance would become much more likely if the tide of the war turned defi- nitely against the USSR and foreign troops entered the USSR. Until that point, many anti-Soviet elements would be afraid to act, remembering the severe penalties imposed on collaborators with the Germans after World War II. Particularly in minority areas along the border, extensive anti-Soviet activity could be expected as anti-Soviet forces approached. Many natives inspired with the vision of liber- ation would take to the woods and form parti- san bands, as they did during and after World War II, raiding supply lines, performing acts of sabotage, providing intelligence and help- ing in escape and evasion operations. Some groups in other parts of the USSR would be willing to offer assistance if communication could be established with them. For example, forced labor camps and colonies, representing as they do concentrations of anti-Soviet ele- ments, might be able to create disturbances in the hinterland. Many exiled Germans, North Caucasians, Crimean Tatars, and Halts in Central Asia, the Altai territory, and Siberia probably would be willing intelligence collec- SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 101 tors. However, it would be difficult to organ- ize active resistance in areas still under Soviet control. Even if hard pressed on military fronts, the Soviet leaders would make a deter- mined, and probably successful, effort to maintain control in the hinterland to prevent resistance elements from becoming active be- hind their lines. 32. In the event of an impending collapse of the Soviet government, anti-Soviet elements of the population, together with forced labor camp inmates and forced exiles, could attain significant resistance capabilities, particularly with external support. But apart from these elements, resistance among the broad masses of the Great Russian people would be difficult to organize. Patriotism, indoctrinated re- spect for Soviet authority, and apathy prob- ably would render them passive and disin- clined to active opposition. Therefore, even if the security apparatus were seriously weak- ened, little resistance activity could be ex- pected from the mass of the Great Russian population beyond local harassing operations and defections. Similarly, the most common reaction to a foreign occupation of Soviet ter- ritory probably would be passivity and suspi- cion. Memories of the last war are still fresh and the people have not forgotten the bru- tality of the German occupation, as well as the subsequent Soviet revenge for collabora- tion. Since Soviet propaganda would try to equate the activities of the invaders with those of the Germans in the last war, occupation policies would be crucial in determining the attitude of the masses. 33. A limited amount of information on nu- clear weapons effects has been released to the Soviet public since 1954, but the campaign appears to have minimized the effects of atomic warfare. This effort has been accom- panied by propaganda, probably to arouse patriotism, picturing a nuclear war purely as a measure in defense of the homeland and reassuring the people of Soviet victory in such a conflict. Although popular reaction to atomic attack is extremely difficult to esti- mate, such a familiarization program may have the effect of leaving the populace so un- prepared for the actual destruction and dislo- cation that survivors would be demoralized and that patriotic fervor might be over- whelmed. 34. A nuclear attack on any scale is unlikely immediately to either increase or decrease re- sistance activities among the survivors to any appreciable extent. However, within a short period of time the extreme hardships brought about by even a small nuclear attack would tend to create actions of desperate elements which, whether intended or not, would have the effect of resistance. At the same time inevitable disruption of the control structure resulting from such an attack would reduce the regime's capability to deal with such ele- ments. If a limited nuclear attack were planned and executed so as to reduce Soviet administrative, political and military control but to minimize general population casualties in national minority areas, such as the Lat- vian, Estonian and Lithuanian SSR's, the Georgian SSR, and to a lesser extent the Ukraine, it is probable that resistance activi- ties in these areas would become greatly in- tensified, particularly if they received external support. 35. Such resistance potential as does exist would probably not be affected by the question of which side started the war. It can be taken for granted that the Soviet government would do all it could to shift the blame to the free world in general and the United States in par- ticular. It may be assumed that potential resisters as well as many dissidents would anticipate such propaganda and not pay too much attention to it. The population as a whole, even if impressed with Soviet argu- ments at the beginning of the war, would in the long run be influenced by the trend of the war rather than by the question as to who attacked whom first. Also, the nationality of the attacking forces would probably have lit- tle effect on long-range popular attitudes, ex- cept that popular opposition to the invaders would almost certainly be much stronger against Germans than other nationalities. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 103 APPENDIX A ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE BALTIC REPUBLICS BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE 1. All the factors which engender dissidence in the USSR are present in the Baltic repub- lics ? collectivized agriculture, low standards of living, pronounced income inequalities, state control of thought and expression, and fresh memories and continuing fear of police terror. These alienating factors are inten- sified manyf old, however, by the national con- sciousness and historic experience of the Bal- tic peoples.1 Resistance potential is probably nowhere higher in the Soviet Union than in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 2. The most important single factor in Baltic opposition to Soviet rule is the experience of national independence between the world wars. The bitter memory of forced Soviet annexation is intensified by the brutality of Soviet rule, which brought the exile or liq- uidation of hundreds of thousands of natives, by the radical depression of living standards, and by the imposition of the rule and immi- gration of the traditionally hated and feared Russians. Thus, anti-Soviet and anti-Russian sentiments pervade all Baltic social strata and groups. Outright Communist sympa- thizers comprise only a minute fraction of the native population. Many native Communist Party leaders lived in the USSR when the Bal- tic states were independent and returned only upon Soviet annexation of their native coun- tries; Balts in general look on them as rene- gades. 3. The near unanimity of anti-Soviet feelings among native Balts is to a certain degree offset I Although in a strict ethnic sense the terms "Baltic" and "Balt" should be applied only to Latvians and Lithuanians, Estonians being of Finnish stock, the term is used in this paper to apply to all three, for convenience and on geographic grounds. by the greater political reliability of ethnic Russians brought into the area since World War II. The estimated proportion of the non- indigenous population of Russians in the Bal- tic republics ranges from a high of 40 percent in Latvia to a low of 20 percent in Lithuania. Since the position of Russians in these coun- tries is dependent entirely on Soviet rule, they have a strong vested interest in main- taining the present regime. 4. Despite the intensity of anti-Soviet feeling among most Balts, Soviet security measures at present prevent any resistance greater than individual or small-group passive resistance and an occasional mass demonstration. Only a radical alteration of the present situation, such as war, a sharp relaxation of security controls, or a breakdown of the Soviet sys- tem itself would seem to make possible or- ganized resistance on a large scale. 5. The de-Stalinization campaign and the partial liberalization of the Soviet system since Stalin's death (both of which were more limited in the Baltic republics than in most other areas of the USSR) brought some hope to Balts, expressed mainly in the form of rumors during the spring of 1956 that the Soviet leadership might restore the Baltic re- publics to autonomous, although satellite, status. The events in Poland and Hungary in the autumn of 1956 encouraged a few nationalist demonstrations in Lithuania and open anti-Soviet talk elsewhere. The regime easily curtailed such public manifestations of nationalism, however. RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE 6. Reports in 1952 and 1953 indicated the pos- sibility of small groups of organized resist- ance in Lithuania. However, as in northwest- ern Latvia, the few remaining groups were be- SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 104 SECRET ing successfully penetrated by MVD provoc- ateurs. It is doubtful if any unpenetrated group existed after 1954. As a result, there are no known organized resistance groups in the Baltic area at this time. While there is reason to believe that some former resistance group members may still live in the forests of southeastern Lithuania, there is no recent evidence to indicate that an organization as such exists. Acts of sabotage that occasional- ly occurred up until 1953 appear to have been the work of isolated persons. 7. The immediate objectives of any remain- ing groups in the Baltic states probably would be personal and organizational survival. A secondary objective would be harassment of Soviet forces and collaborators. Their ulti- mate objective presumably would be the crea- tion of a national state in which they could resume a normal life. There is no known or- ganized anti-Communist infiltration of the armed forces, bureaucracy, or war industry. Nonviolent resistance in the Baltic republics, such as occurred during the Hungarian revolt, when there was what appeared to be a spon- taneous expression of nationalism, was prob- ably not the work of organized resistance groups. 8. The extent and nature of unorganized re- sistance is unknown but believed to be de- creasing in over-all signficance. Students ap- pear to exhibit a potential for unorganized resistance. In all three republics student un- rest in the universities has been expressed during 1956 and 1957 in demonstrations and in the distribution of leaflets. Party leaders have been criticized for neglecting student ideological education. 9. Dissidence and passive resistance also ap- pear to exist, but there is not sufficient evi- dence to evaluate their extent and signifi- cance. Newspapers in the Baltic states crit- icize nonproduction in factories and kolkh- ozes and there is the usual amount of self- criticism in the papers. While these items indicate that the Soviet regime is not satisfied with conditions in the Baltic republics, only a part of the acts can be attributed to purpose- ful resistance. Passive resistance in the form of a slow-down of production cannot be in- creased perceptibly without incurring danger of deportation or other acts of reprisal and control. 10. Dissidence is widespread, but difficult to detect and to evaluate except when the stim- ulus of external events changes dissidence into action. During the Hungarian revolt in 1956 widespread unorganized resistance was shown in the overturning of a Stalin statue, in demonstrations demanding withdrawal of Red Army troops, in staging of parades, and in singing the national anthems, most noticeably in Lithuania, but reportedly in Estonia and Latvia also. From these actions dissidence appears to be widespread. The independence spirit is still alive in the Baltic states, but there is little opportunity to express it effec- tively. Expression of dissident feelings has been more successful in Lithuania than in Es- tonia and Latvia. Moreover, Soviet popula- tion transfers have reduced the number of ethnic Estonians to about 75 percent of the population, and ethnic Latvians to about 60 percent and Lithuanians to about 80 percent. Replacement population transferees cannot be expected to participate in resistance activities. ROLE OF EMIGRES 11. Balts seem to know comparatively little about the activities of emigres, and attempts to resist Soviet domination do not seem to be directly inspired by emigre activity. Many Baits, however, derive satisfaction and encour- agement from the knowledge that emigre groups exist abroad, that many nations (in- cluding the United States) do not recognize the Soviet annexation of their countries, and that the Baltic states still have formal diplo- matic representation in exile. REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE 12. The regime brought the organized resist- ance of the Baltic states under control through the use of militarized security forces and Army troops. Suspect elements of the population were deported during the 1945- 1950 period and later replaced by other ethnic groups, mainly Russian. Subsequent penetra- tion of resistance groups by security organs along with the individual deportations, de- pleted the Baltic states of resistance leader- SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 105 ship, organization, and activity. Russifica- tion of government organizations has proved effective in keeping potential resistance in check. Unorganized resistance has been con- trolled in a similar manner. Passive resist- ance has been inhibited through threatened deportations, pardons to some deportees, and improvement in the standard of living. Feelings of dissidence are widespread but cannot be evaluated accurately because the populations have little opportunity to trans- late dissidence into action. Until recent- ly, even mildly anti-Soviet statements were punished by arrest and long imprisonment. Even now, persons who show evidence of lead- ing nationalistic activity are arrested ? as were the leaders of the November 1956 demon- strations in Lithuania. Both because of the strategic position of the area and the known disaffection of the native population, security measures in the Baltic have been even more stringent than elsewhere in the USSR. 13. Milder methods are also employed by the regime to reduce dissidence and achieve ideological conformity. Party propaganda, agitation, and indoctrination are continual and virtually omnipresent. The regime offers enticing rewards in terms of power and ad- vancement to Balts who collaborate with it, but the threat or exercise of repression re- mains the most important means of prevent- ing active resistance in the Baltic republics. CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT 14. The individual Baltic republic govern- ments can suppress any localized revolt at this time. Soviet troops and militarized security forces stationed in the Baltic repub- lics are of ethnic origins other than the local republic in which they are stationed, and can be expected to cooperate in the suppression of any local revolt. It is therefore unlikely that a Hungarian-type uprising could take place in any of the Baltic states. The majority of Baits live in rural areas while most of the Russians and other non-Baits live in cities, although in Estonia one can find in nearly every kolkhoz some persons who are not Baltic. Russians and non-Balts form at least half the population of the Baltic capitals. 15. In both Estonia and Latvia revolts would be difficult because there is no contiguous land border with a foreign country that might sup- ply help. Of all the Baltic countries, Lith- uania has the best conditions for staging a spontaneous mass uprising of some duration. In addition to bordering on Poland, a foreign country with a volatile and Catholic popula- tion, the Lithuanians have a long history of independence and of fighting for their rights as they see them. Besides, the geography of southeastern Lithuania, particularly the for- ests and hills, provides a refuge from which partisans can operate. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE 16. There are no known organized resistance groups in the Baltic states. Local capabilities for resistance activities do not go beyond un- organized, mainly passive, resistance or ? un- der the most favorable conditions ? occa- sional demonstrations with nationalist over- tones. More violent types of demonstrations, such as holding up Soviet supply vehicles, were reported through 1954 but not since. Such acts probably were the work of outlaw elements, most of whom could not be de- pended on at the present for specific action or for organized action in the future. 17. A marked increase in East-West tensions furnishing hope of liberation would probably encourage more determined attempts at ac- tive resistance. Such a development, however, would probably be accompanied by an intensi- fication of security measures and terror which might neutralize most practical effects of the increased determination to resist. A decrease of East-West tensions would be likely to dis- courage any sort of active resistance and to in- crease fatalistic acquiescence to Soviet rule. If accompanied by a liberalization of security precautions and thought control, it might, however, facilitate the spread and develop- ment of nationalist sentiment. 18. While it is believed that there is no sub- stantial organized resistance, either active or passive, it is conceivable that some very small isolated groups do exist, particularly in south- eastern Lithuania. But it would be extremely SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 106 SECRET difficult for them to expand. They have no contact with the West and have lost contact with friendly local populations through the deportation of identifiable sympathizers. Their survival efforts constantly require theft and other unlawful acts which increase the partisans' vulnerability and constantly in- crease their isolation from any possible sources of help, supply, or recruits. At the present time, resistance in new forms is virtu- ally impossible because resistance groups or potential members must be supplied with funds and equipinent and, most important, an effective communications system with each other and the West. The lack of communica- tions prevents the identification and location of real or potential resistance members. Un- til an effective means of communication is established, resistance in the Baltic states will probably further decrease. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR 19. The outbreak of war between the Soviet Bloc and the West would undoubtedly increase resistance potential in the Baltic states. Contrary to the passionate desire for peace in almost every other portion of the Soviet Union, many Balts hope for an East-West war since they see in it their only hope for liberation. It cannot be assumed, however, that in any future war Baltic resistance could be as widespread and effective as it was when Germany attacked the USSR in 1941, at which time the Baltic states had been under Soviet rule less than a year and the Soviet armies had to beat a hasty retreat. 20. The possibilities for active Baltic resist- ance in any future war would depend largely on whether a fighting front were located in or near the area. If the front were remote, anti-Soviet Balts might be able to form small partisan bands in the forests to harass supply lines and perform acts of sabotage. Many Balts would be willing to assist evasion and escape operations, although the presence of non-Balts on collectivized farms would com- pound the difficulties of such assistance. Given an opportunity, many Balts would probably be willing to perform espionage. So- viet security measures, however, would proba- bly be able to prevent large-scale organization or military and political warfare of more than nuisance value. 21. If an active front approached the area, on the other hand, more widespread resistance could be expected, though not approaching the Baltic performance in 1941. Under anti- Soviet occupation, native Balts would be un- likely to participate in pro-Soviet partisan activity and most would lend their hearty sup- port to the liquidation of Russian partisans or pro-Soviet native elements in the area. 22. Baltic resistance potential in wartime would be little affected by such matters as the nationality of the attacking forces or which side initiated hostilities. Even German rule would be considered preferable to Soviet (the Nazi occupation of the area having been com- paratively mild) , although Balts might resist Soviet rule with somewhat greater determina- tion if the attacking forces were non-German. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 107 APPENDIX B ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE CAUCASUS BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE 1. Any evaluation of disaffection in the Cau- casus must take into account the differing peoples of this area. While there are elements of discontent common to all the indigenous peoples of the area which unite them against the regime, there are also factors which set the Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaidzhani peoples apart from each other. The Georgians and Armenians, for reasons of longer inde- pendent nationhood and a common religion (Christianity) , feel superior to the Azerbaid- zhani, a Moslem people. At the same time, the Georgians, because of a longer and more unbroken period of independence than the Armenians, feel superior to the latter, who harbor a latent distrust of their mountain neighbors. 2. The underlying basis for dissatisfaction and discontent in Georgia, Armenia, and Azer- baidzhan is to be found in an anti-Russian attitude on the part of the native populations. Such factors as non-Slavic lineage, distinct languages, acceptance of Christianity in the case of Georgia and Armenia antedating Rus- sian acceptance by several centuries, and dif- ferent cultural and historical heritages have imparted to the Georgians and Armenians, particularly the former,- a sense of national distinctiveness which makes them look upon the Russians as interlopers and late-comers. The assistance rendered to the Georgian and Armenian nations during critical periods in their histories by the Tsarist regime has not eliminated this feeling. In the case of the Azerbaidzhani people, who prior to the Bol- shevik Revolution had no real sense of nation- hood, the anti-Russian bias stems from Rus- sian colonization. This began in the eight- eenth century, and reached its peak in the late 1800's with Russian exploitation of the oil resources around Baku. The ensuing develop- ment of the area meant a dislocation of native groups, a disruption of their traditional way of life, and an incipient second-class citizen- ship. 3. While difficult to document as to scope and intensity, anti-Russianism is demonstrated by the limited amount of social contact between minorities and Russians. Certain areas of large Caucasian cities appear to be separated into Slavic and non-Slavic sections. Inter- marriage does not appear to be too common and is frequently frowned on. A more im- mediate source for disaffection is Soviet Com- munism in practice ? material hardships, low living standards, the collective farm system, the antireligious nature of the regime, thought control, and the stifling of nationalism ? all of which also engender discontent in other parts of the Soviet Union. 4. Apart from the Party and government elite, discontent would appear to extend to all strata of the population in varying degrees. The politically more mature Georgians have been most vocal in expressing dissidence in the post-Stalin period, followed by the Armenians and the Azerbaidzhani in that order. Among the Georgians, students and intellectuals are the most noteworthy dissident elements. In Armenia, the most disaffected group appears to be the Armenians who returned to Soviet Armenia in the early post-World War II peri- od. Estimates of the numbers who returned range from 25,000 to 100,000. Their disaffec- tion results mainly from very poor economic conditions and the fact that they are not com- pletely accepted by the local population. 5. Discontent, though widespread, does not appear to be intense enough to translate it- self into resistance activity, particularly on SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 108 SECRET an organized basis. Furthermore, the post- war history of dissidence in the Caucasus sug- gests that while there has been some resist- ance, it has been on an unorganized basis and without particular goals in mind. A new pat- tern of dissidence as a result of the post-Sta- lin policies of the regime is not discernible. The relaxation of stringent police controls has been welcomed. People express their doubts and criticisms of the regime more openly now. Such events as the de-Staliniza- tion campaign, the Polish-Hungarian events, and the Soviet leadership ousters of June 1957 have caused confusion and doubt about the present policies of the regime. There are, however, no signs of increased dissidence or resistance. The population is aware that the regime is willing and able to eradicate any evidence of resistance. RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE 6. A few small organized resistance groups are believed to exist in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaidzhan. There is no available informa- tion on their strength, discipline, training, facilities, or equipment. Furthermore, there is no means of communication with these alleged resistance groups. Such groups would almost certainly be nationalistic in motiva- tion. They would operate within the bound- aries of their own national republics in most cases. 7. Unorganized active resistance to some de- gree by the people of the Georgian and Azer- baidzhan SSR's has been reported. The most serious known disturbance occurred in Tbilisi in March 1956 when student meetings to mark the anniversary of Stalin's death grew into nationalistic demonstrations as a result of the regime's refusal to permit honors to Stalin. The demonstrations were eventually put down by force, with casualties estimated by various sources at from dozens to 500. Apart from this incident, it is often difficult to differentiate other reports of unorganized active resistance from criminal, speculative and blackmarket activities. Available evi- dence indicates a great deal of dissatisfaction with the Moscow regime. Intellectual dissi- dence also has been shown in many Caucasian literary publications which have been severely criticized during the last year for nationalistic deviations. Certain examples of this litera- ture reflect a tone of criticism even stronger than that which has been directed against the regime by Russian writers. ROLE OF EMIGRES 8. Although emigre groups have claimed con- tact with resistance organizations inside Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaidzhan, such claims have not been substantiated in the post-Stalin era. There was a contact between an internal Georgian opposition element and the Georgian government-in-exile, but this has not been maintained in recent years. No other external sources appear to have influ- enced any of the internal resistance groups since World War II. REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE 9. In the past the Soviet government has dis- persed from the Caucasus entire ethnic popu- lations which it believed to be disloyal. Many persons have been executed or given sentences in labor camps in Siberia or Central Asia. Moreover, the Soviet Union has a very effec- tive internal security organization, with in- formers in all walks of life and all ethnic groups. These measures have been very effec- tive in controlling active resistance. It is im- probable that any national minority resist- ance group of significant size could exist with- out coming to the attention of the Soviet secu- rity service. It follows that any major upris- ing or riot must be essentially spontaneous in origin, because any organization large enough, with good communications, to foment such an event would have been penetrated and neu- tralized before the event could take place. Since the death of Stalin, the technique of dispersion of people has not been employed and it is possible that the informant system has been relaxed somewhat, but either of these methods could be revitalized at any moment. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE 10. Even under present conditions of some- what relaxed police controls, the Soviet secu- rity system is more than adequate to prevent SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 109 or stamp out any organized resistance activity in the Caucasus. While individual, unorgan- ized resistance might be encouraged by the regime's relaxation of the rigid police terror of the Stalin era, any indication that such acts were becoming common or organized would be enough to bring about increased security con- trols to prevent the formation of organized resistance. The factor most likely to affect resistance potential would appear to be a breakdown of the police and security control system. Short of this, or of a fundamental change in the leadership of the Soviet Union, such events as an increase or decrease in East- West tensions or ideological disputes within the "socialist camp" would have little effect on resistance activity. Any deterioration in the economic condition of the population would lead to increased discontent, but the regime could easily prevent any organized op- position to regime policies. Signs of external support in any form to resistance groups in the Caucasus would bring the sharpest reac- tion and punitive measures against such groups. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR 11. The opportunity for anti-regime resist- ance under conditions of actual warfare would depend considerably on the type and location of war being fought. The outbreak of hostili- ties would bring extraordinary security pre- cautions into play on the part of the state. As long as the theater of operations remained outside the Caucasus, the likelihood of in- creased resistance operations would remain small because of the increased security meas- ures. While some resistance groups might become active, most likely in Georgia, as soon as hostilities broke out, the vast majority of the Caucasian population would probably adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude. If the tide of battle turned conclusively against the So- viet regime, the potential for organized resist- ance on an expanded basis would increase accordingly. Otherwise, the memory of So- viet punishment of World War II collaborators would militate against large-scale organized resistance movements. 12. The optimum conditions for organized re- sistance would, of course, occur if the Cau- casus became a theater of war or if the col- lapse of central authority were imminent. If either should occur, resistance activities would probably range from disobedience of Soviet laws to assistance to enemy forces in provid- ing intelligence information, harassment of Soviet security and armed forces, and help in escape and evasion operations. Independent military activity against Soviet forces proba- bly would be beyond the capacity of resistance groups, unless large-scale units defected along with equipment and material. Such military action would depend on direct outside sup- port. Moreover, the troops of this area are ethnic non-Caucasians. 13. With the exception of the Germans who might encounter hostility because of their World War II policies, only the Turks might arouse Armenian antagonism; the Armenian massacres in the late 1890's and during World War I are not yet forgotten. The question of the responsibility for the instigation of hos- tilities would have little effect on resistance activities. However, the occupation policies of the invading forces would have a strong im- pact on the local populations as far as their willingness to engage in resistance activities would be concerned. The Soviet postwar propaganda campaign depicting the horrors of German occupation in other parts of the country was designed in part to overcome any latent sympathy in such areas as the Cau- casus for future "liberating" forces. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 111 APPENDIX C ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE UKRAINE BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE 1. Ukrainian nationalism continues to be an important political problem with which the Soviet regime must reckon. The Ukrainians are the largest minority group in the USSR. The political, economic and strategic impor- tance of the Ukraine is second only to the RSFSR. The best evidence of Soviet concern over Ukrainian nationalism and its counter- part, anti-Russian sentiment, is found in re- curring appeals to root out "bourgeois nation- alism." 2. The economic and political grievances com- mon throughout the Soviet Union are at the core of opposition in the Ukraine to Soviet rule. Soviet sponsorship of the liquidation of the rich peasant and of the collective farm is probably resented more there than in some other parts of the Soviet Union since the Ukraine had a fairly large proportion of pros- perous peasants. These various grievances, shared with other Soviet peoples, count far more in explaining existing dissidence in the Ukraine than Soviet suppression of Ukrainian nationalist aspirations. Opposition to the re- gime there is first anti-Communist, and only second anti-Russian. 3. Ukrainian reaction to the russification efforts of the Soviet regime remains, however, considerable. Ukrainians, whether Party members or not, remember with bitterness Stalin's purge of leading Ukrainian Commu- nists who stood up for Ukrainian cultural autonomy in the 1930's and resent the con- tinuation of the calculated policy of staffing a good portion of leading Party and govern- ment positions in the Ukraine with Russians. Stalin's glorification of Russian heroes and the continued identification of Russian his- tory with the Soviet state hurt Ukrainian pride. While religious attitudes may be of diminishing importance in the Ukraine as elsewhere in the USSR, the liquidation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church in 1930 and of the Uniate Church in the newly acquired western Ukraine after the war is a further cause for resentment. INTENSITY AND CHARACTER OF DISSIDENCE 4. Ukrainian nationalist tensions, although a continuing nuisance for the Soviet adminis- tration, do not now represent any serious threat to the regime. The nationalist resist- ance organizations active in the years imme- diately following World War II are now large- ly, if not completely, quiescent. Only in the event of a disintegration of Soviet central controls might Ukrainian nationalism rise to the surface and serve as a focus for an anti- Soviet resistance movement. 5. The intensity of Ukrainian nationalist f eel- ing is difficult to measure. A great many Ukrainians, probably the majority, are loyal members of Soviet society, particularly now that living standards are gradually rising and police controls have been slightly relaxed. Russification has probably gone further in the eastern Ukraine than in any other of the non- Russian lands and has been much more suc- cessful in industrial cities, which now contain large numbers of Great Russians, than in towns and villages. Russians and Ukrainians have mingled together there for hundreds of years and the educated members of society know both languages equally well. Nation- alistic sentiments increase as one moves west- ward in the Ukraine away from the Russian lands. Opposition to Soviet rule is believed to be most intense in the territories absorbed during World War II along the Soviet Union's SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 112 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET western borders, where memories of Sovietiza- tion are freshest. Resentment of the Russians is not confined here to Ukrainians alone, but is shared by such other minority groups in the area as Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, and Rumanians. RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE 6. Armed resistance to the Soviet regime after World War II was most intense in these west- ern territories, particularly in the Carpathian mountains. Ukrainian nationalist organiza- tions active in German-occupied Europe dur- ing the war mounted guerrilla operations there against Soviet units, communications lines, and collective farms in 1946 and 1947. The Soviet authorities had crushed these organizations by the late 1940's, but reports received from Soviet defectors as late as 1956 indicating that the Banderovtsy (followers of the Ukrainian nationalist Stefan Bandera) , are still active, remain unconfirmed. Most likely there is no nationalist resistance move- ment of any significance in the Ukraine at this time, but the reports suggest that con- tinued popular belief in the existence of these organizations may be widespread. Although there has been no evidence of an upsurge of resistance activities since the death of Stalin, such activities seem to have been implied in radio and press appeals, as late as 1956, that partisans in the Volynskaya Oblast surrender voluntarily and receive pardons for their past actions. 7. Unorganized resistance in the Ukraine exists primarily in the western oblasts and is conducted mainly by intellectuals. It is pas- sive in nature and is manifested in resisting russification, e.g., by advocating the use of Ukrainian national feeling in literature. Re- cent attacks on Ukrainian writers as being national deviationists tend to confirm these trends. 8. Since the suppression of nationalist aspira- tions and resistance movements during the Stalin regime, there is now no evidence to indicate any nationalist movement. Since the death of Stalin, the Soviets have treated the issue of nationalism cautiously in the Ukraine. Some attempts to conciliate nation- al feeling can be found in their liberation of former partisans from labor camps, the re- habilitation of former Ukrainian Communist writers suspected of nationalistic tendencies, and the disappearance of some Party and KGB officials who had been engaged in the sup- pression of resistance. The celebration of the .300th anniversary of the Union of the Ukraine with Russia was officially observed with con- siderable deference paid to the loyalty and heroism of the Ukrainian peoples. ROLE OF EMIGRES 9. Emigre groups have been of no material assistance to resistance groups in the Ukraine. The little contact that did exist with persons in the Ukraine has been broken by capture and/or liquidation of the Ukrainian individ- uals involved. The contact between groups in the Ukraine and emigre groups tends to become unilateral; escapees augment the emi- gre colony and intensify anti-Soviet feeling in the non-Bloc countries, but there has been no significant reverse flow or intensification of anti-regime feeling in the Ukraine. However, the mere existence of an active emigre group may tend to buoy the hopes of those people inside the Ukraine who are bitterly opposed to the Soviet regime. Concern expressed by the Soviets in this matter is reflected in So- viet intelligence activities against Ukraine emigre groups and the propaganda attacks in the Soviet press and radio attempting to belittle and thereby diminish any potential effectiveness of these groups. CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS REVOLT 10. Any revolt in the Ukraine could be easily suppressed by the Soviet regime at the present time. The existence of satellite regimes on the western borders of the Ukraine has in- creasingly tended to isolate this earlier hot- bed of resistance, both materially and morally. The ruthless suppression of the Hungarian revolt has served as an illuminating example of what would happen to a revolt that is not materially aided by the West. The existence of large numbers of border troops along the entire western border of the USSR provides SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 IDeclassified } 1\ , and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 SECRET 113 immediate forces to counter any revolt. In addition, Soviet army divisions stationed throughout the Ukraine can aid in suppres- sion of revolts. Zakarpatskaya Oblast ap- pears to offer the best terrain for possible re- sistance, but its isolation from the remainder of the Ukraine would probably localize any revolt. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF PEACE 11. As long as Soviet police and security con- trols remain relatively intact, there appears to be no prospect for a resumption of active resistance in the Ukraine. Barring an inter- nal upheaval, these controls are likely to re- main in force for the foreseeable future. Since the suppression of the Hungarian revolt, there is reportedly little sympathy for a violent form of resistance. Instead, sophisticated Ukrainian nationalists engage in a subtle form of resistance by staying within the bounds of the law and officially approved behavior. This type of resistance is directed against fur- ther russification and has as its objective the maintenance and fostering of a Ukrainian na- tional feeling. Apparently it is hoped that this nationalism can be kept alive and that it will serve as an ideological basis for a free Ukraine in the future. Meanwhile, through concessions gained by legal methods, life with- in the Ukraine, although under a Communist system, is becoming more tolerable, thus fur- ther decreasing resistance potential. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR 12. In the event of war, Ukrainians would probably not try to engage in large-scale re- sistance activities while Soviet military con- trols remained in force. They remember the tragic results of their resistance to the So- viet regime during World War II. They would be unlikely to commit themselves to resistance against the Soviet regime unless they were convinced the USSR would lose the war. In other words, Ukrainian dissidence could not be expected to serve a potential enemy of the USSR until the outcome of a war were largely determined. In fact, most Ukrainian soldiers would probably fight fiercely on the Russian side. 13. As long as security controls remained firm, an enemy could expect little or no help from the inside. If, however, the political structure should begin to crumble under the impact of a war, resistance could and might very well become active again. Pent-up opposition to the Soviet regime could quite naturally be channeled into demands for the dismember- ment of the USSR. The Carpathian moun- tains on the border of Hungary, Czechoslo- vakia, and Poland, where Soviet controls are less firmly established than elsewhere in the Ukraine, would provide a convenient base for launching resistance activities in the area. Such a move would almost certainly require foreign assistance. 14. The question as to who initiated the war probably would matter little, nor would the nationality of invading forces, with the ex- ception of Germans, who almost certainly would be fiercely resented even as a part of an international force. Their presence on Ukrai- nian soil would seriously impair the develop- ment of anti-Communist resistance 15. While certain resistance activities such as intelligence collection or escape and evasion operations might be possible on a small scale, no large-scale underground movement in the Ukraine is likely to gain momentum until So- viet power had been shaken at its foundations. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/11 : CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2